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• ^ GOVERNMENT OP INDIA | 't

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CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL^
■ LIBRARY

Class.

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Call No,

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j«D.G.A.70.

. ' I

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A HISTORY OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA

// ’

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A HISTORY OF

• ’ SOUTH-EAST ASIA

* *

•»

D. G. E, HALL

^ Proftavr oj th^ Hut^ry cf Asia

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PSEFACE

present work, large 3n4 detailed though it may appear to the
reader unfamiliar with the subject, is a bare outlifie, periloudy com¬
pressed and oversimpUfied in many parts. As- an introduction to
South-East Asian history, designed as much for the non-specialist
reader as for the student intending to puiEuc the subject further, its
story is told with as few distracting footnotes a$ po^ible- Special care,
however^ ha& been bestowed upon the setection and arrangement of
tides for the bibliography^ 'I'he available literature, it may be re¬
marked, IS immense, running to many thousands of books, articles
and collections of printed documents. For the earlier periods there
are thousands of inscriptions and a great mass of local chronicles still
inadequately explored. For the later periods the contemporary
accounts, documents and memoirs listed in Section 111 of the biblio¬
graphy ate of quite unusual interest.

So much research work is in progress, by European scholars and,
happily I an "ever-increasing number of Asian ones, that it is difficult
til keep pace with the progreits of discovery and interpretation over
the w hole field. Hence the treatment of many subjects, especially in
the very important pre-European period, must be regarded as pro¬
visional only. For instance, Burma's wealth of inscriptions—and she
is incomparably richer in this respect than any other region of South-
East Asia—is likely soon to yield results of no little importance as a
result of the devoted labours of Gordon Luce over many years, Thc^e
Will certainly lead to modifications in the account of the Pagan period
given here. Thenp afso, research by both Dutch and Indonesian
scholars during the past twenty years or so is likely to lead to con¬
siderable revision of N. J. Krom^s version of Old Javanese history. An
attempt has been made here to indicate the importance of C, C. Berg^a
recent series of attacks upon accepted notions regarding the story of
Airlangga^a division of his kingdom, the reign of Kertanagars and the
early Majapahit period. A final pronouncement on these matters is at
present impossible, and it is wdl to take into account the prudent
assessment of the situation by J. G. de Casparis in his valuable 'Twin*
tig jaar studie de oudere geschiedeuis van Indoncstc'.^

^ flo^ 46, 1954, rp.

PREFACE

The tarly chap^rs of this book o^ve much to George Cordcst's f^is
•£tals hin^Quises d"ei /Tlndon^stf, to which the highest tribuie
must be paid, not only as a work of rare scholarship but al$o for pre¬
senting for the first time the early histJrj- of South-East Asia as a
whole. Previousfy the history of the individual states had been treated
so much in isolation that the significance of their many parallel develoa-
ments was hardly realized. The attention drawn to tbem by Cced^
has been immensely stimulating to thought and research.

1 he work that has been done by European scholars in the discovery-
of South-East Asian history' is beyond praise. Krom*s monumental
Hindof-y&taaNsche GficJurdenis^ indeed ^ takes its place among the great
works of pioneer research, "^rhere are.* however, today signs of dis¬
satisfaction on the part of European scholars themselves with their
previous approach to the subject, whicht it b felt, has been too much
influenced by certain preconceptions mherent in their own training
and outlook. De Casparis applies the epithet " Europe-centric^ to this
approach^ and contends that ii shows itself clearly in F. W. Stapel's
pondcro^us five-volume Ceschiedenis mw A^edertandsck Iftdie^ in which
the " Hindu period' of Indonesian history' is treated as if it were a sort
of prelude or introduction to the history of Dutch activities. Similarly,
Indian writers, who largely through the work of the French and the
Dutch hav'e come to discover * Greater India', may be accused of an
India-centric approach. The revolutionary change that lias come over
South-East Asia since the Second World War has inevitably led to
much re-fisaminatlon of the older conceptions of its history', and to
attempts at a reorientation of outlook.

It is in this respect that Berg's tvork assumes special significance,
f or not only has he made a lifelong study of Indonesian historical
literature, but he has laid dow-n also a meth^ of approach to its inter¬
pretation which, though admittedly imposing a heavy task on the
historian, is the only one which he believes js capable of giving trust-
w^orthy results. He explains it as the need to see a peoplc^s htstory-
wTiting as an element in its culture pattern!, which is not isolated,
either si met u rally or in its evolutionary and dynamic aspect, from the
remainder. The literatures of the peoples of South-East Asia abound
ill writings which are either In chronicle form or connected with
historical events. T'hdr number is legion; some are of great length.
Relatively few have as yet been used by hiatqrical w riters. The great
majority still aw'ait exploration and comparative studyk The sig-
nifreance of Berg's challenge therefore extends far beyond his own field
of research.

‘. I .

t^REPACE j Vll*

Thus book is m the main upon lecture courses dctiTfcred to

univeVsiiy cIl^sscs in LoadoUp Rangoon and Singapore. Parts of it have/
been used in lectures delivered in the University of Indonesia at "
Djakarta and the Chuialongkorn University at Bangkok. It was as a
result of the experience gained while conducting tfiese classesp and
through contacts with students and teachers in South-East Asia, that
Ae author came to realise the need for some such book as the present *
one. It represents, thereforc^p a surv'cy of work already published in
ejne form or another. He has, however, incorporated in several chap¬
ters—those dealing vdxh Arakan, the background to Singapore and ^
the reign of Bodawpaya of Burma—the results of his own recent re- *
searches^ not as yet published.*

'I'he compfptely objective history has never been produced^ nor are ^
one rnan*s knowledge and judgement adequate for a fully satisfactory'
treatment of so vast a subject as the present one. ^^^^at is attempted
here is first and foremost to present South-East Asia historically as an
area worthy of consideration in its own right, and not merely when
brought into contact with China^ India or the West. Its history cannot
be safely viewed from any other perspective until seen from its own, ^
With The available literature for its present study this is not at all
easy^ particularly in the ca$e of the period after 15111 the histoiy' of
which in European writings tends to be rather that of European actiW-
tics in South-East Asia than of South-East Asia itself, 1*0 m^y of
them—though not alB—de Casparis*s epithet' Europe-centric" applies
with special force.

Tlie extent to which this book manages to achieve its declared object
is a matter over which opinions may differ, but the writer hopes that
the sources of its inspiration—the delight he has had in his long
association w^ith South-East .Asian students,, and the friendship and
kindness they have always shown him—have made it possible for him
Ui treat the history of their peoples with sympathy and understanding, *
and tn convey some sense of the intellectual stimulus and illumination
to be derived from its study.

"{"he spelling of proper names has presented many problems-
Various systems of romanization have been used by European writers.

I'hese are discussed on pages 99-104 of the author's section on South-
East Asia in C, H, Philipses Hmtdbonk of Orimtal History (Royal Hist.

Soc,p iQ5t). Writers of history have tended to vary these according
to taste, and usually with the object of avoiding the excessive use of

* Nolablc cxeepdofis att ihe kuu>ri» of Burme: by A- P. PhaVre and G. E. Harvey
Fe*pcCli\'dy, and W. A. ft- WtKSd'i HiMtoiy 0/ Swm,

V I • ■ •

VIII I PREFACE

+ *

diacritidiL I^loreover, tKere is no uniformity of practice as be-

iween the different ^tates^ today^ so that In a work such as this ab^Iute
consistent in the representation of sounds is impossible. Here the
method foliow'ed has been to simplify sfctlings and avoid inconsis¬
tencies wherever^ possible. The result may not please the language
scholar, but it has seemed the best way out of the difficulty. l*he
' following points are a useful guide to pronundatlan: ^

(i) Vowels have Italian values; consonants generally Englbh ones*

\ (ii) In Bunnese words a consonant is aspirated by placing Ih^ before

' it; in Tai words by placing the ‘h^ after it. But since this may
cause confusion in the cases of T’ and 'p', the method used here
is to show the aspirated forms by the use of an apostrophe after
these letters^ except in the case of the w'Ofd " Thailand 'p w hich is
the form officially adopted by that country.

(iii) Special cases."

is hard, but the Burmese ^gy ^ is pronounced "j";

^ inital ^ky’ is pronounced *ch’;

final Vn^ tn Burmese represents a nazallzatjon of the preceding
VDW"el;

initial *ng* is pronounced like the final ‘ng’ in ^sing" ;

in Sanskrit words* e.g. Srivijayap is pronounced "sh";

"ou" is normally pronounced *oo\ but in 'Toungoo"^ an older
form of spellings it represents *ow'^ as in ^plow\

ACK NO WLEDG M ENTS

My spociiil ttuuiks are due to ProfesMr W. Ph+ Cocilluias, Pmfesaor C. H.
PhUipfl, Mr, A. H. Ckruine and Mr. C. D. Cowan* who read pordoru *f my
Script befote it went to the press, and to Mv+ H i. H, Klicii^^bcrger of the Library'
stfl^ of SchfHil of Oriental and Mrican Studies for rheddng the cntiifis. in
the bihUagraphy^ Dr. Cooihaaa'a detailed notes on irly treatment of Dtiieh
activities were of much help* and if we were uiuble tp ogrcc rai a number of
matters, I am none the less deeply ^tcful m him for his lielp.

I must aUo thank the various insdtutions and indlvidu^ who have kindly
jillaw^ed me to neproduce illusLrBtiqns of which they hold the copyri^L ITwir
names ore recorded in the list of iliustratipns on pp, jdii-KV. To Mr.
A. IL Chmije 1 am ipedally imlehted for pcEmission to use his nuip qf the
Ptehistop^ of Eastern Asia* and much help in the pTepsmtipn of other maps.
_ My wife hu Kiven imprinted help in the prepaminn of the typescript, and
in pnoof-feading and indexing^ and even more in the patience she has shown
during many months wKefi all my spare time was devoted to the wridns of this
book,

D.G.E.H,

CONTENTS

Prkfacs . . . . >

List of Ii4.vstrat[ons
List of Maps ....
Abbheitations ....

FACE *

. F
. xiti

. XV i

■p *

XVI

PART I

THE PRE-EUROPEAN PERIOD

CIJAPTED

1 . AuSTRQ-AsIATIC CtfLTtTRE

2. IwDiAK Cultural Influence

(a) The early relations of South-East Asia with India
(A) The earliest traces of Indianized states; Funan, the
Lin-yi

(r) The second stage of Indian infiiience; the earliest
inscHptioiis

3h The Island Empires (i) .

(a) The emergence of Srivijaya; the Sailendi^

(b) The greatness and decline of $nvijaya

4. The Island Empires (2) .

(а) Java to the Mongol tnyasion of 1293
(A) Majapahit, 1293-C.1520

5. The Kkmers aw Angkof:.

(ii) The Khmer kingdom of Cambodia to ioo <

(б) From 1001 to the abandonmem of Angkor in *432

6 . Buraia and Arakan ......

(fl) The pre-Pag^ period

(6) The empbe of Pagan, 1044^1287

119

CONTENTS

■_ 7* The T^ais and the Kingdom of Aydt'’ia
• *

8. The Kingdom of Champa

9. ANNAM AN& TONGEINC .

TO. Malacca and the Spread of Islam
n. The Coming of the European

FAGE

■ ‘ m

* ^59

. 169

. i7ti
1S6

PART II*

SOUTH-EAST ASIA DURING THE EARUEk PHASE
OF EUROPEAN EXPANSION

13. The Pobtdguese rs SoirxH-EAST Asia

13. BiptMA AND THE T’aI KINGDOMS IN THE SjKTEENTH

Centurt

(«) To 1J70

(i) From 1570 W (599 _ ■

14. ^Fhe Intrusion op the English and the Dutch

(d) The Angto-Dutch assault on the 'ring fence*

(6) The Anglo-Dutch struggle for the spice trade

15. The Expansion of the V.O.C., 1633^4 .

16. The Zenith and Decline of the V.O.C., 1684-1799

17. The Malay Powers from the Fall of Malacca (15 i i)

TO THE End op the Eighteenth Century

18. Siam and the European PowiiRS in the SEVENTEmni

Century

19. Burma under the Restored Toungoo Dynasty, 1600-

* 7 S 2 . ...

20. The Rise and Fall of the Kingdom of Mrohaung jn

.\rakan ........

21. The Beginnings of the Kdnbaung Dynasty in Burala,

1752—82

197

207

224

=55

266

383

297

3*5

338

3+3

CONTENTS

CRAS'TER

Z2. Annam ano ToNGKiNCp iBzo-tBio .

(fl) The struggle of Tiinh ^nd NguyeUi i6^0’'i777 *
(ft) The establishmciit of the Nguyen empire of Cochin
Chlnn^ Annam and Tongking, 1777-1 S2<S

The Kingpom of Lac?®* 1591-1836 ....

24. SrA>t FROM 1688 TO 1851 * . . . .

PAem

355 /

376 .

386

part III

THE PERIOD OP EUROPEAN TERRITORIAL EXPANSION

25. 1 nuones[a from the Fall of the V.O.C to the Recall
OF Raffles, 1799-1816 . . , , ,

z6, British Begii^nings in Malaya: Baoe.grouni> to

StNGAPOKE

27. The Straits Spitlements akd Borneo, 17S6-1867 •.

(fl) From the Rcqttishion of Pemtig to the Anglo^ Dutch
Treaty of 1824

(6) The Straits Settlements from 1824 to 1867
(e) Piracy and the work of Raja James Brooke

28. The Restored Dutch Regime in Indonesia and the

CtrLTURE System, 1816-4S . , . . .

2 q. The British Forward Movement in Malay a .

30. The Dutch Forward Movement in Indonesia

31. The Reign of Bodawpaya and the First Anglo-

Burmese War, 17S2-1826 . . , . ,

32. Burma from the Treaty op VaxNdabq to the Creation

OF THE Province of British Burma, 1826-62

33. The Last Days of the Konbaung Dynasty at Man¬

dalay, i862--85

34. , Vietnam and the Beginnings of French Expansion in
Indo-China, 1820-70

35, The Second Stage of French Expansion in Indo-
China, 1870-1900

405

421

434

461

473

490

502

519

S 3 &

55 (>

56S

CONtENTS

XU . CONtENTS

aiAPTira

36. SlA&l UNDER MONGEUT AND CHULALONGSORN, I&51-I9IO

' 37. Britain, France and the Siamese Question .

(a) Luang Prabang ■

(ft) The Klekong question
(r) Paknam and after

PART IV

NATIONALISM AND THE CHALLENGE TO
EUROPEAN DOMINATION

38. The Resurgence of South-East Asia

39. British Burma, 1886-1942 . . . . ,

40. The Dutch ‘New CounsE’ and Nationausm in Indo¬

nesia, 1900-42 .......

41. Fi^ch Administration and Nationalism in Indo-

China ........

42. The Economic Aspect op European Domination .

. (d) British Burma ■

(ft) French Indo-China
(r) The Netherlands Indies
Malaya

43. Siam in Transition, 1910-42 . , . . ,

44. The Japanese Impact ......

45. After the War, 1945-50 , . , . .

(d) Malaya
(ft) Burma

(f) French Indo-China

(d) Indonesia

(e) Siam

Appendix I I>yna3tic Hats, with governors and
govemoTO-genera] ......

Select Bibliography ......

Inbfe .... .....

PAfiB

578

59 *

615

620

633

642

649

672

683

698

■728

762

79 *

(

LIST OF ILLUSTIL^TIONS

Chandi Mendtjt

CltANDl MEPfDLTT {INTERIOR) * . . . .

Ct^Tighl, Tan Talh™ S tudio^ Jogjakarta

Hl^RIAL IMaGC of KISG AIR|-AK<3GA FKOM BFXAtiAN
(now in Mojbkeno MujciifOp Jt\'s)

J. S. Oromns^

Burial Image of Kestan'aoara * * . . .

Photographic Architia oj ihr K.<ndmkUjh liatitaut tjd Tropat

Baunese Teaifle , ^ ,

Photographic Archivct of da Komnkiiik intiitmi vld Trfypm

Javanese Wavang Puppet

Photo, Stdwd of Onatlai and Africom Stndic%^ JLoJuioif ^

The Buddha ^ SNAKt BACROROtrND to Head, Angkor

Copyr^ht, Afutdr Guinui, Paris

Banteay Srei: North Library and Central Prasat ,

from vf- Srodrick, UhJc Vehicle, Hutchmon

Relief from the Banteay Srei * * . .

Copyr^ht, Mmic Gfdmi, Pmit

Angkor Wat * ^ * , . , ,

from IL Brodrick, LitJk Vehicle^

Anokor Thom: The Pinnacles of the Havon

from A. H. Bn^ritk^ Uitlc Vchide, HMicJnnfott

Ten-Armed Bodhibattva, Anoror * . ^ ,

The Soraba Gate in Old Fagan * , * ,

£/nu»i of Burma Aiimtfry of l^forTnatirtM phoitigruph

Ananda Temple, Pagan , . , . ,

from p. |> The Culmre of South-l^t Mul, AU^ and Uttmtt

Khmer Towers at Lopburi, Siam—The Phra Prang Sam Yot ,
i^CO, P Biomag, ijqi? Stlom Poad^ Banghftk

Cham Dancer, c. seventh cRNTtiRV . ^ ^ .

{now in the Tourune Mutetm}

PoRnrcuF&F Malacca

^uTDO' Depoftment, Federaiivn of MtduytM

Ternats m THE Seventeenth Century
/ rtjtfi VtdmHfn, Oud en Nieuw 0«t IndiSni
Phato, School of Orienifd cmd African Smdicj, London

lui

FACil *

6t '

7 »

102

10+

110

113

125

12S

»4S

iAo

200

*36

:tiv LIST OP ILLUS&TRATIONS

, UaTAVI.1 in the SeVENTtENTH CENTURY

/rew yahniiJI ^^ Olid tn Nicuw 0(»t IikLI^

SCAMESE Dancing

{from 4 b^€k on BuddJiiAt A>-u|'ia r, 1550J

Ci^yfighif Nq^tUil Cultme Iiajitutf,

SE^'ENTeENTH CeNTUHY AvOT'U , . , *

C/rfint La LAubirt, d* Skm, jl^f J

’ Fhtyto, St^tool 0J Oriental and Afrieort St^ei, IjBttdnH

Kaiinghmitdaw Pagoda npah Sacaing

t/Fwon Gf Biiemn Miniitry 45/ /n/crmdZidiri pkbtcsgrapft

Mhojiaiinc in the Seventeenth Century

' ^ fr&m Maurice CoJSfw, T^nd of ihe Orcat ]man«, Ffabtr tmd FaBtr

Gateway and ANcrEST City Wall at iKoitAT , ^ *

Phuta^ E. //. S^. Suttmands

RnNS OF PlIRA Mongehonbopit, Avvt^ia
Pkofa, E. H. Sn SimmaitiU

Siamese Shadow Pvi'fet . . , . .

Capyei^htf tht National Culturt Imtituie^ Bar^kok

The Royal Ballet^ Phnom Penh, CAAinooiA ,

/earn A. H, Bradrickt Lilttc Vehick, Htitrhijaon

% A Ronc^eng of Dancing Girl ♦ . . .

from Raffia ^ History' of JnVa

i^ofio. School af Orientai and African Sludiet, London

Reception or British Envoy at the Palace at Amarapufa

/ram Mishaei Symt$, Minion ta A?ll, Landtm^

*Fholo^ Schaoi af Orimtal and African Etudies^ Lortdan

Queen's Golden Monastery, ^ [an dal ay

C^yrightf Archaeological Department ^ Union of Burma

The Shwy Dacon Pagoda, Rangoon , . . .

Uman of Burma Mimitry of Infmwaiion phot^^aph

The GdldEhN Palace, Mandalay p h . ,

Verandah. Mandaiay Palace p , . , ,

Rama IV (King MoNGKirr) or Siam . . . ,

fram Dr. Malcolm Smithy A Pliysidan at the Coart of Hiiilnp Connir^' U/r,

Wat BenchAA iA llopitiT, Bangkok . , , ,

PhoiOy R. Bummgy 1017 Silom Rmd^ BtOfglaJt

Rapen Adjeng Kartini ......

Photi^aphic Arckfca of $hc KomnMijk Imiituot vU Tnipen

{RtprodtiCed by y. Giel)

Rice Cultivation in Java * * , , ,

Pholographie Archive of the Komtdiltik Imiiiuitl vfd Tropen
{Reproduced by P. Satmierna)

General Aung San *■*...

- Capyrighi^ Keyrtaw Pret$ Agency, Tdd^

Inpefendence Monumekt, Rangoon - * , .

Urdon of Burma Mimtity of Information pftoto^raph

PAGE

29S

30«

4 r

3^2

391

393

396

414

506

540

545

55 ^

5S4

Lid.

660

709

711

• LIST OF illustrations

Pandit Nehru and U Nu

Kfyrion* Prtn Agfitc^\

Bao Dai at the Hufi Palace .

Capyrightj E.N./L •

Ho Chi Minh . , . .

^REiDENT Sukarno (with KajI Agus Salim in the backgrouncl) * 719

Piciur^ FM Ubmry

LIST OF xMAPS

Prehistory of Eastern Asia 2

Cnpyrigktt A- f/- ChritfU

SoUTJ 1 -East Asia, India and China
( to illustnitc c*riy oontuet^)

■ facing « 3

Mediaeval Java . ^ -

■fa

Plan of the Angkor Group

■fa

. ♦ , 109

Mainland Monarchies

■ . .148

The Spread of [slam *

Adapted from H . J . di Craafs ” Ge»chinleTiiB vm

tP. Van Horn ,

178

IndDnaic " tt . V , Uttgtveiy

The Ltnschoten Map, 1599 .

230

Dutch Expansion in Java

, . 267

La Lous6re's Map of Siam, 1691
(from Dd RoiToiniE dc Siuo)

I % OfO , School of Orirntal uitii AfriCM Siudiu

■ 313

The Fhanco-Siamese Question, 1893 .

^ * 60c

South-East Asia

ut rnd 0/ mlume

FADE

*. 712

* • 715

, 716

■

^ G£FEO

6 K 1

ABBREVIATIONS

Bulletin de TEople Fran^be d'Extr^mc OHczit (Hanoi).
Bijdragcn van hut KoninklLjk Inatltnut vonr de Taal-Latid^u

' - BSEI

BSOAS

Volkenkunde (^s-Gravenhage)*

Bulletin de la Soci^ de« Etudes Indochinnisea dc Saigon.

Bulletin of the School 0^ Oriental and African Studies
(London).

CEFEO

DNB

FEQ

FES

Cahiets dc TEcole Fran^aiBc d^Eatrmc Orient (Hanoi).
Dictionary of National Biography (London).

Far Eastern Quarterly (Ithaca, H.Y.).

Far Eastern Survey (New York).

JA " Jourtial A^dquc^

J. Am.O.Se^Ci Journal of the Aititricati Oriental Society (NewhaTcnj Cann«)

JBRS

Journal of the Burma Research Society (Rangoon).

JGIS

JRAS

JRASMB

Journal of the Greater Indis Sodety (Calcutta).

Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (London).

Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* Malayan Branch (Singa¬
pore).

JSS

RAA

TBG

Journal of the Siain Bodety (Bangkok).

Revue dcB Arts Asiatiques (Paris).

Tijdachrift van het Bataviaasch Oenootschap van Kunsten cn
Wctenschappen (Batavia, now Jakarta).

PART I

THE PRE-EUROPEAN PERIOD

Ot«u - k^-S

jatnort T KwiTur^pan

PREHISTORY OF EASTERN ASIA

€

CHAPTER t

' AUSTRO-ASIATIC CULTURE

South-East Asia is a term Tivhich came into general use during the
Second World War to describe the territories of the eastern Asiatic
mainland forming the Indo-Chinese peninsula and the imniense archi- •
pelago which includes Indonesia and the Philippines. In using the
term American writers have standardized the fonn ^Southeast’ and
have been followed by Victor PurcelP and E. H. G* Dobby.* But
there seems to be no valid reason for coining a new form in preference
to either ^ South-East' or ^ South Eastboth of which have the sanction
of long usage. The Royal Navy uses the hyphen. During the war
SEAC used the unhyphenated form^ but the Mountbatteij Report*
reverts to the use of the hyphen- Like all terms applied to a large area
for the sake of convenience, it is open to a number of objections. Dis¬
cussion of these here is unnecessary, since our use of the term is
dictated solely by convenience.

The area with which the present work is concerned includes fiurma,
Thailand, Indo-China^ Malaya^ and the islands stretching away east¬
wards from the Andamans and Nicobars to New Guinea. It doe^ not
include Assam on the one side or the Philippines on the other, since
both stand outside its main stream of historical developments- It is
an area upon which from very early times Chinese and Indian in¬
fluences have been brought to bcar^ and in one part of which, Annam
and Cochin China, there was for many centuries an intense struggle
between them for supremacy. Its cultural history h of marked interests
therefore, especially during the period of the Middle Ages in Europe,
when, under the stimulus of Indian infitiences, an and archiiecture
developed to a pitch which hears comparison with anything tlie rest
of the world can show.

By the end of the Middle Ages, when the Portuguese appeared on
the scene, South-East Asia w'as divided into two main cultural areas:
one called by the French scholans riffde where Indian

^ Tht Chbsai in Souihf^f i 4 n^p [95 r.

■ SoMShtoil , 4 jfOp 19^0.

■ Rfport io the CombtfUd Ckirft oj Staff by fix Supreme AlUiti CommQnJfT Swith-Eail
Alia, 1951 .

^ rJ!E PRE-EUftOPEAN PUfilOO PT. 1

influence p^edominat<^d, and the other, consisting of [Fongking,
Annam an<| Cochin China, where, with the fall of the “ Hinduiaed
'kingdom of Champa in the fifteenth century, Chinese influences had

the mastery, *

The reader must\»e warned, however, against the insidious tendency
to overatress the part played by the imported cultures and to under- ^
* rate the importance of the indigenous ones of the area* Ihe use of
such terms as ' Further India*, ‘Greater India’ or * Little China is to
be highly deprecated. Even such 'well-worn terms as ‘ Indo-China*

^ and ‘ Indonesia’ are open to serious objections, since they obscure the
•fact that the areas involved are not mere cultural appendages of India
or China but have their own strongly-marked individuality. The art
and architecture which blossomed so gorgeously in .Angkor, Pagan,
central Java and the old kingdom of Champa are strangely different
from that of Hindu and Buddhist India. For the real key to its under¬
standing one has to study the indigenous cultures of the peoples who
produced it. And all of them, it must be realized, have developed on
markedly indlvidu^stic Lln^*

' Indian mfiuencfi, imlike Chinese, had no political implica¬

tions, was, in the process of absorption by the native societies in South-
East nAAiaj tfansformed just as much ae, for example, that of ancient
Greece was in its impact upon western Europe- For the peoples who
felt the stimuitis of Indian culture werCp as George Corf^s puts
not 'wild men' but communities with a relatively high civilization of
their owm And e\en the Vietnamese, who were under Chinese rule
from III B.c* to A-D* 939 p and under the Han were subjected to inten¬
sive sinization, developed a culture which, while owing an immense
amount to China, nevertheless preserved iU own identity, with its
roots going back to a pre-Chinese past^

The main reason for thia failure to pay due regard to the in digen ous
culture of the peoples of our region is easy to see. Both politically and
culturaityi South-East Asia has been overshadowed by India and
China, which w'erc great powers with established civilizations long
before her own historical period begins. And it was only through the
fertilizing impact of their cultures that her own began to develop and
achieve greatness. For obvious reasons also* when European scholars
became aware of it their attention wa$ concentrated upon rulcp^^
Courts and temples, where the cxtemal influences were strongest,
while their approach had necessarily to be made in the first instance
through Chinese or Sanskrit writings.

* La Eiau hindoiai^i d^Indi^chim ft 1548^ P- a?.

CH. I

AX^STRD-ASIAl IC CULTURE

The evidence of the life of the common people has beftn much ^
harder to come by. and 50 far all too Uttle has been discovered. What
does exist, however^ points indubitably to the fact that in the so-called
" Hindu ized" states the groat mass of the people was for long either
uniQuehed by Indian culture or in absorbing it chaJlged it by bringing
it into line with indigenous ideas and practices, Thua the structure of
^ricty was largely unaffected by Indian influences^. The caste systeiUp
which is fundatucnial to Hinduism^ has had notably little influence^
and woman has largely maintained the high place accorded her before
the earliest impact of Indian culture, a fat higher one than she has
ever occupied in India during recorded history. Moreover, after the *
introduction of Hinduism tnd Buddhism the religious ideas and
practices of (;arUer times persisted with immense vitality, and in coming
to terms with them both religions were profoundly changed.

South-East Asia today is an anthropologist's paradise. In its moun¬
tains and jungles live the remnants of a great variety of peoples repre¬
senting early stages of its ethnological history: pigmy Negritos living
as primitive nomads, peoples akin to the Australian abori^nes, and
others that w^ould appear to be Indonesians in more backward stages
of developments There has obviously been a great deal of inter¬
mixture between the earlier inhabitants and later comers. The whole
area, indccdi has been described as a chaos of races and languages.

Traces of extremely early human types have been discovdVed in
Java. Eugene Duboises Pithecanthropus erectus and von Koemgswald^s
even earlier Homo modjokertensis belong to the early pleistocene age,
and were once thought to form a moe apart in human history. The
late pleistocene age has yielded eleven skulls, found at Ngandong in
the Solo valley, which are of a more advanced human typOp hut with a
reasonably close affinity to the pithecanthropoid ^pe. Then there are
the Wadjak skulls of late pleistocene or post-pleistocene age, which
appear to be related to proto-australoid man.

Ilomo modjok^iensis and Pithecanlhropus metus have been showm
to be closely related with Sinanthropus or Peking Man, and their arte-^
facts, like his, are akin to those of the Soan culture of north-west India
and the Ajiyathian of Burma, On the basis of the evidence so far
examined two hypotheaes of outstanding interest have been formu¬
lated: (a) that the mongoloid peoples are ultimately derived from this
stem, and (A) that a clear line may be traced linking Pithecanthrapm
erectus through Hama soloensis (i.e. the Ngandong skulls) with Homo
austraUcus. If this should tum out to be true, (a) the mongoloid
features that are so widespread today over our area were not, as was

THE PRE-EtTROI-EAN PERIOD

PT. J

once thofiglit, introduced for die first time by neolithic or bronze-age
rmmigrant^; {b) a branch of homo sopirm must have evolved in South-
East Asiaj since there is no evidence of its having done so in Australia*
and (c) the theon^ that the mesolithic Veddoid peoples were the
origin^ mhabitantl of South-Eaat Asia is exploded.

The traces of a mesolltiiic culture are widespread. It has been
named Bacsono-Hoabmhian from the regions w'here the greatest^
number of its artefacts has been found, the provinces of Bacson and
Hoabinh in Tongkingp The distinguishing feature of its stone imple¬
ments is that they are worked on one side only* With them have been
found hone utensils and pottery. The human remains have been
interpreted to indicate a dark-'Skinned face of smalt stature and of
Australoid-Veddoid type, l^races of a I^telanesoid type have been
found in Indo-China. Artefacts of these peoples have been tbund in
northern Annam, Luang Prabang, Siam, Malaya, and on the east
coast of Sumatra. Anthropologists have classified these people as
Veddoid after the Vedda tribes of Ceylon^ and assign to this group
the Senoi and Sakai hiU-idhes of Malaya^ and other backw^'ard peoples
of south Celebes and on the Engano and Mentawei Islands off the
west coast of Sumatra.

They practised ritual cannibalism. The men were hunters, fisher¬
men and collectors; the women in some cases used a primitive mattock
for cuftivating the soil. Canoes made out of hoUowed-out tree trunks
w^ere in use. There has been much speculation as to the possible con¬
nection of this culture with the neolithic^ which succeeded it. Von
Hdne-Geldern, for instance^ has ventured the theory^ challenged by
other scholars, that the neolithic oval-axe culture found in northern
Burma, among the Nagas of Assam, in Cambodia and in the eastern
islands of the Archipelago, is connected with the use of a plank-built
canoe, and that both represent a development of mesolithic culture.

Two other forms of cdt come from the neolithic period: the
shouldered axe found in many places from the Ganges to Japan, but
not south of a line drawn through the middle of the r^ialay Peninsula,,
and, most widespread pf all, the rectangular axe, found in the river
valleys of the Hoang-HO| Yangtsc^ Mekong^ Salw'cent [rraw'addy and
Brahmaputra^ as well as throughout Indonesia. As it is found in its
purest form on the Malay Peninsula and in middle and south Sumatra*
this has been taken to have been the route by which it reached
Indonesia.

Discussion has centred round the possihLe relationship bet'ivcen the
shouldered axe and the rectangular axe, and the connection of both

CH. I

^UsmO-MlATlC CULTURE 7

with the spread of the Austro-Asiatic languages. Von Hdne-Gddem
identifies the Ghouldered axe with the culture of the Khmer.
peoples of the mainland, and thinks that the neolithic peoples who
brought the rectangular-^e culture spread a^p the Indonesian
bnguages*

^ This culture was not only the most widespread but also the most *
important of the stone-age cultures^ because of the great develop¬
ments in the arts achieved by the immigrants bringing it. The cousins
P. and F. Sarasin called them the "Froto-Malap* to distinguish them
from the later immignints, who introduced metals. These latter they
called ' Dcutero-Malaya". Hendrik Kem, the pioneer of research into *
the origin of the Indonesian languagi^^ thought that the Iingumic
evidence pomted to the region of Champa, Cochin China and Cam¬
bodia as the birthplace of their culture. Von Heine-Geldem traces
their original home farther back to the region in western China where
the great rivers of East and South-East Asia have their origin. Their
tools show them to have been excellent wood-workers. They decorated
their wooden houses with beautiful carving, produced pottei^ and arc
thought to have made woven Enaterials.

'Phe inurrugFants who introduced the age of metals were of the same
racial type as the * Proto-Malays'. Both are more generally referred
to as Indonesians. The later comers came from the same originaj home
and by the same route a$ their predecessors. In South-East Asia they
mingled freely with the * Proto-Malaya*, but pushed some of them
inland. Thus the Gajo and Alas peoples of Sumatra and the Toradja
of Celebes have been classed as * Pro to-Malays*. The later comers are
also distinguished from the earlier ones by their stronger mongolold
admixture.

Their culture cannot be strictly characterized as bron^ei since they
were iron-workers also. Von Hcine-Geldern applies the term Dong-
Son to their culture from the place in Tongking where the most
striking evidence of it has been found. Their bronze w'ork was of a
very high order. One special feature of it was the production of
various types of kettle-drums/ the use of which for ritual purposes
was widespread over the whole area of South-East Asia. Their navi¬
gation was more highly developed than that of their predecessors-
they were hardy seafarers with some knowledge of astronomy. They
travelled far and wide as merchants, and it l$ interesting to note that

^ H. H. Hrckcrcii, " Bronzen Kctcltcomracii', Onwlwlif, no. 46, Jan, i g54^ pp,

615^5. SEg dOo Bibliof^phy, *+\% -Qobuhew, von Hcinc-Gcldcm, v^is dcr Hoop.
Livy, AEansuy, md Twcedie.

8 TIIE FRE-EUROFE:VN FERIOP PT. 1

SDme of *theLr trade-names for weights and measures— tahil and
kati — are still used in India and China.

Another marked characteristic was the assodatton of tncgaliths with
their religion. TJ^fse monuments compri^ images^ usually of ances¬
tors, grinding stones with a magical significance, troughs in which
^ skulb were preserv ed, menhirs which may have been phallic symbols,^
dolmens at budd places, burial chambers of long flat stones and
tcrraec graves. Von Heine-Gddem thinks that^ vrhilc most of this
culture belongs to the bronze-iron age, some goes back to the neo¬
lithic period* The earlier he characterizes as monumental and sym-
" bolic, the later as mate graphic and ornamental. Examples are to be
found throughout South-East Asia. Pulo Nias, off the west coast of
Suemtra, shoves the culture still in its living stage.

Thus when South-East Asia felt the earliest impact of Indian
culture, it possessed a civilisation of its avtn. Cccdfe^ sums up its
characteristics thus t on the material side (i) the cultivation of irrigated
riceflelds, (ii) the domestication of the ox and buffalo, (iii) a mdi-
mcntary'iise of metals, and (iv) skill in navigation!; on its social side
(i) the importance of w^oman and of decent by the maternal line^, and
(Li) the organisation resulting from irrigated cultivation; on its religious
side (i) animism, (u) the worship of ancestors and of the god of the
soil, (ip) the location of shrine on high places, (iv) burtal in jars or at
dolmens, and (v) a mythology imbued w ith a cosmological dualism of
mountain versus sea, winged beings tJersus water beings, men of the
mountain versiss men of the sea-coast. Furthermore, its separate
languages have shown a remarkable faculty for dcri>'ation by way of
prefixes, suffixes and infixes. Peoples more or le$$ impregnated with
this culture, though of much racial diversity, were to be found over
most of the area, Living mainly in coastal districts and along river
valleys. E"urther inland, and in the mountains, were others, in various
degrees of backw^ardness.

Krum, from his study of Javanese civilization before the coming of
Indian influence, adds to the list given by Ccedt* (i) the or

puppet shadow theatre, (ii) xhegomflt^n orchestra, and (in) batik work.®
In such a vast area there wxre naturally local diversities of culture. It
is significant, however, that the Chineae would acem to have had some
Idea of the cultural unity uf the region when they applied to its various
peoples and languages the name K^un-lun, if, indeed, those scholars
are correct who attribute so wide a meaning to the term.®

* op. at., pp. * Hindne^yaLviatvih pp, 47-S-

* Ccr4^p iip. dir, pp. 2&-7, diicuftscs thia point.

CH. 1

AUSTHO-ASIAT1C CULTUEE

One of the most Interesting discussions of recent limes *1133 Con¬
cerned itself with the retatJonship between this culture i^d tliat of
prc-Aryan India. According to one theory, 'one or several ethnic'
\vavcst originating in Ind^n-China or the islands^ flowed into India
before the Aryan tnvsisii>n\^ Another asserts, on tfie other hand, that
either the Dravidiatis or the Aryans on arriving in India caused an
^exodus of aboriginal mhabitants to South-East jlsia, and that there *
was thus a pre-Aryan influx of Indian culture^ which would explain
the evidence afforded by tools and language of a common cuiture
throughout both regions. While Ccid^s is inclined to regard the
question as still unsettledj a third theory has been formulated which •
appears to merit serious atteiftiao. It asserts that the region of ivestem
China indicated by von Heine-Getdem as the original home of Indo¬
nesian culture was also that of early Indian culture; the two cultures
indeed had a common origin. The streams bringing it southtvards
bifurcated^ one or more passing westwards into India and the others
passing into Indo-China and Indonesia.

According to this theory^ the Aryans nn arriving in India found a
culture there which was a mixture of ^lunda and Dravidkn elements
and was at least as high as the Egyptian^ Assyrian and Babylonian
ones. The Hinduism of historical times indeed contains much that
traces back to a Dravidian or Munda origin. Research into the Munda
element, notably by Sylvain L^vi and Przyluski, has revealed the im¬
portance of its contributions to Indian culture. These tw^o scholars
have stressed the fact that there are non-Aryan elements in the cult of
Siva and his wife Uma, and that the linga cult has a partly Dm vidian,
partly Munda origin, going back to the stone-worship of neolithic
times. Sylvain Livi also, from his study of the Munda languages^
shows not only that some of the races mentioned in Sanskrit literature
have Munda names^ but that not a few Sanskrit worck, $uch as tho^ie
for pepper, dove, onion, aloeswood, betel, etc., arc of Austric origin,
to use the term invented by Pater Schmidt in demonstrating the
underlying unity of the tw'o great groups of Austro-Asiatic and Ausiro-
nesian languages stretching from the lEmalayas to Easter Isbnd and
from Madagascar to Hawaii.*

It seems certain also that Indonesia, before the coming of Hindu
culture, poasessed in its oral tradition stories of the same kind as the
Sanskrit tales, and it may be that when later on, after the introduction

'■ p. 34.

* Die Afon-KAwxsr-FAfifew, dn Bi^tdegUed t^ 6 lkem Zentraitmetti and

Tieriem, 1906^

lO THE PJiE-iailOPEAN PERtOlJ FT. 1

of writteti literature from India, we meet them in literary form with
an Indon^ian setting, they i^re not necessarily foreign impomtions
' which have been given an Indonesian twist, but represent folk m>ths
and legends, springing from the same rofnote origin as the Indian
smrieSp which havf maintained their original character in purer form.
Thus, it is argued, with the coming of Hindu culture Austric stories
* took on a Hindu garb, and the divergencies from the Hindu form^
in a Hindu-Javanese story are often re-creations of an old Austric
theme.

The relations between the Austric languages and the Munda lan-
* guagea of India, now for the most part lost, were first traced by ihe
Austrian scholar Kuhn, but it was Pater Schmidt who, having shown
their lexicographic relationship in a convincing manner,, went on to
formulate the theory that the peoples speaking them were mutually
related, culturally and anthropologically. This tbeoiy has not been
generally accepted, but his suggestion that in very' early times there
were relations between India, Indo-China and the island world of the
Indian and Pacific Oceans cannot be doubted^ And white the bi¬
furcation theory remains unproved, the fact that the Hindu element
has been given too important a place in proportion to the older cultures
of South-^^East Asia has been amply demonstrated.

When Indian culture began to cscert its influence the great pre~
historfc migrations had ended. In the islands the Indonesians, who
had established themselves there in neolithic times^ formed the basis
of the populations. They were of two kinds: first of all thtKse who had
presen ed to some extent purity of race, such as the Bataks of Sumatra*
the Dyaks of Borneo, and the Alfurs of Celebes and the Moluccas;
and in the second place the Malays of the coasts, of many varieties
and mixtures, Malays of Sumatra, Sundanesc, Javanese, Madurese
and Balinese, peoples impregnated more or less with Austro-Asiatic
culture, and referred to by the Chinese as K’un-lun and by the Indians
as Dvipantara, the ‘people of the islands'.

On the mainland there were the Chants in what is today central and
southern Annam, the Kfamers in the Mekong delta, Cambodia and the
middle Mekong region, the Mons, closely related to the Khmers, in
the Menam valley and what is now called Lower Burma^ the Pyus,
possibly the advance guard of the Tibeto-Burmans, in the Irrawaddy
and Sittang basioSp and the Malays of the Peninsula* Thus many, but
not all, of the principal ethnic groups occupied to a large extent their
present habitat.

The chief historical changes were to take place on the mainland.

i AUSTRO-AStATIC CULTUItE

Thus we shsil! see the Cbaots ousted from central Annam by the Viet-
namesep the Mens of the Menam overcome by the T^ais and those of ^
the Irrawaddy by the Burmese- The Pyus disappear completely. The "
*push to the south* which fharacteriaes the prehist^c period is to be
seen again in the historic period. It e,xpkins the actual grouping in
^ndo-China and to some extent in the islands today. Generally speaks ^
ingp though there arc notable exceptionsp the migrations proceed by
the narrow valleys of the rivers starting from China and the borders of
'1 ibet, dratra on by the attraction of deltas and the sea.

But they are not toigrationa in the usually accepted meaning of the
term. They are very slow* [ong-drawn-out movement^p with much
assimilation of conquerors and conqueredp in the course of which the
older inhabitants adopt the language and customs of the immigrants.

1 here is rarely annihilation or eviction^ hardly ever the displacement
of a great mass of people* Thus the basic element of the population
of the Indo-Chinese mainland today remains Indonesian* The history
of the Tkis in late historical times offers an excellent example of what
took place elsewhere in other periods. As CcedAsputs it: warlike
aristocracy succeeded in imposing its language which made oiUstaina
among the other ethnic groups*.^

* iiV.p p. jOp

ciiafteh 2

INDIAN CULTUILAL INFLUENCE

(a) The early relatiGm of South-East Asia mtk India

The term "Hindukatidn" im been generally applied by sehuhns lo
the impact nf Indian culture upon South-E^t Aeia, Ccedte got&^o
far as m term the states which developed under its influence les etais
hindouiseSj in spite of the fact that Buddhism played an important role
in the movement, and Theravada Buddhism^ ultimately became the
dominant faith of Burma and ArakaUi the T'ai states and Cambodia.
And whereas Hinduism disappeared before Islam in the Malay Penin¬
sula and Indonesia at the end of the European Middle Ages, Buddhism
continued to receive the staunch allegiance of the countries it had
conqueredn

The application of so extended a meaning to ihe word fHindu" is
not without its dangers, since in the ordinary use of the terms * Hindu’
and * Buddhist' there is a dear distinetion based upon real points of
differeoce. In the hiatory of the t^vo religions in South-East Asia,
how^everj, it is not always easy to draw a clear dividing line between
them, especially in the case of Tantrayaria Buddhism, which showed
marked Hindu features, and even at tirnes^ as in the cull of Siva-
Buddha in thirteenth-century Java^ de^es exact dassiheation. More¬
over, e^xn in states where Flinayana Buddhism^ prevailed. Brahmans
played an important ceremonial part, espec^y at Court, and still do
so in Burma, Siam and Cambodia, though themselves strikingly
different from their counterparts in India, In the present survey
some equivocation in the use of the term ‘ Hindu ’ may be unavoidable.
The context, however, will, it is hoped, prevent any confusion of
meaning.

Relations betwxen India and South-East Asia probably go back far
into the prehistoric period. Traders from both sides must have visited
each other’s ports. It seems probable that small Indian commercial
colonies existed at South-East Asian ports long before the introduction
of any marked cultural influence. One would aspect that the same in

^ object TO The teim * HiimyAna' (LitiJc Vehicle}: they tail their

Buddhism ''TTberi.Ti'Brda \ the Biiddh-min of ihe T'henu (Xirachcini).

Muttra

KWANG*tLiMG

ASSAM^

Imphal^^

Cakuira
5:«9A_ Tinnliptl/

KWANG^S

iGUJEAATi

HA1*NAM

UPPrNES

ChiracaFa

Lj gKcira! 1
L|^jJJ^Anj;kOi

Aiii^k9r^c»r?^rS

J ^.c^ibun'

3rl

^ <l^C4lh:ui

,M^dr«

KavaH^EJnifn

iradhafpura

Tikua Pa

NJCOBAA

CEYLON

Pcnini£

Ardi^n^

'Palamban^

SOUTH-EAST ASIA, INDIA AND CHINA

(To illustrate earlj^ contacts)

MILES

CH, 2

INDIAN CULTURAL INFLUENCE

reverse is true of ihe Indbu ports, since in the bustorical perifid Indo¬
nesian commercifiJ colonies were to be found both in Bengal and on
the Coroimndcl Coasts The Indon^ans were par exalleact a sea¬
going people, and must h^t resorted to India every bit as much as
Indiana to South-East Asia. This point must be stressed^ since it has
too easily been assumed that the trading relations in the first instance,
^nd the import of Indian culture in the second, have to be explained
in terms of Indian enterprise alone.

After what was presumably a very long period of trading relations
a great change begins to appear in the situation in South-East Asia.
Kingdoms emerge to view on the Peninsula and in the Archipelago,
practising Indian religions, arts and customs, and with Sanskrit as
their sacred language. "Wlicn and how they first came into existence
is to aome extent a matter of surmise; the oldest archaeological evidence
comes in most cases from a considerably later date^ and the references
so far coUected from Indian, Chinese and European sources hardly
permit of exact statements.

The new states grew up around sites which Indian seamen had
frequented from time immemoriaL The change must have been
caused by the arrival of priests and literati able to disseminate Indian
culture, though the possibility cannot be ruled out that Indonesians
themselves acquainted with India played their part in the process.
When the veil is partly lifted and it becomes possible to form some
impression of the new communities, w'hat shows itself is an organized
culture based u pon four elements: (a) a conception of royalty charac¬
terized by Hindu or Buddhist cults^ (^) literary expression by means
of the Sanskrit language^ (c) a mythology taken from the Epics, the
Puranas, and other Sanskrit texts containing a nucleus of royal tra¬
dition and the traditional genealogii^ of royal families of the Ganges
region^ and (rf) the obser%'ancc of the Dhannashastras, the sacred law^
of Plinduism, and in particular the Manava Dhartnashastra or T^aws
of Manu’.

The suggestion has been made that the movement represerits the
continuation oversea of the Brahmanization of India^ w^hich had its
birthplace in north-west India. It is noteworthy that the earlieist Sans¬
krit inscriptLons of South-East Asia are of not much later date than
those of India. However that may be, the culture which the Indians
propagated vvas not completely unfamiliar to the peoples who received
it. Its rapid spread was in part due to the fact that they were able to
recognize, beneath a Hindu veneer* ideas and traditions with w^hJeh
their own had much in common.

THE PRE-EUROPEAN PERIOD

PT. I

[ndiaik sources have been searched for light upon this important
movement. The results have been singularly disappoinbng. A state¬
ment in Kantilya's Arthasastra has been taken to indicate that the
movement dates ^rom a period earlier th^n the Christian era. It is a
passage recommending a king to people an old or a new country by
seizing the territory of another, or by clearing out the surplus popula^
tion of his own. But the reference is all too vague, and in any ca^
the original date ascribed to the compilation, namely crVfn 3 ®®
the reign of Chandragupta Maurya, has been successfully challenged
as being five centuries too early. Moreover, the theory is based upon
the fallacious idea that Indian culture wm brought to South-East Asia
by waves of immigrants.

The Buddhist are full of stories of seamen, while the I lindu

Ramavana mentions Java and possibly Sumatra. But the dates of
their composition arc unknown, and they contain no exact information
concerning our subject. The canonical Pali text, the Niddesa, which
may belong to the beginning of the Christian era, enumerates a series
of Sanskrit place-names which Sylvain L^vi identifies with places in
South-East .Asia. But as the evidence of archaeology' and the references
to the region in Chinese and European writings do not go so far back,
his identifications remain little more than hypothetical.

Thtt Chinese provide historians with their first glimpse of a Hindu
state,* that of Funan, the precursor of the kingdom of Cambodia.
.According to thdr account, Funan was founded by a Brahman, Kaun-
dinya, in the first century A.D. At Oc Eo in western Cochin China, its
principal port, a gold medal of the Itoman emperor Antoninus Pius of
A.D, 152 has been found, together with Sanskrit seals of the same
period. Of the four earliest Sanskrit inscriptions of Funan one ia
thought to date from the time of the earliest Chinese contacts—i.e.
the middle of the third century—but is probably later. The Chinese
also mention the existence of Hindu states in the Malay Poninaula at
the end of the second century A.D., while their earliest references to
what is later known as the kingdom of Champa relate to the same
period.

In the Mcnam basin the sites of PVa Fathom and P’ong Tuk afford
the earliest evidence of Indian influence. They show basements of
buildings and Buddhist sculptures in the Gupta style, besides small
bronze statues of the Buddha in the Amaravati style which flourished
in India between the second and fourth centuries a.d. No other
discoveries in the Thailand region go back earlier than the fifth
century.

cit. z

INDIAN' CCrUTURAL INFLUENCE

Id Arzkzn inscriptions sbow a Candra dynss^ holding sway from
the middle of the fourth century, Burma’s earliest remains^ consisting
of fragments of the Pali Canon found at Hmait'aa and Maun^in, near
modem Prome on the Irrawaddy, cannot be dated earlier than about
A.O. 500. Thaton, in the Mon country, has been asA>dated with the
legend, related in the Bunncse dimnicles, that in the third century
BiC. the Mauiya emperor Asoka sent the Buddhist missionaries Sona
and Uttara to the land of Suvamabhumi, but (here is no historical
corroboration of the story.

So far as the Archipel^o is concerned, there is nothing earlier than
the fifth century. Kutet, in Borneo, yields Sanskrit Inscriptions of a
King Mulavarman belonging to the early part of the century. Those
of PumavarniM, a king of western Java, belong to the middle of the
century. Imag'es of the Buddha in the Amaravati style have been found
in Kedah, Celebes, East Java and at PaJembang in Sumatra, and may
indicate the existence of Buddhist states in those regions before the
fifth century, but nothing is kr^pivn of such states.

The oldest Chinese text to record relations with the Archipelago is
the rr’ieH-Aufl-j/m, 'Annals of the Han Dynasty’, which eovl*rs the
period zo6 n.c. to a,d. 24. It speaks of seafaring from south China to
a number of large and populous islands which are said to have paid
tribute to China from the reign of the Emperor Wu (i+o-Sfi B.C.J. The
Chinese went to them for pearls and other precious stones. To one of
them the Emperor Wang Mang (a,d, 1-6) sent presents and asked for
a rhinoceros. This place has been tentatively identified with Acheh at
the north-western end of Sumatra. There is, however, in all this
account no hint whatever of Indian influence.

A later Chinese report, of a,d. 133, may have some significance in
this connection, if the somew'hat uncertain interpretation of the names
it mentions has any value. It records the reception by the Han
emperor of an embassy bearing a gift of honour from a King of Yc-
tiao named riao-pien. Is Ye-tiao a Chinese version of tlic Sanskrit
Yavadvipa, Java island, and does the king’s name stand for the Sans-
DevavaiiiUm If so, it shows that the Hinduizing process had

begun.

Certain European texts offer evidence which, when sorted out, is of
considerable value for fixing the dale and estimating the causis of the
spread of Indian influence. The earliest is the Pitipius o/lhe Eryihran
5fa, a Greek account of Graeco-Egyptian trade and seafaring in the

‘ Fernmd'* sugigMtion in J.A, Ndv.-Dsc, 1916, p, 510. It u diicuunl by Knrni,

•Dp. pp, dl^2. ^ '

THE PItE-E[}JtOPHU; PERIOD

PT. I

Vl6

East compoKd probably in a,d, 70-1. After mentioning three great
ports ui western India'—Broach, Cnniganore, and Pontkad—^to which
Greek snips made voyages, the author says that native ships go from
these to three more on the eastern side beyond the Gulf of Manaar—
namely Kaveripdtnam, Pondicherry, and one that he calls *Sopatma\
which Indian research tdenuhes with Markanum, From these in turn
great ships called kolanJia trade with the territories at the mouth dt
the Ganges, and among others with the island of Chryse, which pro¬
duces toitoise-shiclL Farther east than this they do not go, Chrysc,
‘gold land', was a name later applied to a part of Burma, and as ‘gold
island' to Sumatra. And as tortoise-shell was a product of the Archi¬
pelago, Dutch scholars arc inclined to-think that this may be a vague
reference to the trade of that region. Dionysius Pericgetes, a second-
century' Greek writer, mentions the ‘gold island' but adds nothing
new to the Periplus^

What appears to be more definite information comes from the Alex¬
andrine geographer Claudius Ptolemy, who wrote in a.d. 165 or
possibly earlier, and certainly used much older sources. Book VII of
his Geograpftia deals in detail with South-East Asia, describing Stiver-
land and Goldland near the towns of the Golden Peninsula, the
■ Chryse ChersonesusAmong the islands of the .Archipelago he men¬
tions the 'five Barousai’j inhabited by cannibals 1 the ‘three Sabadei-
bai',‘a]so inhabited by cannibals; and the island of labadiou or Saba-
diou, the name meaning ‘barley island*, which is said to be very
fruitful and to produce much gold, and has a capital at its western
end, a trading city named Argyre or Silvertown. Then follow the
three islands of Satyroi, whose inhabitants have tails, and the ten
Maniolai, again peopled by cannibals, where iron fastenings arc used
in building ships.

Against the vagueness of the earlier writers Ptolemy gives indica¬
tions of latitude and longitude for his place-names. His labadiou has
been taken to be a transcription of Yavadivu, the Prakrit for Yava-
dripa or ‘barley island', and he Identifies Barousai and Sabadeibat
with parts of Sumatra. As, however, barley is native to neither Java
nor Sumatra, there are difficulties in the way of this interpretation.
But apart from this, snd many other disputed questions of identifi¬
cation which remain still to be settled, the fact remains that, compared
with the vagueness of the Periplus and of Periegetes, Ptolemy's much
clearer statements bring us nearer the realm of reality and strengthen
the view that by the first half of the second century A.D. the spread of
Indian influence to South-East .Asia had begun. The writers of the

CIL Z

[Nl3tAN CULTL'RAL INFLl^ENCE

previolis century + among whom may also be mentioned Pomponius-
MeLa and the Elder PLiny^ have only a vague idea of a lanciof gold^
and it seems obvious that in their day» notmtliatanding a long period
of commercial contactSp the rflovements which broug|^t cultural results
had not yet started.

'rhe causes of Indian cultural expansion in South-East Asia are not
easy to assess. Two discarded theories are based upon the assumption
that it arose out of disturbed conditions in India, w^hich caused large
numbers of refugees to seek new homes across the sea. One attributes
it to the bloody conquest of Kaiinga by the .Maurya emperor Asoka
in the third century B.C,^ which^ it is suggested, may have provoked *
such an exodus. But where is the evidence of such a movement^ and
why were its effects so long in showing themselves?

The other attributes it to the pressure of the Kushana invasions of
India in the first century A.n. The Yueh-chi nomads^ who gained
control over Bactria shortly after loo fi.C., began some time kter to
expand southwards under Kushan controL In A.D. 50 there was a
Kushan king in the Kabul valley. Soon aftenvards they dogiinated
the Punjab and were pressing towards Gujenit and the Gangetic plain*
Their leader became the Emperor Kanishka in a.u. 78, and from his
capital of Peshawar ruled much of north India. Were there any
evidence to prove that his conquests caused an emigration of Indians
overseas, there would be no dLfIicult>’ on the score of the time factor.
But ihere is no such evidence.

An interesting hypothesis has been formuiated by Cccd^s in Les
£tiits in an examinatidn of the various factors which, he

thinks^ may have played a part in the movement. His opinion Is that
in its early stages it is not connected with any mass emigration of
fugitives from India but has a pre-eminently commercial origin, 'l^he
contact between the Mediterranean world and Indiap followed by the
foundation of the Maury^a and Kushan empires on the one hand and
the rise of the Seleucid and Roman empires on the other, led to an
important trade in luxury articles between East and West. Several of
these articles, such as gold, spices, scented woods and perfumed resins,
came from South-East .^sia.

During the two centuries preceding the Christian era India lost her
principal source for the import of precious metals when the movements
of the nomads cut the Bactrian route to Siberia. Hence in the first
century A.^l>. she sought to import them from the Roman empire* But
the grave effects of this upon the imperial economy caused the

Vpp. 41^3.

THE PRE-EL-ROPHAN PERIOD

PT. t

Emperor Vespasian (69-79) stop the flight of precious metals and
forced Ipdians to seek for them elsewhere, Thev turned, Cced^
thinks, to the Golden Chersonese, and the Sanskrit names, such as
Suvarnabhumi syid Suvamadvipa, whi 0 h were given to places in
South-East Asia show that to the Indians they were famous chiefly
for gold.

This reorientation of Indian commerce came, be suggests, at a time
when notable advances were being made in navigation in the Indian
Ocean. One major innovation in the mercantile marines of both India
and China was the construcdon of large sea-going vessels, carrying
up to 700 pas^ftgers, and with a rig which permitted them to sail
close to the wind. In the middle of the first century a.d. the
knowledge of the effects of the monsoons upon conditions of sea
travel, till then the closely guarded secret of .Arabian seamen, was
discovered by the Greek pilot Hippalos and caused an immense
increase in voyages between India and the Red Sea ports, which, it is
arguable, must aUo have had its effects upon communications between
India agd the countries farther east.

"rhe stories in the Buddhist which deal with sea adventures,

bear witness to the important place which nautical enterprise held in
Indian life when they were composed. Buddhism too, it is suggested,
may have played its part tn overcoming the strong repugnance of many
Indians against overseas travel, since its teachings undermined their
ideas of racial purity and their fears of pollution through leaving their
native $horc3.

Ferrand has described what he pictures as the beginnings of the
process of ‘Hindui?ation‘ in Java. A small convoy of ships arrives at
a port Its leaders win over the chiefs by presents, and the ordinary
people by distributing amulets and treating the sick- I'hus they' gain
a reputation for wealth and the possession of magjcal powers, and
their claims, real or spurious, to royal birth are accepted when they
seek the daughters of chiefs in marriage. 'I’hcir wives then become
useful instruments for the propagation of the neiv ideas concerning
royalty, ceremonial and worship which they introduce. Sir Richard
Winstedi, in applying the same picture to Malaya, adds that the
marriages of Indians with chiefs' daughters at this period finds its
parallel centuries later in the propagation of Islam through the marri¬
ages of Tamil Mtisjims into the families of the sultans and bendaharas
of Malacca.

This was, however, not the only way in which the new culture was
first introduced. There were cases where an Indian imposed himself

CK, 2

tNDtAN CULtL^RAL INFLUENCE

3s chief on a native population, or where a native chief adopted the
dvili?.adon of the foreigners and increased his st^iu^ and powar there¬
by. There mu&t also have been cases where merchants of South-East
Asian origin brought over Trfdian culture and Sanscrit literature to
their homelands. There was thus no mass immigration such as would
lv"|ve modified the physical type of the populations.

The successful. launching of ventures such as these would be
followed by the arrival of the culd%^ted elements^ through whom a
knowledge of Sanikrit literature was disseminated. And as the native
languages would hnve no terms adequate to express the new ideas,
Indian terminology found Its w'ay into them^ The Chinese have testi¬
fied to the presence of Indian functionaries in the state of Funan.
Many of them must have been non-.Aryans, claiming to belong to
sodal classes from which they would have been excluded in India.
Otherwise it is difficult to account for the prevalence of mixed mairi-
ages^ which were abhorrent to men of genuine Erahman origin. This
practice of mixed marriages also ensured that a Hindu dynasty must
soon have become I ndo-Chinese or Indonesian. Thus under aFfindu
or Buddhist veneer the older society preserved the essentials of its own
character. The early Chinese reports show native societies that had
adopted Indian culture, not Indian colonics^ Hinduism was aristo¬
cratic and made little impression on the masses. They continue^ to
develop along traditional lines. It was not until many centuries later,
when Theravada Buddhism and Islam were propagated as popular
religions^ that external influences began tq make a real impact upon
the ordinary villager; and even then, in coming to terms with the
indigenous cultures, both imported religions were forced to change
their character to a marked degree.

The fact that Buddhism played an important part in the movemeni
IS shown by the number of images of Buddha of the Amaravati school
associated with the earliest sites. Amaravati, on the river Kistna about
eighty miles from the east coast of India, was the home of a great
school of Buddhist sculpture which flourished especially during the
century from A.D. 150 to 250, Its products can be easily distinguished
from the Indo-Hellenic sculpture of Gandhara, of Avhicb Peshawar
was the ceatrcp by its pure Indian style. But notwithstanding the
importance of Buddhism^ as demonstrated by the prevalence of its art,
it is an inescapable fact that most of the newr Indiania^ed states speedily
adopted the Saivite conception of royalty^ with Brahmans as masters of
ceremonies presiding over the cult of the royal linga. Siva^ says Cied^,
became the guardian of the state and a Br ahma n the royal chaplain.

THE PRE-EHHOfEAN ftJltOU

PT. I

In the absence of historical documents showing from whai part& of
Indiu th^ cultural induence^ flowed into SoijLh-East Asia, the evidence
has to be sought for in much the same w^y as tn the case of the origin
and date of the {novement itself, it is sTgnifleant that modem Indian
w riters who have pronounced upon the subject have been tempted to
stress rather too much the claims of their own localities^ Thus^ ^
Cced^ puts it I Madras claims for the Tamils^ and Bengal for the
Bengalis^ the honour of having colonized 'Greater IndiaThe Peri^
plus, as we have seen, mentions three ports from which the kolundiu
were accustomed to set sail for Chrj^se—namely Kaveripatnamp Pondi*
cherrVp and Markanum. Ptolemy places their port farther north, at
or near Chicacole in the Ganjam district. Later there is mention of a
port called Tamralipti“i.e. Tamluk — at the mouth of the Ganges ^
where the Buddhist pilgrims^ Fa-flicn^ in the dfth century^ and
1 -tsing, in the seventh^ embarked for Sumatra on their way home to
China.

The Jutakas mention three ports in western India, Broachp Sopani^
and Ctanganone, as well as Tamluk, in connection with voyages to
Suvarnabhumi, Sanskrit names, such oia Champa, Dvaravati and
Ayodhya, found in South-East Asia commemorate places in the
Ganges region famous in Indian stories. But their use does not indi¬
cate any connection with the region itself, since such words were also
appfied to places in south India. Tamma, mentioned in the oldest
Javanese inscription, seems to commemorate a locality near Cape
Comorin, but Krom identifies it with the Indonesian word larumf
meaning * indigo'.

On the other hand, some names found in South-East Asia have been
taken to indicate a local connection with India. Thus in Burma the
names Ussa (for Pegu) and Srikshetra (for Hmawipa or old Prome)
probably shoAv an ancient relationship with Orissa, while TaJaing, the
Burmese name for the Mon people on the south, seems to have been
derived from Tehngana in the Madras region, with which they had a
close cultural connection. Ilo-ling^ the Chinese name for an early
Javanese kingdom, is probably their rendering of Kling, still the name
applied to southern Indians in Malaya and Cambodia, and indicative
of an original connection with Kalinga. The Karo-Bataks of Sumatra
have such tribal names as Choi a, Pandya, PaJlava and Malay ala, all
of which come from DravHdian India. The dynastic tradition of the
Kings of Funan harks back to that of the PalLavas and Cholas of soulh
India, when they ascribe their origin to the marriage of the legendarj'
Brahman Kaun^nya with the naga princesa. Kaundinya is the name

CH, 2

INDIAN CULT! ML INFLUENCE

of a Brahman clan of nortk India^ a branch of which became influential
in Mysore in the second century a.d, •

The script used in the earliest inscriptions has also been examined
for light on the problem, 'Fllfc great difficulty here arises from the fact
that in their earliest forms the various types of Indian writing show
fheir fewest divergencies. Hence, while R. C. Majumdar thinka that
the oldest Sanskrit inscription in Funan uses Kusliana script from
north India, K. A. Nilakanta Sastri argues that all the alphabets used
in South-East Asia have a south fndian origin^ and that Pallava script
has a predominant influence. Ccedes, however, points out that the
employment of a pre-Xagari script for a short time at the end of the
eighth and the beginning of the ninth centuries is evidence of a w^avc
of Bengali influence.*

The plastic arts and architecture afford little help, since their
earliest cjcamplea do not appear until long after the first impact of
Indian culture and show a diversity of influences. Of the architecture
Parmentier ventures the considered Dpinion that, shorn of its images
and inscriptions, it is so different From its Indian prototypes |hat the
connection is by no means obvious. In the case of the lovely Ananda
temple at Fagan in Burma, while tradition asserts that King Kyanzi-
ttha built it in imitation o-f the cave temple of Ananta at Udayagiri in
Orissa, Charles Duroiselle, a former Superinlendent of the --Irchaeo-
logical Survey of Burma, thinks that the temple of Paharpur in
northern Bengal may have sensed as the model.

From his examination of all the available evidence CcEdfat, who is
our safest guide in these matters, concludes that $outb India played
the greatest part in the export of Indian culture. But he stresses the
fact that Indian influence wa$ exerted over several centuries and came
in successive weaves. Moreover^ the other parts of India, even the
north-west, must not he excluded from some share in the diffusion of
culture.

So far the sea alone has figured in this discussion as the way by
which Indian influence came into South-East Asia. It was the obvious
Way of travel between India and the Archipelago; indeed the voyage
from the Coromandel Coast to the Straits of Malacca was a com¬
paratively short one, and at the right time of the veaLt was easy and
safe even for small vessels. There was, however, a northerly land
route from India to China through Assam, Upper Burma and Yunnan,
Historical evidence shows it to have been in use as early as 12S b,c^
when Chang Ch'ien discovered the products of Szechwan in Bactria. .

FElttOD

PT. I

Steps were taken to develop it^ and in a.d. 69 ^ far its better control
and protection^ China founded the prefecture of Yung'Ch*ang across
the upper Mekong with its headquarters east of the Salween^ about
abcty miles from the present Burma ftonlier. Along this route in
A.D. 97 travelled envoys from the eastern part of the Roman empire to
Yung-ch'ang. The Buddhist pilgrim I-tsing tells us that it was used ^
the end of the third century by twent>^ Chinese monks^ who went to
the Court of Sri GuptaH

In the fourth century China relaxed her hold on the Burma frontier
to s^uch a degree that in 34a the Yung-ch^ang prefecture was abolished.
Thereafter the route w-as apparently closed until Ko-lo-feng (74S-79)
of Nanchao reopened it, and thereby promoted much economic de¬
velopment in northern Burma and contacts between the Pyu of Burma
and the T^ang Court in China. Evidence discovered in Pyu sites
tend^ to $how that some Indian influence penetrated overland into
Upper Burma. By the same route it came also to the T'al kingdom of
Nanchao. But the usual way of communication between India and
Burmi^ was by sea.

To reach the countries in the eastern parts of the Indo-Chinese
mainland ships had to pass through cither the Malacca or the Sunda
Straits. Owing to the prevalence of piracy in these narrow' waters
travellers sought to avoid them by using a number of short cuts over¬
land. Archaeological discoveries along these overland routes attest
their importance, not only in the early days of Indian penetration, but
later also when the empire of Srivijaya maintained strict control over
the straits and farced all ships to pul in at one or other of its ports.

The favourite short cut was across the narrow' Isthmus of Kra, from
Takua Pa on the western side to Ch^aiya on the eastern, or froiti Kedah
to Singora. Farther north there was a route from Tavoy over the
Three Pagodas Pass and thence by the Kanburi river to the valley of
the Men am. Two ancient sites, P'ong Tuk and P"ra Fathom, lie on
this route. Further still to the north lay s route to the Mcnam region
by Moulmetn and the Raheng pass. Later on these last two routes
w'cre used by the Burmese in their invasions of Siam, notably in the
sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. More recently still they were used
by the Japanese to invade Burma during the Second World War.
There was yet another overland route used by early trav'ellers. It led
from the Menam to the Mekong and passed over the K'orat plateau
via Si T'ep to the Bassak region, which was the cradle of the Khmer
kingdom of Cambodia,

CK, 2

INDJAX CULTmiAL INFLUmCE

[b) The earliest imtei of Indiamsed stofes: Funarj^ ihe Lfrt-yi

So far as historical evidence go£s^ the first signs of states formed in
the manner that has been described in the prececfing section show
jthat they were in existence by the end of the second century a,d. They
appear in three regions: (a) that of the lower Mekong and its dclta^
{b) the neighbourhood of Hiii m modem Annam^ and (r) the Malay
Peninsula. They probably existed elscwherep say in Arakan and Lower
Burma, but the evidence is lacking. In the absence of archaeological
and epigraphical material earlier than the fifth centuiy^, our sole sources
of information for the earlier period are the place-names In the Niddesa
and Ptolemy^s Geqgr&phicOf and the references in the Chinese dynastic
histories to relations w^ith the states of South-East Asia. The latter
are invaluabki for w'ithout them the earliest history of the important
States of Funan and Champa would be completely unknown. But
their geographical particulars are vague and their transcriptions of
Sanskrit names difficult to recognise, ,

Funan represenu the modem Chinese pronunciation of two charac¬
ters once pronounced B'iu-nam, the name by which they knew the
pre-Khmer kingdom, whose original senlements were along the Me¬
kong between Chaudoc and Phnom Penh. This was not its real name,
which ia unknowiij, but the title assumed by its rulers. It is the modern
Khmer word phmm^ 'motlntAin^ in Old Khmer hrtom, and the full
title was kurung bn&tri^ ' king of the mou^tain^ the vernacular equi¬
valent of the Sanskrit imloroja^ itself reminiscent of the title borne by
the Pal lava Kings of Conjeveram In south India.

Funan^s capital city was for some time Vyadhapura, *the dty of
hunters\ which lay near the hill Ba Phnom and the village of Banam
in the present Cambodian province of Prd Veng, The Chinese say
that it w^as 120 miles from the sea. Oc Eo, its port, has been the subject
of recent excavations by French archaeologists. Il was a very early
centre of foreign merchants and probably dates as early as the first
centuiy a.o. 'Fhe country was intersected with innumerable channels
wrhich made it posaiblc for Chinese travellera to ^sail across Funan' on
their w^ay to the Malay Peninsula, Funan indeed was situated on what
ivas in its day the great maritime highw^ay between China and India.
Its people were Indonesians w'ho were in the tribal state at the daw'n of
Its history. They spoke a pre-Khmer Austro-.^siatlc language, though
at the end of the Funan period they seem to have exchanged this
for Old Khmer.

THE PBE-ETBOPEAN FESIOD

FT. I

The earliest Chinese reference to the kingdom comes from the pen
of K*ang T'ai. who together with Cha Tmg was sent thither on a
nussion in the middle of the third century. He tells the story of the
foundaiion of the kingdom by Kauncttnya, whose name he trans¬
literates Hun-t"ien* According to his account this ruler was a foreigner,
who came from a place which may be India^ the Malay Peninsula* of
even the southern islands. He was guided to his future kingdom by
a dream, in which he was vouchsafed a divine revelation of hia destiny-
On arrival he defeated an attempt by the queen of the country^ Liu*-
yeh, "Willow Leaf^ to seize his ship by transfixing her boat with an
arrow from his magic bow. Then he married her and founded the
dynasty which ruled after him for a ccnluty and a halL
The story is apparenlJy a local adaptation of the Indian legend of
the Brahman Kaundinya and the Nagi Soma, the daughter of the King
of the Xaga^^ The correct account of the Indian legend is given in an
inscription found at Mison in Champa^ This tells how' the Brahman
Kaundinya received a sacred javelin from A^vattharman^ the son of
Drona^and threw it in order to mark the site of his future capital. He
then married Soma, the daughter of the naga king, and founded a line
of kings. The descendants of the Pallava rulers of Conjeveram used
a simitar legend to explain their own origin. At a later date the legend
was adopted by the Khmers and the naga became the sacred symbol
of tfieir origin. A mystic union between the Khmer king and a naga
princess had a prominent place in the Court ceremonial of Angkor;
he was required to maintain the well-being of his realm through con¬
summation of a union with a nine-headed naga. This nine-headed
cobm indeed became the dominant theme of Khm^r iconography.

The Umg History asserts that one of Kaundinya's descendants*
Hun P’an-h/uang, died at the age of over ninety and was succeeded by
his second son P'an-p'an^ Avho handed over the conduct of affairs to
his great general Fan Man. I'he title Fou has been thought to have
been a Chinese transliteration of the San&krit suffix varm&n^ which
rulers in south India had begun to use.^ According to th* Southern
T'^si History Fan Man^s full name was Fan Shih-man, and on the
death of P’an-p"an after a short reign of three years he was chosen
king by popular acdamaiion.

Fan Shih-man was a great conqueror He extended hia power so
widely that he took the title of Great King. He also built a fleet which
dominated the seas. The Limig History says that he attacked ten

^ But sn: Coed^f, tip, ril-, p. 71, o.i- The suj^cation thilt in Ji djio name of iijinvc

oriRin WDUld uppear lo bt preferable to jo fkr-fetched ati c<|uivflien,ce.

CH. Z

l^'DlAN CULTURAL IXrLUENCE

kingdoms^ and name? four of thern. There is some difficuli^^ in identi¬
fying these, but hi? vassal state? probably included the low^r valleys
of the Mekong and Tonle Sap ^d parts of the delta. He is thought
aUo to have reduced the co&ial strip from the Mekong-Donnai delta
to Camranh Bay. One of his conquests ha? been identified with Pto-
Jemy'fi Kattigara, which Paul Lcny places in Cochin China. Another*
'Pun-hsuni has been identified by PelHot with the northern part of the
Malay Peninsula^ possibly a? far do%vn as Takola.

The Chinese assert that Fan Shih-man died while conducting an
expedition against a state called Chin-lin* 'Frontier of Gold'. This
has been identified with either Suvamabhuirti, 'Land of Gold", or
Suvamakudya, ' Wall of Gold^ and might be placed in either Lower
Burma or the Malay Peninsula. Coedes b of opinion that he is the
king referred to as Sri Mara in a Sanskrit inscription of Vo-canh in
the region of Nha-trang, now in south cm Annam, but at one time in
the kingdom of Champa, The inscription shows that he was ? patron
of Buddhism and used Sanskrit as the official language of his Court.
Finot, however, think? that Sri Mara was a vassal of Funan. ,

So far h has been impossible to assign exact dates to any of the
rulers or events in the early history of Funan. According to the calcu¬
lation of Ccedcs, tlie events giving rise to the legend of Kaundinya
must have occurred not later than the first century a.d. During the
reign of Fan Shih-man^s successor, Fan Chan, through the relations
of Funan with India and China* certain apparently well-attested dates
do at last emerge. Fan Chan wa? a nephew of the Great King,
vvho killed the legitimate heir, usurped the throne a^nd reigned some
twenty years before dying at the hands of a brother of the man he had
removed from his path. His reign falls somewhere between 225 and
250. He received a visit from a native of India* who so charmed him
by his account of that country that he sent an embas?y\ which after
embarking at the port of Takola in the Malay Peninsula weni: by sea
and up the Ganges to a Court identified by Sylvain L^vi as that of the
Munindas. This embassy belong? to the years 340-5,

Meanwhile, according to the Hutory oj Thm Kingdoms^ he sent
in 243 a mission to China with a present of musicians and product? of
his country. Somewhere between 245 and 250 his successor* Fan
Hsun* received a return mission from China* which met an envoy of
the Murunda? at his Court, K*ang T'ai^ who recorded the fim extant
account of the kingdom of Funan, was a member of this mission.
Funan, be wrotCt had walkd cities containing palaces and dwelling-
houses. The people were ugly; black, fri22y-haircd and went naked^

THE Pft£-ELmOPEAN PERIOD

PT. I

Their mamieDs were simple, but they were not given to theft. They
praetJ^d a primitive kind of agriculture. They enjoyed using the
chi$e] and engraved ornaments. Many of their eating utensils were
made of silver. Taxes were paid in gold, silver, pearls and perfumes.
They had also books and depositories of archives. Their writing
resembled that of the Hon, a central Asian people using an Indian
script*

K'ang T^ai $eeiti$ to have persuaded Fan Hsun to issue a decree
ordering the men to wear clothings and they adopted the piece of cloth
wrapped round the w'aist which is now the Cambodian sampot. Such
' is his story. Kaundin^'a is said to have introduced the custom of
clothing for w'omen. .According to the legend. Soma wore no clothes
when he arrived in the country* He therefore dressed her in a fold of
cloth With 3 hole through which she passed her head. He abo made
her do her hair in a knoL Such was the fabled origin of clothing and
hairdressing in Cambodia.

The relations with China, cemented by these mbsions, remained
close throughout Fan Hsun*s reign, which lasted until at least 2S7.
The Chin Hhtory mentions a series of missions from him covering
the period 268-87. But relations wxre not invariably good, for he
appears to have made an alliance with Fan Hsiung, tvho came to the
throne of Lin-ji (Champa) in 270, and to have joined his ally in a ten-
years war against Chiao-chi (Tongking). When the first emperor of
the Chin dynasty came to the throne in 280, the Governor of Tongking
addressed a memorial to him complaining of the raids of the Lin-yij
aided by friendly bands from Funan^ upon the commandery of Jc-nan.
I'he Chin History, in recording this incident, says that the state to
which the Lin-yi raiders belonged had been founded about a century
earlier by a native oEEcial, K^iu Lien^ who had taken advantage of
the weakness of the Han dynasty (206 b.c.-a.d. 221) to carve out a
kingdom for himself at the expense of |e-nan in the year A D,
192. The Chinese name for his kingdom was Hsiang-Un, which was
in fact the name of their sub-prefecture in which the independence
movement took place. It coincided almost exactly with the present
Annamite province of Thua-thien, in which the dty of Hn€ is
situated.

Thus does the slate later to be known as Champa first appear in
historj^ Archaeological evidence shows that the centre of its power
lay just to the south of the Hue region, in the modem Annamite
province of Quang-nam, which is so rich in archaeological sites that it
was eridently the sacred territory of Champa* But, although the

CH. t INDIAN CULTITRAL INFLUENCH 27

famous sitK of Tra-kieu, Mi son and Dong-duong have yidded speci-
mtm of Amaravali axt^ no evidence exists, as in the case of ngghbour-
ing I'unan, of the dynastic traditions of the Kings of Champa or of
the coming of Indian influeilte. Not till the beginning of the seventh
century does the name Champa first appear in epigraphy, though as
ihe name of the kingdom of the Chains it was probably in existence
before that date. It iSp howeveip by the Chinese name of Lin^yi that
they are knowm during the first phase of their long struggle to expand
northwards into the lands under Chinese control

The narrow coastal strip from the Porte d'Annam to the Col dea
N'uages, which they coveted^ was probably at this time inhabited by
wild tribes in a backward statL Their own territory stretched down
the coast from the Col des Nuages to the Bay of Camranh, but they
had settlements also in the Mekong valley, the valleys of the Sesan
and Song-ba, and the neighbouring hills* They held the western
slopes of the Annamite Chain up to the Mekong valley from Stung
Treng to the river Atun. They belonged to the Indonesian group of
peoples. Later the Indonesian settlements round the Bay of J^hatrang
were to form their southern province of Panduranga^ now Phan-rang^
but this formed part of the empire of Funan when we first hear of the
Lin-yi. The people of this region were related to the Funaneae rather
than to the Chams* They appear to have received Indian influence as
early as the beginning of the first century A.D, According to Par*
mentier, their earliest art and architecture is Khmer rather than Cham.
Their region eontinijed to form part of Funan until the Chenla con¬
quest of that country in the latter part of the sixth century*

The Governor of Tongking'a complaint is not the earliest mention
of the Lin-yi in the Chinese annals. Somewhere between 2ao and 230
a mission was sent by one of the descendants of K'iu-lien to the
Governor of Ktvangtong and Tongkiog. It is in the record of this that
the names " Lin-yi" and " Funan^ appear for the first time. In 248 the
Lin-yi are said to have pillaged the towns of the north, and 10 have
fought a big battle with ihc Chinese in the region of Radon on the
Song Giang. The Fan Hsiung, who came to the throne in 270 and
began another series of attacks upon Tongking in alliance with Funan,
as we have seen above,, is said to have been a gnmdson of K^iu-lien.
When» after a lengthy struggle, these were beaten off, another king of
the Ltn-yiT Fan Yi^ sent in 284 the first official ernbassy from that
kingdom to the Imperial Court of China.

Fan Yi reigned for more than fifiy years. His chief minister. Wen,
who is said to have been of Chinese origin, succeeded to the throne

THE PRE-EIJROPEAM PERJOD

PT. t

in 336* Four years later^ when the Chinese emperor refused to recog¬
nize hisciorthern boundary at the Forte d'Annam, he took possession
of the territory involvedp and at his death in 349 was carrying hi$ arms
still farther northwards, Wen^s son ancf successor. Pan Fo, hawever^
was forced to restore all that his father had conquered. The Chinese
^ record embassies from him in 372 and 377, *

Of the earliest Indianized states in the Malay Peninsula that are
mentioned by the Chinese ^ some may possibly be idendfied with con¬
quests attributed to Fan Chih-man of Funan. Three can be located
with certainty” Lang-ya-siu, Tan-mei-liu, and T'iu-ko-li* The first
is easily recognised as the Lankasul^ of the Malay and Javanese
chronicles. It stretched across the Peninsula from the Gulf of Siam
to the Bay of Bengal and controlled one of the overland short cuts.
Situated in the region of the Perak river^ one tributary of which bears
its namet it dates from the beginning of the second century a.d. It
reappears in sevenih-century Chinese accounts as Lang-kia-chu, and
again in the twelfth century' as Lang-ya-sseu-kia. The region of Kedah
and Petak yields both the oldest and the greatest number of archaeo¬
logical finds in the PenJnsula. But none goes back as far as the con¬
quests of Fan Chih-man; they begin with the fourth-century rock
inscriptions of Province Wellesley, opposite Penang Island.

Tan-mei-liU| which is the Tambralinga of the Pali Niddesa^ was
in existence at the beginning of the second century^ Its centre was
the region of modern Ligon T*iu-ku-lip the port of embarkation of
the Funan mission of 240 to the Mumnda Court, must have been
on the west coast of the Isthmus of Kra. ll is presumably the Takola
of the Niddisa.

So far as our present knowledge goes, it is impossible to give a
connected narrative of the early hiatory of the states mentioned in the
previous section. The Chinese, for instance, have nothing to say
about P'unan between 2S7 and 357* and we have no other evidence to
draw upon for this period. WTien once again light begins to penetrate
the darkness inscriptions appear in Funan, Champa, ^rneo and Java,
and we enter upon a new period in w^hich much stronger cultural
influences are evident.

In recording the receipt of tribute from a King of Funan named
Chan-t^an the Chinese describe him as a Hindu. Chan-t^an is the
Chinese transcription of Chandan, the royal title of the Kushanas of

CM, 2 INDIAN CULTURAL JNFUJEMCE 29

Kaniskha's line, with which Funati is thought to have established
contact in the middle of the third century. Hence the theory*has been ^
pul forward that this king may have been a scion of that house who
fled to Funan as a result of the conquest of north Ipdia by Samudra-
gupta (f. 335-c* 37 S). the second niicr of the Gupta dynasty-*

* The subsequent conquest of much of south India by this king
resulted in the submission of the Pattava sovereign and his viceroys
and caused such grave disturbances that it is feasible to tma^ne the
flight of princes, Brahmans and literati to seek new homes beyond the
sea in lands where Indian culture already existed. This may account
for the strong Pallava influenge which is found in Cambodia, Champa
and the Malay Peninsula, as well as for the fact that the inscriptions
of the new period are in Palkva cliaratlcrs.. But it is only a supposition.

The date 357 is the only one known of Chandan's reign. If, as is
supposed, be was an Indo-Scythian, his reign may account for the
Iranian influence in early Khmer statuary, and for the fact that when
the Khmers conquered Funan their new kingdom had the name of
Kamboja, which, it has been suggested, may indicate some relation¬
ship with the Iranian Kambojas. The cabochon with a Sassanide
efflgy found at Oc Eo seems to he a further pointer to a possible
cnnnection.

The Liang Hhtory asserts that one of Chandan'a successors was a
Brahman from India named Kian-chen-ju, w'hom a supernatural
voice bade go and rule over Funan. According to this account he was
well received by the people, who chose him as their king. He then
changed all the rules in accordance with Indian methods. His name
is thought to be a Chinese rendering of ‘Kaundinya’, and the story
would thus indicate the restoration of the Hindu element in the ruling
family against the indigenous clan of the Fan, under w-hose rule Indian
influence had tended to be weakened by contact with the local culture.
No date is assigned to the reign of this second Kaundinya, but one of
his successors, with a name which may stand for Sreshthavarman, is
reported to have sent an embassy to the Emperor Wen (424-53). 'I'he
Early Sung hiktary mentions further embassies in 434, 435 and 438,
and saya that this king refused to help the Lin-yi in an attack on
Tongking.

The greatest king of the later history of Funan was Jayavarman, or
Kaundinya jayavarman, who died in 5 * 4 - The date of the beginning
of his reign is unknown. He sent merchants to trade at Canton, On
their return journey they were wrecked off the coast of Champa, and
a monk, Nagasena, who was with them made his way back to the

THE PRE-EUKOPF^N PERIOD

FT. I

cspita] overland. In 484 Jayavarman sent him lo China to ask for aid
against the Lin-yi; but this "was refused, Jayavarman's letter to the
Chinese emperor abou.’s that the ofBdal religion of Funan was f^aivite,
but that Buddhism was also practised.

This story comes from the Sout/iem Ch’i History, which also con¬
tains an account of the kingdom as it was in Jayavarmim's day. It is *
a picture of a seafaring people, carrying on both trade and piracy, and
constantly preying upon their neighbours. The king lives in a palace
with a tiered roof, while the houses of the common people are built
on piles and have bamboo leaves as a covering for their roofs. The
people fortify their settlements with wooden pdissadcs. The national
dress is a piece of cloth tied round the waist. The national sport is
cock-fighting and pig-fighting. Trial ts by ordeal. The king rides
about in public on an elephant.

A later text, the Uong Histoty, adds that not only the king but the
whole Court, and the concubines as well, ride on elephants. The deities
of the sky are worshipped, n'hese are represented by bronae images;
some tvLih two faces and four arms, others tvith four faces and eight
arins-Hevidently a reference to the cult of Haribara. The dead are
disposed of in four ways: by throwing the corpse into the current of
a river, by burning it to ashes, by burial in a trench, and by exposure
to th(* birds. This account also refers to a custom of washing still
found in Cambodia and known as the irapeang, the use of a common
bathing tank by a number of families.

On the occasion of the reception of an embassy from Jayavarman

503* the Imperial Court recognised his greatness by conferring upon
him the title of •General of the Pacified South, King of Funan’. No
Jnscriptioiis set up by him have been discovered, but his chief queen
and a son named Gunavarman each left a Sanskrit one. Both display
VaiSnavite inspiration. The prince’s, at Thap-muoi in the Plaint du*
joncs, commemorates the foundation of a sanctuary containing a foot¬
print of Vishnu called Chakratirthasvamin. It is reminiscent of Pur-
navarman’s sanctuary in Java with his footprints likened to those of
Vishnu, Gunavarman's inscription records the reclamation of marsh¬
land, Pumavarman was famous for irrigation works. The footprints
of Vishnu signify the reconquest of territory—in both cases, it would
seem, by peaceful means.

Rudravarman, who succeeded his father Jayavarman in 514, is des¬
cribed by the Liang History as a usurper, bom of a concubine, who
on his father’s death murdered the rightful heir, presumably Guna¬
varman. and seized the throne. Between 517 and 539 he despatched

€iL 2

INDIAN CULTURAL INFLUENCE

a number of mi&siona to China. When he died, presumably in about
550, a movement occurred m the middle Mekong region lindcr the
leadership of tivo brotherSp Bhavavarman and Chitrasena, and under
somewhat mysterious circuitistances the power of Funan was over¬
thrown. Rudravarman's embassy of 539 seems to have been the last
■that Funan as an independent state sent to the Imperial Court, Early
in the next century, when the Chinese record the next embassy from
the Funan region, the ^Vetp T'dug History explains that the " City of
Hunters*, the old capital of Funan, has been conquered by Chenla^
and its king forced to emigrate to a place in the south.

Funan was the first great pqwer in South-East Asian historj'. Like
Rome in European history, its prestige lived on long after its fall. Its
traditions^ notably the cults of the sacred mountain and the naga
princess, were adopted by the Khmer Kings of Cambodia. And
although its architecture has disappeared completely, there is every
reason to believe that some of its characteristics are preserved in a
number of Cambodian buildings of the pre-Angkor period which still
exist, and that the Gupta-style Euddhas, the mitred Vishnus^nd the
Hariharas of that period convey some idea of the way in which the
Funan sculptors fashioned the human form.

Champa’s earliest inscriptions are associated with a King Bhadra-
varman. They are found in Quang-nam and Phu-yen. The older
generation of French scholars identified Bhadra%’armaii with Fan Hu-
ta, the son and successor of Fan Fo, who wa$ driven back by the
Chinese from the Porte d*.Annam frontier, and dated the inscriptions
r. 400, The distinguished Dutch scholar Vogel, however, attributes
them to Fan Fo'3 rdgn. In both cases^ how ever,^ the king^s name bears
not the slightest resemblance to *Bhadravarman*j and Stein has sug¬
gested that the kings with Sanskrit names who reigned in Quang-
nam were not the same as the Lin-yi rulers of the Hue region whose
doings are chronicled In the Chinese histories. He thinks that there
were two separate states, and that the southem one was later conquered
by the Lin-yt.

Bhadravantian^ whoever he may have been» founded the first sanc¬
tuary to be built in the Mison area and dedicated it to Siva-Bhadre^-
vara. Such linking of a royal founder's name with tliat of Siva became
a widespread custom later on in states where Saivite traditions of king-
ship prevailed. One of Bhadravarman^s rock inscriptions is of par¬
ticular interest, since it contains the oldest extant text in any Indo¬
nesian language. It enjoins respect for the ^king's naga\ which seems
to be a divinity guarding a water-spring. These inscriptions indicate

tHE PHE-ELTHOPEA\ F£J^IOD

FT. I

clearly that the Court religion was Siva-worship; ihe god Siva-
Bhadrc^v«ra was represented by a linga, which is the earliest example
of it$ kind in South-East Asia.

No eontemporary Chinese account of the customs of the Lin-Ji
exists, but tbe thirteenth-century traveller Ma Tuan-hn has described
them, presumably from earlier sources. He says that they were re-»
puted to be the same as those of Funan and ail the kingdoms beyond.
He stresses the importance of woman, saying that marriages all take
place in the eighth mondi and that the women choDse their husbands.
He also mentions the custom of urn burial. Seven days after death,
he tells us, the king's body is ceremoniously conducted to the sea¬
shore» where it is burnt on a pyre. The bones are then placed in a
gold vase and thrown into the sea.

The fall of the Chin dynasty at the beginning of the fifth century
led to such a spate of Cham attacks on Tongking that the Chinese
governor was forced to appeal to the Imperial Court for help. In 431
the Chinese made a sea attack on Champa, hut were driven off. It was
in consequence of this threat that King Yang Mah tried, without
success, as we have seen, to obtain the help of Funan in an attack on
Tongking. In 446 a new Governor of Tongking, I'^^an Ho-ch'u,
decided to teach the Lin-yi a severe lesson. He sAvooped down on
their j;:apital in the Hius region, plundered it and retired with a booty
estimated at 100,000 lb. of pure gold, China, it is to be noted, made
no attempt permanently to occupy and annex Lin-jd territory^ Her
aim was simply to keep her frontier region quiet by adminis^tering a
dose of frightfulness to the 'barbarians^ beyond it. After Lhi& there
was a long period of peace during w'hich the customary embassies
were sent to China.

In 529 a new^ dynasty, the fourth in Cham history according to
Maspero's reckoning, came to the throne. Rudra^arman, its first kingt
w'as granted investiture by China, and in 534 sent an embassy. Nine
years later he w^as tempted to send a raiding force into Tongking,
The opportunity seemed a good one, for the Vietnamese leader^ Li
Bon, had revoked against China and was endeavouring to assert his
independence. Rudravarman'a raiden*. however, were defeated by Lt
Bon s general^ Pham Tu. 547 Li Bon^s revolt itself was suppressed
by China, It vvas not long, however, before the weakness of the
Southern Ch en dynasty (SS7“®9) tempted the Chama to renew’
their raids; but only for a brief spelL For the conquests of Vang
Chien, the founder of the Swei dynasty, caused King Samhhuvarman
to change his policy and present tribute in 395.

CIL 2

ISDJilN CVLTVfLkL IN^KLUENCE

Ttfin years later the Chinese decided to ^dminbter another dose of
the same inedicmc as in 446. Their armies im^ded Champa, took its
capital^ and again carried a^^'ay a va$t amount of booty. For a ^^hile
Sambhuvarman was ^ubmisiflve. Then, as a sign of his recoveiy, he
began to neglect to send the customary' tribute. But the accession of the
*T'ang dynasty in 6tS led him to decide that discretion was the better
pan of valour^ So Cham missions were once more sent dutifully to the
Imperial Court at Ch^ang-an, and a long lull beg^ in Cham aggrmiorL
Champa^s earliest Sanskrit inscriptions come just before the earliest
on^ found in the Malay Peninsula, Java and Borneo. Cherok Tekun^
on the mainland opposite to Penang, has yielded some fragments of
rock inscriptions that have been attributed to the fourth century. A
slightly later one comes from near Bukit Meriam in Kedah. It is on a
slate slab found in a ruined brick house which may have been the cell
of a Buddhist monk. It consists of two Buddhist verses in Sanskrit
inscribed in the characters of the oldest Pallava alphabet. The second
runs: ‘Karma accumulates through lack of knowledge. Karma is the
cause of rebirth. Through knowledge it comes about that ny karma
is effected^ and through absence of karma there is no rebirth.*

The late neolithic site of Kuala Sdinsing in Perak has yielded a
fifth-century cornelian seal inscribed >vitb name of Sri Vishnuvarman.
But the most interesting find dating from this period comes from the
north of the present Province Wellesley. It is an iDscribed slate slab
on a stupa surmounted by a chQttravali, or seven-tiered ‘umbrella".
The Sanskrit text consists of the Buddhist verse quoted above and a
prayer for the success of a voyage projected by one Huddhagupta, the
master of a junk, who is said to reside in the * Red Land'* The Red
Land has been identified through Chinese texts with a place in the
P‘at"alung region on the Gulf of Siam. This inscription also is in
Pal lava script. Thus Mahayana Buddhism was in Malaya at this time
and had apparently been brought there from South India.

The same period shmvs the establishment of relations betw een some
of the peninsular states and China. In 515 a King of Lankasuka
called Bhagadatta is mentioned in this connection. The Liang History
describes his people as w^earing their hair loose and sleeveless cotton
garments. The king^ as usual, rides upon an elephant under a canopyt
preceded by drums and flags and surrounded by a fierce-looking body¬
guard, North of Lankasuka was the state of R'an-p^an, which ran
along the Gulf of Siam. Its earliest missions to China date from the
period 424-53. From this state the second KaundJnya was said to have
made his way to restore Hinduism in Funan.

T?IE Pftii-EUllOFEAN' PEKtOt)

PT. 1

Borneo shows its earliest traces of Indian influence in seven in-
seriptioiv found in the sultanate of Kutei in the east of the island at
a sanctuary' whose religious cult has not been identified with certaintj .
They are said to come from c. 400 andVmanate from a King Mula-
varman, vrho mentions his grandfather Kundunga and his father Asva-
rarman. The latter is said to have been the founder of the dynasty,
Kundunga is not a Sanskrit word, and the suggestion has been made
that the family was Indonesian in ongin. In the valleys of the rivers
Kapuhas, Mahakam and Rata other signs of Indian influence have
shown themselves in the form of BrahmanicaJ and Buddhist images in
Gupta style,

java's earliest inscriptions come from the hinterland of Djakarta,
the capital of the republic of Indonesia. At the fool of the mountains
near BogOr-—previously Buitenaurg-—three rock-inscriptions dating
from r. 450 have been found. A fourth belonging to the same period
was found east of Tandjong Priok, the port of Djakarta. The author
was a King Pumavarman of Taruma, who obsen ed Brahmanical rites
and prtjmoted irrigation works, the earliest known in Java. Two of the
inscriptions reproduce his footprints, and one those of his elephant.
He is described as a great warrior, and these are the usual marks of
the occupation of a country after conquest. Stutterheim. however, has
suggested that his most important conquest was the peaceful one
forded in one of the inscriptions wherein he claims to have dug an
irrigation canal some fifteen kilometres in length in the short space of
twenty daj's.* The name of his kingdom is reminiscent of that nf a
region in South India near Cape Comorin, and is still conserved in
that of the river Chi Tarum in the Bandung area. That It lasted until
the second half of the seventh century is attested by the Chinese, w ho
record missions from ' To-lo-mo‘ in 666-9. H « thought to have been
conquered some twenty years later by the rising Sumatran state of
Srivijaya with its centre at Palembang.

Chinese pitgrima on their way to or from the homeland of the
Buddha stopped at Javu or Sumatra in the course of the fifth century.
Fa Hien, on his way homewards to China in 414, comments sadly
ypon the few traces of Buddhism and the predominance of pagans and
heretics in the kingdom of ' Ye-p‘o-t'i Ten yearn later the raiasionarv
monk Gunavarman, a prince of Kashmir, visited the kingdom of‘Cho-
p'o’. whence the Chinese record embassies in 433 and 435. A third
kingdom,' Ho-lo-tati’, situated on the island of' Cho-p-Q’, is also men¬
tioned by the Chinese as sending envoys between 430 and 45^. Some

^ Hti *n d£ fj, 94.

CIt. 2

lNl>tAN CULTURAL INFLUENCE

researchers have attempted to place these kingdoms on the Malay
PeruDsula, but there seems no good reason for abandoning ^^elliot's
identification of the names" Yc-p"o-t"i" and" Cho-p'o^ vAth Java itself.^

A kingdom called “ Kan-i^-U" Is also mentioned by the Chinese.
During the period 454-64 it was ruled by a king styled Sri Varana-
rendra, who sent a Hindu Rudra aa his envoy to China. Later^ in 502,
a Buddhist king was reigning there, and in 519 his son Vijayavarman
sent A mission to China. This kingdom is thought to have been
situated m Sumatrap

From their proximity to India ii would naturally be inferred that
the valleys of the Irrawaddy and the Menam must have been pene¬
trated by Indian influence both earlier and more profoundly than
Funan and Champa. Unfortunately there is practically no archaeo¬
logical evidence from these regions before the middle of the sixth
century^ and Chinese sources do not refer to thenoL The absence of
such evidence does not* however, prove very much either but
merely that the Chinese had no intercounse with these countries so
early. They do indeed mention a Buddhist kingdom of Lin-yang in
their story of Fan Chih-man^s attempt to conquer the Chin-Iin in the
third century, and in $uch a way as to suggest that It lay in central
Burma.

If* as seems likely, they made their earliest contact via A'unnan jvith
the Pyu kingdom in the same century, the assumption may not be far¬
fetched that Lin-yang was the Pyu kingdom who$e capital, bearing
the legendary name of Srikshetra* was at Hmawza, near Prorae in
central Burma. The earliest fragments of inscriptions found there go
back to c. 500. Local chronicles give long li&ts of legendary kings
beginning from the time of the Buddha, but there is no mcana of
verification.

The legends of the Mon people of Burma centre around the city of
Thaton (Sudhammavati), which may have had some connection with
Orissa. There seems no reason to doubt that the Burmese name for a
Mon, *Talaing*, takes its derivation from Telingana, and indicates
the region in India whence their culture came. Legend asserts that
Buddhaghosa, the father of Sinhalese Buddhism of the fifth cennir\%
was a Mon monk of Thaton* that he brought the Pali scriptures to his
native city in 403^ and later died there. No archaeological evidence
exists concerning this subject. The earliest Mon sites are those of Si
T'ep, P'ra Pathom and P‘ong Tuk in the Menam basin, and date from

^ Cirdha, op, rif., p. 95, PcItbVt unpartani' Dkux ltui^jviirc»UEFEO* iv (1904^

PP' ^ 74 -^*

THE PRE-EUilOi*tAN PERIOH

PT. I

befctre 550. In thdr early days they were under Funan, but DQthing
h knowTi of them during this period. In the seventh century they
formed part of the Mon kingdom of Dvaravati, but whether this
existed as early as the fifth or sixth centuries is also unknown^

The earliest epigraphical evidence regarding the kingdom of Arakan
has been interpreted as showing a Candra dynasty reigning there from
the middle of the fourth century. Its capital, near later Mrohaung in
northern Arakan* was called by the Indian name of Valsatt. The
names of thirteen kings w^hose reigns covered a period of 230 years
have been preser^^ed, but only one of them can be equated Tviih a
name in the Arakanese chronicles. He Is Candrodaya, who may be
Sandasurya of the chronicles^ but hia date of accession j$ given in
them as the equivalent of a.d. 146*

(

CHAPTER 3

THE ISLAND EMPIRES (i)

(fl) The emergence of Srivijaya; the SaUe/idras

The pail of Fonan, vdth its powerful fleet and commercial ramifica'
tions, left the way open for the rise of a new maritime empire at the *
western end of Indonesia. The earliest historical evidence of the new
States comes from the seventh century, it is fragmentary, the lacunae
are baffling in the ejctreme, and the picture that emerges is often far
from clear. But since George Gardes published the first study of the
history of Srivijaya in much progress has been made in clarifica¬
tion and amplifiration. On some important points, however, there ate
still wide divergencies of opinion among scholars. ,

The political lay-out in java and Sumatra in the middle of the
seventh century is indicated by the Chinese record of missions coming
from states there. l‘wo states in Sumatra are menrioTied: ‘ Mo-io-yeou’
on the east coast, which has been identified as Makyij, now Jambi, on
the river Batang, and eomew'hat farther south ' Che-Ii-fo-che’, the
Chinese form of the Sanskrit Srivijaya, at what is today Palembang.
Java seems to have been divided between three kingdoms: in the
extreme west Pumavarmaii’s Taruma with a changed name, in the
centre ‘ Ho-ling’, or Kalinga> and in eastern Java a kingdom ivith its
capital somewhere south of modern Surabaya.

The two Sumatran states were visited in 671 by the famous Chinese
Buddhist pilgrim I-taing while on his way to India. At Srivijaya, he
tells us, there were over a thousand Buddhist monks, and their rules
and ceremonies were the same as in India. The fact that he spent six
months there studying Sanskrit grammar before going on to India is
evidence of Srivijayak importance as a centre of Mahayaniat learning.

In 685, after a long period of study at the Buddhist ‘university* of
Nalanda in Bengal, I-tsing returned to Srivijaya and spent some four
years there translating Buddhist texts from Sanskrit into Chinese. In
689, being in urgent need of writing materials and helpers;, he made a
brief visit to Canton, then returned to Srivijaya with four collaboratore
and settled down to complete his two memoirs on the Buddhist
' G. Cadi*.' Le fftyaunw do Cnvg»>'#*, BKFEO, seviii (1918), no. 6.

THE PHE-EUHOPEAN PERIOD

FT. I

‘38

religion in his own time. These were completed and despatched to
China 111/92; he himself followed in 695.

In the second of his books I-tsing makes the intriguing statement
that Malayu (Jamhi), where he had stayed for two months after leaiing
^rivijaya on his way to India, had since then become a part of Srivi-
)aya. What exactly his words signified was only established by the,
discovery of a series of Old Malay inscriptions dating from 683 to 686,
Two of them were found near to Palembang, the third at Karang
Brahi on the upper reaches of the river Batang, and the fourth on the
island of Banka. Together with the Cham inscriptions mentioned
earlier they form the earliest e.\amples of the MaLsy-Polynesian group
of 1 anguages so far discovered.

These valuable records, taken together, attest the existence at Palem¬
bang of a Buddhist klngdum which had just conquered the hinterland
of Malayu and was about to attack Java. The oldest one, which comes
from the Palembang region, records that, on a date that can be fixed
as 13 April 683, a king, who is unnamed, embarked with a force of
20,000 pen to seek the magic power, and as a result conferred victory,
power and riches on Srivijaya. The second commemorates the founda¬
tion in 684 of a public park, called Siriksctra, by order of a King
Jayanasa (or Jayanaga) as an act of Buddhist merit. The third and
fourth, dated 686, call down curses upon the inhabitants of the Batang
river region and the island of Banka respectively, should they be dis^
obedient to the king or his officers, and the Banka one mentions that
the army of Srivijqya is about to depart on an expedition against Java.

Thus does Srivijaya emerge to view as an expanding power, stretch¬
ing out her tentacles towards the Straits of Malacca on the one side
and those of Sun da on the other, Palembang, almost equidistant from
both, was exceptionally well placed for the task of maintaining a com¬
mercial hegemony over Indonesia by controlling the two channels
through which all traffic must pass betw'een India and China, 'I’hc
developments of Arab navigation, and of trade between India and
China, combined to give a new significance to the straits, and Palem¬
bang was the normal port which ships from China would make for
during the north-east monsoon. It seems to have had at this lime a
flDuri.shing commerce and mercantile marine, and to have maintained
its own regular cammunicatiDos with both India and China. I-tsing
tells us that he travelled from China to Srivijaya on a ship belonging
to a Pemian merchant. His voyage onw'ards to India was made in one
belonging to the King of Srivijaya. 'I*he hypothesis therefore seems
to be a reasonable one that the inscriptions of 683-6 point to certain

CH, 3

THE mJ^D EMPIRES (l)

important st^iges in the career of King Jayanasa (or Jayanaga)^ the
coaqueror of Malayo, and presumably of Taruma also, and the origin¬
ator of the policy that was to make Falembang until the thirteenth
century the centre of a powfl-ful maritime empire of the islands.

How long Srivijaya had been in existence before that time is a
matter of surmise. Centuries later the annals of the Ming dynasty of
China asserted that * San-fo-tsithen the Chinese rendering of Srivi-
jaya. had sent its first embassy with tribute in the reign of the Emperor
Hiao-Wu (454-64) of the Sung dynasty. But this statement is diSicuh
to accept^ since they $ay that thb state was then named " Kan-t'odi*;
and although by almost general agreement $cholars have located such
a^place in Sumatra, there is no evidence to support its identification
tvith Srivijaya at an earlier stage of its history. Ingenious theories have
also been put forward ascribing its original home to the north coast
of Java and also to some place in the Malay Peninsula,

The obvious importance of Palernbang as a Buddhist centre at the
time of l-t$irig^s pilgrimages is one of those tantaliririg facts which
emerges from a background so indistinct as to leave much to funnise.
The early history of Buddhism in the Archipelago is unknown save
for a few stray references of this sort. If I^tsing is rights Minay ana
Buddhism was widespread there before the end of the seventh
century. That Sri\ijaya's Buddhism mainly Mahayanist, how¬
ever, has been confirmed by the discx)very of Bodhisattvas therep
though there is also evidence of the existence of same Hinayana
Buddhism of the Sanskrit canon. The difFerenceSi between the two
forms were then far less distinct than they became latett particularly
in thirteenth-century South-East Asia,

It would be interesting to know^ what part Srivijaya pkyed in the
Mahay an ist movement of expansion throughout South-East Asia,
which haa been described as one of the dominating facts of the latter
half of the eighth century. It coincides with the accession of the Pala
dynasty in Bengal and Magadha in the middle of the century, and hag
been attributed to their influence and that of Nalanda. It eishibits the
same mixture of Buddhist and Hindu cults^ and the tendency to
Tantric mystidsm, as in Bengal. Its spread also coincides tvith the
appearance in Java of the Buddhist fiailcndra dynasty bearing the
imperial title of Maharaja. With this dynasty wag to be linked an
important phase in the history of Srivijaya,

For the next half-century after the four Old Malay in$criptions the
only references to i^rivijaya come from the Chinese record of cm-
bassica. These cover the period from 695 to 742, but tell ua very

THE PRE-'El^OPEAN PERIOD

little. Princes of Sdvijaya bring presents of dwarfs^ Tnusiciam and
I multi-coloured parrots^ and the eiuperor in acknowledgement confers
titles of honour on the king. Then there is a complete blank until
775t when the much-discussed Ligor Stele, discovered at the Wat
Sema-muang, takes up the story.

The stele has two faces^ both containing inscriptions. Face con¬
tains ten Sanskrit verses commemorating the foundation of a Maha-
yanist sanctuary by a King of Srivtjaya and bear^ the Saka date
corresponding to ^5 , 4 pTil 775. It thus indicates the expansion of the
empire of Srivijaya and also of Mahay ana Buddhism to the Malay
Peninsula. Face B bears what Ciedis^and Krom describe as an un^
finished inscription celebrating a victorious king, who bears the title
of Sri Maharaja because he is of Sailendra family* Krom and a
numbei: of other scholars identified the King of Snvijaya on face A
with the Sailendra monarch mentioned on face B, and hence inferred
that the Sailcndras were ruling over Srivijaya in 775, And, as it was
already established that they were also mling in central Java at the
same tync* he concluded that Java was then under the supremacy of
the Sumatran kingdom. The assumption, therefore, was that the
Sailendras were a Srivijaya dynasty w*hieh had conquered parts of
Java*

Before attempting to answer the questions posed by this theoiy it
will be well to take a look at two other problems that have arisen
through the scarcity' of historical evidence. The first concerns the
locatlori of the capital of Srivijaya, Attempts have been made to place
it on the Malay Peninsula. The French scholar Ferrand in 1922
suggested Kedah. Later, Dr. Quaritch Wales put forward Chaiya on
the east coast as a more acceptable site. But, w^ithout going into the
details of ihe controversy raised by their suggestions, it may be simply
stated that no one has so far succeeded in shaking the evidence pointing
to Palembang,^

On the subject of the origin of the ^ailendras, R. C. Majumdar^s
theory that they came direct from India and were connected with the
Sailodbhava Kings of Kalinga has been rejected* K. .A.* Nilakanta
Sastri in 1935 suggested that since the title Sailendra^ *King of the
Mountain^ was often applied to Siva^ and the Pandyas of South India
claimed descent from the god and assumed the title ' Minahfcita

I For Turthcf itmly of ihift qiic^dcm kc G. Ferrand, ' L^cmrlrv sumatTAlui^ da
C^rivijaya' in JA, 19^^; Quarilch Wain, ""A Nrwly-^icplrkrvd Route of Andeut [Ddian
Cultural Expmloo' in inditm .^rl and Lmm^ ivcw IX I, p. 155; Nila-

kanta Saatn,' Srivijaya, Cii^drabhanu and Vira^Pandym' in TBG, Ixxvit (1^3^)/a, pp.
251-43; J. 1 .. MocAa, Xdvijaya, Yavn cji Kataha^^d., laivii (19^7), 3, pp. ji 7 ~ 4 >S 7 .

CH. 3 THE ISLAND EMPIEUS (l)

Sailendm", the Sailendn^ mighz; have had a South iDdian origin.
In hts more recent U’ork, The Hist&ry of ^ri Vijay^ (1949), jiowever,
he has abandoned the theory^ though still unable to align himself
fully with the French achdars J. Przyluski and Gh Ceed>&s, who
ascribe to them a purely Javanese origin,'

Cffides is inclined to the view that these Kings of the Mountains
may have resuscitated the title of the Kings of Funan through having
had more or less real tics with them» and vrith the object of claiming
the political and territorial powers which the title implied, 'rheir
entr^' upon the historical scene tvas followed by a number of ex¬
peditions against the mainland of Indo^China. In 767 the Vietnamese
Chronicle states that the Chinese Governor of Tongking drove olf a
raiding force composed of *men of Java and the southern island$\
In 774 a Cham temple was destroyed by foreign seamen of
terrible appearance* black and ugly* Again in 7S7 sea raiders from
"'Java*' destroyed another In the latter half of the eighth century
the Javanese Sailendras claimed overlordship over Cambodia. But
any real evidence that the dynasty had its origin in Funan isjentirely
lacking, and there seems no reason to suppose that it had anything
but a Javanese origin.

Java itself possesses no epigraphical document bctw'cen Purnavar-
man*s fifth-century inscriptions and a Sanskrit inscription of 73a in
a Saivlte sanctuary at Changgal^ south-east of the Borobudur. 'This
records the erection of a linga by a King Sanjaya of Alataram in
Kunjarakunja on the island of javsi "rich m grain and gold mines^
As Java produced no gold^ attempts have been made to identify the
name Kunjarakunja with some place in the Malay Peninsula, but
Stutterheim has shown that it tvas the name of the district in which
Sanjaya erected his sanctuary. Sanjaya, King of Mataram, also appears
iri a much later inscription discovered by Stutterheim at Kedu in
central Java. This valuable record is dated 907 and gives a list of the
predecessors nf the then reigning Icing, Maharaja Balitung, beginning
with Sanjaya. The remaining eight rulers all bear the title Sri Maha¬
raja, Sanjaya's immediate successorp Fahaipana of Panangkarwn,
who was reigning in 77S, is described as a Sailendru by an inscription
at Chandi Kalasan, east of Jogjakarta, w^hich commemorates the
foundation of the chandi as a shrine to the Buddhist goddess Tara.

^ <>n thia BUbjeCI iht reader is referred ta c. Miajumdnr, ' I.m rals SaElundria i 3 c
Syvarriadvipa^ m BEFF,fL t, anxiii* (i933)r PP^ G, Cccdta, 'On the Origin

of ihc iSailentlnj af Indcnciin' in JGISh i (1^341 2 i p. i K- A, N, SMlri, * Origin of che
^ailcndnUi* in I'tlG* bxv 4" h bailcrtifraVimwi' in JGIS, ii

Lp. iS-

*42 THE PRE-EtTlOPEAN PERIOD PT. I

Now the old kingdom of Mataram was in central Java, and Sanjaya
as its king is nowhere referred to as either Maharaja or a Sailendra,
Moreover, he was a Saivite, not a Buddhist. Furthermore, a Chinese
account records that between 742 and 755 the capital of' Ho-lJng' (i.e.
Mataram) was transferred farther eastwards by a King ' Ki-yenwho
has been identified with Gajayana, the founder of a sanctuary of Aga^
stya at Dinaya in East Java In 760. Hence it has been Inferred that the
Buddhist Sailendras drove out the dynasty of Sanjap from central
Java, and with it the Saivite religion. Thus the list of rulers in Bali-
tung’s inscription is not the record of the successive kings of one and
the same dynasty, but a chronologically arranged list of rulers of
central Java. The only connection between Sanjaya and Pancapana of
Panangkaran is that of sequence. On this showing, so far as our
scrappy evidence goes, the Sailendras appeared as a ruling power in
Java in about the middle of the eighth century; during the second half
of that century they extended their po'wer over the central part of the
island, while at the same time attempting to secure control over parts
of the I^ndo-Chinese peninsula.

WTiilfi practically nothing is known of the political history- of the old
kingdom of Mataram. its monumental remains arc the most magni¬
ficent to be found anywhere in Java, or for that matter Indonesia. The
monuments of a later date in East Java attesting the glory and greatness
of Sihgosari and Majapahit bear no comparison with them. Tradition
ascribes to Sanjaya great conquests which brought Sunda, Bali, Srivi-
jaya and other regions under his sway. Of such things no evidence
exists. What is certain is that he built up his power and might by
forcing the *Rakas% ruling the various regions of central Java, to
render him obedience and tribute. Such is the pattern of Javanese
history throughout the pre-European period. The country was
efivided up among a large number of petty ruJers, among whom from
time to time one would arise who was able to extend his power over
a wide area. He would then proceed to demonstrate his greatness by
building a ‘chandi’, or monumentat tomb, dedicated to the deity with
w'hom he chose to be identified tn life and united in death. Sanjaya
was at first ‘Raka’ of the district of Mataram, and the kingdom that
he carved out for himself took its name in that way. The chandi
bearing the Saivite symbol of the linga, which he erected in 732, was
the outward sign and manifestation of his claims to overloidship.

His Buddhist successor, Pancapana, Raka of Panangkaran, the first
Sailendra, signalized the establishment of his power by building Bud¬
dhist monuments on a more magnificent scale than anything Java had

CK. 3 TH£ ISLAND EMPFREE (l) 43*

previously seen. In the when archaeologists attributed the con¬
struction of the Borobudur to the middle of the ninth centu^ he was
famous as the builder of the lovely Chandi Kalasan, in which his wife
was idcntihcd w ith the godcH^ Tara. But recent research has shown
that the majestic Borobudur must have been built earlier than Chandi
Xaia$an, and the date of its foundation i:s now^ thought to have been
the year 772. Pahcapana would thus be its founder.

I'he Borobudur, which represents the highest expression of the
artistic genius of the Sailendra period, is utterly unlike any other
Javanese monument. It is not a temple with an interior, but an im¬
mense stupa in the form of stone terraces covering the upper part of
a natural hill, on the Hattenect top of w-hich stands the central stupa.
Its height is 150 feet. To traverse the whole distance through the
galleries up to the sumnut involves a walk of over three miles. The
walls of the galleries on both sides are adorned with baS’^relief sculp¬
tures illustrating Mahayanist texts. They run to thousands. In
addition there are 4100 statues of the Buddha, The base has a series
of reliefs depicting the effects of good and evil deeds in daily Jife pro^
dudng karma. But these are now covered up by a broad casement of
stonew ork. The Japanese, during their occupation of Java from 1942
to 1945^ showed enough interest in the monument to have a small part
of the casement removed and some of the reliefs of the original base
excavated. The stones have not been replacedp and it Is now^ po'ssible
to see the uncovered reliefs.

From the religious point of mw- the sanctuary as a whole forms an
impressive and convincing textbook of Buddhism as taught by the
Nalanda schouL The style of sculpture follows the classic models of
Gupta India, but the rchcfs are not Indian^ they are Javanese. They
provide a wonderful picture of Javanese life and customs. 'Fhe Java¬
nese artists in adopting Indian models had already changed them in
conformity with their own traditions.^ Even the conventionalized
figures are often given a vitality that scenis to break through formalism,
and there are many human touches.

Architecture was the supreme achievement of the fSailendras. Most
of them are mere names in a list, but their glorious shrines are still to
be seen on the Kedu plain near to Jogjakarta. Not far from the Boro¬
budur is the splendid Chandi Mendut containing three original stone
statues of huge size, representing a preaching Buddha betw^een tw^u
Bodhisuttvas. Thanks to careful restoration by the Dutch, it is in
excellent condition today. Other outstanding examples of the same
' W. F. Stuttcfbciin, Bti HmJutMmt in Jlrclupel, p. 35,

THE PRH-ECROPEAN PERIOD

rr. r

period are Chandi f^ari, 3 single vihara; Chandi Pbosan, consisting of
two central squares, each with a vihara, surrounded by a belt of shrines
and two belts of sttipas; and the unfinished Chandi Sevu, consisting
of a large vihara surrounded by four sqiAre belts of small shrines said
to nuniber 240.

In basic principles of construction and decoration these products of
the Sailcndra period differ little from the more sober Saivite temples
on the Dieng plateau nearby, which bear witness to the prosperity of
the seventh centur)* and the period of Sanjaya, but the vast scale on
which they were planned, their more highly-developed technique and
more imaginative use of ornamentation show an artistic expansion
which must have come from a new impulse of great vitality, ^'he idea
once held was that they were the products of a wave of immigration
from India. But there is no evidence of one, and Stutterheim has
shown that these monuments were not only built by Javanese stone¬
masons and sculptors but also were associated with indigenous religious
ideas and practices par excellence. A chandi was in no sense an 1 ndian
temple.. The outstanding feature of the culture of the Sailendra period
is the vitality and potency of the Indonesian element. In literature this
tendency is already to be seen in the Old Javanese translation of the
Sanskrit work Ameramaiit, which was produced under the patronage
of a Satlendra prince w hose name, given at the beginning of the work,
was Jitendra.

A'lention has been made above of the theory propounded by the
Dutch scholars Vogel and Krora in their earliest studies of the Ligor
stele that the Sailendraa were a ^rivgaya dynasty which conquered
parts of java. This assumed that the King of SrJ\'iJaya mentioned on
face A w'as indeed the Sailcndra ruler referred to on face B. Stutter-
heim, in disputing this view, advanced the opposite one that it was
Srivtjaya that came under Javanese rule. He thus substituted a Java¬
nese period in Sumatran history for a Sumatran period in Javanese
history in the eighth and ninth centuries.

That a Sailendra was In fact ruling over Srivljaya in the middle of
the ninth century is shown by an edict issued by the Pala ruler of
Bengal in c, 850 recording the dedication of five villages to a vihara
founded at Nalanda by Babputradeva, who is styled King of Sumatra
and a descendant of the !>ailendras of Java. He is said to have been
the son of a king entitled Samaragravira, ‘foremost hero in battle’,
and a grandson of the f^ailendra 'king of Java and slayer of enemy
heroes'. The suggestion has been generally accepted that the
title Samaragravira may be another name for the Samarottutiga

Cll, 3 THE lisLANli EMPIRES (l)

who i$ mentioned in a Kcdu inacription &f 847, and may also be
identified with one ot the kings listed in BaJitung^s infcriptiori
of 907. The grandfather mentioned in the edict ta ihonght to have
been the Pancapana of P^iangkanin of the Kalasan inscription
of 778.

Krom came 10 the conclusion that the Sailendra Samaragtavira
married a daughter of a King of Srivijaya w'ho became the mother of
Balaputradeva. Cmdes stresses the fact that the word Balaputra has
the meaning of younger son, and his considered judgement is that
Balaputradeva was 'without doubt' the first ^ailendra King of Srivi¬
jaya. He did not, hovveveri ruje over the Sailendra domain in Java,
and the two realms were never united under one ruler. Vogel also has
come to associate himself with thb view« The accepted position^
therefore, now is that from about the middle of the ninth century
there were two separate branches of the SaJlendra family ruling simul¬
taneously over independent kingdoms.

But not for long. During the ninth century^ a change is seen to come
over the Sailendra position m Java. An inscription at Prambiinan in
863 indicates that Saivism is returning to central Java, and that the
pow'er of the Sailtndras there i$ declining. External sources also
suggest the same tendency. The Chinese^ w ho during the early Sailen-
dra period mention missions from Ho-Jing^ begin in S20 to attribute
them to Ch5-p*o. This wras the name they had applied to Java in the
fifth century, and to the capital, which was abandoned between 743^
and 755 for one whose name they render P’o-lou-k*ia.-sseti. The re¬
appearance of Ch5-p'o has been taken to indicate the return of Saivile
princes to central Java. The Arab writers also, who in their earliest
references to the "King of Zabag" apply the term to the Sailendra
rulers of Java* begin in the tenth century to use it m such a way as to
indicate the Sumatran kingdom of Srivijaya.

Thus the accession of a Sailendra to the throne of Srivijaya seems
to have come at a time when the dynasty was loeing its hold on eentnd
Java, The AW Fihtory of //le which ba$es its account of Java

OH the record of embassies received thence in 860 and 873, helps to
clarify the position. It states that the King of Cbo-p'o lives in the city
of CKG-p‘Oj whereas hb predecessor had lived farther to the cast in the
city of P"o-lou-k"ia-sseu. Inscriptions In the plain of Kedu in the
neighbourhood of Prambanan show^ a line of kings from 879 onwards
who svere not Saikndras. But Utile is known of them or their kingdom
until the reign of Balitung, the author of the famous inscription of
907 giving the Ibt of kings beginning with Sanjaya.

THE PRE-EUROPEAN PERIOD

PT. 1

His inscriptions cover the period 898-910. They apply the name
MataranX'to his Lingdom and show that he was attempting to restore
Saivitc tradition, which had been interrupted by the Jluddhlst
Sailendras. Krom thinks that he may hive been a king of East Java
who acquired his position in central Java by marriage. With him a
nnv period in Javanese history opens which will be the subject of a
later chapter. So far as the SaiJendras arc concerned, the indications
are that by the end of the ninth century, while they were now the
ruling dynasty in Srivijaya, their power over central Java had com¬
pletely disappeared.

Cffidfis inL*s £tgts htndouisii (1948) and Nilakama ^astri in Tkt
History of Srmjaya (1949) have given admirable summaries of what
was known of the Sailendra problem at the time when they wrote.
The treatment of the subject given above accords closely with these.
Since tlicir books were written, however, new material has been dis¬
covered and previously published material revised. Notable progress
has been made towards the solution of a number of big questions. I’he
outstanding contribution to the discussion has been made by Dr. J. G.
dc C^paris in his hiscripties uit de gmlendra-tijd, published at Ban¬
dung, java, in 1950. The new' facte which he establishes and the
hypotheses which he builds up from the epigraphical material set forth
m his book may well form a basis for a thoroughgoing revision of the
Sailendra story.

In the first place he is able to make a clear distinction between the
real Sailendra dynasty and the Ust of rulers given in Balitung's in-
scnpiion of 907, which, as we have showm above, Ccedfes interpreted
as containing a mixture of Sailendras and non-Sailendras, The in-
^riptions, dc Casparis tells us, contain the nam^ of three fsailetidra
kings and a princess belonging to the period 775-842. They are
additional to Balitung’s list, none of the kings of which, according to
dc Casparis’s showing, was a Sailendra; all were indeed the lineal
descendants of Sanjaja. During this period, therefore, there were not
one but two reigning dynasties in central Java, the kings of the Sanjava
line ^mg until 832 subordinate to the Sailendras. On this showing,
which accords with Vogers interpretation of the Kalasan inscription,
Pancapana, the Rakarayan Panangkaran, was not a Sailendra hut a
vassal of the SaiJendni king Vishnu. The table of the two dynasties

ninfli fhna*

CH, 3

me tSLAND (l)

Sanjuyaf line (JSmvile)

The ^mlendras [Buddhist}

Sanjaya (7j2-f. 760) ^

R. Parkangkaran (r* 760-f. jSo)
R* Panungdan (c* 780-^. 800)

R- Warak {£. 8oo-before S19)

R. Ganjng(?R. P^tapan)
(before Si9-^838]!

R. Pikaun (f838-P85i)=

R> Kayuwani {?85i-after SSa)

? (Bhanu, 752)

Vishnu (Dharmalunga)

(before 775-82)

India (Sangramadhananajaya)
{782-?8 i2)

Samaratunga (^Tara)

(? 812-’832)

I Balaputra

= Promo da vardhani (Princess)

In 832 Rakarayan Patapan, whom dc Casparia equates with
Rakarayan Garung of the Sanjaya line, erected an inscription pro¬
claiming his authority over most of central Java. This would imply
the end of Sailendro rule in Java, Exactly what happened the
evidence does not show', De Casparis oHero the following explanation.
He presumes the death of the Sailendro Samaratunga in that year,
Balaputra, bis infant son, was too young to come to the throne.
Pramodavardhani, his daughter, is shown by the epigraphieai evidence
to have married into the Sanjaya house. Her husband was Rakarayan
Pikatan, the son of Rakamyan Patapan, the author of the inscription
of 832, Ten years later, in an inscription of 8+2 recording the
dedication of ricehelds to the upkeep of the Borobudur, she is des¬
cribed as queen. Her husband probably succeeded his father in S38.

Thus did the hegemony over central Java pass out of Sailendro
hands. The young prince Balaputra, it is sunntsed, fled to Sumatra,
married a Srivijayg princess, and ultimately became the ruler of his
adopted state. In Java Rakarayan Pikatan and his SaJlendro consort
were the parents of Kayuwani, who came to the throne in the middle
of the ninth century. 'Later Javanese princes from Kayuwani to
Balitung,^ writes de Casparis, 'and probably his predecessors, con¬
sidered themselves as belonging to the dynasty founded by Sanjaya

CHAKDI

CUANSl MENXUT (uittdor)

CIL 3 Tim ISLAND EMPIRES (l) 49

in 732, but their titles show that they indirectJy also belong to the
^ailendra dynasty.^^ *

This is the most feasible esc ion yet offered of the disappearance
of the SaJlendra dynasty in Java and its almost simultaneous appear¬
ance in Sumatra^ De Caspairs, however, has further interesting
suggestions to inake. He insists that the Buddhist foundations of the
Sail end ras must be examined in the light of ancestor-worsbip, and
shows that the nine Bodhisattva^ sculptured on the outside of Chandi
Meodut, close to the Borobudtir, may be interpreted as representing
the ancestors of King Indra, its founder. If sOp the Sailendra dynasty,
which, it has been generaJJy assumed, had its origin not long before
the date of its earliest inscriptions^ may have been founded as early as
the first half of the seventh century, l^hus the vieiv, long held by
Ccedis, that the Java ^ Kings of the Mountain’ were in some way con¬
nected with the Fuoan monarchy bearing the same title no longer
appears to be ruled out by the rime factor, since the end of Funan
may have coincided with the foundation of the Sailendra dynasty in
Java. And indeed de Casparis has found in two i^aJlendra inscriptions,
at Kelurak and Placssan* allusions pointing to the name of the last
capital of Funan, Naravaranagara*

His interpretation of the * hidden meaning" of the Borobodur is of
special interest. Mention has already been made of the stone case¬
ment covering the reliefs around the foot of ihe monument. Guessea
have been hazarded as to the reason for sculpturing the reliefs only to
cover them up afterwards. From an inscription of 842 de Casparis infers
that the full name of the monument was Bhumisambarabhudhara,
"the Mountain of Accumulation of Virtue on the ten Stages of the
Bodhigattva". Its foot would thus represent the firsi stage. The cover¬
ing of this, he tells us, is not to be explained in terms of Mahayanism,
but rather in those of ancestor-worship. The first stage of the Bodhi-
sattvabhumi must be seen as the one which the Sailendra king Indra
would occupy when he reached the status of a Bodhisattva. It w^as
covered up by way of reservation. In a sense it was dead, and only
upon his becoming a BodhJaattx^a could the reliefs surrounding it be
uncovered and brought to life again.^

In order to sec things in their proper setting it is necessary to treat
the complex Chandi Mendui-Chandi Pawon-Chandi Borobudur as
one whole* capable of analysis from the double standpoint of Maha-
yana Buddhism and antestor-w'orship. From the one standpoint it
represents the Path leading to Buddhahood, with the ^Temple of the

■ Op. Of., p. 20i. * p, 184,

Tlt£ PRE-tmOPEAN PERIOD

rt: I

Bambw Grove" (ChRndi Mcitdut) as the fir&t preparatory stage* The
word g 6 ^ra, however, used in this con section to indicate the funda¬
mental element of Buddhahood^ aw^akened at this stage, aJ$x> aignilies in
a non-Buddhist sense a line of ancestors. From this latter standpoint,
therefore, the chandi demonstrates King Indra’s realization that he
followed a line of ancestors, represented, as already indicated^ by the
nine Bodhisattvaa sculptured on its outside-

Chandi Pawon^ the name of whieh^ according to de Casparig, refers
to a royal cremation, represents the last worldly stage giving entrance
to the aupramundane stages in the progress of the Bodhlsattva. These
latter are represented in the Borobudur itself. The covered-up fooi
of the monument, as we have seen, symbolizes the first. I'he open
terraces above it account for the rcniainder^ culminating in the tenth
and topmost* Again it is the 'hidden meaning" which carries the
greater significancej for according to de Casparis's interpretation it
implies a representation of the nine preceding l^ailendra princes, each
in his proper place on the road leading to BuddhahocKl, with the
first ancestor, ^the "'root*^ (mula) of the dTOasty^ the C^ailendra,
"Lord of the Mountain^*, at the final momentary meditation before
obtaining Buddhahood",

* (A) Th^ greatness anJ decline of Sriviji^ya

Definite evidence b beking concerning both the origin of the SaiU
endras and the disappearance of their power in central Java. So far
as history is concerned, unheralded they come and unheralded they go^
Moreover, they, vvho bequeathed to Java so glorious a heritage of
religious architecture and art, built no enduring monuments either in
Sumatra or anywhere else in their empire when they became the ruling
dynasty of Srivijaya. Intcmai evidence of Srivijaya's history under
their rule is conspicuous by its absence* May the lack of it in the tenth
century be attributed to the destruction caused by the great Chola
raid of 1025? Or does the explanation lie in the fact, noted by Cted^,
that she w^as a "great economic powder which neglected the spiritual
valuea^? Her sovereigns, he suggests, were too busy controlling the
traffic of the straits to waste time on such matters.^

It is intriguing to find that at about the time when the Sailendra
power disimpcars from Java the Chinese begin to employ a different
name for Srivijaya. Instead of Chc-li-fo-che they call it San-fo-ts^i,
The new name appears first in the record of an embassy of 904-5,

^ 0>. nr., p. ill.

CIT. 3 THE [3LAND EMPIRES (l) 5 !

and continues to be used until the end of the fourteenth century-
Np e?&phnatiiin of this change in nomenclature ha$ been suggested.
And the transliteration itself presents a difficulty^ for while fa-ts^t
Stands for tTiJayHt should be rendered by the Chinese characters
for cha^ti.

From the middle of the ninth century a new external source, the
writings of Arabic-Persian geographers^ becomes important. They
extol the riches and power of the Maharaja of ‘Zabag\ who is the
" king of the isles of the eastern sea\ They mention in particular that
he rules over the maritime country of *Kalah" and the island of
*Sribuza". 'Kalah' stands for Kra, now the name of a region of the
Malay Peninsula, but then applied by the writers to the whole Penin¬
sula. 'Sribiiaa* is a rendering of Sri^njaya and is applied to both
Palemhang and the island of Sumatra.

The Arab Mas’udi, wanting in 955, speaks in exaggerated terms of
the enormous population and innumerable armies of the kingdom of
the maharaja. As Krom has pointed out^ the defence of a privileged
position such as Srivijaya assumed involved perpetual recourse to
force. The empire^ like that of the Dutch in the seventeenth century^
was a vast trading monopoly^ and rivals had to be reduced to sub¬
jection or neutralized. Its territories, wTote the Arabs, produced
camphor, aloes, doves, sandalwood, nutmeg, cardamutn, cubeb |nd
much else. Its trade was far-reaching. The Nalanda inscription re¬
cording Babputra^s foundation of a vihara there is evidence of estab¬
lished relations with Bengal, w^bich avbs presumably one of its sources
of piece-goods. There is evidence also of intercourse with the Coro^
mandel Coast.

When in 971 the Chinese opened an agency at Canton for the
management of sea-borne commerce the merchants of drivijaya are
mentioned in the list of foreigners resorting there* The History oj the
Sung records the arrival of a merchant of Srisijaya in 980 at Swatow^
and five years later that of a purely commercial mission. The restora¬
tion of order by the Sung dynasty led to much intercourse with Srivt-
jaya. The Chinese record the arrival of embassies in 96O1 962^ 97ir
972^ 974, 975^ gSot 983^ and 988. In some cases the king^s name is
mentioned, but it has not been possible to transliterate the Chinese
into Sanskrit tvith certainly. Regular intercourse between the two
Courts went on until 1178, when the Chinese emperor, finding the
expense of receiving these embassies somewhat too heavy * directed
that in future they should proceed no farther than Chuan-Chu in
Fukien province, but trade there in the ordinary way.

THE PHE-FJJROPEAX PERIPEI

PT. I

The Sri^-ijaya ambajssador, who appeared at the Imperial Court in
988^ and L-cft for home in 990, heard on reaching Canton that his country
was being attacked by the J av anese. Afier waiting for a year at Canton
he sailed ho me wards, but on ardval in Champa heard such bad new^s
that he returned lo China to ask for the issue of a decree placing hb
country under the imperial protection. 'I'hat was in 99Z- In the same
year Javanese envoys appeared before the emperor to complain of
continua! war with San-fo-ts'i. The war Avas provoked by Dhartna-
vamsa (c. 985-^. 1006}, King of East Javq^ who aimed at destroying
Srivijaya and substituting Javanese supremacy over the islands. Little
is known of the actual struggle^ though it would appear that for some
years the Javanese attacks placed Palembang in dire peril. They AverCj
hoAvever, beaten off. Then, it is thought, Srivijaya, aided by its vassals
from the Malay Peninsula, organized a great counter-attack and burnt
Dharmavamsa's kraton. He himself was killed and his empire
collapsed.

Srivijaya^s success in the long struggle with Dharmavamsa came
partl]^ through cultivating friendly relations with China on the one
hand and with the Cholaa in India on the other. Had either supported
the Javanese attack the result might have been very different- In
sending the customary tribute to China in 1003 the Ring of Srivijaya
announced that he had erected a Buddhist temple for the offering of
prayers for the life of the emperor. This dme the Chinese version of
the king^s name is recognizable as Sri Chulamanivarmadeva.

About two years later this same king emulated Balaputra's example
by building at Negapatam on the Coromandel Coast a Buddhist
temple, named after him the Chulamanivarmadcva Vihara. The Chola
king Rajaraja granted the revenues of a large village for its upkeep.
Like the earlier Nalanda endowment, the Negapatam one was estab¬
lished to provide a place where the merchants of Srivijaya could
resort for ivorship in accordance with their own religious tenets. It
witnesses to the importance of the trading connection betw^een Palcm-
bang and the Coromandel Coast, which drove a nourishing trade in
Indian piece-goods with South-East Asia.

In Rajaraja's grant nf revenues to the Kegapatam vihara it is stated
that the King of Srivijaya belonged to the Sailendra family^ In Ids
reign the empire stood at the height of its poAver and prestige. Un¬
happily none of its records has survived* and all that is knoAvn of it^
even the namea of its kings, comes soldy from external sources. 'Fbus
the Chinese record a mission received in looS from Chulamanivar-
madeva's son Maravijayottungavarma, hut there is no mention of the

CJi. 3 THE ISLAXiJ E.MPJIIE3 (i;) S3

date of I he father^s death. From another exterriaJ source also comes
the Inter eating information that Srivijaya was still a famous ^uddhist
centre. The renowned Atisa^ who reformed Tibetan Buddhism^ is
said to have studied there frcSn loii to 1023 under Dharmakirti, the
head of the Buddhist clergy in Sumatra. The Tibetan biography of
Ati^ calb Sumatra the chief centre of Buddhism and Dharmakirti the
greatest scholar of his time.

The good relations cultivated by Sri Chulamanivarmadeva with the
Chotas did not last long. An expanding sea power like that of the
Cholas was bound to resent the methods used by the old empire of
the islands to maintain its commercial monopoly. In 1017 the Chinese
record the reception of a mission from yet another King of Srivijaya,
Haji Sumatrabhumi by name. It was in his reign that his empire
sustained at Chola hands a staggering bloWj from which it never fully
recovered. In tooy the Choi as had begun to raid eastwards^ and
Rajaraja boasted that in that year he Conquered 12,000 islands. This
exaggerated claim has been taken to refer to an expedition against the
Maldives. His son and successorp Rajendra* has been credited qfith an
attempted raid on the possessions of ^rivijaya in the Malay Peninsula;
but there is some doubt as to whether this actualty took placen Raja-
raja died iti 1014, and Rajendra seems to have remained for some year^
on friendly terms with Srivijaya, and even to have confirmed the grant
made by his father to the Negapatam vihara.

The great raid which crippled the Malay empire occurred in
Details of it were recorded by Rajendra in an inscription at Tanjore
dated 1030—1. NLIakanta Sastrib translation runs thus- ‘[Rajendra]
having despatched many ships in the midst of the rolling sea and
having caught Sangrama-Mjayottungavarman, the King of Kadaram,
together w ith the elephants in his glorious army, [took] the large heap
of treasures, which [that king} had nghtfully accumulated; captured
with noise the [arch called] Vidyadharatorana at the war-gate of his
extensive capitalj Srivijaya, with the jewelled wicket-gate adorned with
great splendour and the gate of large jewels; PannaJ with water in its
bathing ghats; the ancient Malaiyur with the strong mountain for its
rampart; Mayirudingam^ surrounded by the deep sea [ns] by a moat;
Hangasoka undaunted [in] fierce battles; Mappapalam having abundant
[deep] VToter as defence; Mevilimbangarrt guarded by beautiful walls;
Valaippanduru possessed of Vilaippanduru [?|; Talaittakkolam praised
by great men [versed in] the sciences; the great Tararalinga [capable
of] strong action in dangerous battles; Ibmuti-deam, w'hoac fierce
strength rose in war; the great Nakkavaram, in whose es;lcnsivc

THE PRE-EtlROPEAN PERIOD

PT . I

gardens honey was collected; and Xadaram of fierce strength, which
was protected by the deep sea.^^

Most of these places were situated in either Sumatra or the Malay
Peninsula, but several of the names hJve not been identified. Those
that can be identified with certainty are Falembang, Mabyur (Jambi),
and Pane, on the east coast of Sumatni: Lankasuka (Ligor), Tatola,
and Kcdah^ on the Malayan mainland; Tumasik, the old name for
Singapore Island, Acheh at the northern tip of Sumatra, and the
Nicobar Islands^ It is interesting to see that Sangrama \^jayotTun-
gavarman, the King of Sri vijay a, was know^n to the Tamils a$ King of
Kedah, although the chief seat of hisj>ow'er lay in Sumatra, Allowing
for the obscurity of several of the names, the extent of the empire of
Srivijaya corresponds fairly closely with the contemporary Arab
accounts of the empire of Zabag.

Krom is of opinion that the attacks began with Palembang, followed
by the occupation of important places on the east coast of Sumatra,
Then the Malay Peninsala was dealt with. On the way home .Acheh
and t^ie Nicobars were raided. No attempt was made ai conquest in
the real sense. Indeed the only political result of the raid of which
there is any record was the accession of a new' Sailendra king, Sri
Deva, in place of the captured one. His embassy to China in loaS
was accorded more than the usual honours.

The weakness of Sri^ijaya after the raid enabled Airlangga of Java
(1019-42) to reconquer the patrimony lost by his father Dharmavamsa
in JO06. In face of the Chola threat the tw'o Indonesian states buried
the hatchet, and in 1030 Airlangga married a daughter of Sangrama
Vijayottungavarman. From 1030 until 1064 nothing is known of the
history of Srivijaya. An inscription dated 1064 on the image of a
makara found at Solokp to the west of Jambi, menrions a certain
Dharmarira, but nothing is known of him. The image bears traces
of Javanese artistic infiuence. After the raid Srivijaya seems to have
re-established its authority over Sumatra but never to have recovered
its old power. With Airlangga it achieved a moJjis viTendi w'hich left
it supreme over the west of the Archipelago and Java over the east.
But there is evidence of java's commercial nerladDns with the west.

In 1067 3 Sumatran ambassador was received by the Chinese
emperor with great distinction. Ten years later the Chinese received
an embassy from tbc Choia king Rajendradevakulottunga. From the
fact that they referred to him by the same name as the Sumatran
ambassador of 1067 certain Indian winters have concluded that before

■ HifirTfy qf .fri p. So,

CH. 3 ISLAND EMPIRE^ (l) 55 *

Chiming to the throne he must have served as a councillor at ^Tivijaya.
But the case has not been proved. ^

More intriguing still is a brier record of a Chob raid on the Malay
Peninsula in 106S--91 when King V^irarajendra is said to have con¬
quered Kadaram on behalf of Srivijaya and to have handed it over to
the king, who had recognbed Chob overlordship. This seems to have
given the Chinese the erroneous impression that it was the Chola king
who was the vassal of Srivijayap and not the other way round. WTiat-
ever may be the meaning of these stray and obscure references^ there
are clear indications that during V'irarajendra^s reign friendly relations
again existed betw^een the two powers, and no little commercial inter¬
course. An inscription in Tamil dated iq 8S> found near Baros on the
west coast of SumatTa, mentions an imponant south Indian merchant
corporation. In 1090, at the request of Srivijaya. the Chob king KuId-
ttunga J granted a new charter lo the Negapatam vihara.

During the twelfth century' there b little to report. There were no
striking events. The Chinese record the usual series of embassies and
the Arabs $ay much of Chinese trade with Zabag. It must have been
a period of slow' decline. The development of the kingdom of Kediri
in East Java as a naval and commercial power stimubted economic
progress in the Archipelago, and Siivijaya is thought to have bent-
fitted thereby. But in 1178 the Chinese writer Chou K^u-fei relegated
her to the third place among wealthy foreign states; she was surpassed
by the Arab lands and Java. Her methods too seem to have become
more and more piratical. Every passing ship was attacked if it failed
to put in to one of her harbours.

Nevertheless at the beginning of the thirteenth century Srivijaya
must still have been a great power. She is described as such in 1225
by Chau Ju-kua, the Chinese inspector of foreign trade at Ch^uan-
chou, in his Chu-fm-chi, ‘Record of Foreign Nations’. He Usfcg no
less than fifteen vassal states, covering the w'holc of the Malay Penin¬
sula south of the Bay of Bandon and all western Indonesia, including
the state of Sunda in West Java. Nilakanta Sastri thinks that there is
reason to suspect that his political information w'as not as up-to-date
as his commercial data. But there can be no doubt that Srivijaya still
controlled both sides of the Straits of Makeev ^nd Sunda. Not until
that control was broken did her power vanish.

Chau Ju-kua"s account of her capital shows it to have been a typical
water city full of creeks, wdth people living in boats or houses built on
rafts, like Mrohaung, the old capital of .Arakan, modem Bangkok and
many older cities back to the days of Funan. One gathers, however.

THE PRE-EUROPEAS" PERIOD

FT, t

“ 56

from Chinese accounts chat Pdembaiig no longer exerted so eight a
control over its vassal states as once it had done. Katnparr on the
east coast of Sumatra, had set up its own king, while Jambi had even
sent its own envoys to China. Chau )u-kua does not include Jambi
in his list of dependencies of San-fo-ts"i. Strangely enough, Palem-
bang itself figures in the list. Hence the question has ^en posed
whether by this time the centre of gravity was no longer Palembang
but Jambi.

The list, how^ever, 1$ not absolutely reliable. Ceylon, for instance,
is included in it. Moreover, only two embassies from Jambi, in 1079
and 108S, are mentioned by the Chinese, while according to the Ming
embassies from San-fo-ts^i came regularly throughout the
period of the second Sung djuasty, 960-1279. The question cannot
be decided finally as the evidence stands at present. Tranafer of
leadership from Palembang to Jambi certainly took place during the
thirteenth century, since Kertanagara^a expedition to Sumatra had
Malayu—i.e. Jambi—as its objective, and according to the Pararaion
was pjanned as early as 1275. In 1281 the Srivijaya embaasy to China
went from Malayu, and Marco Polo mentions Malayu as the foremost
state In Sumatra when he visited the island in 1292. During this
period the name Srivijaya drops out of use.

One $ign of the coming breakdown comes from the year 1230, when
DKarmaraja Chandrabanu of Tambralinga (Ligor) erected an inscrip¬
tion at Ch'aiya, in which he assumes the style of an independent ruler
He makes no reference to Srivijaya* In 1247 and again in 1270 he
interfered in Ceylon. The defeat of his second expedition was so
severe that it is thought to have been the cause of Ligoris inabifity to
withstand the T'ai onslaught which came some twenty years later.
There is reason to think that Dharmaraja Chandrabanu developed
very friendly relations with the rising T"ai state of Sukhodaya (Suk-
^ot'ai) on the Menam. Cmdes suggests that the explanation of this,
and also of Tambralinga'a attempt to interfere in Ceylon, lies in its
adherence to Hinayana Buddhism of the Pali canon, ^'he T'ai also
were Buddhists of the same school, and Ce>don w'as not only the fore¬
most centre of this form of Buddhism but claimed to possess two of
the most prixed relics of the Buddha, his begging-bowl and the famous
Kandy tooth. Tambralinga's relations with her suxerain may have
been complicated by a growing antagonism bet^veen Hinayana and
Mahayana Buddhists.

The rise of the empires of Sltigosari and Majapahit in Java helped
to bring about the e?ctinction of the old Sumatran empire. And

CH. J THE lS^AKD EMPIRES (l) 57*

although in the light of recent research It b no longer possible to say
that Sumatra passed under the suzerainty of Kertanagaxap theJiingdom
of Sunda became ^object to him^ if the Nagar^heTtugama Is correct^
and $qme parts of the Malay^^enirvsula, Srivtjaya must thus have lost
control over the Sunda StraitSp and Kertanagara may also have weak¬
ened her hold on the Malacca Straits.

7 'he decisive blow in this direction, however, came from the T^ai
kingdom of Suk'ot'ai. According to the Mon chronicles^ the 'I'^ais
were expanding their power over the northern possessions of Srivi-
jaya in the Peninsula from about iz8o. An inscription set up by Rama
K'amheng at Suk/ot^ai in 129a claims that the kingdom of Ligor had
come under his rule. The Yuan History^ in rtfeiring to a mission
received from Rama K'amheng in 1295, says that the people of Siam
and those of Ma-li-yu-eui (Malayu) had been killing each other for a
long timCp but the latter had now submitted.

While the Javanese and the T'ais were extending their conquests
over the territories once ruled by the Sailendra maharaja Islam ap¬
peared as a proselytidng force in South-East Asia and began^to add
to their disintegration. One of the earliest signs of its arrival is the
reference by Marco Polo to the fact that Ferlac, at the northern end of
Sumatra, had been converted to 'the law of Mahomet'. And the
discovery of the tombstone of Sultan Malik-al-Saleh of Samudra, w ho
died in 1297, shows that his state had adopted the new religion at
about the same time. Thus while the old Buddhist empire was losing
control over the straits through the pressure of Siam and Javai Islam
began to undermine its spiritual traditions.

In describing the eight kingdoms of Sumatra Marco Polo convevs
the impre^ion that they w^cre the ruins of an empire. And although
Kertanagara and the empire of Singosari came to a sudden end in 1 292,
when they were threatened by a great ChTOese punitive expedition
sent by Kubki Khan, neither Malayu nor Pakmbang was in a position
to carry out salvaging operations, Malayu was the only Sumatran
state of any importance in the fourteenth century, and epigraphy
shows that it was still a refuge of ^Hindu* culture. But it was no
longer a great mternational empoiium. Srivijaya was no more.

L'HAFTER 4

THE ISLAND EMPIRES (z)

(ffj Javii to the Mmgot invasion of

T*ie daminaiic€ of the Buddhist SaJlcitdr^ over central Java in the
eighth century cauised Saivism to seek a refuge in the mtem paxt^ of
the island. There L$ evidence of the existence of an independent
kingdom there in the latter half of the century, with its centre some¬
where in the neighbourhood of Malang. It was thus a forerunner of
the much later kingdom of Singosari. Ita monunients w^ere simiiar
in style to the ones that the Sailendras w^ere erecting at the same time
in central Java, but were dedicated to the cult of Agastya, the sage w ho
Hindubed south India. The rulera of the state were the guardians of
a royal hnga representing much the same politico-religious ideas as
were to be found in contemporary Champa and Jayavarman IPs
Cambodia. The oldest dated document coming from East Java
belongs to this period. It is a Sanskrit inscription dated 760 recording
the foundation ai Dinaya of a sanctuary of Agastya by a king named
Gajaysna.

During the second half of the ninth century the return of Saivism
to central Java has been taken as an indication of the decline of
Sftilendra power there. Balhung (898“^ 10), whose inscriptions are the
first to mention the kingdom of Malatam, was the first of four Saivite
kings w^ho left inscriptions in the Kedu plain near Prambanan and
represent a dynasty w'hich had come from East java, and w'as pre¬
sumably the one to which Gajayana belonged. Very^ little is known of
them.

Balitung's successor, Daksa (Qto- Pgtg), probably built the majestic
monuments of the Prambanan group, a vast compleis of 156 shrine
ranged around a central duster of eight major temples, with the temple
of as its dominating feature. Just as the Borohudur with its
galleries of reliefs forms a textbook of Mahayana Buddhism, so on a
smaller scale Is the Siva temple^ with its galleries of reliefs illustrating
the Stories in the Hamayana^ one of HinduUm. In one of the other
temples of the central group is the lovely statue of Durga, Siva^s
consort* knowm locally as Lara Djonggrangt *&lender maiden \ The

CH. 4 THE ISLANJ& E^fPERES {i} 39

complex forms a mawsoleum housing the bodily remains of the king,
the royal family and the magnates of the realm, each identifiedLwith the
deity to which his or her shrine tvas dedicated, the royal personages
in the major temples with ftie deities of the Hindu pantheon, the
magnates in the smaller shrines with the protecting deities of the
districts with which in life they were associated. The whole must have
afforded an indescribable impression of magnificence and splendour.

Daksa's successor^ Tnlodong, reigned from 919 to 92 Eh The last
of the four was Wawa, whose dates, according to Krom, were 924-8.
He was the last king to maintain his capital in central Java. Traces of
it have been discovered close by Prambanan. The great aim of these
kings seems to have been to restore the Saivite tradition which the
Buddhist SailendraB had Interrupted. . 4 fter Wawa's brief reign central

Java for some undiscovered reason sank into the background. An
earthquake or pestilence has been suggested as the cause of the sudden
transfer of the capital to East Java^ but it seems most unlikely, since
there is no evidence of such an occurrence. The king who made the
move was Sindok (9Z9-'47)j who is regarded as the founder of a new"
dynasty wWch reigned in East Java until taaa* it is possible that one
reason for his move was the fear that Srivijaya might atEempt to
revive the Sailendra claims to central Java. Like all these early kings,
Sindok is only a name. All that is known of him personally is that he
ruled jointly with his chief queen, who was the daughter of a high
official, the Rakaryan Bawang. This is one of many examples in Old
Javanese history of the importance of woman in the community* On
his death he was succeeded by his daughter Sri [^natunggavijaya^
who ruled as queen. Her husband, a Javanese nobleman, held the
position of prince-consort.

THE PRE-EtTBOFEAS" PERIOD

FT. 1

ttO

Th« period from gsg to 1222 was one of great importance in Java's
culturaUdevelopment. The transfer of the seat of power to the valley
of the river Brantas led to a wakening of Hindu inBoence on govern¬
ment, religion and art and a corresponding increase in the importance
of the native Javanese clement. Notwithstanding the allegiance of the
earlier mlers of East Java to the Sairite tradition, Indian influence had
always been weaker there than in central Java. Under the cloak of
Siva the old indigenous cults flotirished^ as indeed they did in Cam¬
bodia and Champa as welt, Sindok's reign provides a series of Old
Javanese inscriptions which are a valuable source for the study of the
i ns ti cut ions of the country. They show clearly that its civilization was
Indonesian, not Indian.

In the days when it w^as usual to think in terras of Svaves ' of Indian
"immigration', one explanation of the growing predominance of the
Javanese element was that from the ninth century onward$ Java
received no more of them. But the question that poses itself is w'hcther
she bad ever received any. Waves of immigration have been too easily
assumed on extremely tenuous evidence, and this assumption has
militated against seeing the development of Javanese culture in its
proper perspective. And, it may be remarked, this i$ equally true in
the cases of Burma, Siam, Cambodia and Champa.

The rise of the East Javanese kingdom had important economic
consequences for that region. The until led swamps of the coastal
areas and the delta were brought under intensive cultivation. The
rulers of the new period began to develop an interest in overseas trade.
Commercial connections were made with the Moluccas on one hand and
w'lth Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula on the other. Balt also for the
first time began to play a part in Javanese history. Late in the tenth cen¬
tury a Balin^e ruler married a daughter of Sindok's grandson^ and thus
opened the way for the introduction of Javanese culture into the island.

The best knotvn of Sindok^s descendants is Dharmavamsa
r.ioo6)p who has been described as the first historical person of whom
we have more than a dim vision. He ordered a codification of Javanese
law and encouraged the translation of Sanskrit texts into Javanese.
Among other w^orks parts of the MuJiQhfmrata were translated into
Javanese prose with the Sanskrit verata interpolated. Thus arose the
oldest prose literature in the language.

His greatest enterprise directed against the powrerful empire of
Srivijaya. Hia attacks upon Palembang during the last docade of the
tenth century^ as we have seen* placed Srivijaya in imminent dangerf
until in 1006 the great Sumatran counter-attack resulted in the

TlJE f^RE-EUmpPHAN PERIOD PT. 1

de^tmcdon of hia krstan and his own drath. The East Javanese
kingdont temporarily disappeared. Its place was taken by a number of
waxring chiefs, each supreme in his owq district.

Dharmavarnsa had designated as his successor his son-in-Iavv
Airbngga, the son of a Javanese princess, the great-granddaughter of
Sindofcj who had married the Balinese prince Dhartnodayana. He
was in Java at the time of the disaster of 1006, but managed to escape
with his faithful servant Narottama and took refuge at a cloister of
hermits at Wonogiri. There he remained for some years waiting fox
an opporturiity to claim his throne. In 1019 he left his hiding-place
and received oBicial consecration as king. But his sway e?ttended over
only a fragment of the kingdom^ and at first he dared not make any
attempt to recover the remainder through fear of interv'cntion by
Srivijaya, There are indications that tn he may have succeeded
his father in Bali.

Three years later fortune favoured him in a quite unexpected
manner. Srivijaya was temporarily crippled by the great Chola raid,
and its*threat to the Hast Javanese kingdom disappeared. Airlangga
thereupon began the task of reducing to obedience the various local
magnates who had divided the kingdom among themselves. It was
a long struggle, but by about T030 he had made such progress that
Srivgaya recognized him, and its king gave him a daughter in marriage.
A modus ti^endi was established between the two potvers^ which
recognized Sri vijaya’s supremacy over the ivest of the Archipelago and
Java's Over the east. Java, which the Cholas had presumably con¬
sidered a commercial backwater not w^orth raiding, began rapidly to
rise in importance as a trading centre. Airlangga's ports in the bay of
Surabaya and at Tuban traded not only with the 'Great East’ but
tvere also the resort of merchants from the west—Tamils, Sinhalese,
Malabaris, Chams, Mons, Khmtrs and Achinese,

Such were the external signs of the new vigour Infused into East
Java by this fine staiesmam Internally he did much to improve
cultivation^ But his reign has been celebrated by later ages chiefly for
its literary activity. Its most famous product is the Arjunovivahat
composed by the Court poet Mpu Kanwa, probably in honour of
Airlangga's niarriage with the Sumatran princess. The Mattabimrata
story of the ascetic Aijuna is used as an allegorical representation of
Airianggab own storj^ A version of it was adapted for presentation by
the Javanese theatre and has become one of the mosi popular theines
of the ttayang, or shadow drama. In the poem itself and in the (eayaij^
adaptation the setting 15 entirely Javanese.

c:l[. 4 THE IHLAHD EMPIRES (z) 63

Thu mscriptlcns of the reign menrion three religious sects: Salvites,
Mahayano BuddhistS;, and Rishi, or ascetics. The return <Sf Salsite
rule to centra] Java had brc|^LLght no antagonism between Buddhists
and Hindus; their mutual relations eveni'where Avere e;^cellent. This
symbiosis of the two religions was to be found in contemporary
Cambodia also. The Mahayana, especially in its Tantric form^ was
becoming a secret sect^ to which the highest in the land belonged.
Saivism was the first stage on the way to enlightenment; after passing
through it the believer was ready to be inculcated mth the higher
Buddhistic know^lcdge. Both priesthoods were so pOAVerful that
Airlangga deemed it prudent to bring them under royal control. He
himself claimed to be an incarnation of Vishnu. His mausoleum at
Selahan contained a remarkable portrait statue of him as V^ishnu
riding on the man-eagle Garuda/ It was the common practice for
the kings of his Line to he worshipped after death in the form of
Vishnu. Ancestor-woiship was a special task laid upon a king. At
certain set times he had to establish ritual contact with his ancestors in
order to strengthen his position by the receipt of new magical ^powers
from them* Hence the many chandis scattered about East Java
celebrating a dead ruler in the guise of SiA’a, Vishnu or the Bod-
hisattva Avalokitesvara were all centres of ancestor-Avorship and,
although Dutw^ardly Hindu or Buddhistt represented a cuKus tha\ was
a surv'ival from the pre-Hindu past^

Some four years before his death in 1049 Airlangga retired to a
cloister to become a Rishi. Before doing so^ he is said to have per^
formed an act strangely at variance Avith the policy he had pursued
throughout his reign: he divided his kingdont betw^een his two sons^
Both were the children of concubines; he had no son born in royal
wedlock. As their claims were equal, it may be that he feared that to
prefer one at the expense of the other would bring on cistI war and
w^orse disunity than Avould result from peaceful partition. The
Javanese kingship, it must be remembered, wtis not a central power
administering the Avhole kingdom. !t aass a case of a maharaja con¬
trolling countless little lordships. ^Fhe king received the homage and
tribute of the higher chieftains, who managed their own affairs^
Mediaeval Javanese history, like that of Europe, shoAvs a constant
struggle in progress betw'cen the centripetal and the centrifugal
tendencies. Kings maintained their power only by repeated punitive
expeditions.

The river Brantas was the dividing line between the two kingdoms^

* Ni>xv an iht ttiimum ai MndjckicTto, Eui JiavB.

TtlE PRE-titJtlG ENEAS' PHriIDD

PT.

Thi^ cqstem orc^ caJl^^d Janggabp was of little impoTta^^nce; it was soon
absorbecf by the western one, called P:injalu at firsts but better known
to history as Kcdiri. I'he union came ^bout peacefully through the
marriage of Kamesvara (1117-30) of Kcdiri with the Prince:^ Kirana
of Janggala.i

For many years after Airlangga's death Javanese historj' 13 almost
a blank. There arc many inscriptionSp but they contain little historical
substance. Chinese sources mention Kcdiri as a powerful %vell-
organized state. Ten kings are mentioned up to 1222, but most are
^ mere names. Kames%^ara is known through his marriage and Dhar-
maja^s poem Smar^dahanaj in which he is associated with the god
Kama and his wife with the goddess Rati^ Kaxna^s wife. Jayabhaya
(1133-57) IS Airlangga's best-remembered successor. Javanese
tradition asserts that he prophesied the downfall of his country and its
rise once more to greatness. He is the hero of a poem by Mpu Panuluh
entitled Ilumiimu. Little is known of his reigUp though in local legend
it figures as a time of romantic chJva]r}^ Its real fame rests on the fact
that it {Produced another great masterpiece of Old Javanese literature,
the BharsSayuddb^j an adaptation of the story of the great battle
bctw'een the Pandavas and Kauravas from the i\f&^fabftariita. The
Kediri period indeed witnessed an unparalleled flowering of literature.

It^was also a time of much coitimercial development throughout
Indonesia. The Aloluceasp the home of the clove and nutmegs began
to be politically as well as commercially important. Tcrnate was a
vassal state of Kediri. There are accounts of extensive Arab trade with
the whole Archipelago. They came to buy pepper, spices and precious
woods. They were Mahomedan^t but at this time had not attempted
proselytizing activiti^ in these regions. Many merchants came also
from Cambay in Gujerat with Indian piece-goods to sell. I'o this city
Persians had brought the faith of the Prophet^ and before the end of
the thirteenth centuiy' merchants of Gujerat w^ere to make a start with
the conversion of the Malay world -

Kediri fell m 1222^ and a new^ scaiCi Singosarip took its place as the
ruling power in Java. The story is told in the Javanese Chroniclep the
Pararaion or *Rook of Kings'* The central figure of the drama was
Ken Angrok, "he who upsets every things By exploiting the dissatis¬
faction of Janggala with its subordination to Kediri, he managed^ after
a career of crime, to dethrone Kertajaya, the last king of AJrlangga^s

' But £ce C. C. BciigY Ilerkomit, I ’pirna rpi Functi^ tier AJiddfijitv^anje
lhtong^ I9S3, in which the mtDry of Airiiui^H^^a diiiiion of hii mlm u &hown to be
umhifttoriciL

CH. 4 THE r^LANli OtPIRKS (3) 65

liae, and found a new There was indeed so much dissatiS'

faction in Janggala that many people were migrating to tWt neigh¬
bouring region of Tumapel the Malang district. Ken Angrok^ a
man of low origin, murdered the Regent of Tumapel and usurped his
place by maming his widow Ken Dedes. He then availed himself of
a quarrel between Kertajaya and bis clergy to attack Kediri. In 1^22
he defeated the king at the battle of Gantcr. Then as King Rajasa he
built his kraton at Kutaraja, later known as Singosari.

No further facta of his reign are given in the Javanese Chrunide
until his death in 1227, and there h so much legend in his story that it
ia impossible to distinguish between fact and fiction. Rajasa was him¬
self murdered by Anusapati, a son of Ken Dedes by her former
husband. After a reign of just over twenty years the murderer himself
fell a snetim to- hb half-brother Tohjaya, a son of Rajasa^ who seized
the throne in J248+ The latter, how ever^ soon died and was succeeded
by a son of Anusapati, who reigned as King Vishnuvardhana (i 24E-68),

The storj^ of the early years of Singosari is completely lacking in
details, save for the sordid list of murders through which oite king
was replaced by another. Archaeology, however^ ha^ revealed two
developments of much interest during this period. In architecture and
art the purely Javanese element has come into its own fully. In religion
the symbiosis of Saivismand Buddhism has become a marriage:,arid
although outwardly in the sculptures their flindu or Buddhist
character& are distinguishable* their real significance must be sought
in native folklore gnd legend. They personify the divine and magic
power? worshipped by the people. When King Vishnuvardhana
(124&-68) died his ashes were divided between tw^o shrines. At
Chandi Mieri he was worshipped us an incarnation of Siva, while at
Chandi Djago as the Bodhisattva Amoghapasa. The latter in its
terraces and walks contains a wealth of sculptured reliefs representing
xh^jataka stories of the Old Javanese Tantri.

The last King of Singosari, Kertanagara, who succeeded his father
Vishnuvardhana in 1268+ completed the process of religious unification
fay practising the cult of the Siva-Buddha. As a king initiated in the
secret I'antric knowledge necessary for the tvcifare of his realm, it was
his duty to combat the demoniac powers that were rampant in the
world. To accomplish this, ecstasy must be culiivatcd through alcohol
and sexual excesses. His orgies shocked the compiler of the Pantratofif
who dbmisscs him as a drunkard brought to ruin by inordinate
indulgence in lust. On the other hand, in the poem Nagarakertiigaimi^
composed in 1365 by Prapanca, the head of the Buddhist clergy, he is

TIIE PRE-EVROPRAN P£R[Ot>

FT. 1

described as a saint and ascetic, free frcnn all passion. Professor
C+ C. Btrg of LeideUp ^ho has published a recent study of his reign,
is convinced that for a proper underst^'iding of his policy this latter
estimate; must be taken seriouslyJ

Kensnagara believed that in order to defeat the centrifugal tend¬
encies in Java he must combat the curse of division and strife laid
upon the country' by the action of the ascetic Bharada^ who was
believed to have carried out the partition of Airbngga^s kingdom.
Hence he erected his mvn statue in the guise of Aksobhya, a medit^
ative Buddhap on the spot where Bharada had Jived- It now adorns
rhe Knisenperk at Surabaya^ where it is popularly referred to as
Djaka Dolog, * Daddy fatty \ His brand of Tantric Buddhism, known
as katachakra^ had developed in Bengal towards the end of the Pala
dynasty. Thence it had spread to Tibet and Nepal, and also to
Indonesia, where it found in the Javanese anccstor^ult a system to
which it adapted it^lf with remarkable ease, Siva-Buddha was thus
an Indian cloak sheltering a native cult of great antiquity and power.

The* different versions of Kertanagani*s reign, provided by the
Pararaiofi and the Nagamkeriagiirnii respectively^ represent more
than differences of opinion regarding the personality of the king
himself; for the former gives him a short and inconspicuous reign^
while the latter gives him a much longer one, lasting until 1292 and
full of brilliant achievement. Krom, in his monumental Htndof-
Javaaasch Ceschledtms (1931), compiled the account of the reigti that
has been generally accepted by modem historical scholarship^ subject
to the modifications in his original views which he incorporated in
his contribution to the first volume of StapeFs G^sthied^uh van
He accepted the longer reign attributed to the king
by the Nagarakertagama and showed him as an empire-builder whose
greatest aim was the conquest of Sumatra. In 1273, according to
Krom, he sent a great expedition^ known as the Pamalayui to begin
the subjugation of the island, from which it did not return until
ia93p ^he year after his deaths By 12S6 the conquest had gone so well
that he sent a replica of the image of his father Vishnuvardhana at
Chandi Djago to be solemnly installed at Dharmasraya in the kingdom
of Malayii in order to ensure contact betw'een that kingdom, as his
vassal state;^ and his dynasty through the cult of ancestor-worship.

This version of the reign, generally accepted until recently, has

^' Kcrtau!i*gara de miiikrTkdc; cmpJirvbqilder ^ in Orieni^^U, no. 34, fuiv 1050, ptp.
also tectinn oft’. . Stapi+l'm van il, pp. 7-14I8,

m wlucii Re dkioiUjn Old JaviJine huioricil wridni^

CiL 4

INLAND EMPtHES ^^) 67

been subjected to drastic revision by Profcssar Berg. In 'Kertanagara
dc miakendc em pi rebuilder' he attempts a reconstruction of tlie story
based primarily upon a recof side ration of the date of the attack on
Sumatra, He shows that there la no evidence that Kertanagara sent
the Pamaiayit in 1275. Xot only was he not in a position to do so as
early as 1^75^ but the Nagarnkertiigamii passage that has been taken as
an as^rtion that he did has been misinterpreted. What it really says
is that, as a result of the king's assumption of divinity earlier in that
year, the order was issued for Malayu to be conquered. 'Phis must
be interpreted to mean that in that year he was specially consecrated
for the pursuit of an imperialist programme, the crowning achievement
of which was ultimately to be the conquest of ^>rivijaya. From an
exhaustive analysis of the available evidence Berg formulates the
hypothesis that the expedition did not actually leave Java uniil
seventeen years later, in izgi, the year of Keitanagara^s death.

This involves 3 reinterpretation of what, in Krom's view\ was the
most important direct evidence of an earlier conquest^ namely the
image of Vishnuvardhana w'hich Kertanagara sent to Sumatra id ia 86 ,
according to the inscription of that date found in the heart of the
island on the river Batang. It was an image of Buddha Anioghapasa-
lokesvara, the inscription tells us, and w^as conveyed to Sumatra by
four Javanese stale officials on Kerianagara's orders and erected at
Dharmasraya, There it was the joy of all the subjects of the bnd of
Malayu, from the maharaja himself downwards. Berg's theory is that,
so far from testifying to a successful military' campaign, it h evidence
of a friendly policy which sought to draw MalayTJ into an Indonesian
confederacy headed by Singosari. It bears witness to the fact that up
to that date no warlike expedition had been sent against Sumatra.

On the basis of thi$ hypothesis he proceeds to reconstruct the
development of Kertanagara^s policy' of expansion according to a
sequence of events which is logical and convincing if one accepts
his interpretation of the passage in the Nagar<jhrrti^giiTna regarding
the dedication ceremony of 1275. the king's accession in 1268,
he says, he planned to make his kingdom a great Indonesian power.
His father's chief minister, Raganatha, who objected to ihiis on the
grounds that It was too hazardous an undertakingp was given another
appointment, and in his place two supporters of the new policy, Kebo
Ttngah and Aragani, became the king's principal adviaers and were
entrusted %vith the necessary measures for his assumption of divinity
as a Buddha-^Bhairava. This, the necessary preliminary to setting in
motion his ambitious scheme* took place in 1275.

THE EHE-KLIROJ'EAN I’ERIOD

FT^ I

Berg insists that the kijig^s policy can only be properly understood
in the ftght of tvhat he believes to be the fundament a] significance of
this act of consecration. He dismisses Jie idea that the king^s imperi-
nhsm may be attributed to caprice. Equally^ he discounts any attempt
to interpret it as a revival of an earlier Javanese imperiahsm. He
thinks that the stories of Sanjaya's conquests^ of the Javanese action
against Srivijaya shortly before a:d. 1000, and of the imperialist
expansion of the kingdom of Kediri outside Java in the twelfth century
arc without real historical foundation. The imperialism of Singosari,
he contends, was due to an external cause: it ^vas one of the reper¬
cussions of the h'longol invasion of eastern .^ia. He accepts the
theory* originally propounded by Moens in 19^4^* that Kenanagata's
Bhairava-dedieation wafi a consequence of Kublai Khan*s dedication
as a Jina-Buddha in 1264^ and again m 1269, Avhich signalized his
adoption of a prt^ramme of further Mongol conquests. Fear of the
Mongols, Berg suggests, was the mainspring of Kertanagara's policy^
Hence in 1:375^ under the guise of a Bhairava-dedication ceremony,
he coAimiticd himself to a far-reaching imperialistic programme which
aimed at uniting Indonesia against a possible threat from China. By
imitation of Kublai Khan^s dedication he hoped to develop similar
powers^ His plan was to build up a sacred Indonesian confederacy
and mobilize its strength against the Mongols by means of his magical
powers as a Bhairava-Buddha^ Thus it is significant that one of his
early acts was to establish friendly relations with Champa, which itself
was threatened by the Mongols. And his presentation of the Amo-
ghapasa image to Sumatra in 1286 represented an export of his own
sakti to a territory^ also threatened by Mongol imperialist expansion.

After the ceremony of 1275 Kertanagara proceeded systematically
to cany out a planned programmc+ In 1280, according to the
Nagar^keftagama^ he exterminated the malignant Mahlshi-Rangkah.
The precise meaning of this is obscure, but it would seem to refer to
the steps he had to take in order to establish his authority firmly in his
own kingdom before any movement of expansion was possible. The
indications are that this was a very serious outbreak of opposition to
his policy + Throughout hia reign the centrifugal forces were barely
held in check.

'I'he next stepi according to Bcrg+ was the annexation of the island
of Madura lying opposite to his principal port of Tub an. The task of
preserving its loyalty was entrusted to Eanjak Wide, an officer high in

^ J. L. Moctiip 'Hce Buddhiiiti ep Jdva en Sumiitn m xijn blociperiodi!' in

TBGk 3 xev (19134).

CM. 4 THE ISLAND £MPIRE 3 (2) 69

the king^s confidence, who wss given the title of Arya Viraraja. The
prcvioufiiy accepted story wus that Vitaraja was banished ther^becayge
the king suspected hi$ loyalty- Berg, however^ rejects the banishment
theor>' on the grounds that the post of Governor of Madura was one
of key importance in view' of the need to secure his eastern flank while
pursuing a poUcy of expansion m the west.

This was followed by the conquest of Bali, for which, Prapanca tells
us, the order was given in 1284- He also speaks of other acts of hos-
tilitv on the part of Keitanagara against his neighbours, but the
absence of precise details in hi$ statements poses very difficult prob¬
lems. If, as Berg attemps to demonstrate in his "misunderstood
empire-hudder" article, Kertanagara carried through a carefully
integrated programme of military conquests leading up to the final
objective of the subjugation of MaJayUp his next necessary step, after
securing his eastern flanks would have been to reduce the kingdom of
Sun da on his western flank, and thereby effect the unification of the
whole island. Prapanca asserts that Sunda was in Kertanagara^s
empire^ but offers no clue as to how or when it was acquired^ Berg,
in working out a logical sequence of events in the king^s aggressive
programme, places ita conquest in 13S9 or early 129^-

Happily, however, it is unnecessaiy to pursue his highly ingenious
argumentp eince in two subsequent articles^ he has offered an entirely
new' interpretation of the nature of the Pamalayu, involving a coirea-
ponding change of rievv in the niatter of Kertanagara^s other 'con¬
quests", He has removed from the word its military content. It
should be translated, he thinks, 'agreement with Malayu"; no military
action was taken agaimt Malayu. He has come to the conclusion that
the conquests mentioned by Prapanca w'ere in realit)' spiritua] ones,
Kertanagara w'as building up a sacred confederacy of Indonesian
states in face of the Mongol menace by means of the establishment of
spiritual ties with each. Hence neither Bati nor Sunda \vere con¬
quered bv force of arms: they were brought into a 'holy alliance*.
This also explains the object and nature of the Pamatayu.

While Kertanagara was engaged in building up, by one or the other
method,® an anti-Mongol defence front, the danger from the norths
which earlier had been no larger than a man's band, began to assume
threatening proportions. Kublai Khan was sending envoys to the
states of South East Ask, which had been in the habit of recognking

’ * De Ge^chitdoiis van Pril Ntajspahit*, Indvn£n?^ iv, pp. 481-5^^; pp. rgS-zoj.

^ J - G, de Cup«ru^ ^ Twin tig jttar atiidk van dc oudere vm

no. 46, jan+ 19544 pp. 637-41 r differs a viluabk afuilyf of Btrrg's theories.

THE PEE-EUBOPEAX PESTOI>

PT. 1

thtf 0%'erlordship of ChiriR, to deniand tokens of subrtussion. It soon
becametclcaF that ht was asking not for the usual declarations of
respect accoitipajiied by presents of reprsentative products of each
country', but for actual obedience, antT where this was refused was
prepared to back his demands by military^ actionn At Arst Kertanagara
mainiained a watchful^ non-committal attitude^ It may be that he
was pbying for time in order to weigh up the actual risks involved in
refusal.

If so, the disaster which befell the Mongol expedition against Japan
in i^St, and the subsequent failure of Kublai's forces in Tongking
and Champa in 1285, may have Influenced him in staging his rash
act of defiance in 1289, For he arrested the w'hok Mongol deputation
which appeared in his capital in that year and sent the envoys back,
as the Chinese record puts itj with disfigured faces. This has been
held to indicate that he cut off their noseSt or at least that of the leader
of the deputation, Meng K'l. Duyvendak, however^ insists that the
statemeni must not be taken literally, but as signifying that Peking
was d^ply hurt by the king^s rude rejection of the mission.

However that may be, Kublai Khan prepared a great fleet and army
^vith which to punish the recalcitrant ruler, and Kertanagara seems
to have been aw’are, when launching his Pamalayu expedition in 1292,
that real danger waa to be expected from. China. Presumably he
gambled on the expedition completing its task successfully before the
arrival of the Mongol reprisal force.

But what wws its task? The Na/^arakertagama asserts that the
expedition of 1292 w^ent not only to Malayu but also to the west coast
of Borneo and the Malay Peninsuk, It claims that tCertanagam
acquired Bakulapura — i.e. I'anjungpuri—in Borneo, and Pahang, the
name applied to the whole of the southern part of Malaya in Prapanca's
day. It does not say exactly when they were occupied, but scholars
are agreed that it must have been at the time of the Pamalayu expedi¬
tion* It looks as if, being aw^are of the impending Mongol attack,
Kertanagara hoped to W'ard it off by seizing strategic points on its
route. Berg argues that his expeditionary force narrowly missed
intercepting the Mongol armada off the coast of BorneuK In the
absence of conclusive evidence as to the part the Pamalayu was
intended to play in the general plan for dealing with the Mongol
threat, speculation is all too easy. If its ultimate object w'as to mobilke
real resistance to an expected attack, it was ineffective, for it failed
to prevent the Mongol force from landing in Java.

Before that happened, however, an internal movement in Java

CH, 4 THE JSLANT 5 EMPIRES {z) JI *

against Kertanagara's authority brought about the total collapse of his
plans. The despatch of a powerful expedition abroad left ^mgosari
dangerously weakened. Discontented vassals were presented with an
excellent opportunity to rcbeh and the king^s policy had many
opponents^ Kediri was the obvious centre for such a movement,
since ks ruling family had never forgotten its hamiliaLion at the hands
of Ken Angmk. Jayakatwang^ the Prince of Kediri, became the leader
of a formidable rebellion which threatened the capital. He skilfully
drew' off the royal army by a diversionary attack from the north. Then,
on the day when the king and hh circle were busy with the orgies pre¬
scribed by the cult of the Siva-Buddha, he made a surpriae attack on
the capiia] from the tvest^ captured it, and put to death Kertanagara,
his chief minister and the other members of the circle while, in the
wTords of the Pamr&loft, they were drinking palm wine.

Thus when the Mongol armada under Admiral Yi-k’o-mu-su
arrived at Tuban shortly afterwards, in 1293, the king whose powder
it had come to break had disappeared from the scene and his throne
xvas occupied by Jayakatwang of Kediri, Its arrival presented Kert-
anagara's son-in-law^ the previous Crown Prince Vijaya, with a
heaven-sent opportunity^ to overthrow the usurper. When Singosari
was captured he had fled to Madura* On the advice of Viraraja,
however, he had returned to Java and made hia submission to Jaya-
kattvang^ w'ho had rewarded him w'lth the governorship of a district
in the lower Brantas valley.

He notv sought the assistance of the Mongols in overthrowing
Jayakatwang and promised in rctum to recognize Kuhla! Khan's
overlordship over Java. His proposal tvas accepted, and the combined
forces easily defeated the usurper and captured his capital, Thcn^
when the Mongols were off their guard and their troops were split
up into small detachments engaged in the task of pacification, Vijaya
began a series of surprise attacks upon them. Successful in these, he
cleverly manoeuvred the remainder into so unfavourable a position
that Admiral Yi-k"a-mu-su abandoned the campaign and sailed away
homew^ards, leaving him in command of the situation.

Vijaya now became king w^ith the title of Kertarajasa Jayavarddhana,
He built his kraton at Majapahit, the seat of bis headquarters in the
lower Brantas valley' at the time of the Mongol arrival, and was the
founder of the last great dynasty in Javanese history which maintained
the Hindu tradition.

Krom's estimate of the situation w*hen the Mongol fleet sailed away
was that the empire built up by Kertanagara had been weakened, but

THE PRE-EUROPEAN PERIOD

PT, I

not broken, by his death* Kublai Khan’s tspedition had completely
failed, ^nd in effect had brought Java profit through assisting in the
continuation of the Singosari-Majapahk dynasty. Against that Berg
points out that as a result of the Chillese invasion of Java Kcrtan-
agara’s great expedition of 1292 had to return home in the following
year, and that in fact all the results of his efforts were lost. For
Jayi^atwang's action caused Singosari’s attempt to unite mtsantara,
the island empire outside Java, under her leadership to miss its mark.
Xhe work had to be undertaken afresh by Alajapahit, and in his view
failed to achieve the results that were within Kertanagara*s reach at
the rime of his death. His conclusion is that under slightly more
favourable circumstances Kertanagara might have become a national
hero rather than a 'misiindcrstood empire-builder'.

(6) Mf^apokit, i293-f. 1520

The elimination of Jayakatwang gave Prince Vljaya the opportunity
to save his face, says Professor Berg, by transferring attention from
Java's defeat by the Mongols to his own victory over the usurper.
As a result of his successful manoeuvres in forcing the Chinese 10
give up their enterprise and return home, he put over the appearance
of victory with great success. Three inscriptions of his reign, dated
respectively 1294, 1296 and 1305, convey the impression that he
enjoyed unchallenged power as the son-in-law and lawful successor
of Kertanagara and was recognised by all the chiefs who had been the
latter s vassals. I hb is echoed by Prapanca, 'the kraton His Master’s
Voice', as Berg dubs him. Thus the NagaTukertagama states that all
java was ovejyoyed at the accession of Kertarajasa Jayavarddhana and
hb fourfold marriage with the daughters of Kertanagara,

^^tlanagara left no sonj; and although as a descendant of the great
Raja3a(Angrok) Prince Vijaya had a perfectly good claim to the throne,
the NagaTokerU^Qtna lays such emphasis upon hb marriage with the
four daughters of Kertanagara. and upon their great influence as to
suggest that this constituted hb real claim to be his father-in-law’s
successor. Krom and Stutterheim look it for granted that the four
ladies in question w'ere indeed Kertanagara’s daughter, 'Fhe in¬
scription of 1305, however, indicates that the marriages constituted
a mystical union with the territories 'conquered' by Kertanagara as
a result of his dedication as a Bhairava Buddha in 1275. The four
wives represented Bali, Malayu, Madura and Tanjungpura. Berg
has posed the hypothesis that not one of them was a natural daughter

CH. 4

T(fE ISLANU EMPIRES (z) 73

of Kettanagara.^ His explanation of the situation is that just as
Kertanagara had won ftusantara hy yoga^ so Kertarajasa Jayavjrddhana
created four 'daughters of Kertanagara^ by means of Bhainiva ritual,
and in uniting himself witlf them established a special relationsliip
with the island empire brought into being by Kcrtanagara, Thus by
seTcual union with them as he developed new magical powxr for

carrying on Kcitansgata's progtatnme to a further stage.

Apparently the marriages were not made simultaneously, nor tcere
all of them permanent, ’'f he names of only the first and the fourth are
known. The first, w^ho is described as the paramesvari, or chief
queen, was Dara Petak, the Sumatran princess brought back to Java
by Kertanagara's Pamalayu expeditions She became the mother of
Kertarajasa's son Jayanagara, who aucceeded him in 1309. The
fourth, who is $aid to have been the king^s favourite wife, w^as a Cham
princess named Gayatri, who became the mother of two daughters^
the elder of whom succeeded Jayanagara in 1328 as ruler of
Majapahit. She was brought to Java by the mission despatched to
Champa by Kertanagara in 1391 or early tzgi with a Jjavanese
princess for Jayasimhavatman 111, and arrived after the departure
of the Mongol armada for home.

"I’he name of the Javanese prince was Tapasi. Berg not^ that
the word signifies yo^im and is of opinion that her despatch to Champa
was connected with Kertanagara's Bhairava rites. She represented an
export of his mkii to a territory exposed to the Mongol threat. The
other two" daughters of Kertanagara' are vague figures; their marriages
with Kertarajasa appear to have been merely temporary and ritual
unions. The Na^arakerlagama and the inscriptioits ascribe children
to Dara Petak and Gayatri only.

The Nag^irakertagama asserts that the reign of Kertarajasa was
peaceful and the whole land obedient- This was until recently the
accepted view\ It tvas assumed that the Pararat&n, which lists a whole
series of rebellions beginning with one led by Rangga-Lawe in 1295,
wrongly places the early ones in Keitarajasa's reign. Krom, for
instance^ places Rangga-Law^e's in 1309, the first year of Jaya-
nagara's reign.* 'I'he reign^ he explains, was one of constant rebellions,
all of which tvere fomented by old companions of Brince Vijay^a tvho
had helped him to obtain the crown and w^ere disappointed with their
rewards. The fact that he was able, as King Kertarajasa Jayavarddhana,

* 'Dc G€schtcd4nb_^nae Pril (i, Het myfterie vmn dc vkr vwi

Krtin^an), ImiorusiCf iv, pp, 481-530,

* Himi>€-Jmraanst:h eJup. i, pp. :J 46 -Sa.

THE PHE-ELTROPEA?! PERIOD

PT. I

to keep these ambitious people urider his thumb senses to showhd^^*
strong h^ must have been.

*Stutterheini, on the other hand, while attributing the revolts to
the same cause as Krorn^ accepts the cfetcs given in the Pararaion.^
Berg^ agrees with Siutterheim in the matter of the dates. He shows that
there is reason to believe that the passages telling the storj^ of the
revolts belong to a ^proto-Par3raton\ probably written about 1330,
which contains trustworthy material. As far as their cause is concerned*
however, his analysis of the evidence leads him to a condusion that
differs radJcally from Krom's, I'heir origin, he demonstrates quite
coavincinglVp lay in a conflict between two parties: those in favour of
Kettanagara's holy confederacy and those opposed to it, the pan-
Indonesian party and the anii-foreign party. Thus Rangga-Lawe's
rebellion began because in 1295 Jayanagara, the infant son of the
Sumatran paramesvarl Dara Petakp was given the title of Prince of
Kedirip the Javanese equivalent of the English " Prince of Wales^ The
son of a Malay mother was thus given official recognition as the future
ruter of Java. Moreover, in that same year the king began to suffer
from a lingering ittness, and Dara Petak came into prominence as the
mother of a child who might soon become the titular ruler of Maja-
pahit while still a minor. The rebellion was thus a sign of Javanese
antipathy against a foreign queen and her Sumatran entourage.

Silch IS the explanation of a long list of conflicts — nine in alf
according to the which disturbed the reigns of Kcrt-

arajasa and his son Jayanagara from 1^55 until shortly before the
latter's death in 1328. Besides Rangga-Lawe's^ w'hich was quickly
suppressedp three of the rebellions, associated respectively with
leaders named Sora, Nambi and Kuti, w^ere of special importance.
Spra's was a formidable one w'hieh lasted from to 1300. Nambi
stirred up national sentiment in East Java against the half-
Sumatran Jayanagara. He was the son of the great Viraraja. who$e
personal estates were in the Lumajang district of East Java. Appar¬
ently Viraraja disliked the tendency of Kertarajasa's policy and ob¬
tained permission to retire to hi$ East Javanese home. There, after a
time^ he bep.n to neglect his duties as a vassal and failed to appear at
Court to pay his annual homage.

His son Nambi^ who was chief minister at Majapahit, found his
position too difficult under the circumstances, and on the grounds

* van Im/fTttrtir, ii, pp. 7 J-3.

* d* 'Twinriff jaar itiidie\ no. 4 j 6_ np , 63S-40,

where ihc Uam Fctak fitoty 19 examined .

CH. 4

TKE ISLAND EMPIRES (2)

that his father was ill, he obtained
permission to leave the capital and
visit him. The two of them then
began to fortify themselves* in the
stronghold. WTien Kertarajasa died
in 1309 they had broken off all Con¬
tact with Majapahjt. Viraraja died
in 1311, and as Nambi still con¬
tinued to defy the royal authority
Jayanagara had finally to go to war
with him- An expedition was sent
against him in 1316, and according
to the i\agarak£rtitgiiiTtQ hb strong¬
hold at Padjarakan tvas captured^
and he himself killed, Berg, how-
tver shovrg that he maintained the
struggle for another ten years before
being finally disposed of^

In 1319 Jayanagara w^as threatened
by the most dangerous of all these
rebellions. Kuti, its leader^ was
a javanese nobleman, who gained
possession of the capita] itself- The
king Red to Badander, accom¬
panied hy part of his bodyguard
under a young officer named Gaja
Mada. The young man saved the
situatiun by a daring stratagem.
Returning in disguise to the
capital to find out how' the land
lay* he announced that the King

HUKIAI. I>f4GB 07 KEaTANAC^K,^

had been killed by Kutj. The

reception of this ne^vs by the populace showed that Kuti 'was un¬
popular. Gaja Mada therefore was able to raise a successful in¬
surrection against him and restore the king. For this courageous act
he was rewarded by appointment as Patih of Kahuripan. A few
years later he became Patih of Kediri. He was to rise to a still more
important position.

Between the Kuti affair and the death of Jayanagara In 13^8 no
important events are recorded. The circumstances of the king's
death are interesting. He was foolish enough to take possession
of Gaja Mada's wife. The injured husband instigated the Court

THE PRE-EUftOPEAN PER[OP

FT* I

phyaidan, in performing an operation upon the king, to allow the knife
to peneljate farther than was necessary p and immediately aftenvard$
had hU unfortunate agent executed. As jayanagara left no successor^
the throne should now, according to*Krom, have devolved upon
Gayatti. She had retired to a nunnery and for this reason is re¬
presented as having voluntarily stood down in favour of her elder
daughter Tribhuvana^, whom it has been customary to describe as the
regent- But this assumes that Gayatri was a natural daughter of
Kertanagara, whereas^ on Berg's hypothesis, she was a Cham princess.
Her Cham origin would seem to be the explanation of her renuncia¬
tion of the world* She cannot have renounced the throncp he
contends, since she had no daim to ii^

"'rribhuvana was married to a Javanese nobleman^ who as prince-
consort took the title of Kertavarddhana and was created Prince of
Singosarij but had no share in the royal authority. Her reign, which
lasted until 1350, when she resigned the crown to her son Hayam
Wunik, saw the rise of Gaja Mada to a position of power and in¬
flu enc<^rieverp redo usiy held by a rmnlster in Javanese history* In 1330
he was appointed Fft^patth, or chief ministefp of Majapahit. Thence¬
forward until his death in 1364 he was the real ruler of the kingdom.

The part played by Gaja Mada m suppressing Kuti's rebellion
show a him in his early days as a supporter of the pan-Indonesian
poliE^’. This probably explains why his appointment as mapatih
caused a rebellion in East Java. In 133Avhen he returned to
Majapahit after suppressing it, he is said to have taken an oath before
the council of ministers never again to enjoy pahpa until nasantara
had been subdued. That he was announcing the adoption of a new^
policy of imperialist expansion is clear, but the word pahpa has
caused much speculation among scholars. Krom suggested that it
might connote either his personal revenues or leave of absence from
duty. Stutterheim could offer no explanation of its meaning,^ Bergp
however, appears to have solved the riddle.* The w'ord, he explains,
means the exercise of mortification and was used to describe the
Bhairava Buddhist rite involving the enjoyment of sexual intercourse
with ^yogim\ 'J‘he announcement therefore indicated the suspension
of the policy based upon Bhairava rites, or* in other words, the sub¬
stitution of a policy of military conquest^ involving the imposition of
Javanese domination over misantoTa, for Kertanagara's plan of a pan-
Indonesian confederacy maintained through a system of yoga,

* afpp. 76-7^

* Dt Gr^chlcdcniv vm Pril Miijiipdhil *, Indoaesic^ v, pp.

tlL 4 THE I 3 I-AND OIHKES { 2 )

I'he record states that the ministers present derided Gaja Mada's
oath, Thcj' were soon to be disillusioned; some were remowd from
office. The new policy was inaugurated in that same year, 133**
the removal of the Ahsobhya statue, the symbol of Kertanagara's
peaceful policy towards nuiafttara, from his burial-place, Chandi
Javi, and the erection of a demoniac Camundn statue with the an¬
nouncement that military' action was to be undertaken against a
territory called Sadeng.

The term ‘Sadeng’ refers to the island of Balt, which had reverted
to independence when Kertanagara's confederation fell to pieces with
his death. Its reduction became Gaja Mada’s main objective. Other
places were mentioned by him when he took his epoch-making oath—
Gurun, Seran, Tanjungpura, - 4 ru, Pahang, Dompo, Sun da, Palem-
bang, and 'Fumasik, the old name of Singapore. These places and
others also, it has been assumed, were brought into the Majapahit
empire during the period from 1331 to *351 while Chandi Javi was
closed and Kertanagam’s policy suspended. But the evidence re¬
garding their acquisition has been challenged, and only in Bali's case
can one speak with certainty. Its conquest began in 1331 and was
apparently completed in 1343. It was in Bali that the old Javanese
culture made its greatest impact outside Java itself. The island, how¬
ever, was never wholly Javanized: it continued to de%'elop its ow'n
individual type of ‘Hinduized’ culture, which, unlike java's own
culture, was able to maintain its integrity against all the assaults of
Islam.

Evidence of Javanese cultural influence, dating from this period,
it is thought, is to be found also in Dompo, Sumhawa and some other
places which tradition has assigned to the empire of IVIajapahit. Her
dependent states are enumerated in the NagarakeTtagama, 'Fhey
comprise all of Sumatra, a group of names from the Malay Peninsula,
Mendawai, Brunei and Tanjungpuri in Borneo, and a long list of
places eastwards of Java, beginning with Bali and including Makassar,
the Bandas and the Moluccas. Many of the names can only be
identified by guesswork. VVe arc given a picture of an empire as ex¬
tensive as present-day Indonesia plus much of ^lalaya. Krom,
Sturierheim and the many writers who have followed them have
accepted it as substantially true, Vlckke, for instance, has given a
graphic description of a mighty empire maintained by overwhelming
sea-pow'er. After its fall, he says, nothing as great was achieved again
'until the Netherlander^ completed their conquest’.^

* pr 53-

BALISEAE

Did Prapanca’s Great Majapahit ever exist a$ a reality? The
question has beeti posed by Professor C. C, Berg m another of his
attacks upon the orthodojt interpretation of mediaeval Javanese his^
tory as set forth in Krom's Hindoe-^J&taansch Ges^htedenis.^ And his
unequivocal answer is that the Nug^Tukeriag^m^ Ibt of the depen¬
dencies of Majapahit is of great value as a statement of an important
historical myth and a reflection of the geographical knowledge of Gaja
Mada’s own day, but for the student of political history it h ‘AVorth-
It is based upon totally inadequate evidence. So far as the
ascertainable facts go, the state of Majapahit was limited to East Java,
Madura and Bali.

Little b know^n of the relations between Sumatra and Majapahit
after the return of Kertanagara’aPamalayu expedition. What is known,
however^ does not seem to justify the Nagaraktriag^imu^s inclusion
of the island within the Majapahit dominions in 1365. The previous
century had seen the rise of Malayu at the expense of Palembang,
and it was to the former state that Kertanagara had sent the much-
dbcussed Amoghapaia statue in 1386* when engaged upon building
up hb *holy alliance* against the Mongol menace. King Maulivar-

■■'Dc Sadertu-iwlag en dc Myth« vjui Groox

-IVlilaruiliit^ Inditnaiff v (1951). pp.

CH. 4 THE TSLAND EMPIRES (2) 79

madcva, who was on ihe thione at this time^ s^:nt two princmpa to
Majapahit w^ith the returning FamaJayu fleet. One of thein Dara^
Petak, as we have already married Keitarajasa Jayavardhana

and became the mother of Jayanagara. I'he other^ whose name was
Dara Jingga, was, according to Stuttcrhdm^ married to a member of
the Jaranese royaJ house and bore a son who succeeded IVIaulivarma-
dev a King of Malay u. Berg, however, suggests that she went
through a Ehairava-ritual 'marriage' with Kertarajasa, after which
she was sent back to Mahyu to be married to nsvarupakumara^ the
son and successor of MaulivarmadevTi. If one may accept his version
of the story, their son w^as the Adityavarman who later ruled over
much of Sumatra, and by virtue of his mother's double marriage w'as
regarded as at the same time the eldest son of his Sumatran father
and the youngest "son* of Kertarajasa. He was brought up at the
Majapahit kraton and served as commander of the Javanese forces
which overcame Bali. In 1343 he dedicated at Chandi Jaga a statue of
Manju^rit the Bodhisattva who combats ignorance. Stutterhdm has
interpreted this as an allusion to his early years of tutelage at the Court,

Soon afterwards he s-vas ruling in Malayu* w^here, presumably^ he
succeeded his father. There he made no attempt to revive the sea-
power Once wielded by Srivijaya, but concerned hi[tt$clf solely with
the estpansion of hia dominion over the inland parts of Sumatra.

He extended his power over the Menangkabau mountain districts
and became the ruler of an inland state, baaed upon them, that was
to all intents and purposes independent. In 1347 he erected an in¬
scription in which no sign of dependence on Java appears. Ruins in
Sumatra dating from his reign show the prevalence of strong Tantric
Buddhism with Saivite elements. Its days, how ever, were numbered.
Already [slam had begun to make progress in the northern coastal
regions of the island. I bn Batuta, who visited Samudni in 1345-6^
wrote that it had been Muslim for nearly a century.

The accession of Hayatn Wuruk in 1350 brought no change in the
policy of Majapahit. Gaja Mada remained in control until his death
In 1364. The young king was apparently quite content to leave the
direction of affairs in hi$ hands. In 135 J> however, one of the most
dramatic incidents in the early history of Java took place. Historians
refer to it as the 'Bubat bloodbath \ It was the finaL culminating
event of the period during which Chandi Javi was closed and the policy
of blood and iron pursued.

The story goes that aoon after ascending the throne Hay am Wuruk
asked the King of Sunda for a daughter in marriage. His proposal

THE PBE“EL'HOPEA2f PERIOD

PT, I

was accepted, and the king himself, with a splemlid retinue, brought
the princess to Bubat, north of the dty of Majapahit, where the
ceremony was to take place. At the l^si moment Gaja Mada inter¬
vened with the stipulation that the bndc should he handed over in
the manner of a formal act of tribute from a vassal to his overlord.
The King of Sunda realized that he had been neatly trapped. Rather
than surrender his kingdom's independence, he attempted x 6 fight
his way out. But he and all his retinue were overpowered and slain.
From the existing evidence it is not clear w'hether the marriage
actually took place or w'hethcr the princess committed suicide beside
her father's dead body. If it did take place she died soon afterw'ards.
After the affair Sunda seems to have acknowiedged the overlordship
of Majapahit for a time, but ultimately recovered her independence.

The ‘Bubat bloodbath’, as has already been indicated, ended the
period of conquest. GaJa Mada then personally demonstrated that
the policy of Kertanagara had been restored by founding a new shrine,
Chandi Singosari, to take the place of Chandi Javj, Also, under his
patronage, Prapanca began the composition of the Nagamkerfagamit
in praise of the 'misunderstood empire-builder'.

In addition to the list of Majapahit's dependencies Prapanca gives
the names of states with w^hich she maintained friendly relations.
They include Siam, Burma, Cambodia, Champa and ‘Yavana',^—^i.e.
Vietnam—besides more distant countries such as China, the Car¬
natic and Bengal, with which she had commercial intercourse. Chinese
sources record Javanese embassies at the time of the accession of the
Ming dynasty, mentioning dates from 1369 to i38z. During the same
period Palcmbang also sent embassies to China asking for support
against Java. In 1377 the emperor sent a letter of recognition to a
King of Palcmbang. Before it arrived a Majapahit force occupied the
city and the Chinese envoys were put to death. Palembang was going
rapidly downhill. At about this time a Chinese pirate, Leang Tao-
ming, at the head of some thousands of his compatriots, established
control over the city. Java apparently did nothing to interfere, and
Krom suggests that she pursued a deliberate policy of neglect. But
(his assumes the existence of ‘Great Majapahit' with its far-flung
Indonesian empire, which Berg has relegated to the realm of myth¬
ology. 'I'he kingdom founded by Adityavarman, it may be remarked,
had no e.'ttemal interests.

Gaja Mada's attention was concentrated so much upon imperial
affairs, that it is not easy to discover what part he played in the
direction of internal policy. Prapanca gives an excellent account of

CH. 4 the island KMPIFES (£) 8l

Javanese administration in hi$ own day, and shoe's that members of
the royal family exereised important functions* The king'^ father
dealt with justice, taxation and the classification of the popuktion.
His uncle superv ised agrarian Affairs and the upkeep of the roads and
bridges. There was a survey of all desas and sacred lands; police
duties were kid down and families numbered; fixed occupations
were assigned to various classes of the population; regulations wort
issued concerning gifts to officials and pious foundations^ the main¬
tenance of the army, the protection of cuIti^TitJng and landholding,
the payment of the royal revenueSt riic assessment of taxation and the
enforcement of the various forms of labour services.

Most of these regulationSp it is thought, must be ascribed to Gaja
Mada himself. The range of his activities was so great that when he died
a state council decreed that it was impossible to appoint a successor,
and divided his functions among four ministers. Possibly the decision
tvas a polite method of indicating that the council considered it unw ise
to place so much power again in one man's hands.

Gaja Mada'a name is associated with a law-book w^hich was^com¬
piled under his instructions. It seems to have supplanted the Kutu-
ramaitar^i, an adaptation of the Law^s of Many, w'hich had been the
chief written source of Javanese law before the Majapahit period*
But the form in which both works have come dowm to modem times
was the product of a later period* A Judgement of Rajasanagara's
reign, inscribed on copper^ shows how judges were instructed to
work in civ'll Cases. They had to take into account the law as laid dow n
in the law -book, local customs, precedent and the opinions of spiritual
teachers and of the aged. They must also question impartial neigh¬
bours before finally reaching their decision.

Of the king as a ruler very little is ^id. Presumably after Gaja
Madak death he found the task of co-ordinating and directing the
the w'ork of the four ministersi appointed lo stipervHsc the administra¬
tion too,arduous» for a few years later he again appointed a prime
minister with general control over the w hole range of state business*
Prapanca's picture of the life of a great potentate conveys the impress
810 n that amid the distractions of living royally he can have had little
energy^ left for the conduct of affairs. ^Tndy King Hayam Wunik is a
great potentate. He is without cares and worries. He indulges in all
pleasures. All beautiful maidens in Janggala and Kediri are selected
for him, as many as possible, and of those w^ho are captured in foreign
countries the prettiest girls are brought into hi$ harem
* B. H. M. Vlddfc, *Viucinijxra, p, 63*

3s TUfi E>]t£-CtmOPEJUf PEfilOD FT. I

Hsyiim Wimik left no son bjr a ptindpsl qnecn. By bis chief wife
he hat^ only a daughter. She mamed her nearest relative, the king's
nephew Vikramavarddhana, Prince of Mataram, who became heir-

JAV^fSE WAYANG FUPYET

apparent. There waa a son, Virabumi, by a lesser wife. The king was
anxious to makt spedsl provision for biitu He was accordingly
appointed ruler of East Java and married to the hdr-apparent*s stster«
Such an arrangenient was bound to ca^ trouble after the king's

CH. 4 THE [SLAND EMPUIES (2) S3

deaths Indeed there is es-Idence that even before that event Virabuml
'was ruling his appanage as an independent kingdom. »

The rdgn of Vikramavaiddhana (1389-1429) was a period of rapid
decline. The civil war which (developed in consequence of Vtrabumi's
refusal to recognize the authority of Majapahit was the chief cause
of failure, for it fatally weakened Majapahit’a control over her subject
states. Thus was the way opened for the rise of a new state, Malacca,
whose expansion was further facilitated by the vacuum created by the
fall of Srivijaya and the concentration of Malayu upon inland affairs.
Moreover, the spread of Islam added a powerful religious factor to the
political opposition and lent new strength to the centrifugal tendencies
always present in Java itself. For some years good relations were
maintained between Vikramavarddhana and his brother-in-law, In
1399, however, when the king’s only son by his chief queen died,
troubles began. Civil w'ar broke out in 1401. In 1406 Virabumi was
assassinated and his head brought to Majapahit in token of the re¬
storation of unity to the kingdom.

The Chinese had recognized both kings. When Virabumi's oapital
was taken some members of the suite of the Chinese envoy were killed
there. The emperor demanded an immensely large sum of money by
way of compensation. Vikramavarddhana sent one-sixth of the amount
as a token payment. This satisfied the emperor, and he remitted the
remainder of the debt.

The embassy sent to Java oi> this occasion was the first of a long
series, for the Ming emperor Yung-Io wished to revive China's
prestige and make her once more the great centre of the eastern world.
Most of them were led by the famous eunuch admiral Cheng-bo, w ho
made a remarkable sens of voyages between 1405 and 1433, visiting
Champa, Java, Sumatra, India and Ceylon, and even .■\rabia and East
.Africa. His Muslim secretary Ma Huan wrote a valuable account of
three of the voyages, the yj'i^-yat Sht»g Ian, originally compiled in
1416, later improved and expanded in 1451.

The Chinese pirate-ruler of Palembang attempted to rob Cheng-
Ho in 1407, but the adnural, warned in time by Che Tsing-k'ing a
Chinese of the city, arrested the pirate chief and appointed Che Tsing-
k’ing in his place. It la significant that in dealing with this matter
Cheng-Ho regarded himself as acting on behalf of Majapahit, and the
new chief was nominally subject to Vikramavarddhana. Malacca,
which had received its firet Chinese mission in t403, claimed Palem-
bang. The emperor, however, found its claims unacceptable and
decided in favour of Majapahit,

THE PRE-EUSOPEAN PEIUOD

PT. 1

The revival of Chincje interest in the Archipelago was thus in no
way directed against MajapahJt. Evidently China did not fctl called
upon to pursue the policy of ‘fragmenution’; Ma Iluan's account
of his travels shows that Steady Java'! overseas empire was no more
than a name, if even that. To maintain authorit)' over such an empire
required nothing less than a Gaja Mada, and after his death Majapahit
produced no one of his stature. The tveakenmg of political ties, how¬
ever, made little, if any, difference to Java commerce. For instance,
when in the fifteenth century the ports of Borneo, which had pr«s
viously paid tribute to Majapahit, demonstrated their independence
by developing relations with China, their trading relations with Java
remained unaffected, .\nd Chinese trade with the Moluccas was
conducted mainly through Java.

Very little is known of the last century of Majapahit's history after
the death of Vikramavarddhana's death in 1429. He w-as succeeded
by his daughter Queen Suhita (1429-47), in whose reign a rebellion
Dccurrcd under a leader named Bhre Daha. The nest ruler was her
brotttcr Bhre Tumapel, who became King Kertavijaya (1447-51),
After him there is no mention of any further sovereigns of the old
royal house.

The next ruler, Bhre Pamotan, held his Court at Keling Kahuripan
and rdgned as Kajasavarddhana (1451-3). Then after a kingless period
of three years a certain Hyang Punw^isesa reigned from 1456 to 1466.
In 1460 his ambassadors caused a scandal in China by killing six
priests of another mbston in a drunken brawl. Bhre Pandau Sabs,
who reigned from 1466 to c. 147S with the title of Singhavikrama-
varddhana, abandoned the kraton at Majapahit in 1468. Javanese
tradition asserts that in 1478 Majapahit was conquered by a coalition
of Mahommedan states. This, however, is imposaibb, since there is
clear evidence that 3 ' Hindu' king, Ranavijaya, was reigning in i486.

The end of Majapahit is shrouded in darkness. Krom’s last king is
Pateudra, who was in occupation of the throne in 1516, He is men¬
tioned by Barbosa as the heathen king of a heathen people to whom
iUbuquerque sent an embassy after the conquest of Malacca in 1511.
The name ‘Pateudra' is presumably the Portuguese rendering of Pati
Cdara. Barbosa writes that the coastal havens were Mahommedan
and at times rebelled against the ‘King of Java’, but were suppressed.
A report sent in January 1514 to the King of Portugal by de Brito, the
Governor of Malacca, adds just a little to this pimire. He says that
Java has two ‘kafEr-rulers’, tlie King of Sunda and the King of Java,
but the Moors control the coastal regions.

CHAPT^ S

THE KHMERS AND ANGKOR

(a) The Khmer Mngdom Cambodiu io l ooi

The disappearance of the empire of Funan in the middle of the sixth
century came, according to the Chijie$e account, through the rebellion
of a feudatory mte named Chenla. The History of the Sui describes
the occurrence thusi 'the kingdom of Chenla is on the &oiJth-west of
Lin-yi. It was originalJy a vassal kingdom of Funaru The family
name of the king w^s Ch^a-li and his personal name Chc-to-sseu-na.
His predecessors had gradually increased the power of the country.
Chc-to-sseu-na attacked Funan and conquered it.' Lin-yi is, of course^
Champa, Ch'a-Ii stands for Kshatriya, and Che-to-$seu-na forjChit-
rasena. No explanation of the name *Chenla^ has yet been found; it
cannot be related to any Sanskrit or Khmer word.

Fnnao proper stretched over southern Cambodia and Cochin
China of modem times. Chenla was to the north of it; it-oocupied
the lower and middle Mekong from Stung Treng northwards, and its
original centre was in the region of Bassak just below the mouth of
the Mun river. It thus covered w'hat is now northern Cambodia and
the southern part of the kingdom of the Laos. According to the
History of the Sm, before the subjugation of Funan the Chenla capital
was situated near a mountain called ‘Ling-kia-po-^p'o"^—i.e. Linga-
parvata — on which was a temple consecrated to the god ‘P'o-to-li*—
i.e, Bhadreavam—towhom the king annually offered a human sacrilice
during the night.

A Khmer legend recorded on a tenth-century inscription ascribes
the origin of the royal family to the marriage of a hermit, Kambu
Svayambhuva^ with the ceJcsLiaJ nymph Mera given him by the god
Siva. This story^ which is obviously quite different from that of
Kaundinya and the naga princess, seems to have been invented to
explain the name 'Kambuja*, w^hich the Khmers adopted as a result
of IndianizationH

BhavavarmaUp 'Protig^ of Siva", the elder of the two brothers who
led the revolt against Funan, had become King of Chenla through
marriage w ith Princess Lakshmi of the Kambu-Mera dynasty» which

THE PfiE-EUHOPEAN PERIOD

PT. I

had had about a ccrltury and a half of history before that event* His
father Jlravamian Is mcadoned in inscriptions as a vassal of Funan.
His grandfather ts j^Ied ‘Sarvabhauma', and if, as is thought, Rudra-
varman. the last King of Funan, is indicated by this title, he himself
belonged lo the Lunar dynasty founded by Kaundinya and Sotna,
His marriage was of great significance in the development of Khmer
royal traditions, since it was to explain how the later Cambodian
monarchs claimed to trace their descent from both the Lunar and the
Solar lines with their entirely unrelated dynastic legends.

What exactly took place when Rudravaiman of Funan disappeared
from the scene is not known. Ciedis thinks that an attempt was made
to restore the legitimate line, and that this provoked the brothers
Bhavavarman Chitmena to place tbemseU-ea at the head of a
movement to vindicate their own rights as grandsons of the last reign-
mg king. The picture is complicated by the fact that, although Rudra-
yarman presuinably died somewhere about 550, Funan was still send¬
ing missions to China at the beginning of the next century, though
from capital farther to the south, since the old capital of Vyadhapura
had been captured by the Chenla brothers. Briggs thinks that the
evidence points to the fact that Bhavavarman did not annex Funan,
but that it enjoyed autonomy until 627, when it was incorporated with
Chenb in the reign of iSanavarman. He points out that the hereditary
line of ministers w'hich had served Rudmvarman continued in office
at the old capital as the servants of Bhavavarman, though he never
moved his capital from Chenla.'

The exact site of his capital is uncertain. It may have been near
\ at Phu or possibly at Stung Treng. In any ose \t was to Chenla
t^t the sovereignty over Funan was transferred; and even if Briggs's
view is correct that a ‘ wise policy of cotidliatton’ was pu rsued towards
the conquered state, Bhavavarman’s long reign seems to have been a
period of warfare, during which bis brother Chitrasena. who com¬
manded his armies, was kept constantly busy. The empire of Funan
had included peoples and vassal states stretching from Champa in the
^t to the Bay of Bengal in the west, and including most of the Malay
Pcninaiila. Of theses only Funan proper iseema to have acknowledged
the suzerainty of Chenla. The Malay states known to the Chinese as
Lang-ya-haiu, P’an-P'an and Ch’ih-t’u seem lo have opened diplo¬
matic relations with China, as also did the Mon sute of Dvaravati on
the Menam,

The exact length of Ilhavavarman's reign is unknown. I’he date of

' Lnwenre Pslnwr Brigas, Tht Andmi KJmur Empire, p. 43.

CH. S THE KRMERS AND ANGKOE S7

hi9 sole ingcnptioflj commemoradni' the foundation of a Jinga, is 598.
Chitfaaenasucceeded him in r. 600and took the regnal name of Mahen-
dra\^rman, ‘Protege of the Great Indra*. The dates of his reign are
unknown, but it was a short one, since he was getting on in years when
he b^me king. All accounts of him, Cham, Chinese and his own
inscriptions, describe him as a hero and a conqueror. During his
own reign he conquered the lower Mun ^ralley. He celebrated his
conqu^ts by estabiUhing lingas dedicated to ‘Girisa', the ‘Lord of
the Mountain’, His inscriptions have been found along the Mekong
near Kratid and Stung Treng, and to the west as far as Buriram and
Surin.

His son Isanavarman, who succeeded him in c. 611, was credited by
the Chinese with the completion of the conquest of Funan, From the
date given in the T'ang History this must have taken place in, or
shortly after, 627, Its separate existence as a vassal state was ter-
tninated and its territory annexed. The Chinese record that it con*
tinned to send embassies even after its annexation. Briggs suggests
that these were missions of protest sent by the deposed dynast^si

I^navamum I also extended his power westwards towards the
region that vm. later to become the centre of the Angkor monarchy.
A prince named Baladitya, apparently a scion of the Kaundinya-Soma
line which had ruled over Funan, had established an independent
state in the valley of the Stung Sen, a tributary of the Tonle Sap ri ver
running parallel to the Mekong. His kingdom seems at first to have
been known by the name of Baladityapura, though It is better known
by its later name of Aninditapura, This was conquered by I^na^-ar-
man, who thereupon built himself a new t^apital on the Stung Sen.
The new city was called T^napura, Its site was apparently about
twelve miles north of the present city of Kompong Thom and is
marked by the most impressive group of ruins of pre-Angkor Cam¬
bodia so far discovered. The reason for the transfer seems to have
been that with a policy of westwards expansion in riew his old capital
on the Mekong was loo near to his eastern fronticf. Thereafter he
extended his sway over three states of north-west Cambodia: Cafcran-
kapiira, Amoghapurn, and Hhimapura. Tn the south also he conquered
territories which brought hia dominions as far to the west as the
modem city of Chantabun and up to the borders of the Mon kingdom
of Dvanivati, It is significant that both he and his father, in order to
fMilitate their policy of conquest, cultivated friendly relations with
Champa, Hanayarman himself married a Cham princess.

^ Opr p. 48.

THE PHE-EUaOPEAN PEHlOfi

yt. 1

According to Chinese sources, t^navarmui 1 reigned until 635,
thougikhJs latest inscription is dated 628-9. successor vfas Bhava-
varman II, whose relationship to him is unknown, as also are the
dates of his reign. Briggs suggests thit he may have been 'a son of
the m^'sterious son of his namesake W'ho disappeared so completely
from history’.^ Only one of his inscriptions can be dated; Ctcdra
attributes it to 639. He was succeeded by Jayavarman I. who, accord¬
ing to Cced^, was his son. but Briggs denies this.* He thinks that
Jayavarman probably belonged to the dynasty of lianavarman. 1 he
earliest date of his reign is an inscription dated 657, but it is thought
that he came to the throne some years earlier. He reigned for possibly
forty years, and though no building can be assigned to him he was
the author of many inscriptions. One of them calls him ‘glorious lion
of kings, the victorious Jayavarman’- He conquered central and upper
Laos up to the borders of the kingdom of Nanehao. But his large
dominions were never peaceful, and the civil wars which split the
Chcnla empire asunder after his death had their origin much earlier.
He himself was able to maintain his hold over the Mekong region, but
fialadityapura seems to have been the centre of a rival power control¬
ling the west, and it is doubtful whether he controlled the south of
Isanavarma n's far-flung dominions. He left no heir, and for more than
a century after his death Cambodia passed through a very troubled
period- From an inscription of 713 i( would appear that his widow
Jayadevi reigned after him, hut failed to check the separatist move¬
ments that challenged his authority during his lifetlme-

Up to the reign of Jayavarman I the Khmers had progressively
consolidated their power over the lower Mekong region and around
the Tonle Sap. They left behind much that is of archaeological
interest today. 'I'here arc brick towers, single or in groups, statuary
showing a likeness to Hindu prototypes hut also strongly-marked local
traits, and rich decorative sculpture of the sort which developed with
such exuberance during the Angkor period. -Administration was well
organised, but from the cpigraphical sources at our disposal it is im¬
possible to present an integrated picture of its functioning-
The inscriptions are all connected with religious shrines, and
evidence is plentiful regarding the state religion. Buddhism no longer
held 3 favoured position as it bad done under Punan. Hinduism was
predominant, and in particular the linga cult of Siva was the essence
of the Court religion. The principal Saivitc and Vaisnavite sects found
in India are mentioned. The worship of Harihara, or Siva and Vishnu
’ Op. eii., p. si. * /Wrf., p. S3.

CM. 5

THE EHMEKE AHD ANGKOtt

united in a single body, which is said to have fiist appeared tui the
rockfl of Badami and Mahavdlipur in the Pallava country soiaie time
before a.d. 4.50, was a marked feature of the period.

Most of the iiisctiptions arc fn Sanskrit, but there were some already
in the Khmer language, An inscription at Ak Yom in the Mun valley,
which may possibly be dated 609, is the oldest so far discovered in the
Khmer language. Literary culture was based upon the Sanskrit
classics, and much use was made of the mythology of the Ramayana.
the Mahabkaraia and the Puritnas. But all this was the culture of the
Court ; how far it affected the outlook of the ordinary people we are
not told. Tliat the old pre-Hindu culture still persisted strongly
cannot be doubted, and it is interesting to find in the inscriptions
confirmation of the importance of the matrilinea! constitutiofi of the
family.

So far as the material culture of this period is contertied, the Hiitorv
of the Siti gives some account of it as it was in the reign of Isanavar-
man. Most of the space, however, is devoted to the king and his Court,
The only industry mentioned is agriculture, and it is dismissed yi one
cursory sentence; *in this kingdom rice, rye, a little millet and wnic
coarse millet are cultivated.* .And from the fact that Ma 1 uan-tin in
the thirteenth century incorporated the whole passage in his Ethno¬
graphy of the. Peoples Ottlsitle China one is left with the impression
that no great social or economic changes had taken place during the
ititen'ening centuries, and that upon the basis of an economy of small
peasant agriculturists the architectural and artistic wonders of Angkor
were achieved. Up to the present research has for obvious reasons
been concentrated upon the temple and the Court, and unfortunately
outside them history has little to tell in the case of Cambodia.

The History of the Tang asserts that shortly after 706 the country
split up into rtvo separate parts, which it names the Land Chenia and
the Water Chcnla. The names signify a northern and a southern half,
which may conveniently be referred to as Upper and Lower Chents.
Jayavarman 1 successors were in nominal control of both as .Adhir"
ajas’, or Supreme Rulcra, but in fact power was in the bands of a
group of petty kinglets. So great was the confusion, and so scanty is
the evidence, that it is impossible to tell a coherent story. Ever since
the appearance of Aymunier's classic U CamboJge in 1900 theory
after theory has been formulated regarding the sites of the capitals of
the two divisions mentioned by the Chinese.* In his Deitx Itineraires^

’ disGUBiC* this qUC«UOn in deluil in o/>. aL, pp, 5!!-^.

*BEFKO. iv U/04, pp. 131-JS5.

rtm PM-ETOOPEAN PERIOD

PT. I

Paul Pdliot advanced the theory that Vyadhapura was the capital of
IniOwei^ Chenia, and Sambhupura (Sainbor) the seat of Upper Chenia.
For some time this generally accepted^ But it has been challenged
by Henri Maspero* Cotdes and Piefre Dupont* The last named
believes that for the location of Upper Chenla one must look to the
old homeland of the KhmerSp which he places well to the north in the
Bassak-Paks£ region and the lower part of the river Mun. Lower
Chenla, he thinks, comprised Sambhupura, Vyadhapura and Baia-
dityapura. On this showing Lower Chenla would have been the true
successor of the kingdom of Jayavarman L

All that is known of Upper Chenla comes from the Chinese record
of embassies* They called it Wen Tan, and its territories seem to
have extended northwards to Yunnan, with a population of Khas and
possibly of T^ais on the Nanchao border. Its first embassy arrived in
China in 717. In jzt it joined in a war against the Chinese Governor
of Chiao-chou (Tongking), but was defeated. Another embassy was
recorded in 750, but from which Chenla is uncertain. The Crown
PrinQc of Wen Tan went to the Court of China in 753 and received
the title of * Protector Firm and Fensevering^ . China was then at war
with Nanchao, whose king, Kolofeng, had allied with Tibet. The
crown prince accompanied the Chinese arrayi which was utterly
defeated by Nanchao. The last record of an envoy from Wen Tan h
in 799* All that can be said of iu history during this period is that,
compared with Lower Chenla, it maintained a reasonably stable
existence.

In Lower Chenla in the period immediately following the death of
Jayavarman I two dynasties strove for supremacy: the Lunar dynasty
of xAninditapura under Hvara (lords) of Baladitya's family, and the
newly formed Sokr dynasty of Sambhupura. The old kingdom of
Baladityapura, which had been conquered by liatiavannim* was
restored by Nripatindravarman, who ruled as king and acquired a
strip of delta territory extending to the sea at the old Funanese port of
Oc Eo. Its capital is thought to have been at Angkor Borei* Sambhu-
pura, near the present Sambor and Krati^i broke off from Chenla
under Jayavarman I. Many inscriptions and monuments date from
the period 681-716. A princess of this state, thought to have been a
daughter of its founder, married Pushkaraksha, a son of Nripatindra-
varman of Aninditapura, and her husband became King of Sambhu-
pura. Thus both kingdoms came under monarcha claiming to belong
to the Kaundinya-Soma dynasty.

After this period information about Lower Chenla is very slight

ClI. 5 THE EHMERS ANH AN<;K0H 9t

and raises mure questions than it answers. There is no record of
embassies to China, and only a few inscriptions. The last inscription
of Queen Jayadevi, dated 713, speaks of misfortunes. A door-
inscription of Preah Thcat Pir in the province of Kratie, dated

716, runs: *Pu$hkara had the god Pushharesa erected by munis and
the most eminent of firahmariB,' Presumably Pushkaraksha of Sam-
bhupura was its author. This is claimed to be the first example in
Cambodian history of the apotheosis of a king.^ Four inscriptions of
the period 770-81 mention a King Jayavarman who had not been
included in the previously accepted list of Cambodian kings. In order
to prevent confusion, therefore, Cirdcs calls him Jayavarman 1 Us.
All come from the territory of the kingdom of Sambhupura.

The family of Nripatin'dravarman of Aninditapura seems to have
made itself supreme over the whole delta region. Cmdts suggests that
the marriage of Pushkaraksha with the heiress of Sambhupura was a
conquest in disguise. The Adhirajas of Vyadhapura apparently con¬
trolled only a short strip of territory along the Mekong in the vicinity
of Jayavarman I's old capital. .A son of Pushkaraksha married the
h e ire s s to its throne, and as King Sambhuvaitnan united the whole of
Lower Chenla. His son Rajendravarman. who reigned in the second
half of the eighth century, is therefore generally accepted as Rajen-
dravatman I among the Kings of Cambodia. He was succeeded by
his son Mahipativarman. U i» thought that the capital of these kings
was also at Angkor Borei.

During the iatter part of the century Lower Chenla was attacked
by Malay pirates from ‘Java’, The term may refer to java itself, to
Sumatra or the Malay Peninsula, or even to all three. 'I'hey seized
the islands of Pulo Condor and used them as a base for raids which
extended as far north as 'longking. In 774 and 787 they raided
Champa. Cambodia was also attacked, but the inscriptions do not say
precisely what happened. A Jav.<«nese inscription claims that the
country was conquered by King Sanjaya. An early tenth-ccnlury
Arab writer, Abu Zaid Hasan, tells the story of the travels of a mer¬
chant named Sulayman, who travelled in these regions in 851 and
picked up an account of a Javanese expedition against Chenla in the
closing years of the eighth century. Although legendary, it seems to
throw some light on the conditions prevailing at the time.

A voung Khmer king rashly expressed a desire to sec before him
the head of the Maharaja of ‘Zabag' (i.e. Srivijaya) on a dish. The
story reached the ears of the maharaja, who made a surprise attack

* ttf - p. 60,

THE PRE-EUHQFEAK PpHOD

FT, 1

upon the Khmer ting's capita!, seized him and cut off his head.
Taking it home with him* he had it embalmed* and sent it back in an
um as a warning to the king's successor. A Khmer inscription of a
later dale asserts that Jayavarman ! I, before his accession to the throne
of Cambodia* vi&iled Java, Apparently he was taken to the SEiilendra
Court to pay homage as the successor of the beheaded king. Historians
are inclined to think that there is much truth in the Arab stoty* since
when Jayavamiaji 11 had gained control over his kingdom he staged a
special ceremony at which he made an express declaration of his inde¬
pendence. Briggs therefore suggests that he w^as the successor of
Mahipativarman* and that the latter was the Khmer king who was
beheaded by the Sailendra maharaja.^

Notwiihstanding the lack of historical evidence^ the eighth century
provides interesting examples of pre-Angkorian art and architecture.
ITie chronology and classification of Khmer art have been radically
changed since w^hen Philippe Stem published his challenging

Le Bayon tfAtighor et Vivclutian de Pari Khmer^ He stimulated a new
crop researches into the subject by Parmentier, Madame de Coral
Kimusat, Pierre Dupont and other s^olars. In 1940 the i^tilt3 were
incorporated by Madame de Coral Remusat in a work of great im¬
portance^ Uart Khmer^ iei grandes etapes de foi? ^-Glultan, which places
the major monuments in their historical $etung with something like
exactitude, and among other things gives a new significance to the long
period of development before the cslabbshment of Angkor as the
capital and artistic centre of the Khmer realm.*

Jayavarinan II was the founder of the Angkor kingdomp though not
of the actual dty. Briggs assumes that he w-as chosen by the ministers
of Mahipativarman in accordance with the instructions of the Javanese
maharaja of the Arab story.^ He did not belong to the line of Rajen-
dravarman L Later inscriptions make him a great-grandson of Mripa-
tindravarman of Aninditapura, but a successful claimant to a throne
could always be provided with a suitable genealogy. Nothing is known
of his father. That he himself came from Java to assume the crown
is certain- The suggestion has been made that his family may have
settled there during the time of troubles^ and that he had been held as a
hostage at the Sailendra Courtn He left behind no inscription^ so far
as is known, and his importance in Khmer history has only com^'
paratively recently been recogtiized,

^ Opr cft-t 69 ^

^ Ail CDc^cnt iumitiiiy cf Klufiet ilt ind archi WCtuFC C. la gtvyfii by

in ibid., pp, &9-S0.

* p. 69,

CH. 5 THE XHMEES AiJD ANGKOR 93-

The chief facts of his reign arc given in an eleventh-century in¬
scription, the Sdok Kak Thom stele, which was translated by Louis
Finot in 1915. He began his long reign by planting his capital, which
he nameti Indrapura, at a place which has been identified with the
archaeological site of Banteay Prei Nokor, east of Kompong Cham on
the lower Mekong. There he took into his service a Brahman, Siva-
kaivalya, who became the first priest of the new cult which he estab¬
lished as the official religion. It was that of the Deva-raja, the gnod-
Iting, a fonn of Saivism which centred on the worship of a. linga as tlie
king’s sacred personality transmitted to him by Siva through the
medium of his Brahman chaplain. The prosperity of the kingdom
W'as considered to be bound up with the welf^are of the royal linga.
Its sanctuary was at the summit of a temple-mountain, natural or
artificial, which was at the centre of the capita] and was regarded as
the S-xis of the universe.

This conception of a temple-mountain is of much earlier origin than
Siva-worship itself. It goes back to an ancient Mesopotamian practice,
and from thence had come to ancient India, where a number of Hindu
dynasties had their sacred mountains. Funan, as we have seen, bad
its sacred hill of Ba Phnom, and in Java the ^ailendras were ‘Kings
of the Mountain*. The adoption of the cult by Jayavarman was a
gesture of independence, a sign that he recognized no superior on
earth. More than that, it signified his claim to be a Chakravaitin, a
universal monarch, and bore for him and his successors much the
same meaning as the white elephant was to have for the monarchs
who were Buddhists of the Thcravada school. From his time onwarcb
for several centuries it w'as the duty of every Khmer king to raise his
temple-mountain for the presert'ation of the royal linga, which en¬
shrined his ‘sacred ego’. Thus arose the great temples which were
the glory of the Angkor region.

Indrapura, however, was only the first of a number of eapitaJs
founded by Jayavarman 11 , He was apparently anxious to find a site
which, while providing a suitable eminence for his temple, would be
more easily defensible against both e.\tcmal attacks by Malays and
internal enemies. His next move was into the region of the Great
Lake, whose bountiful supplies of fish combined with the high yield
of rice from its flood-plain to enable it to sustain a large population.
Here he planted his second capital at Hariharalaya, ‘the abode of
liarihara’, south-east of modern Siemreap. Its site is today marked
by the group of ruins called Roluos. Later he founded a third capital,
named .^marendrapura, at a site which is still uncertain. Finally he

THE PRE-mJ^OPEAN Pmion

FT. I

moved to Phnom Kulen in the Kulen hUU| ^ome thirty miles north¬
east of Angkor, where he built Mahendmparvata. Excavations on the
summit ofPJmom Kukii have revealed a number of temples^ including
his great pyramid-temple and its linga. Hia buildings, which were
completely hidden by thick forest, were largely excavated hy Philippe
Stern and Henri Marchal. They are in a style that is obviously transi-
rionah linking up the ^ pre-Angkorian * with the style which pre¬
dominated during the early days of Angkor. There are signs of both
Javanese and Cham influences; the former explained by the king's
early connection with Java, the latter as yet inexplicable in terma of
historical facts. It is thought that thb final move marked the com¬
pletion of the conquest of his heritage^ and that his previous capitals
mu&t have been connected with stages in his campaigns. But of these
no historical evidence has st> far come to light.

Cced^s places his accession in the year Against this Briggs
points out that that is the date on which the inscriptions say that he
established his capital on Mount Mahendra (Phnom Kulen).^ Its
significance lies in the fact that it is the year in which he instituted a
new era by a formal declamtion of Cambodian independence and by
the establishment of the ritual for the worship of the Deva-raja. The
date of his return from Java and the length of time he resided at each
of his earber capitals are unknown^

Mahendrapar\^ata ivas not his final residence, for ultimately he re¬
turned to Hariharabya and remained there until his death in 850. In
northern Cambodia his authority did not extend beyond the region of
the Great Lake, He may have chosen this area as the centre of his
power partly because of its proximity to the sandstone quarries of
Phnom Kulen and to the passes giving access to the Korat plateau
and the Mennm basin. It was an excellent base from which to launch
the policy' of expansion Imposed by the Chakravartin title upon its
holders.

Jayav^arman IPs reign made a great impression upon his kingdom.
He was the founder of its grcatnessi and especially of the far-reaching
claims of its ruling authority. From his reign the pyramid-sanctuary
marked the centre of the royal city* At its summit, which was the
centre of the universe, the Deva-raja entered into relationship with
the divine world. He himself was the god to whom in his own lifetime
the temple was dedicated. At hia death it became his mausoleum.

For some time after Jayavarman Il's death his successors continued
to reside at Hariharabya. His son Jayavarman III (850-77} was famous

n. 8S.

THE BUDDHA WITH BHAKA fLACKGIKJDNtl TO HfW, AMQKUB

TBE PRE-EITKOFEAM PKRIOn

I'T, T

as a hunter of elephants. Several foundations in the neighbourhood
of Angkor date from his rrign, but no inscriptions. Indravartnun I
(S77-89) built the Bakong, the first of the majestic stone temples in
the grandiose style found later at Angkor This together with the
Preah Ko, which be built^ and the Lolcy^ built by his son and succes¬
sor, Yasovarman forms a group to which the term 'Art of Indravat-
man" has been applied. It signalizes the beginning of the fim period
□f classical Khmer architecture.

Yaiovarman I (S89-900) was the founder of the first city of Angkor
In order to surpass his faiher^s temple^ the Bakong, he chose a natural
hill, Phnom Bakheng, on which to build his own^ and the city which
grew up around it was named after him Yaaodharapura* His immense
building programme induded the great rescr\'oir^ now the Eastern
Bany, and a series of monasteries for the religious sects—Saidte^
Vai^navitet and possibly Buddhist. Ya;Sodharapura, the original city
of Angkorp covijred a considerably larger area than the later Angkor
Thom^ founded by Jayavarman VII towards the end of the twelfth
centu^", with the unique and mysterious Buddhist temple of the Bayon
as Ll$ central feature. The two cities overlap* but the Phnom Bakheng
is just outside the southern wall of Angkor Thom.

Little is knowm of the political history of these reigns, or of those
that follow up to the end of the tenth century. Yasovarman Vs sway
e:rtended over a much greater area than Jayavarman'g had done. His
inscriptions pay him the most fulsome tributes as a warrior. IF the
inscription of 947 at Baksci Chamrong is reliable, his dominions ex¬
tended as widely a$ those of Funan in her greatest days. When and
how^ this expansion took place does not appear. In view of the fact
that he reigned for only eleven yeans and carried out a vast building
programme, it is difficult to believe that he had time to acquire a far-
flung empire which extended to China on the north, Champa on the
east, the Indian Ocean on the westj and included the northern part of
the Malay Peninsula as far down as, P"an-P’an (Grahi). Briggs thinks
that even if he was not responsible for all the expansion represented
by these boundaries, the territories included m them did indeed
acknowledge his swayj Ctedea, on the other hand, only credits him
with the control of the Mekong valley up to the borders of China and
of the Men am valley, thus omitting the Malay Peninsula region and
the Mon kingdom of Thaton in Lower Burma from the list of his
possessions. The fact is* as Briggs admits, that 'more misinformation
has probably been written about Yasovarman 1 than about any other

113.

THE &H^I£R5 ANI> ANCl^OH

CH. S

king of Cambodian hiatory’^ and much that has been attributed ta
him belongs to a bter period. One example of ibis is the $toij^ of hia
attempt to conquer Champa and its defeat by the Cham Indravarman
IL The greatest achievement of his reign was the provision of an
adequate water supply for his new capital. 'The digging of the
immense East Baray/ writes Briggs, *the changing and control of the
course of the Sierareap river and the wonderful system of moats»
reservoirs and pools with which he provided his new capital constitute
a remarkable achievement/^

Khmer history in the tenth century b mainly a record of buildings^ not
of political events. It was a period of splendour when cirilisjation took
shape. It corresponds to a period of anarchy in China at the end of the
T'ang period and during that of the Five Dynasties. Historians there¬
fore have to rely almost entirely upon inscriptions; all documents of
less durable materiab, such as paimleaf, have perished through the
ravages of mildew* white ants or fire. And the inscriptions are con¬
cerned solely with the affairs of the Deva-raja and his Court; they
give hardly any clue to the material civilisation, customs and J>eliefs
of the people.

The king as head of the state occupied so exalted a position in
theory* and was committed to a hfe involving so much religious ccre-
moniah that he can have had Uttle^ if any, personal contact with his
people. As the source of all authority he was the guardian of law and
order, the protector of rtligioii, and the defender of his land against
external foes. But he can have performed hardly any administrarive
functions. These were in the hands of a narrow oligarchy, with the
chief offices held by members of the royal family and the great sacer¬
dotal families. They intermarried and formed a class racially different
from the rest of the population. But it is noteworthy that although
they represented the Hindu tradition they used Khmer names.

Like the king, only in a smaller way, the magnates erected shrines
to their own personal cults. The beli^ was that by erecting an image
the 'sacred ego" of the person to be worshipped became fixed in the
stone, and the shrine would contain an inscription recommending to
the foundcr*s descendants the continuance of the cult. When he died
it became his tomb. Thus the innumerable statues of Siva, Vishnu^
Harihara, Lakshmi, Pan ati and of Bodhisattvas found on temple sites
are portraits of kings, queens and magnates, while their names, carved
on the statues, show a fusion of chdr personal titles with the names of
the gods and godd^sca, with whom they are united. Each statue was an

* JAtJ., p. E14.

daxteav fin^i: ?<OhTl{ LinjtAnv and centhai.

Clh 5 THB KltMEIt^ AND ANGKOR 99

ArtiRciAi body uitb magic properties conferring immortality upon
the person it represented. The practice was widespread thifinghout
South-East Asia. It is found in Champa and was of special impartance
in Java and BaLi^ It exhibits a f»lendmg of the cult of ancestor-worships
dating from neolithic timeSs ^"^th Hindu and Buddhist ideas introduced
from India.

In the ninth and tenth centuries SaiFism predominated^ By the
twelfth century VaUnavism was powerful enough to inspire great
foxind^-tiona, of which the outstanding ejtample was to be the Angkor
Wat itself. But Buddhism always had its followers, and as alt these
religiuna w'erft foreign importations they found it essentia] to preserv^e
mutual tolerance. Moreover, there was much syncretism^ for the old
cults of animism and ancestor-worship continued to be the real religion
of the mass of the people. In social Ufe also^ while the Law^ of Manu
and other Brahmanical codes were pifidaUy recognized by the Court,
the deciding factor in most matters was immemorial custom.

Six kings reigned during the course of the tenth century. Their
reigns are mainly a record of buildings. Two only are noiew^oithy in
connection with political changes. Jayavarman iV (928^42) was a
usurper who conquered Ya;Sodhajrapura (Angkor) and was either
driven out or abandoned it to establish a new capital at Koh Kcr.
away to the north-east. Rajendravarman II (944-6S) dethroned the
usurper's son Harshavarman II and transferred the capital back to
Angkor, which remained the capital city of the Khmers thence¬
forward until its final abandonment in J432- The return to Yaiodha-
rapura involved a great task of reconstruction,, and the ting i$ praised
in an inscription for rendering it ^superb and charming by erecting
there houses ornamented with shining gold, palaces glittering with
precious stones, like the palace of Mahendni on earth". He vvas res¬
ponsible for the invasion of Champa in 945“6^ and a Cham in$cript]Qn
Credits him with carrying away the goid image of Bhagavati from the
temple of Fo Nagar. Although he him&elf was a Saivite, his inscrip¬
tions display a great variety of religious practices and extreme tolera¬
tion. Buddhism in particular seems to have flourished during hia
reign* Ancestor-worship too became more closely identified with the
great temples than ever before.

The last king of the century* Jayavarman V (968-1001), completed
and dedicated one of the most beautiful of the Khmer temples, the
Banteay Srei, 'Citadel of the Women^ which was the first to be
restored by French archaeologists according to the method known as
anastyloskp flrat exploited by the Dutch in Java.

TOO

THE PRE-EimOPEAN PERIOD

PT, I

(j&) From lool (q the ab&ndonfrfmt of Angkor in 1432

The first haJf of the eleventh century is notable for the reign of
another of the great kings of Khmer history, Snryavarman 1 (1002-50).
He succeeded 'a phantom king who flitted across the throne^ as Finot
describes Udayadityavarman I (1001-2), the successor of Jaya^-annan
V* There is no evidence rcgardiirg either the disappearance of
Udayadity^avarman I or the accession of Suryavamian L The latter
i$ said to have been a son of a King of Tambralinga^ and to have
claimed the throne by ’iirtue of descent through hia mother from the
maternal line of Indravarman I. The indications are that he landed
in eastern Cambodia in loot, and after a long dvil w^ar ultimately
installed at Angkor in e. 1010. Later inscriptions date hi$ reign from
10021 when Udayadityavarman I disappeared. Rb chief rival after
1002 was a certain Jayaviravarman, who held parts of Cambodia until
ioo7p or possible sott. Suryavarman's claim w^as a weak one* He is
described in one inscription as having gained the throne by his sword^
which * broke the drcle of his enemies*.

Suryavarman^s building have attracted much attention. The two
that are beat known, the Fhimeanakas (* celestial palace") and the Ta
Keop tuad been begun in the reign of Jayavarman V. The Ta Kco was
the first of the Khmer temple? to be built of sandstone. Like the
earlier Bakheng and the later Angler Watp its central feature is a
platform surmounted by five totvei^ The Phimeanakas, on the other
hand, h in pyramidal style with one central tower only. Legend has it
that it w'as a paiiccp hut Khmer palaces w^erc always in wood, and its
plan is quite unlike the traditional palace by out* Chou Ta-kuan, who
visited Angkor at the end of the thirteenth centuryp records the
popular belief that the Khmer king spent the first watch of every night
in the tower with the mythical naga in the form of a beautiful w^oman^
and that upon this ceremonial consummation depended the w^elfare of
the kingdom. The towers of these tw^o temples are gilded, and the
fashion is first mentioned in Suryavarman's reign. It was a con¬
temporary Mon custom, which the Khmers are thought to have copied.

The Chlengmai Chronicle of a much later date describes Khmer
expansion in the Menam valley during his reign. An inscription at
Lopburi dating from this period chums that his empire included both
the Mon kingdom of Dvaravati and the !Malay kingdom of Tam-
bralinga, later Ligor. Lon^al chronide? credit him with the occupation
of the Mekong valley as far north as Chiengsen, but archacolog)^

THE KmTEES AND ANGKOR

lOl

CH. 5

shows no trac^ of it beyond Luang Prabang. In contrast with the
many campaigTi& waged on other fronts, his eastern frontier feema to
have remained at peace throughout his reign.

'Fhe eleventh century was mdeed a period of Tncreasing warfare for
the Khmers. Smyavarman's son and successor Udayadityavarman II
(1050-66) was busy doling vnlh revolts throughout his reign. The
first broke out in the far south and seems to have been caused by
Cham interference from the region of Panduranga, That region*
which had been in a state of revolt for some time, was thoroughly
subdued by King Jay a PararnesNi^aravarmanp whose forces also made
an incursion into Cambodian territory and sacked Sambhupura. The
revolt which ensued w-as led by a chief T.vho is described as a master in
the science of archery. He may have been a Cham. At first he achieved
no little success and defeated more than one Cambodian army* When
he was finally crushed by the famous Cambodian general Sangramap
who celebrated each of his victories with a pious foundation, he took
refuge in Champa.

During Udayadityavarman^s reign King Anawrahta of ,Pagao
reduced the Mon peoples of southern Burma and look Thaton, their
capitaL T'ai tradition asserts that he extended his conquests as far as
Lopburi and D varavati, and that the Khmera had to rewgniae Burmese
suseraint^' over the conquered territories as the price of receiving back
Lopburi. Epigraphy yields no evidence in support of this storyp and
the Bunticse chronicles are significantly silent on the subject. There
is no reason to believe that Anawrahta attempted any conquests to the
eastw^ard of the Thaton kingdom.

Two further revolts took place during Udayadityavarmao IPs
reign. One w^as in the north-west and w^as led by a royal general *
KamvaUp who actually threatened the capital, but was defeated by
Sangrama. The other, in the east, was also crushed by him. The
suggestion has been made tlmt they may have been the resuU of the
king^s hostility to Buddhism, His father, coming from a Buddhist
statCi had shoivn special favour to the religion* though maintaining
the cult of the god-king, Udayadityavarman built only Salviie
sanctuaries. In the most magnificent of them alb riie gilded Baphuon*
he installed a gold linga. It was the largest temple built up to that
time in Cambodia- Parmentier describes it as 'one of the most
perfect of Khmer ait\ Chou Ta-kuan, who $aw it in ite full glory*
writes that it was "really impre^ive".

Fiarshavarman HI (1066-80), Udayadityavarman IPs younger
broiheri tried lo repair the damage and loss caused by the warfarE of

E02

THE PRE-EtraOFEAN PERIOD

PT. I

the previous reign. He was a peatc-loving kingt but the times were
against ^lim. He was dethroned fay a revolt led by a prince named
Jayavarman, not of the royal family, faut apparently the son of a
vassal niler—or provihdal governor—ora city named Mahidharapura,
the site of which has not yet been identified.

Jayavarman VI, who founded a new dynasty, had a troubled reign.
Members of the family of Harshavarman III raised the south against
hiin> and continued the struggle until the accession of Suryavanimn II

HELEIIF FTtOfil TIIS llAmXAY AltHJ

in IU3. Ceedfc& thinks it b doubtful whether he ever reigned at
Angkor, though an inscription of a century later asserts that he was
consecrated there, Mahidharapura, somewhere in the north, seems to
have been the headquarters from which he directed operations.

He was succeeded by Ms elder brother Dharanindravarman 1
(1107-13)^ a man of advanced age w“ho had retired to a monastery.
Although an inscription records that he ^governed with prudence*, he
\v^ quite unable to cope with the rebellion which had lasted through¬
out his brother*B reign. That task was performed fay his grand-
nephew' on the maternal side, a young man of boundless ambltiout

the KHMEnS AND ANGKOR

103

CH . 5

fvlio crushci] the house of Harshavsniian II!» deposed the feeble
Dhararatidravarman U and was consecrated king as Suryavitfman II.

Sutyavarman II (1113-50) became the most powerful king of
Khmer history. Coedts comfoents: ‘HU accession coincides with the
deaths of Jaya Indravartnan II of Champa and Kyanzittha of Pagan.
A better knowledge of the relations between these countries might
show a connection of cause and effect between the disappearance of
two powerful kings and the seizure of power by an ambitious Khmer
king able to strike both east and west.*‘ Ito armie went f^er afield
than ever before in Khmer history. The inscriptions of his reign are,
however, strangely silent regarding his campaigns against Champa
and AnnaiTii as well as against the Mons and T ais of the IVlenam
valley. Most of them are found In the north, where he apparently
spent much of his time and founded a number of temples.

Suryavarman Il’s conquest of Champa has been dealt T.vith else¬
where. It was provoked by the Cham attitude towards bis attempts
to coerce them as allies in his operations against the Annamite king¬
dom of Dai-Viet. All tus attempts to invade Annam by the overland
route from Savannakhet to Nghe-an failed, as also did his effort to

hold Champa in subjection. . < l j l

Little a known about his western campaigns. The T’ais had begun
to infiltrate into the Menam valley and had settled in the sUte of Lavo
(Lopburi). According to the T’ai chronicles, his campaipis agiunst
that state and the Mon kingdom of Haripunjaya (Lamp'un) failed.
But Khmer influence upon the contemporary Mchitecture of Lopbun
was so strong that doubt is thrown on their veracity. The Sung
[listory shows a considerable expansion of Khmer sovereignty. It
describes the Cambodian frontiers as the southern border of Champa,
the sea in the south, the borders of Pagan in the west, and Grahi on the

east coast of the Malay Peninsula.

Suryavanmn II was the first King of CamlMdia since Jayavarman
II to enter into diplomatic relations with China* His first embasay
was received in China in ni6. A second appeared in itao. When,
eight years later, a third arrived the emperor conferred high titles upon
the ‘King of Chenla'. Between 1136 and 1147 discussions took place
regarding commercial difficulties, which were peaceably settled.

Suryavarman was as famous as a builder as he was as a wamor,
since he was the founder of the Angkor Wat. With the possible
exception of the Banteay Chhmar, at the foot bf the Dangkrek moun-
tains about a hundred miles north-west of Angkor, and now n heap o

1 La Elatf //tthtotJu/r d'lmlacMHe ft d'lttdoiUttt, p. a6(|.

ASQKDH WAT

CH, 5 THE KHMEfiS. AND AKGKOR 105

ruins, it is the largest religious building in the u-orld.^ Of ^11 the
Khmer munuinents it is the best preserved. The central sajictuar>%
130 feet high^ siandB on a square terrace 40 feet high and 750 feet
square. At the eomera rise four towers conuected bj^ galleries and
communicatmg with the cctitral shrine by covered passages. Around
this immense central building is a lofty wall of galleries, with towers
at its four corners. This in turn is enclosed by an outer square of
colonnades. Beyond this there is a further enclosure measuring S50
by itooo metres and surrounded by a tvall of lateriie and sandstone,
'rhe whole was originally surrounded by a moat 200 metres wide
enclosing a total area of nearly a square mile.

The legend was that the Wat was not built by human hands but by
Indra, the Lord of Heavent who sailed down to earth for the purpose.
Originally all nine great pinnacles were plated with gold* while the
sculptures of incredible richness, covering the walls in high and low
relief, were ablaze ’With colour* The central shrine contained a gold
statue of Vishnu mounted on a garuda, w^hich was taken out of its
sanctuary on festival occasions. It was of coursCj a representation of
the king deified as Vishnu, and the majestic shrine was erected in
order to become his mausoleum ’when he died. The enthusiasm for
Valinaviam which it manifests was to be found at the same time
in Java* where the Kings of Kediri, like Suryavarman, were incarn¬
ations of Vishnu. But Saivism was still important, as the many
Saivite scenes depicted on the walls bear witness. I he total effect is
of a blending of the two cults, ivith the emphasis on laiSnavism.

The exact date of Suiy^avarman’s death is unknown. Cham in¬
scriptions show that he was still reigning in 1149. Ccedis thinks that
he probably sent the Cambodian expedition against Tongting svhtch
met with disaster in 115O1 and that he must have died in that year.
I'lia vast building programme, coupled ’^vith his rash and largely
unsuccessful foreign policy> plunged his cauntry into a sea of mis-
fortunesj from which she was only rescued by Jayavarman VII.

1 'he period from his death to the accession of Jayavarman VH is
verv obscure. There are no contemporary inscriptions, and infdnn-
ation concerning it has to be gleaned froiri those of the ensuing period
and foreign sources. Dbamnindravarnian II, his cousin on the temale
side, who succeeded him in 1 was a Buddhist who broke the long
tradition of Hinduisin* In 1160 he was succeeded by \a^ovarman Up
who is thought to have been one of his sons, but not the legitimate
heir to the throne. His eldest son, Jayavarmati, who should have
succeeded, went into voluntary^ exile in Champa, so the story goes.

THE PRE-EU^Ot'eAE^ PERIOD

PT. f

id6

because as a good Buddhist he shrank from causing dvil war hj
prcssiti]! his claim.

Yasovarman^s short rcign^ vi^hlch ended in 1165 or 1166, aaw two
rebellions. The first, referred to as theVcvolt of the RaAus^ seems to
have been a peasants' revolt, presumably against the harsh conditions
they suffered as a result of Suryavanuan^s e_xtravsgance. The second,
led by a chief called Tribhuvanadityavantiant coat Yasovarman his
throne and his life. The rebel leader is described in an inscripricifi as
"a servant ambitious to arrive at the royal power'. When Jayavarman
heard of the insurrection he hurried back home to help his brother,
or mayhap to seize the throne for himselh An inscription at the
PhiTneanakas runs: 'Seeing the moment come, he rose to save the
land heavy with crime*' But he too late. He found Yaiovarman
dead and the usurper on the throne*^ and he retired again into obscurity.

In 1167 Jaya Indravarman IV of Champa, also a usurper^ began a
long series of attacks upon Cambodia. Hts sole object seems to have
been plunder. At first the campaigns were limited to border fighting,
in which the Chains won some success as a result of training their
cavalry in the use of the crossbow^ In 1177* however, having failed
to obtain the necessary number of hors^ for a raid on the grand scale,
they resorted to a surprise attack by sea, which resulted in the capture
and sack of Angkor. The old city of Ya^odharapura was defended by
wooden palisades, which proved Inadequate to meet the sudden
attack launched by a well-prepared enemy. King Tribhuvanadityavar-
man lost his life when the capital was taken. ITie central government
coUapsed and anarchy became wideapread.

It was now' Jayavarman's turn to deal with the situation. He dealt
first with the Chams* The great naval fight in which he routed them
is represented almost identically on the walls of the Bay on, his own
funerary monument and those of the Banteay Chhmar* His next
task was to reduce the country to obcdiencCp By i iSi he had estab¬
lished his power firmly enough to celebrate hi& coronation at Angkor,
Almost immediately afterwards, however, he was faced by a serious
rising in the dependent kingdom of Malyang, In the soutbem part of
what is now the province of Battambang* His army, which quelled
the rebels, was led by a young Cham prince,. Sri Vidyananda, who
was a refugee from his own country, though for what reason is un-
knowTJ. He displayed such ability as a commander that Jayavarman
VH marked him out for a still greater enterprise which he w^as pre¬
paring secretly against Champa.

The conquest of Champa was the greatest military achievement of

THE KJiM¥R 5 AND ANGR^>R

107

CH- 5

Jtiyavarmati's reign. The patience Jind care which he bestowed upon
preparing his great act of %'eiigeatico were notable. He even |ent an
embaa^ wth presents to the King of Dai-viet so as lo ensure Anna-
nute ncutfality. The story, which belongs rather to the history of
Champa than that of Cambodia, is told in Chapter 7. That he
enrisaged the permanent reduction of Champa to the position of a
vassal state Ls showm not only by his appointment of the Cham prince
Vidyanandana as commander-in-chief of the invading force but also
by the fact that when Champa fell a second time to the Khmer armies,
in 1203, its administratioit 'vt'as entrusted to another Chanit Ong
Dhamapatigramai who had spent sorne time at the Court of Angkor*
It is also significant, in quite a different connection, that the Cham
viceroy, who w-as created Yuvaraja in 1207, employed the Khmer
troops at Ida disposal mainly in attacks upon Annam- They were led
by another Cham prince, Ong Ansaraja^ a son of Jaya Harshavarman
II (1163-3) throne of Champa-

Under Jayavarman VII the sway of Angkor CJitcnded possibly even
more widely than under Suryavarman 11 . An inscription dated^t tS6
at Say Fong, on the Mekong closo to Vien Chang (Vientiane), indicat^
its farthest extension northwards. Chinese sources show that it
exercised at least nominal suzerainty over part of the Malay Peninsula^
They also assert that the kingdom of Pagan w'as a dependency of
Cambodia at this time^ Attempts have been made to explain that in
their Ignorance of the geography of Burma they confused Pegu» the
capital of the Mon country, w'ith Pagan. But even this suggestion is
unacceptable. Burmese and Mon sources are completely silent on the
subject, and the rule of Pagan under Narapatisithu (*173-1210) was
too firmly established to admit of Cambodian suzerainty over any

part of the country* ^ .

One interesting development in Burma during this king s reign %vas
destined to have important effects upon Cambodia by the middle of
the nest cenlu^y^ Among the companions of the Mon monk Chapata,
who in iii^ established a chapter of Ihcravada liuddhism after the
Sinhalese pattern in Burma, wras a Khmer prince whom Cccdta
suspects to have been a son of Jayavarman \ II. 1 he teaching of the
new sect were brought by mi$sionaiy monks to the states of the Menam
valley, and ultimately to Cambodia itadfi with revolutidnary effects*
For unlike Saiviam* Vat^navism, and Mahayana Buddhism, which
were imposed from above, the netv doctrines were preached to the
people, and stimulated a popular movement which carried the Khmers
as a whole into the Hinayana fold, which they have never deserted.

THE PIl£-EL^EPPEiUJ PEEIOD

PT, I

loS

Jayavarman VlVs internal work shows a building programme of
the molt extravagant order. It wa^ unparalleled alike in its immensity
and in the ha&te and carelessness with which h was carried out. In
the first placet ^rith the lessons of the Cham in^^ion in v^ew, he set
himself to build an impregnable dty* The result was Angkor Thom,
which was planned on a much smaller scale than Yaiodharapura.
While it was under construction the king resided in a lemporaiy
capitalj Nagara Jaya^ri, which was erected just outside the north-east
comer of the new one,

Angkor Thom was enclosed by a wide moat some eight miles in
circumference and a formidable latcHte w-all, supported on the inside
by an enormous earth embankment. Five stone causeways crossed the
moat and gave access to the city through five monumental gates, each
with towei^ surmounted by gigantic heads with four human faces.
The causew^ays themselves ^vere flanked on each side by balustrades
formed by rows of gbnts holding on their knees a naga, w^hosc seven
heads rose fan wise at each end of the causeway.

At jhe centre of the city rose the strangest monument ever erected
by a Khmer kingt the Bayon, next to the Angkor Wat the largest
temple of the Angkor group.* It was a pyramidal temple with its
central mass crowned by a lower of gold bearing four gigantic human
faces. Around it from an inner and an outer gallery arose many
smaller four-faced towers, the number of which has been estimated
at fifty. It was built in such a hurry that stone was piled upon stone
without any form of cement. Its decorations were among the finest
in Khmer architecture, its architectural motif one of the most striking
in the worlds but it is now in a worse state of ruin than almost any of
the other grat Angkor temples. The myriad faces Avhich so impres¬
sively and diacoricertingly confront the observer are portraits of
Jayavarman himself in the guise of the Mahayanist Bodhisattva
Avalokitesvara, usually referred to in South-East Asia as Lokesvara.

Like his father Dharanindravarimn II, he was a Buddhiat, and
under him Mahayanism became for a time the dominant religion in
Cambodia^ Suni'avarman 11 had blended V^abnaviam with SaSvism
in such a way as to substitute a Vbhnuraja for a Devaraja at the
Angkor Wat. Jayavarman \T! took the blending process a further
stage by the substitution of a Iluddharaja cult with its centre at the
Bay on. In 1933 the French archaenlogigt Trouve discovered a huge
siaiiie of the Buddha in a pit under the central tower of the Bayon.

Pour mtffux C^mprsndrg , chtip. vi, *Lc uivsthrc du BaVnn’ pp

THE KHTilERS MW ANGKOR

CH. 5

109

This must hnvc becu the reptesfntatioii of the Buddha^rRjRp It
sppareutly buried there during the riolent Hindu reactioti after
JayavartriRn^s death, when the Bayon became a Saivite ahrine and the
linga cult replaced that of Lokesvara.

Saivtsm, however, did not disappear during Jayavarraan's reign.
No great Saivite monument waa erected, but among the smaller
shrines as many were dedicated to &ivA as to Lokesvarai Needless to
say^ the mass of the people remained iaj^cly untouched by these

PLAN OF THE
ANGKOR GROUP

OB.F,

WESTERN flARAY

T.N,i=
P. =
T.P, ■
T.K_:=
B, :=
P'S. m
BK.ii
B P. ^

Khtn
Ta N»

Ta Mfohm
Ta Kca

Phnam Bakhen^
BafltcaJi Kdck
Bunical Prc4

waGftOft THOH

^[“Iastern saRay”

H) 0HEBON

b.k:

[d|Pre Rup

AhlOl^OK WAT.

HIL£&

N.B. Iht^icd iifws indtooti ihe bouadaria of thm
onipcial inkft and of tht flof^wr crtf of
Yci^haraptifij wfth PhfKm ct iit ewitfe

developments in the ofRdal cult* They interpreted its various forms
in terms of their own animism and ancestor-wor^bip^

Jayavarman VIFs building programme induded much more than
his two great monuments^ Angkor Thom and the Bayon. Among
other things he claimed also to have built no less than tzi rest-houses
at intervals along the roads radiating from the capital. His chief
queen Jayarajadevi^ we are told^ * filled the earth with a shower of
magnificent gifts*. On her death he raised her elder sister Indradevi
to the position she had occupied. Indradevi had been a distinguished
teacher of the Buddhist doctrine in three monastic schools. Bt^idea
erecting * numerous images of Jayarajadevi with images of the king

ANGKOR THOM: THE OF THE UAVON

r^iE ASt> an^^koh

111

CIL 5

and hmelf in all the cities", she composed in perfect Sanskrit the
famous inscription on the Pbimeanafcas which gives her huiband"s
biography.

A prograinme such as this far too heavy for a people already
crushed by tlie burden of wars and the buildings of Suryavarman IL
Thousands of villages were assigned for the upkeep of the great
temple while tens of thousands of officiants and hundreds of dancers
were employed in their semee, not to mention the army of labourers,
m^sonsp sculptors and decorators required for the constructional work,
Jayavarman VII may have been the greatest of all the Khmer mon-
archs, and it may be claimed that his reign represented the apogee of
Cambodia, but he impoverished his people with heavy taxation and
insatiable demands for forced labour and military service, Cced^
poses the question whether he b not rather to be seen as *u. megalo-
inanuic whose foolish prodigality was one of the causes of the decadence
of his country There can be no doubt as to the answer.

Up to the present no definite evidence regarding the dare of
Jayavamian Vll’s death has come to light. At one time it wa^, sup¬
posed to have been in 1201* Now Coedes places it in. laiS. The
increase in the length of the reign attributed to him illustrates the
growth of knowledge concerning him during the past fifty yeers. In
1900 little more than hb name was known. The programme of con¬
quest and buildings with w"hich he is now credited would certainly
demand a reign ending not earlier than 1215. I^Ioreover, the date of
his birth also has been altered. Ctedcs, who at one time placed it
shortly before 1130^ now favours a date not later than 112:5^ This
would mitke him well over ninety at the time of his death.*-

The details of Khmer history during the remainder of the thirteenth
century are hard to find. There are no important contemporaiy
inscriptions, and the Chinese dynastic histories have nothing to say
about the period. The chief sources of informatJon are Cham and
T'ai inscriptionap and later Cambodian ones. No great ruler arose
after Jayavarman VIL Much of his work perished soon after his death.
Champa was evacuated and a Hindu reacUoi> swept away the cult of
the Buddharaja, Everywhere lingas replaced Lakesvaras.

The evacuation of Champa vms the first step in the dissolution of
the empire* There is reason to think that it iraa followed aoqn after¬
wards by the independence of Tambralingaj though quite what
happened ia by no means clear. The "Fai also were strengthening

^ Op. PI, jup-t i^iap. viii, pp. 176-^10.

* Lti etait fiindmdiitt pp. 291.

I !2

THE PRE-EtTROPEAN PERIOD

FT* !

th^ir hold on the upper Memm valley at the expense of the Khmer
power.* In Cambodia itsdf, however, there were no signs of collapse,
and only a few of decays $o that at the end of the century k wus possible
for the Chinese observ^er Chou Ta-kuan to describe a magniheent
city and a prosperous country» notwithstanding the ravages of 1’m
raiders.

Five more Kings of Angkor are mentioned before the inscriptions
come to an end and the official Cambodian Chronicle begins. One
of them, Jayavarman VIII (1243-95), had the longest reign In Khmer
history, but achieved no distinction either as statesman or builder.
The great age of Khmer architecture had come to an abrupt end with
the passing of Jayavarman VII, Jayavarman VIII was largely respon¬
sible for the acts of vandalism on the Buddhist images erected by his
predecessor. Under him Brahman dominance was re^'establishcd.

He was quite unable to curb the T'ai, It was during his reign that
they gained control over most of what Is today the kingdom of Thai¬
land or Siamp A big step in this direction was taken when a T"ai
chief^n who had married a daughter of Jayavarman VII defeated
the Khmer governor of the upper Menam valley and established the
kingdom of Sukhot^al. Rama Khamhcng, who ascended its throne in
1370^ expanded his power far and wide at the expense of the Khmer
empire. Farther north another T^ai prince, MangraJ, conquered the
old Mon kingdom of Haripunjaya in the Meping valley and built the
city of Chiengmai as his capital. Both he and Rama Khamheng
established close relations with Kublai Khan» who had conquered the
old T'ai kingdom of TaJ^ or Nanchao, in 1253. Their attacks upon
the Khmer were made w'ith hb encouragement. Jayavarman VllI
asked for trouble by stolidly turning a deaf ear to Mongol demands
for homage^ and even went so far as to imprison Kublai's envoy. Had
Marshal SOgatu succeeded in subduing Champa, doubtless Cambodians
turn w'ould have come next. But his attempt ended in disaster. Hence
Kublai found the T^ai all the more useful as a means of weakening
the proud Angkor regime.

'Fhe early conquests of the T'ai caused such serious losses both of
revenue and of man power for forced labour that they alone would
account for the sudden stop in the erection of great monuments of art*
Otherwbe, however, the life of Cambodia went on much as before,
and for a time may have become somewhat easier for the oppressed
masses, w^hose main task was to labour for the greedy gods. At the
top of the scale the abandonment of great enterprises, whether of
erecting temples or of foreign conquest, promoted a new Kcst for

T^-AIUIZD aODiilSATTAVAf ANGKOB

the PRE-EUROPEAN PERIOD

PT. 1

114

learning. As Loub Finot puts it: * Sanskrit vers^ was still written*
Wise ^ncti abounded there, and foreign savants came, drawn by the
reputation of this kingdom of high culture. Nowhere w^as knowledge
more in honour. Scholars occupied the first charges of the State;
they w'erc on terms of familjarity with lungs. Their daughters were
queens. They themselves were roya! preceptors, grand judges,
ministers. There w-as a ^^King of Professors”.^*

But it was at the other end of the scale that the great change was
lit progress which was to be the most potent factor in causing the
collapse of the old culture, upon which the greatness of -\ngkor had
been basedL This was the conversion of the people to the Buddhism
of the Sinhalese Mahavihara sect. We have seen how' the new^ teach^
ing had been Introduced into Burma at the end of the twelfth centuiy
by Mon monks. Thence it had spread to the Mon peoples of the
Menam valley^ w^here Hi nay ana Buddhism had already centuries of
existence behind it. By the middle of the thirteenth century it was
spreading northwards to the T'ai and eastwards to the Khrners.

luwas simple and needed no priesthood for the maintenance of
expensive temples and elaborate cerenionla]* Its missionaries were
monks who prescribed austerity, solitude and meditation, and were
devoted to a life of poverty and self-abnegation* Unlihe the hiemrehy
at the capital^ they w^ere in direct contaiirt with the people, and they
undermined completely the old state religion and all that went with it.
‘From the day when the ^vereign ceased £0 be Siva descended to
earth/ writes Ccedfes,* 'or the living Buddha, as jayavarman VII had
been, the royal dynasty failed any longer to inspire the people with
the religious reapect w'hich enabled it to accomplish great enterprisesp
Under the threat of the anarchical spirit of Sinhalese Buddhism his
prestige diminished, his temporal power crumbled away, and the god-
king was thrown down from his altar.'

When Chou Ta-kuan arrived in Angkor with the Chinese embassy
of 1296-7 a new king, Indravarman HI, was on the throne. Be was a
soldier who bad married Jayavarman VIII's daughter and sci^^ed the
royal power by deposing his father-in-law' and imprisoning the
legitimate claimant. He tried to infuse new energy into the kingship;
and whereas his predecessor had never shown himself in public,
Indravarman appeared often in the streets. I lie reception of a Chinese
mission was a sign of a change of attitude, if not of policy^ Javavarman
Vlil had imprisoned the members of the sole Chinese mission on

^ In G. MddpcJt}, UlndothinCy i, io3.

* irticux ctimpriisdre Anchor^ p+

CH. 5 THE KHMERS AND ANGKOR TI 5

record to his Court; this oae was accorded an honourable reception.
It was sent by Timur Khaot Kubki's grandson and successdt, and
Chou Ta-kuan asserts that homage was paid by Indfavarman III to
the new emperor* But there is no sign of th* usual official relations
subsequentlyt and Pelltot, in his edition of Chou Ta-kuan's Memotrt
0n the Catioms of Csm&odiaj^ quotes a Chinese author of 1520 to the
effect that Cambodia never did pay homage to China.

Stillp Indravarman must have done enough to placate the Imperial
Court. Moreover* he was able to hold the T*ai attacks^ and the danger
from their direction lessened. In 1317 Rama K^amheng died and the
power of Sukhot'ai dedlned. Chou Ta-kuan mentions that before
Indtavarman^s accession Cambodia proper had been subjected to
Siamese raids. ^From his time until the foundation of Ayut'ia in
1350 she seems to have been in no great danger*

There is reason to suspect that in religion also Indravarman III
reversed the policy of Jayavarman VlfL He would appear to have
made no change in the official state ceremonial, which had become
Saivite again after Jayavarman VITs death. But there are records of
his benefactions to a Buddhist monastery and shrine at the dose of
his reign« An inscription dated 1309* recording a gift of revenues
made by him to the monastery* shows that he bad abdicated in the
previous year^^ Did he do so, as Cccd^ suggests, in order to become
a monk and devote himself to the study and practice of the new
Hinayana doctrine? That Hinayana Buddhism had become the
predominant rdigion of the people by the end of Jayavarman VlIFs
reign is abundantly evident from Chou Ta-kuan^s account of the
religions of Angkor. Everybody, he says, worshipped the Buddha,
and his description of the chu-ku (Siamese fAoo-Aii='air")* the name
he applies to the Buddhist mouk^* who * shave the head* wear yellow
clothing and leave tfae right shoulder uncovered** leaves no doubt that
they were Hinayanist.

Little is known of the reigns of Indtavarman’a two immediate
successors* Indrajayavarman (130S-27) and Jayavarman Faramesvam
(1327-?)- The latter is the last Cambodian king to be mentioned by
the inscriptions. Not only is the date of the end of his reign unknowu,
but also his connection with the earliest kings of the Cambodian
Chromete, who begin in c. 1340 with a posthumous name* Mahanip-
pean. The Sanskrit mscriptionB end abruptly in the retgn of J ayavarman

* BBFEOp ii, PP- 1

’ Untii rcceam he wu thought to have died tn 1307. On thu point ia Briggs
dmimt KAjfur p.

TttE FH^-ETOOPEAN PER101>

PT. I

Paramesvara; there ta no decline in their style or in. the &kill of
the iaffidists who executed chem> I'he only explanation would seem
to be that the king and hh Court became eonvem to Hinayana
Buddhismp and the official language thus became Pali, With the
passing of the dev 4 i-Ti^a passed also the habit of celebrating hU
achievements in conventional Sanskrit verse exquisitely carved in
stone. Was Jayavarman Paramesvara the king under whom thb
Important change took place?

Briggs^ shows that there is good reason lo suppose that he had a
long reignp that he was the Khmer king who helped the exiled I^aos
prince Phi-Fa and his son Fa-Ngoun to found the independent king¬
dom of Lan Chang with its capital at Muang Swa in 1353+ that Fa
Ngoun married his daughter, and that largely through her elTorts the
Laotians were converted to Hinayanism. Jayavarman Paramesvara is
said to have exhorted his son-in-law^ soon after his accession, to obey
the teaching of the Buddha in bis relations with his subjects.

The Cambodian Chronicle* on the other hand, places a scries of
fouridngs, berginning with fsippean Bat {Nirvanapada), on ilie throne
of Angkor betAveen 1340 and 1353* It also asserts that in the latter
year the king of Ayut*ia, Rama Thibodi I,, captured the cit>^ and held
it for four y^s, during ivhich time the Khmer king took refuge at the
Court of Laos. Briggs, how'ever^ has disposed of these intrusive
kings by proving that thej% together with the Siamese capture of
Angkor, belong to a much later period.^ 'Those who prepared the
Chronicles/ he writes, 'apparently set back the dates of the reigns and
events^ inteijected kings and otherwise distorted and misrepresented
the facts.*^

The exact date of Jayavarman Paramesvara^s death is unknown^
and for the remainder of the fourteenth century the chronicle of events
is uncertain- The accession of the Ming dynasty in 136S brought
Cambodia once more into relationship with China. The Mmg
Ilistur^' records the reception of ten embassies from *Ghenla^ between
1371 and 1403^ A king is mentioned as coming m person in 137 L but
the Chinese version of his name* has not been identiBed. The next
king named by tbe Chinese hears the title of Samtac Preah Phaya.
He died in 1404 or 1405, and the Ming emperor Ching Sung sent a
delegation to attend hU funeral and accord his eldest son, "Phing-ya\
official recognition. He, according to Briggses reckoning, should be

^ n*-253-5-

* Attnckft ^ Ani^or before 1430 Mn [vEQr viii (1941$), pp. 3-3

^ Ths 354 ,

Pr -i-r

THE KmiERS ANGKOR

CEl. 5

II7

the Nippean Bat irientioited in the Cambodian Ckrooicle list of kings
leading op to the supposed fall of Angkor in 1353, The List \fith the
amended chronology he gives as follows:^

u Samtac Chao Phaya Pbing-ya^ Nippean Bat, 1405^9,

2. Lam pong, or Lampang Paramarajap 1409-16.

3. Sorijovong^ Sorijong or Lambang, 1416-25.

4. Baroixi Raeha, or Gamkhat Ramadhapati^ 1425 -29.

5* Thommo-Soccoracbp or Dharmasoka, 1429-31,

6, Ponha Yat, or Gam Yat^ 1432-?.

Between and the Siamese capture of Angkor in 1431 there
must have been almost incessant fighting between T*aia and Khmers.
Ayut'ia was far more dangerous to Angkor than Sukbot^ai had been.
It w£L^ much nearer and lay in the Mon country, whose people were
closely related to the Khmers in race and language. Most of the
fighting took place in the frontier regions of Chantabun, Jolburi and
Korat. The very unfeliable Cambodian Chronicle has led bist<«ri3ns
to conclude that the T^ais captured Angkor again in 1394 and placed
a puppet king on the throne. Then, after an interregnum lasting
until 1401, the T’ais were driven out and the Khmer monarchy
restored.

What actually happened cannot be estabhshed with certainty, save
that, as in 1353* Angkor wa3 not captured by the T^ais. Raiding, said
to have been started by the Khmers^ and counter-raiding by the
T’aisj began in the provinces of Chantabun and Jolhuri in 1390 and
lasted for some ycars^ with each side deporting thousands of people
when it carried out a raid.

'Phis severe struggle led the Chams to think the time ripe for an
attempt on tlieir part to ravage Cambodia. In 1414 Khmer envoys
complained to China that Cham raids had on several occasions pre¬
vented the despatch of embassies to the Imperial Court. The emperor
sent a letter of warning to the Cham king, but It did not restrain the
latter in 1421 from carry^ing out a brge-^ale invasion of the Mekong
delta region, whence his forces were not expelled until about 1426*
But the Khmers showed no signs of weakness. At the very time w'hen
they ivere forced to deal with the Cham invasion they were apparently
engaged in offensive operations against Ayut'ia.

Along both the Jolburi route in the south and the Mun valley route
in the north they threatened the 'J’bi capital again and again. Whenp

^ p. 256.

THE PRE-EimOPEAN PERIOD

rr. I

iiS

therefore. King Boromoraja II of Ayuila did at last penetrate to
Angko« and lay aiege to it in 1430, it was only after his own capital had
for some year^ been exposed to the same threat by the Khmers,
Moreover^ when Angkor did falh after a si^e of seven mortthSp it was
by treachery rather than through weakness. For King Dharmasoka'^s
death during the siege was followed by the defection of two mandarins
and two leading Buddhist monks to the enemy, and it wzs in conse¬
quence of this that the city fell.

The Siamese^ on taking Angkor in 1431, stripped it of all they could
carry away and deported thousands of prisoners. A Siamese prince
was placed on the throne as a puppet king. His career %V3S short*
The Cambodian crown prince Ponha Yat managed to procure hia
assassination and w'as then himself crowned at Angkor. Before long
the Khmers were once more holding their own along the Chantabun-
Jolbori-Korat frontier. Angkor Thom, however, was no longer con¬
sidered safe as a capitaL It was evacuated by Ponha Yat in 1432. He
transferred his Court hm to Basan in the province of Srei Santhor on
the eastern side of the Mekong, and in 1434 to Phnom Penh*

Cambodia was still intact; she had ceded no territory to Boromo-
raja 11 and was still a pow^erful state. She had not been conquered.
Ncvcnhclesa the evacuation of Angkor ended finally the great period
of Khmer civilisation* The Khmers were not to repeat elsewhere the
wonderful works of art and arohitecture, or the treasures of Sanskrit
epigraphy, which they had wrought at Angkor in the days of its glory.
They were not even to make an attempt to conserve what was left
there: that was to be the task of the French centuries later^ The king
and bis Court fled because the city Avas no longer suitable as a capltaL
The people fled to escape from slavery to the greedy gods, whose yoke
was too heavy to bear. And inside and around the deserted city the
tropical forest began rapidly to efface the traces of man.

CIIAFTe!l 6

BURMA AND AR.\KAN
(a) 7V« pre-Pagan period

The earliest historical evidence touching the land of Burma relates to
the old overland route between China and the West, which crossed
the northern region of the country^ The first reference to its use is in
laS B.c.f when Chang Ch^en discovered the products of the Chinese
province of Szechwan in Bactria, Steps were taken to develop it* but
only in a.d, 65 did China found the prefecture of Yung^ch^ang across
the Mekong with its headquarters rast of the Salween» some sixty
miles from the present Eunm frontier. The peoples who submitted
were called the Ai^lao, who were said to be under the rule of seveiity-
seven ^ district princes'- They bored thdr noa@ and loaded their cars.
Shortly after the foundation of the prefecture they revolted. With the
suppression of their rebellion there ensued a century of peace, during
which the peoples heyond thenit called by the Chinese the Tun-jen-i
and the Lu-lei, sent embassies. They are thought to have been
settled in northern Burma.

In AhO, 97 ambassadors coming from the Tan or Shan in the Roman
empire arrived in YungMrh'ang by the northern land route. They may
have come from Tanisp east of the Nik deltan Other travellers between
the Roman empire and Clilna used the sea route and made the short
overland journey across Tenasserim. Thus in iji-a Tan envoys on
their way to Tongkingp then in Chinese hands^ are said to have used
this route, as also a trade delegation from the Roman empire to China
in 166, and the merchant Ch'in Lun in 226.

Burmese Buddhist legends tell of Indian influence coming to
Lower Burma by sea. In the Jatakas the region b referred to as
^uv'amabhumi, the Golden Land. A favourite Burmese story is of the
two hrothets, Tapusa and Fahkat^ who are said to have been given
eight hairs of his head by Gautama. These they brought by sea to the
Golden Land and enshrined under the Shwe Dagon Pagoda, which
adorns modern Rangoon. The Mon chronicler contain a legend which
tells how Sona and Uttara, two'Buddhist monks, were deputed to the
Golden Land by the Third Euddhkt Synod at Patslipotra in 241

120

THE PRE-EHROPEAS PERIOD

PT. I

B.c, So far as historical evidence is concerned, however, there is no
trace af the penetration of Indian influence earlier than the fragments
of the Pali canon found at Hmawza (Srikshetra or Old Prome) dating
from c, A.D. joo,

Ptolemy’s Geogmphte shows a coastline roughly approximating to
that of Arakan and Burma as far as the Gulf of' Sahara’ (? Martaban).
His Argyra fits the situation of Arakan, and he mentions Chryad: as
its neighbour. He mentions a race of cannibals who occupy a river
mouth thought by scholars to be in the hloulmein region. It may be
of some significance that their name corresponds to Vesunga, a port
named in the Jalahas.

In connection with the conquests of Fan Shih-man, the Great
King of Funan, mention has been made in an earlier chapter* of the
Buddhist kingdom of Lin-yang, which, it has been suggested, may
have been situated in central Burma. If so. whence came its Budd¬
hism? Was it from India by the northern land route? Chinese works
from the fourth century onwards refer to the wild and troublesome
tribes south-west of Yung-ch*ang, and especially the P’u, who tattooed,
used bows and arrows, and some of ivhom were cannibals and ivent
naked. Beyond them some 3,000 li south-imt of Yung-ch’ang was a
civilized people, the P’iao, who as the Pyu arc the earliest inhabitants
of Burma of whom local memory survives.

Their capital, Srikshetra, is mentioned in the seventh century
by the Chinese pilgrims kisuan-tsang and I-tsIng, Legends of this
people come from the area between Halin, in Shwebo district, and
Prome. Inscriptions at both these places are of seventh-century or
earlier origin. Urn inscriptions, deciphered by the late Otto Blagden,
show a Vikrama dynasty reigning at Prome from at least 673 to 71S.
Three king^ are Tnentioned :

Suryavikrama^ who died in aged 64.

Harivikrama^ who died in 695 aged 41.

Sihavikrama^ who died in 71S aged 44.

The dates are provisional, since the era is not stated. If, as is
thoughtj it IS the • Burmese which begins in A.D. 638^ this may
have originated as a Pyu era under this dynasty, Inseriptions have
also been found with the name of a Varman dynasty, but where it
reigned has not been discovered. The name indicates the p<^ibility
of Pat lava influence from Conjeverann

* CKup. 2, (b).

CH, 6

BURAfA ANP ARAKAN-

IZ1

Srikshetrap now IlmawKa, the oiily Pyu site searched with
thoroughness, has provided archaeologists ^^ith much ^'aluabJe
materiaL There are traces of a massive dty walJ, embracing an area
larger than that of Pagan or Mandalay, and with impressive internal
and eisternaJ moats. The importance of the city is shown by the fact
that Mon mscriptiun^ as late as Kyanaittha's reign (1084-1112) still
referred to it as the capitaL Close to it are three lai^e Buddhist
slnpas. one 150 feet high. It has also a number of small vaulted
chapels, which are protot>'pes of ihc later Pagan temples* There arc
large stone acylptures in relief in the Gupta style, small images in the
rounds silver coins, probably symbolical^ with curious designs of the
sun, moon and stars, and terra-cotta votive plaques with Sanskrit
legends in Nagari characters.

The religious remains are mixed and syncretist. There are numerous
stone sculptures of Vishnu, bronze statuettes qf Avalokitesvara and
other Mahayanist Bodhisattvaa, besides statuarj^ and Pali inscripilons
showing that Bi nay an a Buddhism flourished there from an early date.
The dead vvere burnt and their ashes stored in ums within pagoda
prectnets, or in extensive cemeteries on brick platforms covered with
earth. Mention has been made earlier of the Candra dynasty of
Vaisalip the first Amkanesc ruicns to be attested fay epigraphy. The
same source shows a second dynasty, founded in the eighth century
by Sri Dharmavijaya, whose grandson is said to have married a
daughter of a Pyu King of Srikshetra.

In the eighth and ninth centuries the T'ai state of Nanchao domin-
alcd L‘pper, and much of Lower, Burma. Kolofeng, its ruler, (748-79)
built a fortress to control the upper Irraivaddy and enlUted local
trifaesmen in his armies. He had relations w*ith the Pyu, whom he
may have subdued, since Pyu soldiers serv'ed with the Nanchao force
which captured Hanoi in 863* His campaigns opened the old road to
India across Upper Burma. One of the routes passed through the
Pyu capital —prcsuniiably this was Hahn — whence it proceeded up the
C hind win lo the borders of Manipur. There are signs that northern
Burma in this period saw much development. Contemporary w^riters
refer to the production of gold^ ambers salt, horses^ long-horned cattle,
elephants for ploughing, and much else.

Lmou-hsunj Kolofeng's grandson and successor* $ent a present of
Pyu musicians to the T'ang Court in Soo. In 801-2 a Pvu king sent
a formal embassy, accompanied by thirty-five musicians, to China via
Nanchao. Chinese interest in the Pyu was stimulated, and the T^atig
History contains a graphic account of the Pyu capital. The Chinese

IZZ

THE PHE-EOBOFEAN PERIOD

FT, I

also state that in S32 ‘Man rebels^ (?NanclLac>) plundered the Pyu
capital hnd deported 3^000 captives to Yuimanfii.

Was this the end of the Pyu kingdom ? It is the last we hear of it- Were
the Pyti the advance-guard of the Buimcse ? Their language belongs to
the Tibcto-Biimtan group. The Pyu face of the Myazedi inscription of
1113 shows that speakers of the language still existed then. As a people
they have completely disappeared. Presumably they merged with the
Burmese when the latter became the dominant people in Burma.

The Pyu claimed suzerainty over eighteen subject staieSj mainly
in Lower Burma. One of them* Mi-chen, whose king secured recog¬
nition from China in 805, was in 835 destroyed by Nanchao. Among
them also w^ere the K*un-Jun states near a port, Mo-ti-po, from which
Palembang and java could be reached. These were Mon states. The
kingdom of Dvaravati in the Menam valley was the centre of Mon
power^ and in the seventh century controlled part of Tenasaerirru
The earliest Mon inscriptionB are eighth-century ones found at
Lopburi- The Mon states in Burma and Siam maintained contact
wi^ each others and under the stimolus of Indian culture developed
a high civilization.

The K^un-lim states repelled the Nanchao invasion which destroyed
Mi-chen- The Arab geographers refer to Lower Burma by the name
Ramahnadesa, ‘the Mon country\ The word is an adaptation of
an Old Mon word^ from which the modern one derives.' Later

the Burmese called them TalaJngs, thereby identifying them with the
region of Indla^ Telinganai with which they were culturally associated.
The Mon chronicles assign the foundation of their capitalj Hamsavad,
now Pegu, to the year 825. Pagan, the Burmese capital^ enters history
In 8+9, the traditional date of the construction of ita walls by Pyinpya.
It is said to have been formed by the union of nineteen villages. If
the date is correct^ the depopulation of the Pyu capital in the north
may have caused a movement of refugees downstream which kd to
the formation of a new centre at Pagan. The Burmese chronicles push
ita foujidarion back to the second century hut there are in¬
superable difficultica in the w^ay of accepting this hypothcais.

Between 849 and the foundation of the Pagan kingship in 1044 by
AnawTahta there is almost a complete blank so far as reliable historic^
sources are concerned. This is all the more tantalizmgp since it was
during this period that the main body of the Burmese people entered
Burma and settled down. G. H, Luce has attempted to trace their
histoiy before they began^ in the middle of the ninth century^ to come
down from the hills in what are now the Northern Shan States and

c». 6

AND ARAKAN

1^3

penetrate mto the Kyauks^ district south of modem Mandalay. The
earliest known home of the Tibeto-Burraan-speating peoples was
somewhere between the Gobi Desert and north-east Tibet^ possibly
Kansu. The earliest Chinese written records mention the Ch'iang, who
were tribes of shepherds and goatherds to the west of the Chinese.
The ancestors of the Burmese, Luce thinkSp were to be found among
the Ch^iang. The Chinese constantly raided them to obtain victims for
human sacrifice. From these raids the Ch^iang took refuge in north-
cast Tibet. In the first millennium B.c* the Chinese rulers of T^sin
pursued them, and many fled southwards.

The Burmese were on the eastern edge of the migration, and when
the T^ai kingdom of Kanebao arose in Yunnan they came under its
dominance. From their overlords they learnt the area of war, the use
of the bow', horsemanship, the terracing of hill slopes for cultivation,
wet rice cultri’ation on the ptains^ and much else. The desire for
independence^ which has been such a strong feature of their mentality
throughout history, led them to escape from NanchaOi and they made
for the hot arid plains of Upper Burma, >

They entered Burma through the region between the * Nmai Hka
and the Salween, and it was shortly after the destniction of the Pyu
kingdom in 832 by Nanchao that they arc found in the 'Eleven
Villages* of Myittha in the Kyaukse di$tri^^ There they took over
an already existing Irrigation system, w'hichj according to Luce, must
have been originally developed by the Mens, By their sudden move¬
ment down from the hills they drove a wedge into the Mens, leaving
some in the north separated from the main body in the ^uth.

They fanned out to cross the Irrawaddy. Some w'eot beyond it to
the Pondaung range, the Chin hills and the Akyab region of Arakan,
Others went to found a second home in Minbu district west of the
Irrawaddy I w^here in the Salin-Sagu region they entered another
irrigated system, older than that of Kyauks^ and presumably the
work of Sgaw Karens and Palaungs-^ Further migrations toot them
down the Irniwaddy to the Taungdwingyi ricelarLds and Prome, up
the ChJudwin to a number of places whose names have not been
identified, and up the Mu valley northw^ards to Shwebo, Tahayin and
Myedu, where they mixed with older tribes.

During this period of settlement the Mranma, as they called them-
selves^ must have been under a number of local leaders. The Burm^e
chronicles, which place the foundation of Pagan in a.d^ ioS, give a
list of forty kings reigning there before the accession of Anawrahta,
hut these are unknovm to history. Before hia time only one Burmese

124

THE PRE-EttROF^4N PEHIOD

FT. t

monarch is mentioned in the inscriptions. He is Saw* Rahan^ who built
a BudUhist shrine on Mount To ran, eight miles from Pagan. The
carll^t hiatorica] reference to the city itself is In a Cham inscription
dating from somewhere before 1050. The earliest mcntiori of the
name of the Burmese is in a Mon inscription of 1102, in which they
are called the " Mirma'* Mien, the name by which the Chinese knew
them and their country, only appears in 1273^ shortly before the
Mongol conquest of Fagan.

(ft) The empire cf 1044-1587

It was Anawrabta (1044-77) united Bunna politically and

founded the greatness of Fagan, He is, howevcTp rather a majestic
legendary figure than a historical personage. Moreover, not a single
authentic inscription dates from his rdgn, save for votive tablets
briefly inscribed. Hb achievements were real enough and left a
permanent impress upon his country and people. He united under
his 3<^vay most of what may be termed Burmer properp together with
northern Arakan and Low'er Bunua, the Mon country. Easttvards
he made expeditions into the Shan country, but not with the intention
of adding it to hb kingdom, since he built a line of forty-three out¬
posts along the eastern foothills to restrain the Shans from attempting
to push into the plains. The Siamese chronicles assert that he attacked
Cambodia and ruled over most of what is now' Siam, obtaining the
Hi nay ana Buddhism, w'hich he established as the official religion of
Pagan, from Nakom Pat'om. But there would seem to be no historical
basis for such as$urnptions.

His most important achievement was the conquest of the Mon
kingdom of Thaton, Tradition asserts that he took a Mon monk.
Shin Arahan, into hb service and charged him with the task of con¬
verting the Burmese to Hinayana Buddhism. This entailed a struggle
with a priesthood knowm as the Ari^ who dominated Upper Burma.
ITiey w'ere Mahayanist and practised Tantric and other erotic rites.
To obtain copies of the Pali canon, the Tripitaka^ for the proper
instnjction of the people, he conquered Thaton, which possessed
thirty complete sets* deported to Fagan its king, Manuha, and its
entire population of 30,000 souls* The main facts of the story are
accepted by historians. Fart of the building w'hich housed the captive
king and Ids Court b still in e.\istence, as also the library building,
the Tripitataik, erected to house the scriptures.

t^ali now' became the sacred language of Burma, and the Mon

THE OATE IN OLD PAjOAN

alphabet was adopted for the literary expression of the Burmese
language. Through the Mons Indian influenee was distilled to the
Burmese. The first century of Pagan's history Is predominantly Mon;
the language of the inscriptions of thi$ period is either Pali or Mon*
The Buddhism, however^ which was brought from Thaton was by no
means the pure miJk of the Hinayana. The evidence of epigraphy
and archaeology shows dearly that Pagan Buddhism^ in Luce*s words,
'was mixed up with Mahayanisnit ^nd towards the end of the dynasty
at least with Tantrism. It rested doubtless on a deep bed of Naga and
Nat worship". And in King Manuha's throne-room at the Nanpaya
shrine south of Pagan the has-reliefs of Hindu deities show how'
closely the two religions were interwoven^ Furthermore, in spite of
tradition that Buddhaghos^ brought Pali Buddhism to Thaton in
jrom CeylpHj historical evidence goe^ to show that the real
influence upon Thaton^s Buddhism was not Ceylon but Conjeveram*
which had become a famous centre in the fifth century under the great
commentator Dhammapala. The earli^t Mon inscriptions are
significantly in Pallava script.

126

THB PRE-EtiHOFEAN PERIOD

FT, 1

The chronicles cany a story of rclationa with Ceylon iit Anawrahta^s
reign. 'Chola attacks caused Vijaya Bahu to app«] to Pagan for help.
Anawrahta sent a costly present instead. Later, when he had driven
out the invaders^ \^jaya Bahu sent again to Pagan for monks and
copies of the scriptures to assist him in the task of reconstruction*
These ^ere sent, and in return the Burmese monarch recdved a
miraculously produced replies of the Kandy Tooth, which he en¬
shrined beneath the Shwezjgon Pagoda. Whatever the truth of the
story' as it stands, its significance Lies in the fact that in the eleventh
century Conjevetmt was no longer a great Buddhbt centre; Brah^
manism had triumphed there. Ceylon was then coming to take it$
place as the main centre of Theravada Buddhism,

Anawrahta^s conquest of Thaton was a key event in Burmese
history« Mon civilization was higher than Burm^e and the influence
of the Thaton captives v\^ though perhaps of less importance

than the opening of a door to the sea, which resulted from the control
of the Irrawaddy delta. Moreover, Anawrahta'a work assured the
triunrph of Theravada Buddhism; in time it became the most powerful
factor in Burmese national life. The splendid temples of Pagan, how¬
ever, were not buUt until after his reign. He built solid pagodas, not
temples* The Sfawezigon Pagoda, b^n in 1059. was his chief
monument, and It is significant that one of its notable features is a set
of shrines to the Thirty-seven Nats, Nat-worship, Burma's own form
of animism, which wa$ so important an ingredient in the basic culture
of South-East Asia as a whole, continued to hold sway with scarcely
abated force over men^s minds, from the highest downwards. The
Pali scriptures, setting forth the Buddhist ethic, came ultimately
to exert sufficient moral force to liberate them from the worst of their
animistic practices- But Buddhism had to come to terms with the
old religion, and in so doing became highly syncreristic, Nat-worship
continued to exist in two forms: one closdy interwoven with Budd¬
hism, and the other having no connection whatever with it, and frowned
on by the monkhood.

Anawrahta^s conquest of the Mona had disastrous consequences
for that people* It was the beginning of a struggle between Burmese
and Mo ns running right through Burmese history^ and resulting by
thc first half of the nineteenth century in the virtual elimination of the
Mods as a people* A Mon cebelliori indeed brought the reign of
Anawrahta*a son Sawlu (1077^4) to a sudden end. Pagan, however,
was saved by another son of Amwrahta, who defeated the Mons and
ascended the throne. King Kyanzittha (1084^-^11 la), ^ ho is known

CH. 6

BURMA A^D AiUSlAN

12J

in the chronideSj raised the Burmese kirtgship to a higher levd than
it had previously reached^ He had a magfuficent coronatisn
BrahjnMical rituah built himself a aew palace, and erected a series of
inscriptions^ mostly in the Mon language, which rank as Uterature,
The story goes that he had lived in exile in the Mon country during
hia father*s rdgru He was sympathetic to the Mona and partial to
their culture^ This may explain why, after the suppression of thdr
rebellioop there was no further trouble from them for some con¬
siderable time,

Kyanzittha revived the practice of sending misdons to China- The
two he sentp in 1103 and 1:106, probably represent an attempt to
facilitate overland trade with Yunnan, which had revived after Nanchao
was subdued by China at the end of the ninth century* He was also
the first King of Burma to take an active interest in the Mahabodi
temple at Buddhagaya. The work of restoration, carried out there at
hb behesti was recorded in an inscription in Mon at the Shwehsandaw
Pagoda at Prome*

He in his cum w^as visited by a Chola ptiacCp about whom* there
has been much speculation- The Cholas, it will be rememberedj b^
raided Srivijaya In 1025* subdued Kedah in were develop¬

ing extensive trading contacts with South-East Ask and sending
missions to China. What was a Cbola prince doing at Pagan? The
probable answer is that he was a trad^g prospector, or a traveller
anxious to improve hb knowledge, not the ruler of a Tamil
colony in the delta regioiip as has been suggested^ It has yet to be
proved that there ever was such a colony in Burma. Is it another
example of the colonisation myth which has grown up through the
equivocal use of the word * colony' in describing a trading settlement
pure and simple?

Kyanzittha is best known today as the builder of the Ananda temple
at Pagan. The story goes that he entertained eight monks who had
fled from persecution in India, and whose dcscriptioii of the cave-
temple of Ananta in the Udayagiri hilb of Orissa ^ndled in him the
desire to build one in imitatioiL Duroisellc, however, in hb description
of the building in the Annual l^orf of the Arnhaeological SurMy <?/
India for 1913—14, expresses the view that the temple of Pahatpur in
northern Bengal may have been the modeL Compared with its
e.xterior loveliness of form and proportiont its interior is disappointing*
The building is a solid mass pierced by lofty vaulted corridors leading
to four central chambers, in each of which staixcb a gigantic Buddha
with its head and shoulders lit by natural light from outside in such

J^iyAMIlA TBMI'LE, TAG AN

CH. 6

BURMA ANB ABAKAN

iz9

3. way as to produce a ciazzlij^g effect as the spectator emerges from
The dim corridor^ Before the w^estern image are two life-size kneeling
statues of Kyatusittha and Shin Arahan.

The story of Kyaiizitlha*s reign was recorded in an inscription
erected by his grandson and successor Alaungsithu at

the Myazedi Pagoda, south of Pegy* in 1113* it has been caUed the
Rosetta Stone of Burma, since the $iiine text appears on its four faces
in Pyu, Mon, Burmese and Pali, Ita discovery in 1911 provided a key
not only to the Pyu language but also to the dates of the early kings
of Pagan.

The reign of Alaungsithu shows two distinct pictures, in striking
contrast. One, much played up by the chronicleSp is of the ideal Budd¬
hist king, travelling far and w*ide throughout his kingdom engaged
upon building w^orks of merit and composing inscriptions which
reflect a deep sense of other w^orldliness, expressed in poetry un¬
surpassed in the literature of his country^ His flnest building, the
Thatpinnyu temple, was consecratird in 1144. Its sryle resembles
closely that of the Ananda, but the main mass rises much higher
before the tapering process begins. The spirit which inspired Alaung¬
sithu in his pious tvorks reaches its perfect expression in his Pali
prayer inscribed at the Shwegu Pagoda. Mutatis mutandis, it suggests
the aspiration of the mediaeval saint in Christendom.

The other picture is of revolU and disorder. The king's early
years w'ere spent quelling revolts in d’enasscrim and northern Arakan.
An inscription ai Buddhagaya commemorates the repairs executed
there at Ahungsithu^s request by a ruler of Arakan in token of
gratitude for help in driving out a usurper. But the king's long
absences from the capital caused a relaxation of control over the
administration which was disastrous. The final outcome wa$ the
king's own murder by his son Narathui who seized the throne
in U67-

His own brief reign (1167-70) was a lime of disorder and blood¬
shed, which culminated in his own murder in a palace revolt. His
son Naratheinka, who succeeded him, also failed to cope with the
prevailing anarchy and was murdered by rebels in 1:173,
to his younger brother Xarapatisithu (1173-1210) to restore internal
peace and resume the erection of splendid architectural monuments.

The time of troubles between 1167 and 1 173 seems to have been a
dividing-line in the history of Pagan. From a period in \vhich Mon is
the chief language of the inscriptions we enter abruptly upon one in
which Burmese predominates. For the remainder of the Pagan period

X30 the PKE-EUBOPEAN^ PStUOP PT. I

Mon as a Iitcruy expression disappears contpleteLy. Are the Btmggles
of the'six years from 1167 to 1173 to be explained in tcmts of an
upsurge of Burmese nationalbmj a reaction against Mon Induence?
Whatever the explanation^ a cultural revolution toot place which
substituted Burmese for Mon as the predominant influence during the
last century of the history of Pagan. And since positive e^'idence is
lacking it does not retpiire much stretch of imagination to see m it
perhaps the chief cause of the general Mon revolt which broke out
when Tarokpyemin 'ran away from the Chinese' after the Burmese
defeat at Kaungsln in 1283,

Narapatisithu's reign, the longest of the Pagan period, is of much
interest. Two of the finest temples, the Gawdawpalin and the
Sulamanl, were built at P:^an, and innumerable pagodas elsewhere.
Much irrigation work also was done In both the Kyauksi and Shwebo
districts. But the moist importaat development was the introduction
of Sinhalese Buddhism and the beginnings of a religious movement
which ultimately substituted it for the Conjeveram form brought
frotrrThaton in Anawrahta's reign.

The story, as given in the Hmatman Yasamn ('Glass Palace
Chronicle*), tells how during the disorders of Narathu's reign Shin
Aiahan’s successor, the primate Panthagu, retired to Ceylon. After
Narapatisithu's accession he returned, but soon died. His succ^sor,
a Mon monk named Dttarajiva, followed his example in riSo by going
there, and on his return received the title of * First Pilgrim of Ceylon
One of his monks, Chapata, also a Mon, remained behind in Ctylon
for ten years. On his return in 1190 he became the 'Second Pilgrim
of Ceylon'. He brought with him four foreign monks, one of whom,
Tamalioda, must have been, according to Cted^, a son of Jayavarman
VII of Angkor.

At Nyaung-u they formed a chapter for ordination according to
Mahavihara principles and built a pagoda of Sinhalese pattern. This
caused a schism in Burmese Buddhism between those who followed
the new leaders and those who remained loyal to the Thaton form.
The king gave his support to the reformers, but the Former Order, as
the Thaton school was calk^, continued to exist for another two
centuries. The reformers set about their task with missionary ardour.
I.arge numbers of monks w'ent to Ceylon for ordination, and Budd¬
hism became for the first time in the Indo-Chinese peninsula a truly
popular movement, not something imposed by the Court, As such
it spread far and wide beyond the confines of Burma, embracing the
T'ai peoples, the T.aos states and Cambodia. The results were of

CH. 5

BURMA AND ARAKAN

pc^rmaneDt importance; for while during die subsequeDt period lalam
became the religion'of the peoples of Malaya and Indonesia, it made
no headway in the Baddhist cotintiies. The various cults of Saivism,
Vaiinaviam, Sanskrit Hinayana and Mahayana Buddhism were Court
religionsj whose main function was the deification of kings and
ruling classes. They imdc no real impression upon the mas$ of the
people. States* where they were established^ were easily won over
to Islam.

Naraparisithu's son and successor Nantaungmya (1210-34)^ better
known by the soubriquet Htilominlo, *he whom the umbrella desig¬
nated as king"* from the belief that the royal umbrella had miracu-
lousiy indicated him as the rightful claimant to the throne, was the
last of the great temple-builders. He devoted his time so fuhy to
pious works tbfti- he left the management of the realm to his four
brothers, who ruled jointly. Under him monastic life flourished and
many Pali treatises and commentaries were producecL During his
reign were built the last two temples in the grand style^ the Mahabadi,
an imitation of the famous temple at Buddhagaya, and the Htilonunlo,
named after himself-

He was followed by two nonentiti^, Kyaswa (1234-50) and U^ana
(1250-54). The dynasty was beginning to show' signs of exhausHon.
But it was the foolish policy of Narathihapate (1254-87) which brought
about the collapse. A brutal despot who showed no zeal for religion 1
he built the Mmgalazedi Pagoda and commemorated its dedication by
a hyperbolic inscriptionp in which he described himself as the * supreme
commander of a vast army of 36 million soldiers, the swallower of 300
dishes of curry daily'* He boasted abo of possessing 3*000 concu¬
bines. His pagoda, which took six years to build» inspired the Burmese
proverb: *The pagoda is finished and the great country mined.' The
Burmese chronicles refer to him as the Tarokpyemin* 'the king who
ran aw^ay from the Chinese

During his reign the Mongol conquest of China was completed by
Kublai Khan, When the conqueror had established himself at Peking
be sent out missions to demand tokens of submission from aU the
states recorded in the imperial archives a* tributaries of the Middle
Kingdom. In izyt his viceroy in Yunnan was instructed to send
envoys to Pagan to request the payment of tribute. Narathihapate
proudly refused to receive them. Two years later the demand was
renewed by an imperial envoy, who was the bearer of a letter from
Kublai Khan himself. This time the rash king seized the ambassador
and hi$ retinue and summarily executed them.

THE PRE-EUROPEAN PCRIOl}

l»T, 1

IJ2

Kublai, with many irons in the fire, had to postpone action, and
Xarathihapate carried his defiance further by attacking the little state
of ^ungaj on the Taping river because its chief had submitted to
China. T hereupon Kublai ordered the local authorities to punish the
Burmese, and the Governor of Tali sent a Tartar force, which defeated
them at the battle of Ngasaunggyan and drove them back into their
□wn county' (1277). The battle was made famous by the graphic
account of it written by the Venetian traveller Marco I’olo from eye¬
witness stories.

A second Tartar force under Nasr-uddin, the Viceroy of Yunnan,
advanced into the Bhamo district, and after destroving some Burmese
stockades retired homewards because of the excessive heat. The
Burmese thereupon recovered their self-confidence and renewed their
raids on the Yunnan frontier. In 1283, therefore, the I’artars invaded
again by the same route, defeated the Burmese at Kaungsin, and
planted garrisons in the upper Irrawaddy valley. Narathihapate,
believing that his capital was about to be attacked, abandoned it in
panj{vind fled to Bassein in the delta region.

This precipitate act sealed the fate of his kingdom. I’he central
authority vanished, northern Arakan proclaimed its independence, and
the Mens of the south rose in rebellion under a leader Tarabya,
assisted by a Shan adventurer, Wareru, who is said to have absconded
from Sukhot'ai. Too late Xarathihapate sent his submission to Yun¬
nan and attempted to return to his capital. In 12S7 on his way north¬
wards he was murdered by one of his sons, who was holding Prome.

At about the same time Prince Ye-su Timur, Kublai‘s grandson,
fought his way down the Irrawaddy to occupy Pagan, whence he sent
out detachments to enforce the submission of the provinces. A Tartar
occupation of the kingdom was not at first envisaged. The campaign
had been a costly one, and the original plan was to organize northern
and central Burma into two provinces of the Tartar empire and permit
a member of the royal family tu return to Pagan and rule over central
Burma. When, therefore, after a bloodbath of the royal princes in the
south, the sole survivor, Kyawswa, returned to Pagan, he was accorded
official recognition. So for a few years Pagan was a provincial capital.
Its very existence, however, was threatened by three Shan chiefs who
had made themselves masters of the vital Kyauks^ region, from which
it drew all its supplies of rice. In 1299 thej- murdered Kyawswa and
burnt his city.

CH. 6

ANO AUAKAS

*33

(f) From fh^ Mongol conqu^tf 0/ Pagan (12S7) to ttig
Shari sack 0/ Ava (15^7)

The Mongol invasions of Burma gave the Shans the opportunity to
play a docmnant role in that unhappy country. This proved to be
more than the Mongols had bargained fon They had begun to
organize northern and central Burma into two provinces. In 12S3,
when they had taken Tagaung* they had made it the centre of a new
province of Chieng-niiefi, Similarly» in 1287^ when Pagan fcJlp they
set about organkiug centra] Burma into a province named Mien-
chung* These arrangements were upset by the Shans.

Thy story of Shnn penetration into Upper Burma is obscure.
Before 1260 there was apparently a Shan colony at Mymsaing in the
Kyauks^ district. It was customary for Burmese king$ to assign lands
in this area to regiments of the army, and there is reason to think that
the colony may have been formed by a mercenary force employed by
Pagan. The chronicles relate how in xz 6 o a Shan chief from the hills
took refuge at Mpnsaing and sent his three sons to be educated at the
Court of Naraihihapate. During the Mongol invasion $ the ‘Three
Shan Brothers** as they are described, made themselv^ masters of
three principalities, all in the Kj^ukse area. Athinkaya, the eldest,
became Chirf of Myinaaing; Yazatbinkyan* the second^ Chief of Mek-
kaya; and Thihathup the youngest* Chief of Pinle, Kyawswa, un re¬
turning to Pagan as the vassal of the Mongols* confirmed them in the
possession of these principalities. So say the chronicles. In other
sources they make their first appearance in February 1289, when they
dedicated a pagoda in their ar^+

Two years later the province of Mien-chung disappears. Perhaps
the task of maintaining it proved too difficult and expensive. ^Vht
Shans now became the dominant factor in the situation at Pagan,
'rheir control over the vital irrigation area gave them a stranglehold
Over the cit^'*s food supplies* Kyawswp^ finding himself in an im¬
possible position, sought to call in external aid against the Three Shan
Brothers. He succeeded only in bringing about his own downfall and
the destruction of his city* In 1299 the Shans seized him and put him
to death. Then they sacked and burnt Pagan, incidentally massacring
all the Chinese there. Quite a different version of the events leading
to this last tragedy is given in the Glass Palace Chronicle. It tdb of
the treachery of Queen Saw* who plotted with the Three Shan
Brothers against the king. It belongs to the realm of fancy*

THE PRE-EUKOPEAN PERTOD

PT. I

13+

Two further sdoris of the old house ruled at Pagan: Sawhniti a son
of Kyawswa^ from 1:^99 to 1325* and Uzana, his son, from 1335 to
1369* They tverc mere petty chieftains; real power was centred else-
where in the broken and divided kingdom. Pagan indeed had become
an unsuitable site fora capital. The proper place for one lay somewhere
in the area controlled by the Shan brothers. The loss of Pegu in the wet
£one necessitated the reorganization of the kingdom and the removal
of the capital to a place near the junction of the Myitogi with the
Irrawaddy, whence the paddy traffic from the Kyauksi ricebnds
could be controlled. For shorn of the Mon province$ the kingdom lay
almost entirely m the dry zone*

But before this question could he attended to another Mongol
invasion, the last of the series, was launched in 1300 from Yunnan in
order to punish the Shan brothers for their treatment of Fagan. This
time the Mongols came up against stubborn resistance. From their
fortifications at Myinsaingthe Shans beat off all attacks, until at Iasi the
Mongol commander accepted a heavy biibe to lead his forces home.
The eitcuse that he gave for breaking off the campaign was not accepted
by the Yunnan authorities, and he and his chief of staff were executed*
No further expeditions w-cre sent. The task of holding Burma in
subjection was abandoned. In r3Q3 the Chieng-mien province was
evacuated.

The repulse of the Mongols was a victory for the Shans, and thence*
forward th^ carried all before them. Myitisaing, however, was too
far away from the Irrawaddy to become the capital of an Upper Burma
kingdom. Ava, the obvious place, was for some reason declared
unpropitioufl by the Brahmans. Finally in 1312 Thihathura, the sole
survivor of the Shan brothers, fixed his capital at Ptnya close by.
Later inscriptions attribute the discomfiture of the Mongob to him
and refer to him as the ^Tarok Kan Mingyi', "the king who defeated
the Chinese^ In 1315 one of his sons, after a family quarrel, crossed
the river and founded another principality at Sagaing,

I'he Mongol abandonment of Upper Burma and the T,ieakening of
their power in Yunnan opened the way for a great increase m Shan
activity in the far north of Burma, and for the foundation of a new
kingdom with its capital at Che-lan and with ambitions of expanding
its authority southwards. In Burma proper there was anarchy and
disorder. The Shan rulers of Pinya and Sagaing quarxelled in^
cessantly, and one of them, Narathu of Pinp, in 1364 called in the
Maw Shans to attack Bagaing. The populstion stampeded into the
jungle. The Maws tlien turned and sacked Piny a as well, 'rhereupon

BtmMA AND ilRAEAN

Cft. 6

I3J

a Stepson af the chief of Sogalngi Thadominbya, founded 8 new
capita] at Ava and set about redudng the country to obedience.

Ava, a oortuption of In-wa, 'the entrance to the lake’, was founded
in 1364 or 1365. As the capita! of Upper Burma, and, after 1634, of
the whole of Burma, its name became so closely associated with the
country itself that Europeans came to refer to Upper Burma as the
'laud of Ava’, and to the government aa the' Court of Ava’, even when
the capital was at Amarapura or Mandalay. The striking thing about
Ava was that it was Burmese, not Shan. The royal city followed the
pattern of Fagan. Its founder sought to conciliate Burmese national
sentiment by tracing his descent from the legendary kings of Tagaung.
From its foundation its inscriptions were in excellent Burmese.
Thadotoinfaya’s efforts to establish his rule were directed to the
Burmese districts to the southwards, which were unaffected by Shan
infiltration. In 1368 he died of smallpox while attacking Sagu. His
Eucccssor, Mingyi Swasawke (1368-1401), stgniScandy Imd stress on
his descent from the Pagan dynasty.

The Shan penetration into Upper Burma led to the formation of a
new Burmese centre on the Sictang river, where in 1280 a village had
been fortified on a hiU spur {taungi^) as an outpost against slave-
raids from the nearby Karen states. The fall of Pagan led numbere
of Burmese famiUes to escape from Sban rule by trekking off and
settling there. Its early development was almost unhampered, and by
the middle of the fourteenth century it had become strong enough for
its chief, Thinhkaba (1347-53), to assert his independence by assuming
the roval title and building himself a palace in traditional style.
During the reign of his son Pyanebi (i3S8-77) liqui^tion of
Sagaing and Pinya brought a fresh wave of Burmese imnugrants to
Toungoo. Pyanchi erected an insciiption at Pagan, in which he re¬
corded a viat he paid to make offerings to the temples there and slated
that he and his wife had welcomed refugees from the Shan terror. The
new state had a chequered existence; both Ava and Pegu tried to
quench its independence. But its rulera were destined to play an
important part in Burmese histoiy later on.

Mingyi Swasawke was anxious to revive the traditional Burmese
policy of subduing the Mons of the south. In the early part of his
reign, however, the threat from the Shans on his northern and north¬
western frontiers was too serious for him to embark on any adventures
in Lower Burma. Moreover, Pyanchi of Toungoo was friendly mth
the Mons. He was forced, therefore, to puiau* a peaceable policy,
and in 1371 he had a conference with King Binnya U of Pegu,

FT. 1

136 the PRE-EUROPEAN PERIOD

at which the frontier between Burma and the Mon country was
delimited.

Front the first he trod delicately in his relations with the pow^erfal
and quarrcbome Shan states. In 1371 he refused to intervene in a
struggle that wag m progress between the Sawbwag of Kale in the
upper Chindwin valley and Mohnyin in the Katha district. In i373r
however, Mohnyin raided Myedu in the Shweho district. By this
time the Mongol dynasty, after a period of rapid decline, had been
supplanted by the Mings, and until Ming rule was firmly established
in Yunnan, where the Mongols were making a last stand, the Shan
states in and around northern Burma went in no fear of the strong
hand of Peking, The Myedu raid was the beginning of a long series
of attacks from Mohnyin, and in 13S3. two years after the last Mongol
resistance had been stamped out in Yunnan, the harassed King of Ava
sent an embassy to the Ming viceroy there asking for help.

The Chinese, who were now for the first time in contact with the
Maw Shans, were as anxious as Mingyi Swasawke to restrain their
lawl^sncss^ Hence he was accorded official recognition as * Governor"
of Ava, and the \icerDy ordered Mohnyin to keep the peace. For
some years the order seems to have been effect!ve^ but in 1393 a
further Mohnyin raid penetrated to Sagaing. The king's brother-in-
law, Thilawa, Chief of Yamcthin, inflicted so severe a defeat upon the
marauders that for some years afterwards all the neighbouring Shan
saw’bwas treated Ava with respect.

The support obtained from China in 13S3 enabled Mingyi Swa-
sawke to turn his attention at last to the project of gaining control
over the Irrawaddy watertvay dow^n to the sea. In 1377 he had
procured the murder of the pro-Mon Pyanchi of Toungoo.
In 13S5, thereforct when Razadarit succeeded Binnya U to the
throne of Pegu and a traitorous uncle wrote offering to hold Pegu as
his vassal in return for support in a rebellion againgt his nephew*
\Iingyi Sw'asaw'ke saw a golden opportunity for extinguishing Mon
independence.

But the Mons proved a tougher proposition than he had bargained
for; and although he took Prome and carried the fighting again and
s^ain into the heart of the Mon country', he failed to capture Pegu.
The Mon chronicles mention contingents of Sfaans from the mountains
in hia forces, and sometimes refer to the invaders as Shans. But the
struggle was essentially one of Burmese against Mons, It was not a
Shan migration that the Mons held up> but a Burmese push towards
the Irrawaddy delta. All the Upper Burma inscriptions of the period

BURMA AND ARAKAN

CM, 6

^37

are in Bwrttiesep and before the long period of the warfare ended,
Burmeae vernacular literature was bom.

Mingyi Swasawke's successor^ Minhkaung, who ruled energetically
from 1401 to 1422^ made tremendous cifforts to bring the struggle to
a successful Issue, and nearly succeeded^ But Ra^adarit w^as an able
opponent who weakened the Burmese striking power by obtaining
Arakanese help and fomenting discord between Ava and the Shan
states of the north. In 1374 Mlngyi Sw'asawke had placed an uncle on
the throne of Arakan. On the latter's death in 1381 he sent his own
son to rule there, but the prince was soon driven out. In 1404, as
punishment for an Arakanese raid on the Pakokku district^ he sent an
expedition which occupied the capital, while the king Red to Bengal
and his son escaped into the Mon country. Tbi^ time he placed a son-
m-law' on the throne. But the Arakanese prince relumed with Mon
support and killed the Burmese puppet king. The Burmese replied
by sending another expedition* and so began a ding-dong stniggle
between ihe two sides which lasted until 1430* w'hen the exiled king,
Narameikhla, returned, and with help from Bengal regained his throne.

In 1406, after some years of peace with the Shans* Minhkaung w^us
lempted to interfere in the feud w^hich had again broken out between
Kale and Mohnyitin According to the Chinese account* he sent a force
under ^Nolota^ (Nawrahta), his ^Senior Comforter^ (Wungjd), whn
robbed the land and killed the Sawbwa of Mohnyin and hJs son. The
emperor sent his ‘ Governor' of A% a a severe reprimand, and the laller
w ithdrew his troops and sent a propitiatory^ ernbassy. But so thoroughly
had the Burmese commander performed the task entrusted to him
that it was not until 1416 that the sawbw’aship of Mohnyin was re¬
vived, the dead saiivbwa’g nephew' and heir having fled and taken
refuge in Nan-tien,

In due course the Jsawbwa of Hsenwi took upon himself to avenge
the ravaging of Mohnyin- In 1413 he raided some Ava villages and
sent some of the prisoners to Peking. But the Burmese followed him
up and defeated his force at AVetwin, near the present Maymyo. In
the following year, at the instigation of Razadarit of Pegu* he raided
again, w hile at the same time the Shan Chiefs of Mawke and Mawdon
attacked Myedu. This lime they were driven off* but in 1415, while
the Burmese forces were campaigning in the delta, the two chiefs
attacked again and thrcaicned Ava itself, Minhkaung's son by a Maw
Shan princess, Minrekyawswa, was at the time almost within sight of
decisive victory over the Mons. Only Pegu and Martaban were left to
Razadarit. But he had to be recalled in haste to -Ava to deal with the

the toe^euhopean fertod

FT*. I

138

Shan threat, and victory over the Mons slipped from the Burmese
gr^p. Two years later the prince was killed while on another cun-
paign in the delta. That was the end of the struggle with the Mons.
The Shan pressure had become so insistent that further campaigning
in the delta involved too much risk.

Hsinbyushin Thihathu succeeded his father as King of Ava in
1422, and as husband of the Maw Shan princess. He attacked the
Shans, but through the treachery of his wife was ambushed by the
Sawabwa of Onbaung (Hsipaw) in 1426 and killed. The sawbwa then
placed his own nominee, Kalekyetaungnyo, upon the throne. But
he was driven out, together with the Onbaung Shans, by a Burmese
chief, Mohnyinthado, who seized the crown for himself. Mohnyin-
thado reigned from 1427 to 1440. The country was in disorder. The
feudal chiefs were independent, and were supported against the king
by the Sawbwas of Onbaung and Yawnghwe. There were times when
he even lost control over the vital Kyauks^ area. The Onbaung raids
forced him to abandon Ava temporarily. He was kept so busy with
the efSorts to stave off complete disaster that when, in, 1430, the eaiied
King of Arakan returned home and began to build a new capital at
Mrohaung he had no power to interfere. Arakan began a long period
of independence.

Under Mohnyinthado^s sons, Minrekyawswa (1440-3) and Nam-
pati (1443-6$), the Ava kingstup revived considerably. The chief
factor in this was the Chinese attack on the Maw Shans. With the
passing of Kublai Khan's dynasty in 1368 China lost control over the
route across Asb to the West, In their search for new outlets for
trade the Mings, with their eyes upon the Irrawaddy, decided that the
Maw Shans must be subdued. The result w'as a long struggle lasting
from 1438 to 1465. There was added reason for the Chinese move in
view of the fact that an ambitious Maw Shan tJjieftain, 'Fhonganhwa
(‘Ssu-jen-fa’), was attempting to revive the old Nanchao empire. In
1441 Wang Chi, the President of the Board of War, was appointed to
lead a strong army, which drove the Shans out of Luch’uan. Some of
them (led to Hsem.vi, but the majority, under Thonganbwa, crossed
the Irrawaddy and took refuge in Mohnyin. The story of Wang Chi’s
campaigns is told in the Ming ihiti, which states that the emperor
offered ‘ Ssu-jen-fa*3’ land to whoev'cr should succeed in arresting him.
. 4 n inscription at the Tupayon Pagoda, erected by Narapati at Sagaing,
relates how Thonganbwa, fleeing before Wang Chi to Mohnyin and
Kale, was captured by the Burmese and presented to their king on
his coronation day.

CH. 6

BCriutU AM> AlUSAN

139

Wang Chi's forces in due course conquered Mohiiyiii, and he
dcmandcc! the surrender of the fugitive. When Narapati refused tus
demand the Chinese proceeded to invade Burmese territory. A
battle was fought near Tagaiing in which^ according to the Hrminniin
Yazamn^ the Chinese general was lulled and his army badly mauled
(1445). In the following year the Chinese invaded in greater strength
and appeared before the walls of Ai-a, Narapati thereupon agreed to
their demand. Thonganbwa, however^ committed aujcidCt and only
his dead body could be surrendered. Narapati also formally accepted
Chinese overlordship. In return the Yunnan forces assisted him to
subdue the rebellious Chief of Yamethin. In 1451 he received from
China a gold seal of appointment as "Comforter of Ava\ and three
years later a slice of Mohnyin temtoty .

While the Shans felt the impact of China^s chastising hand the Ava
king managed to maintain some semblance of authority. But it was
very delicately poised^ for the constant state of friction between the
Shan states—-a major cau;^ of Burma*s survival—alw^ay$ threatened
to involve the king In some dispute or other» or give his va$sa;[^ an
excuse to rebel. Thiliathura (1469^81) was the last of the Ava kings
in whose reign revolts and diBorder were not the normal state of
affairs. During this brief interval of relative calm the Ava kings
established relations with the famous centre of ITiemvada Buddhism
at Kandy in Ceylon. In 1456 Narapati bought land tlierc for the
maintenance of Burmese monks vlsiring the Temple of the Tooth.
In 1474 Thihathura and his queen sent brooms made from the hair of
their head^ as an oSTering.

Much future trouble might have been prevented had China agreed
to Thihathura's request in 1472 for the cession of Mohnym. Instead,
however, China contented herself with warning the sawbwa against
obstructing the route between Burma and Yunnan. The trouble was
that, although from time to time she would administer a dose of fright*
fulness and send them scattering in all directiortSt China failed to
aduumster the Shans» And her policy of fragmentation aimed at
preventing the development of any powerful state within the areas
from w hich ahe claimed allegiance* Hence, w^hen her control weakened
even for a short time, Upper Burma and the regions to the north and
east became, as Harvey puts it, bedlam of snarling Shan states"*

That 1$ what happened after Thihathura^s death in 14S1. Two
kings, Minhkaung (t4Sr-tso2), and Shwenankyavrshin (150^-27)^
completely failed to stem the disorders. Mohnyin became so strong
and threatening that in 1507 Ava resorted to appeasement by ceding

THE PRE-EUEOPEAN PERIOD

FT. I

140

territory in order to gain time. So serious became the gitu^tion that in
1520 the Chinese pushed across the Salween and moved their advanced
base to Tengjnjeh. Unfortunately this had not the slightest effect,
fn 1527 Mohnyin's chronic attacks culminated in the capture and
sack of Ava, the death of Shwenanfcyawshint and his replaceitient by
the sawbwa's son ThphaGbwap a 'fuLL-blooded savage says Har\ey^
who pillaged pagodas, massacred monks^ and made bonfires of the
precious contents of monastic libraries. The remaining rulers of Ava^
from 1527 until Its absorption in 1555 into the reunited kingdom of
Burma created by Bayinnaung^ were all Shan chiefs.

The force that reunited Burma in the middle of the sixteenth
century, and finally delivered the Ava region from the Shan terror*
was built Up tmostentatiously at Toungoo in the Sittang valley, away
from the main centres of disturbance. During the long struggle
between Ava and the Mons the little state barely maintained its
existence, with each of the combatants from time to time attempting
to bring it to an end. No ruling family held power for long. But a
turning point came under King Mintyinyo (1486-1531), when the
chaos in Ava offered an able ruler an excellent opportunity for ex¬
panding his domains. His most important acquisition the
Kyaukse area. In 1527, when the Sawbwa of Mohnyin sacked Ava, so
many Buimew chiefs fled 10 take service under him that he became the
most powerful ruler in Burma.

With this addition to his strength he turned his attcnticm south¬
wards and began to make preparations for an attack upon the rich and
cultivated Mon kingdom of Pegu* The ^Tirious Shan sawbvvas to the
north^vards of his territory were so deeply engaged in quarrelling
among themselves that he gambled on their congenital incapacity for
combined action and determined on a bid tg acquire the fabulous
riches of Pegu as a basia for further conquests. In 1531, however,
w hile in the midst of his preparations he died, and it fell to hia
brilliant son Tabinshwehti to carry through his cherished project.

The Alon kingdom which Anawrahta of Pagan had conquered in
the middlir of the ele^xnth century and incorporated in hh dominions
had regained its independence during the Mongol invasions ^vhich
brought about the downfall of the great Buddhist state in 12S7. l^'hc
initial movement of severance came in 12S1, when Wareru* or Mogado,
captain of the guard to King Rama Khamheng of SukhoPal, eloped with
one of the king's daughters, so the 3tor\' runs^ and seized the port of
Martaban. At Domvun in Thaton district* his birthplacep he is said to
have started his career as a pedbr. After establishing himself at

ctt. 6

BURMA AND ABAKAN

141

Maitaban he joined with a Mon rebel leader, Tarabya, in expelling the
Burmese from Pegu. By 1287 they had gained control over all the
country south of Prome and 'Poungoo. Then they quarrelled, and
Wareru murdered Tarabya,

Siamese sources assert that Wareru held his new kingdom as the
vassal of Rama Khatnheng who conferred on him the title of Chao Fa
Rua. This, how'ever, did not prevent him from obtaining recognition of
China an d ruli ng as an in dependent sovereign. Martaban was his capital,
and remained tlie capital of the Mon kingdom until 1363. Southwards
his territory stretched down the Peninsula as far as MerguL But
the kingdom of .\yut’ia, after its foundation in 1350, claimed all
the territory from JMartaban southwards, and ultimately acquired
most of it. Wareru is said to have beaten off an attack by the three
Shan Brothers. His chief monument today is the iaiv-book knoivn as
the Wagaru Dhtimmalhat, 3 digest of the Laws of Manu, compiled at
his behest by monks from the rvritings of earlier scholars presen’ed in
Mon monasteries. It is the earliest law-book in Burma still extant.

After Wareru’s death in 1296 the Mon kingdom passed throifgh a
time of internal troubles and succession disputes which lasted many
years, and might have had disastrous results had the Shans or the
Siamese been in a position to intervene. When, however, they did at
last attack, a strong king, Blnnya U (1333^5), was on the throne;
and though forced to yield territory, he managed to save his kingdom.
The attacks came from both Chiengmai and Ayut’ia. The Chiengmai
forces burnt Taikkola, Bittaung and Donwun, but were driven off in
1356. In 1363 the Siamese forced Binnya U to abandon Martaban
and pressed their attacks upon the provinces of Moulmein and
'I'enasscrim. Binnya U transferred his capital temporarily to Donwun,
and finally in 1369 established it at Pegu, which remained the capital
of the Mon kingdom until Tabinshwehti extinguished its indepen¬
dence in 1539. In 136a he repaired the Shwe Dagon Pagoda and
raised its height to 66 feet, h was a famous resort of pilgrims, stand¬
ing just outside the small fishing village of Dagon, named after it, and
centuries later renamed Rangoon by Abungpaya (1753).

Bitinya U*s reign was a troubled one, full of wars and strife. The
Siamese held hlaitaban and Tenasseiim and were constantly threaten¬
ing. His eldest son Razadarit (1385-1423) had to deal not only with
raids from Chiengmai, Kampcngp'et and Ayiit’ia, but also, as we
have seen, with a long succession of attacks from Ava. .Against them
all he defended his realm with success. Only the preoccupation of
AyuPia with her attempts to subdue Cambodia, Sukhot'ai and

1+2 tllE f'RE^EtJUOPEAN PEKtOD FT. I

Chiengmai saved the Mon connuy from becomjDg a hone of con¬
tention between Avs and Siam, Razadarit w^as not only a statesman
who played his cards witK consummate skill ~ he has also a great name
in Burmese and Mon tradition as an administrator* The Burmese say
that he divided the "Three Talaing Countries % Pegu, Myaimgmya,
and BasseLn, into thirty-two provinces each. Presumably the area
indicated was what British administrators called a ^drcle", under a
wtyo^Au^’ or taikfkugyi.

With the cessation of the Burmese wars shortly before Razadarit’s
death, the Mon kingdom passed into a long period of peace and pros¬
perity* Its capital became a great centre of commerce and the resort of
foreign merchants* Its three busy porte of Martaban, recovered from
Siam; Syriam, just below Dagon; and Bassein, in the delta, carried on
regular trade with India, Malacca, and the Malay Archipelago. In
1435 Nicolo di Conti of VenicCj the first recorded European to visit
Burma, stayed four months at Pegu, then ruled by Buinyarati t
(1426-46).

The fiftcenth^entury Kings of Pegu were deeply interested in
religion. B inn yabyan (1450-53) raised the height of the Shw'c Dagon
Pagoda to 302 feet. His successor, Queen Shinsawbu (r 453 “ 7 z)t ^
daughter of Razadarit, constructed additions to the precincts of the
pagoda which made it very much as it is today* Missions were agam
sent to Ceylon, and, like those of an earlier period, stimulated a new
religious revit'al which affected the whole of Burma and caused the
rulers of Ava also to seek direct contact with the source of Theravada
teaching.

The centre of the movement waa the Kalyani ihHn near PegUj
which took its name from the river in Ceylon where the monks who
founded it had been ordained. Kalyaui ordioation became the standard
form for the whole country. The story of the refomts is told in the
inscriptions erected at the ih^irt by Stun Sawbu^s successor Damma-
zedi (1472-92)* He was a monk chosen for the succession by the
devout queen, and accordingly made to leave his doisier and marry
her daughter. He became a Buddhist ruler of the beat type, famous
for his wisdom. A collection of his rulings, the Dammazedi pyalfmt is
still extant* Under him mildness prevailed and a gracious civilization
flourished* Friendly intercourse was maintained with China, and
missions were again sent to Buddhagaya. When he died he was
honoured as a saint, 2nd a pagoda was erected over his bones.

His son Binnyaran II (1492“!526) rweived two more European
prospectorSj both Italiana. The first was Hieronomo de^ Santo Stefano,

CH. 6

BURAIA Airo ARAKAX

who in 1496 field him a valuable fitoek of merchRodbe and wa$ kept
waiting for payment much longer than he had bargained for^ The
fiecond was Ludovico di Varthema, vrho wtote with enthusiasm about
the splendour of the king and his capital, and the abundance of
elephants in the country* He listed shelfac^ sandalwood, couon, silk,
and rubies as the main articles of trade from which the king drew hXs
revenue*

Binnyaran also received in 1512 a European prospeclor of a different
sort. He Tvas Ruy Nunra d^^cunha, deputed by Affonso de Albuquer¬
que after the capture of Malacca to report on conditions at Tenas-
senm» Martaban, and Pegu* As a result of hb vifiit a Portuguese
trading station waa opened in 1519 at Martaban* It was a sign of a new
age that was dawning. Another, the gathering of a Burmese nationalist
re>'iva] at Toungoo, was hardly as yet visible during Binnyarau’s
reign* The pent-up avalanche broke suddenly upon his successor
Takayutpi (1526-^9) when Tabinahwehti fdl upon the delta region
in 1535. WitWn a very short period the Burmese leader had reduced
the whole of the Mon kingdom to submission^ captured Pegu by
stratagem^ and brought the rule of Wareni's line to an end.

tHAPTEft 7

THE T'AIS AND THE KINGDOM OF AYUTTA

The Shafts^ the Laotians and the Siamese are all descended from a
parent racial group, cognate to the Chinese* which b thought to have
made Lla first historical appearance in the sixth centurj^ B.c. From that
rime onwards Chinese records make frequent references to them as
the ^barbarians' south of the Yang-^tse-kiang. They came under
Chinese su^ierainty early in the Christian era, but made many attempts
to assert their independence. In order to escape subjection to China
many of them emigrated to the region now occupied by the Northern
Shan States of Burma, There the Chinese knew them as the
AiJab. In the middle of the seventh century they began to form the
powerful kingdom of Nanchao in west and north-west Yunnan. Be¬
tween 757 and 763, under Ko-Io-feng» Nanchao conquered the valley of
the upper Irrawaddy. In 791 I-mou-hsunp his grandson and successor,
accepted Chinese overlord^hip, and through him the earliest relations
were established between the Fyu of Burma and the Chinese,

Dmou-hsiln was a conqueror who expanded his control over neigh¬
bouring states and tribes. His successors in the ninth century pursued
the same policy. Not only did they destroy the Pyu capital in S32
and carry' their conquests as far as tlie delta region of the Irrawaddy,
but they twice invaded China and besieged Chengtu^ They raided
Tongking and Annam, then under Chinese rule. Before the end of
the century^ however, they made their peace with China and settled
down as a vassal kingdom. Thenceforward for a considerable period
little mention is made of them by the Chinese dynastic hiatories.

But they never ceased to be on the move, slowly, very slowly,
infiltrating along the rivers and in the valleys of central Indo-China,
Small groups of them settled among the Khmers, the Mons, and the
Burmese. T*ai mercenaries appear on the bas-reliefs of the Angkor
Wat. Long before that they had been crossing into the Menam valley
from those of the Salween and Mekong. North of Raheng^ at the
junction of the Mop'ing and the Mewang rivers* the small independent
T"ai state of P'ayao came into existence aa early as 1096.

Early in the twelfth century their muongs in the upper Menam valley

began to form tiny states u:
In the thirteenth century w
scarcely obis^rvable became

under chieftains called chaos and
what had been a movement so slow m to be
what has been described by Ccedes as an
‘cffcnescence^ showing itself on the southern confines of Yunnan.
Possibly it was a result of the weakening cjf Khmer power in that
region towards the end of Jayavarman Vll's rcign through hie con¬
centration upon balding Champa in subjection. In 1215 the T'ai state
of i^Iogaungp north of Bhamo in Upper Burma^ came into existencCp
[n 1223 Mnne or Muong another pow^crfijl Shan state^ was
founded. The year tzzf^ is the traditional date of the establishment
of the Ahom kingdom of Assanip also a T'^ai achievement.

At about the same time the T'ai chiefa of Chieng Rung and Chieng
Sen on the upper Mekong made a marriage alliance. To this period
also the legendary maa.s migration of T'ais along the Nam U river to
the site of the preaenc Luang Frabang may possibly be ascribed. In
iijS iwQ T'ai chiefs attacked and defeated the Khmer commander at
Sukhot^aj, then the capital of the north-western part of the Angkor
empire, and established there the centre of a T'ai kingdom w hich was
® iSmebtpa it ihc Burrn^sf nenderiflg df the T"ai C/uw

TIIH t'RK'KL'ttOPRAK PEttlOP

PT. 1

146

to become a mighty state under Rama Khamheng in the latter half of
the century-

Kublai Khan’s conquest of the kingdom of Nanchao in 1253 caused
an even stronger ‘efFer^escenee’ among the T’ais. Cades thinks that
the prodigious epic of the Mongol conquests struck their imagination
and inspired them to great achievements. Whether this be so or not,
the Mongols adopted the traditional Chinese policy of ‘fragmentation’
and favoured the establishment of a senes of T’al states at the expense
of the older states. And what happened was not a mass displacement
of population in the areas affected but the seizure of power by a T'ai
governing class.

The fall of Pagan in 1287 resulted in the division of much of its
territory under T’ai rulers. In the upper Menam valley Mangrai, the
T'ai Chief of Chieng Rai, conquered the old Mon state of Haripun-
jaya, or Lampun, in and founded the kingdom of Chiengmai.

Between 1283 and 1287 Rama Khamheng of Sukhot’al conquered the
Mons of the Menam valley and substituted T’ai rule for Khmer over
an aiea which included much of the upper Mekong region as well. In
1287 Mangrai, Rama Khamheng and Ngam Muong, the Chief of
P’ayao, met together and concluded a firm pact of.friendship. The
year was signiheantiy that of the Mongol conquest of Pagan, The
decline of Khmer power on the one side and the disappearance of a
strong Burma on the other provided the T’ais with an unrivalled
opportunity far expansion, provided they kept the peace among
themselves.

Rama Khamheng, or 'Rama the Brave’ {1283-^.1317), had proved
himself a redoubtable warrior before he succeeded his father Sri I ndra-
ditya as king of Sukhot'aJ. He became a renowned statesman, under
whom the T'ais absorbed the best elements of the civilizations with
which they came into contact. Indeed, Sukhot’ai during this period
has been called the ‘ cradle of Siamese civilization ’■ The T’ais posses*
aed a social organization of a feudal type, vestigial remains of which
still persist in the Shan and Laos states and the Muongs of Tongking
and Thanh-hoa. Through long contact with China they had a rela¬
tively advanced civilization, ’l^ey were as remarkable as assimilators
as the Normans in Europe. By the trade route through Assam, joining
China and India, they had made contact with the Buddhism of
northern India, and the inHuence of Buddhist and Sena art upon their
ow n in the extreme north of the Menam basin is easily recognizable.

Under Rama Khamheng, in expanding down the .Menam valley and
into the Malay Peninsula, they conquered an area that had been Mon

cit. 7 TUB T'MS and tm KINGDOM OF AYUT’ia 147

Since before the dawn of the histoncal period. It was the home of a
fine civilization with deep roots. In the seventh centurj, when the
strong hand nf Funan was removed, the Buddhist kingdom of D varavati
had arisen there. Of its history unfortunately ver^' little is known.
WTiile the Khmers conquered large parts of what is now eastern and
north-eastern Thailand, Dvaravati maintained its independence up to
the reign of Suryavarman I (roii-5o)p when what was then called
Lavo, namely the region of the Menam valley, came under Khmer
rule.

In the thirteenth centurvi when the western parts of the Khmer
empire vrere coming under T'ai control Lava regained its indepen¬
dence and sent embassies to China. Thus it was not absorbed into
Rama Khamheng’s kingdom^ though in the middle of the next century
it came under a T^ai ruler. Nevertheless the majority of Rama Kham-
heng^s subjects must have been Mon$ and Khmers, and from them
he adopted the script which he used for reducing the T'ai language
to writing in 12S3. His aim w^as to establish an official language that
could be used also by his Mon-Khmer-speaking subjccEs. Ir> his
celebrated inscription of 1292 at Sukhot'ai he employed the new
characters for the first timCp and this inscription is the oldest extant
specimen of the T'lai language- His alphabet, the Sukodaya script,
was adopted throughout Siam. It had a strong influence also upon
the development of writing in the Laos states.

Sukho£'ai*s geographical situatian helps to explain its role as the
cradle of Siamese eivilization. It lay on die dividing^Iine between the
spheres of influence of the Khmers on the one hand and of the Mons
atid Burmese on the other. Moreoverj it had easy communicatiDn
with Lower Biirma* through which it could maintain relations with
the Ttietfopolis of its Buddhisrn, Ceylon. Through all theae contacis
it absorbed important cultural elements and incorporaled them in the
civilization of Siam.^ To quote Cmdes: *From Cambodia the Siamese
assimilated its political organization, material civilization, writing and
a considerable number of words. Siamese artists teamt from Khmer
artists and transformed Khmer an according to their own genius,
and above all under the influence of their contaet with their western
neighbours, the Mons and Burmese. From these latter the Siamese
received their juristic traditions, of Indian origin, and above all
Sinhalese Buddhism and its artistic traditions/^

A postscript to Rama Khamheng's inscription, of later date, sets
forth the details of his conquests. It runs: 'Rama Khamheng is

* Lrt £tats p. 370, ifirulnted.

r^ONGKING

htan^MO / HaaHdinI

Ciunf

t (Luwy PniWi}

/ ^ f THAN NINN \

irte d'Annam

,fc|»<*VJ Chan
i PrtswHjSak^-iL-,

VNHy X
QUAP^

\H6n

Qjnh-O^nh

CVlJa^i)

Virtflir

Kratk

C A rf

Phn&m

^Penh

Sai^am

Heot

%t\ Tiiramam^

MAINLAND

MONARCHIES

Hitts

THE T^AtS AND THE KIXCDOM OF AYLrr^IA

CH, 7

149

sovereign lord of siW the T'ais . * . He has conquered the multitude
of his enemies, posse^^sing spacious cities and numbers of eJephants,
Eastwards he has conquered the land up to Saraluang [PichJt]|
Song K\ve [P'l^nulok]* Lum [Lomsak], Bachay, Sakha up to the
hanks of the Mekong and as far as Vieng Chan, Vieng Kham which
mark the frontier. Southwards he has subdued the countrY- up to
Khioni'i [on the Meping between Kanip'engp''et and Nakhon Savan]^
P*rek [Paknam P"o], Syp^annaphum, Ratburi, P'echaburip Si Tham-
marat [Ligor]^ up to the sea, which marks the frontier. Westwards
he has conquered the country up to Muong Chot [Me Sojt, Hang-
savati [Pegu] and up to the sea which marks the frontier. Northwards
he ha.s conquered the country up to Muong P'le [PVe], Muong Man*
Muong P'lua [on the river of Kan]* and on the other side of the Mekong
up to Muong Chava [Luang Prabang] which marks the frontier.'^

It is impossible on the existing evidence to check up this list in
eveiy^ detail. So far as the territories preriously under Khmer rule
are concerned, Chou Ta-kyaii's testimony lends support to the T^ai
claim. Ccedefi dates Rama Khamheng's conquests in the iVtalay
Peninsula from round about 1294 and suggests that 'r'ai penetration
dates from the reign of Chandrabhanu of Tambralinga in the middle
of the century. 'Phe ‘P'^ai conquests were made at the expense of
Srivijaya, and in 1295* w^hen a Siamcf^e envoy appeared at the Mongol
Court* a Chinese mission went with him on his return bearing an
impenai order to Rama Khamhcng: ' Keep your promise and do no
evil to Ma-li-yu-eul/

The T’ai claim to Pegu raises the question of the historicity of the
story of Wareru^ or Mogado, which h related in the previous chupter.
It may well be that the stor>' of his elopement with a daughter of Ratna
Khamheng is legendary^ but VVareru, the first ruler of the independent
kingdom of the Mons* is a Avell-attcsted historical person, and there
can be little doubt that after seiiing Martaban he must have paid
formal homage lo Sukhot'ai.

The linch-pin of Rama Khamheng^s policy w^as the maintenance
of the most cordial relations wnth China* As the director of a splinter
movement in the Khmer empire he had the full approval of China.
The Yuan History records a whole series of missions from Sukhot^ai
lo the Imperial Court* Siamese tradition asserts that Rama Kham¬
heng went there in person once, and possibly twice, and brought back
with him Chinese Yvorkmenj who established the production of
ceramic ware at Sukhot'ai and 5 av%':ankhalok^ The industry persisted

* Ibid. ^ pr ^4j, A tranelaliiiti of CirJ^'s Pr^llGh veraion.

THE PRE*ELROPEAN PERIOD

PT. 1

150

down 10 tht middle of the eighteenth centuiy. The sites of the oJd
kilns with their huge heaps of celadon refuse are a striking testimony to
the importance of the industry at certain periods.

Rama Khamheng’a great inscription paints a picture of a prosperous
state governed with justice and magnanimity', and with Pah Buddhism
of the Sinhalese orthodox pattern as its official religion. The king,
we are told, with his Court and all his m^natcs, practises the religion
of the Buddha with devotion. For all this, however, it is not surprising
to learn that on the south side of the dty there is a hill (Rhao Luang)
on which dwelt the most important of alt the spirits in the country,
P’ra Khap’ung, and that the ruler of Sukhot'ai made regular ritual
offerings at his shrine in order to ensure ihe prosperity of the realm.

The Chinese applied the name *Sien’ to the kingdom of Sukhot'ai.
*Syam’ was the name used by the Khmers for the 'savages’ from the
middle Menam depicted on the south gallery of the Angkor Wat.
The earliest use of the w'ord so far discovered is in a Cham epigraph
of the eleventh century, which mentions Siamese in a list of prisoners
of lYar. The name seems to be a variant of the w'ord ‘Shan*, applied
by the Burmese to the wedge of hill states running southwards from
Mogaung and Mohnyin in the far north. Its etymology is unknown.
After the foundation of .Ayut'ia in 1350 the territory that owed
obedience to its monarchs became known as Siam. Europeans often
called the city itself ‘the city of Siam’,

Rama Khamheng ceased to retgn shortly before 1318; tradition
asserts that he disappeared in the rapids of the river at Sawankhalok.
Under his son Lo T’ai (?i3t7-?i347) the power of Sukhot'ai declined
almost as rapidly as it had arisen. .A false reading of his name has
caused him to be celebrated in some writings as Sua T'ai, the ‘tiger
of the T’ais’. Far from being a tiger he was interested chiefly in works
of Buddhist merit and founded a number of BuddhspQda, or foot¬
prints of the Buddha, in imitation of the one on Adam’s Peak in
Ceylon, His religious devotion earned him the title of Dharmaraja.

Lo T'ai’s son Lu T'ai, who succeeded him in ?i347, was a scholar
who was completely preoccupied with religion, and eventually resigned
his crown in 1361 to enter a monastery. In 1345 he had composed a
large treatise on Buddhist cosmology, the Triiibhumikatha, which is
still estant under the name Traipham P'a Ruung. An inscription
describes him thus: ‘Tlus king observed the ten royal precepts. He
showed mercy towards all his subjects. When he saw another man’s
rice he did not covet it, and when he saw another's wealth he did not
behave unworthily. , . . If he arrcsteil people guilty of cheating or

THE T'aIS ANP the KINGDOM OF AYUT’ia

CH. 7

IS*

tnsalcnce, those who put poison in his food so as to cause him illness
or dtiath, he never killed or beat them, but forgave those who behaved
evilly towards him* *rhe reason why he repressed hia heart and
restrained his temper, and did not give way to anger when he might
have done, was that he desired to become a Buddha and to taLf« every
creature beyond the ocean of the affiiction of transmigration.**

I’he way was thus left open for an ambitious T'ai prince to found
a new state in the south. According to tradition, he belonged to the
Chiengsen house, from which Mangrai, the founder of Chiengmai,
had sprung. He married a daughter of the Mon ruler of U T'ong and
eventually succeeded him. Having made himself master of much of
the old kingdom of Lavo, he forced the pious Lu T'ai to acknowledge
his suaerainty. Then, when an epidemic of cholera forced him to
evacuate his own city, he went fifty' miles to the southward and
founded a new capital, Dvaravati Sri Ayudhya, on an island in the
Menam. In 1350 he was crowned with the title of Ramadhipati. He
is regarded as the first King of Siam.

Three years after his accession another T'ai chieftain. Fa Ngpun,
united all the small Laos states to the north, in the region of the upper
Mekong, to found the kingdom of Lang Chang, later known as Luang
Prabang. Here also Khmer influence was felt, for Fa Ngoim had been
brought up at the Court of Angkor and w'as married to a Khmer
princess.

1 'he new kingdom of Ayut'ia was a strong one which soon began
to make its power fdt. It gained control over the middle and lower
Menam, and of much of the Malay t'eninsuJa,* including Tenasserim
and lavoy in what is now Burma, and exercised suzctBlntv over
Sukhot'ai. Whether a strong China would have permitted so powerful
a state to arise without let or hindrance is highly doubtful. Kublai
Khan and his successors had encouraged the 'Paia to dismember
the Khmer empire in accordance with the traditional Chinese policy
of fragmentation pursued towards the 'southern barbarians\ hut it
was the weakness of the Mongol power in the middle of the fourteenth
century that made possible the creation of so strong a kingdom as
Ayut'ia became. As soon as the Mongols were supplanted by the
Mings the situation changed radically. The Siamese kings seem to
have been aware of this, for they sent frequent embassies to Nanking,

’ A miulauiiti of C4 «(I^‘b Fnnch venjod in iunJouitA, pp, 36S-9. nnd hii

det imniptiortT du Surntf p. 107.

* Wood's s^ary in hi* p. 64, thfli Hjimadhirrati ciitirndcd bis cqnqurSCa

to Mslflcca mmt nol few liken lilcmlly, abict ^as not fijutldcd untU 1x03 or

[ heresbooirs,

THE PftE-EUROP^N PERIOD

PT. I

152

the Min|^ capital, and sedulouE^ly cullivatcd friendly reLation^. As
diplomatists the T^ais have never been surpassed^

The transference of the main centre of T"ai power in the Menam
valley from Sukhot'ai away in the north to AyutSa in the south spelt
danger for Cambodiap for her capital, Angkor, was now within range
of attack- It has been conclusively proved that Ramadhipati did not
capture Angkor in 1353* but there can be no doubt that as soon as he
bad founded his new capital he began to make sustained efforts to
subdue Cambodia. A long period of warfare began between the two
states. Siam. hoAvever, was tinable to give undivided attention to the
CambodUn enterprise, for she soon became engaged in a series of
struggles with rebellious Sukhot'al and hostile Chiengmai.

Ramadhtpati I promulgated the first system of law on record in
Thailand- It embodies much ancient T*ai custom going back to the
Nanchao period. Modified as it was subsequently by assimilation
w^ith the I-aw-s of Manu, it provided the basic principles of Siamese
law for centuries up to the reign of Chulaloitgkom, and has not been
entirely superseded by modern legislation. For all his importance in
Siamese history, practically nothing is knowm of Ramadhipati person¬
ally. When he ^ed m 1369 he was succeeded by his son Prince
Ramesuen, who was Governor of Lopburi. He, hoMrever, was
unpopular, and in face of disturbances which he wa^^ unable to quell
he abdicated in 1370 in favour of an uncle, who became Boromoraja L

During the early part of his reign the new' king had to devote his
whole attention to the task of re-establishing authority over the upper
Menam valley- Sukhot^ai was bent upon reviving its independence.
In 1371 Boromoraja led an invasion of the northern kingdom and
succeeded in capturing several tow^ns. '['his was the first of a series of
annual invasions culminating m 1378 in the submission of King
T'ammaraja II of Sukhot'ai, and the cession to Ayutla of its western
districts, including Kamp'engp'et. The king, who iransferred his
capital to P'itsanulok, was allowed to reign over the remainder as the
vassal of Siam.

The extension of Ayut^ia^s power so far northwards brought trouble
with ChiengiTLHi, and just before Boromoraja^s death a struggle began
w'hich w'3s to last off and on for several centuries- Like so many of
these \var$^ it a rose out of 3 disputed succession. In 13S7 Sen Muang
Ma, a boy of fourteen, aucoeeded to the Chiengmni throne, and an
unde at once sought to dispossess him by summoning Siamese aid.
The Siamese invading force, how^ever, was defeated at the village of
Sen Sanuk, close to Chiengmai, The battle became famous in local

CH. 7

THE T^ArS AND THE KINCSIHIM OF AYlTT^lA

153

history through the exploit of the princess Nang Aluang, who* although
far advanced in pregnancj^ took part in the fighting dressed as a man
riding on an elephant*

In the following year Boromoraja 1 died and was auccecded by hLs
son, a boy of fifteen. He was immediately dethroned and put to death
by the ex-king Ramesuen, who seized power and reigned until 1395*
He has been credited in error with a second Siamese conquest of
Angkor, supposed to have taken place in 1394 and to have been the
cause of the removal of the Khmer capital to Phnom Penh- The
Siamese Chronicle^ the P'angsatvurdan^ credits him also with the
capture of Chiengmai and relates how he battered dowTi its walla
with large cannon* Thia stoiy^ also is apocryphal. What actually
happenetl was that the King of Chiengmai, on the pretext of helping
Sukhot^ai to make another bid for independence* led an army there.
But King T'ammaraja, realizing that Chiengmai"s real aim was to
gain control over his kingdom and use it as a base from which to
attack Ayutia, defeated the Laos army and drove jt out of his
territories. The Siamese took no pan in the struggle. ^

The period 1395“ 1408 is a blank in Siamese history, ,A phantom
king. Ram Raja, a son of Ramesuen, occupied the throne, but nothing
is recorded of his reign^ In 1408 he was deposed through a palace
revolt led by a son of Boromoraja I, who succeeded to the throne as
Int^araja (1408-24), ''rhe only noteworthy events in his reign occurred
in the north* where there were two succession disputes.

The first was in Sukhot’ai, where the Siamese intervened and
impo$ed a settlement in 1410, The other occurred in the following
year in Chiengmai and resulted from the death of Sen Muang Ala.
\ Siamese force commanded by T’ammaraja III of Sukhot'ai was
sent to place one of the claimants on the throne. Instead of proceeding
direct I y to Chiengmai it attacked the city of P'ayao, once an iudepend-
em T‘ai state, away to the north-Here, according to the Chieng-
mai Chronicle, cannon were used by both sides. The resistance of the
city was so stubborn that the Siamese abandoned the siege and went
on to Chiengrai to recruit their strength for an attack on Chiengmaip
The capital, however, resisted all attempts to take it, and finally the
Siamese moved off again to Chiengrai* captured it after some resist¬
ance, and deported large numbers of prisoners to Ayut’ia,

When in 1424 Int'araja died he left three sons, A struggle for the
throne at once broke out between the two elder ones. An attempt to-
settle it by personal combai on elephants resulted in both combatants
being thrown from their mounts and killed. The yoimgcst brother

THE PHF.-EX'[ioFEAN PERIOD

FT, I

'54

was thereupon proebjmed king as Boromoraja 11 (1421-4S). He vvas
the conqueror of Angkort though from what has bpen said in the
prc’^ious chapter the word * conqueror* can only be applied in this
case Avhh a somewhat restricted meaning; for his attempt to impose
a Siamese puppet king upon Cambodia was an immediate failure^
and in effect his campaign was little more than a successful raid on a
big scale. Its objective* to make Cambodia a vassal state, was not
realized, "I’he Cambodian Chronicle mentions further fighting after
a brief interval, and it Is significant that the T’ais obtained no territory
as a result of the struggle of 1431-2. In the subsequent fighting the
initiative was by no means altvaya with the T'ais.

In 1438 an important step 'kvas taken in the consolidation of the
kingdom of Siaim Boromoraja 11 appointed his eldest son, Ramesuen,
to be Governor of F'it^anulok, thereby incorporating what was left
of the old kingdom of Sukhot^ai as a province of Siam^ Shortly after-
w'ardsj in t442, another succession struggle in Clueiigmai afforded an
opportunity for Siamese interventioix Again it was unsuccfc^ftjl. The
Chj^ngmai army inflicted a severe defeat upon the Siamese. The king
was taken ill during the campaign and the expedition was abandoned.
When in, 1448 he died he conducting a further abortive campaign
against the arch-enemy.

Prince Ramesuen, who succeeded him as Boromo Trailokanai
(1448-88), usually shortened to TmiJok* has left his mark upon the
administraiivc history of his countrj". His measures aimed at the
creation of a centralized system of administration. Up to his time the
various provincial governments had been subject 10 very little central
control. The provinces indeed had functioned much in the same way
as the great fiefs of mediaeval France and Germany. In order to con¬
trol them the central administration was reorganiKed on a depart¬
mental basis and the rank of its principal officers raised. A distinction
was made between the five great civil departments and the military
adminbtnitlon. The civil departments were the Ministry of the
Interior, at the head of which w^as the chief minister; the Ministry of
Local Government^ which dealt with the city and province of Ayut'la;
the Ministry of Finance, which also dealt with foreign trade; the
Ministry of Agricuhuret vrhich was concerned with cultivation and
land tenure; and the Ministry of the Royal Household, which had
charge of palace affairs and justice.

The military administration under the Kalahom was also divided
into departments, whose heads had ministerial rank. This remained
largely the atniciure of the central government until the nineteenth

CH. 7 TKI; T'AIS AND THE KINGDOM OE ^\YVX*lA 155

centijr}^ Id its distribution of fundtionia it was abcad of all the other
governments of Soulh-E^t Asia. Sbm^s neighbour Burma, for
instance, never achieved more than a mere rudimentary difTerentiatian
of functions at the highest leveL Its supreme body of ministers com-
posing the Hlutdaw maintained, in theory, joint control over the
whole held of administration until the abolition of the monarchy in
1886.

Another notable measure of Trailok's reign was the regulation of
the Sakdi Na grades. From the carlie&i times under the T"ai social
system every^ man might possess an amount of land varying according
to his status. Trailot overhauled the whole system, laying down
dehnite rules regarding the status of the different classes of people and
assigning amounts of land to each. The amounts varied from the
equivalent of 4,000 acres for a Chao P^ya down to that of 10 acres in
the case of the lowest class. The system, which survived until recent
times, supplied more than a framework to society. For officials^
before the introduction of salaries in the second half of the nineteenth
ccjiturVp it determined their emoluments; each received the amouyt of
land prescribed by the Bakdi Na and was expected to live on the
revenue received therefrom. In the courts the amount of the fine
which could be imposed was determined by a man^s Sakdi Na grade;
so too Avas the compensation to be paid for hia murder. For the loAvcst
grades, seeing that there wras plenty of land for ail and in monsoon
Asia nature h beneficent, it meant that no one need starve.

The Kot Mont^ien Ban, or ‘Palace Law', of r45o was a further
lengthy and detailed enactment of this Siamese Edward L ^nd like the
English monarches work w^as definitive rather than novel. Ii was a
codification and clarification of existing custom. It enumerated the
tributary states and the form of their tribute^ defined the relative
rank of all classes at Court from queens and royal princes doAvnsvards^
regulated ceremonieSp prescribed functions nf officials, and fixed
punishments. Thus it laid down the procedure to be foUoAved when a
member of the royal family was to be beaten to death w^ith a sandal¬
wood club.

Trailok's reign was one of almost incessant war with Chiengmau
This time it was the northern kingdom which started the trouble.
The Avar arose out of the dissatisfaction felt in Sukhot'ai at its in¬
corporation in the Siamese kingdom. Matters came to a head in 1451
when the Governor of Sawankhalok offered to beconie a tributary
of Chiengmai in return for support in a rebellion against At^t'ia. The
King of Chiengmai at once despatched a force^ Avhich attacked

THE PRE-ElFROPEA>' PERIOD

FT. r

T56

SukKot'af but was repulsed, A second force, sent against Kamp'eng-
p'ct, captured the cUy; But an invasion of the Chicngmal dominJons
by the King of Luang Prahang caused the uhole campaign to be called
olf,^ and for $OTne years no further move was made.

Trailok was in no position to take advantage of the Luang Prabang
diversion by seeking to deal a decisive blow at Chiengmai, for his
attention was concentrated upon developments in the Malay Penin¬
sula. He was handicapped also by an alarming outbreak of smallpo]t
throughout his kingdom. Exactly what happened in Malaya is not
clear. Wood asserts that Malacca rebelled^ that the Siamese captured
the cit>' in 1455^ but failed to make their control effective for long.
Apparently the rapid rise of the power of Malacca during the first
half of the fifteenth century was achiei^ed only in face of the chronic
hostility of Siam^ ivhich during the sudden decline of the Javanese
powder after the death of Hayam Wumk had sought tn extend her
suzerains over the whole of the Malay Peninsula.

Kroin's account of the reign of Mudhafar Shah, better known as
Raji^ Kasim {1446-59), causes one to suspect the veracitj' of the Siamese
record. He wxites that the greatest expansion of Malacca's power
occurred under this ruler, whose name is associated with his success
in beating off Siamese attacks, Winstedt in his History of Alahya
is silent on the subject of the supposed Siam^e capture of Malacca,
but records that Raja Kasim defeated a Siamese fleet off Batu Pabat-
The story of the Siamese attacks on Malacca, as recorded in the
S^iirah or " Malay Annals % shou'^ two as having been made

during Raja Kasim's reign, the first by land and the second by sea.
Both were defeated, and the Malay account of the former expressly
Slates that the city was not takenJ The second w^as defeated before
It reached its objective* Afterwards, according to the Sfj^rah Mel&yo,
Sultan Muzaffar Shah and the King of Siam exchanged envoys and
presents and made peace,"

Tome Pire^i^ who resided at Malacca $oon after its capture by the
Portuguese in 1511, and in his Suma Oitejifa/ presents a picture of the
East that is remarkable for its trustworthiness, mentions an alliance
between Malacca and Siam in the reign of" Modafarxa', He says chat
this ruler fought successfully with the Rajas of E^ahang^ Trengganu
and Patani, and also against the states of Kampar and Indraglri in
Sumatra, and that his success was due to his alliances with the

^ Cr C, Bmwn In $hf Malrtyitn <lff $he jff.dnSTr, XXV,

pArt* i mid 3, P-

* pp. 7a-^a.

CH, 7 THE t'aIS ASt> Tilt KINGDOM OF AYL'T'iA 157

Ja.vane54^T the Chinese and the Siamese. As in 1456 China accorded
Raja Kasim the title of ‘sultan' in recognition of his importance^ this
may have affected Siam's attitude towards him- She was usually very
heedful of the wishes of the Mings«

In 1460 the clouds gathered again in the upper Menam region.
The Governor of Saw ankhalak fled to Chiengmai and stirred up its
king once more to invade Siam. In the next year the Chiengmai
forces captured Sukhofai and besieged PMtsanuJok- An invasion
from Yunnan forced them to retire to defend their own terntories,
and in 146^ the Siamese rccaptiired Sukhot'ai. Sawankhalok, how-
evefp remained in ChiengmaPs possession. The threat from Chiengmai
caused Trailok to transfer his headquarters from Ayut'ia to P'its-
anulok in 1463, and that cit>' became for all practical purposes his
capital for the remainder of his reign. Soon aftenvards Chiengmai
made the third attack of his reign on Sukhot’ai. It was severely
repulsedp and the Siamese chased the retreating enemy as far as Doi
Ba. There, however, they turned and made a stand. In a battle
fought by moonlight the Siamese were checked and retreated hcfne“
wards. After this there was peace for some year^,

in the interval TraJlok received tonsure as a monk and entered a
monastery for a time. He then sought to weaken Chiengmai by
occult means. In 14&7 he sent a Burmese monk to sovv dissension at
the Court of Chiengmai. In the next year he followed this up by
sending an embassy, headed by a Brahman, bent on the same object.
Much trouble was indeed caused by these emissaries, for their
slanders led to the execution of the king's eldest son and a faithful
minister on false charges. But the Brahman's actions caused suspicion,
the plot was discoveredj and both he and the Burman were throwm into
the river with stones tied to their necks. The war was resumed in
1494, and vvent on intermittently and without result for the next
quarter of a century.

Shortly before his death in 148S Trailok took the important step of
creating his son. Prince jett'a;^ Maha Uparat—i.e. Second King or
Vice-King. This is the first mention of an office which lasted until
the second half of the nineteenth century. The Maha Uparat was
given some of the appurtenances of kingship and ten times the amount
of land granted to the highest official in the government. In the early
days the dignity was usually conferred upon the king's eldest son.
As Jai Jett'a. hovveverp was not his eldest son, it has been suggested
that kis intention was to divide the administration of the kingdom
between the two capitals of F^itsanulok and Ayut'ia. He died before

TtlE P^l£-b^^ROPKAN PERIOD

Pt, 1

158

this could be arranged, and was succeeded by his eldest son Boro-
moraja III (1488-91). Ayut^ia becanie again the capital, but Jai
Jett^a, as Maha Uparat, remained at P^itsanulok a$ its gmemor.

When Boromoraja III died Jai Jett'a succeeded him as Rama
T^ibodi IT (1491-1529). With his reign we enter a new period in the
history of South-East Asia* He received the first envoy of the Port¬
uguese conqueror of Malacca, Duarte Fernandes, who came to
announce the victory to the Court of Ayut^ia. Siam still claimed
suzerainty over the whole of the Malay Peninsuiat but Rama T'lbodi^s
attention was concentrated upon ChiengmaJ, and he wag not in a
position to create difficulties over the Portuguese possession of Malacca.
He therefore consented to treaties permitting them to tmde at Ayut^ia,
Nakhon Sritammarat, Patani, Tenasserim and Mergui.

Trouble with Chiengmai had flared up early in the reign because
one of the Siamese royal princes, who had taken the yellow robe there,
smuggled aw^ay a wrhite crystal image of the Buddtia to Ayut’ia- The
King of Chiengmai thereupon invaded Siamese territory and Rama
T^ifeodi restored the image. A second incident occurred in 1508,
when an attack by Chiengmai on Sukhot^ai led to a Siamese invasion
of Chiengmai. It failed, as also did a further one in 1510. When
Duarte FemandesE arrived in Ayut'ia the w^ar “wag in full swing. In
1513 the Chiengmai forces raided Sukhot^ai and returned home with
a haul of prisoners and booty* l"wo years later they took Sukhot'ai
and Kamp*^engp*et, but a large Siamese army under the king himself
drove them back into their own territory and inflicted on them a
decisive defeat on the banks of the Me Wang river near Nakhon
Lamp^ang.

The Siamese did not follow up this victory, but it is significant
that Rama T^ibodi set about to reorganize the whole military system
upon the basis of compulsory service. The kingdom was divided up
into military divisions and subdivisions, and all men of eighteen and
over w^cre enrolled for call-up* if and ivhen required. Boromoraja IV”
(1529-34) made a treaty of peace with Chiengmai, and for a few yenrg
there was a breathing space in the interminable struggle.

In 1545, however, another succession dispute at Chiengmai offered
Siam an opportunity for intci^^ention, which she seized. But this
story must be deferred to another chapter, since it was no longer a
simple struggle between Ayut^ia and Chiengmai, The Laos kingdom
of Lan Chang (Luang Frabang) w'as also involved, as well as the
newly united kingdom of Burma* created by the victories of Tabin-
shwchti, and ambitious to establish its authority over all the T’ai
slates.

CilAPTER 8

THE KINGDOM OF CHAMPA

The foundation and early history of the Cham kingdom hm been
dealt with in a prwious chapter. The $toty ia now taken up from the
early part of the seventh century, when the accession of the T*ang
dynasty in China brought a lull tn Cham aggression w'hJch for various
reasons lasted until the beginning of the ninth century". The seventh
century saw the beginnings of artistic developments, chiefly at Misdn
and Tra-kieu, close to Amaravati (Quang-nam) just south of modern
Tourane and the Col dcs Nuages. Some of the Misdn monuments are
still to be seen^ but at ''Fra-kicu only the bases remain, since the city was
later destroyed- Most of them belong to the long and peaceful reign
of Prakasadha^rma, who on coming to the throne in 653 adopted the
regnal title of Yikrantavarman, They are closely Indian in stylc^
Several are dedicated to Vishnu> whose cult appears for the first time
in Champa during his reign. Both he and his auccesaorp Vikrantavar-
man 11 ( f686“73t)j sent numerous missions to Chinai A rock in¬
scription of Prakasadharma, found to the north of Nha-trang,
shows that his sway extended w^ell to the south of the modern
Cap Varelk.

In the middle of the eighth century the Chinese cease to mention
the Lin-yij they refer to the Chams by the name Huan-wang, 1 'his
change synchronizes with a transference of the centre of graii^ty in
the kingdom southwards from Quang-nam to Panduranga (Phan^rang)
and Kauthara (Nha-trang). A new dynaaty—the fifth, according to
Georges Maspero^s reckoning—reigns there from 75® ®59

begins to use posthumous name$ indicating the god with tvhom the
dead king has united himself. More stress is kid on state Salvbm.
and the cult of the linga becomes more important even than in
Cambodia. It imposes itself upon the ancient indigenous worship of
upright stones symbolizing the god of the soil. There are many ex¬
amples of the use of the an Indian form of the cultp in

which the stone has a metal covering decorated with one or more
human faces, symbolizing, as in the case of the Khmer Devaraja, the
identificadon of the king with Siva. It U an interesting case of

l6o THE PRE-EUtlOPEAN PEKZOD FT. I

^ymbiu&b^ whereby the im¬
ported and the tradiiional
culls were united in an
attempt to broaden the ba^is
of the state religion.

The second half of the
eighth centuji' was a critical
lime for Champa. Like Cam¬
bodia^ it had to sustain a
number of hea\y Javanese
attacks. One in 774 destroyed
the old sanctuary of Po Nagar
at Nha-trang. I'hree years
later another destroyed a
temple near the capita^ Vira-
pura^ which occupied a site
not far from modern Phan-
rang* But the Javanese peril
passed away^ and early in the
ninth century Champa henself
again w^ent over to the offen¬
sive. Under Harivarman 1
she renewed her attacks on
the Chinese provinces to the
north, with varying success.
'I'here were also Cham
attacks on Cambodia early
in the reign of Jayavarman lip the founder of the Angkor dynasty* It
used to be thought that Yasovarmanp the founder of the city of Aogkorp
replied to these by an invasion of Champa which ivas repelled by
Indravarman IL But it is now known that the record of the Khmer
invasion refers to a much later one.

Under Indravarman 11 (854-93) nnrth again became the centre
of gravity; he founded a new capital Indrapurap in Quang-nam
province. Me restored good relations with Chini^ and in his reign
Chinese historians begin to refer to Champa by a third name* Chang-
cheng—i.e. the city of ChaOp or, in its Sanskrit form, Champapura.
His reign was a peaceful one, notable for a great Buddhist foundation,
a monastery, the ruins of which have been located at Doog-duong,
south-east of Misotu This is the first evidence of the existence of
Mahay ana BuddhUm in Champa*

CI1. S

THE KINGDOM OF OHAMt*A

l6l

Indravarman H founded the sixth dynasty in Champa's history.
The kings of Kis line were more active than any of their predecessors
in their interest in the religious life of the country. Not only did they
build new sanctuaries but they protected religious foundations against
pirates and restored them after desecration. They erected inscriptions
describing in detail their donations to temples and monasteries.
During the reign of Irvdravarman’s successor, Java Simhavarman I,
relations with java w'erc close and friendly, A relative of his queen
W'cnt to Java on a pilgrimage and returned to hold high office under a
number of kings. This contact is thought to explain the Javanese
influence on Cham art tvhich shows itself in the tenth century.

During the tenth century events of great importance for the future
of Champa took place beyond her northern borders. In 907 the
T’ang dynasty fell in China, and the Annamites took advantage of the
situation to stage a struggle for independence which resulted in the
foundation of the kingdom of Dai^co-viet (.Annam and Tongking) in
This happened during the reign of the Cham king Indravarman
III (c. 9 iB^ 59). -At first the change seems to have had link effect
uponjChampa, unless the friendly relations cultivated by Indravarman
Ill’s successor, Jaya Indravarman I, with the first Sung emperor may
be taken 10 indicate the likelihood of trouble arising bctw'een Champa
and the new kingdom.

Trouble indeed did arise under the next king, Paramesvaravarman.
He w'as persuaded by a refugee Annamite claimant in 979 to espouse
his cause and sent an expedition by sea against Hoa-*lu, the capital of
the Dinh dynasty. It came to grief, hotvever, in a storm. Then in the
following year, when I,e I loan seiaed the throne from the Dinh and
sent a mission to Champa to announce his accession, Paramesx'aravar-
man was foolish enough to clap the envoy into prison. The result was
an .Annamite invasion which destroyed Indrapura and killed the Cham
king. His successor, Indravarman IV, had to take refuge in the south
while appealing in vain for Chinese help. Such was the disorder in
northern Champa that .in .Annamite named Luu Ky-Tong seized
power and successfully resisted an attempt by Le Hoan to depose him.
When in 986 Indravarman IV died Luu Ky-Tong even proclaimed
himself King of Champa and sought Chinese recognition.

In 9SS a Cham resistance movement came to a head under a native
leader, who was proclaimed king at Vijaya (Binh-dmh). His task w-as
rendered easier by the death of Luu Ky-Tong in 989, but he had to
beat off a renewed Annamite attack in the following year. He took the
title of Harivarman II and was the founder of the seventh dynasty in

FT, r

1^2 TJIE I’RE-Rl'ROPEAN PIHtlOD

Cham fiistoryh After a short period of peace, during which he secured
reco^ition by China and restored the capital to Indmpura, he launched
a series of counter-attacks upon Annam. Thus began the long struggle
which was to end only with the extinction of the Cham kingdom,
Annamite pressure upon the northern Cham provinces became so
acute that as early as the year looo Harivarman Il’s successor, who is
known by the incomplete name of l^ng Pu Ku Vijaya Sri—, was forced
to abandon Indrapura and transfer his capital to the less exposed
Vijaya.

The eleventh century was one of disaster, when the Chants lost
their northern provinces to Annam. *J'hey sent frequent missions to
China, and in 1030 made an alliance with Smyavarman I of Angkor,
But all hopes of help from these quartets were illusory, and in 1044
a long series of Annamite attacks culminated in another great Cham
disaster. Their capital, V ijaya, was taken and Ki ng J ayasimhavarman
II beheaded. A new dynasty, the eighth, was founded by a war leader
belonging to one of the noble families. He took the title of Jaya
Parades vara varman I and set himself to revive the kingdom. He
repressed revolts in the southern provinces and made every effort to
develop good relations with both Annam and China by means of
frequent missions.

Rudravarman III, however, who came to the throne in lobi, while
seeking to lull Annamite suspicions by continuing to send frequent
missions, went ahead with preparations to attack the arch-enemy.
WTtCJj he launched his attack, late in the year 106S, it was a fiasco. It
brought the inevitable Annamite counter-invasion in 1069. Li
Thanh-Ton speedily obtained possesion of the capital and captured
the fugitive king, alter pursuing him into Cambodian territory. Then
the victor celebrated his triumph with a great ceremonial banquet in
the royal palace and made a holocaust of the capital. His wretched
captive, Rudravarman Hi, was taken away to Tongting, and only
liberated on making a formal surrender of the three northern pro¬
vinces of his country, corresponding to modern Quang-binh and
Quang-tri. On arrival home, however, he was quite unable to restore
his authority, and with his death in 1074 his short-lived dynasty came
to an end.

A prince named Thang founded the ninth dynasty. He took the
title of Harivarman IV and was soon dbplaying the greatest energy
repairing the damage caused by the invaders and reviving the fortunes
of his country, enfeebled as it was through the loss of Its northern
provinces. Champa’s recovery seems to have been remarkably rapid,

CH. S

THE KINGDOM OF CHAMPA

163

for not only did HajivarroiLo drive off 3 further Annamitc amck but
he alsci defeated a Khmer one^ and followed this up by sending a raid¬
ing force which penetrated Cambodia as far as Sambor on the Mekong,
where it destroyed aU the religious sanctuaries,

Harivarman lV*s policy was to cultivate better relations with the
Annamites. Hence it was with some reluctance that in 1076 he
allowed himself to be drawn into a coalition organized by China
for an attack on Annam. When it failed he took care to ward olF
Arniamite anger by sending propitiatory olferings* After this regular
tribute was sent to Annam until the end of the century. In 1103,
however, his son Jaya Indravarman II was persuaded by an Anna mite
refugee into making a vain attempt to recover the three lost northern
provinces. But this was only a passing interlude in a long period of
peaceable relations with Annam which lasted untO the middle of the
thirteenth century^ Not that the Chains acquiesced in the permanent
loss of the disputed territory; on the contraiy^ they were forced to live
at peace with Annam because they had to concentrate all their efforts
upon defending their independence against the Khmers. •

This new^ struggle was precipitated by the warlike Suryavarman II
of Angkor, who made a determined attempt to impose Khmer rule
upon Champa^ His ambition to become a w^orld conqueror was
favoured by the circumstances of his time. Because of the struggle
hetw^een the Sung and the Kin, China w-as unable to exercise a re¬
straining ha^nd on the ^southern barbarians*. Annam also, a^ a result
of the long minority of h\ Anh-Ton, was. weakened by faction struggle^
among the magnates. The Khmers began by raiding Champa. Then,
when refugees sought safety by crossing over into xAnnamitc territory,
Suryavarman invaded the province of Nghe-an and pillaged the
coastal districts of Thanh-hoa. In 1132 he persuaded^ or forced, Jaya
IndravaiTTLan III to Join with turn in an attack which failed. The Cham
king thereupon made his peace with Annanip and when some years
later Suryavarman renew ed the attack he refused to co-operate with
the Khmer^*

In revenge for this, Suryavarman in 1145 invaded Champa, took
the capital. Vijaya, and made himself master of the kingdom. Jaya
Indravarman HI disappeared during the struggle! w^hat happened to
him is unknown. The northern part of Champa remained under
Khmer rule until 1149^ but in the southern region of Punduranga a new
Cham king, Jaya Harivarmaii 1. arose in 1147. In the next year,
having driven off a Khmer Invading force, he went over to the offen¬
sive, and in J149 recovered \''ija>a and reunited the kingdom. But he

i 64

THE PR£-EllftOPEAN' PERIOD

FT. I

Hot yet in his own house. A pretender^ Vamsaraja^

collected a large force of savage peoples froni the mouniaiHS, and
when this was routed <^caped to Annam. There he was allow ed to
recmit another large force, with which he invaded Champa. He was
again defeated, in late E150 or early 1151, and both he and his Anna-
mite commander lost their livca.

Jaya Harivarmao Ts troubles were still not over. In 1155 the
district of Panduranga rose in rebellionp and it was not until 1160 that
the revolt w'as finally crushed. Notwithstanding all these disturbances
his reign was a period of recuperation. He repaired the damage of
war, devoted part of the booty to the restoration of temples, and
erected new' ones. He sent embassies to China and appeased Annam
by regular payments of tribute. A rupture was nearly caused by the
lawless behaviour of the Cham envoy bearing presents to Thein To in
1166. An Annamite force actually crossed the frontier in 1167, but
by that time Jaya Harivannaii I was dead, and his successor, Java
Indravarman IV, sent a rich present to 'Fhein To, who recalled his
froopc-

Jaya Indravarman 1 \^ ivas a clever adventurer who had seized the
throne from jaya Harivarman r*s son. His great desire was to turn
the tables on Cambodia in revenge for Sutyavarman iTs invasions
of Champa. Hi$ first attack, made in 1170 after assuring himself of
Annam "g neutrality, w^ent by land and failed, in 1177, bow^ever, he
sent an expedition by sea to the Mekong delta, whence it sailed up the
river and took Angkor by surprise. The city W'ag pillaged, and the
Cham force then retired with immense booty. This daring act caused
the deepest hatred between Champa and Cambodia for many years.

In 1190 after long preparation Jayavarman VJI, the builder of
Angkor Ihom, launched a great attack on Champa under the leader¬
ship of a Cham prince^ Sri Vidyanandana, who had been educated at
Angkor. Once more the Cham kingdom fell to the Cambodian invaders.
Java rndtavarman IV was sent a captive to Angkor, and the son of
Jayavarman \ ll, Prince In, was proclaimed king in his stead at
Vijaya. The realm was again split into two, and the Cham Sri Vidyan-
andana became ruler of Panduranga as the vassal of Cambodia and
with the title of Suryavarman,

Rebellions arose everywhere against the new regime. Prince In was
chased out of Vijaya tn 1 tgi by a Cham leader^ who proclaimed him-
self king as laya Indravarman V. Jayavarman V'^ll thereupon sent the
captive Jaya Indravarman IV with an army to regain his throne_ The
latter called upon Suryavarman, who had crushed his owm rebels, for

CH. 8

THE K.1NGDOM Ot CHAaiPA

165

aid. Suryavarman led a force to Vijaya+ captured the city and killed
Jay a Indravarman V, He then turned on the unlucky Jaya Tndravar-
TTian IV, whom he defeated and killed in 1192. Ha^dng reunited
Champa by these successesp he threw off his allegiance to Cambodia,
He now had to meet a whole sutce^on of Khmer attacks. For some
years he was successful* He sent embassies to Annam and Chinap and
in 1199 secured an edict of in%'estiture from the Emperor Long Can.

In 1:203* however* the Khmer armies drove him out. After attempt¬
ing utisuceessfuUy to shelter in AnnamT whither he had fled by sea^ he
evaded an Annamite attempt to arrest him and sailed away, andp
writes Maspero, 'history docs not tell us what became of him\ For
seventeen yearSp 1303-1220, Champa was under Khmer domination,
ThcHp for some reason about which the records are silent, the Khmer
army of occupation evacuated the country. It was a voluntary
withdrawal, and a Cham prince of the old royal line took over the
reins of government peaceably and assumed the difficult task of
reconstruction.

There has been much speculation among historians as to the ^use
of the Khmer evacuation. Maspero's concIusioRi accepted by Ctedes*
is that T*ai pressure upon the Khmer empire had become so acute
that Angkor was forced to abandon the idea of holding Champa in sub¬
jection. Her cenlurydong feud with Cambodia left Champa very weakp
and her recovery w'as slow- Throughout the period she had had to fore¬
go all attempts to regain her three northerly provinces from Annam.
But it wa^ a case of postponement only: she was implacable in her
resolve never flnaily to acquiesce in their abandonment. And as
Annam was equally determined to keep them, there could be only-
one end to the contEst: the total extinction of one or other of the
contending parties.

I'he resumption of the struggle took place during the reign of Jaya
Paramesvaravarman Ii+ the king who came to the throne when the
Khmers left* According to the Annamilc Annals: the Chams took
advantage of the weakness of the Li dynasty to commit a series of
piratical raids upon the coastal districts of .Annam. In 1225 a netv
dynastyT, the Tran, succeeded the Li, and in due course an Annamite
envoy was sent to complain that the Cham tribute had not been paid
regularly- Paramesvaravarman II replied by demanding the

return of the lost provinces. The reauli was a fresh Annamite iri-
vasion led by King Tran Thai-Ton in person. Cham resistance w^a
fierce. Jaya Paramesvaravarman II seems to have been killed during
the struggle, presumably in 1252. He was succeeded by his younger

i66

THJi PRE-EfROPF^ PERIOD PT. I

brother. Java Indravarojaii VI, a man of peace. And although the
Aniiamites had won no apettacular successp they Avere glad to call off
the gtniggte, for they themaelves were now threatened bv a new
danger from the north.

The \ictories of the Mongols in China were the cause of this
Sudden cessation in the Cham-Annamite war. Only five years later,
in 1357 , 3 Alongol army pillaged Hanoi, but retired before strong
Annamite resistance. In 1260 Kubtai Khan succeeded to the Mongol
leadership, and, while continuing the conquest of the Sung empire,
began to demand tokens of obedience from the states which had pre*
vmusly recogni^ted Chinese overlordship. En voys were sent to Annam,
Cambodia and Champa ordering their kings to proceed to his hcad-
quarteiv and pay homage in person. All made excuses and sought to
temporiac by sending envoys and presents.

In Champa's case matters came to a head in 12S1, when Kublai's
patience was exhausted and he sent Marshal Sdgatu to impose .Mongol
adrmnistration upon the country. The appearance of the Mongols
caust-d a nation-wide movement of resistance in Champa. Sdgatu
soon found his task too great for his resources, and he was unable to
deal a knock-out blow to the Cham army, for Indravarman V retired
with it into the mountains. When Kublai sent reinforcements Annam
refused them passage by land. In 1285 Kublai‘s son Togan, while
trying to force his way through Tongking, was defeated and driven
back into China by the Annamites, rvhlle SogalS, on attempting to go
to his aid, was defeated and driven back into Champa, where he w^as
kilted by the Chams.

indravarman \, in the hope of avoiding further trouble, at once
sent an envoy with tribute, which was accepted. Kublai had too many
irons in the fire to risk another adventure in Champa. T hree years
later, when Marco Polo visited the country, a new king, Java Sinhavar-
man 111 (1288^1307), was reigning peaceably. He was determined,
however, to make no concessions to China and to take no chances, for
m 1292. when the Mongol fleet sailed down his coast on its famous
punitive expedition against Java, the Cham fleet shadowed it to see
that it made no attempt to land in Champa,

Jaya Sinhavarman HI was disposed to ally with Annam. In 1301
he received a visit from Tran Nhon-Ton, who had abdicated in favour
of hU son Tran Anh-Ton and was ostensibly seeking merit by a round
of pilgrimages to sacred shrines in neighbouring countries. On leaving,
the ex-king professed himself so gratified at the warmth of his re¬
ception that he promised the Cham monarch one of his daughters in

€H- 8

THF Kf?<CDDM OF CllAMPA

167

maniage, Jaya Sinhavarinan 11who was partial to foreign n^rnages
and already had a Javanese wife, weakly swallowed the bait. In the
n^otiationSp w’hich Jed up to a marriage alliance m 1306* he was
cajol^ into suixendcriog tw^o of the Cham provinces north of the Col
des Nttages as the price for the hand of a sister of Tran -■‘knh-Ton.

^ He died in the following year, and his son Che Chi, who succeeded
him as Java Sinhavarman IV, had to bear the consequences of this
stupid act. For the ceded provinces^ renamed Thuan-chau and Hoa-
chau by Annam, were so rebellious that they made life unbearable
for their Annamite administrators, who naturally attributed all
their troubles to Cham support of the rebel I ions elements. In 1312
Annam, unable to put up with this condition of alTjiii:^ any longer*
invaded Champa, dethroned Jaya Sinhavarman IV and took him away
a pnsoner, having replaced him by his younger brother Che Nang.

Champa now became a province of Annam and its ruler was de¬
signated a "feudaior)' ptince of the second raiik\ In the following
year, w'hen troo^ of the T’ai ruler, Rama Khamheng of Sukhot'ai,
Crossed Cambodian territory and raided Champa^ Annam faithfully
carried out the task of a suzerain by driving them off. Che Nang,
however, was a loyal Cham and unwilling to submit to Annamite
domination. In 1314 he rebelled and made an attempt to recover the
tw^o provinces ceded by his father. Success favoured him at first* hut
in 131S he w'as so badly defeated that he disbanded his army and fled
to Java* His mother “"s home.

He was succeeded by a viceroy* Che Anan, installed by the victorious
Annamite commanderK In 1323 he in turn threw off his allegiance to
Annam. He managed to beat off every Annamite attempt to depose
him* but made no attempt to recover the ceded provinces. After
1326 he was left to reign in peace until his death in 1342. The
Franciscan friar Odoric of Pordenone, who travelled in these regions
during his reign, placed on record that the King of Chiimpa had no
less than 200 children, and a very fine country with rich fishing grounds
off its coast. He was the founder of the twelfth dynasty in Cham
hLstory^ which held power until 1590^

*353 auccessor, Tra Hoa, made a further attempt to recover
the ]o3i province*, but failed. 'Phis, however, w™ the prelude to a
periud of amazing Cham recove^3^ It began in 1360 with the accession
of Che Bong Nga, the last king of the short-lived dynasty* and a
military adventurer uf immense daring and resource. So great was
his success that Maspero call* his reign the 'apogee^ of Cham powTr*
Ccedira, how^ever^ challenges this appraisal and prefers to regard it as

THR P11F.-EURDI^\N PERIOD

PT. 1

*the last ray of the setting sun".^ Che Bong Kga took advantage of the
establishment of the Ming dynasty in China to begin a series of
suce^ful attacks on AnnarriK which culminated in 1371 with the sack
of Hanoi. When the first Ming emperor ordered him to stop his
campaigns he proceeded to attack pirates at sea and send the booty
to China, while nnder cover of this he continued his war with Annam.
That country was kept in a constant state of terror until in 1390 the
indomitable Cham king w'as killed in a sea fight.

His successor w'as soon forced to abandon all his conquestSp but
owing to revolutions in Annam, w'hich reused a temporary loss of
power by the Tran dynasty, Annam"s counter-attack did not come
until 1402. Then Champa lost the province of Indrapura (Quang-
nam)t and would have been forced to yield much marc to her northern
neighbour had not China inten ened in 1407 and driven off the Anna-
mite fleet, which w as attacking Vtjaya.

The tables were then turned on the Annamites in the most dramatic
way. For the Chinese proceeded to conquer and annes Annsm^
which they held until 1428* The Chams on their part recovered the
territory they had lost in 1402. Moreover, they were soon so aggres¬
sive that they turned their arms upon the enfeebled kingdom of
Cambodia, w hich w^as forced to appeal to the Ming for protection.
And when in 1458 Le Lo*i, the Anna mite national leader, expelled
the Chinese and regained his country's mdependence his successors
for some years were glad to maintain peaceable relations with Champa^

In 1441 the long reign of Jaya Sinhavarinan V came to an end and
Champa became a prey to civil war. '[*he Annamites were presented
with an unrivalled opportunity once and for all to break the power of
their troublesome neighbour* In 1446 they took Vijaya^ but the Chams
recovered the city*. In 1471, however, the final conquest was achieved-
No less than 60,000 people are said to have lost their lives in this last
struggle, while the royal family and 30,000 prisoners were carried
away into captivity*

Annam annexed the whole of Champa down to Cap Varella.
Beyond it in the far south a diminutive Cham state continued to
exist for some centuries- A succession of kings w^a$ recognised by
China until 1543. A Cham Court existed in this region until 1720,
when the last king fled with most of his people before Annamite
pressure into Cambodian territory'. His last descendant died early
in the present century.

^ Maspero,!.# Rvyaume de Uhmnptif 1^9^318 ;C€tdl3,I>f p.

CKAPTEB 9

ANNAM AND TONGKIXG

Th£ Vietnamese, as they now prefer to be called, are today the most
niiinerolls of the peoples of the Indo-Chinese peninsula, Xhey occupy
the valleys of the Red and Bbct rivers of Tongking, the coastal belt
of Annam and the Mekong delta region of Cochin China. At the
beginning of the Christian era they occupied Tongking and northern
Annam only. They pushed southi^-ards at the expense of the Chams,
whose kingdom they conquered in the fifteenth century. Under the
leadership of the Nguyen of Hue the last remaining independent Cham
districts were absorbed during the seventeenth century. In the same
century the Vietnamese began to plant colonics in the Mekong dplta
region in what was then Cambodian territorj', and from that time
onw'ards their steady penetration into Cochin China has been con¬
tinuous.

Their origin has been much debated. They are thought to have
been the result of intermarriage between local tribes already settled
in Tongking and a mongoloid people, who may represent the third
prehistoric migration to reach Indo-China—in their case via the
Yangtse valley and what are now the Chinese provinces of Chekiang,
Fukien, Kivang-tong and Kwang-si. Their language has predomin¬
antly T’ai affinities, but contains so many Mon-Khmer elements that
some theorists have attempted to place it in the Mon-Khmer group.

The earliest archaeological evidence, chiefly from the sites of
Thanh-hoa and Dong-son, shows their culture as a Mongol-Indonesian
mixture already profoundly influenced by China. Chinese culture
spread over the Chekiang,'Fukien, Kwang-tong and Kwang-si area
during the period from the ninth to the fourth centuries before the
Christian era. In the third century s.c. it began to affert the region
that is now Tongking and northern Annsm. Under Shih Huang Ti
(246-209), the ‘First Emperor' of the Ch’in dynasty, General Chao
T'o conquered the two Kwangs and they were annexed to China.
Their population at the time was non-Chinese; it was made up of
peoples related to the T'ais and the Annamites. Chinese colonization
(jf the area began from about 214 Xongltingand northern Annam

i6»

THE I'll E-EURO FEAN PERIOD

FT. I

renmined for the time being outside the Chinese empire. When the
Ch'in dynasty was tottering to it$ fall General Chao T'o in 208 B.c.
united them with the two Kwango to form the independent kingdom
of Nan-yoe^ or Nam-viet, to use the x\nnamite form of the word. The
part of Annam affected consisted of the three provinces of Thanh-hoa,
Quang-tri and Quang-binh, The Han dynasty recogmzed Nan-yue as
an autonomous kingdom, over which they retained vague rights of
suzerainty* The Canton dynasty^ founded by Chao T'o. confined its
direct rule to Kwang-tung and Kwang-^i^ leading Tongking and
northern Aanam under native administration.

In 1II n.c.^ however, the Emperor Wu Ti (140-^7 h.c.)^ the creator
of Chinese impcrialistn in xAaia^ annexed the Canton kingdom, and
with it Tongking and Annam. to which by this time the name Nam-
Viet was limited. This latter region he div idcd into the commanderies
of Chiao Chih (Tongking), Chiu Chen (Thanh-hoa) and Jenan (North
Annam). From this time onwards until A.D. 939 Nam-viet remained
an integral part of the Chinese empire. At first the people were per-
miued to remain under their own feudal administration. Hut in A.D.
40, in consequence of a revolt, Chinese administration and institutions
were imposed^

Between 541 and 603 Nam-viet made three major attempts to regain
independence. The first was a movement against the tyranny of the
Chinese governor Siao Tseu* .\t the outset it was successful and in
544 its leader Li-Bon proclaimed himself King of Nam-viet. But
in 547 he was defeated and his movement collapsed. The second,
which occurred m 590, was an attempt to take advantage of the situa¬
tion in China at the fall of the Ch*en dynasty. The third, which
began in 600, w as led by another memberof the ].i family, Li-phat-Tu,
and was crushed in 60a by General Lieu Fang, who subsequently
proceeded to punish the Cham king Sambhuvarman for his encroach -
ments upon the Jenan commandeiy^

During its long period under Chinese rule, although exposed to a
gradual intensification of Chinese cultumJ pressure, involving the
introduction of the Chinese classics, the ethical system of Confucius
and Mahayana Buddism, Nam-viet remained stubbornty loyal to its
national traditions. Chinese culture w^a$ of course otdy for the literate
minority; the people as a whole retained their language, customs and
ancient culture with its roots in animism and ancestor-worship* From
the third to the tenth century a number of ntiesions passing between the
Indian W'Orld and China touched at Tongking and introduced a certain
amount of Indian culture^ but with only slight effect. I-tsing w'riies

CH, 9 ANS^AM AKU^TON^irliiNG IJt

that by hta time the country had become a great intellectual centre
of Buddhism where many translations were made of lexts brought
from Srlvijaya. This had begun through the labours of Chinese and
Annamite pilgrims.

China’s influence was strengthened by her succi^sful defence of the
country against the Malay attack of 767. But during the decadence of
the T’ang dynasty her hold began to weaken. She failed to prevent
Champa in 780 from, gaining control over Hu^» Quang-tri and Quang-
biah, the coastal strip from the Col dcs Nuages to Porte d'Annam.
In 862 Tongking was invaded by the T'ai from Nanchao, and in the
following year Hanoi tvas sacketL When in 907 the T'ang fell and
anarchy reigned in China the Ann am it es sebed the opportunity to
make another bid for independence. This time they were successful,
and in 9J9 tlieir leader Ngo Quyen founded the national dynasty of
the Xgo (939—68)*

French scholars distinguish fifteen dynasties during the whole
period of Annamite history* Four held power for brief periods before
939 during intcn'als in Chinese domination. Fhe first three afterjJ 39
had very short careerSp numbering in all only eight kings and covering
the period up to 1009^ With one exception, the later ones had longer
careers, each of which marks a distinct development in the country s
history. At first the independent kingdom comprised only Tongking
and the three northern Annamite provinces of 'Ihanh-hoa, Nghe-an
and Ha-tinh. South of these the kingdom of Champa held sway-

The Ngo dynasty was unable to control the local chieftains and
never secured recognition from China. The Dmh dynasty { 9 & 8 ^ 79 )
was even more ephemeral. The earlier I/O dynasty (979—1009) started
off with a flourish* Its first king, Lc Hoan, invaded Champa in 982,
killed its kingi sacked its capital Indrapura^ and retired home w'lth
vast booty. His successor, however^ was dEthroned in 1009 to make
way for the Lt dynasty^ which Listed for over two centuries. Between
968 and 1009 important developments in the sphere of religion took
place* I'ien-Hoang of the Dinh dynasty established the official
religious organization by incorporating Taoisls and Buddhists in an
administrative hierarchy* The second Le king imported classical
texts of Mahayana Buddhism from China and made an effort to induce
his people to accept Buddhism in place of the indigenous cults of
animism and ancestor-worship. In effect Biiddhiam became grafted
on to the indigenous cuItSp which continued to exist as strongly as
ever. The scholars, however, rEmained for the most part Taobt or
Confucian*

THE PRE-Et^HOPEAN PERIOD

FT* I

172

The Li dynasty (1009--1225) began the long fight to recover the
Annamite provinces from Champa, which in its cnltura! aspect repre¬
sented a struggle between Chinese and Indian influence. In the
eleventh century Annamite pressure forced the Chams to abandon
their northern provinces- After the saeJ; of Tndrapura by Le Hoan in
9S2 the Chams transferred their capital farther south to Vijaya
(Binh Dinh). But in 1044 Vijaya itself was sacked by the Annamites
and its king beheaded. It was taken a second time in 1069, Its king,
Rudravarman III, was chased into Cambodian territorj' and taken
prisoner. Then+ after a grand ceremonial banquet held by Li l^'hanh-
Ton in the captured city^ he and his family were deported to Annam^
In the following year he regained hia Uberty by the formal cession of
the three northern provinces to Annam.

The Chams rnade tremendous efforts to recover the lost provinces,
but in the twelfth century the attacks launched by the great Cam¬
bodian warrior Suryavarman II reduced them to- impotence^ so far as
their stniggle with Annam was concerned. The Cambodian wars,
wbjph ended in 1220, left the three northern provinces firmly in
Cambodian hands.

In 1225 the Li dynasty was supplanted by the Tran. Champa was
then beginning slowly to recover after her long contest with Cambodia*
But the lost provinces remained an eternal bone of contention, and in
the middle of the thirteenth century the duel showed signs of begin¬
ning again* This time, however^ it had hardly got going when a truce
was imposed on both side^ by the IVIongol threat. In t 2 S 7 ^ Mongol
army sacked Hanoi (Thanh-long)^ but w^as forced to retire before
growing Annamite resistance. Kubiai Khan^ who became emperor
in labOf sent envoys to all the states of the Indo-Chinese peninsula
demanding tokens of obedience- I'he danger caused Champa to
attempt a rapprochement with Annam, but nothing came of it.
Nevertheless when Marshal Sogatu was sent by Kubiai in 1281 to
impose Mongol rule on Champa, Annam found herself forced to fight
as the ally of the Chams, for in striving to overcome the extremely
effective Cham resistance Kubiai tried to send an army through
Annamite territory^ and the i\nnamices, realisiing that their own
independence was at slake, resisted- Tn tzBs a Mongol army fought
its w^ay to Hanoi through Lang-son and Bac-ninh. But again Ann^s-
mite resistance w^as too strong and it had to retire. Another Mongol
army under Kubiai's son Togan was defeated when attempting to
enter Tongking from the north, and Marshal 5 ^tu» in trying to
come 10 his aid, tvas defeated and killed by the Chsms. In 12B7

ANNAM and TONfiKtNG

173

CH« 9

Hanoi was occupied by the Mongols for the ihird time, but again the
Annamites forced them to ev'acuate the country, and Tran Nho'n^Ton
(1^78-93) re-entered his capital in triumph.

Together Champa and Annam had successfully repelled all the
Mongol attempts to subjugate them. To cement the friendship thus
achieved, the King of Champa was persuaded to ask for an Annamite
princess in marriage. When in 130b, after long negotiations, Fran
Anh-Ton consented to bestow his sister upon the Cham monarch, the
price demanded, and strangely enough accepted, was the ce^ion to
Annam of the provinces of Quang-lri and Thu’a-thicn (Hue), But
Jaya Sinhavarman died soon after the marriage, and the Chams at
once started to recover the two provinces. Then in 1312 Tran Anh-
Ton invaded Champa, crushed its resistance and took its king a
prisoner to 'Fongking. The conquered kingdom w^ thereupon
reduced to the rank of a feudatory state of Annam,

In 1326, after several rebellions and an appeal to China, Champa
regained her independence. But it was the leadership of Che Anan,
and not the injunction issued by Peking in 13^4 ordering the .An-Tia-
mites to respect Champa, that caused them to relinquish their prej.
In 1353 the Chams made an effort to regain the Hue region but failed.
Then the Cham hero Che Bong Nga (1360--90) began a series of attacks
which kept Annam in a constant state of terror during hiS reign. In
1371 he even sacked Hanoi, I n 1377 Tran Due-Ton staged a counter¬
attack and managed to penetrate as far as Vijaya, but he was ambushed
outside the city and perished with the whole of his force. Che Bong
Nga reoccupied all the territories previously taken from Champa by
her rival. As soon as he was dead, however, the Annamites recovered
all the territory they had lo&t to him as far as Tourane, and in 139^?
in order the better to direct their efforts to complete the conquest
of Champa, moved their capital southwards from Hanoi to Thanh-hoa.

Then came a sudden and unespeeted halt in their progress. In
1400 a general named Le-Qui-Li deposed the Tran monarch and
seized the throne. The partisans of the Tran dynasty thereupon
called in Chinese aid, and in 1407 the Ming emperor Vung-lo sen^n
army tol’ongking which occupied Hanoi and seized the usurper. The
Chinese had come to sUV, and had they not made the nustake of
attempting to denationalize the country by forcing them language and
customs upon the people they might have added Annam to their
empire as a vassal state. As it was, however, the discontented people
found a-leader in a Thanh-hoa chieftain named Le Lo’i, who m 1418
began guerrilla openitiona against the Chinese with marked success.

THE FRE-FUEOPEi^N PERIOD

FT, I

174

In 1427 ht penned them up In Hanoi^ The emperor sent an army to
relieve the city, but Lc LoH defeated it before it could make contact
with the beleaguered garrison, and in 14^8 the dry capitulated. Lc
Lo'i then proclaimed himself King of Annam and became the founder
of a second Le dynasty. He adroitly warded off the wrath of the Ming
emperor by sending an embassy with tokens of his submissiDn to
Chinese ovcrlordshjp. and Peking deemed it wise to let well alone and
accord him formal recognition.

The Chams had taken advantage of the troubles in Annam to
recover their lost provinces to the north of the Col dca Nuagea^ At
first the new Annamite dynasty nmintained peaceful relations with
its southern neighbourp but in 1441 a new series of Cham attacks
began. In 1446 the Annamites, taking advantage of dvil war In
Champa^ reoccupied V^ijayap but not for long^ for the Chams soon
recovered it. It was left to Le Thanh-Ton (1460-97), the greatest of the
Le rulers, to deal the death-blotv to the Cham kingdom in 1471. He
transformed Champa into a circle of his dominions.

The politieal independence ^vrested by Le Lo^i from the Ming
proved to be real and durable. But while throwing off Chinesfi
domination the Anna mites conserved the culture which in the course
of the centuries they had absorbed from China, Le Thanh-Ton divided
his empire into thirteen circles and gave it the strong administrative
system which it maintained long after hrs time. His successors*
however* were w'eaklings. Between 1497 and 1527 no leas than ten
kings came to the throne, four of them usurpers. Their ineptitude
encouraged the ambition of the great mandarin families. The Court
became a centre of intrigue, while central control over the feudal
magnates practically lapsed. In 1527 an ambitious mandBrin Mac
Dang-Dung, who had made and unmade kings since ijtg^ ordered the
reigning monarch Lc Hoang'-De Xuan to commit suicide and usurped
the throne. In 1529 he abdicated in favour of his son Mac Dang-
doanhp but retained control until hiii death in 1541*

In iS33t however, through the powerful Nguyen family, the Lc
dynasty w'as restored^ Nguyen Kim drove the Mac out of the Annamite
provinces of Nghe-an and I’hanh-hoa, but when he was poised far the
conquest of Tongking in 1545 he was assassinated^ and his sons were
too young to take up hi$ task. The Mac therefore remained in con¬
trol of Tongkitig, and China, appealed to by both sides, authorized
them to govern the parts they occupied as hereditary lordships under
her suzerainty. The Mac dynasty niled Tongking until 1592.' Annam
proper in the south was nominally under the Le dynasty, but as they

CH. 9

ANNAM AN £5 TONCKING

175

were row actual pewer was wielded by Nguyen Kim*s

successors as may ora of die palace. His immediate ^ceeasor was his
able son-in-law Tnnh Kiem, who died in 1570,

When Nguyen Kim's two sons grew up* bitter ri\'alry developed
between them and the Trinh. Tririh Kiem procured the murder of
the elder, but the younger, Nguyen Hoang, escaped death by feigning
madnesSj and Trinh Kiem sent him to govern the southern provini^
that had once been the Cham kingdom- He calctilated that in such a
dangerous area the young man would not long suniive. In this he was
mistaken, for Nguyen Hoang, throwing off the cloak of madness, w"on
the affection of the people of the south and before long was beginning
to build up hia military strength.

In 1570, when Trinh Kiem died, the Annamite domimonB were
divided l^tween three authorities. The Mac were masters of l^ongking,
with Hanoi as their capitals The Trinh, as mayors of the palace for the
Le sovereigns* ruled Thanh-hoa, Nghe-au and Ha-tinh, with Tay-do
os their capital. The Nguyen, abo acting on behalf of the Le, ruled
the southern provinces, with Quang-tri as their centre. In 1592 Triisli-
tong, 'Frinh Kicm*s successor, captured Hanoi and obtained control
over most of Tongking. The Mac fled to Cao-bang on the Chinese
frontier^ where they managed to hold out with the support of Peking
until 1677, As China refused for many years to recognize the authority
of the Le over Totigking, the Mac at Gao-bang, though without
effective power, were always a potential danger. Not until the Mings
were supplanted by the Manchus at Peking was Chinese recognition
withdrawn from them and transferred to the Le. Nevertheless from
1592 onw^ards the Trinh were the lords of the north, and in iS93thejr
moved their capitil, and the puppet Le sovereign, from Tay-do to
Hanoi.

From time to time Nguyen Hoang appeared at Court. He still
hoped that an opportunity would ariae for him to regain th^ position
held by hb father By the end of the century, however, it was obvious
that the power of the Trinh was too well established to he shaken.
In j 5 oO therefore, w^hen n revolt occurred in Ninh Binh, and Nguyen
Hoang went to quell it, he severed hb connection permanently wHth the
Court of Hanoi. Thenceforward the two rival families, each supreme
in its own sphere, began to prepare for the inevitable war, w hich broke
out in 1620.

CHAFTEH JO

MALACCA AND THE SPREAD OF ISLAM

Long before the days of the Prophet the Arabs had made settlcioents
along the trade route between the Red Sea and China, Islam gave
3 new impctua to their shipping. In the eighth ccnturv they were
sufficiently numerous in south China to sack Canton (75S). In the
ninth century there were small communities of Mahommedan mer¬
chants m several ports on the route to China, In the eleventh century
they are mentioned as having existed in Champa for some time. They
native women but kept themselves socially apart from the non-
Mahommedan communiltes, I'herc is no evidence of Arab settle-
myits of any importance in the Indonesian archipelago. Much of it,
including Java and the Spice Islands, lay well away from the trade
route VO China.

The reports of the early Arab geographers concerning South-East
Asia are vague and fantastic, and much of their information is second¬
hand. .■^n^ Arabic-inscribed gravestone of a young woman at Leran,
near Gresik, has been taken as the earliest evidence of the presence of
Musli^ in Java. The date may be 1082 or 1102, but there is a strong
suspicion that the stone was brought there at a later period. Even if the
date is genuine, the inscripb'on docs no morethan indicate the presence
of an Arab, or Persian, there in about i (oo. There is no evidence of
the spread of Islam to that area until long afterwards,

^ In 1292 the Polos, on their way home from China, visited Sumatra,
terlec , the first port they entered, has been identified as Perlak,
According to Marco s story, it was visited by so many Muslim traders
that they had converted the natives of the place to the Law of the
Prophet, From what he has to say further it is obvious that the
conversion of Sumatra had only Just begun. His is the earliest report
we have of Islamic proselytizing activities in South-East Asia.

From Perlak the Polos went on to Samudnt. where their ship was
delayed for five months by the monsoon. In its immediate vidnitv
have been found the oldest relics, in the form of tombstones, of the
Mahommedan sultanate of Samudra, Marco writes that at the time
of his visit it was not Mahommedan, Its conversion must have come

176

CHp lO MAUJiCrCA Ai\D tHE SE’READ OF ISLAM 1 77

eoon. afterwards, since the tombstonii of Sultan Malik sd Salch^ its
first Muslim ruler, is dated 1597. The stone came from Cambay io
Gujerat,

The spread of Islam lo Gujerat was one of the results of the con-
quesis of Mohammed of Ghor in north India and the Ganges valley
nearly a century' earlier^ In the latter half a struggle for dominance
over Gujerat was decided in favour of the Mahommedans, Cambay
fell into their hands in 1298, and although the majority of the Gujeratis
remained Hindu the Court and ruling class became MusUm- In the
thirteenth century' Cambay already had a long history behind it as an
emporium. Arab and Persian merchants had been settled there from
the ninth century. Its trading connection with Indonesia was also
of long standing. The conversion to Islam of many of its native
merchants added the s6mu1us of missionary ardour to their trade with
Indone^iap Hence it can have been no mere coincidence that the
evidence of the presence of l$lam In the northern ports of Sumatra
hears witness to a Cambay origin.

I bn Batiita, who was twice at Samudra on his way to and from China
in 1345-6, tells us that the sultan followed the rite of Shafi^i^ the form
of Islam which all Indonesian believers profess today. On his showing
also the coimtry around was still non-Muslim. On the opposite bank
of the river to the towm of Samudra a Mahommedan grave dated 1421
luis been found. This is thought to have been the site of Pas^^
mentioned in the Malay Aanali as Pasai^ which Diogo Lopes de
Sequeim viaiEed in 1509. It was apparently the fir$t important
djfusion-centre of the new faith in South-East Asia.

So far as the Peninsula is concerned, the earliest Islamic document
is a stone inscription at Trengganii with its date defaced. It h somc-
\vhere between 1303 and 1387. Blagden, whose authority commands
respect, favours the earlier date^ The stone may have been a boundary
mark between the territory of Islam and the 'territory of the war',
and shows hy its tvording that the new faith had not been accepted
by the local people. Against the early date suggested by Blagden
Stands the testimony of I bn Batuta that in 1343-6 the ruler of the
Malay Peninsula was an inddel. Does he refer to the King of Kedah i
The NogaTokertagama of 1365 claims the region as a dependency of
Majapahit- Actually there is little evidence suggesting the spread of
Islam to the Peninsula before the fifteenth century.

It was the rise of Malacca that gave the real impetus to the con¬
version of the Peninsula. There has been much divergence of view
regarding the date of the city^s foundationn Against the arguments

cir lo

MALACCA AK1> TJIE SFHEAl> OF

179

in favour of a date earlier than 1400 standi the fact that no mention
of such a place h made by Marco Polop who passed through the
Straits in 1292; the Blessed Odoric of PordenonCp who passed that
way in 1323; Ibn Batuta in 1345-6; and Prapancap who composed the
A'i^araA^rtagnma in 1365,

In i9i8p however^ Ferrand^ put forward an ingenious argument
in support of Caspar Conrea^s statement in Lendusda India^ that w^hen
the Portuguese arrived Malacca had already been m existence for
more than seven centuries. He i den tilted Malacca with Marco Polo's
" Mala^iir which he placed on the Peninsula, and with * Ma-h-yu-euP,
w^hich, according to the Chinese account^ was attacked by the T'ais of
Sukhot'ai in and before 1295. In 1921 G. P, Rouffacr attacked
Ferrand's thesis,* He argued that both names referred to Malayu—
i.e. Jambi in Sumatra—and on the available evidence built up the
story of the foundation of the city by Paramesvara that is generalLy
accepted today.

The founder* whose name means * prince-consort^, was the husband
of a Majapahit princc$$^ According to Sumatran tradition^ he was a
Sailendra prince of Palembang^ During the war of recession which
broke out in 14OT between Virabumi of East Java and King Vikra-
mavarddhana of Majapahit he took refuge in Tumasik (Singapore)*
then under a chief who owed allegiance to Siam. He killed his host
and took possession of the tow^ti- In 140Z he w^as driven out by the
Raja of Pahang or Patani. also a vassal of Siam* and according to one
account brother of the murdered chief. After ^mc wanderings he
settled at Makecap then an insigtiificant village of sea-rovers and
fishermen. A pbee of that name is mentioned in a Siamese source in
r. 1360. Tom6 Pires, who was in Malacca from 1512 to 1515* tells the
story with a trvealth of detail not elsewhere available in his valuable
Suma Oriental^ irvhich was discovered as recently as 1937,^ He placed
the arrival of' Paramjeura * there in about 1400. D^AlbiJiquerque*3 son^
who WTOte his Comm^ntanes in 1557, gives substantially the same
story* So also does de Barros in Di^cada 11 , but he dates the foundation
of the city 250 years before the arrival of the Portuguese.

Aided by the sea-rovem and reinforced by numbers of Malays*
who came over from Palcmbaag to join him, Paramesvara rapidly

"' Milnccfl, Ic ^fiilfl>'y cl r ‘ in JA, 1918.

* CofTipogeJ between 1512 und is^i.

Muldka ctilporiuni voor A.D. 1400 g^aiiunU MdifyCKr?' in BR 1 , ITie Haffuc,
, tJwl 77, part J.

^ EnRJiah truiiUtLan by Amundo wai publiabni by ihe KakLuyt

Society in 1944.

TH£ I'KE-EUROPKAN PHRJOIl

FT, 1

iSo

built up a large sctilcmeut* It began as a murki^t far irregular goods^ a
pirate centre. Then^ by forcing all vessels passing through the Straits
to put into its harbour for passes, it developed at the expense of
Samudra and Singapore. Both Siam and Majapahit daimed suster-
ainty over the Peninsubj but Siam alone could enforce it. Hence
when in 1403 Malacca was visited by a Chinese envoy^ the eunuch
Yin-lt"ing, Paramesvara seized the opportunity to apply for recognition
by the Ming emperor and support against Siam. In 1405 he sent an
embassy to China and promptly received recognition, Ming policy^
as we have seen^ aimed at restoring Chinese control over the states
of South-East Asia. Ambassadors were sent from port to port to
explain Chinese policy and were follotved by a war fleet to enforce it
where necessary. The mission which appeared at ^lalacca in 1403
was sent by the third Ming emperor Ch^eng-tsu (Yung 4 o). It was the
one which went to Java and found two kings there. It was followed
by a war fleet under Cheng Ho^ whose scries of voyages began in 1405.

Paramesvara majotained the closi!st poi^ible rdations with Chi nap
In 4405 Cheng Ho visited Malacca, and in 1411 the king returned the
compliment by going pcrsondly to Peking to pay his respects to the
emperor. In the following year he sent his nephew\ R, A. Kem
states that in 1414 his son Mohammed Iskander Shah went to China
to announce his father's death.^ This would appear to be a mistake,
which, as Sir Richard Winstedt points outi^ was due to the fact that
the Chinese failed to realize that Paramesvara had become a Muslim
and changed his name to Megat Iskandar Shah. His conversion seems
to have been the result of his marriage to a daughter of the Sultan
of Pas^^ who himself was a recent convert to Islam. According to
Ccedes, he paid a further visit to China in 1415 to ask for support
against Siam.

Malacca's expansion was particularly rapid. Its position was more
favourable than Palembang^s or Jambi's for controlling shipping
passing through the Straits^ It thus became the heir to the commercial
power once wielded by Srivijaya. It became an emporium^ whereas
the Sumatran ports were merely places for the export of pepper* It
thrtiftt itself into the trade route in spices {cloves, nutmeg and mace)
from the Moluccas to India. Previously the route had been from the
Moluccas to East Java and thence to India. Now ships leaving East

^ In Staitcl, van J^edffiandifh-Iisdi^f L p. jzj,

^ Mahiya^ pp. 41-3, C3tpi™« the viewf held by Kem. In The
a he quotn the oecoiiiit jpvcfi by Tom^ Pirm ef Panhmes^'drd'i

cany^nionyo lilam and i5DTi*equtnl chMnjie af nvne. S« Aino an thii paint Cerd^,
jLh hiftd^uifhy p. 410, fji, 2.

CH. lo MALACCA AND TME SPHEAP OF ISLAM iSi

Java had to put in at Malacca before proceeding onward:^ to India,
The riaing state, which at first had paid tribute to Siam to escape
destruction, goon ceased to consider itself a dependency of Ayut'ia,
especially after Cheng Ho in 1409 ha'i presented Paramesvara with a
silver seal, a cap, and official robes ‘and declared him king’.i Indeed,
Paramesvara so far forgot his humble beginnings as to demand the
submission of Palembang, and the Emperor Yung-lo had to intcri’ene
in order to maintain the status quo. This was one of the objects of
Cheng Ho’s tliird voyage in 1415.

Mcgat Islmndar Shah, who, according to Tome Pi res, embraced
Islam at the age of seventy-two, died in 1424. His son, who succeeded
him, significantly took the old Srivijaya title of Sri Maharaja. He went
at once to China for recognition, taking his son with him. In the
Chinese record of his visit he appears as Si-la Ma-ha-la. Fear of
trouble from Siam led him to send regular embassies to China
throughout his reign, which lasted until J444, Winstedt tells us that
in some recensions of the Malay Anmih he is credited with the
o^anization of the elaborate palace etiquette which still obtains, in
Perak,* He also received a visit from Cheng Ho.

His son Raja Ibrahim, who succeeded him, assumed the title of Sri
Paramesvara Deva Shah. Winstedt thinks that his assumption of this
hybrid Hindu-Muslim title may indicate a reaction against the new
faith. lie sent a mission to China in 1445, but in the following year
was dethroned and murdered as a result of « coup d’litat by Tamil
Muslims led by his elder brother Raja Kasim, whose mother was the
daughter of a rich Tamil or half-Tamil merchant from Pasc.

Raja Kasim assumed the title of Muzafiar Shah. The Portuguese
writers refer to him as Modafaixa or Malafar Sha. He reigned until
*459- His reign saw the emergence of a famous figure in Malaccan
history. Tun Perak, the brother of Tun Kudu, a wife of MtizalTar
Shah. In the Malay Annals he is celebrated a-s the victorious hero of
campaigns against the Siamese, Pahang and Pasc, Winstedt calls him
‘the brain of Malacca's imperialist policy in Malaya and Sumatra for
more than three reignsThe story goes that the king’s Tamil uncle,
who had been mainly instrumental in placing him on the throne,
received thereby so much power that the bendahara, the father of Tun
Perak and Tun Kudu, committed suicide. The Tamil Tun .\li then
became bendahara. This caused so bitter a feud between him and Tun
Perak that the king to end it offered Tun Ali any bride he might choose
as the price of his resignation. His price was the hand of Tun Kudu,

’ Winitcdi, HiUmry nf .tfcfejvi. p. 4t. ' tbitl., p. 44. » p, 4®,

THE PftE-EUROFEAN PERIOD

PT. 1

184

fitates^ BO Islam penetrated them^ The first Muslim ruler of Pahang^
who died in 1475, was a son of a Sultan of Malacca. His grave
received a gravestone imported from CambaY like that of the first
Sultan of Samudra. A Muslim prince is mentioned as ruler of Redda
in 1474. Palani tvas converted from Malacca during the latter half of
the fifteenth centur>^ Kelantan received Islam as a dependency of
Palani* Trenggann as a vassal state of Malacca,

Malacca also influenced the states of the coast of Sumatra lying
opposite to her. Thus RokaUp Kampari Indragiri and probably Siak
went over to Islam during the course of the fifteenth century* When
the Portuguese conquest of Malacca brought her proselytizing
activities to a sudden stop^ north Sumatra became once more an
important centre of Muslim influence* In 1526^ for instance^ a Muslim
missionary from north Sumatra went to Java^ married the sister of the
ruler of Demak and Japara^ and then settled in Bantam ^ where he soon
had a large following. With the help of his brother-in-law he got
possession of the city. In 156S his son Hassan Udin founded the
independent sultanate of Bantam that was to play $0 important a
part in Javanese affaiis until conquered by the Dutch in 1684.

Krom is of opinion that Majapahit fell between 1513 and 1558
before a coalition of Muslim states composed of Madura, Tuban,
Surabaya and Bintani (Demak). Demak and Japara were central
Javanese ports which took the spice trade of the Moluccas from the
harbours of East Java to Malacca* together with rice and other food¬
stuffs collected from their own hintcrLand, *rhey became di ffusion-
centres of Islam^ and the fall of Majapahit left Demak for a time the
chief state in Java. Balambangan, in the farthest east of the island^
long resisted the penetration of Islam and was still Hindu when the
Dutch arrived in 159s ^ II had close relations with the island of Bali,
which remamed Hindu throughout. Balambangan* hosvever, was
converted to Islam in the latter half of the eighteenth century,
though some vijbgcs in the Tengger range are, like Bali, still Hindu
today*

The Moluccas became Muslim in 1498 through their trade with
Java. In Sumatra the Bataks were never converted to Islam. Macassar
on Celebes did not become Muslim until 1603, but the Dyaks and the
various mountain tribes of the island never accepted the new faith,
l^he coastal towns of Borneo seem to have been converted mainly
by Javanese merchants* before the coming of the Portuguese, though
de Brito, the first Governor of Malacca* reported home in 1514 that
the King of Brunei was a "heathen".

CK. ID

MALACCA A^’I> TKE SPREMV OF t^LAM

1S5

So far as the mainland "was concerned^ it may be briefly stated
that the Buddhist regions—Gurma^ Siam, Cambodia^ and the kingdom
of Laos—never accepted IsJam^ Arakan remained predominantly
Buddhistp but vrith a fairly strong admixture of Muslims as a result
of intermarriage vrith Indians. Most of the Chams are today Aluslim3+
Their legends assert that they were converted early in the eleventh
century^ There is no contemporary evidence of this, and Maspero
thinks they did not practise Islam before their final conquest by
Annam in 1470. How the religion came to them is unknown, Annam
and Tongking, where Chinese culture W3s supreme, remained firmly
attached to Confudanism, Taoism and Mahayana Buddhism, though
with a strong admixture of local animUm and ancestor-worship. For
the great majority of ordinary people everyw^here both Buddhism and
Islam remained for long a veneect beneath which the ancient beliefs
and cults continued to exercise undiminished sway.

CHAFTEH 1 1

THE COM[NG OF THE EUROPEAN

Mediaeval EurcipE had no recorded contacts with South-^East Asia
until late in the thirteenth century, when the Polos, rettiming from
the Court of Kublai Khan by the sea route, passed down the coast of
Champa, rounded the southern extremity of the Malay Peninsula*
and were held up for five months by monsoon conditions in north¬
ern Sumatra before passing on their way across the Indian Ocean.
I'hey had crossed Asia by the overland caravan route to China,
where in 1275 they had been received by Kublai in the "Upper
Court’ at Shangtu. During their seventeen years' sojourn in China
Mtrco was employed as an intelligence officer by the Imperial Court
and was sent on distant journeys. On one of these* a four-months
journey from Peking to the west, he went via the land of the " gold-
teeth' people, with its capital at Yting-ch^ang, betiveen the Mekong
and the Salween* by an Idnerary' w'hich it Js impossible to trace, to a
town in northern Burma, which he calls *Mien\ What impressed
him most wxre tw'o stone towers fifty feet in height* one covered with
gold and the other with silver^ and both hung round with bells w^hich
tinkled in the wind. If his claim to have actually entered Burma is
tnie, and much doubt has been thrown upon it* he may have reached
Tagaung. He refers to ' Mien' as the capital of Burma* but it is not
recognizably Pagan* nor could he have travelled so far within the time
at his disposal.

Of greater Interest is hia account of the Great Khan's war with the
King of' Mien and BangaiaHis description of the battle of Ngasau-
nggyan, fought in the Narnti valley in 1277* wherdn the Tartar
archers won a victory fay causing panic among the Burmese elephants*
must have been derived from eye-witnesses. But he erroneously
attributes the leadership of the Mongol forces to Nasr ed-Din* who
was the commander of the later expedition which captured Kaungsin,
the Burmese stronghold commanding the defile of Bhamo.

He gives a brief glimpse into one of the semi-independent Laos
states on the Yunnan border. The king has 300 wives j there is
abundance of gold and elephants and many kinds of spices; wine made

1S6

CM. II

THi: COMING OF THE EUHOPEAN

187

from ric* h drunk, and both men and women tattoo their bodies aJl
over with figures of beasts and birds in black colouring stuff. How'
much of this was mere hearsay it is impossible to determine. His
information certainly contains much that is inaccuratCp as is shown by
his reference lo ^Bangala'' as a part of the dominions of the King of
Burma. The ward can only refer to Bengal; apparently Polo confused
the deltas of the Ganges and the Irrawaddy. It 1$ significant that Fra
Mauro's map, based upon the information in hia book^ makes a similar
error

Marco's account of his homeward voyage^ which began early in
1^9^^ contains interesting material on South-East Asia. KubJai's
great-nephcAv Arghun, Tartar lord of Persia* had requested a Mongol
princess of China in marriage. The Great Khan selected the Lady
Kukachin for this purpose and committed her to the special care of
the Polos* who had begged him to allow’^ them to return to their native
land. Marco's description of the Chinese junk in which they made
the voyage talli^ c^ctly with those of such fourteenth^entury travel¬
ogues as the Blessed Odorit, Ibn Batuta and Fra Jordanus. He says
that *Chamfaa'—Le. Champa—is a very rich region ruled by a king
w^ho pays an annual tribute of elephants to the Great Khan. He w rites
in extravagant terms of the Mongol S-ictory" over Champa in 12S1*
but is Silent on the subject of the final disaster W'hich befell Marshal
Sogatu's army there four years later.

Java he calls the * Great Island of Java' as distinct from ^Java the
Less*, his name for Sumatra. Ja%^, he tells us, was reputed among
marincj^ to be the largc$t island in the world and was more than 5,000
miles in circumference A His extravagant notion of its size reflects an
idea that was current among Arab seamen, whose knowledge was
confined to the few ports on its north coast which they frequented.
The island, he says, produces black pepper, nutmegs* spikenard, galin-
galcp cubebs, cloven and all other kinds of spieea. In point of fact*
though the island w'as a great mart for spices, it produced none. Flc
docs not seem to have visited it but to have relied entirely on seamen's
gossip for his account of ir. l|i& statement that Java had never fallen
into the Great Khan's possession is intriguing in view of the great
armada which Kublai despatched against Kertanagara of Singosari
not so %ery long after Marco's departure from China.

Among other islands, some of which are very difficult to identify*
he mentions Pulo Condore, lying opposite to the Mekong deltap the
strategic possibilities of which were to be much debated by .the Engile h

* give* nuiea.

THE PRE-EUROFE^X PERIOD

FT. 1

l8S

and the French in the $eventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and Bin-
tang at the ea&t end of the Straits of Malacca, where the Sultan of
Malacca settled after Albuquerque captured his city in 1511. The
identity of ‘Malaiur', vvhich he describes as a fine and noble city with
its own king, great trades and abundance of spices* has been the
subject of 3 certain amount of debate, as we have seen in the previous
chapter. It must obviously be Jambi, and it is perhaps of some signifi*
eance that he makes no mention, of a Javanese conqu^t. Equally
significant is the fact that he makes no mention of Malacca.

In striking contrast to his inaccurate account of Java is his better-
informed description of Sumatra. His estimate of its compass at z*Doa
miles i$ not far from the truth. His reference to the recent conver¬
sion to Islam of 'Ferlec' by Saracen merchanta is a piece of
valuable historical evidence. He personally visited six Sumatran
"kingdorns"; and although he credited the island with only eight
states, there is much that rings true in tils account, e^en if he was
credulous enough to record the story that one of them was peopled
bYi.men with tails about a palm in length and of the thickness of a
doge's* though without a hair on them.

In the year before the Polos began their homeward journey from
China a Franciscan friarp John of Monte ConrinOj set out for Peking
in the hope of converting Kublai Khan to Christianity. He and his
Utile company reached India via OrmuK and the Persian Gulf. Then,
after a stay of over a year on the Coromandel Coast, they proceeded
onwards by the sea route through the Archipelago* reaching their
destination before Kublal'fl death in 1294. This was the beginning of
half a century of Latin missions to the Mongol Court. And as several
of the missionaries either went or returned by ihe sea route, South-
East Asia received further attention in books of travel.

The best, and indeed the only one worthy of serious consideration,
was by the Franciscan Odoiic of Pordenone, who left Europe in 1316
and reiurncd early in 1330. His route, after leaving the Coromandel
Coast, was via Sumatra+ Java* Borneo and Champa to Canton. His
D^sirriptiim of the East^ written after his arrivaJ home, is characterized
by Sir Raymond Beasley as "the fullest, most graphic, and the most
amusing picture of Asia left by any religious traveller of this agc*.^
Notwithstanding a good many inaccuracies, it does to some extent
supplement Marco Polo^s picture of South-East Asia. His knowledge
of Sumatra compares unfavourably with Polo's. He mendons only
three kingdLotns* and he does not give the island a name. But his

* Darvn qf Modfrn G^vgraphy^ tii , P- □ 5J,

CH. II

THE COMING OF THE EUROPEAN

1S9

“ Lamori", at the extreme north-wissr* is undoubcedly Polo^s *Liinibri\
and his ^Sumokh^l^ where people branded their faces with hot iron^
corresponds to the Venetian's 'Samara', the place from which the
island was ultimately to take its name. He was horrified by the customs
of the island, such as communal marriage and cannibalism. Children,
he credulously asserts, were brought in by foreign merchants and sold
for slaughter as food.

His account of Java Is fuller than Foln'Sp though he repeats some of
the latter's inaccuracies. While Polo has nothing to say about the
government of the island, Odoric speaks of a great king who rules over
seven under-king$ and lives in a magnificent palace. The Great Khan
of Cathay, he writes, has often taken the field against this King of Java,
but never with success. When due allowance is made for the exag¬
geration, the statement is not entirely wide of the mark. The Great
Khan, of course, did not command in person the sole expedition he
sent against Kertanagara.

He mentions "Patem' or "Taiamasim', presumably a region in
Borneo, as tying near to Java^ and bordered on the south by a dead
sea whose waters run only in a southwards direction, so that if a man
drifts into them he is never seen again. Here he meets the sago palm
and watches the process of sago-preparaltonp though not with com¬
plete understanding.

His account of Champa^ has striking similarities with Polo's, but
he docs not mention the Mongol invasions^ The king, he says^ h
polygamous and has 200 children. He has also 14,000 tame elephants.
Vast shoals of fish come ashore in Champa at certain times of the year
and allow' themselves to be caught, ^doing homage to the emperor',
according to the local saying. He mentions the prevalence of sutt'C^
and professes having seen a huge tortoise larger than the dome of Sn
Anthony of Padua.

His chapter on ‘Nicuveran*—i,e, the Nicobar Islands—is full of
legendary^ nonsense, and disconcertingly so, for he implies that he had
Visited "it". He describes ' Nicuveran* as a great Island 2,000 miles in
circuit, remarkable for naked, dog-headed, ox-worshipping cannibals.

Tw'o other friars of this period wrote of South-East Asia, Jordanus
and John Marignolli. Jordanus, ^vhose work is entitled 7 "^^ K oni/err
of the Eastj went to India in 1330, but no farther eastwards. He des¬
cribes the spice trade, *Java' (=Sumatta) and Champa^ and repeats

^eszlcy is vexan^ m giving Cochie China aa ihc cquivKkht oFFglo^l
and Odoric^* Champa. It was the old kingdom oi Champa with iti unLTvjiiit south nf
iTwxIera to which they referred.

THE FERIOP

FT. r

190

had become the traditional yama of Arab seamen, "There is
also', he writes, 'another exceeding great island, which is called Jaua,
which is in cirersit more than seven [thousand ?J miles as 1 have heard,
and wherein are many world's wonders. Among which, besides the
finest aromatic spices, this is One, to wit, that there be found pygmy
men^ of the size of a boy of three or four years old, all shaggy like a he
goat. They dwell in the woods and few are found," In ‘Java*, he also
tells us, ^they delight to eat white and fat men when they can get
them’. Franciscan friars, presumably.

John Marignolli of Florenctp who arrived in China by the overland
route in 134^ and left for home in December 134&, travelled home¬
wards through South-East Asia. He describes *Saba’ (Jas'a or Suma¬
tra) as a remote and matchless isle, where women have the mastery
in all things and the queens are descended from Semiramis, 'Fhe
queen, he says, honoured him with banquets and pre&cnts, and he rode
on an elephant from the royal stables. Was he by any chance referring
to the Minangkabau districts of Sumaini? On the island's sacred
mountain, he w'as told, the Magi first saw the star which led them to
Bethlehem. His account of his travels is, strangely enough, introduced
into his Latin Ann^h of which he compiled as domeslic

chaplain to the Holy Roman Emperor Charles IV. It contains
graphic descriptions of personal experiences mingled with fantastic
hearsay.

Whence came all these fantastic tales? *One must notice", writes
Sir Henry Yule of Jordanus,^ *the frequent extraordinary coincidences
of statement, and almost of expression^ between this and other
travellers of the same age, especially hlarco Polo. At first one would
think that Jordanua had Polo^s book. But he certainly had not I bn
Batuta'Sp and the coincidences w'ilh him arc sometimes almost as
striking^ Had these ancient worthies, then, a Murray from whom they
pilfered experiences, as modem travellers do? I think they had; but
their Murray lay in the traditional yams of the .Arab sailors with whom
they voyaged, some of which seem to have been handed down steadily
from the titne of Ptolemy—^peradventure of Herodotus^—^almost to out
own day/

Soon after the middle of the fourteenth century the Mongol djmasty
made way for the Mings, and Western intercourse with China ceased.
The next European to travel in South-East Asia was not a miBsionary
but a trading prospector, a Venetian of noble family, Ntcolo de' Conti,
w ho spent twenty^five years wandering about the East and returned

* t^dlAoy ami tH< ircrj Tellur, Preface, p.

CH. II

THE COMING OE THE EUROPEAN

19T

home in 1444. As a young man he was a merchani in Damascus. Then
he passed through Persia, sailed along the Malabar Coast^ visited
parts of the interior of India, went on to Ceylon and thence to South-
East Asia. There he visited Sumatra, Java, Tenasserim, Arakan and
Burma. He b thought to have gone also as far as southern China. He
retumed home via the Red Sea and Cairo, On anivai he confessed
that to save his life he had been forced to renounce the Chrisiian
religion and become a Muslim. Pope Eugeni us IV granted him
absolution on condition that he related his adventures to the papal
secrelary* Poggio Bracciolini, who wrole the account of them that we
now possess^

Conti calls Sumatra ^Taprobana', a name applied by Europeans in
early days to Ceylon. This curious error appears in both the Catalan
Map of 1375 and Fra Mauro's of 1458- He says, however, that among
the native it is known as "Sciamuthera". Although he remained there
a year^ be has linle of real interest to say about it. Its chief products
were pepper* ramphor and gold, but the people were cruel, and in
parts of the inland there was cannibalism and head-hunting. *

He mentions also an island named ' AndamanJa\ ^which means the
island of gold*. It is Soo miles in circumference, he says, but the
inhabitants are cannibals and travellers avoid it, Tenasserim abounds
in elephants and a species of thrush. Presumably he refers to the mina
bird* F rom Tenmserim he went to Bengal, where he stayed for some
months. Then he took ship down to Arakan and travelled overland
to Ava* the capital of the Upper Burma kingdom^ guing by the route
across the Yomas to the Irraw^addy, which be thought larger than the
Ganges. .■\va was then in its heyday and the chief centre of Burmese
culture. He estimated its circumference at fifteen miles and con¬
sidered it a noble city. He describes the Burmese method of catching
elephants and their use of them in battle. The king, he tells us, rides
upon a white elephant. He is nearer the truth when describing the
universal practice of tattooing, the Trightful serpents without feet, as
thick as a man, and six cubits in length*, and the universal belief that
rhinoceros horn was an antidote against poison.

He travelled down the Irrawaddy and made his way through the
creeks to very populous city called Panconia 7 —i,e. Pegu* the capital
of the Mon kingdom. But although he stayed there four months he
teUft US little about it. Equally disappointing is his account of Java.
He describes the process of running amuck and says that the chief
amusement is cock-fighting. The inhabitants he considers inhuinan,
since they ate dogs» cats* mice and unclean animals.

192 rm fue-elteopL^n period pTp t

In 1496 another Italian, a Genoese merchant* Hieronomti dc Santo
Stefano, crossed from the Coromandel Coast to Burma and reached
PegTjj which he cal la by ita correct name. He was a trading prospector
malving his way round the E^t from one commercial centre to another^
doing tvhat trade he could at each. He was unable to go to Ava because
there was war between the two states. He bad, thcretbre^ to sell hi$^
valuable stock to the King of Pegu^ who kept him waiting eight ten
months for payment. While there hia companion^ Messer Hieronomo
Adorno^ died. He buried him in w^hat he took to be a ruined church,

* frequented by none*.

On leaving Pegu he set sail for ^lalacca, but was driven by stress
of weather to Sumatra, "where growls pepper in considerable quanti¬
ties, silk, long pepper, benzoin^ w hite sandal wood^ and mant^ other
articles". There he was plundered of his rubies and much else by the
Mahommedan ruler of a port w hich he does not name. He decided«
therefore, that it was "not a desirable place to stay in' and took ship
for Cambay on the west coast of India.

Santo Stefano was followed shortly afterwards by a Bolognese
traveller, Ludovico di Varthema, who left Europe tow^ards the end of
150Z and travelled through Egypt* Syria^ Arabia, Persia* India to
South-East Asia, returning to Lisbon after an absence of some five
years. Very little is know^n of him. He had the instinct of the geo¬
grapher, an insatiable desire to visit foreign countries and learn about
them. He was the first European on record to visit the holy places of
Islam. He did so by becoming a Muslim and attaching hiin$eLf to a
company of Mamelukes at Damascus.

His account of Tenasserim is, with the exception of Conti's few"
remarks, the first authentic account w^ritten by a European. I'he city
of *Tcmassari?p he teUs u&„ was situated at the mouth of a river of the
same name. Lat^e ttvo-ma.sted junks (gititithi) were built there for
trade with Malacca. Its importance^ it is to be noted, lay in the fact
chat much of the Malay Peninsula under Siam, and it served one
of the best short cuts between the I ndian Ocean and the Gulf of Siam,

V^arthema dcacribes Pegu as a great city^ west of a beautiful river,
containing Vgood houses and palaces built of stone with lime\ and
enclosed with a wall. When he arrived there the king was absent on
an expedition against the King of Ava. On his return he granted the
visitor an audience. Varthema was much impressed by the vast
number of rubies worn by the king^ as also by hia afiability. * He is so
humane and domestic\ he tvrites, "that an infant might speak to him.*
He sold the king some coral in return for rubies.

CIL M

THE COM INC OF THE EUROVEA:^

Varthera:! was the first to make Europe acquainted with Malacca.
He mentions the great commerce carried on at the port* and especi¬
ally its spice trade. More ships arrived there, he tells than at any
other place in the world. The majority of the inhabitauta of the city
were ^Giav^i*—i,e. Javanese^ There were also the 'men of the sea^
who did not care to reside on land^ and set the local authorities at
defiance. These w^erc the" Ontng-Jaut * of the Malays, the ^ Cellates ^ or
*nien of the straits% of Tome Pires and de Barros, the *sea-gipsies* of
Crawford, w^bosc headquarters were the narrow- straits of the Johore
Archipelago, They lived by the produce of the sea or by robbery*
The natives of Malacca^ he says, were a bad race* the w^orst ever
created, and foreigners slept on board their ships to avoid assassina¬
tion. The most marketable commodities to be obtained were spices
and silks.

In Sumatra Varthema visited the flourishing port of Pedir, near
Acheh* Every year, he telb us* eighteen to twenty ships were laden
with pepper for China, it also produced an immense quantity of silk
and much benzoin. So extensive w as its trade, and so great the nur^ber
of merchants resorting there, that one of its streets contained about
500 money-changers. Stamped money of gold* silver and tin was in
use there, with a devil stamped on one side and something resembling
a chariot drawn by elephants on the other. He w^as much impressed
by the strict administration of justice there. Three-masted junks with
two rudders were built there. He also makes the interesting statement
that the natives excelled in the art of making fireworks. This is corro¬
borated by Crawfurd/ w’ho meat ions that the more advanced Malay
peoples already used fireanns w hen the Portuguese first arrived in the
Archipelago.

He visited the island of Banda, wrhere nutmegs and mace grew\
but the people were without understanding! the MoluccaSp where the
people were worse than those of Banda; Borneo; and the * beautiful
island of Giava\ which was divided up into many kingdoms all subject
to a pagan king, who resided inland. But he heard &□ many hair-
raising stories of the cannibalism there that be left as semn as possible
for fear of being carried off and eaten. Crawfurd dubs his description
of the island false and w orthless.* From Java he returned to Malacca^
and after a stay of only three days took ship for the "City of Cioro-
mander.®

^ O^eripti^ Dicffonary of ihc Indian liitmdt, p,

* pp. 163 ^.

^ Badg<er in kiA editinn of Tit* TrartU tff Lwhiw Dt (HeiIc. Soc., iSfijJ

XeaapBiCEm.

THE PHE-EUKOPEAN PERIOD

PT. 1

194

Varthema's work was first published in 1510 in Rome. His des¬
cription of men^ countries and scenes which he had himself seen at
once attracted attentionp and translations of it were issued in Latin,
German, Spanish, French, Dutch and English. After him we pass
from the age of mediaeval wanderers to that of the Portuguese
filihustersp

PART II

SOUTH-EAST ASLA DURING THE EARLIER PHASE
OF EUROPEAN EXPANSION

CHAPTER 12

THE PORTUGUESE IK SOUTH-EAST ASIA

At the end of the Middle Age$ the Portuguese were well fitted for the
leadership of a European effort to exploit the trade of the Indian
Ocean. 'Pheir position on the Atlantic made them a race of mariners
able to cope with the risks of the sea. In their long crusade against
the Moors they had built up a formidable naval power. They em¬
ployed skilled Genoese seamen. They were ahead of other powers in
the constfuction of 'great ships* able to accommodate large numbers
of men for long ocean voyages. Their chief ports^ Lisbon and Oporto,
had trading connections with both the Mediterranean and northern
Europe. %Vhen, under the leadership of Vasco da Gama, they tn^de
their first appearance in the Indian Ocean they had behind them the
experience of a long series of explorations and the urge of a fervent
nationalism, which impelled them to destroy Islam.

In the eastern seas they excelled the Moors in both fighting and
navigating their ships, and the ships themselves were in every' way
superior to those of the Arabs* which w'cre built for sailing only under
favourable monsoon conditions. Lest the crusading motive be over-
stres^d, let it be stated that Long before they first rounded the Cape
of Bona Esperanza the economic motive had begun to compete w'ith
the religipus^ and as the ideas of commerce and colonization gained
ground, so the mediaeval crusading Ideal weakened. In the light of
the experience gained at CaUcut, the chief emporium of Arab trade on
the Malabar Coast, the enormous profits of the spice trade and the
desire to wTest the trade monopoly from the Moors became over¬
riding considerations. Happily it possible to serve God and
Mammon at the same time, for by striking at Arab trade in the Indian
Ocean Portugal aimed a bbtv at the Ottoman empire, which drew the
major part of its revenues from the spice monopoly.

Against the strong opposition of the Arabs and other Muslim
traders the Portuguese rapidly expanded their potver and influence^
Cochin, their first settlement and a centre of the pepper trade, became
the headquarters of thdr first viceroy, Francisco de Almeida, whose
policy iivas to gain the mastery over the trade of the Malabar Coast,

1^7

THE EAULtER PHASE OF EUROPEAN EXPANSION PT. II

whik at the same time resisting the pressure to extend Portuguese
influence into the Red Sea or the Straits of Malacca, since in his Aiew
such a course was calculated to weaken their position. lli$ successor,
Don AlTonse de Albuquerque^ however^ decided that such limited aims
would fail to achLe%'e the desired result. To gain commercial sup¬
remacy over the Indian Ocean it was necessar>^ to seize and contraJ
the main strategic points and drive a trade which should provide a
revenue adequate for the maintenance of irresistible power.

The capture of Goa in 1510 gave him a centre from which to develop
control over the Indian trade, but IVluslim vessels could still collect
the produce of Bengal^ Burma, Sumatra, the Spice Isbnds, Siam and
China at the great emporium of Malacca. He proposed to stop this^
trade by holding the mouth qf the Red Sea and at the same time
striking at its very headquarteis. Moreover^ since Malacca under a
Muslim ruler was the chief dilfusion-centrc of Islam in Indonesia, by
capturing it he would be orrying out the obligation laid on the Portu¬
guese by the bull of Alexander VI, Thus the conquest of Malacca in
15H was one of the most important features of an over-all strategic
plan, and not an act of revenge for the treachery of the sultan in his
dealings with DJogo Lopez de Sequeira when he attempted to establish
a factory there in 1509. The Malay Annah state that Sequeira abused
the sultan’s hospitality by beginning to build a fort from which to
menace the city. There can be no doubt that he sent there with
the deliberate intention of manufacturing a caner belli.

From Malacca Albuquerque sent ambassadors to Biam and Bunrn.
Duarte Fernandez, who went to Siam, was the first European to visit
Ayut'ia. From Malacca Albuquerque also sent an expedition to the
Moluccas. Its leader, Antonio d'AbreUp had strict instructions to
refrain from filibustering, to do every^thing possible to establish
friendly relations with the islands, and to observe the customs of the
people. Temate, Tidore and Halmahera and a number of small
islands were the original home of the dove tree. Nutmeg and mace
were the principal products of Ambqina and the Banda Islands.
Malacca, the chief distribution centre for these spices^ received its
supplies from Javanese traders, who collected them from the islands
themselves. Supplies were so abundant and cheap that if the Portu¬
guese were to keep the prices high in Europe it was essential for them
to establish a monopoly and restrict export. This entailed driving out
the Javanese traders and policing the eea-roules between Indonesia and
Arabia. The chief difficulty lay in the fact that shortly before the arrival
of the Portuguese the Spice Islands had been converted to Islam.

CH. IZ THE roMTt CUESE IN SOITH-K^T ASIA igg

A more pressing danger at firstp however^ by in the stale of oifain^
at Malacca ilselt I'hcre the Portuguese were on the defensive. The
neighbouring country was unsubdued, the Muslim sultans of Indo¬
nesia were hostile^ and Sultan ^fIahmtJd of Malacca, who escaped w'hen
his city fell, made the island of Bintang in the Straits of Singapore his
headquarters and used his powTrFul fleet in an attempt to cut off
Malacca from all trade with the Archipelago. In 1517 he took the
offensive, stockaded himself on the Muar river close to the citj. and
was not driven out until 1520, In the following year, assisted by the
forces of Acheh, whose sultan was expanding his power over northern
Sumatra, he returned. But the Portuguese stormed his fortified posi¬
tion after twelve days of hcav)' fighting. In 1 526 a Portuguese counter¬
attack upon his capital on Binlang was successful. But his son and
succe^or established himself on the southern tip of the mainland at
Johore and continued the struggle by harassing Portuguese shipping.
And Muslim merchants, In order to avoid Malacca^ transferred thdr
headquarters to Brunei on the southern coast of Borneo^ which became
a new centre for the spread of Islam. »

After 1526, however, Acheh became the leader of the opposition to
the Portuguese. ITie increased demand for pepper brought its sultan
a corresponding increase in pow'cr, and between 1529 and 15S7 the
Achinesc made attempt after attempt to capture Malacca. The biggest
of these occurred in 1558^ w^hen an arQ;:Lada of 300 w'ar-boats, with
15^000 troops and ^00 artillerymen from Turkey, besieged the city for
a month. The years 1570 to 1573 were a critical period, when, in
addition to three major .ichinese attacks, the city had to meet a dan¬
gerous attack launched in 1574 by the Javanese state of Japara. It was
saved only by the timely arrival of reinforcements from Goa. In 1587
a period of easier relations began^ when a new^ Sultan of Acheh, Ala'ud^
din Riayat, in difficulties vvith the rebellious chiefs of his dependent
states^ wa$ gbd to make peace with the Portuguese. Notwithstanding
all the threaU and dangers of the years before 1SS7, Portuguese
Malacca prospered exceedingly; its trade coniinvied to expand and
showed vast profits,

Abreu’a expeditiont which left Malacca for the Spice Islands in
December 1511* met with little success. He lost two of his three ships;
and although he procured a cargo of cloves and nutmeg from the
Bandanese, he was unable to make Tern ate and Tidore, the chief clove
islands. A second expedition in 1513 was more successful. The
Sultans of Temate and Tidorc provided a large cargo of cloves, and
each granted permission for a factory to be established on his island.

mRTUCJL'ISSJ! mLAOCX

CM. 12 THE PORTUGUESE tS SOttTH-EAST ASIA ^01

These two chiefs were the head$ of opposing island confederacies^ and
both played for Portuguese support- The situation was complicated
in 1521 by the arrivaJ of Magellan's ship the ITcfo™ on her homew^ird
voyage. This Spanish intrusion into their preserve led the Portuguese
to seek to strengthen their position by concluding a treaty with Ter-
nate giving them the monopoly of its clove tradep
At the same time Portugal protested to Spain that the appearance
of a Spanish ship tn the Spice Islands constituted an infringement of
the Treaty of Tordesillas, concluded between the two states in 1494,
The papal bull of 1493 had separated their respective spheres of
interest by a line drawn from the North to the South Pole 100 miles
to the and south of ihe Azores and the Cape Verde Islands. The
treaty had improved on this by laying down the dividing line 370
mites west of the Cape Verde Islands. Nothing, howeverii had been
done towards demarcating the respective spheres of the two powers
on the far side of the newly discovered continent.

In consequence of the Portuguese protest a conference of experts
met in 1524, but failed to agree on the exact location of the Moluccas,
since the computations of each side differed by no less than forty-sLx
degrees. Spain thereupon sent a fleet of seven ship^ by way of the
Straits of Magellan to assert her claim to the islands. Only one ship
reached them- It was welcomed by Tidore, and a struggle then began
between the Portuguese allied with Temate and the Spanish allied with
Tidorc. Fortune favoured the Portuguese, for the Spanish were de¬
pendent for help upon Cortez in Mexico, and w^hen it failed to arrive
in time were forced to come to terms with their opponents. In Europe
also the Portuguese managed to t^rry their point. In 1530 by a new
treaty the Spanish agreed to hall their explorations seventeen degree
east of the Moluccas. This, however* did not prevent them, later in the
ceniuryp from sailing to the Philippines and founding Manila in 1570-
The Portuguese voyages to the Spice Islands brought the question
uf Java to the fore. The normal route from Malacca folJotved the
southern coast of Borneo, crossed the Java Sea to Gresik near Sura¬
baya, and proceeded thence via the south of Celebes to the Moluccas.
The hostility of the Java Muslims made this way unsafe. Hence an
attempt made to establish connections with the Hindu states, and
in 1522 a ship was sent to Sunda Kalapa^ later to become the Dutch
port of Batavian The Hindu raja granted facilities for building a fort,
bur when the Portugutji^ returned in 1527 they found that the towm
had been conquered by the Muslim state of Bantam and renamed
Jacatra.

302

THE EARLIEH PHASE OF EUHQFEJVN EXPANSION

PT. t]

The rapid spread of Islam constituted a serious setback to their
plans. The Bandanese and Amboinese maintained dose connections
with the Muslim sultans of Java* The Portuguese failed to obtain
permission to build forts on the Banda Islands or to monopolize the
nutmeg trade* Amboina was less difficult, and for their supply of
nutmeg they had to rely upon cultivating friendly relations with its
chiefs. By 1535 the whole of the north coast of Java had become
Muslim; only in the e’ftnemc east of the island did Hinduism^ hold
out. Under the circumstances, thirrefore, it was decided to make a
great effort to convert the non-Muslim peoples so as to prevent the
further spread of Islam. WTiere Islam had already penetrated
Catholic missions had no hope of success.

Missionary enterprise was first directed to those parts of East Java
which had not yet embraced the faith of the Prophet* But it came just
too late, for except in the extreme east, in which they had no interest,
Hindu rule w'as already tottering before Muslim penetration. Parts of
Ambnina had not yet accepted Islam, and the Catholic missionaries
^uied a foothold there, as also in the northern part of Halmahera
The Portuguese ally, the Sultan of Temate, was. however, the enemy
of Christianity, and for commercial reasons they dared not support
the missionaries against him.

Moreover, in the Moluccas they had gained a bad reputation for
rapacity* Only one Portuguese governor, Antonio GaIvSo (1536-40),
behaved in such a way as to gain the respect and regard of the native
peoples. The saintly Jesuit St* Francis Xavier, who arrived in .Am¬
boina in 1546, wrote that the knowledge of the Portuguese in the
Moluccas was restricted to the conjugation of the verb ropio, in which
they showed ‘an amaaing capacity for inventing new tenses and parti¬
ciples’* Amboina and its neighbouring islands were thought to be
ripe for Christianity, and as they were independent of both Temate
and Tidore, and the Portuguese needed a second base in the Spice
Islands, the decision was taken to concentrate upon their conversion*
St, Francis, w'ho spent a year and a half in the ' Islands of Divine
Hope', as he called the Moluccas, found the Christian communities
too ignorant and the population too barbarous for his liking. After a
tour of all the places where Christian communities existed he decided
that he could do better work in China and returned to Malacca*

In practice the fortunes of Christianity depended almost entirely
upon the military strength of the Portuguese. Most of their converte

‘ The word u wed rtlaiively 'Phe exwtiiiB rtligion Vbu msinlj- a mixtun of aneator

wonhip uid erthef irodlEiaiiiiL ciiJt*, h hud m Hindii-Buddhiic fA^odc,

CH* T 2 THE POHT^ CTTCE IN SOITFI-EAST ASIA ^03

fell away when tKreatened by the Muslims. Sultan Haimn of Temate
became their determined enemy, and he was powerful enough to defy
them. He attacked the Christian communkies, and by 1565 had
practically ruined the whole mission. Goa then sent a fleet to restore
the situation, a fortress built on Arnboina, and Christianity began
to revive. But not for long, for the Portuguese quarrelled with Hairun,
who accused them of depriving him of his legal share'of the spice profits.
Then, to make matters worse, ihty made a solemn agreement with him
and immediately afterwards treacherously murdered him ftjTo).

The result was disastrous. Ternate rose in revolt, led by its new
sultan Baabullah. For nearly five years the Portuguese fortress on the
island was besieged. Neither Goa nor Malacca could send hclp^ and
when in 1574 the fortress fell the Christjan coniniunities were doomed.
Amboina, however, was saved by Vascoocellos^ its governor, who
rallied the native Christians there and built a new fort. The hostility
of Baabulbh drove the Portuguese to turn to Tidore, where in 1578
they were permitted to build s fort. No sooner were they installed
there than Francis Drake appeared at Ternate, and the vengeful
Baabullah offered him a treaty and a lading of spice. His return home
from his voyage of circumnavigation (1577-80) aroused English
interest in the possibility of voyages direct to the Spice Islands, and
in 1586 Cavendish crossed the Archipelago from north to south
through the Straits of Macassar and Bali.

Spanish powder in the Philippines too had sought to expand south-^
w^rds since the foundation of Manila in 1570, and at the moment w hen
Philip II united Portugal and Spain the Spaniards w'ere preparing
once more to interfere in the Moluccas, and w’cre only restrained from
doing so by Philip's prohibition. The Portuguese position there had
begun to look hopeless. It improved, however, in 1587 with the death
of Baabullah and with the removal of the Achinese threat to Malacca in
the same year^

l‘he extension of Portuguese commercial activity in South-East
Asia, notwithstanding the constant threats to their position at Malacca
and in the Moluccas^ was indeed remarkable. After 1545 they man¬
aged to obtain a share in the trade of Bantam, w^hich had become the
chief pepper port for the supply of both India and China, and through
which it has been esUmated that 3 J million pounds of pepper passed
annually. To avoid the southern passage to the Moluccas via East
Java they made treaties ivith the SuJtan of Brunei w hich enabled them
to use a northern one through the Sulu Archipelago and the Celebes
Sea. It w'as through their application of the name of his kingdom to

204 THE EAHLtER PHASE OF EUROPEAN EXPAN'SfON PT. II

tKe whole of the island that its corrupt form 'Borneo' came into
general use* By both routes they touched at the island of Celebes, but
nei er realised the different parts were those of a single island and not
a group of separate ones: hence the name by which they knew them—
'the Celebes’.

We have seen how the Javanese empire of Majapahit fell between
1513 and 1528 before a coalition of Muslim states composed of
Madura, Tuban, Surabaya and Demak. The sultanate of Demak
thereupon became the most powerful state in Java. It controlled the
northern rice-growing plains from Japara to Gresik and grew rich on
the trade of those two ports. Through Japara the rice of Java was es-
[TOrted to Malacca; Gresik conducted a flourishing trade with the
Spice Islands. During the sixteenth century two new states, Bantam
and Mataram, which w'ere to play an important part in the next cen¬
tury came into existence. The independent sultanate of Bantam was
founded by Haasan Udin in 1568. It extended its control over the
whole of the w estem end of the island, once the kingdom of Sunda, and
became rich as the chief centre for the purchase of pepper, whither
came merchants from India and China, bringing textiles, sJik and
porcelain in great quantities.

The small district of Matarant to the south of Demak, once the
heart of a powerful central Javanese kingdom before the rise of the
East Javanese states to importance, was tributary to the sultanate of
Padjang, one of the component states of the sultanate of Demak.
Towards the end of the century its second Muslim ruler, Suta
Vijaya, upon whom the Sultan of Padjang had conferred the title of
Senapati, or commander-in-chief, proclaimed his independence, and
before his death in 1601 had extended his authority over alL the inland
districts from the borders of Bantam in the west to those of the East
Javanew kingdom of Bakmbangan. Mataram was an agricultural
State with small interest in commence. While the trading cities on the
coast to the north of it grew steadily weaker through repeated defeats
at the hands of the Portuguese, the growth of the power of the new
empire was fostered, and its kraton became the centre of the political,
cultural and economic life of much of the island. Thus when the
English and the Dutch first came to Java its once formidable sea pow er
was no more; its most important kingdom was a land power. .^Ind
with the exception of Bantam, its northern ports were waiting like ripe
cherries to be plucked by the rapidly expanding power of Mataram.

In their reladons with the more powerful kingdoms of the Indo-
Chinese mainland the Portuguese had to be content to play a humbler

CH. 12

THE PORTUGi;tSE IS SOLTTlt-EAST ASM

fole than at Malacca and in the Spice Islands, Many of them scre ed as
mercenaries in the armies of the various monarcha and often proved
a source of embarrassment to their employers. Under commercbl
treaties vAth Siam they were permitted to trade at Ayut^ia the capital^
at Mergui and Tenasserim in the Bay of Bengal^ and at Pa tarn and
Nakon Srit'ammarat on the eastern coast of the Malay Peninsula^
Both Aynjt'ia and Patani did a considerable Chinese tmde, and the
Portuguese fattoric^ at both placeis flourished. The Siamese ports
were also useful as places where Portuguese ships bound for China
could shelter during the north-west monsoon^ when the China Sea
was difficuh to navigate. They remained well established there until
ousted by the Dutch in about 1630- 'fheir missionaries and traders
settled also in Cambodia, and it would appear that a Portuguese friar
was in 1570 the first European to see the Great Lake and the ruins of
Angkor*

In Burma and Arakan Portuguese mercenaries and adventurers
were more in evidence than missionaries and traders* Diogo Soares
de Mello played an important part in the wars of Tabinshwehti acd
Bayinnaung and helped the latter to gain his crosvn in 1551. In Siam
the Portuguese never attempted to gain territorial possessions; the
king wa$ too poiverfuL So it w'as in Surma until the end of the
sixteenth century. But in t5^p when Pegu was captured and its
booty shared betw^een a rebclLious prince of Toungoo and the King of
Arakan, and the country' laid w-'aste by Siamese invaders, Philip de
Brito, a leader in the scrv'icc of Arakan, seized its chief port;

Syriam, and tried to gain the mastery over Lower Burnla, But after
an adventurous career of fourteen years he fell before the revived
power of the house of Bayinnaung.

At almost the same time another fmitgi leader, Gonsalves TibSo of
Dknga^ made himself *king" of the island of Sandwjp, lying below
the eastern arm of the Ganges delta, and maintained himself thero
from 1609 to i6r7* In 1615 with the help of Goa he even attacked
Mrohaung, the capital of Anikan, but was driven off. From the
middle of the sixteenth century' Porttigueae freebooters settled in
large numbers at Dianga, close by Chittagong, then in the dominions
of Arakan. I'hey made the place a notorious centre of piracy^ whence
they sailed up the creeks of the Sunderbunds to bring back thousands
of slaves^, whom they sold to the King of .Arakan, Their foray's went
on until i666» when the Mughal Viceroy of Bengal, Shayista Rhan^
w^iped out their pirate nest and annexed the Chittagong district to
the empire of Aurungzeb.

2o6 the EAHLItH fHAJJE OF EtTlOPEAN EXPANSION px. ]]

Th^e declint of Portuguese power in the East set irv earlv, thoueh in
South-East ^la, through their tenacious hold on Malacca, there were
Pew sig^ of It before the appearance of the English and the Dutch as
compeutore for the control of the spice trade. The Portuguese have
been desenbed b. Sir Hugh Clifford as swarming into Asia in a spirit
of open bngandageA Against the Muslim peoples their crusading aesl
stimulat^ rather than restrained their cruel and capricious behaSour
Even their own historians were ashamed at their crimes b the
Moluccas, where the natives were driven into resistance by the injustice
of their trading methods. And although priests and monks multiplied
in their dominions, they were ineffectual missionaries because of the
tnisdwds of traders and freebooters. That indeed seems to have been
the theme of Mendes Pinto’s which for all its question¬

able accuracy of detail gives a remarkably authentic picture of Portu¬
guese acUvities in the middle of the sixteenth century. Moreover the
c^t of their mihtary and ecclesiastical establishments was more ihan
the profits of their commercial enterprise couJd bear
:Laok at the Portuguese,’ wrote Sir Thomas Roe' the EngEsh am¬
bassador to the Mughal Court in 1613. ' In spite of all their fine settle¬
ments they are beggared by the maintenance of miUtary forces- and
even their garrisons are only mediocre.’ Albuquerque’s poEw of
er^ng forts and establishing domination over native rulers has been
held to have been one of the chief causes of their downfall. They
behaved ^ conquerors rather than merchants, and when internal dis-
o^mration and lack of dracipline began to appear, as they did before
the middle of the sixteenth century, general corruption resulted.
1 here ^ere too many potential de Britos and TibSos, all anxious to
m^e their fortunes and get home while the going was good

I r nTj Portugal, if not the main cause of their

downM, had serious consequences for the Portuguese, for the enemies
ot berainc their enemies, and in their attacks on them were

aided by native rulers and peoples who had learnt from bitter exneri-
cn« to detest them. One has also to realize that the Dutch and English
had made w much progress in developing their sea-power during the
century before they appeared in the East that in sea fighu with the
Portuguese they could both sail and fight their ships better than their
opjwn^ts. Yet when all has been said regarding the moribund state
of the Portuguese empire at the end qf the sixteenth centurv the fact
remains that, like Charles II, it took an nnconscionable time in dying.

^ Further India^ Liaiidoil* 1QO4, p. 4S,

CHAFTER 13

BURMA AND THE T'AI KINGDOMS IN THE SIXTEENTH

CENTURY

(a) To 1570

Three years after the foundation of Ayut'ia in 1350 another T’ai king¬
dom, later known as the kingdom of Laos or Luang Prabang, was
founded in the upper Mekong valley. It came into existence through
the union of a number of smaJl Laos states under the leadership of a
chief of Nluong Swa named Pa Ngoun, who had been brought up at
the Court of Angkor and was married to a Khmer princess^ The origin
of the Laos states on the Mekong ta obscure and legendary. The T^ai
seem to have settled there in the second half of the thirteenth century,
and to have been first under the suzerainty of Angkor and later under
that of Sukhot’ai. Through such channels they came into contact with
Indian culture. Under Fa Ngoun they were converted to Hinayana
Buddhism. His father-in-law sent him a mission of monks beanng
with them the Pali scriptures and a famous statue of the Buddha,
which had been sent much earlier by a King of Ceylon as a present to
Cambodia and was called the Prabang. It was installed at Lang
Chang, Fa Ngoun’s capital, tn a temple specially built for it. and at a
later date the city came to be named after it.

Fa Ngoun's military prowess earned him the title of 'the Con¬
queror'. The kingdom which he acquired and consolidated ex¬
tended from the borders of the Sibsong Pannas along the valley of
the Mekong down to the northern confines of Cambodia. On the west
it touched the borders of the T’ai states of Cbiengmai, Sukhot'ai and
Ajmt’ia, while on the east its neighbours were Annam and Champa,
though sparsely populated, it was one of the largest states in Indo-
China. Fa Ngoun's reign was one of constant campaigns and aggres¬
sion, and both Annam and Ayut'ia felt the impact of his power. But
to his peace-loving, easygoing subjects his autocratic rule, and the
exhaustion caused by his wars, became increasingly unpalatable, until
in 1373 W* ministers united to drive him into exil^ and placed on the
throne his son Oun Hueun, a young man of seventeen.

20S

THE EAltLlER PHASE QP EUROPEAN EXPANSION

FT. II

P aya Sam Sine 1 ai, as he is known in the official chronicle, earned
his title of Lord of 300,000 T’ais ’ from the census of males which he
earned out in 1376, His reign was a period of consolidation and
administrative development. He was married to a Siamese princess
01 .^ut la, and m carrying out the organization <jf his kingdom was
much influenced by Siamese methods. He also built temples and
founded^ monastic schools for the study of Buddhism. Economically
,ang Chang was wdI placed. It had easy communications with both
Annam and Siam, and it soon became an important centre of trade
wjtti Its gumlac and benzoin much in demand by the Siamese

Prosperity depended upon the raaintainance of good relations with
these ttvo powerful neighbours. In the latter half of the fifteenth
century, however, Lang Chang was nearly brought to min through the
hostility of Annam. rhis was aroused by an incident w hich occurred
m the reign of Lan*kham-Ding {1416-28). He had offered assistance
to the Ant^mites when they were invaded by the Chinese in 1421. but
the force he sent had gone over to the Chinese and had eventually
b^en driven back into its owm country by the exasperated Annamites.
Dunng the subsequent period they were too deeply involved in their
final smuggle with Champa to take their revenge. But as soon as Le
1 han Ton had completed the reduction of Champa ini 471 he began
to prepare to attack Lang Chang. In 1478 he delivered his bl^
storming the city of J^ng Chang itself and driving its king. P’aya Sai
I lakap at (143S-79}, into exile. His success, however, was shortlived
A son of the fugitive king, T'iine Kham. rallied the Laos forces and
drove out the .Annamites. He then succeeded to the throne and set
himwlf to reestablish his country’s prosperity by cultivating better
reiatjQns wth her eastern neighbour.

The simggle with Annam was followed by a long period of peace
during which, ^ a result of the development of closer commercial
relations with the Menam valley cities, the kingdom prospered. King
Ponaarat (1520-4?). the builder of Wat Visoun, waTa devoted
Buddhist tvho strove to stamp out the popular animbm and witch^
craft, but faded. He was the first of the Laos kings to take up his
r^idence at the city of \lcn Chang (Vientiane}, which, lying Lch
farther down the Mekong, occupied a central position in his long-
atmng territories and was better placed than Lang Chang for irale
With baam and Annam.

The period of comparative calm ended in 1545, when P’otWrat
was teinpted to intervene m an acute succesaion dispute in the much^
troubled kingdom of Chiengmai. In 1538 Muang Kesa. the fifteenth

20Q

>3 BURMA ADD THR T*At KIXGIXIMS

king since ihc foundation of tKc state, had been deposed by his son
1 ai Sai Kham. The latter's cruelty and itiisgovcmment, however, led
to his assassination in 1543, and with him the direct male line became
extinct. P'ot'isarat thereupon claimed the throne through his mother^
a Chiengitul princess, and sent a strong force which rapidly defeated
the various rival claimants who had come upon the scene, and caused
a deputation to be sent to him with an offer of the crown. He accepted
it for his son Sett'at'irat, a boy of twelve. Pending the boy’s arrival
the notables of the kiogdom met and appointed a princess, Mahd
Tewi, as regent.

The news of Sctt'at'irat’s accession to the throne of Chiengmai
brought a Siamese army on the scene, led by King P’tajai himself.
Apparently his excuse for intervention tvas the punishment of Muang
Kc^’s murderer. But as this had already been carried out before his
arrival, and Siam's real aims were well knowTi, and likely to be stoutly
resisted, he was persuaded by Princess Maha Tewi, a woman of
immense ability in the exercise of statecraft, to return home. In 1547
King P'ot’isarat was killed in a hunting accident, and Sett'at’irat had
TO return to Lang Chang in order to deal with an attempt by liis
younger brothers to partition the kingdom. As soon as his back was
turned another crop of pretenders arose to dispute the Chiengmai
succesaion, and once again King PTajai invaded the kingdom. ’Phis
time Princess Maha Tewi resisted. The Siamese were repulsed before
the walls of Chiengmai, While retreating they were defeated in a series
of engagements by the pursuing Laos army and completely routed.

'rhe story of the campaign is graphically told by Fernio Mendes
Pinto, who of course claims to have accompanied the expedition. He
tells us also that on arrival home King P'nyai was poisoned by T’ao
Sri Suda Chan, one of his four senior non-royal consorts. She was
pregnant by a lover, whom she had taken during the king’s absence
on campaign. Her own son, a boy of nine, succeeded his father as
king, but she soon had him put out of the way. Then after a blood¬
bath of her opponents she placed her lover on the throne. Two months
later they were both assassinated at a royal banquet.

Pinto cannot have accompanied P’rajai’s army, since he represents
the campaign as a victorious one against an invading force from Chien¬
gmai. His account seems to be a hotch-potch of stories picked up
probably from Portuguese soldicrs-of-fortune who had served in the
Siamese army. His story- of T’ao Sri Suda Chan’s coup d'etat is
nearer the mark, though the Siamese version accepted by Wood^

^ Hisrory o/ Swm, p. 1 m

aio THE TA1%LEKR PH45E OF FUBOPEANT EXPANSION PT. II

repnrAenls the ass4issin;jtion i)f her and her lover 35 taking place >\ hile
they were in the royal barge iiti their way to an elephant hunt. I^into^s
dates do not fit in >vich what j& know^n of the story. But in any case
the Siamese records for this period are so conflicting and obscure that
it is almost imposstble to check his deiaib.

The Leaders in the assassination plol placed Prince I'^ien, a younger
brother of P'rajai, on the throne with the title of Maha Chakrap'at.
Wood assigns ihia event to tlic year 1549^^ but ihenc is good reason
for placing it a year earlier^ since that would accord with the dale
ascribed by the Burmese chronicles* to Tabinshwehti's invasion of
Siam, which took place towards the end of the year of ^laha Chak-
rap’at's accession^ and the Burmese sources for this period are n^ore
reliable than the Siamese in the matter of dates,

Tabinshwehli (1531-50) of the Toungoo dynasty, whose rise has
been recorded in Chapter 6, §c, aimed at reuniting the whole of Burma
under one rulen His first step* for which his father had been in the
midst of preparations when he died, was to conquer the richer and
more urbane kingdom of Pegu, Such was the chaos in the Ava king¬
dom after the conquest of its capital by the Shans in 1527 that he took
the risk of leaving hh rear undefended while he eoneentraied upon
his southern objectives* His first campaign in 1535 gave him possession
of the Irrawaddy delta and its chief town Bassein. Fegu, however,
was strongly defended, and only fell by stratagem in 1539 after four
years* resistance^ 'Phe Mon king, Takayutpl, fled northwards to
Prome, w'herc Tabinsh%vehti'& attack was foiled by reinforcements sent
down from Ava by its Shan ruler.

But Takayutpi died, and many of the Mon chiefs offered their
allegiance to the Burmese king, seeing in him the only leader capable
of giving their land settled government. Moreover, he wisely showed
respect for their customs and institutions and accorded Mons equaiity
of treatment with his Burmese. In 15411 with an army reinforced by
Mon lir^ues and a contingent of J^ortuguese mercenaries under joio
Caycyro, he captured the port of Martaban. It had put up a magni¬
ficent resistance;, hut was finally taken by storm and sacked without
mercy. Pinto^ who again claims to have been present, givt^ a vxvid
ey^e-wit ness account of the horrible maitgacre Systematically carried
out by the conqueror. Moulmcin, cowed by the treat me nt of Marta¬
ban, surrendered* and the whole of the Mon kingdom down to the

^ p. iii^

^ AyoDiftikiB to Pliimyre'a roudm^ in hii WUary of Burrmt ji. Joo. But Mt Harv^fy"*
in, tiij Ifiitiiry cf p. 343.

BVftMA AND TIIF T\kf KINGTX>M5

211

ciu 13

frontier ai Tavoy fell itim Dunnes hands, 'rhen as a tliank-
tiiTering for victory Tabinshwchti placed nevr spires on the chief Mon
pagodas. The most renowned of them all, the Shwe Dagonp received
a special offering of ten viss (36,5 Ib.) of pure gold.

In the following year Prome was star^-ed into submisstiiTi after a
five-months siege and treated with the same cruelty' as Martaban. Its
capture opened the way to central Burma. But before Tabinshwehtl
was in a position to take the offensive he had to meet a powerful
counter-attack launched against Pro me by the Shan ruler of Ava in
league with the sawbwas of six of the Shan state$^ With the help of
hia Portuguese gunners he won a decisive victory, w'hich he followed
up by occupying all the country as far as the districts of Minbu and
Myingyan. At Pagan he crow^ned with ancient ceremoniaL But
he did not go on to attack Ava. He returned southwards and in 154O
staged a second coronation at Pegu, using both Burmese and Mon rites.

Neither Toungoo nor Pagan was to be h!$ capita!, but Pegu with
its historic Mon associations. The explanation^ so often given, that
he was pro-Mon in hia sympathies is inadequate. It is true that»hc
did everything possible to conciliate the Mons^ even to adopting their
hair-style. But a pro-Mon king would hardly have permitted the
atrocities perpetrated at Martaban and Prome. His real reason seoma
lo have been that he planned to attack Ayut^ia and needed the _Mon
country as a base. He sought to become a Chakravartin^ the world
conqueror of the Buddhist Avhite elephant myth. I'hc King of Siam
possessed a number of these precious animals, and he w as determined
to have them.

Actually* how^ever, his first great enterprise after his coronation was
an invasion of Arakan. This move docs not seem to have formed part
of any over-all plan but to have been purely opportunist* A discon¬
tented Arakanese prince appeared at his Court and offered to become
his vassal if he w'uuld place him on the throne at Mrohaung. But the
city's fortifications w'ere too pow^erful for liim, and he was glad of an
excuse to abandon the expedition. The excuse was the news of a
Siamese raid on the Tavoy region. Wood* however* rightly points out
that the violent revolutions that had been taking pbce at the Court of
.\yut'ia led him to beheve that the moment was ripe for an invasion.
His preparations were on a great scale, and the force be kd into Siam
^vhen the campaigning season began with the end of the w'ct monsoon
of 1548 was indeed formidable. Nevertheless it failed to break through
the defences of Ayut^ia3 ^tnd on returning homew'arda nearlv came to
grief before the incessant attacks of the Siamese.

3t2

niR RAtlLlRR PHASE OF RUROPFAN EXPANSION

PT. J1

After two major re^crats I'abimhwehti, thtiujrh only thiity^six years
old, completely lost his morale. He became a debauchee and left the
conduct of iiffairs to others. The Mons, who hatl borne the brunt of
his wars, rose In revolt under Smim Mtaw, a minor prince of the old
dynasty. While TabinshwehU's brother-in-law and alter ego Bayin-
naung was absent dealing with this rebellion another member of the
Mon royal family, Smlm Sawhtut, procured the king’s murder (1550),
Pegu opened its gates to him ivith joy. For the moment Tabinsh-
wehti’s kingdom was in hopeless chaos. Mon leader nded as king
in Pegu, Another tvas gathering strength at Martaban. And the
Burmese chiefs of Totingoo and Prome refused to recognize the
authority of Bayiiinaung, who aimed at succeeding the murdered
king,

^ first of all, however, Smim Htaw marched on Pegu and eliminated
his rival Smim Sawhtut. Then Baytnnaung seized Toungoo and was
crowned king. His next move was to gain control over central Burma
as far nonhwards as Pagan. He considered the feasibility of an jutack
on jkva, but decided to reconquer the Mon kingdom first. In 1551.
with a mixed force of Burmese and IMons, and a Portuguese detach¬
ment led by Diogo Soarez de Mel to, he defeated Smim Htaw in a
battle fought outside the walls of Pegu. Mon resistance thereupon
collapsed cverytvhere. Smim Htaw himself was hunted through the
delta, managed to escape in an open boat to Martaban, but was finally
caught in the hills around Sittaung and cruelly done to death. His
gallant struggle caught the popular Imagination, and many local
traditions of him still survive.

Bavinnaung was crowned at Pegu with the grandest ceremonial.
He began to build a magnificent palace-city for himself and his Court.
Ills next military enterprise, the subjugation of northern Burma and
the Shan states, was on a far more ambitious scale than the two cam¬
paigns whereby he had restored the kingdom created by Tabinsli-
wehti. In 1553 he sent an army of observation up the Irrawaddy, but
its advance caused the Shan cluefs to set aside their mutual quarrels
and unite against the threatened invasion. He therefore raised the
largest force he could possibly muster, and late in 1554 launched a
two-pronged attack against .Ava from 'roungooand Pagan respectively.
In March 1555 the city fell, and he then pushed his conquests to
Bangyt in Monyua district and Myedu in Shwebo dtstrict, beyond
which in those days the authority' of the .Ava rulers did not extend.

Xttt he turned on the Shans. In 1556 he subdued Hsipaw and
hTon^ while on his way to conquer Chicngmai. This state was notv

13 BlTR^fA AXO THE T'aI KINCDOMii Jlt 3

ruled by a Sban prince named Mekut’i, who had been accepted as
their king by the local chieftains wlien Setl'at'irat, having secured the
throne of Luang"Prabang, refused to retum to Chiengmai. Mekm’i
surrendered without resistance, swore atlcgiance to Bayinnaung, and
agreed to pay an annual tribute of elephants, horses, "silk and other
products of his country. This expedition had a'profound effect upon
the Shan chiefs on the borderland between Burma and China; all
ha.^tened to pay homage to the new conqueror.

As soon as the Burmese army left Chiengmai, howe^-er, force* from
Luang Prabang moved in. In 1558 they defeated Mckut’i and would
have deposed him had not Bayinnaung reappeared on the scene and
driven them out. He then proclaimed the deposition of Setl’at’irat
from the throne of l.uang Prabang. Sett’at’irat in reply formed a
large coalition of Shan states and advanced to Chiengsen at the head
of their combined forces, Bayinnaimg, however, by occupying the
territories of his allies, forced him to retire, and the confederation
broke up {1559).

In the following year Bayinnaung returned to Pegu, and Sett’at’kat,
taking advantage of the lull, made a formal alliance with Ayut’ia. In
1563, in order to maintain closer contact with the Siamese and avoid
a surprise attack by the Burmese, he removed his capital to Vien
Chang and strongly fortified the city. He also built there a shrine for
the famous Emerald Buddha (Pra Ken), which he had carried off from
Chicngmai when he had returned to Luang Prabang after his father’s
death. ^ His greatest arehitcctural work in his new capital was the
pyramidal structure known as the 'Phat Liiong, which is today the
finest exannplc of Laotian architecture, though severely damag^ in
•^73 by bandits from Yunnan.

Bayintiaung's assumption of suzerainty over the Shan states was a
new departure in Burmese hiatory. Ji was the inevitable result of the
successful risistanee of the Burmese to the Shan attempts to dominate
Burma, which had gone on ever since the fall of Pagan in 1287 and
had brought the min nf the Ava kingdom. Henceforward there was
to be no longer any question of the Shans recovering control over
• pptr Durmn I the shot!' wa.? now Hrcnly on the othtr foot.

The Burmese champion’s control over Chicngmai was of even
j^eater immediate importance, since it vastly facilitated an attack upon
Ayut’ia. And it was Baylnnaung’a dearest ambition to force the most
powerful uf all the T’ai state* to submit to his authority. Sett'at'iral’s
alliance with King Chakrap'at and Siam’s rapid recovery after Tabin-
shw'ehti’s invasion hastened his decision to strike as soon as possible.

314 THE EARLIER OP E1-ROEEL4X EXPAMSIOS [n. ll

liiA dcniand for a c:oiiple of white elephants and Chakrap'at’s refusal^
much discussed as the cause of the war^ must surely be regarded merely
Sis formalities preceding hostilities, like the solemn throwing down of
the gauntlet in mediaeval Europe.

1 ‘he invasion began after the cSf>$e of the wet monsoon of 1563. The
Burme^se forces crossed from the Sitting valley to Chiengmai. They
then proceeded by way of Kamp^cngp'et and Sukhot'ai to Ayut'ia*
which surrendered in February' 1564 after slight resistance. The king
and most of the royal family were carried off to Surma as hostages,
while a aon of Chakrap^at was left behind as vassal niJer with a Bur¬
mese garrison to control him. As soon as he bad settled the new
regime at Ayut'ia, Bayinnaung planned to lead a punitive expedition
against the King of Cliiengmai, whose attitude had been unsat is-
factor)' w^hen the Burmese army had passed through his state. News
came, howeveri of a serious Mon rebellion, and he had to hurry off to
Pegu, leaving his son^ the heir-apparent^ to command the force march¬
ing against Chiengmai.

On arrival home Bayinnaung found that the rebels, aided by Shan
and Siamese prisoners settled in the neighbourhood, had burnt Pegu
together with his own palace and even some of the older buildings
dating from Dammazedi's reign. With characteristic energy' he
crushed the outbreak> rounded up the rebels, and was only dissuaded
by the intcr^'cntion of the Buddhist clergy from burning several
thousands of them in huge bamboo cageis. He at once began to build
an even more magnificent palace-city than the one that had been
destroyed. The Venetian Caesar Frederickc and the Englishman Ralph
Fitch, who saw it in its full glory, have recorded their W'onder at its
size and richriieEs. In some parts, they said, its roofs were covered
with plates of gold.

Meanwhile the hcir-apparent"s expedition against Chiengmai had
met with general resistance and King ]\lckut"i had taken refuge in Vien
Chang. I'he Burmese therefore invaded the kingdom of Luang Pra-
bang and prepared to attack Sctt^at'imt in his capital On the appear¬
ance of their flotilla before \nen Chang the king fled. They occupied
the city, capturing the queen and Oupahat, or heir-apparent, as well
as the fugitive MekutM. When, however, they tried to follow up
Sett'at'irat hU harassing tactics w'ere too much for them and they had
to give up the attempt. In October 1565 they arrived back in Burma
with their prisoners. Mekut'i W'as placed in safe tuatodv at Pegu
while Princess Maha Ti^%w\ was installed a second time as regent at
Chiengmaip this time with a Burmese garrison.

CH. 13 B[TR^fA AND THE T'A! KJNGDOAtS 315

In Siam Frinct Mahin, who had been established as regent by Bayin-
naung, functioned under the control of the pro-Bunncse Raja of
P’itaanulok. Sett'at’irat’s successful defiance of the Burmese caused
Mahin to turn to him for assistance in throwing off the yoke of Bayin-
naung. In 1566 the two of them attacked P’itsanulok, but the arri^-al
of a Burmese army forced them to abandon the enterprise. In the
hope of preventing further trouble, Baytnnaung in the following year
permitted the captive king Chakrap’at, M'ho had become a monk, to
return to Siam on a pilgrimage. His generosity wjis misplaced, for on
arrival home the king threw off the ydlow robe and joined Prince
Mahin in another attack on P’itsanuloL

Ba\dnnaung therefore had to stage a second invasion of Siam. In
156S he set out from Martaban and made for P’itsanulok, W'hich he
relieved. Then he passed on to Ayut’ia, This time the cky put up a
desperate defence and defied all his efforts to storm it. Sctt'at’iraf sent
a force to the a^istance of his ally, but the Burmese ambushed h and
drove it off. The siege lasted until August 1569, when the city fell
through treachery. King Chakrap'at had died during the siege. Priftce
Mahin died a prisoner on his way to Pegu. Maha T’ammamja, the
pro-Burmese Raja of P’itsanulok, was installed as the next vassal ruler
of Ayut ia, and Bavin nan ng prepared to lead his victorious army to
punish the King of Vien Chang. He had gorged his men with the
plunder of Ayut’ia. The city’s defences tverc dismantled and vast
numbers of its population deported to Low'cr Burma.

I-or the second time the Burmese invasion of the Laos kingdom w as
a failure. Vien Chang defied all Bayinnaung's attempts to take it, and
in April 1570, with his troops exhausted by famine and disease, he beat
a hasty retreat so as to reach home before the onset of the wet mon¬
soon. Siam, on the other hand, remained under Burmese control for
the next fifteen years. One interesting result of this was the adoption
by Siam of the Burmese Era beginning in a.d, 638. Jt became known
^the Chtjla Safcarat to distinguish it from the Maha Sakarat beginning
m A.D. 78, which it displaced. It remained in official use until 1887,
when Chulalongkorn adopted the Piuropcan calendar. According to
Wood, the Burmese based on the Laws of Manu, was

introduced at the same time and grafted on to Siamese law.

(A) f rom 1570 /o 1599

Bapnnaung’s career has been aptly described as ‘the greatest
explosion of human energy' ever seen in Burma'. ’The king of Pegu*,

2i 6 TltE EARHEH PHASE OF EUHOPEAJi EXPANSION PT. II

wrote the Venetian Caesar Frcdericke, who visited his capital in 1569,
'hath not any army or power by sta, but in the iand, (ot people;,
dominions, gold and silver^ he far exceeds the power of the Great
Turk in treasure and strength/ The bare record of the events of his
reign shows him everlastingly hastenidg Somewhere to assert his
authority: it U a catalogue of campaigns.

Inhere is, however^ another side to his story, though it is of minor
importance. Strange as it may seem in one who was responsihk for
so rnuch human bloodshed, he strove to be a model Buddhbt king,
building pagodas w^herever he W'ent, distributing copies of the Pali
scriptures, feeding monks, and p/amoting the collection and study of
the The costly offerings he made to pagodas at Pegu

on his return from Vien Chang in 1570 give the impression of being
acts of atonement for the demerit incurred through the deaths of so
many thousands of human beings* He probably explained aw^ay his
own responsibility' in much the same terms as, two centuries later*
King Naungdaw-gyi used when rejecting the British demand for com¬
pensation for the massacre of Negrais (1759). The victims, he said,
were fated to die in such a tvay*

But if Bayinnaung had no strong feelings about human slaughter,
he had conscientious scruples against animal sacrifices such as the
Muslim practice of killing goats in celebration of Bakr Id or the offer¬
ing of white animals to the Mahagiri spirit on Mount Fopa. Such
practices he prohibited, as also the killing of slaves^ elephants and
horses at the death of a Shan saw“bwa for burial along with his body.

In his zeal for the enhancement of his reputation as a Buddhist king
throughout Indo-China he aent offerings on several occasions to the
famous d'aoth of the Buddha ut Kandy in Cejion, pro\"iding lights
to burn at its shrine, craftsmen to beautify the building, and hrooms,
made from his own and his chief queen’s hair, for use there. In 1560
the Viceroy of Goa, Dom Constantino dc Braganza, led an expedition
to punish the Kaja of Jafna for the pefsecuttoii of Catholic converts
made there by St. Francis Xavier. In sacking the place a tooth, re¬
puted to be the Kandy one, was seized and taken to Goa. Bayinnaung
sent envoys with the offer of a large sum of money for it. But the
archbishop inierv'ened and referred the matter to the Inquisition,
which condemned it to be destroyed as a dangerous idol. The sentence
was carried out before a great concourse of people^ among whom w^ere
the scandalized Burmese envoys.

Some years later Bayittnaurtg asked R.ija Dbarmapala of Colombo
for a daughter in marriage. Having no daughter, but being anxious

BURMA AND rtlE T*A( KINGDOMS

Clt, 13

217

tti please the king, that ruler palmed off on him the daughter of one
of h» ministers as his own. He also sent with the bride a tooth, w'hich
he claimed was the genuine one. 'I'he Raja of Jafna, he said, had palmed
off 3 monkey 's tooth on the Viceroy of Goa. Both the * princess’ and
the tooth «-cre received in Burma with the high(*$t honour, and the
Raja of Colombo received so muniiicent a present in return that the
King of Kandy offered a princess and a tooth, both of which should
be genuine. But it was useless for him to protest that the real tooth
had never left its temple at Kandy and that the Raja of Colombo had
no daughter. Bayinnaung was far too shrewd to permit any doubt as
to the autbentJdty of the raja’s gifts. The tooth he had deposited in a
jew'elled casket beneaih the Mahiucdi Pagoda,

In 157* died Sctt'at’irat of Vien Chang, the chieftain who had never
bent the knee to the king of kings. His brother the Oupahat had been
a hostage in Burma since 1565, and Bayinnaung sent envoys to Vien
Chang to negotiate his return as a vassal ruler. But the Laotians had
bitter memories of Burmese invasions, and they murdered the envoys.
In revenge Bayinnaung sent Binnya Dala, his Mon commander-in-
chief, with an army composed of levies drawn from Chtengmai and
Siam to attack Vien Chang, it was defeated, and Bayinnaung either
put his general to death or eKiIed him to a place where he soon died.
Then in the dry season of 1574-5 h* personally led an expedition
which drove the regent, General S^ne Soulint'a, out of the capital and
placed the Oupahat on the throne.

.As soon as his back was turned his puppet’s power began to dwindle.
In 1579 he sent another army to deal with the general disorder, w'hich
his rassal was unable to cjuelL But no sooner had it completed its
task and left for home than the unhappy king Was driven out of his
capital and died white fleeing to safety. Bayinnaung thereupon
sought to solve the problem by placing Sene Soulint'a himself on the
throne. But he was an old man and only survived for two years. He
was succeeded by his son Nakone Noi, who soon found his task
impossible. Revolts broke out everywhere. In the confusion the new
king was dethroned and anarchy reigned supreme. There w'as no
longer any fear of Burmese intervention; Bayinnaung had died iti
J581 and his son Nanda Bayin had other things to attend to.

For several years no solution could be found. Sctt'at’irat’s only
son had been born at the time of his death in 1571, When he had
placed the Oupahat on the throne in 1575 Bayinnaung had carried off
the pung prince as a hostage to Burma, fn 1591 the abbots of the
leading monasteries met and decided that the only cure for the

2!S THE EARLIHfE EHASE OF EUROPEAN mf, II

country'si ills was to the legitimate hdr from captivity. The

iiiomctit was propitiouSt since King Naada Bavin was so hard pressed
by the gathering strength of a Siamese nationa] movement against
Bunnese dominance led by Pra Naret that he willingly released the
prince. In 1592 Prince Nokea Kournane gained possession of Luang
Prabang and was accepted as king. His first act after establishing
control over his kingdom \v$s publicly to proclaim its independence of
Burma,

When Bayinnaung died in 15S1 be was poised for an attempt to
deliver a knock-out blow to the kingdom of Arakan. The Burmese
chronicles assert that shortly before his death he deputed a minion
to the ^lughal emperor Akbar, As Bengal had been conquered by the
hrliighal armies in 157^1 there is no mention of a Burmese mission
to Fatehpur Sikri in the Mughal records, It seems more probable that
the mission went to the Viceroy of Bengal. Its object seems to have
been to sound him regarding his attitude to^rds a Burmese attack
upon Arakan. But the blow was never delivered^ and when the two
states did in fact come to in 1596, it was the Arakaneae who were
the aggressors^ joining in the general scramble for loot which occurred
when Nanda Bavin's armJes were driven out of Siam and Pra Maret's
counter-offensive was making serious inroads into Burma.

Bayinnaung had sotvn the wind; his son reaped the whirlwind.
Not that Nanda Bavin was lacking in either ability or determinationt
but sooner or later the reaction against his father's extravagance and
megalomania must come^ The Mo ns in particular were driven to
desperation by the unceasing demands upon them for military service
and the famine and exhaustion which resulted from their inability to
cultiv.ite their lands. For uncultivated deira lands relapse quickly
into impenetrable jungle, and the task of clearing them is heajt-
breaking-

The Siamese might have attempted to regain their independence
earlier had not Boromoraja of Cambodia seized the opportunity pre¬
sented by their weakness to pay off old scores, in the year after the
second fall of .Ayui'ia he invaded Siam, and, though driven out with
heavy kept up the pressure untD after Bayinnaung^s death. The
threat to Ayut'ia made it necessary to restore the fortifications which
had been dismantled,- and the Burmese had to permit the strengthen¬
ing of the city'B defences. The Siamese also found a new^ leader in
Pra Naret, the 'Black Prince', later to be King Naresuen, the elder
son of T*^ammarajap who had been taken as a hostage to Burma
when his father became vassal king of Ayutla. In 1571 as a lad of

CH. IJ BC-RMA AND THE t'ai KINGDOMS 219

sixteen he had been allowed to return home as a result of the m^mage
of on.e of his sisters to Bayinnating^ His courage and resourcefulness
against the invading Cambodians tiiadc him the hope of the patriots.

Nanda Bay in's accession the signal for a dangerous attempt to
break up the united kingdom. Bayinnaung^s brother Thadominsaw,
the Viceroy of Ava, tried to draw the Viceroys of Prome and Toungoo
into a inovemenl for independence. They, however, forwarded his
letters to the Court, and Nanda Bayin, suspecting that some of hi^
ministers were involved, arrested them, and had them burned to death
together with their wives and families. Gaspero Baibi, a Venetian
jewel lefi who Witnessed the appalling scenc^ describes it in his account
of his travels, an English translation of which weis published by
Richard Hakluyt in his Pnvcipijll Vi^yuges. In 1584 Nanda Bayin led
an army against his uncle and defeated hiin in a battle in which the
two Icadera^ in traditional style^ fought a duel on elephants.

Pra Narct had been summoned £0 bring a contingent from Siam
to support his overlord against the Ava rebels. According to Wood,
Nanda Bayin planned to have him murdered, but the Mon chiefs
entrusted with the task disclosed the plan to the prince. Instead of
marching on Ava, therefore, he appeared before Pegu and threatened
an attack. On learning of Nanda Bayin*s victory over the Ava forces,
however, he retreated to Martaban, collected a large number of
Siamese prisoners, w^ho had been deported to Lower Burma during
Bayinnaung's wars, and led them back to their ow^n country, Nanda
Bayin sent a force in pursuit of him, but he turned and defeated it in
the Menam valley. Shortly afterw^ards another Burmese force,
chasing some Shan prisoners who were fleeing from Burma to P^it-
sanulok^ was also defeated and driven back over the frontier. The die
was now cast* Siam was asserting her independence. The Covernor^ of
Sawankhalok and P'ljai, fearing Burmese vengeance, rebelled against
Pra Naret, but he stormed Sawankhalok and executed them both.

In December 15S4 Nanda Bayin invaded Siam through the Three
Pagodas Pass, midway between Moulmein and I'avoy, He was lo
to join up with the Chiengmai army before Ayut'ia^ but Pra Naret
defeated each force separately. In November 1586 three Burmese
armies began a converging movement upon Ayut^ta, and from January^
to June 1587 the city was besieged* But the administrative arrange^*
ments for such a large-scale effort tvere defect!ve, and the invasion
ended in dlBaster^ Things might have gone even worse with the
Burmese had not King Satt'a of Cambodia invaded Siam while the
siege tvas in progress, so that as soon as the Burmese retired Pra Naret

220

FT. II

THE EAHLtEB PHASE OP EUROPEAN EXPANSION

had to concentrate upon driving out the Cambodians instead of seeking
to deliver a knock-out bJow at Nanda Bavin's disorganized and dis¬
heartened forces. On the other hand, his pursuit of the Cambodians
was so relentless that he nearly succeeded in capturing their capital
Lovek. Outside its walls, however, lack of supplies forced him to
abandon the enterprise and return home.

From this moment the independence of Siam was assured. But the
stubborn Burmese lung refused to give up the futile struggle and there¬
by accomplished his own doom. He could have held his own country
together had he been wise enough to evacuate Siam. In his desperate
attempts to raise and equip new armies his demands fell most heavily
upon the Mons. already alienated by the treatment they had received
over many years. Many tried to evade the press-gang by taking the
yellow robe and becoming monks. But the king had them unfrocked.
Many abandoned their villages and took to the jungle. Bassein
rebelled, without success, and all the captured rebels were tortured to
death. Many fled to Arakan and SLun.

* In 15S7 Ralph Fitch, the first recorded Englishman to set foot in
Burma, arrived at Basse!n from Bengal. He had left England with three
companions in 1583 and had travelled to India. There he had parted
with his companions and pursued his w'ay farther eastwards alone.
On his journey through the creeks from Bassein to Pegu he noted
the houses built on ‘great high pastes' for fear of the many tigers,
he supposed. In his account, which Hakluyt included in the
second edition of his Pnnnpall Niivigatioas, and FurchaS printed also
in his I^lgrimes, he indicates no signs of the coming collapse. He
describes the country as ‘very fruitful’ and was much impressed by
the king's majesty and riches. Unfortunately he kept no diary or
notes for fear of being arrested as a spy by the Purtuguesc on his
way home, as indeed he had been on his way out. Hence in writing his
account of Burma he made extensive use of Thomas Hickock's
translation of Caesar Fredcricke's story of his own visit to the country
in 1569. when he 3□^v Bayinnaung in his glory. This also was published
by Hakluyt.

Caesar Frederickc wrote what might he described as a guide for
commercial prospectors, and as such it is invaluable, full of useful
information about trade, conditions of travel, and currency and
exchange. Ralph Fitch also was 3 merchant, seeking knowledge that
would be of possible commercial value. He obviously could not
improve on the Venetian's account, and he was a modest man
with no pretensions to literary skill. He docs, however, add a few

CH. 13 BURMA AN» THE T’AI RINCDO^tS 221

independent touches which show that he could be interested in things
other than trade. Here is his description of the Shwe Dagon Pagoda:

‘About two day ea journey from Pegu there is a Varellc or Pagode,
which is the pilgrimage of the Peguea: it is called Dogonne, and
is of a wonderful I bignesse, and all gilded from the foot to the toppe.
It is the fairest place, as 1 suppose, that is in the world: it standeth
very high, and there are fourc ways to it, which all along are set
with trees of fruits, in such wise that a man may go in the shade
above two miles in length.'

His account of the Buddhist monkhood is equally apt:

'The Tallipoies go very strangely apparelled srith one camholine
or thinne cloth next to their body of a brown colour, another of
yellow doubled many times upon their shoulder: and those tt%-o be
girded to them with a broad girdle: and they have a skinne of
leather hanging on a string about their necks, whereupon they sif,
bareheaded and barefooted: for none of them weareth shoes j with
their right armes bare and a great broad sombrero or shadow In their
liand to defend them in the Summer from the Sunne, and in the
Winter from the rain. They keepe their feasts by the Moone: and
when it is new Moone they keepe their greatest feaste: and then the
people send rice and other thin^ to that kiack or church of wltich
they be; and there all the Tallipoies doc mecte which be of that
, Churche, and cate the victuab which are sent them. When the
Tallipoies do preach, many of the people carry them gifts into the
pulpit where they sit and preach. And there is one that sitteth
by them to take that which the people bring. It is divided among
them. They have none other ceremonies nor service that 1 could
see, but onely preaching,'

tn 1590 T'ammaraja died and Pra Narct became king, in name
as well as in fact. In the list of Kings of Siam he is known as Naresuen,
% *593 Nanda Bayin had failed in five full-scale in^-asions of Siam.
In the last, which was launched at the end of 1592, the Burmese
heir-apparent w-as defeated and killed at Nong Sa Rai before he
reached Ayut'ia. The ruins of a pagoda erected an the spot where he
was killed—in personal combat with Naresuen, according to the
Siamese — are still to be seen. From this time onwards it was the turn
of the Siamese to invade Burma.

ZZZ Tilt ttARLIER PIi.%SF OF EUnOPRAN ESPANSION PT. If

But first it was necessary to deal with Cambodia, so that there
should be no danger of a stab in the back when Naresuen’s attention
was concentrated upon Burma. Immediately after the Burmese
defeat of February t5g.3 ^^aresuen began a campaign against Cambodia.
It was long and severe. E^-entually in July 1594 Lovek was taken and
the king lied to Luang Prabang. No attempt svas made to annex the
kingdom; it tvas enough to paralyse it so that Nareauen should be
free to deal with the arch-enemy. 'I'housands of prisoners were
deported to Siam to be settled in her depopulated northern provinces;
many Siamese previously carried off by King Satt'a’s raids were
brought back.

Naresuen’s first moves in taking the offensive against Burma show
a statesmanlike regard for the needs of his kingdom. He did not
seek to inflict a knock-out blow, which would merely have brought
plunder and might have involved him in an exhausting attempt to
hold the turbulent Burmese in subjection. Siam was a trading state
and had urgent need of ports on the Indian Ocean. Southern Burma
hud useful ones within comparatively easy reach of Ayut'ia, It was
on these that Naresuen first concentrated his attention. In 1593 the
Siamese made themselves masters of Tavoy and I'cnasserini. There¬
upon the Mon Governor of Moulmein, sick of the massacres of bis
people, roue in rebellion and called on Siam for help. In response
Naresuen led a force which not only drove off the Burmese from
besieging Moulmeiti hut also took Martaban.

Nanda Bayin’s next loss was Chiengmai. The old Princess Maha
Tewi, whom Bayinnaung in 1564 had made regent for the second time^
had died in 1578. With the object of strengthening his position
vis-a-vts Luang Prabang, Bayinnaung had ne-xt placed his son Thar-
rawaddy Min on the throne of Chiengmai. When things began lo
go badly willi NaAda Bavin, Nokeo Koumane of Luang l^rabang
declared war on Chiengmai, and Tharrawaddy, unable to obtain help
from his brother, was in such dire straits that he appealed to King
Naresuen. It was a heaven-sent opportunity for the King of Ayut’ia.
In 159st •>' return for reinforcements w'hich saved his kingdom,
Iharrawaddy had to place the much-coveted Chiengmai under
Siamese suiscrainty.

In that same year the Siamese threatened the city of Pegu. But a
Burmese force came down from Toungoo and forced Naresuen to
withdraw. Then, with the writing on the wall, a family quarrel broke
out which made disaster inevitable. Promc, I’oungoo and .4va were all
governed by brothers of Nanda Bay in. When the 1 oungoo Min went

CH- 13 nnihiA am> the t'ai Ki vcttous 333

to the as9i&taiic« of Pegu against Karesuen, hi® brother the Pyii Min
took advantage of his absence to attack Toungoo. The king help¬
less to deal with the situation and a general revolt began. The
Toungoo Min invited the Arakanese to join with him in an attack
on Pegu, In 1599 a powerful Arakancse fleet seized the port of Syriam
and conveyed a land force to effect a junction with the Toungoo army
besieging Pegu. Then Naresuen realized what was afoot and attempted
to join in. He was just too late, for when he arrived in Burma Nanda
Bayin was a prisoner on his way to Toungoo, and Pegu lay in ashes.
The confederates had divided the booty. Toungoo received the king
and the Tooth of Buddha, Arakan a princess and the royal white
elephant. The Arakancse on leaving set fire to the city. Tliey deported
thousands of Mon households. They also maintained a foothold in
the country by retaining Syriam, w>hich was placed under one of their
Portuguese mercenaries, Philip de Brito.

Naresuen, in an effort to gain possession of Nanda Bayin, marched
northwards to attack Toungoo, But he was so heavily defeated
that he had to return home. Nanda Bavin was murdered soon after
reaching Toungoo. With the fall of Pegu aU semblance of a central
government disappeared. Siam held Lower Burma from Martaban
southwards. A parcel of warring chiefs divided the remainder of the
country between them, while Philip de Brito, ^vith Syriam as his base,
began to play a game of high stakes.

* Th« Bi^mine tiamt for Bnom*,

CHAPTER 1+

TMK INTRUSION OF THE ENGLISH AND THE DUTCH

(a) The Angto-Duich assault on the ‘ring fence'

I HAT ibc English made so late a start in exploiting the Cape ruutc
to the Indian Ocean and beyond was in no way due to lack of interest
in Eastern trade. 'Fhe voyages of John Cabot from Bristol in the reign
of Henry VIl were undertaken W'ith the object of reaching the great
spice and silk markets of eastern Asia. The discovery of America
resulted in the postponement of the achievement of this aim for some¬
thing like a century. But the many attempts to discover a northern
passage either round .America or round Russia and Siberia show that
the original object of intrusion into the trade of Asia was kept con¬
stantly in mind. The failure of the Muscovy Company to open up
the North-East Passage led to Anthony Jenkioson's attempts to find
a way to the Far East overland through Russia, But the sole result was
a short-lived trading connection with Persia. And when the I^ndon
merchants sought to develop a route to the East through Syria, though
they managed to establish a prosperous trade with the eastern Mediter¬
ranean, it was useless as a gatew'ay to India and the lands beyond.
Individual prospectors such as John Ncwbery and Ralph Fitch did
indeed make their way via the Levant to India, and in Fitch's case to
bouth-Last Asia; but Newbery disappeared on his way home, and
Fitch's experiences showed clearly the impracticability of the route he
used for large-scale commerce. lienee as the sixteenth century drew
towards its close the London merchants came to reatis!% that the only
practicable route was round the Cape of Good Hope.

The difficulties which for so long deterred the English from taptoii-
ing the Cape route must be realized if their appearance in South-
East .\sia as competitors with the Portuguese and the Dutch is
to be seen in its true perspective. In the first place there is no
evidence that they deliberately refrained from poaching in the
Portuguese preserves out of respect for the papal award of [49Z.
During the first half of the sixteenth century their lack of knowledge
concerning the trade and navigation of the Indian Ocean was a
sufficient deterrent. The Portuguese took the greatest pains to

Clt. 14 T«F IJJTRCSION OF THE ENGLISH ASn THE PITCH 225

maJntalri secrecy regarding their operatiorL^ in the East. No Portugnesc
navigator would serve on an English shipp nor would they permit an
Englishman to sail on one of their eastbound ships if he were of
sufficient cducadon to learn thdr secrets.

During the second half of the century English geographical knowl¬
edge improved immensely as a result of the work of such scholars as
Dr. John Dee, Richard Eden and the two Hakluyts, But there were still
immense difficulties to be overcome. England produced practicalIv
no goods that were saleable in tropical countries. Her greatest need
was to set! her woollen doth, and for this a northern approach seemed
to be essential. Moreover, not until the end of the century did her
merchants dispose of enough Htiid capital to risk on an all-round
voyage of 16,OCo miles for a cargo of spiceSn Expeditions involving
long voyages w'ere indeed sent out, but they w^ent westwards in i^vearch
of Spanish treasure ships.

There was also a further difficulty involved in long trading voyages^
Ships required large crews in proportion to their si^e, and the longer
the voyage the more space was requited for their provisions, so that
the problem was to find enough space for a profitable cargo. The
Portuguese solved it by building large carracks of 1,200-1,500 tons
which required proportionately fewer men to handle them than the
200-ton merchantmen which constituted the largest type normally
employed by Ervgibh shippers. The war with Spain Jed to the con¬
struction of larger ships by private enterprise, but not until sufficient
headway had been made in meeting this difficulty w'ere the English
in a position to compete with the Portuguese in the trade of the
Indian Occam

When Philip II of Spain acquired the crown of Portugal in 15S0
he in effect invited the enemies of Spain to invade the Portuguese
empire. In that same year Drake returned from his voyage round the
world bringing >vith him, besides the precious metals he had looted
from the Spaniards, a small cargo of clovea he had acquired at Ternate
after crossing the Pacific, l ie reported that he had made a trade treaty
with the king of the island, who was anxious for help in a struggle
he was engaged in against the Portuguese. His exploit stimulated
much interest in the East Indies, and six years later Thomas Cavendish
k-fi on a voyage which took him through the Magellan Straits, across
the Pacific to the Philippines and on to the south-west coast of java,
where he refitted for his voyage home. He reported that trade might
be carried on freely with the Moluccas and, moreover, that he had
heard in Java that if the Portuguese pretender, Don Antonio, w^hose

22 f» T!IF. EABLIEK PllA-Sg OK EUKorEAy EJCPJVyjiiOS PT. 11

cause England supported, were ta go to the East Indies they would be
at hi3 disposal, ‘fhcrc were two schools of thought in England re¬
garding the question of the Portuguese empire. Drake and the Devon
men believed that England's best plan for obtaining access to the
trade of the Indian Ocean would be by heljjlng Portugal to gain her
independence. Then, they argued, she could expect to be rewarded
a share in the Pnrtugufiii? monopoly.

The London merchants, however, favoured a direct attack upon
the monopoly, and after the defeat of the Armada in 15SS they
began to petition the queen to encourage trade via the Cape route
Drake s capture in 1587 of the Portuguese Fj7jr>pe qff the .\zons
with a cargo of spices worth j£io8,ooo led them to suggest that the
proposed venture could be financed by the plunder of Portuguese ships
.-Vtid they pointed out that trade could be opened with places between
south India and the Philippines without going near any Pnrtugucse
or Spanish stronghold. To their original petition, presented in
October 1589, there is no answer on record. But the project was
revived in the following year and reanhed in the despatch in icqt
oftm expedition of three ships from Plymouth under George Rav-
mond and James Lancaster bound for the East Indies by the Cape
™ute It is significant that both ComeUs de Hontman, whom the
Dutch Amstwdam merchants chose to lead their first expedition to
the East Indies, and Lancaster were men who had spent part of their
early life in Lisbon.

The expedition would have been successful had it not been for the
appalling mo^ty among the crews. On the way to the Cape it
bwame so serious that one ship had to be sent home from Table Bay
with the sick men. After leaving the Cape Raymond’s ship was lost
at sea, Lancaster, however, reached north-west Sumatra and passed
on to Penang, w^hence he carried on commerce-raiding activities
against Portuguese shipping passing through the Straits of Malacca
But he lost so many men by disease that he was unable to work his
ship home; for when, after leaving St, Helena, he was delayed by
calms he bad to run across to the West Indies for provisions, and
while collecting them he was marooned on Mona through his ship
drifting away with only six men on board to San Domingo, where she
surrendered to the Spaniards. He Wmself and eighteen men were
taken by a French privateer to Dieppe, whence he reached England
1 ^ venture had come to grief, but the fact that

an English ship had roamed the Indian Ocean, preying with impunity
upon Portuguese commerce, aroused some compensating enthusiasm.

CIL 14 THE INTRL^StOJS OF TOK ENOUSif ANH THE DlTOlf 227

And while l^iica:&ter was away another carmek, with an even richer
cargo than Drake's pri^e of 15^7, had been taken.

The Ivondon merchants^ however^ hesitated to send a further expedi¬
tion by the direct route, 'rhere was a deepening trade depression and
much opposition from the merchants engaged in the Le^'ant trade.
In t5g6 Dudley was able to obtain support for a voyage to China via
the Magellan Straits^ and Benjamin Word's disastrous espedition
Avas despatched. The original plan was abandoned and his squadron
of three ships entered the Indian Ocean by the Cape route After
reaching the Malay Peninsula they Avere ail loslt and the sole survivor,
a Frenchman^ was in 1601 picked up by a Dutch ship from Mauritius^
where he was living in Robinson Crusoe style.

The news of lioutman's voyage to Bantam (1595-7) caused opinion
to veer once more in favour of the Cape-route approach: the Dutch
intrusion into the field avss seen as a threat to the Levant trade. When,
thercforCT in 1599 Neck's four ships returned to Holland not only
with rich cargoes but also in record time, a large subscription began
to be raised in the London market for a further voyage lo the East.
The appearance in 159S of an English tEanslatton of Linschoten's
IfittetarWj providing first-rate information regarding the trade and
navigation of the Indian Ocean, had already aroused considerable
interest, and, together with the reports of van Neck's success, clinched
opinion in favour of the formation of a company to trade to the East
Indies by the Cape route.

But there Avere still great diEculties to be overcome. Elizabeth's
government was tn financial straits^ there xvas the Irish rebellion and
the Avar with Spain, The project Avas held up by the queen's negoti¬
ations with Spain. When, howtverp these broke down in July tfkio,
the Privy Council tipped the promoters of the company to go ahead,
with the assurance that an application for a royal charter would be
successful. On 3! December of that same year the East India Com¬
pany began its official existence. StoAv's CAr/iWfVfe attributes its
cnealion to a Dutch corner in pepper, and the story^ has often been
quoted, though entirely legendary.

Under its royal chatter the Companyi Avhich consisted of a governor
and twenty-four 'comminecs' appointed to organize a trading
expedition to the East Indies, Avas granted a monopoly of trade in the
region betAVeen the Cape of Good Hope and the Magellan Straits for
a period of fifteen years. For its first voyage it raised a capital of
j£6fi,oo0. Four ^hips were specially purchased at a cost of ^^41,000,
was spent on goods for trading, and specially coined 'Hals

223 THE EARLJEll PHASE OF EHROPEAX EAPANitON PT. IT

of eight' to the value of £ 3 t, 7 -P were put on board for the purchase of
return cargoes, Lancaster, who had assisted in fitting out the fleet,
was placed in diarge of the expedition, with John Davis as pilot-
major. He had occupied a similar position in Cornells de Houtman's
fleet on his second voyage in 159S-1600,

Lancaster's fleet left in February 1601 and reached .Acheh on 5 June
160a. It sailed on to Bantam, where permission was obtained to build
a factory. Then it set out for home with full cargoes of spices. It
brought back so much pepper that there was a glut in the market and
the shareholders had to receive part payment of the proceeds of the
voyage in pepper. Lancaster had met with no opposition from the
Dutch, who were already well established in the East Indian trade,
and had received active assistance from the King of Acheh in keeping
Malacca ignorant of hb arrival in its neighbourhood. Bantam was the
most suitable site for the first English factory, since it was not only a
flourishing centre for local commerce but was the port to which ihe
Chinese junks came for their pepper. It continued to be the head-
queers of English trade in the Archipelago until 1682.

When Lancaster founded the first English factory in the East
Indies the Dutch had already put in four years of the most intensive
elforts to capture the markets hitherto dominated by the Portuguese.
I^forc the end of 1601 no less than fifteen fleets, oompnaing in all
sixty-five ships, had sailed lo the Indian Ocean either round the Cape
or through the Magellan Straits. Philip II’s decree of 1594 closing
the port of Lisbon to Dutch and English traders has usually been
given as the cause of this truly remarkable onslaught upon the Portu¬
guese ‘ring fence'. ftc«ntly, however, Dutch scholars have been in¬
clined to ascribe Jess importance to it, and to point out that long
before 1594 the Dutch were dissatisfied with thdr position as middle¬
men between Lisbon and the rest of Europe and were anxious to make
the voyage direct to the East for their own profit. The decree, it is
claimed, hastened this new development of Dutch enterprise^ but
did not cause it.

When the Dutch assumed the task of wresting the spice trade from
the Portuguese they possessed certain advantages which placed them
well ahead of the English or any other likely competitors. Their
extensive fishing trade was an excellent nursery for seamanship. Their
function as the waggoners and factors of Europe, in which they were
competing successfully iviih the Hanseatic cities, gave them ex-
pertenee as middlemen which few could rival. Moreover, their
financial methods were the most up-tendate in Europe, and they had

Ctt. 14 nTE TXTRUSION OF THE ENCLISK AND THE DUTCH 229

their disposal an amount of fluid capital which from the start ga%'c
them an immense superiority over the English East India Company.
Thdr chief reasons for hesitation in attempting to develop the Cape
route were, ^ in the case of the English, the lack of knowledge concern¬
ing the navigation of the Indian Ocean and their long concentration
upon attempts to discover a North-East Passage,

In 1592, however, Jan Huygen van Linschoten of Haariem, who
had spent four years in Portugal and subsequently five years in Goa as
secretary to its archbishop, arrived back in his native countrv with ah
immense fund of knowledge regarding the trade and navigation of the
Indian Ocean, which he at once placed at the disposal of the leading
gccigrapbers and cartographers. His RfysgejrAri/t van tit .Vatigatirn
der PoTtt^aloy$rrt in On>B/e«, published in 1595, and Itincrario,
yoyagif t^fU Sekiptaert zatt Jan Huygza van Linsc/ioien neat Oast —
ofie Portugaets /rti/fm, which appeared a year later, contained exactly
the practical information that had hitherto been lacking. Perhaps
more important still, he showed that the Portuguese power in the
East was rotten and that their rebiions with the native peoples wer* so
bad that other traders had a splendid opportunity to enter into com¬
petition. ,^nd he pointed to Java as an excellent centre for establishing
trade, since the Portuguese rarely went there.

In 1595 the first Dutch expedition set out to the East Indies by the
Cape route. It was financed by a symiicate known as the Compagnie
van Verve, which came into existence as a result of the failure to make
headway with the discovery of the North-East Passage. I’he ex¬
pedition was under the leadership of Cornelia de Houtman, who had
spent some years as a merchant in Lisbon, How much he actually
learnt from Linachoten before his departure is uncertain, hut it is
significant that his toursis vv3$ plf^tted by Linschoten "s close friend
and colleagxi^^ the cartographer Plandua, and he used the Rfy^gfsefiri/i^
He himself uas a bad conunander^ a boaster and ruffian^ who nearly
brought the e?tpcdition to grief through his 'preposterous* conduct-
The fact that on the outward journey done 145 of his 249 men
died has been attributed to his deficiencies as a commander, but, in
view of Lancaster's losses in men during his first voyage, must
probably Avith more Justice be put doAvn lo lack of experience.

VVith his small squadron of four ships he reached Bantam in June
1596. He was well received, but his behaviour was so outrageous that he
and some of hi$ men were throw n into prison- The Dutch ships there¬
upon bombarded the town- A month later de Houtman w'as mnsomed.
After sailing off east wards to Jacatra and other north Javanese ports

Cli. 14 THE INTRUSION OF THE ENGLISH AND THE DITCH 231

as far aa the iaiand of Bali, de Houtinan^s officers forced him to make
for homCf though madequate cargoes had been procured and he was
anxious to visit the Moluccas. In August 1597 he returned to the
Texel with three out of his four ships and eighty-nine men* Notwith¬
standing the disappointingly small cargoes which he brought back
with him, there great jubilation tn Holland at his return. His
voyage had demonstrated that with better organisation and leadership
successful trade with the Indies was possible. And preparations were
at once put in hand for further expeditions.

The rejoicing of the Dutch was equalled by the consternation of
the Portuguese at de Houtman's exploit. The Viceroy of Goa equipped
a fleet to prevent further Dutch voyages. The King of Bantam was
strictly forbidden to receive further foreign Europi^n merchants and
reprisals vvere taken against his shipping. But the Javanese resis¬
tance was so determined that the Portuguese fleet had to retreat on
Malacca.

In 159S no less than five expeditions^ numbering in all tiventv-two
ships, left Holland for the East Indies. Of thesc^ thirteen vvent via riie
Cape and nine via the Magellan Straits. Oliver van Noort^ in one of
the westward‘bound ships, returned via the Cape and bec-amt the
first Dutch commander to circumnavigate the globe. The biggest
single expedition was sent by the Corapagnie van Verre from Amster¬
dam under Jacob van Neck, with van Warwijek and van Heemskerck
next in command. On the outward v-^oyage the island of Mauritius wa^i
discovered by van Warwijek and named af^er Maurice of Nassau.
Van Neck reached Bantam in six months from leaving home. The
Bantammers, having had to fight off a Portuguese fleet, traded will¬
ingly, and with four ships fully laden with pepper he sailed for home,
whither he arrived less than fourteen months after his departure.
His treatment of the natives had been so tactful that he brought w'ith
him for presentation to Prince Maurice a gold cup from the young sul¬
tan and a letter from his chief minister, ^fhe remaining four aliips of
van Neck ^5 squadron sailed along the north coast of Java, touching at
Jacaini, Tuban and Gresik* Van FIcemskerck and van VV^arwijek then
tt^ent on to Amboina, whence the former was sent on to the Banda
Islands. He established a factory on Lonthor and returned to Holland
in 1599* Van Warwijck went on to Ternatc and returned home late
in 1600. The cargoes brought back by van Neck yielded a profit of
100 per cent on the outlay for the whole expedition. When the re¬
maining ships returned home and the accounts were closed a total
profit of 400 per cent was declared.

THE EAniJEfi PHASE OF EITROPEAX EXPANSION PT. II

Other ships of the fleets sent out in 1598 visited Sumatra. Borneo,
Siam, IVIaniJa, Oantnn and Japan^ But none of the other expeditions
made sueh staggering profits as van Neck’s. The two expeditions
through the Magellan Straits failed badly to the tune of half a million
galldere, and one of those via. the Cape brought heavy losses to its
promoters. But the significant fact is that, nonviihstanding their
struggle for independence against Spain, these losses, which would
have brought a crisis in London, neither crippled nor even cramped
the Dutch effort. Several more companies were formed and more
ships than ever before were despatched to the Hast, "niere were so
many companies competing with each other in sending out ships that
the period up to the formation of the United East India Company in
160a goes by the name of the teiltie vaarl, or the period of indis¬
criminate voj-aging. So far as South-East Asia was concerned there
WM hardly a port of any importance that was not visited by Dutch
ships. Everywhere almost without exception they were received with
friendliness and their help was sought against the Portuguese. The
mBst striking exception was the murder of Comclis dc Houtman at
Acheh in 1599 and the imprisonment of his brother Frederick there
for two years, during which he composed the earliest Malay-Dutch
dictionary and Malay translations of a number of Christian prayers.

In j6oo Steven van der Haghen concluded the first important treaty
w ith a native ruler. It was with a chief of Amboina, who besides per¬
mitting the Dutch to establish the ‘Kasteel van Verre’ on his territory
promised them the exclusive delivety of all the cloves produced
there, !t vras the first of many similar agreements whereby the Dutch
sought not merely to oust the Portuguese but to monoplize the trade
against all corners from Europe, Before the ever-increasing number
of Dutch ships that poured into their preserves the Portuguese were
at a great disadvantage. At home Lisbon could send no help. Philip
I ITs use of the port for his naval preparations against England and the
Netherlands in J599 caused the English to blockade it, and in any ease
the extravagance and inclfidcncy of Spanish policy had reduced it to
a mere shadow of its former greatness. Goa therefore had 10 manage
with such naval forces as it could muster in the Eastern seas. In 1601
furtado de Mendoza put out from Malacca with a fleet of thirtv
vessels to attack Bantam, but Wolphcrt Ifarmensz with five ships of
the Compagnic van Verm drove him off. But while the Dutch ships
were scattered collecting cloves among the islands of the Moluccas the
Portuguese commander succeeded in an effort to regain control of
Amboina, He followed this up with an attack upon Ternate in

ClI. 14 THE Or THE ENGLISH AND THE DtiTCH 233

C£K(>pi:ration with the Spaniards (jam Manila. But thb failed and he
returned with his exhausted trdop$ to ^lalacca^ The Portuguese were
also foiled by a Dutch ^uadron in an aitaek upon their old enemy
the Sultan of Johore,

The failure of the Portuguese attempt to drive the Dutch om of the
Archipelago provided the latter with an excellent opportunity for a
general counier-ofFensive, but one which under the existing con¬
ditions of trade they were Hot to a position to sciite. It had become
urgently necessan' to bring the taUdr mart to an end. Prices were
rising steeply as a result of the competition between the merchants of
different companies to procure cargoes* and in some cases they had
even come to blows, A movement towards amalgamation began m
1600. I'hc formation of the English East India Company convinced
the l>utch that only by a united national effort could they con¬
solidate and preserve what they had gained in the enthtisiasm of their
first push to the East. Such were the factors whieh brought into
being the United East India Company or the V,OX\ (\'ereenigde
Oi;>stindische Compagnic), *

"Phe constitution of the Company was laid down by the orirooi of
the Slates General of 20 March 1602 w^hich btought it into being, ft
was gnintcd the monopoly of trade in the regions between the Cape of
Good Hope and the Magellan Straits for an initial period of tivcnty-
one years, together with power to make treaties, build forts, maintain
armed forces and install officers of justice. In each city where amal¬
gamating companies were established, namely Anusterdam, Middel-
hurgj I 3 clft, Rotterdam, Hoorn and Enkhuizen, there was to he a
V^O-C. Chamber* while the governors of these companies, numbering
seventy-^ix were to form its directors* vvitb the provision that vacancies
were to remain unfilled until the number had declined to sixty. The
actual management of day-to-day affairs w^as entrusted to a body of
sseventeeji, referred to as the Hceren AT 7 /, the fk'recltiir^n or the
Major^s. On this body the Amsterdam Chamber w^as to have eight
seats. An initial capital of 6| million guilders was subscribed, of
which .Amsterdam's $harc amounted to 3,675,000 guilders. Each
Chamber was lo fit out ships independently^ but profit and loss were
to be shared by alL E^inally the Company was to lake over all the
factories esLihlishcd in the E^st by its predecessors, namely at Tern ate
in the Moluccas, Banda, Bantam and Grcaik on the north coast of Java,
Patani and Johore on the Malay Peninsula, and Acheh at the north-
w^cgtcrn tip of Sumatra, h was a truly remarkable piece of amalgam¬
ation, in w'hich local inierests and central direction were hLirmonixed

234 TTIE FAJILIER 1 ‘HASE OF FUMOPEAN EXPANSION Pr. II

in such a way as £o provide for the utmost concentration of the
national effort. And it is noteworthy that the capital with which ft
commenced operations was practically ten times as large as the

EnglUh Company's.

Wybrand van Warwijefc commanded the firet fleet of fifteen shijTS
wnt out by the Company, and within three years thirty-eight ships
had been equipped and despatched to the East- They'went out in
powerful, heavily armed fleets designed to attack the Portuguese, and
while new factories were being established in Java. Celebes (at
Macassar) and on the mainland of India (at Surat. Ma^unpatam and
Petapoli) relations were established with Ceyinn, where the Portuguese
monopolized the emnamon trade, and preparations were made to
trade directly to CWna arid Japsn.

The counter-attack upon the Portuguese had only mixed success.
With their backs to the wall they show'ed unexpected powers of re¬
sistance, and they received valuable assistance from the Spaniards at
-Manila. A Portuguese fleet was defeated off Johore in 1603. Two
yaars later notable successes were gained in the Spice Islands: the
Portuguese fortresses on .Amboina and in the Moluccas came under
the suzerainty of the -Netherlands. But in 1606 the Dutch attack on
Malacca was beaten off by the Portuguese, while a Spanish fleet from
the Philippines conquered their trading posts in the Moluccas- And
although in 1607 they recovered eastern Tematc from the Spaniards,
their attacks on Mozambique and Goa in the next vear completely
failed, and they wasted their resources in fruitless efforts to capture
Manila-

In 1609 the situation showed dear signs of improvement. By the
occupation of the island of Banda-Neira and the establishment of
Fort Nassau the Dutch regained the upper hand in the Spice Islands,
while by the Twelve Years' Truce signed with Spain at Antwerp thev
obtained a breathing-space from the Jong struggle in Europe together
with the right to hold ail the conquests they had made from Spain and
Portugal. In that same year they took a far-reaching and much-
needed step in the consolidation of their power in the East by the
appointment of Pieter Roth as Oovemor-CeneraLof the Indies with
control over all ‘forts, places, factories, persons and business of the
United^ Company’. With him was associated a ‘Council of India'
consisting of four members- His instructions laid down that the
possession of the Spice Islands w'as of the highest importance to the
Company and that aJ| competitors must he excluded from them.
Before these instructions were draw n up there had already been trouble

CH. 14 niE INTKISION OF TIIE ENOLIi^ll ^ND THE DUTCH 2^3

betvvecH the Dutch the EngUs-h in both the MoIucca£ :md the
Bandar. It was soon to develop into a serious quarrel.

(6) Thf vtwj/O'Dif/fA struggle /or the sptce trade

* From the beginning of the centurj^ the English^ though far inferior
in strengthp had been following the Dutch around the archipelago,
pursuing them like gadflies/ writes J. S. FumivalL^ And Bernard
Vlekke writes in the same vein; *The merchants of London followed
their more powerful neighboui^ wherever they went, hoping to profit
from the pioneer work of others. The expenses of the war against
Spain, by Avhich Indonesian trade was made safe for the northern
nations, were left graciously to the Netherlandets^ and w’herever tlie
Dutch Company founded a reading post the English were sure to
follow; at Patani^ at Djantbi:! at Jacatra, and in many other places-^'
And he ptocecds to quote Fumivairs statement in support of his owm,

Now', though plausible, neither statement will bear detailed exami-
nation. It is true that the Dutch point of vietv concerning what to
them W'as the heroic period in the history of their East India Company
is strikingly different from that of English researchers^ $uch as Sir
William Foster* and W. H. Moreland,^ who made a lifelong study of
the early records of the English Company. Hence it is all die more
unfortunate that the works of Cohnbrander* and Stape!/ who have
given it its most authoritative expression, should be a^^ikble only in
Dutch. Jn any case it is difficult for a Dutchman to write dispassion¬
ately of this period. Dutch expansion to the East formed a major item
in their eighty years* struggle for independence and was undertaken
as much for political and strategic as for economic reasons. Their East
India Company conducted a concentrated national offensive against
P<mugal and Spaint they bitterly resented the intrusion of the

English into the spice trade, since the latter had lost much of their
Elizabethan hatred of Spain and would gladly have made peace wnth
the Portuguese on a basis of live and let live in the East.

^ NiitJtrrlafutK India, CimttHdKc, i9j9aed pp. afr-7.

■ NwanfiifcA^ ,4 vj iht Ea^t Indian Archipditi^l>, Ilan'ard Ufiiv, Cjm-

bndii;^, ]^5, l>. [ 1 ].

* •^cep^tticillarly tff 7 >rtdr(ly 35 >, Thr Vayagtt af Sirjfam^s

lMri£asifr (194D). The I'aytj^ af Sir Henry MMiitriun lo thf and The

Jfmrnai John JwirJain

* PrtiT Fhmt, //u t Imhev in the GMc (i934)k TAr Rditthm of

Qtdenmta

* KoimiaU GeithieJemt (j VoU.f iy:i 5 > and hi^ fiKPhiinicxitat /Vcfm54>Dw Q*fff (5
vnUr, ?qrq).

* Gfteki^rnh van Srdertanftieh Ir^if, vqIi iii.

ititx sai gXVJtftImT.

tiT. f4 im iNTfir^ioN Of the English Am thk i>mrcH 237

Mxireovcr. from thdr^perience ais middk-m&n the Dutch realijced,
in u way that the Etiglish cuuld not. that the market for Apices in
Europe was Hmited^ and that competition, by forcing up the purchase
price in the East and causing a glut in the Wiist, wouJd dangerously
reduce the possibilities of prolitable trade. They therefore concen^
lrated upon establishing a monopoly, and were prepared, by fair
means or foul, to exclude all competitors. And the EngJish, who had
sympathised with and helped the Dutch in their struggle against
l^hilip T[ of Spain, were at finst surprised, and subsequently deeply
indignant, at their treatment hy the people whom they regarded as
their natural allies in Europe.

The trouble began during what is known as the Second Voj'age of
tile English Company, which w^as intended to open up direct relations
w'ith Amboina and the Banda Islands. Its commander, Htnry Middle-
ton, on arrival at Bantam in December 1604 found there a powerful
Dutch fleet under Steven van der ilaghen. which had been sent out
to attack the Portuguese. The Dutch altitude was friendly, and he
icamt from the English factors w^ho had been left behind by the Finyc
Voyage that after Lancaateris departure for home the attitude of the
natives had become so difhenU that but for the backing of the Dutch
factors the English factory might have been exterminated. Middleton
arrived at Amboina before the Dutch and began 10 negotiate with the
Portuguese for permission to trade. But the Dutch fleet, following on.
forced the Portuguese to capitulate and prevented him from carrying
on trade. He went on to Tidore, where by chance he saved the Sukan
of Tcraate and three Dutch merchants, who were fleeing from the
place. Me tvas again followed up by the Dutch fleci, now bent on the
capture uf TidorCj tvhich fell to it tn May 1605. He managed to obtain
a cargo of cloves at 'Pemate, and one of his ships collected a fair
quantity of mace and nutmegs in the Bandas; but Dutch hostility
forced him to return to Bantam without planting a factor

The commanders of the Third Voyage had much the same e.xpcri-
ence as Middleton's^ David Middleton, his brother, arrived in the
Moluccas in January 160S to find a struggle in progress between the
Dutch and the Spaniards, w^ho had come to the help of the Portuguese
and inflicted a severe reverse on the Dutch and their ally the Sultan of
I'ernate* As he refused to join in an attack upon the Dutch, he was
refused permission to trade. William Keeling, who arrived 111 the
Bandas in Februar)' of the following year, found the Dutch factors
friendly and began to collect a cargo of $pices. But in the following
month Admiral Verhoeff arrived there in command of a powerful fleet

IT. II

238 THE EARLIER PHASE OF EUROPEAN EXPANSION

with spccioJ ordurs to cnforct the monopttly. I'lav'ing ovetcttme alj
resistance, the Dutch then forced the local chiefs toaign treattea grant¬
ing them 3 monopoly of the spice trade and ordered Keeling to depart.
In 1610 David Middleton, in charge of the Company's Fifth Voyage,
arrived at Banda Neira only to be ordered away bv the Dutch governor.
When he adopted a defiant attitude, saying that the English had a right
to be there since their nations were friends in Europe, the Dutch
threatened force. He also made a shotv of force and got awav to the
island of Wai, which was not under Dutch control. "J’herc he secured
a good lading and left behind two factors to collect more.

As incident after incident of this sort followed nnc another, the
English merchants came to realize that they were up against a resolute
Dutch move to monopolize the commerce of the Archipelago; and the
East India Company decided lo invoke the support of the government.
In November 1611 it complained to Lord Treasurer Salisbiirv of the
'undvil and inhuman wrongs’ committed by the Dutch a^inst its
^rvamsand begged him toiaketbe matter up with the States General.
Fhe English ambassador at The Hague, who was instructed to make
representations on the subject, warned Salisbury that the V.O.C. was
so powerful that it was quite likely to flout the orders of the States
General if these were contrary to its own interests. I'hc only result
of bis interv ention was the production by the Dutch of a long list of
counter-charges against the English. He suggested, therefore, that
pressure should be brought to bear upon both companies by their
respective governments to negotiate an agreement for joint trade.

Neither side, however, was willing to come to such an arrangement;
so that although, under pressure from both governments, tw'o con¬
ferences w'ereheld—one in London in 1613 and the othcratThc Hague
in if* 15 nothing came of them. The Dutch took their stand upon the
i-hey had concluded with native rulers, though the manner in
which they had secured some of them would not hear investigation,
and complained that the English expected to share free of cost the
commerce which they had wrested from Spain and Tortuga] at im¬
mense cost. The English contended that they had traded in tlic Moluc¬
ca long before the Dutch had appeared on the scene, and that as a
friendly nation they should not be debarred from trading there on the
pretext of Dutch hostilities with other powers. *l'hey refused outright
to pay any share of the expenditure already incurred by the Dutch in
fighting the Spaniards and the Portuguese, or to join with them in
further acta of war, in this they were supported by James I, who was
most assiduously cultivating friendly relations with Philip Ilf,

I'Ji. [4 TttB tSTRt-SlON OF THE ANO THE DUTCH 339

Meanwhile the English were busily engaged in broadening the scope
of their trade. 'I'hey had discovered that the best way to obtain spices
was to lade cotton goods and opium in India for sale in the spice pons
of the Archipelago. One result of this was that in 1609 they began to
Cultivate relations with the Mughal emperor Jehangir and at the same
time, against fierce Portuguese resistance, to force their way into the
textile trade of western India. Another was the despatch of the GtoSte
in 1611 to engage in trade in the Bay of Bengal and the Gulf of Siam.
'I’he Dutch had already pushed thdr way with considerable success
into the textile trade hetw'een the Coromandel Coast and the countries
on the opposite side of the bay; and in j6io the committee entrusted
with the preparation of the English Company’s Seventh V’oyage
obtained the serv ices of two Dutchmen, Pieter VViJIemszoon Floris and
Lucas Antheunissmon (always referred to in the English records as
Peter Floris and Lucas Antheunis), both of whom had had practical
experience in the Dutch Coromandel factories, to take charge of the
enterprise.

The voyage of the Ghhe opened a new chapter in the bistorv' of the
East India Company, for it not only resulted in the establishment of
an English factory at Alasulipatam on the Coromandel Coast but also
directly in the opening of commercial relations with Siam and in¬
directly with Burma. In Siam factories were planted at Patani, a
Malay state under Siamese suzerainty, and at .■\yut’ia, the capital.
Both I’atani and Ayut’ia were important for their trade with China,
whence tame supplies of silk and porcelain, and japan. The merchants
of the two countries went to Ayut’ia principally to buy hides and
skins, and to Patani for spices imported there from the Archipelago.
I'he dye-wood known as ‘brazil’, aloes-wood, benzoin and tin could
also he obtained in the local markets. *l'he Dutch were already estah-
Jished at both places and the rulers welcomed competition from other
Europeans. From .\yut’ia two factors were sent up to Chiengmai to
open trade with the Laos states. While they were there King .Inauk-
petlun of Burtiia besieged the city . One of them got away before it
fell; the other, 't'homas Samuel, was captured and taken to Pegu with
his unsold goods, '[’here he died, and the East India Company’s first
relations with Burma were opened when the Masulipatam factorj' sent
two of its assistants to Pegu to claim his goods.

While the Giohe was engaged upon this enterprise further develop¬
ments were taking place in Sumatra, Java, Borneo and Celebes.
Captain Thomas Best, after establishing English trade at Surat in 161 a
(in the teeth of Portuguese opposition), wi-nt on to Acheh in April

240 THE EARLIER PHASE OF El'ROPFAV EXi'ANSIfW PT, |]

iftij to exploit the pepper tnide. Two years hiter. against strong
Dutch opposition, fartories Here planted at Acheh, friomam and
Jambi. In 1617 the English at Bantam pfanted factories at Jacatra
and Japara on the north coast of Ja^’a. 'Phe Dutch destroyed the
factory at japara in the course of a war with Mataram, but it'was re*
established in 1619. In 1611 or i6ia Bantam had also planted a
faetoiy at Succadana on the south-west coast of Borneo. I’his was in
consequence of a report that the Dutch were obtaining gold and
diamonds therej but Dutch competition prevented it from making
headway, and when in 1622 the town was sacked by a Javanese force
both Dutch and English sustained heavy Josses and ■withdrew'.

I he factory at Aflacassar in Celebes was founded bv John Jourdain
in 1613. Ihis tough Devon seaman, whom Jan Pieterszoon Coen
considered the 'most guilty*' of all his English opponents,‘ became
the leading protagonist of the struggle against the Dutch when in that
year be was entrusted by Sir Henry Middleton with the task of planting
a factory in the Moluccas. He went first to Hitu on the northern coast
of Amboina, where the Dutch refused him permission to buy cloves.
Pie thereupon sailed across to Luhu on the western enti of Ceram,
where the Dutch had become unpopular through using their monopolv
agreement to beat down the price of cloves by almost 50 per cent.
When the natives explained that they would willingly supply him
w'ith cloves were it not for their fear of the Dutch, he went up'to the
Dutch factory to expostulate. There he was confronted by an indig¬
nant young man who was none other than the future governor-general
himself.

In the interview that took place each struck sparks off the other's
armour. Coen, ‘in a choleric manner’, said that if Jourdain bought
cloves without Dutch consent ‘it was so much stolen from them, and
therefore they would prevent it, if by any means they migliiJourdain
replied that the country was free for the English os for the Dutch, and
when Coen refused his challenge to put the matter to a meeting of the
chiefs he went off to an assembly of llic natives and told them what
had passed bctivcen himself and Coen. The natives accordingly
demanded the attendance of the Dutch, and in their presence re¬
affirmed their desire to trade with the English. But it was all to no
purpose; for though Jourdain contemptuously refused to he deterred
by Dutch threats to use force, he failed to persuade the natives to
disobey their masters and sailed away to Kambelu, on the opposite
coast of Ceram, in response to a message that he might take delivery

* H. I'cipiira, JJf Faiuirij itrr On$fhuiinrfif Cfimfittffmr If Ptitum, p. ii6.

CTi. 14 THE INTRll^iTON OP T>TE HNGI.J 5 H THE OTTCIl 241

of a quantity of doves there. He obtained a small supply, but the
chief was too frightened of the Dutch to grant his request to plant a
factory,

'I'here was nothing for it but to return to Bantam with hia mission
unaccomplished. On the way he called at Macassar; and although the
Dutch had settled there, the king was on bad terms w'ith them and
gladly permitted him to establish a factor)'. It proved to be of con¬
siderable importance^ for Macassar was a halfway house between Java
and the Spice Tslands* lu connection with the latter was important*
for it scot thecn gold and much-needed rice in ret urn for spices. For
many years it was to be a thorn in the side of the Dutch, stoutly
maintaining its independence and defying aU their attempts to prevent
a large leakage in their spice monopoly, until at last they conquered
it in 1667.

So far as the Moluccas were concerned, the English persevered in
attempts to carry on trade despite Dutch opposition. Cloves fetched
more than three times the price of pepper In tlic London market, and
there wras a demand for the finer spices all over the East. In every
w'ay it was the most lucrative trade in the East, and, writes Foster^
^our countrjmien can scarcely be blamed for struggling hard against
the attempt to exclude them from all share in this commerceThey
were* however, too weak to undertake anything more than sporadic
efforts, in which they encouraged the natives to break their contracts
with the Dutch in the hope 0/ English supports When, in face of the
determined attitude of the Dutch, these efforts petered out, as they
did in the case of the attempts of the Concord and the Thamasine to
trade with Ceram in 1615, the unfortunate natives were left in the
lurch.

It was in the Bandas that the great struggle took place which more
than anjihing else brought matters to a head. It began with the
expedition in 1615 of George Bail and George Cokayne in the Concord
and Spccdtscllto the islands. On arrival at Neira in March they found
a strong Dutch squadron there under the command of no less a person
than the govemor-generd himself, Gerard Keynst {1614-15). What
had happened w^ that the Dutchj in view of persistent English
attempts to trade with the islands, had decided that the only effective
method of maintaining their monopoly was that of outright conquest.
Reynst noi only forbade the English to trade but sent ships to shadow
them in their endeavours to evade his order. When* in spite of Dutch
Vigilance, Ball managed to purchase a quantity of spices on the island
^ Quat E^lrnt Trad^t p.

242 THE HACtLIFJt PHASE OE EHAOPFAN PT. II

of Wai* the Dutch landed a force on the island. But the natives rallied
to the support of the English and drove off the Dutch with heavy loss,
1 he upshot of it ah wa3 that two En|:1ish merchants were left on the
island while a representative of the chiefs went to Bantam, where
Jourdain was Agent, to ask for help against the Dutch. Jooirdain,
however, had not the strength at his disposal to challenge the Dutch
to a fight, and he was atvare that negotiations fora settlement were m
progress in Europe, Nevertheless he was resolved to do w hat he could,
since he believed that the Dutch had no claim to Wais its chiefs, he
W 3 S informed, had never made any agreement with them.* In Januar^^
i6i6p therefore* he sent a squadron of five a hips under l^amucJ Castle-
ton to the BaiidasH

As soon as the Dutch at Neira heard of Castlcton's arrival at Wai
they despatched a Strong fleet to drive him off. Faced by ovcnvhelm-
ingly superior numbers, he w eakly accepted the terras dictated to him
by the Dutch commander, Jan Dirkszoon Lam_ E le gave an assurance
that no English assistance would be given to the natives of Wai on
the understanding that wben the Dutch invaded the island th^^ would
not interfere with the English factors there. If the Dutch conquered
the island the English factors would leave. To have attempted to put
up a fight would have been madness^ but Sir WilHam Foster claims
with justice that he could have withdrawn under pratest^ leaving the
Dutch with the erabarrassment of deahng with the year-old English
factory on an island to wbkh they had no valid claim.* Casdeton^s
squadron, leaving behind a pinnace for the evacuation of the factory
should the need arise, w^ent on to seek for spices in the •Moluccas. But
wherever the Dutch were in control the natives were prevented from
trading with them. Only at Tidore, where the Spanish still raaintained
a fortress, w'crc they able to barter rice for spices.

Meanwhile Richard Hunt, the chief English factor at Wai« was
determined not to leave the native in the lurch. He therefore per^
suaded them and the inhabitants of the neighbouring island of Run
to make a formal surrender of their klands to the East India Company
and to hoist the English colours over their defences. His fond hope
that this would deter the Dutch from attacking proved false. They
quickly made themselves masters of Wai, Most of the inhabitants fled
in panic to Run. Hunt also eluded the infuriated Dutch and escaped
to Macassar, whence he made his way to Bantam. For the lime Ijeing
they left Run alone, and Jourdain, as soon as he heard what had

* thlji point, however, ae« Heeren, Corpm j, p, 35^

® Op. at.^ p* j? 64.

CU. 14 TifE OF THE AXO THE DlfTCH 243

happened^ sent a fre^ih expedition under NathanJcl Coiirthope to help
the natives to defend the island* He was instructed to offer Hnglish
protection to the people of Lonthor and Rosengijn also.

Courthope with his two ships^ the Stnan and the /)i/enee, arrived at
Run in December 1616. Although Wai was in Dutch handsp the
ceremony of ceding both islands was re-enacted after he had received
assurances from the chiefs that they had never made any agreement
with the Dutch. Then guns w'ere landed and preparations made for
defence. Agreements were also made Avith Rosetigijn and a town on
Lonthor for the surrender of their lands to the British Crown. The
D□tch^ however, Averejust as determined as Courthope. They attacked
and overpoAvered the killing in the fight one gf the senior

officers of the expedition. Courthope then prepared to make a deS’-
peratc resistance. He fortified the little island of Nail aka overlooking
his anchorage and prepared to beach the Dt/rnfc in a shckcred place.
Unfortunately during the operation she began to drift away and
eventually a mutinous section of her crew sailed her off and surrendered
her to the Dutch. *

At thb juncture the Dutch governor-geo era I Laurens Rcael arrived
in Neira. Realising the full seriousness of the situation, he decided to
tr>^ negotiation before proceeding to sterner measure. His proposals
Avere not unlike tho:^ previously accepted by Castle ton at Wai: if the
English would leave the Dutch a free hand to deal with the island
their ships would be restored and they could depart with all the spices
they had collected* But Courthope replied that he Avould neither turn
traitor to his king and country nor Avould he betray the natives, flis
own counter proposal was that if Reael would leave the matter of the
disputed territory to he settled at Bantam or in Europe he would agree
to depart. The governor-general in his turn rejected these terras and
negotiations were broken off. Reael decided that he must await rein¬
forcements before attacking Run; Courthope held on grimly at Naibka
and sent an urgent appeal for help to Bantam, But Jourdain was no
longer in command there ; he had gone home. 1 lence nothing effective
Avas done to relieve the threatened post. In November 1617 Read
AATOtc to the English president at Bantam ordering the evacuation of
Run and threatening that any English ship found in the Moluccas
would be attacked. He received a defiant reply to the effect that the
island Avould be defended to the last and he would he held responsible
for any bloodshed that might occur

In 161S relations bctAvceti the two parties became steadily Avorse,
The Dutch Avere genuinely worried by the situation in the Spice

344 TlfF RARLIEH I'lWSR OF El’ROPEAN EXPANSION FT, H

IsLanda; they feared lest as a result of English encouragement the
natives would fall upoo and destroy their w*eaJ( garrisons there. By
this time they' had spread themselves so widely that their strength was
dangerously dispersed. In June of that year Jan Pieierszoon Coen
became governor-general of the Netherlands Indies and at once began
to infuse a new vigour into the administration. As early as 1614 he
had submitted a statement on policy to the directors,* He recorn-
mcndcd a programme of vast territorial expansion and colonization at
the expense of the Spaniards and Portuguese, and the annihilation of
the shipping of other European competitors, English competition he
considered to be the greatest danger: in the Moluccas they ruined the
piece-goods trade and got away with much spice, 'I'he Bandas, he
thought, must be either peopled ivilh colonists from other parts or
completely conquered by arms. Moreover, to concentrate and direct
their full strength the Dutch must have a rendezvous. In his instruc¬
tions, which Were signed the Heeren XVII and conhnned by
Maurice, he was enjoined to expel all foreigners, whether allies or
enemies, from places where the Dutch traded—by force, if necessary.
Their ships must be searched, and if spice were found on them it must
be removed. ,

In the following November John Jourdain arrived in Bantam aa the
English president. His appointment indicated the adoption of a
more vigorous policy by the English Company. While tn England he
had attended the Company’s committee and pressed for force sufficient
not only to hold Bantam but to trade vrith the Moluccas and Bandas.
He affirmed his beliet that uncompromising resistance to the Dutch
monopolbcing efforts would not lead to w.ir, since the Dutch would
hesitate before taking extreme measures. He underestimated Jan
Pieterszoon Coen.

He was sent out W'iih a fleet of six vessels under the command of
Sir Thomas Dale and was given authority over all the Company's
factories, except Surat and its dependencies. Otf the coa.st of Sumatra
the fleet's flagship, the Sun, was wrecked. On arrival at Bantam they
were greeted with serious news. Two ships sent to relieve Courthopc
at Run had been captured by the Dutch, while in Bantam they had
assaulted Englishmen in the streets. But the Dutch situation in Java
was by no means happy. Their relations W'ith Ronamanggala* of
Bantam had been so strained that Coen had threatened 10 withdraw

icn de E, IlHrcn Bcwinthebburcn, iciiischfrendc den NcdcrljiiitM^hc
liwiUcHen Stun."

* He WM ihtidiief nfimutcriinil, as the king wm a minQr, wii ihc dftctivc hfind of the

■tiitc.

CII. 14 THE INTHUSJON OF THE ENGLISH AND THE DLtTCH 245

the factory. He had gone to Jacatra with the intention of truiking the
Dutch factory there his rendezvous. But when, against the strict
Orders of the pangt:ran, he had begun to fortify it a state of war had
developed. At about the same time the Dutch factory at Japara had
been captured by the forces of the Sunan Agung of Mataram, whose
ambition was to restore the empire of Majapahit, and he came to the
conclusion that a coalition of Javanese states was forming against the
Dutch. And as most of his ships were guarding the Spice Islands
against an expected attack by the English in reprisal for the action
against their ships at Run, Dale’s arrival and junction with another
English fleet under Martin Pring, which was already off Bantam,
placed him in a position of serious inferiority at sea.

trouble began oij 14 December 1618, when the Zirarie Legate,
on arriving at Bantam from Patani, was seized by Dale to be held as
surety for the satisfaction of the English claims against the Dutch.
Unfort^atdy she was accidentally set on fire and burnt out, and Coen
in reprisal attacked and destroyed the English factory at Jacatra. Dale
thereupon sailed to Jacatra and an indecisive engagement took place
betw'cen the two fleets, Coen, however, managed to extricate his fleet
and sailed aw'ay to .AmboLna to collect reinforcements and concentrate
hla forces. lie was prepared to sacrifice the beleaguered fort at Jacatra
in Order to save his ships. And Dale, although the main objective of
his expedition was to protect English trade in the Spice Islands,
Weakly decided against following Coen and taking relief to the gallant
Counhopc. Instead he remained at Jacatra to assist the pangdran
against the Dutch fort. It was a bad miscalculation of the situation;
for when the Dutch Council had agreed to articles of surrender under
which the Dutch personnel were to be transported in English ships
to the Coromandel Coast, Ranamanggala of Bantam suddenly ap¬
peared at Jacatra with an army and demanded that the fort and ail
the prisoner should be handed over to him. .And, to cut a long story
short. Dale, unwilling to go hack on the agreement he had made with
the Dutch, sailed away to Bantam; the Bantam army drove off the
pangcran’s besieging force, hut then found itself quite unable to
capture the fort, which managed to hold out until the end of May
t6iq, when it wps relieved by Coen, who returned from Amfaoina with
a powerful fleet.

Coen’s bold gamble succeeded beyond his highest expectations, for
he found on returning that the whole situation had changed in his
favour. In the first place the English had quarrelled with Ranamang-
gala and had decided, temporarily at least, to leave Bantam. Dale and

246 THE tiAHLIER PHASE OF Fl'KOPEAN EXPANSION PT. II

faring, whose ships were m bad oonclitiDci, had left for the Coromandel
Coast to effect repairs and collect more ships with which to fight Coen,
jourdain himself, with two ships, had left m tatc much-needed help
to the factories at Jambi. Patani, A)*ut'ia and elsewhere. Coen learnt
ot these happenings when, having taken initial steps to establish the
new' city O'f Batavia on the site of Jacatia aa the capital of the Dutch
eastern empire, he went on to Bantam to challenge Dale and Jourdain.
He at once detached three ships in pursuit of Jourdain. In the middle
of July thej' found him at anchor off Patani and at once attacked. 'Phe
result was a foregone conclusion; Jourdain was caught in a trap, and
although he put up a stubborn fight his casualties were so heavy that
he was compelled to negotiate for surrender. While the discussion was
in progress under a flag of truce he unwisely appeared on deck and
was at once killed hy a shot from one of the Dutch ships. I’hc Dutch
claimed that his death was accidental, but the English account asserted
that 'the Flemmings espying him most ireacherously and cruelly shot
at him with a musket', hlodern Dutch historical research confirnas
thjs v-iew, for Terpstra in his history of the Dutch factory at Patani
Writes: ‘Careful comparison of the evidence has convinced me that
the English view ts more acceptable than the Dutch.'*

This was not the only English disaster. In the following month the
Dutch captured the St^T in the Sunda Straits; and a few weeks later
they surprised and captured no less than four English ships at the
pepper port of 'Piku on the west coast of Sumatra. Dale died at Masu-
lipatam in August 1619. Nat till December of that year was his
squadron, under Pring, ready to return to the Archipelago, In March
at Tiku it was Joined by three ships from Stirat. On 8 April, in the
Sunda Straits, while on thcii way to Bantam the united squadrons met
a ship coming from Itngbnd bringing news of the signature of an
Anglo-Dutch treaty whereby the two companies were to share the
trade of the Archipelago and jointly bear the costs of defence. Four
days later, on arrival at Bantam, they found that Coen had already
received notification of the agreement from Efolland, so that instead
of meeting as enemies they now had to co-operate as allies.

'Fhis short-lived attempt to end a rivalry which had deteriorated
into a savage undeclared war was by no means so unrealistic as it might
seem at first sight. The initiative had been taken by the Dutch late in
the year 1618 because the directors of tlic V.O.C., with the end of the
Truce of Antwerp in sight, felt it to be essential to come to terma with
the English. The East India Company, however, was hostile, and the

* *7^. ol., p. aJ5,

CH, t 4 THC intri; 5 [ 6 n of nii; English and the dutch 247

nei^oiiations, which began in December i6i8, threatened to be broken
off several times before agreement was reached on 17 July 1619. Foster
tells us that it was concluded only under pressnre from James 1 ,^ but
according t* Stapel* the king’s attitude was very reserved. Its main
provisions were (o) that grievances on both sides were to be forgiven
and forgotten, prisoners to be freed and captured ships restored; (fr)
that each company was to buy half of the total pepper available, and
the Engbsh were to have a third share of the spice trade df the Moluc¬
cas, Ambaina and the Bandas; (c) that a Council of Defence was to be
established consisting of four members from each side and was to have
at its disposal a defence fleet composed of ten ships from each party;

(d) that each party was to keep its own forts and strongholds, and
during the first two to three years was not to build new ones; and

(e) the capita] of the two companies was to remain separate and each
was to keep its own accounts.

Coen s reaction on learning the terms of the treaty was character!i^tic,
lie wrote home that he wondered whether the directors had had good
advice in so hastily assuming so hard a bridle and surrendering
many of their rightful conquests. ITiey were, he said, nourishing a
serpent in their bosom. What he found most difficult to understand
was why a third of the cloves, nutmeg and macc should have been
conceded to the English when they had no claim to a particle of the
beach in the Moluccas, .Vmboina or the Bandas. There can be no
doubt that, however one may view the difficulties which arose in
the working of the other ebusca of the treaty, the operation of this
one was deliberately sabotaged by Coen. In 1608 the Hetren XVlI
had written: ’Banda and the Moluccas are the principal target at
which we shoot'. They were now to be the principal rock upon which
the unsteady bark of .Anglo-Dutch co-operation foundered.

News of the treaty did not reach Robert Hayes, the English chief
factor at Nailaka, until late in November 1620. A month earlier his
predecessor, the heroic Nathaniel Courthope, had been waylaid and
killed by the Dutch while returning from a visit to Lanthor. The
news of the agreement brought hostilities to an end, but left the situ
ation otherwise unchanged. Meanv%'hi!e at Batavia Coen and his
council had ti^en the fateful decision to complete the conquest of
ffie Bandas which had been held up after their capture of Wai in 1616.
Coen justified the decision to the directoia on the plea that the
Bandunese were delivering their produce to the Spaniards on Tldore.

■ OPr rtV.fc p.

* iii, p, 141,

248 THE EARLIER PHASE OK ^IKOV^AN EXKAKSlON PT. H

He invited the English to particip^ite in the expedition^ but according
to the Dutch account they excused Ehemselvea on the grounds that
they had no ships available.

In January 1631 Coen himself left in command of a fleet of twelve
ships to carry' out the task. The conquest of Lonthor w-as his first
objective. While completing his preparations for a landing he offered
the islanders peace if they would hand over all their nutmeg and macc
exclusively lo the Dutch under the terms of the original agreement.
He also informed Robert Hayes of his intentions^ and when the latter
urged that he should await the arrival of English ships he bluntly
refused. The islanders put up what resistance they could, but were
eventually, on 11 March 1621, forced to capitulate. Soon afterwards
the inhabitants of Run, fearing a Dutch attack, made their submission
abo. The Dutch occupied the island, forced the English there to
lea%‘e. but left the English post on Nail aka alone. A few days later
an English vessel under Captain Tfumphrey FitsEherhert arrived in
the islands, and on jg March the solemn farce w^as enacted of pro-
chiming the Anglo-Dutch treaty. I'he Dutch, however, began to
consolidate their conquest by building a new' fort, Hollandia Castle,
on Lonthor.

'rhe effect of all this upon the minds of the Bandanese was a con¬
viction that they had been betrayed by the English, and a serious
revolt began on Lonthor aided by partisans from other islancb. Coen
then proceeded to cany* out his full plan of removing all the inhabiiants
and restocking the rebctlious islands with Other settlers. ^It tvas carried
out with appalling ftightfuLness. Hundreds of people were rounded up
on Lonthor and sent into slavery in Java, their kampongs and boats
being systematically deatroyed^ Forty-seven orangkayas, held as
hostages^ were tortured and executed when the rebels, who had taken
to the mountains, repulsed a Dutch attack. Thousands died of starva¬
tion in the mountains rather than surrender* Some 300 got away in
prau^ to south Ceram. The inhabitants of Run, on learning of the
atrocities in Lonthor, tried to flee en masse, but were rounded up and
all the grown men killed to the number of i6o. ^fhe cuitivated lands in
the islands w'erc then parcelled out to Company's servants to work
with slave labour. 'Coen acted in this whole business/ writes Colcn-
brandcr^, Nvhich is a stain on his memory, with an inhuman ruthless-
neas w'hich shocked even the Company’^s seiv'ants.' And when bis
former colleague^ Aert Gysels, heard of il he wrote: * We must realize
that they fought for the freedom of their land Just ajt we expended our

^ tjrtf/rtWrmi, II, p.

CJi. 14 THi; INTRUSION OF THE ENGLISH AND THE DUTCH 249

lives and goods for so many years in defence of ours.’ The directors
themselves were moved to write to Coen that they wished he could
have carried out his task with greater modcratioo.’^

Having scored a buJL's-eye on his chosen target, Coen next turned
his attention to Aoiboina and the Moluccas, He forced the chiefs of
Atnboirta to make a new treaty recognizing Dutch authority. Ceram,
whose chiefs showed some reluctance to follow suit, was then treated
to a dose of the same medicine as the Bandas. With the Moluccas,
however, the difficulties were greater, since the Spaniards stiJI held
Tidore and Coen could not spare adequate forces to deal with
them. Moreover, he had to return to Batavia before attempting a
final settlement.

Meanwhile the arrangements for Anglo*Dutch co-operation in
other spheres liad completely broken down. The Council of Defence,
provided for under the treaty^ had been set up at Batavia. 'I’he Dutch
quarrel with Ranamanggala of Bantam showed no signs of abating,
and their blockade of the place became so intense that the English,
unable to trade there, transferred their headquarters to Batavia.
'I'here they found their position an impossible one. The Dutch
insisted that their authority was supreme there by right of conquest
and that all Englishmen were amenable to Dutch tribunals. 7'he
Truce of Antwerp expired in 1621 and Coen planned expeditions
against Manila and the Portuguese ports in India and at Mozambique,
The English were dragged into these, and when they could not afford
their share of the expenses and their quota of ships the effort to co¬
operate petered out. By the time that Coen left for home at the end
of his first term as governor-general early in i6zj the decision had been
taken to leave Batavia and to withdraw their factors from all the
Dutch settlements. Before they could begin to carry out this decision
an event took place which made a deeper and more lasting impression
upon the relations of the two peoples than any other incident of this
unhappy period, ft became known as the 'Massacre of Amboina’.

On leaving Amboina in ifizz to return to Batavia Coen had re¬
minded the governor, Herman van Spcult, not to allow the English
to reduce his authority. The English, under the treaty of 1619,
traded there under the protection of the Dutch fort Metoria Castle.
Relations with the Dutch ivcrc good until suddenly, on 23 February
the membera of the English factory—eighteen Englishmen,
eleven Japanese, and one Portuguese—were arrested by the Dutch
on a charge of conspiring to seize the fortress. Confessions were wrung

* Sinpcl, up, ril,, iii, p, 151,

250 ITfE EARLIER ERASE OF EUROPEAN EXPANSION FT, Jl

from all of them under torture, and after a 'trial' ten Englishmen,
including the chief factor Gabriel Towerson, ten Japanese and the
Portuguese were beheaded, Stapei is of opinion that although the
penalty was vciy heavy the fact that there was a conspiracy cannot
be denied,^ But as all the evidence was obtained under torture it
WAS w-urthless, and the only conclusion to be safety reached is that the
Dutch either acted m a state of panic, as in the of Pieter
Eberfelt's Judicial murder at Batavia in 1721, which Stapei himself
condemns,* or deliberately in order to force the English to quit the
Spice Islands, The hurried nature of the proceedings and the flimsy
excuses made for not referring the matter to Batavia before carrying
out the executions arouse one's deepest suspicions.

Attempts to deal with the difRculties which had arisen under the
treaty had been made in England, and in January 1623 a fresh agree¬
ment had been made. But the Amboina outrage now removed all hope
of further co-operation. The English withdrew their factory from
Batavia early in 1624 and tried to settle on an island in the Sunda
Straits; but it was so unhealthy that they were soon too weak to
defend themselves against plundering hands from Sumatra. In May
1625 they had to obtain Dutch help to return to Batavia, where Coen’s
successor, de Carpentier, housed them in a disused school building.
In 1627 when Coen returned to Java they decided to transfer to Ban¬
tam, and the sultan, still on had terms with the Dutch, willingly took
them under his protection, rherc they remained until the Dutch
conquered the place in 1682. Under the agreement of 1623 Pulo Run
had been recognised as English property, but the Dutch clung on to
it, and the East India Company was in no position to maintain a factory
there. ,41 the end of the First Dutch War in 1654 the Dutch agreed to
restore it and pay a sum of j£85,ooo in compensation for the losses
inflicted upon the East India Company. But the Company was still
unable to take possesion of the island. Charles 11 took the matter up
In 1662, and again the Dutch agreed to hand over the island. In 16&5
the East India Company did actually occupy it, only to lose it a few
months later as a result of the outbreak of the Second Dutch War.
It was finally ceded to the Dutch by the Treaty of Breda, which ended
that war in 1667.

It is interesting to note that during the years in which the English
were competing with the Dutch for the trade of the Spice Islands the
East India Company was able to pay higher dividends than the \^ 0 ,C.

^ Qp. n/,jiii, p, 161,

CH, 14 rm of the ahd the Durctt 251

The reason was that the Dutch had to devote too much of their profit
to the expense of building forts, maititaining large gairii^n^ and
equipping hghting squadrons. They were firmly convinced that the
spice monopoly was a matter of vital national imponance, and ao^ in
the words of an acute critic,^ "applied their greatest effort of empire-
building to an object that was only teraporariiy worth attaining^ For
with the expansion of world trade the spice trade became less and Jess
important, and the mtsappheation of Dutch energy’ in the East had its
effect upon the decline of their national power in the second half of the
seventeenth century.

. But from the point of view of South-East Asia the Dutch triumph
over the English is to be seen as the first decisive step tow^ards.the
formation of a new empire, commercial at the outset like Srivijaya and
Malacca, but gradually becoming predominantly territorial yet not in
the true line of succession to either, since the centre of control lay
thousands of miles away.

* J- A- WiIiwm*on, Tht Ocaan I'w Bfittih Hiitory^ p* loj.

CHAFTEM IS

THE EXP.\NSION OF THE V.O.C, 1623^4

Jax Pietehszoon Coen was the founder of the Dutch empire of the
East Indies; but its devdopmertt after his death was hardly along the
lines he had striven to lay down. According to hia pkns^ Batavia was
to be the centre of a great commercia] empire based upon complete
control of the sea. He did not envisage any wide e]ctension of teni^
torial power and was not interested in the political a^airs of the in¬
terior of Java, The territories which^ in his view^ the V.O.C. should
have in actual possession were small islands such as Amboina and the
Bandas, The remainder of the empire should consist of strongly
fv^rtified trading settlements clc^ely linked and protected by in¬
vincible sea-power.

Nor TVouId it be confined to Indonesia: it& forts and trading stations
should be far-flung over the whole of the East. He was especially
anxious to conquer Manila and Macao so as to drive the Spaniards and
Portuguese from the Philippines and the China coast. And he u^anted
plenty of Dutch colonists; they w^ere to direct slave labour in
cultivating estates in the Spke Islands and elaew^herCp to assist in
defending the newly accquired possessions and to engage in the inter-
Asiatic trade* I'his trade he believed to be capable of yielding far
greater profits than the traffic between Europe and Asia, each of which
had very limited requirements of the other*s goods. His ideas were
vague and imaginative rather than practical and utterly ruthless* In
the days w hen he was Director-General of Commerce at Batavia bis
plans for the Spice Islands shocked his predecessor as governor-
general, Laurens Read, who thought that their execution would
involve such cruel qt to the native people as would involve the min of
the V.O*C.

His warlike measures vastly increased the Company *s expenses; and
although its methods of accountancy and the loss of some of its
account-books made the presentation of an accurate statement of
profit and loss for the early period impossible, his own estimate for the
years 1613-20 showed q deficit of S.ooo guilders, and on occasion the
directors had to borrow money in order to maintain an average dividend

CH, 15 THE E 5 tPAN 3 ION OF THE V.O.C., i6z3^+ 253

of 10 per cent. Nevertheless he was convinced that if the commercial
system could be reformed in accordance with his suggestions enormous
profits could be realized with the export of further capital from Holland*
And after hb death the development of the Company's inter-^Vsiatic
trade, upon which he pinned his faith^ certainly did yield a vety^
satisfactory^ returrit although the directors rejected his colonization
proposal, w'hich was the chief ingredient in hia recipe.

Coenb short second term of office as governor-general (1627-^)
* provided an object lesson in the dangers to w hich a commerciaJ empire
with no territorial power w^as exposed. Sun an Agung of blataram had
gone far towards realizing his ambition of reviving the power of
Majapahit. Year after year the steady tale of his conquests mounted
up. In i6zi he took Tuban; in the following year Gresik fell for the
second time, and he sent an expedition to Borneo which destroyed
^uccadana. In 1624 he ravaged Madura^ killed its chiefs and deported
40,000 people to the mainland. In 1625 he conquered Surahava. He
nosv took the title of Susuhunan {*he to whom all are subject^) and
claimed overlordship over the whole island. Bui Bantiim refused |o
recognize his claims^ and Batavia, although it began sending fomral
embassies with presents in 1625^ incurred his anger by refusing 10
assist him in hJs attack on Surabaya, In 1626, therefore, he refused
to receive the usual Dutch mission and prepared to attack Batavia.

It tvaa at this juncture that Coen returned. Batavia still maintatned
its close blockade of the trade of Bantam which had been imposed
during his previous govemor-generabhip* and it was against the
raiding bands of his nearer neighbour that he had ai first to strengthen
the city's deiencea- On Christmas Eve 1G27 a Bantam force actually
got inside the citadel in a surprise attack, but w'as driven oui. Eight
months later Mataram abo staged ^ surprise attack, by but after a
desperate resbtance this also was beaten off. In 1629 Agung laid
siege to the city with the biggest force he could muster. But so large
an army could not be adequately supplied with food by overland
transport and the Dutch reduced it to starv'ation by theSr attacks upon
its supply ships. After five weeks the grand army of the susuhunan
had to beiit a disorderly retreat, leaving its track strewn with the bodies
of men and animals ^vho had died of starvation and exhaustion. During
the siege Coen contracted cholera and died within a feiv hours. This
second attack of Matanim upon Bavatia alarmed the Sultan of Bantam,
who realized that if the city fell his state would be the nest to be
attacked. He therefore offered terms of peace which Coen aecepted
and the ten years' blockade w^aa lifted.

254 FARUKS HLVSE OF EUROPEAN EXI'ANi^ltlX PT. [[

The severe defeat indicted oit Sunan Agung's forces by the Dutch
did not lead to any better felattoiw, although Hendrik Brouwer^ who
became govemor-general in 1632, made an attempt to reach an under¬
standing tvith him. But there was little lighting, for the susuhunan
left the west alone and cuncentrated his attention on the cast. He was
a fen'cnt Muslim, and one of bis most far-reachJng acts wns to develop
relations with the Muslim powem of .Arabia, as a result of which a new*
wave of Islamic missionary activity began in 1 nduncsia. Pilgrims from
Mecca sought to revive and intensify the faith of the peoples, who,
though nominally Muslims, still clung to most of their old traditional
customs and observances. Agting proclaimed a holy war against the
two regions, Balambangan and the island of Bali, which up till then
still held out against conversion to Islam. In 1639 he conquered
Balambangait and deported much of its population. Bali, however,
resisted his attacks with easemplaiy courage and maintained its
independence.

The Dutch, freed from the threat of Mataram, entered upon a
period of spectacular success and cjipansion. The great advance began
under Antonie van Diemen, 1636-45. He had been Coen’s choice as
his successor tn 1629, but the Council had decided otherwise and had
appointed Jacques Specx acting govemor-gcncral. The directors at
home after lengthy consideration appointed one of their number,
Hendrick Brouwer. In comparison with Coen and Van Diemen,
both Specs and Brouwer were mediocrities‘ but when Stapel describes
their period as one in which little energy was shown for expansion in
new regions^ he is surely confining his attention too much to the
.Archipelago, for the early thirties saw much expansive activity on the
Indo-Chinese mainland, in .Arakan, Burma, Tenasserim, Biam, and
Cochin China. It was in one sense a development of Coco's policy of
annihilating nntiv'e as well as foreign Hiimpcan shipping in the Indies.
The Dutch Corotnandvl Coast factories, the' loft arm of the Moluccas’,
were striving to capture the export trade in Indian textiles from Indian
and Arab merchants. And in order to achieve this it was found
necessary to establish factories at all places outside India which im¬
ported these goods.

Thus in 1634, in an intensive effort to gain complete control over
the trade of the Bay of Uengul, the Dutch reopened their factory in
.Arnkan, planted one for the first time in Burma and sent a prospecting
expedition to 'I'enasserim, then in Siamese hands. The rc-estab-
lishment of the Arakan factory was also closely connected with the
^ tvn N^f^ifTtandich-indic (i^cond i p, 85.

CH. 15 THU EXPAXSIOJ^ OF TIIE V.O.C., 1623-84 255

permanent blockade of MaJaeca, which began in 1633 and lasted until
the city fell in 1641, Arakan cscported rice, and Bata\ia, faced by the
hostility of Sunan Agung and his repeated prohibitions of the import
of rice from his dominlDns by the Dutch, was anxiously looking round
for new sources of supply. Throughout the factory's histoiy, there¬
fore, by far the greater part of its trade was carried on dirertly with
Batavin.^

llie ventures to Burma and Tenasscrini, on the other hand, were
undertaken and directed by Pulieat. In all three places the Dutch
entered as competitors with Indian merchants: but although they
carried on successfully for about half a century, they never ousted the

Indians. Wherever there was relatively fair competition, the Asian_

Arab, Persian, Indian or Chinese—could always maintain his position.
Only where the Dutchman could resort to force, as in the Spice
Islands, could he gain the advantage over the Asian trader; even then
he could not drive him out of the field, but had to arrange a modus
vivendi. With the more pow^eiful monarchies of the mainland the
Dutch were rarely In a position to dictate terms, and the Asian trader
was too well established to be ousted.

The early thirties also saw developments in Dutch relations with
Siam and .\nnam. Dutch ships were sent to assist King Prasat T'oijg
of Siam against the Cambodians and Portuguese on the otic hand and
rebellious Patani on the other. Prince Frederick Henry of Orange sent
a congratulatory letter to the king in 1632, and in 1634 van Vlict was
established as Dutch .Agent in a solid brick headquarters at Avut’ia.
It was the beginning of a long period of Dutch ascendancy in Siamese
trade. Like Arakanj Siam at this period assumed a new importance in
Dutch eyes betause of the food question. 'This station', wrote Joost
Schouten in 1636 in his Dtscripiian of Siam, ‘supplies Batavia with
great quantities of provisions,' From Ayut'ia a factor)' was planted
in Cambodia in 1637, and in 1641 van VVuysLholf went from the latter
up the difficult Mekong river to open relations with the Laos kingdom
of Vien Chang {Vientiane). Settled commercial relations with Annam
began in 1633 with the establishment of a factory at Qui-nam, but
because of the factory planted four yeans later in Tongking they were
never happy and were soon broken off. Both rhe Trinh of Hanoi and
the Nguyen of Hut welcomed European merchants, but as they were
at war w'ith each other it was practically impossible to carry' on trade
with both.

‘ 1). G. E, HflU. 'SWtaticf in DaiEh Relnrinn* tvith AntLon*. JBRS, xxvi. pt. i, pp.

2j6 THE EAFtLtKH OK KtHOPEAV FIXPANSION PT. II

it can be seen that the period iif Spec:x and Brou^ver^ thougli
unable to show the spectacular advances made under Coen and van
Diemen^ has an interest all of its own. It has been passed over lightly
by Dutch historians largely because the ventures described above had
comparativdy little success. The factory at ^Irohaungin Amkan had
a chequered existence and was finally withdrawn before the end of the
century. In Burma, after several threats to withdraw,, the factories
were wound up in 1679. In Siam duting the second part of the cen¬
tury King Narai attempted to escape from the grip of the Dutch by
calling in the French; and akhough Louis XIV attempt to secure a
predominant influence there collapsed with the fall of Comtant
Phaulkoo in i68S, the Dutch never managed to get back on the old
fooling. Their factory in Tongking lasted until 1700 but can never
have been a comnierdal success.

Van Diemen has been called 'statesman, warrior, admiral and mer¬
chant in one'. As a builder of their empire of the Indies he ranks next
to Coen in the estimation of the Dutch. He owed much to Coen, for
soon after his first arxivaJ at Batavia an order came from the directors
that he was to be sent home because he was a bankrupt who had got
into the Company's sersTcc under a false name. But Coen set aside
the order and gave the young man rapid promotionH The most pressing
problem when he entered upon his term of office in 1636 was that of
the spice trade. The efforts constantly made by the Dutch to Lighten
their monopoly hit the peoples of Amboina and the Moluccas, and
there was unrest and ^smuggling*. Sultan Hamja of Tcmate was the
ally of the but his kim^lafm (deputy ruler) in south Ceram

was hand-in-glove with the Sultan of Macassar and promoted the large
clandestine trade of which IVIacassar ivas the centre. A Dutch attempt
in 1635 to invade south Ceram failed badly and caused so much unrest
throughout the lalands that in 1637 van Diemen went wTth a fleet of
$cveritccn ships to deal with the situation^ f[e put down the rebellion
in Ceram and restored peace in the islands, but as soon as his back was
turned the old troubles broke out afresh.

In 163S, thereforej he returned to Amboina and made a new’ agree¬
ment with Sultan Hamja, "who came to meet him in person. On his
way back from his first visit he visited Macas^r, where he brought to
an end the long state of war which had existed since i6i 6 betw een the
V-OX. and the ruler by an agreement wherein the latter recognised
the Company^a rights in the Bpice Islands and conceded to it the right
to capture and destroy any Macassar ships found in their vicinity.
Firmer action he hesitated to take, aince bis ships and soldiers were

CH, 15 thK IDCPANSION Of THE V.O.C., 1623-S4 257

needed clsc^vhere. On his second visit to Amboitia in 1638 he sent a
punitive expedition against Butoni off the south-east coast of Celebes,
which was deeply involved in the clandestine spice trade* These
various measures brought some improvement to the situation but fell
far short of a solution. While Macassar remained unsubdued and a
prosperous centre of English, French, Portuguese and Danish spice
merchants the spice monopoly remained an unrealised dream. But
van Diemen^s hands were tied by his commitments in Ceylon and
before Malacca, while the susuhunan of Mataram^ Agung, was
again creating serious difficulties by forbidding the sale of rice to the
Dutch and obstructing their trade on the north coast of Java.

Ceylon and Malacca were still important centres of Porcugutse
power. In Ceylon the King of Kandy, Raja Singa^ was anxious to
obtain Dutch help against their stranglehold on all his ports. In
answer to a request made by him in 163& to the governor of the Dutch
Coromandel factories van Diemen had instituted a blockade of Goa,
In 1638 a Dutch fleet under Adam Wcsterwoldi Came to the help of
Raja Singa, who was now' at open war with the Portuguese, and took
the Portuguese fort at Batticalo. In return Raja Singa made a treaty
granting the Dutch the cinnamon monopoly. During the next few
years the Dutch captured further Portuguese settlements and planted
strong garrisons at Gale and Negombo. They were well on tbeir way
towards the complete domination of the island when Fortugal, as a
result of her successful revolt against Spain in 1640, made a ten-vear
irtice with the Netherlands wHch left Colombo stilJ in Portuguese
hands.

Before the new agreement look effect in the East, Malacca felt at
last in 1641* Right to the end it put up a magnifleent resistance.
Malilictr had failed to take it in 1606 and van der Kagheit in 1675.
On several occasions the Dutch made approaches to Acheh, the old
enemy of the Portuguese, but nothing came of them. Malacca re¬
mained a thorn in the side of the Dutch# supporting boih Mataram
and Macassar against them. From 1(133 wards they instituted a
close blockade of the port, which seriously interrupted its trade and
supplies. In August 1640, with the help of the Sultan of Johore^ a
descendant of the last Sultan of Malacca driven out by .Albuquerque,
the Dutch began a regular siege of the dty. It held out with incredible
valour until the middle of January' w^hen the besiegers finally

stormed the ruins and brought resistance to an end. Its fall revolu¬
tionised the situation in the Archipelago. Malacca quickly lost its
importance. Many Portuguese families moved to BataAda, Mataram

2.^5 TJI£ IL^RLIHA rtlASR OF tfKOI'EAS EXPANSION PT. 11

lost one of its best trustumers for rice; and with the Javanese mcrchanis
transferring their trade to Batavia, jVgttng bad to revoke his
prohibition of the export of rice to the Dutch, though he remained
as hostile as ever. 'I'he Dutch were now unquestionably the strongest
power in the Archipelago and their efforts to maintain the spice mono¬
poly were greatly strengthened. Van Diemen was anxious to settle
matters with Agung, who intrigued with the English, murdered
Dutch hostages and Enally fomented an attempt to seize the fortress
at Batavia. But the directors were opposed to any strong action, and
relations remained unsatisfactory and undecided until after both van
Diemen and .Agung passed from the scene in 1645.

Van Diemen’s term of ofFice saw other notable developments in the
history of Dutch eastern enterprise in regions outside South-East Asia.
When in 1641 Japan expelled all Westerners the Dutch alone were
allowed to continue their commercial activities. They bad to leave the
main islands and confine themselves to the little island of Deshima off
the port of Nagasaki, where they lived and worked under rigorous
conditions and the closest supert*ision. Van Diemen sought com¬
pensation for this In a more determined pursuit of Chinese trade. In
1642 by the conquest of the Spanish fort at Quelang the Dutch gained
passe.s!iion of the w'hole island of Formosa, an important distribution
centre in the sugar trade from China. They soon 3 flouri-S^i of?!
trade going there; but when the Alanchus brought the Ming dynasty
to an end and Ming leaders were flying in various directions, one of
them, Kuo Hsing Yeh ('Co.xiiig:a’), established himself in Formosa in
1661, and soon afterwards forced the Dutch to abandon their factory.

Van Diemen’s name is associated with a number of important
voyages of discovery. He sent out navigators in search of the fabulous
island of ‘Rica Doro\ whieh was said to be somewhere east of Japan.
Two expeditions—one in 1639 under Matthijs Ilcndrickss. Quast and
Abel JanszDon Tasman, and the other in 1643 under Maarten Gerritsz.
de Vries“reaultcd in the discovery of the Kurile Islands and the cast
coast of Sakhalin, but there was no gold island to be found; and Tas¬
man made far more valuable contributions to geographical knowledge
in quite another direction.

Quite early on in their quest of the spice trade the Dutch had dis¬
covered that there was a better approach to the Archipelago than the
one used by the Portuguese, The latter had adopted from the Arabs
the practice of monsoon sailing whereby they proceeded up the coast
of East Africa into the monsoon belt and approached the Archipelago
by crossing the Indian Ocean north of the Equator and passing into

CH. 15

Till- f-:XPANSION Oh TKK V.O.C., 1623-S4 259

the Strait:^ of Malacca. Such a route Kinged upon a strategic centre
on the west coast of India. Th^ Dutch, however, unhampered by such
considerations, after passing the Cape used the westerly winds of the
"roaring forties’ of the southern hemisphere, which gave them 2 much
quicker passage across the Indian Ocean and made the Sunda Straits
their natural approach to the Archipelago. Ships sailing too far along
the SDUtheriy course had discovered whit is now known as Australia^
and not a fciv had been wrecked upon its inhospitable western shore.

In 1642 and again in 1644 van Diemen sent out Tasman and Frans
Jacobsa, Visschcr to determine its connection, if any, with the Terr€i
Austrahs IncogFiita of the geographeis. On their first voyage^ after
touching at Mauritius they passed round Ausiralia from the west and
made their first landing on the island named by Tasman vin Diemen's
I^and, but subsequently, by the English, Tasmania. They then went
cm to discover New Zealand^ which^they thought to be a part of the
great southern coniinent^ and returned to Batavia by the north of New
Guinea. Their second voyage was undertaken to discover whether
there was a channel between New^ Guinea and Australia and whether
the Gulf of Carpentaria w'ss the opening of a channel which passed
right through Australia. Although they failed to discover the strait
which the Spaniards Torres and Prado had successfully navigated as
early as 1607,^ the^' mapped out the Gulf of Carpentaria correctly.
But their voyage >va5 the last important Dutch effort of ^^(plorauon.

Van Diemen could point to no new openings for trade as a result of
their efforts. Ihe people they encountered on the north coast of
Australia were 'without rice or any considerable fniits, very poor, and
in many places cvil-naturcd\ With his death in 1645 the V.O.C. lo^^lt
interest not only in further discovery but also in the lands their in¬
trepid mariners had placed on the map.

If Coen was the founder of Batavia, van Diemen was in many ways
the creator of the city that wis soon to be dubbed the ‘Queen of the
Easton He completed its castle, built a town hall and a Latin school
and did much to ejcpand and beautify the original settlement. Culti-'
vation and industry' were developed around chieffy by the Chinese
whom Coen had encouraged to settle. A new church was built* houses
in the Dutch style lined the banks of the canals, and the wliole place
began to look almost like a Dutch city transplanted from Europe. It
became the home, and indeed the grave, of an increasing number of
Dutchmen, for it excessively unhealthy, and one of van Diemen’s

* Itokh wrntr luccmints of their dlseu^^icr)' hut they hc^-er puhloihcd. Torrea'ii
Eitanuneript only ealTke to [iuht in the middle of the elj^hlwtith century'.

26o the earlier PHA$£ OV EIFROPRAN I^PANSION IT, 11

more importnnt conirifaiitions to tht city's amciutics wga an orphanage
founded iii j 639.

Van Diemen’s immediate successors, Comelis van dcr Lijn (1645-
50) and Carcl Reijniersz. (1650-3), made no outstanding personal con¬
tributions to the development of the Dutch empire; but their period
was far from one of stagnation. Amangkurat I (1645-77), son

and successor, made peace with van der Lijn, and conceded to the
V.O.C. freedom of trade in his dominions. The Company in return
undertook to send an annual embassy to Mataram and to permit the
susuhunan's Javanese subjects to trade everywhere save in the Moluc¬
cas. New agreements were also made with Raja Singa in Ceylon and
with the tin-producing states of the Malay Peninsula which improved
the Dutch position in both regions. In 1650 the directors issued a new
comprehensive set of regulations {Generale Fnstructit) for the adminis¬
tration of the Indies, These emphasized the Company’s position as a
commercial body whose operations must be conducted according to
the twin principles of the exclusion of competitors and of ’buy cheap,
st-y dear', Jn order that the spice trade should be more effectively
brought under control it laid down that the production of doves should
be confined to Amboina and the neighbouring islands and that of nut¬
meg and mace to the Bandas; overproduction and smuggling must be
prevented by destroying trees elsewhere. In the same year for strategic
reasons a decision was taken to colonize the Cape of Good Hope, and
in 165a Jan van Riebccck planted there the one and only colony in
the real sense that the V.O,C. ever possessed.

The policy of destroying the surplus spice trees which invited
smuggling had actually been put into practice by Arnold de Viaming
van Oudshoorn in 1649, when he led what was known as a Iwtigitacfil
to cut down trees in west Ceram, where the clandestine trade with
Macassar still continued. A /longi was a fleet of cora-coras or large
praus propelled by oatg. This inhumane method of enforcing the
monopoly was systematically employed until the production of cloves
was practically eliminated in the Moluccas. In J650 a serious revolt
broke out in these unhappy islands which was not completely re¬
pressed until 1656. The Dutch arrested the Sultan of Ternatc, .Man-
dar Shah, and deported him to Batavia; and he was only reinstated
when he had made a formal agreement permitting them to cut down
clove trees wherever they liked in his dominions. As the price of
compliance he was granted an annual allowance. His people were
forced to plant rice and sago in place of doves, and as their islands
could not produce enough food they had to buy additional rice, at a

26i

Cl I- IS THE EXPANSION Or THE V.O.C., 1623-34

higher price than they could afford, from the Dutch. Ruin spread
over the once-prosperous islands, and an alarming increase of piracy
naturally resulted.

Johan Maetsuyeker's term of office as governor-general (i653-78)
ranks Vrith those of Coen and van Diemen as a period of notable
advance in the affairs of the V,O.C. Under van Diemen, as legal
expert of the Council of the Indies, he had composed the Statutes of
Batavia, which gave the Dutch empire its first code of law and re¬
mained until the beginning of the nineteenth century the chief
authorit)' in legal mattere. Later, as Governor of Ceylon, he had
cultivated good relations with Raja Singa and paved the wav for the
final elimination of Portuguese power there. One of his early achieve¬
ments as governor-general was the accomplishmenl of this aim. Not
only was Colombo taken (1656) and the Dutch headquarters esfah-
lishcd there, but van Goens, who was sent in 1657 to chase the Portu¬
guese out of Ceylon and the Coromandel and Malabar coasts of India,
carried out his task with such success that when the peace of August
1661 between the Netherlands and Portugal brought his conquest to
an end at the beginning of 1663, the Portuguese had not only lost all
their possessions In Ceylon but were left with only Goa and Diu in
India. In that same year the Spaniards evacuated Tidore and the
Dutch tverc left complete masters of the Moluccas.

Under Maetsuyeker the Dutch achieved a great measure of control
over the pepper pom of Sumatra. Finn action had to be taken against
the Sultan of Palcmbang, who in 1658 treacherously attacked the
Dutch factory, murdering the factors and the crew's of two ships lying
at anchor before it. A punitive expedition forced him to permit the
construction of a Dutch fort close to his tovvtt and to grant the Dutch
the exciuaive right to purchase his pepper. Measures were also taken
against Achch, whoAc pow'er had notably declined after the death of
Iskander Muda in 1636. 0y the Pal nan Contract of 1G62 the leading
Mittangkabau chiefs, in revolt against Achinese suxerainty. came under
the protection of the V,O.C.; and when four years later Achinese
agents stirred up trouble for the Dutch on the west coast, an expedition
under Abraham Versprect put an end to Achinese influence through¬
out the whole region.

After breaking all resistance in the Moluccas in 1636 the obvious
next step was to put an end to the power of Macassar. But Haasan
Udm had strongly fortified his city and was well supplied whth arms
by the Europeans who traded there; and moreover Maetsuyeker
shrank from a task %vhic1i W'as certain to entail a hca’^y expenditure

262 THE EARLltS HIASE OF EimOI‘£AN EXPANSION PT. tl

such as would be frowned on by the directoi^. Tor some years the
renewed war with the Portuguese in Ceylon and south India prevented
him from risking a large expedition against Hassan Udin. In (660,
however, a force under Johan van Dam captured one of Macassar’s
forts, and in consequence the suitan accepted terms by which he
promised to stop all sailings to the Spice Islands, abstain from inter¬
ference with the Company's allies, Buton and ^tenado, and expel the
Portuguese from his dominions. But he failed to carry out bis treaty
obligations and reverted to his former attitude gf hostility. In 1666,
therefore, Maetsuyeker entrusted Comeiis Jansioon Spedman with
the task of settling accounts with him. Sped man enlisted the support
of Aru Pakkka, a Buginese chief of Boni, whose family had been
murdered by Hassan Cdin. The expedition began by destroying a
large Macassar force which was operating againift Buton. Speetman
next sailed to the Moluccas, where be forced the ruler of Tidorc to
recognize Dutch overlordship and abandon his age-long feud with
Tematc. Then, with further reinforcements from Temale, he re-
tuyieci to Celebes and began the hard task of bringing Macassar to its
knees. It took four months of desperate fighting to force Hassan LTdin
to submit. On tS Nosxmber 1667 he signed the Treaty of Bongaya,
by which he accepted Dutch overlordship, dismantled his forts,
granted the Dutch a monopoly of trade and agreed to expel all non-
Dutch Europeans, He had also to pay a huge indemnity and permit
the Dutch to occupy his principal fortress, which they named Fort
Rotterdam after Speelman's birthplace. Four months later he tried
once again to evade the peace terms. This time the Dutch took pos¬
session of hia city, pensinned him off and placed south Celebes under
a Dutch governor with his headquarters at Fort Rotterdam, Indo¬
nesian independence in the east of the Archipelago was now virtually
stamped out.

Up to Maetsuyeker’s time there had been no deviation fnim Coen’s
policy of confining the Dutch empire to a chain of forts and trading
posts and of eschewing territorial dominion save in the case of verv
small islands such as Amboina and the Bandets. A change, however,
begins to be discernible with Maetsuyeker; though it can scarcely
have been realized by anyone at the time. I n the first place the V,O.C.
became the controlling power in Ceylon; and although the Raja nf
Kandy still continued to function as a ruler, the island had in fact
become largely a Dutch territorial poscsession. Shortly before Mact-
suyeker's death events took place in the kingdom of Mataram which
led to Dutch interference, and thereby set up a chain of consequences

cu. 15

TTTE E^FANISTOX OF THE 163:3-54 363

culnujiatiag m the establishment of their supremacy over the whole
island. There was no conscious change of programme, no ambition
on the part of the directors to transform their commercial empire into
a territorial one* Yet such a transformation mevltablc^ as in the
case of the English in India at a later date, if they were to maintam
and consoiidate the position they had won for themselves in defeating
their Ettropcan rivals. The alternative was decline and in all prob-
abilit)' extinction. Hence although it was clearly recognized that non-
inter%'ention in the mutual quarrels of the Indonesian njlcrs was
essential, and Batavia was willing to recognise any do facto ruler so
long as he w'as willing to fulhl the obligations of his state towards the
V.OX*, the verj' condition upon w'hich this policy ivas based was
bound, sooner or lateCt force its abandonment.

The trouble in Mataram which caused Dutch interference began in
1674 when Tranojoyo, a Madurese prince vrho claimed descent from
the old royal family of Majapahic, led a fornudable rebellion against
Agung’s successor, Amangkurat !, w-ith whom the Dutch bad been
on good terms since the treaty of 1646. Amangkurat I, or Sunen
Tegalwangi, to use the name by tvhich he w^as commonly knowm, was
a monster of cruelty whose atrocities tvere on so extravagant a scale as
to be scarcely credible. In carrying nut the reorganization of the
administration of hia empire his measures to crush local independence
stirred up much discontent. The situation was complicated by the
presence of a large number of refugees from Macassar who had settled
on the east coast of Java and became pirates. With these and his own
Madurese followers^ who were angry at Javanese treatment of their
island, Trunojoyo quickly overran East and part of central Java and
established himself at Kediri. And the susuhunan, quite unable from
the start to take effective measures against the reheU, called on Batavia
for help.

Maetsuyeker tvas not bound by the treaty of 1646 to give military
help unless Mataram^s enemies were also those of the Dutch. He
realized, however, that the rebels contained strong anti-Dutch de¬
ments, audt moreover, that the Multan of Bantam hoped to turn the
confusion in Mataram to his own advanlage by semng its western
provinces and thus encircling Batavia. He decided, therefore, to send
help* hut to cut down Dutch intervention to the absolute minimum.
Speelman, whom he placed in charge of the naval force sent iu 1676
against Trunojoyo^s Macassar pirates, had quite different views. He
wanted to pursue a strong policy which would restore Amangkurat^s
authority^ while placing him in a position of dependence upon the

a6+ TIIE EAftLlEH PRASE OP EUROPEAN EXPANSION FT. It

Dutch, and enable a decisive blow to be delivered against the plans of
Abulfatah Agung of Bantam, Meanwhile Trunojoyo, profiling by the
Dutch half-measures, stormed and sacked the kraton of Mataram, and
Amangkurat, fleeing to place himself under Dutch protection, died at
Tcgalwangi, leaWng his successor, Adipad Anom. completely de¬
pendent upon the Dutch so far as any hope of his restoradon was
concerned. In October 1677, in return for recognition as the legal
sunan, he granted the Dutch vast commercial concessions together
with the cession of much territory south of Bataria and the port and
district of Semarang, He also promised to repay all their war expenses
and handed over a number of coastal towns to be held as 3 pledge.

Maetsiiycker was far from happy about the treaty which was nego¬
tiated by Speelman; but he died soon afiens-ards and was succeeded
by the more warlike Rijklof van Goens, who made Speelman his right-
hand man in the Council of the Indies and at once adopted a vigorous
policy, Anthony Kurdt, in command of a strong force of Dutch
troops, captured Kediri, and Adipati Anom was crowned as Amang-
kurat II wnth the ancient crowm of Majapahit, which was handed over
by the Dutch commander, Trunojoyo escaped but was followed up
by two native forces, a Bugincse and an Amhoinese, in the senice of
the Dutch. He was finally run to earth in the jungle-covered moun¬
tains of East Java by the Amboinese and handed over to Amangkurat II
at his new capital of Kartasura, where a few days later the susuhiinan
slew him with his awn hands. Gradually the other rebels were hunted
dftwn and destroyed by Dutch and NTataram forces; but peace was
only finally restored in 168a, ‘He whom all obey’ was now, for all
practical purposes, a Dutch vassal maintained on his throne by a body¬
guard of Dutch troops.

The Mataram struggle was rendered all the more difficult for Batavia
by the situation at Bantam. Abulfatah, who had come to the throne
with the tide of Sultan .Agung in 1651, was a powerful ruler who
sought to restore to his kingdom the important position she had earlier
occupied in commerce. He had resumed hostile relations with the
Dutch in j6s 6, but their close blockade of his capital had caused him
to moke peace in 1659. As soon as the blockade was lifted he made
efforts to promote commercial prosperity, and ivith French and
English factories operating there Bantam became oticc more a serious
rival to Batavia. The treaty of 1677 between Batavia and Mataram
mused him to make an attempt to prevent Amangkurat II from drifting
into too dose association with the Dutch, and In particular he laid
claim to su:&eratnty over Chcribon, whose territory lay to the east

Cl[. 15 THE EXPANSION OF THE V.O.C., 1623-S4 265

of that of Batavia^ and threatened the Dutch with war If they
mterfered.

But a family quarrel played into the hands of the Dutch. Agung's
eldest son returned in 1676 from a pilgrirmee to Mecca, w hich earned
him the title of Sultan Hajip to find that during his absence his younger
brother, Avho Avas married to a daughter of the chief minister, was to
be invested as heir-apparent. This drove Haji to cuItiA^ate secret
relations with the Dutch. In May t6So# Avhen Agung AA^as about to
reson to antis to enforce his claim over Cheribon, a palace revolution
forced him to abdicate in favour of HajL The new ruler at once began
negotiations vvith Batavia for a treaty of friendship. This caused a
revulsion of feeling against him in certain districts; Agung Avas able
to regain power and a civil Avar began betAveen father and son. In
16R3 Uaji captured his father and handed him over to the Dutch, who
kept him a prisoner until his death in 169a.

Haji's success was due entirely to the support he receiA-ed from a
strong contingent of Dutch troops and was achieved only after a very
severe struggle. Hence in 1684 he had to make a treaty in AA^hich be
practically signed away the independence of his state. Beside^ gur-
rendering all claim to Cheribon he promised to pay the war-costs of
the Dutch forces amounting to 600,000 dollars, granted the Dutch the
exclusive right to the import and export trade of his kingdoin, and
agreed to expel all non-Dutch Europeans. He Avas relieved of the
obhgatidn to pay his debt so long as he honoured the monopoly con¬
ferred upon the Dutch, 'rhey in their turn made sure of his obedience
by building a strong fortress at Bantam. The English, who had
already lost their fooling at Nlacassar, were now forced to leave Ban¬
tam. They retired to Bencoolen on the Avest coast of Sumatra, where
they were lo remain until 1824,

I'he Dutch vvere now^ unquestioned masters of the Archipelago. But
they had won their supremacy at great coat and at a lime when they
were fighting w'kh their hacks to the wall in Europe against Louis XIV
and Charles IL Their trade had passed through periods of serious
interniption, and on a number of occasions during .Maetsuyeker's term
of office the V.O.C. had been unable to pay its annual dividend, h
Avas still, liow'eA^er, able to show a high average profit and to send rich
cargoes of spices to Europe. But it was now changing from a com¬
mercial to a territorial powTr* and the time Avas soon to come Avhen,
AA'ith increased costa of administration and decreased trade, its steady
decline Avas to set in.

CHAPTEH l6

THE ZENITH AND DECLINE OF THE V.O.C. 1654-1799

In 1684, when Governor-General Spcelman died and was succeeded
by the scholarly and unw^likc Johannes Camphuys (16S4-9T), the
Dutch Company had become the most powerful political force in Java,
The sultans of the two most Impomnt states, Mataiam and
had been placed on their thrones by its troops and owed it vast sums
of money by way of war costs. With both rulers the Dutch had
concluded agreements by which, so long as they faithfully carried out
the tcmis of the conunercial treaties dictated to them, the question of
repayment would not be raised. Quite apart from the indirect control
which was thereby implied, the Dutch now possessed a belt of territory
stretching across the island from Batavia southward to the opposite
coast, thus completely separating the territories of the two states.

From the point of view of all the parties concerned, this was a
highly unsatisfactory situation, though the Dutch higher command
seems to have been slow to realize its implications. Dutch policy for
some considerable period, so far from proceeding according to anv
overall plan, tended to wait upon events and to issue in positive action
only when forced to by drcumstancos- Louis XIV’s growing threat
to their homeland in Europe made them healtant about assuming new
military or territorial responsibilities abroad. Such things involved
much extra expense and no compensating increase in revenue.
Nevertheless the expansion of the Company’s power and the
methods it used in building up its trade monopoly created a situation
which rendered further advance in Java inevitable, no matter how
hard those in charge of its affairs, both at home and on the spot, might
strive to limit its commitments. The treatment received by Mataram
and Bantam at the hands ofthe Dutch ‘inlidels’ caused many Maham-
medans to take up arms in defence of their religion, and for a time a
pirate fleet under a fanatical Malay of Sumatra, who assumed the name
of Ibn Iskander (‘Son of Alexander the Great'), terrorized the Java
Sea until in 1686 a Dutch squadron under Krijn dc Ronde destroyed it.
The threat of a widespread Mabommedan movement against them
caused the Dutch no little uneasiness, especially as some of the Ban tam

CH* l6 TliE ^ITJI A^^tJ UECLINK OF THE \\OX. 267

chiefs were involved^ while the Susuhunan Amangkurac II of Mata-
ram also allowed hiiti$elf to be drawn into the intjigo^» At the same
time trouble broke out in the Jowlands to the south of Batavia and in
the mountains of the Prcanger^ where the Dutch had hesitated to
enforce their control over the districts ceded 10 them by Alataram in
the treaty concluded in 1678 by Speciman. These districts had become
the refuge of many lawless characterSi one of whom, Surapadf oncse a
Balinese slave at Batavia, had found a happy hunting-ground there
at the head of a band of his compatriots. During the struggle against
Bantam he and his riien had taken service with the Dutch^ but as a
result of an insult offered him by a Dutch officer he and his follmvers
bad fled to the Galungung mountains^ where they were joined by
several hundreds of bad-hats. While the Dutch were busy with Ibn

Iskander, Surapati and hie ‘patriots" were terrorising the whole
countryside south of Batavian A Dutch detachment was sent to hunt
him downp but he escaped 10 Kartasura, where he was favourably
received by the susubunan.

Camphuys sent an embassy to demand his surrender He appointed
as its leader Major Tack, who had diatlngufshed himaelf in the fighting
against '['runedjaya in Bantam and shocked Javanese upinion at the
capture of Kediri in 167S by trying on the sacred crowm of Majapahit
before handing it over to Amangkiirat If* Soon after his arrival at
Kartasura he intervened in an affmy between some Javanese and
Surapari^s Bidinese and was killed together with a large number of his
escort. Although Batavia reali7.ed that the inti deni had been staged
with the object of getting rid of the detested Dutchman, Camphuys
held his hand. He had discovered signs of disloyalty among the Com¬
pany's native troops. The susuhunan soon found his Balinese guests
an unwelcome encumbrance, and Surapati^ escaping to Pasunjan in

bAtAVIA IN TWm IlFmVTEHjmt

CH. l6

THE ZFNITH AND DtCXLIN^ OF THE \\0X\

269

East Java, began to ean-e out a kingdom for and to make

iserious inroads into the territory owning allegiance to Mataram* But
both Camphiiys and hh successor, Willem v an Outhoorn (1691-1704),
turned a deaf car to the appeals of Amangkurat II for help.

While the affairs of central and East Java were thus in the melting-
pot Amangkurat 11 died in 1703 ^nd was succeeded by his son Aman-
gkurat IIlj called by the Dutch Sunan Mas. He was a bloodthirsty
tyrant whose quarrels with his uncle, Pangiran Puger, caused the
latter to flee to Semirang and crave Dutch protection. Joan van
lloorn, who succeeded his father-in-kw Van Outhoom as governor-
general in 1704, le-amt that Sunan -Mas was in league with Sumpati
against the Company and that a number of Mataram chieftains were in
favour of raising Puger to the throne. He thereupon recognized him
as susuhunan and lent him a Dutch force*

So began what h known to the Dutch historians as the First Javanese
War of Succession. With his Dutch force Puger easily occupied Karta-
suta and was installed as Pakubuwono I. He had, however, to pay
heavily for Dutch support. In 1705 he concluded a treaty which
ceded them further territorj^ at the expense of his kingdom up to the
river Losari in the north and the river Donsn in the souths He form¬
ally waived aU claims to Cherihon and the Preanger besides the eastern
half of the island of Madura* Moreover, he granted the Company full
control over the trade of his kingdom and accepted a strong Dutch
garrison in his capital, Kartasura.

Meanwhile the Dutch had driven Sunan Mas out of his kingdom
to seek a refuge at the Court of Surapati. In 1706 a strong Dutch
force landed at Surabaya and captured Sura patios fruntier fortress of
BangiL He himself died of wounds sustained in attempting to defend
it* In the following year, after heavy fighting against Sunan Mas and
the sons of SurapatJ, the Dutch w^on a complete victory. Sunan Mas
surrendered and with his family was sent into txUc iit Ceylon.

1 he Company w^as now' master of Java, but it had yet to crush out
the last embers of resistance. In 1712 Surapati^s pardsans made
further trouble and were not finally liquidated until 1719. In that
same year the Company's vassal, Pakubuwono I of Mataram^ died and
what is knowm as the Second Javanese Wkr of Succession broke out.
Pakubutvono's son Amangkurat IV’s succession to the throne vvas
eontested by his own brothers, who rose in rebellion. It took the
Dutch four years of hard fighting before the rebel leaders were all
rounded up and sent away into exile, some to Ccyloii and the re¬
mainder to the Cape of Good Hope. Like the empire of Majapahit,

ZJO TIIE EAULIEIt PHASE OF EUJIOPFAN ESPAHSIO?i PT. II

Mataram had falkn through mtemal dis&ensmns rather than aa a
result of outside pressure. C(intrar>' lo the aceusatJons of Machia¬
vellian policy levelled against them by thdr critics from Raffles on-
wardsj the Dutch bad intervened unwillingly in the case of Mataram.
The ceaselm d^il wans affected their trade adversely and might have
had serious politieal conse^iuences if they had not adopted a firm line.
The extension of their control over the whole island was the inevitable
result of their assumption of the role of a territorial power. A centurv
later the British were to find themselves m a similar position in relation
to India.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century the V.O.C. stood at the
zenith of its pow'er. 'Fo the outside obsen cr it appeared to be rich and
prosperous, with its annual fleets returning to Europe laden with
merchandise and its annual dividends of between zo and 40 per cent.
Actually its financia] condition was wretched. The long, expensive
warsp the increase of territory^ and the consequent increase in the
numbers of ofiicials involved it in immense expenditure at a time when
4 ts trade was actually decreasing*

The policy of "sell dcar^ buy cheap* brought its own nemesis^ for
it reduced the Javanese to a condition of such poverty that he could
not afford to buy the European gooda or the fine Indian textiles
brought to him by the Dutch. He learnt to supply his needs otherwise,
by growing his own cotton and weaving it in traditional fashion, or bj"
clandestine trade with Portuguese and Englbh smugglers^ who gave
him better prices for his produce than the Dutch^ On more than one
occasion Governor-General van Hoom (1704-9) had to report home
that the goods sent out to java faad had to be sold at a loss.

The directors at home^ with a blind eye to the defects of their own
policy^ attributed their losses to smuggling and the private trade,,
which was the common practice of their officials, whose salaries were
below subsistence level for Europeans in the East. But the hcav-y
penalties they imposed for these practices completely failed to achieve
their object. In 1722, for instance, Governor-General Zw aardekroon
had no less than twenty-six Company's servants beheaded in one day
for theft and smuggling* And nine yeare later Governor-General
Durven, Director-General Hassclaar and two members of the Council
of India were dismissed for failing to deal adequately with the pre¬
vailing corruption. But the malpractices went on unchecked.

\Mth a mounting deficit the directors pursued a policy^ of absolute
secrecy regarding the Company*s accounts, and in order to maintain
its credit in the money-market paid out annual dividends of from 20

CH. I& THE ZENITH ANU t^ECUNE OF THE V.O*C, ^71

to 40 per cent, although to do so they had to float furtl^er loans- By
the year 1700 the Company's debt already stood at 12 milUon guilderst
and in order to fight it$ wars it was forced to apply to the States*
Gcfieral for help in the form of tnoncy and ships. 7'hijs its outward
appearance of riches and power concealed a state of deterioration and
corruption. The most disturbing fact was the actual decline in its
trade at a rime when the expansion of its territory entailed a marked
increase in the number of its olfieiab^

The Batavia authorities^ in suggesting methods to deal with the
decline of tracie^ revived Coen's proposal to open the trade of the
Indies to private enterprise and confine the Company's shipping to
voyages between the East and Europe. But the directors refused to
abandon the strict monopoly system and ordered it to be supple*
mented by the jntr#duction of the met hod of * contingencies and forced
deliveries'. Contingencies were a form of tribute in kind levied on
cUstiicts under the Company's direct control, while forced deliveries
were in products w'hich cultivators were forced to grow* and deliver
at a fixed price^ always much to the advantage of the purchaser. The
directors took no heed of the fact that such methods increased the
poverty of the people and were a direct incentive to smuggling,.

Governor*Gencral Zwaardekroon sought to improve the situation
by introducing new' products into Java. He put into operation a better
method of preparing indigo for the European market, which stimu*
lated its production. His efforts also to improve cotton cultivation and
to encourage the planting of sappan W'ood, which yields a red dvestuff^
met with success. But the most imporumt development of this period
w'aa the introduction of coffee planting, which proved an immediate
success and freed the Dutch from their dependence upon the Mokka
trade at a rime when the Turks were placing difficulties in the way of
their export of coffee, l"he first plantations gtewr tip in the districts
around Batavia and Gheribon, and Zwaardekrgon^s contracts for
deliveries of coffee at the equivalent of fivepence a pound caused the
Javanese to expand their cultivation of the erop to such an extent that
production threatened to outstrip demand, "ITiereuponj against the
advice of the govemor^general, the directors insisted on the price
being towered by 75 per cent, and the growers in desperation cut down
large numbers of their trees. The government therefore applied the
system of forced deliveries to the community and raised the price
somewhat.

The subsequent manipulation of the coffee trade by the Company
during the eighteenth century is a soriy^ tale of measures taken to

272 Tin; EARt.l^ l-HAfSE OF FOROREAK EXPANSION FT. II

ensure a high price in itic European marktl and a mere pittance for
the producer, vho was at the mercy of a government which changed
its policy from time to time in such an arbitrary fashion as to make it
impossible for him to cultivate on economic lines. Moreover, as the
Dutch worked through the local chiefs, who in equally arbitrary
fashion feed their own share of the proceeds, the euJtivalor's position
was worse than that of a slave. I’’umival] sums up the linal position
thus: 'The net result was that for every pikol of 126 pounds shipped,
the cultivator had to supply 240 to 270 pounds and was paid the
equivalent of 14 pounds.*^

During the third and fourth decades of the eighteenth century
Dutch rule in Java passed through a period of turbulence. Before the
end of the Second Javanese War of Succession there occurred the ugly
incident known as Peter Erberfeld’s 'conspiracy'. Erberfeld was a
well-established free burgher of Batavia who developed a grievance
against the government over a claim it enforced unfairly to some
property- left him by his father. In December 1721 he was accused of
plotting with the Surapati party and a number of discontented chiefs
to raise an insurrection with the aim of murdering all the Europeans
in the city. Although the evidence was obtained under torture,
nervous tension was stimulated to such a pilch that he and such of his
supposed accomplices as ivere within reach were put to death. The
authorities even went so far as to pull down his house, e.xposed his head
on the ruins and set up a stone inscription enjoining that the place
should remain desolate for ever. Historians seem to be generally
agreed that the evidence upon which he was condemned w-aa worthless
and that he was more sinned against than sinning.*

.A few years later mass hysteria was responsible for a far worse
crime which had serioua consequences. There were Chinese settlers
in Indonesia long before the coming of the Portuguese. Jan Pietemoon
Coen had a high opinion oftheir industry and diligence and encouraged
them to settle at Batavia. By the year 1700 there were some io,ooo of
them living in or in the neighbourhood of the city. 'I’hey were crafts¬
men, tea-traders and sugar cultivators for the most part. They were
useful to the Dutch as intermediaries in their trade with the Javanese.
'J'hey were also a mainstay of the smuggling trade, while some of them
had become so wealthy and powerful as to constitute a potential
danger to Dutch rule. But the real problem in the early years of the
eighteenth century arose from the fact that the tea-junks plying

^ J. S. FlimiVMlI, Nelhrri^ndi Stutiaf p.

■ Dc ifain^ Pnang&n, i, p. 310 .

CH. 16

THE ZENITH .\ND DECLINE OF THE V.O.C.

^73

regularly from China brought increasing numbers without means
of existence wlio became roving l>eggars and a menace to law and
order.

.As early as 1:706 the Dutch issued stiff regulations aimed at pre¬
venting the entry of such undesiniblcs. When this method proved of
no avail the Batavia authorities rounded up numbers of U'anderirxg
beggars and transponed them to Ceylon, the Banda Islands and the
Cape of Good Hope. Only those with a government pass might remain
in Java. These measures also Failed: deeds of violence by wandering
bands of Chinese became frequent^ and the officials entrusted with
the issue of passes used them as a means of grafts 1 he bad situation
became suddenly critkal when in July 1740 Governor-General
V'alkcnier and the Council of the Indies decided on sterner measures.
Ail Chinese unable to prove that they were suitably employed were
to be deported to wort in the cinnamon gardens in Ceylon. The
regulation was carried out with gross unfaimess: greedy officials sciaed
Chinese long resident in Java in order to squeeze money out of them
under threat of deportation. And when a baseless rumour weijt
round that the deportees were thrown overboard as soon as their ships
tvere out of sight of Java, large numbers of Chinese fled from Batavia
and organised armed resistance.

'I’he Dutch authorities discovered that those still remaining in the
city were in league with the rebels and were preparing to defend them¬
selves. A chance fire which broke out m a Chinese house was taken as
a sign that tho^e within the city and those without were to make a
concerted attack. Thereupon the infuriated popukdant supported
by soldienip seamen, slaves and Javanese, fell upon the Chinese, and fm:
a whole week mas^^acrc and plunder went on unchecked. Governor-
General Valkenier lost his head so completely as to order the massacre
of all Chinese prisoners and did nothing to prevent the Company's
troops from participating in the bloodbath.

When the work of vengeance was over and order was restored,
the government offered a general amnesty to all Chinese who sur¬
rendered their weapons within one months The large numbers who
availed themselves of tlii$ offer were housed in a spet^al quarter that
was built beyond the city limits. Many, however, trekked away and
formed a formidabLe force which WTeaked vengeance on Europeans at
Rembangi J oana and elsewhere, and Anally kid siege to Serna rang. The
situation became serious for the Dutch when the susuhun^, Paku
Buwono II, openly declared for the rebels, seized the Dutch garrison at
Kartasum and murdered its officers. Semarang, ho%vever, was saved

274 TJIE EAULIEH miASE OF EUROPEAN EXPANSION J’T. II

bv the timely arrival of Dutch reinrorcemcnts, and the Madurtsc, who
had suffered much at the hands of Mataram^ threU’ in their lot with
the Dutch.

Then Paliu Buwono 11 , suddenly realizing that he was hacking the
wrong horse, made his peace with the Dutch, His action nearly cost
him his throne^ for many of his chiefs, in their fanatical hatred of the
Dutch, joined with the Chinese in driving him out of his capital and
proclaimed as their ruler a grandson of the esciled Sunan Mas. He was
saved, however^ by quarreb which broke out beiwcen the Chinese and
their Javanese alli^. The Dutch recaptured Kartasura and reinstated
him as ruler of Mataram.

But it was a sadly depleted Matatam over which he was allowed to
rule. By a new treaty, which he was forced to conclude with Batavia
in 1743, he had to cede the svhole of the north coast of java together
with all his claims to the bland of Madura. Moreover, he abandoned
Kartasura as hb capital city and built a new kraton in the Solo
district to which he gave the name of Surakarta. The Dutch created
a new North Coast Province with Remarang as iis capital. I'heir
Madurese allies, however, had come into the struggle in the hope of
gaining their independence. They refu&ed to accept the settlement
and Avere only reduced to obedience after much fighting.

Governor-General '^''alkenier b handling of lite Chinese question
met with stiff opposition from a section of the Council of the Indies
headed by van Imhoff. After a dramatic quarrel, in the course
of which Vaikenicr had the members of the opposition arrested
and sent home, he himself was put on trial at Bala via by order
of the directors, and van Imhoff appointed governor-general in
his stead.

This able and energetic man realized chat exceptional measures were
needed to arrest the economic decline of the Company. He persuaded
the directors to open the inland trade and the siea trade between
Indonesia and India to free burgherH and natives subject lo certain
restnedons. For instance, Batavia must be the beginning and the end
of eaeh trading voyage. Inter-commcrce lietwecn other ports wag
forbidden. The scheme failed to realise his escpcctations, partly be¬
cause of this resiricHDii. In any case it came a century too latcp when
private trading and smuggling in Indonesia had already passed beyond
Dutch control Also in the hope of reducing smuggling van Imhoff
established in 1745 the Opium Society, wdth sole rights of trading
in that article in the Dutch empire. Here also his efforts met with
little succ<!$a.

CH. l6

THE ZENITH ANH DECLINE OP THE V;O.C*

275

More succc^, dn (he other hand, attended his nimiirea to extend
land cultivation in the UHtavian hinterland, espceially in the parts
affected by the Chinese depredations^ Waste land was sold to private
farmers with seignorial rights over the native settlers, but with the
□hligation to sell their produce to the government at fixed prices. He
himself purchased land in the lovely Bogor region, where he built him¬
self the stately inansion named Buitenzorg (‘Carefree’)^ which at his
death was taken over by his successors in turn until it ultimately
became the ofHcial country residence of the governor-generaL ^Vith
his encouragement Dutch farmer families migrated from the homeland
to lake up lands in Ja’^^a. He also improved the lot of the native
cultivator by fixing the annua] amount of coffee to be delivered to the
Company, thereby aiming at preventing the destruction of redundant
coffee when there was overproduction, llh reforms were introduced as
the result of journeys of inspection made to various parts of Java^
w^here he met regents and other local officials and took measures to
save the villager from the oppression of his immediate masters. His
valuable report on his travels, full of interesting details of places an^
peoples, could not be published owing to the policy of secrecy
sedulously maintained by the directors.

Van Imhoff‘a fertile brain produced scheme after scheme of reform
in such rapid succession that he attempted far too much, and little that
he did took rootK The overall plan which he would have liked to carry
out w'ould have been to reduce drasttcaliy the Company's commit¬
ments in the way of trading stations outside Indonesia and Ceylon,
and to conccntniie upon its growing responsibilities as a teriitoriaJ
power. His ill-starred attempt to open: direct inidc with Mexico in
order to import badly-needed silver for coinage show^s haw far his
imagination could lead him to disregard hard facts such as the existing
treaty stipulations preventing such enterprises.

His greatest failing was a lack of statesmanlike insight in bis dealings
with native potentates. While on a A’isit to the susuhumm^ l^aku
Buwuno Up at Surakarta his tactless inlervTiwion in a quarrel between
that ruler and his brother Mangkii Bumi caused the latter to rise in
revolt, and a long strugglcp the I'hird Javanese War of Succession,
^ 749 “S 7 t ^>nce more involved the Company in expensive military
action- During its first year the death of the susuhunan changed its
character from a dynastic squabble into a w^ar of liberation from Dutch
rule; for Paku Buivono II on his deathbed agreed with Van Hohen-
dorff, the governor of the North Coast Province, to cede his kingdom
to the Dutch, and his successor, Paku Buwono received his crown

^7^ TIFF PUA&i: OF El HOPF_^N I!:SFANSIOX PT. fl

3t the hands of the Compatiy* not by virtue of birthrif^ht. This
caused the majority of the chiefs to throw in their lot with

Mangku Bumi, whom they proclaimed jiusuhunan. The Dutch there¬
fore had to fight the most destructive of all their Javanese wars in
order to maioLaiTi their candidate on the throne* And while they had
their hands full to Mataram a serious rebelh'on hnoke out in the
sultanate of Bantam which also involved them in hea^-y military
sacrifices before it was crushed.

In the Mataram struggle, after two years of varying fortunes, Mangku
Bmtii defeated and killed the Dutch commander De Clercq in a battle
at the Bogowonto river in 175 1 and proceeded to occupy a large part of
the North Coa^t Province^ from which he threatened to advance deep
into the Company’s territory. After a great effort, however, he was
driven out of the pfoviocCi and luckily for the Company found himself
involved in a fight for leadership with his nephew Alas Said which
paralysed his efforts against the Dutch. Van Imhoff had died in 1750,
and his successor, Jacob Mossel, decided to partition Mataram. In
V755 a treaty was made with Mangku Bumi by which he accepted Paku
Buwono JIl as ruler of the eastern half of the kingdom. He himself
received the western half with Jogjakarta as his capital and the title of
Sultan Amangku Buwnno, h took two years of fierce fighting to
subdue Mas Said. At the Peace of Salatiga (1757) he recognized the
suzerainty of the Company and received as its vassal a portion of
Mataram now known as the Alangku-Negorose territory.

The trouble in Bantam arose out of a dynastic dispute, and again
van Imhoff’s inter^'ention on the WTongside had serious resnlta* The
old sultan who had ruled since 1733, came so much under the in¬
fluence of one of his wives, Ratu Fadma, of Arab race* that she
persuaded him to nominate her son-in-lahis nephew, as heir-
apparent in place of the rightful heir, Pangeran Gusti. \^an Imhoff
lent his support to the scheme, and in t748, when the Sultan showed
signs of madness, Ratu Fatima brought about his deposition in
favour of her candidate, with heraelf as regent. When Range ran Gusfi
attempted to assert his rights he was deported by the Dutch to Ceylon,
and the old sultan was tak^n to .Ambotna, where he soon died. A
general revolt at once broke out under the leadership of a prii^t, Kjahi
^Papa, and a chieftain^ Ratu Bagus. The Dutch troops sent in support
of Fatima were defeated, and tlie rebels sought the help of the Fnglish
at Bencoolen,

Such was the situation when van Imhoff died in 1750. Jacob
Mossel, on succeeding him, decided to reverse his policy* He won

CH- l 6

THE ZELNLTIl ASt> DECLINE OF THE V,OX%

277

nver the leading Bantam chiefs by banishing Fatima and her can¬
didate^ placed the brother of the dead sultan on the throne, brought
back Paogerait Gnsti. from Ceylon, and recognized him aa heir-
apparent. The nevv suhan made a treaty in 1753 with the Company
by which he recognbed its overlordship and ceded it concrtil over the
Lampongs. 'I'he rebellion* however, continued. Ratu Bagus took the
title of Bultan, while Kjahi Tapa* taking advantage of the Dutch pre^
occupation with the Mataram war* plundered Dutch territory and
even made an abortive attack on Bata^na. Fora time the Dutch troops
were cloflely besieged in Bantam by the rebels. It took much hard
fighting before the two rebel leaders gave up the struggle* In 1753
the new sultan abdicated in favour o-f Pangeran Custi* who confirmed
the treaty with the Company, and quiet ^vas restored, '["he Dutch
were now masters of the w hole of Java* save for the territory in the
extreme east of the island* where the Balinese supporters of Surapati
still caused trouble. Not until 177a were the Dutch able to put an
end to their actmtics.

The Dutch were now complete masters of Java. They had long
been more or less the dominant pow er over the re$t of the Archipelago,
Of the larger islands only Bali and Lombok remained free from tbeir
influence. Their products had bttle economic importance, while the
warlike character of their people and the dogged ness with winch time
and again in history they had ^resisted outside mterference were a
strong deterrent to the Dutch. The remarkable success with which the
Balinese clung to their traditional religion with its Hindu associations
when all the great powers in the island world adopted Islam tells its
own tale.

In Sumatra they had broken the Achinese control over the pepper
trade before the end of the seventeenth century. The result was that
with the exception of Acheh, which stoutly maintained its indepen¬
dence* most of the coastal slates were vassals of Batavia. But there
was little or no interference with natiA^e life* for the Dutch were
strongly averse to territorial expansion on the island; and In any case
the authority of the coastal sultans did not spread far inland. The
pepper monopoly could not be rigorously maintained* partly for geog¬
raphical reasons* and also becau^ of the factory established at Ben-
eoolen by the English after their expulsion from Bantam. In more back¬
ward Borneo Dutch relariuns w^re mainly irith the sultanate of Band-
jermasin* which attained some impoitance asa centre of the smuggling
trade after the Dutch conquest of Macassar in 1667* ^ ® this
situation Batavia seni a special envoy in 1756 w^ho concluded a new^

27 S TllE EARLIEE PHASE OF El-ROPEAN E?«PAMSrON FT. IE

tmde apccmpni under which control parsed min Durch hands. The
eighteenth century’ saw the rise of a Chinese mining colony to work at
the rich gold deposits of the Sumhas sultanate. I’he immigrants were
organized in kongnSf and ultimately came to form semi-independent
communities.

If the Dutch made little impact upon the life of Sumatra and
Borneo, their rigid reguktion of spice producirtran and trade in the
islands of the 'Great Bast" ruined alike the prosperity and the native
culture of the region. The production of clove and nutmeg was
limited to the Banda Isknck and .Amboina. Unlicensed trees growm
elsewhere were destroyed by large fleets of prows under the command
of Dutch officers which made annual voyages {fiQr^gitochtett) to sus¬
pected areas, Temate and Tidore^ once prosperous centres of the
clove cultivation and of inter-island shipping, became poverty-
stricken and backward* Their hereditary ruling famiises received
annual pensions for their compliance. But conditions in the' privileged'
areas w ere, if anything, worse than in those In which spice production
was prohibited. The natives worked for a pittance, were forced to
buy all their foodstuffs from the Dutch at e.vorbitant prices^ and had
to cut doivn their spice trees whenever the Company decided to
restrict the supply. To make matters worse, the policy of monopoly
and restriction brought its own nemesis, for it forced the English and
the French to experiment with the planting of clove and nutmeg in
their own tropical tcrxitories, and ^rith enough success to keep the
price at a reasonable level w^hen the European demand began to
expand tow'ards the end of the eighteenth century.

One of the worst results of the harsh measures taken by the Dutch
in building up and maintaining their trade monopoly an immeiise
increase in piracy. Among the Malays piracy^ had for many centuries
been regarded as an honourable ocetjpation, while to the Indonesian
Mahommedans war against the infidel was a religious duty. The
destruction of much of the native shipping trade and the extreme
poverty to which many coastal districts of nusmitara were reduced
caused larger numbers than ever to swxll the great pirate fleets which
swarmed in the seas of the .Archipelago. 'Fhe defeat of the sea power
nf Macassar in particular opened the ^vay for the rise of the Buginese
state of Boni. Its intrepid and intelligent people began to prey upon
the coasts of Java, Sumatra and the Malay Peninsuk in increasing
numbers from the latter pan of the seventeenth century onwards^
Throughout the eighteenth century they were the open enemies of
the Dutch East India Company. They joined in the intervening wars

CM. [6

THE ZENITH AND DECLINE OF THE V, 0 *C.

279

waged by the of the west coast of Borneo, overnm the sultanate

of Johore and even threatened Malacca, And as Dutch control of the
seas declined during the latter half of the century immense pirate
fleets made regular annual voyages from well-established boBCs in
various parts of the Archipelago—at 'robelo on the north-east coast
of Halmaherap in the islands off the coast of New' Guinea, and in the
Sulu Islands. 'Fhe tllanos of the Sulu Islands were the most dreaded
of all. Their large fleets of heavily armed galleys would fearlessly
attack the strongest warships of the Company, w hile at the end of the
century' they planted a fortified base at the southern tip of Sumatra
from which they preyed upon the Sunda Straits and carried their slave
raids far and wide.

The restoration of peace in Java after the Third War of Succession
and the Bantam rebellion brought some improvement in conditions
there* The Company was at pains to maintain good relations with the
vassal sultans of Surakarta and Jogjakarta, and refused to be drawn
into the frontier dbputes Avhich constantly arose between the two.
The cultivation of coffee and sugar was encouraged, and roads tvefe
built to improve the traffic in these articles. The salaries of officials
were raised in the hope of reducing corruption and there w^as some
attempt to raise the efficiency of the armed forces. But the increasing
financial exhauBtion of the Company and the steadily mounting deficit
in its accounts pre^Tnted any tharough-going reforms.

Outside Java Dutch decline was more obvious^ The growth of
English power in India from the days of Clive onwards became a
serious menace to their position there, especially in Bengal, from which
Batavia imported not only vast quantities of tcjctiles but also supplies
of opium, the secret monopoly of which brought the Company*s
servants immenffic gains, 'fheir blundering attempt at armed inler-
vemion in 1759 against Clive brought ihcm a humiliating defeat as a
result of which their Bengal trade came under English supervision.^
In Ceylon their quarrels with the King of Kandy over the cinnamon
trade resulted in open war* This^ however, ended in 1766 in a treaty
favourable to them. Elsctvhtre, in Sumatra, Borneo and the Spice
Islands, it was a Sad story of commercial stagnation and decline. To
make matters worse, ai the moment when only a great national effort
could have saved the Company, the quarret which broke out in 17&D
between the Patriots and the Princely party in Holland prevented
anything from being done.

In the same year also the ' Fourth English War*, as it is called by

* VetttfhtiJgf fff loK pp, i .

28 o the EAilLlEll FiiABB OF EltHOFEAN EXPANSION PT. li

Dutch hUtorians, broke out, auil, as they binerly remark, gave the
Company its deathblow^ Their government listened to the blandish-
ntent^ of ilie New Hcigknder^ John Adams, and agreed to recognize
American independence. Lord Noith^s govemnient got wind of the
agreement and declared war on Hohand^ In both the East and the
West Indies her colonics were defenceless. Her losses of merchatitmcn
w^ere immense. Negapatam and other trading stations in India fell
into British handsp as also all the Dutch stations on the west coast of
Sumatra. Only through the help of a French naval squadron under
the brilliant Suffren were the Dutch able to save Ceylon and the Cape
from falling into British hands. The}^ lost almost all their homc%vard-
bound ships from the East. No trading ships dared leave the Dutch
ports in Europe. Trade was at a standstill. I'heir godowns at Batavia
were packed with unexportable goods, which they w^ere glad to sell
to neutrals at sacrifice prices.

The Treaty of Paris, which was signed in t7S4^ broke the Dutch
monopoly system. Under it British shipping was granted free trade
throughout the Indian seas. The way was open once more for llie
British to challenge the Dutch supremacy over the trade of Indonesia,
Only two years later a significant step in that direction was taken when
Francis Light founded a British settlement at Penang^ off the coast
of Kedah.

The loss of control by the Dutch over their eastern empire
during the war of 1780—4 had further crmsequences. The Bugis
seized the opportunity to threaten Malacca^ acid only the timely
arrival of a Dutch squadron under van Braam saved the city. When
in 1785 the Dutch brought about their expulsion from Johore they
caused trouble to Dutch interests on the west coast of Borneo and at
Banjermasin in the south of the island. This, combined with the
foundation of Penangt led the Dutch in 1787 to enforce their control
in that region, but nut for long. Bhortly ^erwards trouble began
to brew in central Java bctw'cen the sultanates of Surakarta and
Jogjakarta, and in the w’eakened state of Dutch power might have had
serious conaequencesj happily Dutch pressure on the sunan in 1790
brought about a settlement.

The tempomiy^ restoration of Dutch naval power by van Brjam's
squadron came through the intervention of the home government in
the Company's affairs. A committee sent out subsequenlly to investi¬
gate the state of defence of the Dutch eastern empire found the
situation alarming. Equally alarming was the unchecked and rapidly
mounting deficit in its accounts. In 17S9 this stood at 74 million

CIT. i6

TKK ZENlTJr AND DECLtNI^ OF TltE

281

guilder?^ Two years later it bad increased to 96 million guitderSp the
Company's credit wa^ lost and it could negotiate no further loans in
the open market. The States-General must now act. The great
question was whether the Company's life could be saved by reform
or whether the home government should dissolve it and take over all
its responsibiliti^.'

William V, who was reinstated as StadKouder as a result of the
counter-revolution of 1787, was anxious to save the Company,
Notwithstanding the failure of previous commissions for reforming it,
he appointed in 1791 a high commission composed of Nederburgh*
the Company's advocate^ and FrijkeniuSj the officer in charge of its
maritime affairs^ to proceed to the Indies^ where it was to act with
Governor-General Ailing and van Stodtum, the Director-General
of 'I'rade at Batavia. Nederburgh and Frijkenius did not arrive in
Batavia until 1793. There they joined hands with the ruling clique
and proceeded to stifle the demands for reform—for a time.

At the beginning of 1795, however^ the troops of General Pichegru
overran lioUandT overthrew the Stadhouderate and established in it!i
place the Batavian Republic under French protectorate, William V
fled to England and issued the * Kew Letters' by which he ordered the
Dutch East Indies ofEcials to place the Company's possessions in
British hands as a safeguard against sei^^ure by the French. I'he
British^ he explajoedi had given a solemn pledge to return them to the
Netherlands w'hen peace was restored. Under this arrangement the
British in 1796 took over control of the Cape of Good Hope and Ceylon.
All the Dutch posts in India and on the west coast of Sumatra, as w^eU
as Malacca, fell into British hands. In the Moluccas they took
Amboina and the Bandas but failed to get Ternate.

The Government of Batavia imdeF Nederburgh's influence was
opposed to the policy laid down in the Kew Letters. It equally
opposed to the demands for a more democratic government, which
began to arise from groups of free burghers and Company^a employees
in Java. While, therefore, Nederburgh and Govemor-General van
Overstralen sternly repressed the Liberal movement, they also pre¬
pared to resist any British attempt to occupy the island. But none was
made, although the alliance between the Batavian Republic and
revolutionaiy France brought once more a slate of war between
Britain and the Dutch. For the time being British hands were too
full elsewhere.

'I'hc change of government at The Hague, however, brought a clear
change of policy there towards the eastern empire. The College of

282 THE EARLIER PHASE OF EtrROpEAN EXPANEIO?^ PT. II

Directors hto abolished. In it» place a * Comnuttec for the Affairs
of the East Indian Trade and Settlements' was established under
close government supervision. In J798 the decision was taien to wind
up the Company itself; its debts and possessions were to be taken over
by the State. decree took effect on 31 December 1799 when the
Company’s charter e.rpircd and was not renew'ed. Its debt then
stood at 134 million guilders.

CHAPtER 17

THE MALAY POWERS FROM THE FALL OF MALACCA
(!5ii) TO the end of the EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

Towi PiRES, who came to Malacca jn the year after its conquest by
Albuquerque^^ describes conditions there and throughout the Penin¬
sula in the sLxth book of his S^rna Qriettlai, He says that from MaJacca
up to Kedah are the tin lands, all of them previously subject to Its
sultan. In describing them he mentions vSungd Jugra^ Selangor,
Klang, Bemamp Mimjam, Bruas and a tillage called Perak. To the
south are Aluar and Singapore, the latter of which, he says, consists
of only a few villages of Celbte$p and ia 'nothing much’. On the east
coastp he says, Pahang and its tributary state Trengganu are in the
land of Siam; but Pahang is also in the empire of Malacca and con¬
stantly at wax With the Siamese,

When Sultan Mahmud lost the battle for Malacca he and his son
fled across countr^'^ to Pahang, whence he sent an emissary to China
beseeching aid against the Portuguese^ The Ming emperori however,
pleaded that with a war against the Tartars on his hands he was in no
position to fight the Portuguese. Mahmud therefore had to search
for a site for a new capital where he could to-establish his sway over
the Peninsula and be reasonably safe from the Portuguese, His first
settlement was at Sayong Pinang on the upper reaches of a tributary
of the Johore river- Thi$ turned out to be too far from the sea, and in
I5ZI he removed to the inland of Binlang, south-east of Singapore.
Here, however, he was repeatedly attacked by the Portuguese* In
1523 and 1524 he beat them off with heavy loss, and even sent a force
to lay siege to Malacca.

But in 1526 the Portuguese counter-attacked, destroyed his capital
and gave the island to the Raja of Lingga, Mahmud himself iied to
Kampar in Sumatra, where he died in 152S. His younger son
Ala*ud-din succeeded him and planted his capital on the Johore
liver* "Fhere for a time he was a seiious thorn in the flesh of
the Portuguese, until at last in 1536 Dorn EstavSo da Gama led
an esepedition which forced him to make peace and take up his
residence at Muar.

PT . U

284 THE EARLTER P^IASE OF EUROPEAN EJCPANj^ION

Ir the meantime his cider brother Mustaffar Shah had made his
way up to Perak, where be founded the dynasty which still reigns
there. For a time Perak, Johore and Pahang were content to remain
on friendly terms with the Portuguese. They were watctiing with
considerable alarm the rapidly rising pmver of Achch, on the north¬
western tip of Sumatra, which under Sultan Ali Moghayat Shah had
gained control over the pepper porta of Pedir and Pasai and was carry-
ing on a rich trade with Gujerat and China. Under hts son Ala'ud-din
Ri'ayat Shah (1530—68) Acheh became the tough rival of Portuguese
MaJacca and for many years made repeated efFoits to capture the city.
Her ambittoua policy threatened not only Malacca but also the Malay
states of Sumatra and tlie Peninsula. The Portuguese drove off a
surprise attack in 1537* Tw^o yeai^ later the Achinese fleet captured
Dell in Sumatra. In reply Johore, together with Perak and the
Sumatran state of Siak, inflicted a crushing defeat upon the upstart
power.

The Achinese setback was only a temporary one. By 1547 they had
necovered sufficiently to launch another attack on Malacca. It came
perilously near to success^ and their Malay rivals were tempted to try^
their hand at the game. The combined fleet of Johore, Perak and
Pahang sailed into the _Muar estuary and waited to see what the out¬
come of the struggle with the Achinese would be. When the Portu¬
guese at liist heat off the Sumatran flotilla the Malay fleet sailed away*
In 1551 it returned and for three months laid siege to Malacca, An
attempt to storm the city was repelled with such determination that
it Was not repeated. In the end the Portuguese forced the besieging
fleet to give up the enterprise by sending a fleet to harry the home
harbours of the allies.

Acheh's bid for dominance over the Malay world assumed formid¬
able proportions before the death of the second of the great auhans,
Ala^ud-din Ri^ayat Shah, in 1568* He built up a league of states against
the Portuguese, obtained gunners, guns and ammunition from Turkey*
and amassed a bigger fighting force than ever before. Before striking
at Malacca he dealt a staggering blow to hia rival, the Suitan of Johore.

In 1564 his armada sacked Johore Lama and took away Sultan
Ala'ud-din a captive to Sumatra. For some years after this a bitter
feud raged belw^een Johore and Acheh* and Johore swung over to the
Portuguese side. So much so that in 1568, when .Acheh'a great attack
was made on Malacca, the Portuguese sought Johoraid. This was
granted, but %vhen the Johore fleet of sixty vessels arrived the Portu¬
guese had already beaten off the Achinese* By way of retaliation an

CH. 17 UtE MALAY POWESS FBOM THR FALL OF MAT.ACCA 285

Achintes^^ fleet Siiiled up the Joliorc river dnd burnt a number uf
villages.

The ding-dong struggle between Acheh and Malacca continued
until 1575^ when, for a rrason never explained, the Achinese fleeti
after threatening Malacca,, turned north and conquered Pemk,
killing its s^ultan^ a kinsman of the Johote house^ and carrying away his
widow and children to Acheh^ Thh caused some extraordirtan'
changes in the Malay situation. 'I'he captive Crown Prince of Perak
married an Achinese princess and in 1579 succeeded his father-in-law
as Sultan Ala^ud-din Mansur Shah. He in turn married his daughter
tn Sultan AH Jalla Abdul-Jalil Ri'ayat Shah of Johore and sent his
younger brother to rule Perak as vassal nija.

The Jobore marriage, however, did not improve the relations be¬
tween the two states. In 1582 the Portuguese helped the Johore
sultan to beat off an Achinese attack. In 1585 Mansur Shah appears
to have been murdered by the admiral of his fleet. Fuur years bier
the murderer became Sultan Ma'ud-din Ri'ayat Shah (1589-1604).
It was in his reign that the Dutchp French and English first vasitc^
Acheh. For a space there was a lull in the Acheh-Johore struggle.
In 15S4 the Portuguese had quarrelled with their ally over matters
arising out of their trade monopoly. As a result in 1586^ and again in
1587^ johore besieged Malacca and blockaded it by land and sea. She
also made an alHance with Acheh. But it was of very short durationi
for Avhen the Portuguese made a great counter-attack* sending an
expedition up the Johore river which destroyed Juhore Lama and
carried aw'ay immense booty. Acheh sent fomml congratublions to
Malacca.

"I'hua the triangular struggle continued. The feud between the two
Malay empires was in the last resort of greater monxent to them than
their desire to drive out the Portuguese, By the end of the century
Johore had recovered suflicienily to threaten Acheh so seriously that
Ala^ud-din Hi'ay at Shah sent an embassy to Malacca to ask for help.
And the Portuguese, with the Dutch and English trespassing in their
preserves, decided that the wise course would be to bury the hatchet
provided the sultan would kill Dutch ‘pirates' and hand over his
strongest fort. But the fortunes of war changed suddenly^ as so often
before, and the alliance did not take place. I'hen the siilt.in^ having
in 1599 killed Cornells de lloutman and taken his brother Frederick
prisoner, became abimed at his dangerous isolation. .And since he
feared an alliance between the Portuguese and Johore more than the
vengeance of the Dutch^ he decided to turn the Dutch hustility against

286 THR HA RUHR FMASK OK EtTftOFEAN PT. tJ

the Portuguese to his own udviiritage. Hence he released his Dutch
prisoners and sent envoys to Hollands He even sent an expeditton to
besiege Johore's new capilat at Batu Sawar^ but without success.

'Phe arrival of the Dutch and the English presented Johore^ as well
as Acheh, with new opportunities. Johore aljao saw in the Dutch a
potential ally against her old enemy Portugal and began to listen to
Dutch proposals for a joint attack upon Malacca, seemingly regardless
of the fact that the Dutch had no intention whatever of restoring the
city to Malay rule. In 1606 they joined in an attack on Malaccan But
it failed, and fora time the suhan'$ confidence in the Dutch weakened
so that he wavered.

In the following year a new ruler, Iskandar Shahi seized the thrune
of Acheh ami began to pursue an expansionist policy with great vigour.
Taking advantage of the decline of Portuguese power he extended his
control not only over further Coastal regions of Sumatra hut also over
the mainland states of Pahang ((618)^ Kedah (1619) and, most
important of all because of its tin, Perak (1620)* in 1613, and again
\p. 1615, the Achinese sacked Johore because its sultan was negotiating
with Malacca. In 1&161 therefore, the Sultan of Johore deemed it
prudent to join [skandar Shah in a big attack on Malacca. Again it
failed: the Portuguese with their backs to the wall proved themselves
very' tough fighters, still able to maintain possesion of the famous
emporium.

Nevertheless the expansion of the power of Acheh wm indeed
spectacular. In writing to James I of England Iskandar claimed over¬
lordship over Johore itself* This was mere tvishful thinking, but his
control over both aides of the Straits of Malacca was extending to such
a degree that he looked like gaining auprcmacy over all the native
states of the Peninsula and the north-western parts of the Archipelago.
On the other hand, hisi deportations of thousands of people from the
States he conquered stirred up a deep hatred of the Achtnese yoke and
a movement to get rid of it. In 1629 the united forces of Malacca,
Johore and Patani inflicted a crushing defeat on the Achinese fleet
near Malacca. Thereafter the power of Acheh began to decline a^
rapidly as it had arisen. Iskandar died in He was succeeded

by an adopted son Iskandar IL He died in [641, the year in which the
Dutch captured Malacca. Then for sixty years Acheh was ruled by
queens* The pressure of the Dutch and their support of Johore
caused Acheh to lose all her territories on the Peninsula except Perak.

Jchoreas great hope had been to recover Malacca through alliance
with the Dutch. Her sultan styled himself King of Johore and Malacca.

CH. 17 THE MALAV POWERS FROM THE FALL OF MALACCA 287

The Dutch, however, refused to recognize his claifii 10 the city.
Nevertheless such >s'as his hatred of the Portuguese that Sultan Abdul
Jalil made a treaty with the Dutch in t6j7 by which he undertook to
co-operate with them in an attack upon the city, and in the final struggle
in 1640-1 assisted them with a fleet of forty sail. He had already
added Pahang to his domlmons »vhen Acheh’s control over it lapsed.
Now, free from any further threat from either the Portuguese or
.^cheh, he proceeded to build a new capital at Maltam Tauhid, near
the present Kota 'J'inggi. He was still the titular head of a great empire
which included most of the Malay states of the Peninsula, the Riau
.Archipelago and Bengkalis, Kampar and Sink in Sumatra. Only when
it was too late did he begin to realize that whereas the Portuguese had
chastised with whips, the Dutch were to chastise with scorpions.

No sooner had they taken Malacca than the Dutch began to seek
to control the tin-producing states. Tin was their main interest in
the Peninsula; it was of prime importance to them in their commercial
dealings with both India and the Chinese, In 1639 they had made a
contract with Acheh permitting them to purchase tin in Perak. I^i
1641 the first Dutch Governor of Malacca presented the Sultan of
Perak with a demand that he should stop all dealings with foreigners
and in future sell all his tin to the V.O.C. When he refused to do so,
Dutch cruisers blockaded the entrance to the Perak river. \ATitn,
however, he still managed to evade their persistent sttempis to estab¬
lish a monopoly over hia esport trade the Dutch in 1650 extorted from
his suzerain, the Queen of Acheh, a treaty w'hercby the Company was
to share tlic Perak tin trade equally with her and to the exclusion of all
other traders,

'I'he subsequent history of Dutch relations with Acheh and Perak
over the tin question may be briefly told. The 1650 agreement
satisfied no one. It was detrimental to the large trade carried on
bctw'een Acheh and Surat, through which quantities of Indian textiles
came to Sumatra and the Peninsula. As a result the Dutch factory
at Surat was attacked and plundered. Moreover, in 1651. with the
connivance of Acheh, the Dutch factor)' at Perak also was attacked
and plundered and nine of its officials killed. .And they were too busy
elsewhere to send a punitive expedition. In 1653 Sultan Musiatfar of
Perak promised to restore the 1650 agreement, pay compensation for
the loss of the Dutch factory, and execute the chiefs responsible for the
murders. But he made no attempt to carry out his undertaking.

In 1655 the Dutch approached the sultan through Acheh, and in the
presence of .Achincse ambassadors he signed a further agreement to the

288 THE tL^ELlEH fHASK OF EUROFKAN EXPA?^StON FT* 11

startle effect. Again^ however, he failed to cany if not, and when the
Achinesc put new diffieultie!^ in the way of the Dutch it became obvious
that as their rivals for the Perak trade th€y were double-crossing them.
The Dutch therefore blockaded both ports, Perak and Acheh. In
i6s7 the Achinese replied by destroying the Duteh factories in their
subject ports of Priamam, Tikti and Salido in Sumatra. Batavia
thereupon sent a naval force to attack these ports and tightened the
blockade of Perak and Acheh, Again Achch climbed down. In
an .Achinese embassy was received at Batavia by Governor-General
Joan Maetsuyeker, and a treaty w^as signed which provided for the
payment of compensation through a reduction in the price of the tin
bought by the Dutch in Perak and a division of the trade whereby
the Achinese were to take one^third and the V.O.C, two-thirds of
Perak^a tin export.*

I'his treatyp however^ had no more value than its predecessors,
since at this time the woman w^ho exercised the sultan'a powders at
Acheh was merely the head of a confederation of chiefs, over whom^
the Dutch were to discover, s]ie had little or no real control As we
have iseerij johore and Pahang had already successfulJy asserted their
independence of Achch. Now Perak, annoyed by Acheh^s action in
concluding the treaty, threatened to transfer her allcgtance to Johore.
As things turned out, however, the Dutch tin trad* with Perak im¬
proved considerably, for the reason that Acheh's decline became so
marked that few’ of her vessels visited the part*

In their dealings with other tin states the Dutch had mi.xed success.
In 1642 they made an agreement with Kedah for the delivery of half
its product. In 1643 Junk Ceylon, and in 1645 Bangerii prombed the
Dutch the whole of their product. Kedah, however, evaded her agree¬
ment, and the Dutch in retalxation resorted to blockade. The Malays
indeed would appear to have been annoyed that a treaty should have
been considered anything more than a diplomatic gesture. When the
Dutch found themselves uitable to maintain an effeetivc blockade
owing to Kedah's distance from Malacca and her easy communicalions
with the Coromandel Coast, they tried to enhat Siamese support. In
1664 they made a treaty with Siam w hich granted them free trade with
the Malay states under her suzerainty. But her overlordship over
Kedah meant Iktic or nothing in practice, and all the Dutch efforts
to coerce the little state failed. Wkh other states under Siamese

^ VVinBEcdl, Hatary af Mufaya, p, 133^ Baya t|w tin ta be divided njiutlv

the V.O.C. HJid Achch, hut Stapf |V atatcmcpl m pmj i'hh ^nUrltindnit

iii p- tft thr mnr4s ftccc*ptKbl<,

17 THF- MALAY POWEH.S F^l 0 ^f TfIF. FALL OF MALACCA ^89

control, notably Ligor and Selangor, they bad better successp and
ultimately made monopolbtic agreemems.

^rhe decline of Acbeh entailed the of her control not only over
the states of the PeninAub but al&o over the MLnangkabnu pepper
ports of west Sumatra. With tbeac the Dutch long sought to make
individual agreements by which they w'ere to for^ke their allegiance
to Acheh and come under the Company's protection. In 1663 they
were at last successful with an agreemenl known as the Painan Con-
tmetp which was signed by a number of West Coast sultans granting
the V^O^Ch an absolute monopoly over the pepper trade, together with
freedom from tolls^ in return for protection. It resulted in much
lighting and led the Dutch to wlthdratv their factories from Acheh
and Perak, But it brought the w^est coast of Sumatra practically under
Dutch supervision.

The Dutch conquest of Malacca and the decline of Acheh offered
Abdul Jalil a good opportunity to strengthen the position of Johore^
In 1644 his younger brother married the Queen of Patani, Fear of the
Dutch gave him Jambi and Acheh as allies, while he weakness of
x^chch enabled him to extend his power over Siak and Indragiri on
the east coast of Sumatra. For a time his capital became an important
centre of trade, and he a rich man. But in i666^ owing to a broken
contract of marriage between his heir and a daughter of the Pang^mn
of Jambi, resulting from the intrigu^^ of an ambitious laks^mana of
Johore, who married his owm daughter to the prince^ the two states
drifted into a chronic condition of warfare. In 1673 Jambi sacked
Batu Sawar, Abdul Jalil'a capitaU ^d the old sultan fled to Pahang,
where be died three years later at the age of ninety.

His nephew' and successor Ibrahim settled at Riau, whence he
carried on the struggle. But hJs empire was already falling apartp
Unable to gain a decisive success^ he called to his aid a Bugts mercenary
leader Daing Mangika, who in 1679 sacked Jambi in retribution for
her treatment of Johore six years earlier. The war, howeverp con-
timicd^ and in iSSz Ibrohim Avrote to Governor-General Cornells
Spec!man suggesting a revival of the old alliance originally made in
1603^ when an embassy had been sent to Prince Maurice at The
Hague, Speelman replied by asking for the monopoly of the trade of
Johore and Pahang.

Before anything came of the negotiations Ibrahim died in 1683^
leaving a young son Mahmud to succeed him under the regency of his
mother and Paduka Raja, the tahamum who had brought on the war
with Jambi. The Governor of Malacca at once sent an envoy to ask

290 EARLIER PHASE OF EUROPEAN EXPANSION PT. tl

for a monopoly of Slakes newly discovered tin. The regency, unable
to control the Mirtatigkabaus of that district^ signed a tre.aty prancing
it in return for a Dutch undertaking to mediate between johore and
Jambi, The treaty, however, proved futile, and w hen in i6S8 Paduka
Raja was driven out and replaced by a new chief minister, who took
the young euUan away from Rtau back to Kota Tinggi on the main-
land, a new one was made io 1689. This confirmed the provisions of
the earlier one, granted the Dutch toll-free trade in Johore until the
sultan came of age, and added a prohibition to Indian traders to ^"ttle
in the Johore dominions. Winstedt asserts that this treaty also was
futile^^ F. W. Stapel on the other hand describes it ag' very profitable ^
and is of opinion that it greatly strengthened the Dutch position at
Sink at the end of the seventeenth eent^r>^'

Mahmud turned out to be a pert'crt and sadist whoae cruelties
caused his murder in 1699. He was the last of the old Malacca royal
line tp rule in Johore. He tvas succeeded by the chief minister,
Bendahara Sri Maharaja Tun Habib Abdul JaliL But family feuds
caused him to leave affairs of state in the hands of his brother the Raja
Muda, and the latter’s tyranny led to so much dissension that in 1717
theMinangkabau ruler of Siak, Raja Kechil, surprised Johore Lama and
smed the throne. Abdul Jalil was reduced once more to the position of
bendahara. In the Ai^n^lls the new ruler is known under the

title Abdul Jalil Rahmat Shah.

Raja Kechil ruled the Johore dominions from Riau. In 1718 the
deposed sultan intrigued with Daing Farani, a Bngis chief who had
ser>^ed Raja Kechil in Sumatra and was disappointed in his expecta¬
tions of receiving the office of Yam-tiian Muda of Johore. The plot
failed, and the fugitive Abdu! Jalil put to death %vhile attempting to
flee to Pahang. In 172^1 however, Daing Patani and hi a Bugis
followers drove out Raja Kechil and placed a aon of Abdul Jalil on
the throne. The new* sultan was forced lo appoint Daing Parani^s
eldest brother Yam-tuan Muda, or Under-king, of Riau and reign as
the puppet of the Bugis. From then onwards the Bugis were the real
rulers of Johore.

Malayan histor)- throughout the eighteenth centuiy' is the story of
Bugis ascendancy. The domiitant people in Celebes in the seventeenth
century, they become known to histor}- first as mercenaries fighting
for the Dutch. The Am Palacca of Boni led a contingent of Bugis
volunteers in Speclman^s campaign against Macassar in 1666-7. They
were of much assistance to the Dutch in the conquest of Mataram.

*■ Op. 14ft. * Op. dt.f \ii, p. 460.

(.’It. 17 THE tnWHJtS VHOM THE FAl^L OF MALACCA 291

Their natj%T countr>" m the iiouth-west limb of the i^landi where

they were organ bed in a number of small states, which from time to
time formed confederations. They were a maritime people and linked
among the most advajiccd in Indonesia. The Batigais IVeaty of 1667,
which ended the independence of Macassar, and the ruin of the
Moluccas caused them to roam far and wide, 'fheir pirate fleets
swarmed all over the Archipelago, and before the end of the century
had begun to attack the coasts of Java, Sumatra and the Peninsula. As
early as i68t there were large Bugis settlements on the XJang and
Selangor estuaries.

Doing Paranit who secured Uugis ascendancy over Johore in tjz%y
w'as one of five famous brotheni who had left Celebes to seek their
fortunes in Borneo, the Rian Archipelago and the Peninsula. Riau
noAV became the centre of their influence. From it they established
control over the tin states of Kedah and Perak. A dynastic struggle
in Kedah led to their being invited to assist a new' suUan against lus
rebellious brother. For this they received a huge cash payment, and
Daing Parani married the sultanas sister. In 17^4 their enemy the
Minangkabau Raja Kechil of Siak, whom they had driven out of Riau,
led a force to Kedah against them, and for two years the Minangkabau
and the Bugis fought for the possession of the state. The war had
disastrous effects upon Kedah’s trade. Daing Parani was killed, but
in the end the Bugis drove Raja Kechil back to Siak.

Then the struggle spread to Perak and Selangor. Daing Parani’s
brother Daing Merewah, the Undcr-king of Hiau^ led an invasion of
Perak, where Minangkabau warriors and Kedah chiefs w^cre seeking to
gain control over the country. This also was successful, and Bugis
dominance established over a third state, Selangor was raided by a son
of Raja Kechil and a renegade Bugis chieftain. This situation was
dealt with by another of the famous brothers^ Daing Chelak, w'ho had
succeeded Daing Merewah as Under-king of Riau, He and bis
puppet, Sultan Suhuman, ex^pclled the raiders* His son Raja Luma
Was then created sultan of Selangor^ the first in its hi8to^^ 1 wo
years later in 1742 he led another invasion of l^erak to re-establish
Bugis control against further Minangkabau interference*

This immense upsurge of Bugis activity and influence alarn'ied the
Dutch* Their long etfoiis to monopolize the tin of Malaya were now^
in danger of coming to grief before ihe competition of Bugis traders
under the protection of the fighting fleets of Riau, In 1745 t therefore,
they began to rebuild their fort at the Bindings. By that time there
were signs that the Malays themselves were looking rourtd for help

TtlE EAKLIF^ PltASE OF Fl'ROPF^N EXPANSrOM it

to get rid of Bugi:^ contfoL Sultan Sulalman made a treaty with van
[mhofF by which in return for a promise of Dutch assistance he ceded
Siak besides granting them once again the tin monopoly tn hb
dominions- So strong was Malay hostility at Riau that Daing Kem-
boja, who had become the power behind the throne at RiaUp found it
safer to transfer his headquarters to Linggi,

For some time the Dutch made no move to take over Siak. In
1753, however^ a palace revolution there placed on the throne a ruler
who began a cotmuerclal w'ar against them. In 1755, iherefotei they
expelled him. Then they made a fresh treaty with Sultan Subiman
by which they promised him help in recovering his lost possessions
from the Bugb. He in his turn appointed a regent to look after Dutch
interests at Siak and conferred on the Company the tin monopoly in
Selangor^ Xiang and Linggi. Dutch ships abo were to trade free of
tolls throughout his kingdom.

There was now open war between the Dutch and the Bugis. In
1756 the Bugis attacked Malacca. In retaliatiDn the Dutch, together
t^th the forces of Trengganu^ attacked the Bugis stronghold at Linggi.
The fighting at both places was long and bitter^ but in the end the
Bugis were defeated. . 4 s a safeguard Sultan Sulaiman ceded Rembau
and Linggi to the Dutch, and on i January 1758 the three Bugis
leaders, Daing Kemboja of Linggi^ Raja Tua of Klang^ and Raja Adil
of Rembau, signed a treaty of peace with the Dutch and confirmed
the sultanas grant of the tin monopoly.

'I he empire of Johore ivas now a thing of the past. Selangor an
indqiendent state under a Bugis jaultan^ The smaller inland states tvere
under Minangkabaus or Bugis^ Pahang was under Minangkabau
chiefs^ Anarchy reigned in johore itself. . 4 nd Sbk was ahuiit to be
lost, and just before hb death in 1759 its vassal niier, Sultan Muham¬
mad, massacred the Dutch garrison on the bland of Guntung. In
Tyfiii therefore, the Dutch sent a punitive expedition which installed
their own nominee as sultan. I'o complete the picture^ in 1759.
shortly before the death of Sultan Sulaiman^ the Bugis leader Raja
Haji^ nephew of Daing Kembtjja, staged a coup d'itat at Riau and
reinstated his uncle as under-king of the Johore dominions. In the
next year, when Sulaiman himself died, the Bugis murdered hh
successor^ and Daing Kemhoja^ os the guardian of his infant grandson
bom in that year, thus remained the de facto ruler of the state.

Under Daing Kemboja b rule the imperial sway of Johore saw a
temporary revival, mainly through the military prowess of Raja Haji
and partly through his skill in maintaining good relations with the

CH. 17 TliE MAIJK\ I^WEHS FROM THE FALL OF MALACCA Z <}2

Dutch. Raja Haji forced the niters of Jambi and Indragrri to pay
homage to Johore, thereby reviving her influence in Sumatra. Then
he saifed north to deal with Perak and Kedah, The Sultan of Perak
made the necessary acknowledgements* but the Sultan of Kedali
resisted. For ao doing he was deposed and expelled»

In 1771 Francis Lights bter to be the founder of Penangp had
urged the Madras authorities to guarantee the sultan's independence
and accept his offer of a seaport in return. But when the East [ndla
Company learnt that the sultan wanted militar)' help against a possible
attack by the Bugis Sultan of Selangor, Raja Haji's brother, the
negotiations broke down. The excuse W 3 S that such a move would
cause trouble with the Dutch. Hovr completely irrelevant this w'as
becomes clear when one realiKcs that the decay of Dutch pow^r was
the main cause of the Bugta threat to the sultan's independence. So
the way w^as left open for Raja Hajl and his Sdangor brother to gain
control over Kedah and an ample share of the revenue drawn by its
sultan from its extensive trade with Bengah Surat and Sumatra.

In i777» when Daing Kemboja died. Raja Haji w^ent to Riau amd
Avrested the chief authority from the dead leader's son, his cousin,
although the latter had received Dutch recognition as his father's
successor.. For some time he maintained frienJly relations Arith the
Dutch, but in 1782 they quarrelled and the Bugis began to raid Dutch
positions in the Malacca Straits. In 17S3 ^ Dutch attempt to capture
Riau failed thriiugh mismanagement. Thereupon Raja Haji, gathering
together his utmust strength, besieged Malacca, He had caught the
Dutch on the wrong foot; they were fully engaged in tlicir disastrous
'Fourth English War' (178^4) could not muster adequate
naval strength to defend their eastern empire. But Malacca stood
firm. In June 1784 van Braam with a fleet of six ships* sent out from
Holland m an attempt to restore their fortunes, suddenly attacked the
besieging force and completely destroyed it* killiog Raja Haji in the
process.

In August van Braam followed up this sueccss by driving its Bugis
sultan out of Selangor. 'Phen in October he expelled the Bugis from
Riau and dictated a treaty whereby the sultan, the bendahara and the
temenggong acknowledged that the port and kingdom Avere Dutch
property and that they must entertain a Dutch Resident and garrison.
In June 1785 the first Resident entered into occupation^

The war, however* had only finished its first phase. In that same
year the Bugis Sultan of Selangor, Ibrahim, returned, and the Dutch
garrison, unable to hold out against his attacks, evacuated their fort

29+ THE EARLIER PHASE OF EUROPEAN EXPANSION FT. II

3Tid tied to M^kcca. He was soon biockaded by a Duteh fleet. In
the vain hope of English assistance, he defied the beLcagijering force
for a year, but bad finally to accept Dutch authorily,

*Ehe Dutch hold on Riau was nejct challenged. Sultan Mahmud
had sought the assistance of the dreaded Jhnuns of Borneo. In May
17S7 the)' arrived and drove out not only the Dutch but also the sultan
himself and his Malay chiefs. The fugitive sultan sought help first of
the Dutch and next of Captain Francis Lightt who in the pre^nous
year had taken possession of Penang for the English East India Com¬
pany, When these overtures failed he formed a coalition composed of
'Frengganu, Kedah, Remhau, Siak, Solok^ Lingga^ Indtagiri^ Siantan
and Johore^ which had the declared mm of driving both the Dutch
and the English from Malayan waters. But after some ineflectual
attacks on the Dutch fort at the Dinduigs and the coast of Penang
the grandiose coalition dissolved. The Dutch recovered Riau, the
Ilanuns returned home, the Bugis migrated to Selangor^ Sjantan and
Bomeoj and the Malays, stimulated by Mahmud, turned 10 piracy*
JSuch remained the situation until in 1795 the French revolutional
armies overran Holland, and as a reauH of the Kew Letters, issued by
the exiled Dutch government, the English began to occupy the Dutch
possessions in the East. When th^t happened the Dutch had just
concluded an agreement by which they had undertaken to restore the
fugitive sultan. It w'as the English, howeverp who reinstated Mahmud
and incidentally removed the Dutch garrison from Kiau. In $0 doing
they restored also the Bugis to power*

This revolution in Riau was to have consequences of no little
interest^ for the Bugis leader Raja .41 i, by driving out the Malay
under-king Enku Mu da, started a feud which not only caused much
trouble in the Malay tvorld for a good many years but also presented
RalTles in 1819 with the perfect opportunity for creating a sultan from
whom to purchase the island of Singapore. For Raja All resisted all
Mahmud's attempts to drive him out of Riau so stubbornly that at
length in 1803 the sultan accepted him as undcr-king and gave him
his younger son Tengku . 4 bdur-Rahman to bring up. Then three
years lateri having failed to persuade the disappointed Engku Muda
to accept it, he conferred the office of temenggong upon the Malay
chief's nephew. At the same time he entrusted hia elder son Tengku
Hussein to Engku Muds to bring up, and in due course marry to his
daughter. The new^ temenggong was the one who in 1819 was to
enter into the famous deal with Ratflea; while I'engku Hussem^
cheated of his succession to the throne at his fat her death by Raja

cn, IJ THE MALAY FROM THE FALL OF MALACCA 295

All'a successor as under-king, was thu sultan created by Raffles to gi%'e
legal semblance to that deal.

rhe feud between Raja Mi and Engku Muda had its repercussions
in other Malay stat« al^. In iScso the Bugis Sultan Ibrahim of
Selangor intervened in support of his relative. Soon afterwards the
Perak chiefs, unaware that the Bugis had the upper hand at Riau,
sent an iU-timed offer of their throne to Sultan ^lahmud. 1 his
brought down on them the full force of Sulaiman^s wrath. In 1804 he
conquered Perakt driving out the reigning sultan and holding the state
for tw^o ycar^. In 1806, however^ a new sultan of the old Jine succeededp
and when Sulaiman made a further attack to regain control the defence
w^as too strong for hitn^ Nevertheless he continued for many years^ as
%Vinstedt puts it, 'to fish in the troubled waters of the Perak river

By the end of the eighteenth century, save in Selangor, the Bugia"
ambitions had received, or were about to receive, a series of decisive
checks, mainly through the intervention of outside powers. One
further one remains to be recorded- Behind Malacca ever since the
fifteenth century Malays from the Minangkabau region of S^m3^ra
had been coming across to form new settlerncnts. By the time of the
Dutch conquest of Malacca in 1641 there were Minangkabau colonies
at Naning, Rembau, Sungai Lijong and Klang. In the latter half of the
century the Dutch had some trouble tvith them. In the early part of
the eighteenth century the Bugjs became the dominant factor in
Malacca's hinterland and kept the Minangkabau power in check. Van
Braam's conquest of Selangor and the expulsion of the Bugis Irom
Riaw by the Dutch left the way open for the formation of a looac
coalition nf the small Minangkabau states with a ruling dynasty at its
head. Its founder. Raja Mdew^ar {l^ 73 ^" 95 )^ claimed descent from the
royal house of Minangkabau in Sumatrai w^hich itself claimed descent
from the Saikndras of Srivijaya fame. He 5eem$ to have been recog¬
nized by the Dutch Governor of Malacca^ and by carefully eschewing
rivalry with any of the powerful chiefs he gradually built up a compact
wedge of Minangkabau states- At his death in 1795^ year in which
the British took over Malacca and readmitted the Bugia to Riau, what
is now the state of Negri Semhilan had becomo an independent unit^

With the coming of the nineteenth century Malaya stood on the
threshold of a new era. The ambitions of the Bugia had been thsvarted.
Dutch power was tcmjKirarily in abeyance while Napoleon dominated
Europe. The Malay empire of Johore was at its last gasp- Meanwhile
Siam, after her disastrous defeat by the Burmese in 1767, had made a

* ti/ P' "

296 THE EARHER PHASE OV EUROPEAN EXPANSION FT. ll

vi'ondcrful recovery, and under the new Chakri dynasty was begins
tiing to revive her ancient claims over the Malay states. Finally the
British, having planted their flag on the island of Penang ui 1786 and
occupied Malacca in 17951 engaged in 2 mighty stryggle with
France^ and consequently were determined to deny their rival the
strategic adv^tages in the Indian Ocean which the occupation of the
Netherlands Indies would confer on her. Moreover, in 1805 the young
Stamford Raffles was to arrive in Penang, And although some ten
years later he was to be prevented from realizing his dream of sub¬
stituting British for Dutch control over the ArchipelagOp he was never¬
theless by the occupation of Singapore to do something of decisive
importance to the future of Malaya.

CiUPTFJl iS

SIAA'S AND 1 ’IiE EUROPEAN POWERS IN THE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

NARES^^^^^^, the ‘Black Prince' of Siam, who turned the tables on the
Burmese and. restored the indepetidctice of his countrj', holds one of
the most honoured places in her history. After the failure of his attack
on 'Poungoo in 1600 he concentrated his attention upon the Shan
states., all of which had become independent when Nanda Bavin was
finally defeated in 15^. But. as we have seen, the Nyaungyan Prince,
with Ava as his base, was soon en^ged vipon the task of reconquering
them, and while campaigning against him In 1605 Naresuen died o a

carbuncle. ■ 1 V

His brother, the ‘White King*, succeeded him with the title ot

Ekat’otsann. He was unwarlike and so the Siamese effort in the Shan
statea was abandoned and Burma recovered them. Ekat’otsarat was
iTileresteil in financial reform and tradefc and during hh brief o
five ve3T3 the Dutch trading connection with Slam Avas established.
In j6oz they opened a factory at I^atarn and In i6oS ai Ayut'ia. Both
places were important centres for Chinese and Japanese trade. The
Japanese had been the first foreign traders to settle in Siam m soon as
Naresuen’s vHctorii-s over the Burmese made □ resumption of j^ceful
trade possible. Many of them were converts of the Jesuit missionaries
in Japan and cainc to Siam when the religious policy of the Shogun
Ivevasu made their position unsafe in their own country. At ,\yut la
they were granted a settlement of their own by Ekat'otsorat, who
enlisted a large force of them in his bodyguard under the command ot
their headman, Yamada. Siam also exchanged complimentary missions

With the ereat sihogAin. . , ^

.At both Paiani and Ay^it’ia the Dutch had to face the opposition of
the Portuguese and the Japanese, but they were welcomed at both
plates by the nilers, and in 1609 a Siamese embassy from Ayut ja was
received'at The Hague by Maurice of Nassau. It was the first re¬
corded visit of Siamese to Europe. In 16 lo EkaPotsarat was succeeded
by his son Int’araja, who is referred to in Siamese history as Songi am
‘the Just'. His accesision was the signal for a Japanese nsmg which

SlAAfEKE DAKClSR

299

CH. iS SIAM ANI> THE EUBOI'EAN POWERS

for a time threatened m bring disaster to the kingdom- I hey rose
because the minister who was their patron was ciccuted on account
of the part he had played in a conspiracy which had caused the death
of the Maha Uparat in the previous reign. They sacked Ayut'ia and
then made off to P’ctchaburi, which they fortified and prepared to
hold. At the same lime the King of Luang Prabang invaded Siam on
the pretext of coming to expel the Japanese. Songt am, however, was
equal to the emergenev- He reduced P'ctchaburi and then turned and
inflicted a decisive defiat on the inv’aders. The Japanese seem to have
made tenns with the king, for they were retained in the royal body^
guard and Vamada himself was given a Siam^ title of honour.

Peace was restored in 1612, the year in which the Gfofie appeared at
Ayut’ia bringing a complimentary letter from King James [ of England.
Nottvithstanding Dutch opposition, Songt’am permitted the Last
India Company to establish a factor)' at his capital. In the following
y^ar Anaukpetiun of Burma captured Syriam and put an end to the
stormy career of Philip de Brito. He then proceeded to strike at the
parts of Bayinnaung's empire held by Siam, Binnya Dala handed over
Martaban to him without a blow, but further south there was some
severe flghting during the course of the year 1614. The Burmese, as
we have seen, recovered Moulmein and '[’avoy, but failed to capture
Tenasscrim, which was defended by Portuguese auxiliaries in the

service of Siam, - l- 1 t.

In the follow ing year the war was switched to Clnengmai, which the

Burmese took, .■\ftcr three mure years of struggle, during which the
Siamese failed to regain the place, a truce was negotiated in ihifl
which left the Burmese in possession of their gains. The ceiaatioii of
the w'Rr was probably due to an event which took place in Cambodia
In that year. Taking advantage of the Siamese preoccupation with the
Chiengmai question, the Cambodians declared their independence and
drove out the Siamese garrison, which Naresuen had placed in their
capital in 1594. In 162a a Siamese attempt to restore their control
over I,ovek‘failed. During the rest of his reign Songt’am repeatedly
sought to enlist Dutch and English support against Cambodia, but
both were unwilling to commit themselves to such a dubious adventure
and Cambodia retained her independence. .Although he had acted
with firmness in face of the Japanese revolt and the Luang Prabang
invasion, Songt’am disliked war. He bad been a monk w'hen called to
the throne and was fond of study and devoted to religious e.xercises.

Relations betw'cen the English and the Dutch in tviam became
steadily worse. The sea fight at Patani in 1619, in which John Jourdain

irr. u

300 THE EiUtLIEH PHASE OF EUEOPEAN EXPANSION

lost his life, has been chronicled elsewhere. At Ayut'ia the Dutch bad
the advantage over the English as a result of the agreement they made
with Songt'am in 1617 for the purchase of hides. In 1622 the English
factories at both Patani and Ayut’ia w'cre closed down, and for thirtj'-
seven yeare they had no regular trade with Siam, '[’he Dutch also
dosed their factory at Patani; trade there did not fulfil the great
expectations cherished by both companies when they first settled
there. At Ayut’ia, however, with the departure of the English they
became stronger thnn ever.

When Songt’am died, while still a young man, in 1628, he was
succeeded by his son Jett'a. I Ic was a puppet in the hands of I’’ya Sri
Worawong, a cousin of Songt'am, who had had a stormv career and
seized power with the help of the Japanese leader Yamada, In 1630
the ambitious minister seized the throne for himself and assumed the
title of Prasat T'ong, the King of the Golden Palace. His nickname
among the people was 'the bottled spider'. At the moment of his
usurpation Yamada turned against him and essayed the role of king-
i^aker. He succeeded, however, in outwitting the Japanese leader,
who was promptly poisoned. Then after a bloody struggle in 163a
culminating in a massacre of the Japanese in Aynt’ia the survivors
were expelled from the kingdom. The trouble with the Japanese
played into the hands of the Dutch, who established even closer
relations with the usurper and promised him their support against his
enemies. In 1632 Prince Frederick Henry of the Netherlands sent a
letter congratutaring Prasat T'ong on his accession to the throne, and
in 1634 the Dutch were permitted to build *a stone lodge, with fit
packhouses, pleasant apartments and a commodious landing-place' on
the river'bank at Ayut'ia A

But although Juoat Behouten, who was the Dutch Agent at the time
of Prasat T'ong's usurpation, described him in 1636 an ^ruling with
great reputation and honour’, his successor, jeremias van Vliet, paints
a very different picture of his rule.* The explanation is that relations
between the Dutch and the 'bottled spider’ passed through some
critical phases. The Siamese became uneasy at the prosperity and
power of the Dutch as a result of the etimination of their rivals. 'I’he
reign was, moreover, one of murders and revolts, and the king on more
than one occasion quarrelled with the Dutch over their failure to give

* JoMl Schuut«n; A Tmr DairiptitHt of ih* KiHgtititia af Japan ami Suim,

iftitnfthtioiif Ixmdckn^ 1*663^ ppr

* Jtmmiiud VAn Vlif E, RA oltithim i 4 U Siar^t rn Purw, 1663^ itnii

litm it/ ihr Kinitiiiim a/ Siumt vsm HavemWBJiy'i InanibtHia in af itit Siam

Soculy^ yol, p(, i.

CH. l8

S\^^^ ANH THE ELH0P1L4K POWERS

3OT

him the help they hud promised. E^irly on. the Qutren of Patani re¬
fused lo rreognizc his ^VAur^ of the throne and descHhed him as a
' rascal, murderer and lraitor\ In 1632, and again in 1634, the royal
army failed badly in attacks upon Patani. On the first oecasion the
Dutch sent no help; on the second it came too late, though through
no fault of theirs. In 1636^ when a furtber attack waa planned* a
reconeiliation was clFecied through Dutch mediation. But in that
year a further quarrel arose over the Siamese deliveries of rice
and an attack w'as made on two Dutch factors at Ayut'ia, who
were arrested and sentenced m be trampled to death by elephants^
Their lives w’ere only saved by heavy bribes to the king and chief
ministers.

After this incident there was a long period of better relations. The
goodwill of the king %va5 sedulously culti\iited by the Dutch authori¬
ties, both at Batavia and The Hague. The growing strength of Batavia
and the conquest of Malacca in 1641 wxre not without their effects
upon the Dutch altitude towards the king. Thus when in 1649 the
Court of Ayui'ia failed to satisfy certain claims put forward by tly?
Dutch, van Vliet threatened to call in the Dutch fleet to attack the
city. This caused a serious crisis. The factory wa$ besieged and all
its inmates arrested and threatened with death. Five years later, when
another crisis blew up over the Dutch refusal to assist Pra$at T^ong
against rebellious Siugura, van Vliet's successor, Westerwolt threat¬
ened to close the factory and leave the country. On this occasion a
Dutch naval demonstration was staged in the Gulf of Siam with appre-
ciabk effect. Prasat I'^ong climbed down and there was no further
trouble.

When Prasat T^ong died iti 1656 there was an uneasy period of a
few months during which tw'o short-lived kings came to the throne
and were murdered. They w^ere followed by Narai, a younger son of
Prasat T'ong, whose long reign of thirty-one years {1657-88) is of
unusual interest in the history of European rivalry in South-East Asia.
Apart from a recurrence of the perennial struggle with Burma for
Chiengtnai, King Narai^s policy wa& mainly concerned with efforts to
free himself from the economic control which the Dutch had been
gradually fastening upon his countty^ during his fathers reigti. And
by inviting the assistance of Louis XI V of France he created a situation
which not only made his country for a time of no little importance in
the calculations of the European naval powers but developed to a
degree of dramatic Intensity only equalled by the Paknam incident of
1S53,

302 THE EARLIER OF EUROPEAN EXPANSION PT. II

The renewal of the struggle for Chiengmai resulted from the con¬
fusion wrought in Burma and the Shan states through the Hight of
Yung Li, the last Ming emperor, from Yunnan to Bhamo in 1658.^
Chiengmai, in terror of a Chinese mvaj^jont fdt impelled to seek
Siamese aid. But when in 1660 Narai led a large force northwards
better news from Ava caused Chiengmai to change its mind and the
king was forced to retire. In 1661 the unsuccessful Mon revolt at
Martaban ted to a Burm^e invasion of Siam by the Ataran river and
the 'rhree Pagodas Pa^ towards Kanburj, and during the lull in the
Chinese invasions of Burma, caused by the energetic mopping-up
operations of the Manchus in Yunnan^ it looked as if the full-scale
struggles of the latter half of the previous century between the two
powers were about to be revived. But the Siamese easily drove out
the invading force; and although they followed up their victory by
raiding deeply into Burma in ifibs, their real interest was in Chieng-
mai. Early in that year they had captured the citj'. and King Pye of
Ava, threatened by the Manchus, was powerless to inter vent. 'Phe
Siamese were, howe\^er, quite unable to hold on to the place. In 1&6+
the people of Chiengmai rose in revolt and drove them out, and a
Burmese prince was again installed as a vassal of Ava. It was to
remain under Burmese control until 1727.

In 1659 the English factors of the East India Company's Cambodian
factory, established at Lovek m 1654, were forced by an Annamite
invasion to dee the country. I'hey look refuge at Ayut’Ja^ where they
were so warmly w^elcomed by Narai that in j66i the Company re¬
opened its faciory there. In April of the following year Bishop Lam¬
bert de la Motto of the French Societi des Missions Etrangercs landed
at Mergui en route for Annam. The society had been founded in
Paris in 1659 writh the object of undertaking missionar>' tvork, inde¬
pendently of the Jesuits, in China, Annam and Tongking, Louis XIV
backed the scheme. It was bitterly opposed not only by the Jesuits,
tvho had been in the field since the pioneer days of St. Francis Xavier
in the middle of the sixteenth century, but also by Spain and Portugal*
who realised that it was intended as a means of spreading French
influence in the Far East. I’he Pope, in an effort to disarm the oppo¬
sition of the Archbishop of Goa, Avho claimed aulhorfiy over all
missionaries working in the East, conferred upon the bishops sent out

*This Portu|£uc» itiJI iriiqrd'«J iheir o3d pfivilcHM Kmnli?d by papnt blllli durinR the
KlX[«nili Mhlury. Under thw. m Usintin KoinR tu. the EiHt mvax embark at IJabon
must have the permi&iki-ti <t( ftie King i*t Poftugd, On Arrival in the East they cflme
under the juriidjetKin of the AixhbUhiip uf Go*.

CH. iS

SIAM ANI> THK FlJllOPEAN POWERS

303

in otgiiiiizi: the work on n territoKiil basils obsolete titles of bishoprics
in existence in Asia Minor before its conversion 10 bbtnip together
tviih the rank of Vicar-Apostolic^ Lambcn dc b for insiance»

was Bishop of Beritos*

His original intention had been to proceed to western China by the
Irrawaddy and the old overland route from Bhamo* But owing lu the
nesvs of Chinese incursions into Burma, which he received at Masiili=
patani before crossing the Bay of Bengal^ he decided to go to Ayut'ia,
where he hoped to obtain a passage to Annam. After IcaAang Avntla,
however^ hLs ship was wrecked and he had to return to the Siamese
capital, where in januarj^ 1664 he was Joined by a second missionarv'
prelate^ PallUp Bishop of Heliopolis^, and four priests. News of the
outbreak of a very severe persecution of Catbolii^ in Annam caused
the two bishops to remain in Siam; and hoding the king well disposed^
they decided to make Ayut’ia the headquarters of tlicir mUsion* They
were permitted to build a church and a seminary' there, and before
long their priests began to penetrate into various parts of the country.

'rhe favour shown by Narai to the English and the French atouscc^
the hostility of the Dutch,, who demanded additional commercial
privileges* When these were rejected, a Dutch fleet blockaded the
mouth of the Menam^ and Narai, unable to resist this form of pressure,
had to climb dowo. In August 1664 he signed a treaty granting the
Dutch the monopoly of the trade in hides, the practical monopoly of
sea-borne trade between Ayut'ia and China, and certain extra-
territorial rights of jurisdiction. The Dutch had won the first round;
but their victor)' made the king all the more anxious to shake off their
control. He would have liked to obtain the support of the English
East India Companyt ^nd the English factory at Bantam wrote xn
London urging that something should be done. The Ayiit'ia factory,
however, was tinder lhe jurisdiction of Fort St. Gcurge, on the Coro¬
mandel Coast, which WRA most unwilling to interfere in Siamese
affairs. Moreover, while Sir Edward Winter remained in control at
Fort St. George the Company's interests in Siam were so badly mis¬
managed that the factory was ruined and English trade in the countiy'
fell into the hands of interlopers*

Meanw^hile the French missionaries at Ayut'ia were sending home
exaggerated accounts of their success which led the Court of Versailles
to entertain the fond hope that the conversion of Siam to Chrislianity
tvas within sight. In 1673 Mgr. Pallu, who hud been on a visit to
Europe^ returned to Siam with a personal letter from Louis XIV to
the king. It w'as accorded so splendid a reception that the two bishops^

304 ^ FARLtlvH PUASti OF EURO FEAN EXFANSiON PT. U

Palin and I^mbcrt, bcEait to prcstji the kmf^ lo a diptnmatic

minion to Vcr^lltas, Narai dcfcs nnt ?4;em up to this point to have
$eriousi}' comemplated attempting tu obtain a French alliance against
the Dntch^ but Louis XlV^s letter ceitainly turned his mind in that
directiun. France and Holland, however, were at war in Ivurope and
for some years the plan hung fire—if indeed there was anything so
definite as a plan in any other minds than those of the French miasioTi-
aries. During these years a new^ actor appeared on the scene whose
influence carried the king completely into the French camp.

In 1674 the Fnghsh factojy^ was reopened. I'he initiative came from
Bantam, w^hose interest in Siam had never relaxed. From the start
things went badly with the factor>% and in 167S Richard Burnaby was
deputed by the Bantam Council to investigate the cause of the irouble.
With him went a Greeks Constant Pkaulkon, who had been in the East
India Company's service at Bantam^ and having won a large reward
for saving the magazine there had resigned in order to try his fortune
in Siam. Fhaulkon was the son of an innkeeper on the island of
jZephallonia; he had run away from home to become a cabin-boy on
an Engliish merchant ship. His real name was Constantin Hierachy,
but at the suggestion of George White, whom he apparently accom¬
panied to India tn 1670^ he changed it to its French equivalent^ by
which he became known to history. White went on to Siam^ ivhcre
he became a pilot on the Menam river. In 1675 his younger brother
Samuel followed him there and became the captain of a Siamese ship
trading between Merguj and Maaulipatam. On arrival in Ayut'ia
Burnaby persuaded George While to enter the service of the East India
Company, and for a time the two of them employed Phaulkon in
private trading ventures^ "^Fhen in 16S0 they hit upon a plan w'hercby
the Greek w^as to enter the Siamese service and use his position to
further the interests of the English Company against the Dutch. He
was accepted by P*ya Kosa T'ibodi, the Siamese Minister of the
Treasury, as an interpreter^ and showed such high ability that he was
soon promoted to the post of Superintendent of Foreign Trade.

"^Fhe chief object of the plan^ however, was never achieved. Burnaby
quarrelled so badly wdth hia colleague PottSi who heartily disliked
Fhaulkon, that he was recalled to Bantam in 16S3, while George
White resigned tn disgust and went home to London, where he tip
in business on hia own account. Fotts, left in charge of the factor)'*
plunged into a hitter quarrel with Phaulkon over a debt he owed lo
the Company. The latter, therefore, finding it impossible to maintain
good relatione with the English factory, allowed his favour to be wooed

c«, 18 SIAM AN1> THE Ei-ROPF^V POWERS 305

by a young French conimerctal agent, Bourcau-Delandcs^ who
appeared at Ayut'la early in 1682 with a special retommendation from
Louis XIV transmitted to King Nanii by Bishop Ballu. The young
Frenchman^ who was a son-in-law of Francois Martin, the founder
of Pondicherry (1674), set hirtiself to win over Phaulkon lo the French
interest. He w^as considenabiy aided by an incident which CK:cuiTcd
in Dteemher 168^^ The English factory was burnt out and Potts w'as
foolish enough to hint that the Greek adventurer had enginieered the
fire. Even then^ however, Phaulkon acema to have wavered for a long
time before committing himaelf finally»and there can be no doubt that
had he received any encouragement from the English he would have
preferred thein to the FrenchJ But his closest associates were Burn¬
aby» who after dismissal by the Company had returned to Ayut'ia as
a private trader, and Samuel While, And William Strangh, who was
sent to AyuFia in 1683 by Surat^ to decide w^hethcr or not to dose the
factoty there, tvould neither co-operate with the friend of Bumaby
and \\Eite nor submit to the conditions of trade imposed upon the
factory; so in January 1684 it tvas closed and its personnel left for
Surat.

During this period Phaulkon^s influence at Court had increased to
such a degree that he had become the controlling factor in its foreign
policy. Narai was as anxJous as ever to bring in another power as a
counterpoise to the influence of the Dutch. The English tvere obvi¬
ously unable to fill the role effectively^ and the fact that their king,
unlike Louis XiV, completely ignored hi$ existence was a source of
keen disappointment. He would have preferred not to commit him¬
self wholly to a French alliance, but there seemed to be no allemative.
In 1680, therefore, he had deputed an embassy to the Court of V"er-
saillea, but the French ship conveying it was lost off the coast of
Madagascan The news of this disaster reached Siam in Scptcmher
1683. Narai therefore decided to send tw'o minor officials to France
with the request that a French ambassador should be sent to Aynut^ia
with powers to conclude a treaty. It is a fact of some significance,
how^everp that the ship> w hich kft in January 1684 with the envoy$ on
boardp w'as bound for England and carried despatches from Phaulkon
to George White and the East India Company and a consignment of
presents fur judicious distribution. Thus before they proceeded to
France the envoys made a brief stay in London, and Father ^'achei,

^ Tbc qurttion if cflnefully H. \\\ BuE^hiitfoti in .-JiLfcYnfurerT rn Sttim in

* Bantinl, fjiClory bfld been cln&cd in l6Sl k reault af Dutch turtlMl igaiiut ibe
tyfiae.

3q6 the earlier PWASH of EUROPEAN E^PAN^tON PT. 11

thtit was personally recdvcd by Charles 11. 'I'he East India

Company* however^ was so firmly opposed to Phaulkoni who was
regarded as the chief cause of the failure of the Ayut'ia factory, that
Whitens efforts on his behalf were in ’vain* Moreover^ the envoys were
accredited only to the Court of Versailles, and for obvious reasons
Vachet was in a hurry to get them safely across the Straits of Doveti

They were accorded a magnificent reception in France^ though
behind the scenes Vaehet found hlmseif up against an unei^pected
sjiiiation. The king bad come completely under the influence of
Madame de IVlamtenon and the Jesuits, and the Societc des Missions
Etrangeres no longer held the place it had once had in the royal favour.
Moreover, the high hopes of Narai's personal conversion to the
Catholic faith, with which Pallu had earlier stimulated Louis XIV^s
interest in Siam, had given w^ay to dUilluiiionraent, Vachet, however,
held a trump Card In hb hand in that he was able to tell Pere de ia
Chaise, the king's Jesuit confeswr, that I'haulkon had been converted
to the Catholic Church by a Jesuit. This, in fact, had been one of the
chief reasons for Pbaulkon's hesitancy in committing himself whole¬
heartedly to the French interest. He was a patron of the Jesuits and
disliked the influence exerted on King Xarai’s mind by the mission¬
aries of the Rociete des Missions Etrangirres, their rivals. V’'achet*s
description of Phaulkon a$ the dominating personality in the Siamese
government and the staunch friend of the Jesuits completely w'on over
Pi re de la Chaise, and as a result Louis XIV dedded tu send the
Chevalier de Chaumont as hb accredited ambassador to the Court of
Ayut'ia together with a large suite of priests and Jesuits and with the
avowed object of converting King Norai to Christianity.

'Fhe embassy, conveyed in two French men^f-wart arrived at
Ayut^ia in October i68j and w^as received with the utmost pomp by
the king* De Chaumont, a 1 lugucnot converted to Catholicism! ^
religious fanatic whose one atm was the conversion of King Nanii' he
had no interest In the negotiation of commercial concessions and little,
indeed, in the question uppermost in the minds of Narai and Phaulkon
—a political ailbince against the Dutch- Phaulkon, how'cvcr* ^vho
acted iia interpreter at all royal audiences, carefully parried all de
Chaumont's clumsy attempts to raise the question of the king's con¬
version and behind the ambassadoris back made secret arrangernents
with the Jesuit Pfere Tachard to lay before Louts XIV a plan for the
conversion of the kingdom by the Jesuits. His suggestion was that a
large number of them should be sent to Siam dressed as laymen and
he would then secure for them appointments to the govemorsbips of

CH. iS

SIAM AND THE El^ROPFAS POWERS

3«=7

provinces* cities and fortresses. To ensure the success of tbe scUeroc
it Avoiild be necessary, he said, to have two good colonies of French
soldiers in the country. He cleverly manttuvred de Chaumont into
making a public afEirmation of a French alliance. In return he negoti¬
ated a draft agreement containing trading concessions, privileges for
missionaries and the promise of ihe cession of Singorap near to Fatani
on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula, as a French garrison town^
the ostensible object of which was to deter the Dutch from any
offensive action against Siam. De Chaumont left for France in
December 16S5, taking with him Kosa Pan, a high official of the Court
of Ayut’ia, as ambassador to Versailles charged with the task of
negotiating the arrangements for the despatch of French troop$ to
Singom.

De Chaumont, with Kosa Pan and Tachardj arrived in France in
June 1686. Again a double set of negotiations was carried on, ’with
Rosa Pan completely ignorant of the extremely shady arrangements
that were being made behind his back by Tachard. Louis XlV's
advisers were of opinion that Sitigora, in spite of its strategic positionp
was too far away from the capital. They decided to raise the price of
T^uis XI Vs support far Phaulkon's scheme as high as possibLc. De
Scigneby, Colbert^s son, went so far as to question Kosa Pan regard¬
ing the fc^asibility of ceding Mcrgiii as a depot for shipbuilding and
repairSp but his arguments against the proposal were so strong that no
more was said about it to him^ And he was kept completely in the dark
as to the real destination of the troops for whose despatch to Siam he
had been sent to negotiate. Had he knowm that the arrangement
made with Tachard W'as for the occupation of Bangkok, a move which
was calculated to strangle the independence of his couniryt he would
have broken off negoriations at once, 'l^he upshot of it all was that on
i March 1687 a squadron of six warships left Brest for Siam with 636
soldiers under the command of Nlarshal Dtsfatges^ VVith them went
Kosa Pan, two French plenipotentiaries, Claude Cebdret dc Boullay^
a director of the Compagnie Indes^ and Simon de !a Loub^re,^
together with Peru Tachard and a number of Jesuits. Tachard waa
entrusted with the task of persuading Phaulkon to agree to the sub¬
stitution of Eangkok fur Singora. He was also to arrange for a French
governor and garrison to he posted to Mergui^ which, he was informed,
was as vital for French trade with the Coromandel Coast in particular
and India in general as Bangkok was for the control of trade with the

* His Da Aoj-fiyfMf d& a v(iila+, Paris, 1691, b the beat Recount of Siam at this

ximcL

308 niE Fj^aLlKR FIJA^E OF ITUROPEAK ESPANSION" FT. J1

Gulf of Siam and the China coa^i. In return for hi^ compliance
Phaulkon was to be created a Count of France and a Knight of the
Order of St. Michael. In case of opposition Deafarges was instructed
to seize Bangkok by force*

Phfliilkon *fi dilemma when the mission arrived in Siam in September
1687 may well be irpagined. French garrisons at Bangkok and Mergui
would be highly unpopular with the Siamese and might easily en¬
danger his hold over King Nami. Refusal, on the other handi might

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ruin the co-operation with Louis XIV upon w^hich his scheme for the
conver^iion of Siam depended* He decided to throw caution to the winds
and commit himself wholeheartedly to the French plan; but in order
to overcome the scniplesof his royal master he insisted that Desfarges
and his troops must become mercenaries of Siam under hb persotial
control and must take the oaib of allegiance lo the king. In due course,
therefore, Desfarges and the main body of his troops occupied Bang¬
kok, which they proceeded to fortify strongly, and Dubruant was sent
as governor to Mergm with a garrison of lao men* In due course also

CH, iS SIAM AND THE ELHOFEAN l^WERS 309

the two plenipotefiti:iric3 negotiated a treaty granting the French
extra-territorial jurisdiction over all subjects of Louis XIV in Siam,
permission to build Buitabk trading posts and. significantly, the
cession of alt the islands within a ten-mile radius of Mcrgni.

Before following the course of this extraordinary^ French adventure
further it is necessary to turn back and take note of its repercussions
in the English camp. Siam^s possession of Mergui had resulted in the
development of a very profitable trade with the Coromandel Coast.
Before Phaulkon*s time thi? was entirely in the hands of Mohammedan
shippers belonging to the kingdom of Golconda. Phaulkon^s policy
was to develop this trade by using ship* the Siamese flag and

captained by English 'interlopers’. The ships were built at Mergui,
and the place soon had quite a colony of English seafaring men io
Phaulkon's employment. The Indian traders namrally resented this
intrusion into their domain and English skippers complained of ill-
treatment at Golconda pom. In 1681 Samuel White's ship was
wrecked through the refusal of the port officer at Masulipatam to
supply him with cables, fn 16S3 Phaulkon appointed Burnaby^
Governor of Mergui and White its shabandcr* Their task was to
superintend the building and commissioning of ships at what had now
become a very busy port. White^ in his new capacity* was anxious to
exploit his grievance against Golconda in such a way a* to make a
fortune rapidly and get away home with it. In 1684, therefore, he
insatituted a war of reprisals against Indian shipping in the Bay of
Bengal. It was not long before this began to cause the English factory
at Fort St. George, Madras, considerable loconvenienee. and very
naturally Phaiilkon was held to blame for the acts of piracy committed
by the ships based on Mergui. Madras therefore began to contemplate
strong action against Siam.

The rift became wider through a quarrel w^Kich arose in 1685 be¬
tween Elihu Yak and Phaulkon over a contract for the supply of some
jewellery ordered for King Xarai through Thomas I volt, the agent for
Siam at Madras. Yale had sent in what can only be characterized as
an outrageously heavy bill which Phaulkon had refused to pay. Yale^s
brother Thomas and two other factors had taken the jewels to Ayut^ia
with the intention of renpeuing the English factory. They had arrived
in time to be present at the reception of dc Chaumont's embassy,
VViieti soon aftertvards Phaulkon ordered them to take the jetveb
back to Madras fuel was added lo 11 fire that was already becoming
dangerously strong. And although a* soon as he discovered the effect
upon Madras of the piracies organ bed at Mergui he withdrew his

310 THE EARLIER PHASE OF EUROPF-AN EXPANSION PT. H

sanction for theiri, Samutl White anti his associates found tsasy ex*
cuscs for going on with them^ and thereby made war between the East
India Company and Siam inevitable.

Janies II on coming to the throne in 16S5 had sent an autograph
letter to Phaulkon thanking him for the prraents he had sent in 1684
for distribution by George White. In July 16S6. however, before the
letter arrived at its destination, the king held a council at Windsor
Castle at which the decision was taken to issue a proclamation for¬
bidding British subjects from serving in the ships of foreign rulers in
the East. By this time the Fort St, Ceor^ authorities had already
begun a ivar of reprisals against the Mergui pirates and ivere looking for
a base on the east coast of the Bay of Bengal from which to conduct
operations. Their first plan w'a$ to seize the island of Negrais at the
entrance to the western arm of the Irrawaddy delta, but the expedition
was a fia.seo. It left Madras in October, after the changeover from the
S. VV. to the N'.E. monsoon had begun, and was forced by contrary winds
to return. A few weeks later, at the beginning of 16S7, news came of
■James H's proclamation and it was decided to send a couple of war¬
ships, the Curlana and the to Mergui to order all the English

to leave and to seiac all the shipping there pending settlement of a
claim for j(|65,ooo damages by King Narai. Meanwhile in NOTcmber
1686 Phaulkon, who had become alarmed at the irresponsible be¬
haviour of White at Mergui, had written to Fire de la Chaise offering
to hand over Mergui to the French. Needless to say, he was quite
unaw'are of the fact that the occupation of the port had already become
a prime object of French policy in the hast.

The two English warships carrying James TI s proclamation arrived
at Mergui in June 1687 at the very moment when White, fearing an
English attack on the place, was making final preparations to escape
homewards in his ship the Re^alulion, W'hite, finding himself trapped,
decided that his only possible course was to comply with the orders
sent from Madras, and he and all the English in the town signified
their intention to leave the Siamese service. Anthony Weltden, the
commander of the expedition, who had been instructed to keep up a
blockade of Mergui until late in October, when the change of monsoon
%vuutd pcrroil him to return to Madras, took W’^hite's submission at its
face value, and with the most surprising unprepared ness against a
possible Siamese attack he and the English on short gave themselves
up to a scries of lavish entertainments. On the night of the I4ih,
during an orgy on shore, the Siamese batteries began to fire on the
ships, sinking the JamfS, while on shore their troops felt upon the

CH. 18 SIAM KiO THE EItROPEAM POWERS 311

English and tnasaacred them. White and Weltden were among the
few survivors to get away* and with their two ships, the JiftoittlioTi
and the Curtatta, they ran for shelter among the islands of the Archi¬
pelago, where they lay waiting for the change of monsoon. White
then persuaded Weltdcn to allow him to sail for England in the
Remlutifin, while Weltden returned to Madras.

While thU little drama was in progress the French squadron under
the command of Marshal Desfarges was on its way to Siam. On
learning of its departure from Brest the East India Company had
represented to James II how serious would be the position of its
shipping in the Bay of Bengal were the French to possess Mergui on
its eastern aide in addition to I'ondicherry on the Coromandel Coasts
The king had therefore sent secret instructions to Governor Elihu
Yale of hladras to seize Mergui before it fell into French hands. These
arrived in August 1687, and \ale, in the belief that Weltden with his
two ships was still blockading the port, at once despatched a frigate to
reinforce him, hoping that he would thus be able to force it to sur¬
render. Sailing unsuspectingly into the harbour on zz September in
chase of one of the Siamese commerce raiders under an English
captain, the frigate’s commander found himsdf neatly (nipped and had
to surrender to Dubruant, who had already taken over control there.

Bv this time Siam was officially at war with the East India Company,
"^rhe declaration was published in August 1687 and was the direct
eunscqucnce of \Veltdcn’s action at Mergui in the previous June and
July. It had, however, strangely little effect, for Phaulkon in handing
over Bangkok and Mergui to the French had fatally weakened his own
position in the government, and the Company after its failure at
Alergui was content to play a vvaiting game. 'I'hat also had been the
policy of the Dutch throughout the period of King Narai’a flirtation
with France, As his relations with the Court of Versailles had become
closer Phaulkon had gradually adapted a more uncompromising
attitude towards Dutch trade. Consequently in ifi86 the position of
the Dutch factory had become so difficult that it was closed and
Phaulkon was told to deal directly with Batavia. When Desfarges’s
expedition arrived in 16S7 there were rumoma of a Dutch declaration
of war on Siam, but nothing came of them, 'Phe astute Dutch waited
for the inevitable reaction which the presence of a foreign garrison
within striking distance of ihc capital must have upon the feelings of
the Siamese.

In any case the forces at the disposal of Deafarges were too small
and too widely dlaperaed to be of any use in case of serious trouble.

TilF- ILJIKLIER PHASE OF EUROPFA,N EXPANSION

ITT. II

3t2

To make matters uorsc, Phaiilkon in supporting the tlemamis of the
Jesuits quarrelled hopelessly ^^ith Bishop Laneau, the head of the
Missions Etrangeres at Ayut’ia, and a serious rift appeared in the
French camp. Then in March 168S King Naiai became so seriously
ill at Lopburi that he was unable to conduct business. 'J his gave an
opportunity for an anti-foreign conspiracy led by Fra P'etraja, the
general in charge of the royal elephants, to gain control over the palace.
Too late Phaulkon summoned Desfarges to his aid; thousands of
armed Siamese were rallying to the cause of the conspirators. Pm
P’etraja was appointed regent, and in the middle of May he arrested
Phaulkon. 'I'he French, threatened by overwhelming mimhcrs of
Siamese troops, were throwi upon the defensive and could do nothing
to save their ally. On July 5 he was publicly executed. In the next
month the king died and Pra P’etraja was raised to the throne.

All that Desfarges could now' hope to do was to secure the best
terms possible for the evacuation of his small force and the safety
of the French residents at the capital. His fortified area at Bangkok
jvas besieged by a force large enough and well enough equipped to
have txlerminaicd it; but the Siamese had a wholesome fear of the
sort of resistance they might meet, and preferred to negotiate. In
September all agreement was reached by which the French troops were
to be evacuated to Pondicherry while their missionaries and traders
were to retain their privileges. Fhe Bangkok gamson departed to¬
wards the end of November, leaving behind the two sons of Desfarges
and the Catholic bishop as hostages. At Mergui Dubruant, hemmed
in by hostile forces, fought his way out with severe losses and look
the remnant of his garrison to Pondicherry. Notwithstanding the
agreement nude with Desfarges. the I'rench missionaries and other
residents were treated with great severity, and many of them lost
their lives.

Late in 16S9 Desfarges made an unsuccessful attempt to restore
French influence in Siam by seizing the island of Puket, better known
as Junk Ceylon, the European corruption of its Malay name Ijjung
Selang. liis foolish act caused a renewal of the severities against the
remnant of the French at .Ayut’ia, and many of them, including the
bishop, were killed. To stop further slaughter Pete Tachard went to
Ayut’ia. proclaiming that he came to conclude peace on behalf of
lands XIV, w hile Desfarges withdrew once more to Pondicherry and
eventually sailed for home. Nothing came of Tachard s negotiations,
and at the end of (690 lie left for Pondicherry. But the persecution
of Christians Stopped, the French were released and the missionaries

Casltx

lA LOUHiflJS's MAr* Of AIAS% x6^[

PT. 11

314 "fHE earheh phase of euhopean expansion

were permitted to continue with their work. France now at war
with the Grand Alliance in Europe, and for the time being Louis XIV
had to drop his scheme for the conversion of Siam.

After the Peace of Ryswick one more attempt was made to negotiate
with Siam, and once again Ptre Tachard went to Ayut^b. But it was
all to no purpose. The reaction against the policy of King Narai and,
Constant Phaulkon had caused such a powerful upsurp of anti-
fordgn sentiment that until the days of Mongkut in the middle of the
nineteenth century Siam was to be very chary of granting privileges
to Europeans. A new agreement was indeed made wi^ the Dutch
in November 168S by which they recovered some of their commercial
concessions, especially those concerning the purchase of hides and tin,
but they had lost for ever the dominating position which had caused
Narai to throw himself into the arms of the hrench.

The war with the English East India Company died a natural
death. No formal peace treaty was made because the Company
refused to drop its claim to ^£65,000 which Wdtdcn had presented to
the Siamese authorities at Mergui, No attempt, therefore, was made
* to reopen the English factory at Ayut’ia. A foothold at Meigui
rather than the convcdrsion of Siam had all along been the real ambition
of the French Foreign Office. Early in the eighteenth century more
than one attempt was made to reopen the question of a naval repair
station there, but the Siamese remained adamant in their opposition.
Consequently the English turned their attention to the port of Syriam
in Burma and were followed there by the French.^

* D. G, K. Hdt,' Fwro to SuiKspni^i 1686-1810’, in jSS, ali, pt. i, July

1953 , PP-

CFIAFTTH 19

BURMA UNDER THE RESTORED TOUNGOO DYNAS IT,

1600-175:^

When the united kingdom of Burma fell apurt in 1599 the condition
of the nld Man kingdom of Begu was indeed wretched. Not only w:i$
the capital city in mins but the whole countryside %va5 laid waste by
the invading armi^ of Arakan, Toungoo and Siam^ Syriam was in
.Arakanese hands, and thither came Philip de Brito y Nicote, a Portu¬
guese in the ser^'ice of King Min Razagyi, to take charge of the custom¬
house arid control the Portuguese living there under their own laws.
With him went t\%^o Jesuit missionarieSt Pimenta and Boves, both of
whom wrote accounts of their experiencreSf translations of which werii
published by Samuel Purchas in his PH^nmes^ Roves wrote: " 1 also
went thither with Philip Brito, and in fifteen days arrived at Syriam,
the chief port in Pegu. It is a lamentable spectacle to see the banks of
the rivers set with infinite fmit-bearing trees, now overwhelmed with
ruins of gilded temples and noble edifices; the w^ays and fields full of
skuJJs and bones of wretched Peguana, killed or famished or cast into
the riverp in such numbers that the multitude of carcasses prohibits
the way and passage of any ship/*

Dc Brito formed an ambitious plan to gain control over Syriam and
hold it under the authority of the Viceroy of Goa. Together with a
Portuguese officer, Salvador Ribeyro, he erected a fort and expelled
the .Arakanese governor^ Then* leaving Ribeyro to hold the place* he
went to Goa to obtain official recognition and help. He received a
daughter of the viceroy in mairiage and returned as captain-general
with six ships containing reinforcements and stores. During his
absence Salvador Ribeyro had beaten off successive Arakanesc and
Burmese attacks and had cultivated such good relations with the Mon
chiefs that they offered to accept dc Brito as king, I'he latter on
arrival accepted the offer on behalf of his sovereign, and Ribeyro then
retired into the background and soon left the counlry. His wisdom
in handling a difficuh situation during his chief's absence givea the

^ Both a^coundi nnc in Vol. li of th«e ifijj editinn af the Wurk.

* Op. cit., iLi, p. 1748-

315

3i 6 TI1£ EAflLLER PHASE OF EUROPEAN EXPANSION PT. ll

impression that had he remained in control the adventure might have
had ft far better chance of success than it had under the impulsive
leadership of the over-sinbitious de Brito. At first, however, siioce$s
followed success. A large Arakatiese Aotilb under the caminand of the
heir-'ftpparent was defeated and the prince himself captured and held
to rartsom. A further Arakanese attack in league with the Toungcwi
Min was beaten off. and in 1604 both mlers came lo terms with de
Brito.

ITic Strongest of the Mon chiefs^ Binnya Dala, who held Martaban
as the vassal of Ayut^ia, made a marriage alliance by which de Brito's
son hy a former wife married his daughter. For some years the
Portugiicse adventurer was the unchallenged lord of much of the Mon
country, though Bassein and the western part of the delta remained
indepeiidcnL As yet^ however, no full-scale Burmese attack had been
launched against him. It certain to come as soon as the Burmese
found a leader capable of uniting them. But the Nyaungyan Prince,
a younger brother of Nanda Bayin^ who was ruling at Ava when the
Jdngdom broke up, and took up the task of restoring the fortunes of his
familyi died in 1605 while striving to bring the rebelUous Shan stales
of the north and east into subjection. .\nd for some years afterwards
his son and successor, Maha Dhamma Raja, better known by hia later
litie of Anaukpetiunt w^as too busily engaged in the north to devote
attention to the south. De Brito should have etmeentrated upon con¬
ciliating and uniting the Mons, Instead, however, he alienated them
by plundering pagodas and pressing ahead with deeply resented
measures for the mass conversion of Buddhists to Christianity. In
1608, having established his authority over the north, Anaukpetbn
captured Promt. Two years later he forced his cousin, the niler of
Toungoo. to acknowledge his overiordship. De Brito chose to regard
this as an act of treachery', and in league with Biiinya Dab of Martaban
he attacked Toungoo^ captured the prince, plundered and burnt the
palace, and then rciired. Thereupon Anaukpctlun. after the most
careful prcparatluns, laid siege to Syriam early in 1613. De Brilo was
caught unprepared, but the Burmese ting had no hciivy guns capable
of battering the fortifications. After a siege of a little over a month,
however, a Mon chief in de Brito's service opened one of the gates and
the Burmese captured the city. De Brito was impaled on an eminence
above the fort and mosi of hia officers were done to death. The
remainder of his Ponugucae followers tvere sent upoountry to be
settled in a number of villages between the Chindwin and the Mu,
where for centuries afterwards their dcsceniiaiils formed a Catholic

CH. 19 BITIMA UNDKft: TliH RESTORED TOUNCWJ DYNASTY 317

commujiity with its own priests. They were enrolled in the royal
guard as musketeers and gunners^

Anaukpetlim next turned against the provinces of hJs grandfather's
kingdom which had been occupied by Siam, l^he warlike t*ra Xarel
had died in 1605 and had been succeeded by his unwarlike brother
Ekat^otsaratp who in turn had died in The btter*s son Int^araja

(1610-iS) sent an army to oppose the Burmese invasion of I'ensissertm
and managed to halt it after Martaban and Ye had submitted without
a blow^ In 1615, however, Anaukpetlun turned eastwards and struck
at Chiengmai, which he captured- There his campaigns against Siam
stopped, and after placing one of his sons in charge of the kingdom,
which he reorganized as a Burmcise province, he returned home.
He wisely refrained from attempting to reassert Bnnnesc cliilms to
Luang Fnibang, but the fact that on his return from Chiengmai he
made Pegu hia headquarters and w-as intent upon restoring it as the
capital of his dominions show^ that he hoped for an opportunity of
renewing the old stmggle for the possession of Ayut'ia which had
brought so much humiliation to his dynasty. Hostilities continueci
for some years, but they were mainly over the question of Chiengmai,
According to the Siamese account, both sides tried to enlist the sup port
of Goa but failed. Anaukpetlun certainly sent an envoy to Goa, bul
his object seems to have been to explain aw*ay w^hat had taken place
at Syriam and to offer help against Arakan, which a Goa Beet had
unsuccessfully attacked in ihij. But when a Goanese envoy in due
course appeared at Pegu the king refused to receive him. No reason
Avas given for this and one can only assume that the king

had discovered that the Porniguese were not in a position to exact
vengeance for his treatment of de Brito.

Among the captives taken by the Burmese at Chiengmai was
I'homas Samuel of the East India Company's Ayut^ia factory. He
ivas taken to Pegu and died there. Ncavs of this reached Lucas
Antheunis at Masulipatam in 1617 through Indian merchants trading
with Burma. He sent over tsvo of his assistants, Henry l-orrest and
John Staveley^ on an Indian ship to claim the East India Company's
goods in Samucra haneb at the time of his death. Anaukpetlun
promised to hand over the goocL if the Company Avould open trade
with hia countn% and retained at l^egu the two young men as hostages
when he reaiiz^ that it had no such intention. Eventually, however,
after long delay he restored the goods and sent the ttvo factors back
to Masulipatam with a small present and a letter inviting the Company
to trade. His overture led to nothing. The Company w^os loo deeply

PT. II

3I& TUB BARUEft PHASE OF EUROPEAN EXPANSION

cummitted elsewhere under the Anglo-Datch treaty of 161 p to open
new factories in countries where the chances of profitable trade were
highly doubtful; and as a result of its unsuccessful struggle with Jan
rieteiszoon Coen it was soon to begin drawing in its boms and closing
a number of its factories. Moreover, Forrest and Staveky reported so
adversely on trading conditions at Pegu that the Masulipalara factory
was for many years opposed to the planting of a factory in Burma, and
it was not until after Fort St. George was founded at Madras in 1639
that the country came to be seriously considered as a field for English
commercial enterprise.

In 1628 Anaukpetiun completed the transfer of hia household from
Ava to Pegu and began to plan an attack upon Ayut'ia. In the next
year, however, he was murdered and the throne seized by one of his
brothers, Thalun, who carried out a complete reversal of his policy.
The Siamese project was abandoned and in 1635 the capital was t rana-
ferred from Pegu back to Ava, Immediately after his accession 3
considerable Mon insurrection had broken ont, and when it was
suppressed another mass exodus of Mona into Siamese territory had
resulted. The idea of a united kingdom of Mons and Burmese which
Tabinshwehti and Bayinnaiing seem to have cherished no longer
existed. The Burmese treated the Mona as a subject race, and as [*egu
had become useless as a port through silting the choice whs between
Syriam and .Ava. From the economic point of view Syiiam would
have been a better capital, and by going there the government would
have maintained contact with the outside world. But no king after
Anaukpetiun appreciated the value of overseas intercourse, and Upper
Burma was essentially the Burmese homeland. So the dynasty
surrendered to traditionalism and isolationism, and its increasing
intransigence and xenophobia made Western trade with Burma on
any satisfactory scale, and even ordinary diplomatic relations,
impossible.

'I'halun’s policy tvas peaceable and conservative; he aimed at
restoring order and social organization, ilis retgn, therefore, is chiefly
interesting for his administrative work. His minister Kaingsa com¬
piled the AfjiHttfjrmAfpeirtrff, the first law*-book in the Burmese
language. Thalun also reconstructed the administtralion of the Kyaukst
irrigated area and the system whereby lands were held there by regi¬
ments of the royal army, His Revenue I nquest of 1638 was hb biggest
achievement. It entailed the compilation of a Domesday survey of the
whole kingdom, which were it in existence today would be an Invalu¬
able historical record. Unfortunately, like moat of the palm-leal

CH* 19 BURTLIA ITJPFJl THE RESTOMD TOUNGOO PlTNiSTV 319

and parabaik records not only of this dynasty but also of its successor,
none of it has survived, and the little that is known of it coiues from
the references to it in the compilations of a similar nature made during
lJoda»^TJaya’$ reign in 1799 and tSoa.

During Thalun’s reign in 1635 the Dutch planted their first factory
in Burma. It was at Syriam, but their fecturs, Dirck Steur and Wiert
Jansen Popta, had to follow the Court up to Ava, where in September
of that year the king received them and treated them to 'sundry
spectacles of dancing, leaping and fighting'. Their trade in Burma was
managed from Pulicat, and they had come with the object of elbowing
out the Indian and Portuguese merchants who ran the country's
foreign trade. Mon merchants and ships had carried on a substantial
amount of trade to foreign parts, and among the records of Lancaster’s
first voyage on behalf of the East India Company there is a brief
word-list of the 'Pegu language' which seems to have been picked
up at Achch. Hardly any Burmese, however, engaged in foreign
trade, which was left almost entirely in the hands of foreigners. And
there are no further signs of Mon activity. When the Dutch tried to,
employ their twU-tried methods for obtaining a monopoly Thalun
protected the Indian merchants against unfair competition and wrote
to the Governor of Pulicat telling him to abstain from hostile measures
against the Portuguese, who, he complained, were being prevented
from carrying on their accustomed trade tvith Burma. The Dutch
w'ere so disappointed in the trade that in 1^45 *bey seriously thought
of closing their factories, and only held on to them for fear lest the
English would step into their shoes.

The English, on the other hand, who planted their first factory in
Burma at Byriam in 1647, went there partly because of rumours of fabu¬
lous Dutch profits there. Before their factors arrived in Ava E halun had
died {164B) and his son Pindale {164B-61) liad succeeded. They found
the Dutch so w'ell established that there was little hope of success;
and when the First Anglo-Dvitch War broke out in 1652 and the
Dutch literally cleared the Bay of Bengal of English shipping their
factories in Burma were doomed. They were withdrawn in i657'*

Pindale. a weak king, had to face an unprecedented situation
which arose out of the war in China when the Manchus drove out the
Mings. Yung-U, the last of the Mings, had in 1644 fled to \unnan,
where for a long time he defied the Manchus. His heavy demands up¬
on Hsenwi and Maingmaw for men and supplies led Pindale to send
a force to their assistance; and with some success, since in 1650 the

1 The atory- h told in D. G. E. HfttI, Hitrly H^lilh iKfrrcoune teith Bvrmtt.pp- +7-*4-

THR RAItlJER PHASE OF EVROPf-AN EXPAKSlOX

PT. JT

3310

EngHsli f&ctors in Buima reported to Madras that the Burmese had
defeated 'their plundering neighbours and the country was like to
be settled and in a peaceful condiuon\^ In 165ft Yung’^Li was driven
out of Yunnan and fled by the old Burma Road to Bhamo with 700
followers. They were disarmed and permitted to reside at Sagaing,
This caused a spate of raids by bands of Ming supporters w^ho en¬
deavoured to rescue their leader. A Burmese army was defeated at
Wetw in, and for three years Upper Burma wfas ravaged up to the walls
of Ava and as far south as Pagan. In t6fii the Dutch factors at the
capital reported that the cotifuaiun was ao great that all trade had
stopped.*

Worse was to follow, Mon levies summoned to the defence of Ava
deserted and there was a revolt at Martaban.* Then, fearing Burmese
reprisals, thousands of Mons fled into Siam. A Burmese force pur¬
suing them was defeated by the Siamese at Kanburit beyond the
'Phree Pagodas Pass, and the Siamese followed up their victory by
nuding deep into Lower Burma. The Dutch at Syriam reported that
t,hey were taking special measures to protect their factory there.
Pin dale seemed incapable of dealing with the situation. In 1661,
thercforcp he was dethroned and his brother Pye pbced upon the
throne. The disorder gradually subsidedp but not through any action
the new king was able to take. The Siamese turned their attention to
Chiengmait which they recovered, and P)^e vvas too tveak to attempt a
reassenion of Burmese authority there. The people of Chiengraait
how^cver^ drove out the Siamese garrison and the Burmese returned.
The Manchus showed such energy in bringing Yunnan under control
that the Chinese raiders, unable to use it as a base of operations,
disintegrated. Then in i66a the Manchu Viceroy of Yunnan marched
into Burma and demanded the surtender of Yung-Ii. Pyc had no
alternative but to hand over his embarrassing guest> who was taken
to Yunnatifu and publicly strangled with a botv-atiing in the market¬
place.

Burma had now' entered upon a long period of stagnation, Pye died
in and his son Narawara, who succeeded him, died within a

year. A number of influential people at the Court thereupon took
^ssession of the palace and placed the youngest son of the Prince of

^ Foster, FfJVfmra in 1650-41 P“ , . , , «

* D. G+ K Hnll, *'rhe l>fl«hre^Sier of BjitavLi imd Dutch Kelfttiont With Buima ,

JBRS., Jtw* pr. H, p. 14Q, Sec eIio Picicr 1:^11 Dam. . . , ^

* Phftyrc (o#>. nt., p. 13.9) and Wf>od rtf., p, i93> pT^cc thii niridmi tn 16^2 after
Ujc acc^kin of Pyc to ihe thfon* oi A™. Han'ey, howEver, Duippis it To the yeflf l^i*l
before; Ptttdulc'o depodtion, liad the refErtnft* to it in the cotreapondrnce of the Dutch
factor) It Syriam Mcim to confirm tiii date (Hall, mp. cff. rifp., p. tjo).

Cir, 19 BfHMA fNliER THE HKSTORED TOTOCOO DYNASTY 32I

Promc Qit tlie throne- Oppoaition within the ropi family was crushed
by a considerable number of secret executions. Miiirekyawdin, or
Sri Pawara Maha Dharnma Raja, reigned for nearly twenty-sijt yeare
(1673-98). He was little more than a figureheadt real power was in
the hands of a small coterie of ministers. Both internal and external
peace was maintained, but there was no leadership and consequently
no vigour. Outlying districts were lost because when encroachments
such as the occupation of the Kabaw valley by the Raja of Manipur
took place there was no one capable of expelling the intruders.

'rhe narrow tradition-ridden policj' of the Court had particularly
bad effects upon foreign trade. The Dutch finally lost their patience
and in 1679 closed their factories. They had been particularly anxious
to plant one at Bhamo, which was once again beginning to attract
targe caravans of Chinese traders now that firm rule was restored in
Yutman- The idea of opening up trade with western China through
Burma had great attractions for them, and when the Court of Ava
flatly prohibited their project they decided that the trade of Burma
per se was not worth pursuing any further. The Dutch withdrawaj
inclined the English Bast India Company to make another attempt
at trading with the country. Madras and the other Coromandel Coast
factories, which felt themselves threatened by the sweeping raids
of Sivaji and his Marathas, were arming and needed saltpetre and lead,
which Burma produced, for making munitions. It was Sir Strej nsham
Master, the Governor of Fort St. George, therefore, who in 16S0
started the ball rolling by sending an envoy to Ava.

q'here was another cogent reason for the move. The Prench had
opened a factory at Ayut*ia in r6So and were hand in glove with the
Greek adventurer Constant Phaulkon, who was coming to be the
dominating personality in King Narai's government. 1 he representa-
lives of the East India Company there were coming up against the
increasing hostility of Phaulkon and the English interlopers, who
swarmed at Mergui. Hence although the Company far preferred
Siam, w'hosc attitude towards foreign trade was altogether more
enlightened than that of the Court of Ava, its unhappy position there
made it willing 10 try its luck once more in Burma. And it was prodded
on by James Duke of York, who was persuaded by a Dutchman named
Spar, pndviouslv head of the Dutch factory at Ava, that it was worth
while making a'further attempt to exploit the overland trade route to
western China. 'Phe directors were extremely hesitant about em¬
barking on such a scheme and were relieved when the evasive answers
made by the Burmese ministers to all the Company’s proposals caused

TlfE EARLIF-H PHASE OF EUROPEAN EXPANSION PT. H

the negotiations to peter oui. The Oiirmese would under no circum¬
stances permit the export of saltpetre or leadp And Fort St. George
discovered that it could obtain ail the supplies of other products of
Burma it needed through the operatioiks of IndiaUp Armenian and
other private traders living under its jurisdiction at Madras.

Mean while the development of Loub XIV^s Siamese project and
the piratical operations of the English private traders at Mergui had
brought on not only a severance of relations with Siam but a war of
repiisakp and late in ibSfi the Fort St. George Council made an
abortive attempt to seize the Jsknd of Negrais, just inside the mouth
of the western arm of the Irrawaddy delta, writh the intention of using
it as a naval sution from which to threaten Merguin^ In the following
year in the course of a struggle to gam control of Mergui Captain
Anthony Weltden did actually visit the island, but the Company*
which had become involved in a quarrel with Aurungzeb, could spare
no forces with which to plant a settlement there. And although the
F rench managed to hold Mergui for a short time^ their w hole adventure
in Siam crashed in 1688 and the immediate need for strong action
by the Company on the eastern coast of the Bay of Bengal passed away.

Instead, therefore, the Fort St. George authorities turned their
aicention to the port of Syriaro, from which valuable cargoes of tcak-
woud were coming regularly to Madras. The development of French
naval potver in the (sistern seas, and the lessons learnt from their brief
occupation of Mergui* pointed lo the need for a repair station some¬
where on the eastern side of the Bay. 1 he Coromandel Coast had no
good harbour where repairs could safely be executed, especially during
the period beginning in October with the changeover from the soiith-
>vest to the north-east monsoon^ In any case it was impossible to keep
a fleet off the Coromandel Coast during the stormy weather of
October and November, so that the fuctori^ there and shipping in the
Bay might be at the mere)' of an enemy fleet if one appeared while they
were denuded of nav'al protection. A naval repair station on the
opposite side of the bay would be of great valuer and although the full
strategic signifrcanec of the question was not reati^.cd until the begin¬
ning of the great naval struggle with France for the mastery of the
Indian Ocean during the War of the Austriiin Succession (t 740“S)> it
is significant that soon after its failure to seize Mergui in 1687 Fort St.
George began to consider the possibility' of establishing a dockyard
at Syriam. Thus in 16S9 the frigate Diapiami was sent there fc»r

* Hill, Earty Efisluh IntfTfCurti, pp. 13 ^ 3 ^.

CH. 19 BURMA UNOER THE RESTORED im'KGOO DTi’^JASEV 323

This initial expcrioienl had no immediaic results, probably because
the directors at home had set their faces against any project for reviving
the English factory there. In (692. however, the Burmese authorities
at scis^cii 2. smiill sl-uop bdoft^ing to an Anutnian rciii cut

at Madras and imprisoned her crew; and as she was carrying a con¬
signment of goods belonging to Nathaniel Higglnson, the Governor
of Fort St, George, he decided to send an etivoy to Ava to negotiate
the release of the captive merchant and his property. Higginson
guessed that if he could promise the reopening of official trade between
the Company and Burma all would be plain sailing. But he was not
in a position even to send an accredited Company's servant much
less make any offer which would involve the Company officially.
His agent, Edward Fleetwood, who made the journey to Ava in 1695,
was a private merchant of Madras whose expenses were paid pcrsomlly
by Higginson. But he did his best to pass off the mission as an official
one and instructed Fleetwood to ask for ‘free liberty of repairing an
building of ships’ at Syriam. .% he had expected, the Burme^
ministens le± Fleetwood know quite plainly that if the Company would
reopen the Syriam factory all hU requests would be granted, but 1

not it was useless to negotiate, - c r

Eventually a method of procedure was agreed upon which satisfied
them. Fort St, George was to appoint a Chief who was to take charge
of an English dockyard at Syriam and be the responsible j^rson m
charge of all the English merchants trading in Burma, As, however,
the Company could not be brought into the venture.
failing to form a private syndicate to lake it over, appoinicd 1 hoi^
Bowyear, a ‘freeman inhabiUnt’ of Madras, to reside at the English
dockyard at Sviiam and superintend wort there, and all Englishmirn
trading to Bumia were required to ‘pay due respect and obedience
to him. In practice the English C^ef did not normally reside m
Burma; he went out Avtth the Madras sUppem m September each
year and returned with them in March. Ihe arrangement was an
unsatisfactory one: the Company had no control over the C
his control could be flouted by the private iradcR at^ ynam. le
refusal of the captain and supercargo of an English ship which put
into Syriam for repairs in 1720 to recognize the authority of the Chief.
Captain George Heron, resulted in a brawl in which two of the ship a

company lost their lives. . * *

Madras thereupon replaced the Chief by a Resident, who had to
pay down a large sum to the Madras Council as security money and
was given regular contracts fur the eonstniction and repair of ships

324 the EAltLr£R PHASE OF EL’HOPEAX EXPANSION PT. J1

on behalf of the Company. Thh experiment ako was far from success¬
ful Some of the Residents tvere unsatisfactoryt one actuaJly ab¬
sconded. There were serious complaints about both the iiVorkmanship
and the cost of the ships built at Syriam, and in 1741 the Fort St,
George Council decided to transfer its building orders to the Parsi
yards at Bombay. The dockyard^ howevert remained in. use as a repair
depot until tt was destroyed by rehellioijs Mons In 1743.

Meanwhile the French had lolJowed the Enghsh example by open¬
ing a dockyard at Syiiani. Dupleix, w^ho had arrived at Pondicherry
in 1720, xvas soon awake to the importance of the Burmese ports in
the naval strategy of the Bay of Bengal In I'jlj he suggested the
planting of a dockyard at Syriamp and two years later it began work.
It w‘as well managed by experienced shipwrights and built some
e.xcel]ent teak ships. Plans for considerable extensions w^cre under
consideration w'hen the great Mon rebellion broke out in 1740 and
forced it to dose dowm.

Minrekyaw^din died in 169S and w^as followed by the bst three
kings of the dynasty: Sane (1698 -1714), Taninganwe (1714-33)^ and
^•tahadammayaza Dipati (1733-5^)^ Hkc him they were nonentities
who rarely I if evett left the capital and were practically palace prisoners.
Even the fact that under them Burma pursued a policy^ of peace reflects
no credit on their mlcj since it wias dictated by xveakne^ alone. How
much power the Court of x 4 va exercised over the feudal lords who
administered the various parts of the country it is difficult to say. Its
contrul over Lower Burnta probably did not extend bey'ond the
Lrraw^ddy high way ^ the city of Pegu and the port of Syria m.

The delta had never recovered from its appalling state of devastation
at the end of the sixteenth century. But the Mons had never lost thdr
desire for independence and were bound one day to make another
bid at restoring the kingdom of Pegu, should the opportunity occur.
It came in due course when the little mountain slate of Manipur
began a scries of raids upon Upper Burma w hich the enfeebled rulers
of Ava were quite unable to check. In the sixteenth century Bayin-
naung had forced Manipur to recogaize his suzerainty^ but later it
reasserted its independence^ andp as we have seen, in the reign of
Minreisyawdin succeeded in encroaching upon the Kabaw >alley
running alongside the Upper Chindwin. Under Ghaiib Newaz
(1714-54) its expert horsemen became the terror of Upper Burma,
'rhey destroyed villages and pagodas and got away w^ith their loot
before they could be intercepted. On more than one occasion they
defeated Burmese armica sent to hold the frontier. 'Phey had recently

ItAUN'CJIMTOAW PAGOI^A NEAR EAGAtNC

been cotiveitcd to Hinduism, and their Brahraans incited them on with
the proTTiUe that they would obtain blessednesa by bathing in the
Iirawaddy at Sagaing. In 1738 they camped near Sagaing, stormed
the stockade built to defend the famous Kaunghmudaw Pagoda
erected by Thaluii, massacred sts garrison and burnt w ery house and
monastery up to the walls of Ava. Plunder was their object, not con¬
quest, and there was no leader in Btirma strong enough to take the
situation in hand.

The degradation of the monarchy caused the disintegration of the
kingdom. It began in 1740 when a colony of Gwi Shans at Okpo,
near ^tadaya in Upper Burma, discontented at the es.orbitant taxes
demanded on their areca palms, rose in rebellion under a leader named
Gonna-cin. They united with a hand of Mon deportees and drove the
Burmese out of their district. Almost simultaneously Lower Burma
rose in revolt. The Burmese governor of the province of Pegii aspired
to overthTow the government and marched on Syriam, But his troops
mutinied and killed him, and when the king sent a force to restore
order the Mons rose en masse, defeated it, seized Syriam and Hflartaban
and massacred all (he Burmese they could lay hands on. They then
proceeded to invest a king of their own, Srnim Htaw Buddhakeii, in

IT. II

336 THE RARLIEA PHASE OF ElTlOl'EAN EXPANSJOS

Pegu, He was the soa of a Governor of Pagan who had failed in an
attempt to sej 2 e Ava in 17^4 had fled to the hiU country east of
Pegu. Smim Htaw Buddhaketi was a monk when he was called to
occupy the throne. He proved an ineffectual leader, but such was the
weakness of Ava that his forces quickly cKicupied Lower Burma up to
Prome and Toungoo and began raiding far up the Irrawaddy until
they threatened the capital itself.

The Burmese resistance to this new threat was seriously hampered
by the Manipuri raids, which continued until 1749. They could rareJy
take the initiative and attack the delta because of the danger of leaving
the homeland unprotected. Not until they found a leader capable of
sobing that problem were they in a position to turn the tables on the
^fons. and by that time .'Xva had fallen. T he Governor of Brome did
indeed lead a raid in 1743 which gave him temporary possession of
Syriam, but his followers then proceeded to get so drunk that a Mon
counter-attack soon cleared them out, and by a rapid follow-up of their
victory the Mons captured Prome. Thereafter the initiative by with
jheifi. During their occupation of Syriam the Burmese buimt the
.Armenian, French and Portuguese churches there and destroyed all
the factories of foreign merchants save the English, which was defended
by a small force of sepoys sent over from Madras. I’he victorious
Mons, however, annoyed at the strict neutrality maintained by Jona¬
than Smart, the Resident, in face of their repeated requests for help,
compelled him to surrender and burnt the factor)' to the ground. He
and his small company were permitted to return to Madras,

In that same year Father Gallbia, who had been consecrated Kv the
pope as the first Bishop of Burma, arrived at Syriam with a small band
of assistant clergy bound for Ava. Unable to proceed to his destination
he went to Pegu, where he was permitted to reside. Not long after¬
wards six ships belonging to the Ostend Company pul into Syriam
harbour bearing the staff and effects of their former factory at Banki-
bazar in Bengal, from which they had been e.vpeilcd. The Mon
government at Pegu sent Bishop GalJixia to ascertain their intention.s,
and when he learnt that their leader, de SchonamiHe, sought per¬
mission to open a factory at Syriam he prevailed upon him to go to
Pegu to lay his request beW the king. De Schonamilic very unwisely
t<»k with him a considerable armed escort, which roused the sus¬
picions of the Mons to such a degree that a plot ivas formed to murder
the whole party, Gallizia, hearing of the plot, warned de Schonamille,
who made a desperate effort to escape, But he and all his following]
together with the bishop and two priests, were surrounded and

cii. ig atJti^tA the nm-OREo tounoto dymasty 327

massacj:ed+ Four survivors only escaped to the shipsj which managed
to make good their escape from Syriam.

Smint Htaw Buddhaketi w^s popular with the people, who appre¬
ciated hLs kindly disposition; but his ministers became weary of his
incapacity as a leader^ Matters came to a crisis in i 747 ''^'hen a Mon
attack up the frrawTiddy towards Ava was repulsed with hea^y loss.
The king thereupon left Pegu and settled at Sittaung, where after some
deliberation he announced his intention to retire from his uncongenial
post. Then with a strong guard he made his escape to Chiengmai- His
chief minisier, Binnya Oala, was chosen king in his place and an¬
nounced that he intended to revive the empire of Bayinnaung. For
such a project he had neither the rKOurces nor the ability; and al¬
though he appointed as comnirander-in-chief Talaban^ a soldier with
a great reputation among the hlonSj. the only result was an intenijiE-
cation of the raiding activities which had gone on unceasingly since
Oie achievement of independence. The Burmese, however, could put
up no effectual resistance, and soon the raiders vrere penetrating
beyond Ava, apparently with the aim of linking up with the Shans of
the upper Irrawaddy. Al last in 173^1 having assembled a large army
equipped with arms procured from European traders at S^Tiam, Tala-
ban made a full-scale invasion of Upper Burma which culminated in
April 1752 in the capture of Ava and the deposition of the last king
of the Toungoo dynasty.

The campaign had been carried through all too easily, and the :VIons
were deceived into thinking that in taking the capital they had con¬
quered the country. Hence, instead of concentrating upon stamping
out all possible centres of resi&tancCi the heir-apparenti who had
accompanied Talaban upon the expedition, returned to Pegu with the
main body of the iroopsi leaving the commander-in-chief to exact the
allegiance of the chiefs of the Ava kingdom with inadequate forces at
his disposal. Before sUrting back the prince heard the disturbing
news that the Mon detachment sent to receive the allegiance of
the town of Mok^obomyo (^the town of the hunter chief*)> some
sixty rnilcs north of Ava, had been cut to pieces by the inhabitants.
But as he mistakenly supposed that trouble was brewing with Siam,
which had recently exchanged friendly missions with the deposed
King of Ava, he preferred to treat the incident as trivial and left with
the parting injunction to Talatian to make an example of the place*
Little did he realize that the Moksobomyo incident ivas the prelude
to a Burmese national uprising that was to clear the Mons out of
Upper Burma and destroy their kingdom utterly.

CHAPTER 30

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE KINGDOM OF
MROHAUNG IN ARAILAN

Akakan stretches for some 350 iiiiica along the eastern shore of the
Bay of Bengal to the south of the Chittagong division of East Bengal.
It is separated from Burma by a long, deep range of mountains, the
Arakan Yoma, through which there are only two serviceable passes,
the An connecting with Minbu on the west bank of the Irrawaddy!
and the Taungup connecting with Prome. The Arakanesc call them¬
selves Rakhaing and their country Rakhaingpyi, According to Sir
Arthur Phayre,* the word is a corruption of the Pali raMAaso (Skt.
jvksAasa) meaning 'ogre' (Burmese &i/«) or guardian of the mansion
of Indra on Mount Meru. Sir Henry Yule* identifies the Argyre or
Silverland of Ptolemy with Arakan. But Arakan produced no silver
and the previously accepted views of Ptolemy's data concerning the
Indo-Chinese peninsula are now' open to question.*

The Arakanese of today are basically Burmese, though with an un¬
mistakable Indian admixture. Although mainly Buddhist, they have
been influenced by long centuries of contact with Muslim India, Their
language is Burmese ivith some dialectical differencca and an older
form of pronunciation, especially noticeable in their retention of the
'r' sound, which the Burmese have changed to ^y*. The Bengalis refer
to them by the name JHogA, a vi'ord adopted by seventeenth-century
European writers and written *Mugg', The name is also applied to a
class of people belonging to Chittagong who are Buddhists but speak
Bengali and are not Mongoloid. Much that is fanciful has been w*rtttcn
about its possible etymology,* but the question is as yet unsolved.

Buddhism would seem to have reached Arakan long before its arrival
in the interior of Burma, and the famous Mahamuui image, brought

* o/^MTOlp iBSj, p* 4 J,

cofitributlofi 10 oj thf Rnyat G^aphtcuf Sodfty,

for hs/i Gcfigraphy tfj Eiuiern pp, J7-40.

* See not* m <jp. fil,, pp. 47 - 8 ^ luid the BrV. in

Cl I* 20 rm KINGDOM OF itKOHALTNG IN ARAKAN 329

from Arakan by the Burmtsi!: in 1783. and now to be seen in the
Arakan Pagoda at MandaJay, may date from liie early Christian era.
Inscriptions meniion a Candra dynasty, which may have been founded
as early as the middle of the fourth century Its capital was called
by the Indian name of Vaisaii^ and thirteen kin^s of the dynasty are
said 10 have reigned there for a total period of ^30 years, 'Phe Ara^
kancae chronicles claim that the kingdom was founded in the year
2666 B.C., and contain lists of kings beginning with that date.**

The Burmese do not seem to have settled in Arakan until possibly
as late aa the tenth cento a.d. Hence earlier dynasties are thought
to have been I ndian^ rtiUng over a population similar to that of Bengal.
All tlie capitals known to history have been in the north near modem
Akyab. It was a district subject ro chronic raids from hill tribes—
Shanst Burmese, and Bengalis—and there were long periods when
settled government can hardly have existed* But the spirit of inde¬
pendence was always strong, and in the business of niidiug the Ara-
kanese could usually give as much as they received. I’heir main
activity was by aea into Bengal, and they developed great skill in sc^
and riverine warfare. By the middle of the sixteenth cenlurj' they
were the terror of the Ganges delta*

North Arakan was conquered by AnawTahta of Pagan (1044-77), hut
was not incorporated in his kingdom. It remained a semi-independent
feudatory slate under its hereditary kings. When Pagan fell in 1287
Arakan asserted its independence under the famous Minhti, svho&e
reignj according to the chronicle, lasted for the fabulously long period
of ninety-five years (1279-1374). His reign is also notable for the
defeat of a great Bengali raid. After his death Arakan was for a con¬
siderable time one of the theatres of war in the great struggle between
Ava and the Mon kingdom of Pegu. Both sides sought to gain control
over it. First the Burmese, then the Mons, placed their nominees on
its throne.

When in 1404 the Burmese regained control King Naramcikhla^
fled to Bengal, where he was hospitably received by King Ahmed
Shah of Ganr, During his exile he distinguished himself while assist¬
ing his host to repel an invasion, and when in 1426 Ahmed Shah died

^ K. H. JohilKin, ^Saint faannknt IjnatiHpliuffiii of Ajnkim^^ v/ th* a/

umf Afntan li, 2, pp. J 57 ^S-

■Phayre, <3p. flf., pn. Z93‘-jo4* wliole list. Harvey, Hiitiiry aj

pp* IT Wily ffCWTi A-li. 146- For the Itgcnds canpernjpR the foundation of

the kint^ocn PhayR, Op- pp. ^^-4- l^hnyrc aervtd 'm Arakan as acnior assiataiu
to the commu^ianor fnina to JS44 Audi duHlli} ih^t period puhli^ibnJ I'sluatile

atudlea gf tta. coHy history nnd antiquitiea.

* Phayre, ai-t 79 . call* Idm Mcng Soafnijn and pve< the date ns t^o*^

330 THE EAKLIEH fHASE OF EL'ttOPEAK EXPANSION' PT. JI

arid waa succeeded by Nsiair Shah the new ruler provided him with a
force for the recoveni’ of his kingdom under the command of a generaJ
called in the Arakanese Chronicle Wall Shah- This man, however,
turned traitor, and in league with a disloyal Arakanese chieftain im¬
prisoned Naramcikhla. The king managed to escape, and in 1430
regained his throne mth the aid of a second force supplied by N'azir
Shah.

lie ihcrcnpon built himself a new capital named Mrauk-o in Ara¬
kanese, but usually known by its Burmese name of Mrohaung- The
date of its foundation is given as 1433, King Narameikhla held his
kingdom as the vassal of Gaur, and in token of this he and his im¬
mediate successor, though Buddhists, added Mahommedan titles to
their Arakaneae ones and issued medallions bearing the Katima, the
Mahomtnedan confession of faith.

In 1434 Narameikhla was succeeded by his brother Min Khari,
also known as Ali Khan, who declared his indq^endence of Gaur. His
son Basawpyu, who succeeded him in 1459, took advantage of the
tt^cakness of Barbek Shah of Gaur to seij'-e Chittagong. He and his
“successors continued to use Mahommedan titles, no longer as a sign
of vassaldom but as a token of their sovereignty over Chittagong,
which was recognized as lying beyond the geographical borders of
-Arakan. Chittagong had for centuries been a hone of contention
between Arakan and Bengal and had often changed hands, li was
now to remain in Arakanese hands until 1666, when the Mughals
recovered it permanently for India.

Basawpyu was murdered in 1482 and bis coiintiy entered upon a
half-century of disorder and dynastic weakness. No less than eight
kings came to the throne; most of them were assassinated. ‘I’hcn in
1331 a capable young king, Minbin, came to the throne and .Arakan
entered upon a new era. It was in his reign that the first European
ships made their appearance, a,s raiders, and that the Portuguese free¬
booters (fetitighi) began to settle at Chittagong. It was in hta reign
also that 'I'abinshwehti revived Burmese power, conquered the Mon
kingdom of Pegu, and threatened the independence of Arakan. With
great foresight Minbin strengthened the defences of his capital with
massive earthworks and dug a deep moat, which was filled with tidal
water from the river. Hence in 1544, when the inevitable Burmese
attack came, althmigh Minbin could not defeat the invaders tn the
open, the defensive works of Mrohaung proved an obstacle against
which even the great '[ abinshwehti could not prevail when he ap¬
peared before them in 1546. While the siege was on the Raja of

CH. 10 tM£ KINGDOM OF MBOIIAUNO IN AllAKAN 331

Tippcrah raided Chittagong and Ramu with his wild tribesmen. But
again victory was on the side of the Arakanese.

When Minbin died in 1553 he had a force of Portuguese mercen¬
aries. His sea^power, based an Chittagotig. was the terror of the
Ganges region, and his country was on the threshold of the greatest
period of her hUtorj'. But he/somewhat spectacular rise was hardly
due to the genius of her rulers. It coincides with a period of weakness
in Bengal, when, before the gradual extension eastwards of the Mughal
power, the native governments of that region were tottering. The
ptisscssion of Chittagong was the key to the situation; for Minbin
leased to tht feringhi who took service under his flag the port of Dianga
on the sea-coast south of the mouth of the river l^umaphuli, some
twenty miles south of the modem city of Chittagong. The place soon
attracted a large European and Eurasian population which drove a
thriving trade with the ports of Bengal. But piracy and slave-raiding
were the chief occupations of the feriaghi, who gathered there in
increasing numbers and before long became as great a source of em¬
barrassment to the King of .Araksn as to the \iceroy of Goa. ^ ^

Matters came to a crisis during the reign of Min Raxagri (1593-
16iz), He was the king w’ho employed Philip de Brito in his attack
on Nandfl Bavin of Pegu, thereby opening the way for the feringhi
leader to make himself master ol Syriam. W'hen de Brito defeated
the Arakanese flotilla sent to dislodge him from the 1^1 on port and
captured the crown prince, Min Ra/agn decided that he must break
the pow er of the Portuguese at Dianga. hor that port also was coveted
by de Brito; he planned to use it as a base for the conquest of .Arakan.
In 1607. therefore, the king sent an expedition which attacked Dianga
hy land and massacred its inhabitants without mercy. Six hundred
Portuguese are said to have fallen.*

Among those tvho escaped was the egregious Sebastian Gonzales
Tibao. lie had been engaged in the salt trade. Now with other
refugees he took to piracy, and in 160^ made himself king of Sand-
wip Island by exterminating the .Afghan pirates who had made thdr
nest there. At Sandwip he received a refugee .Vrakanese prince who,
as Governor of Chittagong, had quairellcd with his brother. King
Kazagri. Tihao married the prince's sister and when he died suddenly,
probably from poison, seized all his treasure. Soon afterwards the
Mughal Governor of Bengal began an attack upon the district of

iThat u the nuinbar given by ihc Mnjf in • l=ncr to the Dufeh at UlMulipshm in
160&, De Jonije, Opkomit turn hrl JVWa-tniiK/Mlt (j*sag m Owl-im*/ {1595-161 ft), Ul,

p. 2 ‘JI.

33^ THE EABTIER PJiASE OF EHFEOPEAN EiPJtNSION PT. ]]

Noakhali^ cast of the Gangea mouth., which had submitted to Arakan*
This threw Tibio and Min Razagri into one another's arms. But
while his ally was canducting an unsuccessful land cainpajgn *11 bio
took possession of the Arakanc^ fleet by luring its leaders to a
conference and murdering them. Then he raided up the Lemro
river to the very walls of Mrohating, capturing the royal barge as a
trDphy.

When in z6iz Alin Razagri died his successor, Miahkaruaung (1612-
Z2), decided that the power of Tibio and his ntffians must be finally
broken. His first effort failed because the Raja of Tippera raided at
the crucial moment and he had to withdraw his forces, Tiblo, aware
of his precarious position, \v\ih hostile Bengal on one side and revenge¬
ful Arakan on the other, appealed to Go^ urging the viceroy lo avenge
the massacre of Dianga. He suggested a joint attack on Arakan and
offered to pay annual tribute to the Portuguese crown for his island
" kingdom % Tlie viceroy sent a fleet of fourteen galliots^ which arrived
off the coast of Arakan at the end of the wet monsoon in 1615. Mm-
haung was attacked, but partly through faulty arrangements for co¬
operation and partly through the help given to the Arakanese by a
Dutch ship lying in the harbour the Portuguese failed to effect a land¬
ing and sailed away. 1 wo years later Minhkamaung captured Sand-
wiped out the fmngki settlement and destroyed its fortifications.
Tibao h said to have escaped, but is heard of no more^

The fertngfti had now shot their bolt, Philip de Brito's escapade at
Syriam had already come to its sorry end in 1613, So they made their
peace with the king and settled down once more to assist him in his
efforts to gain control over the south-eastern parts of Bengal—^The
conquest of the middle land*^ as the Arakanese Chronicle euphemis¬
tically calls itn '^rhere was no conquest in the real sense, though for a
time Arakan held the districts of Noakhali and Backergunge and EOme
of the Sunderbunds delta. What chiefly took place was slave-raidings
and it was on so extended a scale that Dacca itself was threatened and
in 1625 even captured and held for a short time, 'rhis kind of thing
could never have occurred had it not been fur the crisis in the Mughal
empire resulting from fthah Jahan's rebellion in 16iz against his father
Jehangtr. Year after year xh^ /rringhi armada returned to Dianga
bringing thousands of Bengali slaves. Before long not a house was
left inhabited on either side of the rivers between Chittagong and
Dacca.

Min kazagri's attempt to rid himself of the Portuguese coincided
with the first Dutch trading voyage to Arakan. In 1605 they had

Clt. 20 THE KrNGQOM OF MftOIIADNO IM ARAKAN J33

pknted factories at Masulipatani and l*etapo!i On the Coromandel
Coast. From these two centres they began to explore the possibility
of establishing trading relations with Bengal and Arakan. An invita¬
tion from Razagri led to the despatch of two merchants, Pieter Wil-
lemszA and Jan Gerritaz. Ruyll, to Mrohaung in 1607, the year of the
Dianga massacre. The king, like so many other rulers in South-East
Asia, received them with delight, offered them customs-free trade in
his dominions, and expressed the hope that they would assist him 'to
drive the Portuguese out’.

lie asked particularly for their help against Philip do Brito at
Bvriatn. ' So would he give us to wit the aforesaid Castle in Pegu, the
island of Sundiva, Chittagong, Dianga, or any other places in Bengal,
as he had given the same previously to the Portuguese,' wrote Pieter
Willemsz. in his report.* And he went on to represent that if the
opportunity were not seized the Portuguese w'uuld 'determine it so
well for theniaeives that it would be to the great detriment of the
Company'. But the Dutch wanted trade, not war, eten against the
Portugu^, in this region, for, with their hands full with the struggle^
to gain control over the spice-bearing areas, ihcj- tvere unw'illing even
to contemplate an expedition against Syriam.

'I’he envoys returned to AlasuUpatam in May i 5 oS. In September
tfiio vTin W«ick. the Dutch chief of the Coromandel factories, decided
to make a trial venture viith an established factory at Mrohaung.
Jacob Dirckszoon Cortenhoof went to take charge of it. The king,
how'ever, wanted luilitary help rather than trade and pressed hard for
it. He wanted the Dutch to build a fort at Dianga. In 1615, as we
have already seen, they played an Important part in warding off the
attack of the Portuguese fleet on Mrohaung.* They had, however, no
desire to become involved in Minhltamaung's wars, and especially in
his projected operations against TibSo, because, as tliey put it, ‘of the
sifiall profits, which could be made there, and the great expenses the
Company must first be put to, in order to establish the king again in
his kingdom, w'hich at present is much in trouble’.* The factory was
accordingly withdrawn in 1617.

* Later Jie teft tbc Dytcii aervke artd joined ihc [:rkgliah East Irbdta Conripany,

rclyrmnj? to the liwt in i6l l nnc of ihe Iwlexa of the Seventh VoyH^t. To the
Kngluh he was Itno^n as. Pelcr Ftoria. Ati Enj^lsah tnnaSation of extmetu from hia
JyumaS, written bl 1613^ w»i publiahrd by Sumwel PurElmi in hb The

OOoipIrteJrniflwIwMpubtbhedbydKHJlIui'tSwijtym 1934-

■ Dc JoriKfp tU, iSm!. caatte m petlli la Syruim, or San ba the

PortuKU«c iOfWP to hiivc cailini it, ^Syndivit-Sandwip

■ Frof«K>r GeW hita Itstetl that the ttliack on Mrohaung m 1615 Wu

mode * to dCpe! ihe Duith *' (Cowifr.. HiiL v, 34 ) '

* E. Fl«tei, CoppUj Diphmalkum NierlanJu-IniSkum^ 41a,

nm EAftLlEfl PJiASE OF FUftOPEAN EXPANSION

PT. II

334

But Arakan remaineti on the progTamme^ and from 1623 Dutch
i^hips were going thtri: to buy the Bengali aUve^i captured by the
marauding feringhi, and the surplus rice thnl the country produced as
a result of ibc abundant slave labour available for cultivating the
fields.^ Early in 1625 the Dutch planted another factory at Mrohaungi
with Paul us Cramer Heyn as it$ Chief, tt came about through an
expedition under Anthonij Caen which had been despatched from
Batavia in September of the previous year’ to attack Portuguese
vessels. He was instructed to call at Mrohaung and discuss with King
Thirithudamim (16^2-38) the possibility of co-operation against * our
common enemy *, and to conclude an agreement for the export of rice
and slaves. Little came of the negotiadonSp although the king sent an
envoy to Batavia in 1627^ and as die slave trade did nut go well jan
Picter42!oon Coen issued orders for the factory to be closed for the
second tinie«

'Prade, however, continued. The free burghers of Batavia were
allowed to have a share in it, and envoys passed frequently between
Batavia and Mrohaung. The Dutch, having completely depopulated
the Banda Islands and given over the land there to Company*s sen'anls
to cultivate with slave labourp were anxious to buy all the slaves that
Arakan could $pare from the proceeds of iht feringM raids. So the
factory' w^as soon reopened; again only for a short time. In 1631
CorneUs van Houten, the chief factor* reported that trade had been
brought to 3 standstill by a terrible famine and pestilence. He was
accordingly mthdrawn and the trade again thrown open to private
merchants.

Meanwhile Dianga and the /erii^hi had once more come into the
1 i melight. Ini 630 Thi rit hudamma appoi nted a new Vi ceroy of C h itta-
gong, who took so violent a dislike to the feringbi that he sent an
alarmist report to Mrohaung alleging a Portuguese plot to admit ihe
fortes of the Mughal Viceroy of Dacca into Chittagong, His inlention
was to persuade *rhirithudamma to adminifitcr to Dianga a further
dose of the medicine given in 1607. As the feringhi fleet was away upon
its annual slaving expedition, the inhabitantSp who got wind of the
$chcme, deputed two envoys to hurry to the capital to persuade the
king that the rumour was without foundation. They were
captain^ Gonzales Tibao, a relative of the erstw'bilc ^king' of Sandwip,
and Fra Sebasti^o Manrique, an Augustinian friar of Oporto, who had

^ F, \V. SlEpcI, Gtichiidtitit ran Nedfrlandah-^itutlif ill, p. xij..

^ ijtApcl, ioc. or., give* cliile m 16^5, but the Eiitr>'m the ihawi that

Citen left U^uivui tin 3 ^cpicnat^r i ft* 4 ; 11^, ' Dutch ItclEti^iOii with Kinyi

‘I'hirithiidflniJiw c^f Ai»kma\ JBES, mvj leji, pt i, p. 3,

CH. 20 THE K ISC DOM OF MRQHALSG IS ARA1US 33 S

recently arrived m Dianga as hs vicar under the jurisdiction of the
archbishopric of Goa. Years Inter, after his return home to Portugal,
Manrique told the story of his travcb in detailed mcrooirs, which arc
of exceptional interest and value.

The mission was successful. I’he king called off a large expedition
he was preparing for the punishnienl of Dianga. He also gave per¬
mission for the construction of a Catholic church in the suburb of
Daingri-pet, on the western side of the capital, where the Portuguese
mercenaries of the royal guard lived. 'I'he outepokcn friar, who did
not fear to adjure the king to abandon his false religious beliefs and
become a Christian, was treated as an honoured guest. He was shown
the loot taken from Pegu in 1599 and was greatly impressed by the
white elephant. Nanda Bavin's daughter, w'ho had been carried off
to Mrohaung and married to King Razagri, received him and related
the story of her sufferings with deep emotion. Early in 1631, after a
stay of six months, Manrique returned to Dianga.

lu the following year Shah jahan, now tlie Great Mughal, decided
to W'ipe out the Portuguese settlement at Hugli. He suspected it of .
being implicated in the intolerable slave*raids of the Dianga free¬
booters. His religious fer^'our also had been deeply stirred by the
abduction in 1629 by the feringhi of the wife of a high official near
[>acca and her subsequent conversion to Catholicism by Fra Man¬
rique. The town put up a desperate resistance, but without timely
help could not possibly hold out. Some of the defenders cut their way
out, boarded their ships and got away to Saggar Island, just outside
the river mouth, where they proceeded to establish themselves. At
the same time they sent a Jesuit, Father Cabral, to ask King Thirithu-
damma for help. New’s of the siege, however, had already reached
him long before Cabral's arrival, and be had ordered the feTiJtghi
armada of Dianga to make a surprise attack upon the Mughal fleet in
the Hugh river. The armada was held up by bad weather, and when
at last it was able to sail it arrived too late to sas'C the cky. It managed,
however, to follow up the Mughal fleet and destroy it. Then it fell
back on Saugar to await reinforoements.

In launching this attack the king appears to have had a double
object. He aimed at preventing the Mughals from attempting the
capture of Chittagong; he naturally expected this to be their next
objective after taking Hugh. He hoped also that a decisive vicloiy

* See the Hakluyi Societj'a edition of the TrtireU ttf Fray Srhailitn A(uttri<iue,
i6a«-i(43, edited by Lt.-Col. C. E. Lunrd, m voU., 1917. Mandque's ndvenlure* at
Pullfta and Mmhauilg are also the lubjevt of Mjiuricc CoQii't Land qf the Grmi

IK rm sitvmmKTH CBNryHV

CH. 20 THE KINGDOM OF MROllAUx^O OF ABAKAN 337

over the ^[ughal fleet would enable him to persuade the Viceroy of
Go^ to join forces wiih him in an invasion ipf Bengal, The viceroy
was mdeed willing to discuss matters, and in 1633 deputed Caspar de
Mesquita to proceed to Mrohaung for thb purpose, wiih Fra Man-
rique as his adviser. 'Fhe negotiations^ however* came to nothing. The
king^s grandiose scheme for rhe conquest of Bengal had to be dropped*

The Goanese envoy sailed away* but Man rique had to remain
behind. 'Fhe king liked him. Moreover, he knew- too many state
secrets to be allowed to return at once to Dianga. Not until ttvo years
later^ in 1635, was he permitted to depart. His book tells of further
strange adventures while at Mrohaung. He gives also a vivid des¬
cription of Tbirithudamma'a coronation^ which was not celebrated
until 1635 because of a prophecy that he would die within a year of it.
Before it took place barbarous propitiatory^ sacrifices were made to
avert this fate. But three years later his chief queen procured his
murder and placed her lover on the throne. He was King Narapa-
tigyi (1638-45)*

Manrique makes no mention of Thirithudamma's relations with ihe^
Dutch. In 1633 he had sent two envoys to Batavia to invite them to
reopen their factory- "^rhey were engaged upon the blockade of
Malacca and needed the food supplies that could be obtained from
Arakan. "I'wn Dutch ships, the ref ore, with cargoes uf goods for sale
escorted the Anikanese envoyti home, and in 1635 Adam van dcr
Mandere reopened the factory. At first trade went well. But soon
difficulties aroise* The king wanted a military^ alliance* and when he
heard that Mughal ambassadors had been received at Batavia he sent
an angry letter to warn the governor-general that the Mughals were
his enemies. Moreover, van der Mandere's relations with the king
w'ere bad. The king established a royal monopoly over rice, and when
van der Mandere objected to the price and attempted to- buy his
supplies in the open market serious trouble resulted*

Van der Mandcre'sconduct was considered undignified by Governor-
General Anthony van Diemen and his bucks were found to have been
carelessly kept* He was accordingly transferred elsewhere, and van
Diemen directed that in future ^mcn of good bearing and not slovens*
should be appointed to Mrohaung. The next Chief, .^rent Jansen van
den Helm, got on extremely well with the usurper Narapatigji as a
result of lavish presents of wine and spirits, which the latter much
appreciated^^ But in 1643 the king'^s health broke down and he lost

* A ftrmnn |^ranl«l i-an dvfl Hrim by ' Nurjibidrij' in Auj^^l 16+3 u prinl^^d in
HeCTrs, Carpui, i, p. 414.

FT, II

338 THF- EAFtUEft PHA 3 E OF EUROPEA.N

control over affairs. Then an iticiikoi occurred which caused the
Dutch to dose the factory once more, A frigate belonging to a Dutcli
free burgher, bound for Chitiagoag with a valuable cargo of piece-
goodSf was decoyed into Mrohaung harbour^ its cargo conhsc^ated and
its captain and crew imptisoiied. When efforts for their release failed
and several of them died in prison the Dutch broke off retatlons. E-’or
eight years the factory was empty, and the Dutch subjected Arakanese
shipping to severe reprisals,

Narapatigyi's nephew Thado, who succeeded him in 1645, was a
nonentity and reigned for only seven years. But hia son Sandathii-
damma, who came to the throne in 1652 and reigned for thirty-two
Years, became famous as one of the best of the Arakanese monaxchs,

^ a ^ M r ^

Although he was quite young at the time of bis accession,^ it soon
became known at Batavia that he had a more enlightened attitude
towards trade than hts predecessots. And as the directors of the
V.O.C. were lu^ng Batavia to reopen trade with Arakan, a Dutch
envoy, Joan Gocssens, left in October 165a with a long list of stipu¬
lations for negotiations with the new king. Agreement s>eem<i to have
' been easily reached, and the terms, embodied in the form of a treaty,
were accepted by both parties in 1653.* Its main provisions were to
the effect that the Dutch w ere to enjoy customs-free trade under royal
licence and be exempt from the necessity of buying and selling through
the king's agents. Goessens was much impressed by the riches and
splendour of the Court. There can be no doubt of the prosperity of
the kingdom at this time.

The Dutch factorj-, thus reopened in 1633, carried on successfully
until 1665, w'hen it was again closed, this time for a political reason.
Shah Shuja, the second son of the Great Mughal Shall Jahan, had
been appointed Viceroy of Bengal in 1639. In 1657, when the emperor
fell BO seriously ill that there were premature rumours of his death,
a struggle for power began between his sons. It was won by Aurang-
zeb, who deposed his father in 165S and became emperor himself.
Shah Sbuja refused to accept this arrangement but was defeated by
Aurangaeb’s general Mir Jumla, and after failing to hold Bengal fled
from Dacca to Chittagong, together with hia faintly and a bodyguard of
some 500 faithful followers. Sandatlmdamma granted him permission
to continue hia journey to Mrohaung on condition that his followers

‘ 'line Dutch catinuile ot ihincnn ur fourteen in the Dug/irtgifiir u luieljr wrong.
Wilthcr Schoulen, who mw hiiu in iMlj catinuiled Wj ttgi: at cbuut tWEDty-«<Bht.

* A full iccouni of thd neipjtiiition* » in the Daghnsiilrr for 1653, pp. 98-103-
ValEntijn pdntt the (ermt «f the trcaiy ill hu Oiui «I NituiS Chur-/iufi'/jr, V, i, pp.
14.^ >6.

CH* the KIXQIJOM of MROItAU^G IN ARAKAN 339

surrendered their artns. He arrived ihere on 2& August 1660 and was
favuumbly received by the king«. who assigned him a residence near
the city on the right bank of the Wathi Creek at the fcHit of Bah-
budaung HilL He asked for ships to convey him and his people to
Mecca and was promised that they would be supplied.

But the promise remained unfulfilled and the fugitive prince soon
found his situation intolerable. Repeated demands for his surrender
came from Mir Junda, and Sandathudamma, expecting trouble,
posted his fleet off Dbnga and sent up reinforcements* A state of
alarm developed and a rumour spread that Mir Jumla had taken
Dianga, Moreover^ the king asked for one of Shah Shuja^s daughters
in marriage and his request was indignantly rejected. Thus were had
relations fomented; deliberately, suggests JPhayre, in order that
Sandathudumma might have a specious cause for quarrel, since he was
only too conscious of the contempt in Tvliich the haughty Mughal held
him and was greedy to get possession of the rich hoard of treasure the
other had brought with him.

Shall Shuja^ realizing his peril, made a desperate auerupt to escape^
from the country. But his plans miscarried^ and when the populace
set upon his foliowrers the latter ran amok and set fire to a large part of
the dtv before they were rounded up and massacred. That was in
December i66o« It was given out that he had attempted to seize the
palace^ 'I'he king, it was said, had only been dissuaded by his mother
from having him killed. She argued that killiiig princes was a dangerous
sport for wliich his own subjects might acquire a taste. But on 7
Februarj' 1661 Shah Shuja*s residence w^as attacked and there was
an(>ther massacre. Shah Shu]a was never seen again. It was rumoured
that he had fled to die hills with bis sons but had been caught and put
to death. Not until months afterwards did Gerrit van Voorburg^ the
Chief of the Dutch factory, discover tvhat had happened* His report
is summarized in the Doghr^gister thus:

* The prince Chasousa, of whom in the p revious Arakan advices of
February last it was said that he w^as a fugitive, and had not been
found either alive nr dead, is believed, though with no certainty, to
have perished in the first fury, but his body was made unrecognizable
by the grandees in order the better to be able to deck their persons
with the costly jewels which he w^ore flis three sons together with
his wives and daughters have been taken; the wive3 and daughters
have been brought into the king's palace, and the sons, after being
imprisoned for some time, have been released and permitted to
live in a little house. Everj^ day the gold and silver, which the

THE £\RLl£R PHASE OF E1180PEAN EXPANSION

PT* II

340

Anik:inesc have taljen, are brought into the king's treasury- to b«
ineltcd down, '*

As soon as the Viceroy of Bengal heard, through the Dutch factory
at Dacca, of Shah Shuja's murder he cotnimtidcercd a Dutch ship
to carry' an envoy to Mrohaung with a peremptory demand for the
surrender of his children. It was refused, and the king protested to
Batavia against the use of a Dutch ship by a Mughal envoy, As the
threat of war increased, so did the Dutch position as neutrals become
correspondingly more uncomfortable. In July 1663 a desperate
attempt to rescue the three captive princes failed. Thereupon the king
burnt hia boats by having them beheaded and slaughtering a large
number of Bengalis and Moslems at the capital. Early in the nest
year thfifentighi fleet sailed up the river towards Dacca, put to flight a
Klughal flotilla of z(K3 vessels, destroying more than half of them, and
carried away hundreds of people into slavery.

The time was now past when that sort of thing could go on with
impunity. Shayista Khan, .Aurangzeb’s maternal uncle, had just been
appointed Viceroy of Bengal and was determined to bum out the pirate
nest at Dianga. He called on the Dutch for assistance and threatened
them with expulsion from all their Bengal factories if they refused.
.\t the same time the King of .Arakan, who was preparing yet another
great raid on Bengal, ordered them to lend their ships for service
with hia armada. Luckily for them, a storm shattered his fleet before
it sailed, and while he was repairing the damage the Dutch ship* got
away. When at last it did sail it carried out an even more devastating
raid than the previous one.

In July 1665 the Council of the Indies at Batavia held a special
meeting at which secret orders were passed for the abandonment of the
Mrohaung factory. The king was cleverly hoodwinked, and on a dark
night in November the factors hurriedly loaded everything that could
be carried away on foor ships and decamped. At the mouth of the river
they were overtaken by a special messenger bearing a letter from the
king for delivery to the governor-general. Why, he asked, were the
Dutch 80 much afraid of the Viceroy of Bengal? It would be easier
for him to build the Tower of Babel than conquer .Arakan.

But thtferinghi navy was to raid Bengal no more. Shayista Khan,
\vho had built and equipped a new fleet, had already seized Sandwip
Island as a base for an attack upon Dianga, W hat would have happened
had \\v: feringhis decided to fight it out it is hard to say, for they were
more than a match for the Bengal navy. But at the crucial moment

■ linll,' Studies in Dutch Hobtiana with Anluiniii, JDItS, Sftvi (lOsS), pt. {, p. 24.

CH. 20 TH£ KrNGIKJM OF MROHAlNC IN ARAKAN 341

they quarrelled with the Arakanese, and when Shayista Khan seized
the opportunity to invite them to change sides most of them did so»
Then early in 1666 he assailed Dianga by land and sea. In FebrQary
he deteated the Arakanese fleet in a fierce fight. Dianga surrendered,
and the whole of the Chittagong district dovm to the River Naaf was
annexed to the Mughal empire.

Shorn of its powerful fleer the Arakan kingdom declined rapidly
after 1666, Some years later the Dutch returned and reopened their
factory, but we know Utile about it. The D^ghregister for t6Sa con¬
tains a letter from Governor-General Cornelis Spedman to King
Sandathudamma announcing tltat owing to the lack of trade the
factory was to be ^reduced*. A resident factor would no longer
remain there after the business of collecting outstanding debts had
been completed. He hoped^ however, to send one or two ships
annually for the purchase of ^

When Sandathudamma died in 1G84 the country became a prey to
internal disorder As Vlat^ey puts it: "the profits of piracy had gone
but the piratical instinct reniained, rendering governmeni impossible.^' *
Many of Shah Shuja^s followers had been taken into the royal service
as xArchers of the Guard. Their numbers were maintained by a con¬
stant supply of recruits from north India, In 16S5 they murdered
Thirithuriya, Sandathudamma's son and succe^r, plundered the
treasury, and placed his brother Waradharamarazq on the throne.
When he was unable to give them their promised pay they mutinied
and set the palace on fire. I'hen they roamed about the country^ doing
as they pleased. After some time they came to terms with the king,
and he returned to hia capital. But in 1692 they deposed him and
placed his brother Muni Thudhamma Raza on the throne, only to
murder him some two years later and place another brother on the
thronep

Ho things went on until 17 to. In tltat year an Arakanese chicfmn
Maha Danda Bo^ with the support of a band of devoted men, overcame
the Archers and deported them to Ramree Island, where their des¬
cendants still live, speaking Arakanese and retaining their Maham-
medan religion. Maha Danda Bo became king Saudawizaya and
reigned until 1731. But he spent little of his time on constructive
work and much of it in raiding his neighbours. He made tvar on the
Raja of Tippera and collected booty and prisoners. He took advantage

* VflL ii at ifiSip pp. Piclcr v'ati Umm, in hii van d& Oosttrtd-

iulit muca no m^ntinn of Atstan jiftCf tite ^hllh ^hiyii tplKHle.

■ 0 >. or., p. 14S.

THE EAJILIEII PHASE OF EDJtOPEAN EX^PANSIOS

PT. I[

342

of the weakness of the last king of the Toungoo dynasty m Burma to
cross the mountains and raid Promc and Malun. The decline of the
Mughal power after the death of Aunmgzeb in 1707 tempted him to
push his authority towards the north and raid Sandwip Island. But
nothing came of ^ these efforts, and when he vras murdered in 1731
the country relapsed into chaos.

Fourteen more kings came to the throne before King Bodawpaya’^s
armies entered the kingdom and deposed the last king Thamada in
17S5. Long before that event Arakanese chieftains were fleeing to the
Court of Ava and urging Burmese intervention. When at last it came
it brought such evils that half the population of Arakan fled into the
Chittagong district and a situarion was created that again chaliengcd
the security of Bengal, this time with consequences of far greater
moment. For it was one of the main causes of the first Anglo-Burmes*
war of IS24-6.

CHAPTER 21

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE KONBAUNG DYNASTY IN
BURMA, 1752-82

When he returned to Pegu the Yuva Raja left Talaban with inadequate
forces to deal with a nehellion on a big scale. This was precisely what
the Moksobomyo rebel leader's succcsafiil resistance created within a
surprising short cirne. Calling himself Atingzeya, 'the Victorious*,
and 'inspired by the good Nats who observe religion', as the Malmya-
zatcin puts it, he found himself the leader of a national movement. In
May 1752 he defeated an attack upon his stronghold led by Talaban
in person. In the following month he went over to the offensive and
attacked a Mon stockade set up to cut off his supplies. Its garrison
abandoned it in a panic, leaving all their equipment behind, flc was *
now 3 mialatmg or daimant to the throne, styling himself .Maungpsp,
or 'embryo Buddha*, and provided with a pedigree connecting him
with Mohnyinthado, who had reigned at Ava from 1+27 to 1440.
Everywhere he went he exacted the oath of allegiance, Moksobomyo,
'the town of the hunter chief’, became Shwebo, ‘the towm of the
golden leader*, and there he began to build a palsce in the approved
traditional style.

But the Mons were not easily driven out of Upper Burma, and they
were joined by the Gwe Shans of Madaya-Okpo, It was a war of
stockades and in its course the patriot forces suffered many setbacks.
Not until December 1753 was Alaungpaya able to encircle Ava, but
by that time he had formed a considerable flotilla, mainly of boats
captured from the enemy. The Mons, after failing to capture his main
stockade, lost heart. There was no sign of reinforcements from Pegu,
and they feared that the Burmese and Shan inhabitants of tlie city
would join hands with the besiegers outside, .Accordingly they
abandoned it by night with the greatest sccreci- and made their escape
downstream before the Burmese reahacd what was happening.

Alaungpaya was not in a position to pursue the retreating Mons or
stage an attack upon the south. He had first to make sure of the
allegiance of the Shan sawbwaS of the north. While he was engaged
upon this task King Blnnya Dais of Pegu launched an attack in great
force upon the JVva region. Had it been dcliv'crcd earlier, while the

TUB EARIJFR PHASE OF EUROPEAN EXPANSION

PT. tt

344

Moiw Still held the city, it might easily have tipped the scale against
Alaungpaya. But the Vuva Raja, the commander-in-chief of the Mon
forces, was an incompetent leader; and although he defeated a
Burmese army at Talokmyo and ravaged the country as far as Ryauk-
myaimg, dose to Shwebo, a counter-attack ddived by Alaungpaya
from Shwebo, and a sortie on the part of the beleaguered garrison in
Ava, inflicted such losses that in May 1754 the whole invading force
began a hasty retreat which did not stop before Prome was reached.
Meanwhile discontent in the Mon kingdom had come to a head in a
plot aiming at the restoration of the captive Mahadammayaza Dipati,
who was at Pegu. When it was discovered, and the deposed king,
three of his sons and many others implicated were done to death, the
delta Burmese n>se in revolt and rushed the town of Prome, which
they proceeded to hold, even though it was invested by the Mon
forces retreating from Ava-

But the siege wa.s not pressed with vigour, and early in 1755
Alaungpaya, having collected a great force for the conquest of the
< Pegu kingdom, relieved its Burmese defenders without difliculty. 't'hc
MotUJ, however, had constructed a strongly defended earthwork just
to the south of the town, and there was much heavy fighting before
this was finally stormecL This success enabled him to claim the
allegiance of central Buttns, and he spent some weeks at Prome en¬
gaged upon the task of pacification. Then he pushed on southwards
to meet the Mons at Lunhsc in the Henisada district. The decisive
victory which he gained inspired him to rename the place MyaMung,
'Speedy Victory’. Here amidst scenes of festival and rejoicing he
received the submission of Toungoo, Hemiada. Mysungtnya, Bassein
and even the .Arakanese district of Sandoway. I’inally, pushing on
through Danubyu, he drove the Mons out of Dagon at the beginning
of May and celebrated the close of bia campaign with a festival at the
Shwe Dagon Pagoda, lie planned to make the place the chief port of
his kingdom and began work on the foundation of a new city, which he
optimistically named Rangoon, ‘the End of Strife’.

The strife, however, was by no means ended. The capital, Pegu,
still maintained its independence, and Syriam, its port, the head¬
quarters of European trade, tvhere the main Mon force was concen¬
trated, close to Rangoon, was far too strongly defended for him to risk
an attack upon it. Moreover, the Mons were aided by a brilliant
French man, the Sieur de Bruno, whom Dupleix had sent some years
earlier to Pegu 35 his agent.

At the end of the War of the .Austrian Succession, while Dupleix

CH. TTIE KONBAUNG DVSASTY [N BURMA, 1752“S2 345

as Governor of Pondicherry was busy with schemes for extending
French influence at the expense of his British rivals, the Court of Pegu
looking for a European ally from whom it might obtain the 6rc-
arma which ivouJd give it a decisive advantage over the Burmese.
After the closing of the European dockyards at Syriam during the early
stages of the struggle for independence, while the British w'ere repre¬
sented by a few private traders w'ho counted for little^ French interests
had been left in the hand^ of an Italian priest, Pere Vinoni, who waii a
Persia grata with the Mems. At his suggestion a Mon mission was
sent in 1750 to sound Dupleix regarding assistance. Hence it came
about that a few weeks after one agent, Bussy, left Pondicherii' to
establish French inBuence in the Deccan, another, Bruno, departed
for Biirma on a similar mission. He arrived at Pegu in July 1751 and
had no difhculty in ncgotjating a treaty by which, in return for com¬
mercial concessions, the Moris were to receive substantial French aid.
On his return to Pondicherry he convinced Dupleix thiit a dazzling
opportunity atvaited the French in Burma if he was prepared for
armed intervention in the Mon-Burmese struggle- With 500 or 600 p
well-equipped French troops, he said, it w^ould be a simple matter to
gain control over the Mon kingdom. Dupleix at once wrote home
commending the plan and asking for the necessary' reinforcements to
put it into executloiL

Meanwhile the British at Madras had become highly suspicious of
French designs upon Burma. Even before Bruno's mission l*homas
Saunders, the Governor of Fort St. George, had reported home a
rumour that the French intended to sei^C the island of Negraia^ and
had urged the East India Company to forestall them by planting a
settlement there. The directors gave their full approval to the plan.
'Iheir reply was despatched in December 1751, long before news of
Brunovs mission to Pegu could liave reached London. Before Saunders
received this dispatch he had word, through English private traders
at Syriam, of Bruno*s treaty with the Mon government, and at once
took action on his own authority. He sene a small expedition under
Thomas Taylor to surv'ey the island and commissioned Robert West-
garth, a private trader at Syriam,^ to negotiate w 4 th the Court of Pegu
for its cession to the East India Company.

Taylor found the local officials extremely hostile, and after a
cursory surt'cy went on to P^^gti to join forces with Weslgarth. 'I'hey
found the Mon government resolutely opptfcscd to any settlement on the
island. While they w^ere there, in November r753t> Bruno returned as
* D. G. E. Hall, ■'rhtf TrufiCtly of Ncjfniis^ Jtxi (1931). pi- m, p,

the earlier fhase of eupopban expansion ft. ti

Dupldx'a resident agent; and since it became only too obvious that
his influence with the Mens was supreme, negoLbtiQti& were broken ofT
and Taylor returned to ^fad^as. After leaving Negrab he had sent off
a very unfavourable report on the island, which had caused Saunders
to have doubts as to the ivbdom of g^uig on with the scheme, not¬
withstanding the enthusiastic sanction accorded to it in the directors*
despatch. But when Taylor arrived in hladras with the story of
Brunovs ascendancy at Pegu^ Saunders cast all doubts aside and sent
a strong expedition which took possession of the island on 2!^ April
1753* Had he known that the directors of the French Company had
already turned down Dupleix's proposal, he might have acted differ¬
ently* In a letter dated a January 1753 they had advised Dupieix
that the shipbuilding concessions at Syriam granted in the treaty of
1751 were adequate; anything involving military commitments would
be certain to provoke a further contest with the British^

I'aylor had reported that the island w^as very unhealthy and would
be usel<^ as a trading station. His estimate proved only too true;
,it was flooded during the rainy season and malaria-ridden. No
attempt was ever made to de\'elop it as a naval station. But although
disease took a terrible toll of its staffs both European and j^ian, and all
its supplies of food and labour had to be brought across from Madras,
there could be no thought of abandoning the settlement while Bruno
remained at Pegu^

The rise of Alauagpaya, on the other hand, caused both Dupieix
and the Mans to have second thoughts regarding their altiance. The
former sent a present of arms to Alaungpaya. The latter asked the
English East India Company for military aid and offered to cede
Negrais, Th^e were manctuvres, but the Mons certainly needed far
more help than Pondicherry could afford. When, late in 1754^
Dupieix was recalled to France, the hope of any real French help to the
Mons faded out» though Bruno remained at Pegu. At almost the same
time Thomas Taylor returned to Madras from Ncgrals completely
convinced that Alaungpaya*® success was assured, and that the Com¬
pany should cultivate good relations with him. And a few months
later, when the Burmese king, in the course of his rapid thrust down the
Irrawaddy, sent envoys to Negrais asking for arms, Henry Brooke,
the Company's agent there, wrote to Fort St. George urging that all
possible assbtance should be given to him. But Madras could no
mote afford to satisfy Alaungpaya^s demands for arras than could
Fondicherry those of the Monsp and for the simple rc-ason that a new
Anglo-French struggle in India was imminent.

CH* 21 THE KONftAUNC DYNASTT IN SURAtA, 1752-82 347

Alaungpaya’s final victoiy, however, was by no means assured
when his campaign came to a halt at Dagon just before the onset of the
wet monsoon of 1755. He had totally inadequate siege equipment
with which to assault such strongly defended cities as Syriam and
Pegu. Serious trouble had broken out in the north. The Manipuris
were raiding again, the Shans were restive, and there was some fear
that a member of the old Toungoo royal family who had taken refuge
in Siam was planning to recover the throne of his fathers. Alaungpaya
had perforce to return to deal with these tlireats, knowing full well
that as soon as his back was turned the Mon army at Syriam would
strive to defeat his holding force at Rangoon.

This indeed happened, but the Mon attacks were made with so
little determination that they failed dismally, although the Mon heir-
apparent and Bruno, who directed them, received a certain amount of
unwilling assistance from a number of English ships that had come to
Syriam for trade. One of them happened to be a Company's vessel, the
Arcotf whose entirely unauthorized action caused grave concern to the
Fort St- George authorities, for when Alaungpaya heard of it he at
once suspected the good faith of the Negrak factory, which had agreed
to negotiate with him A Hence, when Captain George Baker, who had
been deputed by Henry Brooke to negotiate an agreement, appeared
at Shwebo, he found the king in no mood to come to terms. 'Fhc hand¬
some present of cannon which Baker brought with him, and the pro¬
mise to supply him with all the military stores the Negrais settlement
could spare, somewhat mollified the king’s anger, but the utmost con¬
cession he would make was that negotiations might be resumed when
he returned to Rangoon to direct operations aganst Syriam,

Alaungpaya tackled the problems which had brought him back to
his homeland with characteristic vigour. A punitive expedition, the
first of many, against Manipur wrought fearful havoc. A strong
detachment went to the Shan states and received tokens of sub¬
mission. The Viceroy of Yunnan accorded the king official recognition.
Then with a large force, which included Shan and Chin levies, he
returned to the Mon country. .At Rangoon Ensign John Dyer and Dr.
William .Anderson met him and concluded an agreement whereby in
return for military stores he recognized the Negrais settlement and
gave permission for a factory to be established at Basscin. The terms
were recorded in a royal letter on gold-leaf, directed tu the King of
England. It was beneath ALaungpaya’s dignity to deal with a Governor

Accent of ihe Knatish ProHedinai sit i7Si'. «» Didrympk’a On^nlni

Rfp^rtMy^ VoL ltP9-

3^8 THE EARLtFJt PIIASJJ OP EIHOPFJN EXPAJs'SION PT. t(

of Madras representing a mere trading company. The missive was
delivered through Mr. Secretary Pitt, Britain’s great war minister,
early in 1758. By that time the East India Conspany had thoroughly
repented of its rash action in seizing Negtais. Orders had already been
sent out for complete withdrawal from Burma.

In February 1756 the siege of Syriam began in earnest. Everything
now depended upon whether Bruno’s urgent appeals would move
Pondicherry to send the necessary help. Had the relief expedition
which tvas at last despatched only arrived in time the city could have
been saved. The first tt%'0 ships bringing it arrived just two days too
late, when .\taungpaya had captured the place by a surprise attack.
The third ship, sent from Pondicherry, was delayed by bad weather,
and on arrival at the river-mouth learnt of the fall of the city in time
to turn homewards. The other two, ignorant of what had happened,
were decoyed up the river by a false message which Maungpaya forced
the captive Bruno to w'ritc before executing him. They were neatly
run aground by their Burmese pitots and farced to surrender. The
• guns, muskets and ammunition they were bringing for the Mons
were a godsend to Alaungpaya: even more so the 300 fighting men he
impressed into his service.

He could now tackle the defences of Pegu. The city, however, put
up a dogged resistance and was not finally taken until May 1757,
During its long siege .Maungpaya Was insatiable in his demands on
Negrais for munitions and threatened to treat the settlement tn the
same manner as Syriam if they were not met. But with the elimination
of French influence in Burma the Negrais settlement had lost its
raisots ii'itrt, and with the Seven Years War in progress it had become
urgent for the British to concentrate upon the French threat in India.
As early as March 1757 the directors of the Company had issued
orders for the liquidation of the Burma venture. Some montlts, of
course, elapsed before they were received in Madras. When they did
arrive Fort St. George was not in a position to carry them out, for
. 1 ,ally’s operations in the Carnatic absorbed its whole attention.
Indeed, throughout the whole of 1758 the British w ere on the defensive
in that region, and from December of that year until the following
February Madras itself was besieged by tlie French.

In the meantime Alaungpaya, having completed the conquest of
the Mons, sent peremptory orders for the Chief of Negtais to attend
on him at Prome while on his way back to his capital. But Captain
'I'homas Newton deemed it unwise to go in person and deputed
Ensign Thomas Lester instead, l-ester describes in detail his interviews

CIT, 21 THE KONBAUNG DYNASTY IN EIT&MA, 1752-S2 349

with the king in a journal which is one of the most interesting of
the many documents which have sumved from this peritnl of British
contact with Burma.* He found Abungpaya somewhat piqued that
George II had failed to reply to the gold-kaf letter he had despatched
in the previoufl year* But his victor)^ had put him in a very good
humour, and he agreed to make a ^treaty’ recognizing the British
position at Negruis and Bassein in return for an annual present of
inunitions and 3 promise of military aid against his enemies. The
"treaty\ was, of course, valueless, since the Burmese king could not
bind himself in $uch a way; he could only issue orders, and in any case
they were not binding on his successor. Aitchison Bignificantly
omitted the document from his collection of the East India Company a
7 Vf£in>^, SunaJs and Engagements.^ Nevertheless under its second
clausOp which granted the British a site *on the bank of the Fersaim
River, opposite to the Pagoda Hill, and the Old Town of Persaim , a
factory was actually constructed at Ba^scin in i 7 S 7 became an
agenc)" for the purchase of teak timber.

With Madras unable to carry out the directors' order to evacuate ^
the Negrais settlement, the task devolved upon the Governor of Fort
William, Calcutta. The main operation of bringing away Captain
Thomas Newton and the garrison was performed in April 1759 *
at both Ntgrais and Bassein the collected limber and stores were more
than the ships could carrj' away. Lieutenant Hope and a small guard
were accordingly left behind in charge of them. During the cold
season of Abungpaya was absent on a campaign in Mantpur.

His absence was the signal for a desperate ctfort on the part of the
Mons to throw off the Burmese yoke. They inassacred the Burmese in
several districts, defeated the Burmese v^iccroy and drove hint into
Henzada^ AJaungpaya had to abandon his campaign and hurry to
Rangoon. When he arrived there, ho we vet, the local forces had
mastered the rebels. An Armen tan in the royal serv'ice whispered lO
the king a rumour that the Chief of Negrais had helped the Mon
rebels. A few months bter Burmese troops surprised the settlement,
massacred its personnel, and destroyed its buildings.

The cause of this treacherous act was at the time thought to have
been the king's fury at what he must have taken to be a second case
of British perfidy. But it svas not the reastm given by the king hin^self
lo an English survivor of the massacre at a subsequent interview. He
said it was because the King of England had not replied to his lette^r,

^ DsitryiTiplc^ ftp. y<A. % pp. aqi-aa.

■ Hi? lioniTTcnt* on liic' treaty arc m val. 1* p. 335.

350 TMK OF ElTlOFEAN EXPANSION PT, II

and that he had come to the conclusion that *the English and the
Company looked on him and hts people as fooU\^ One must bear in
mind that the rumour canitot have reached Alaungpaya later than
May i7S9r and the massacre did not lake place until the following
October. It is not without significance also that the Bassein factory
was unharmed. The story itself was a canard deliberately invented by
the Armenians^ who took every possible opportunity at this time to
bedevil the British because of a pathological jealousy of their in¬
creasing influence in India and ebewhere in the East, 'fhe evidence
goes to show that Alaungpaya was all along determined to evict the
British from Negrais. He wanted theoi closer under his controL To
achieve his aim by means of a massacre, how ever, w'as not his intention.
It was deliberately planned and carried out by the French officer in
charge of the troops sent to seize the settlement ^ presumably as an act
of revenge for the defeats sustained by his country' at British hands *

Alaungpaya^s expedition against Manipurp from which he had been
recalled by the Mon rising, inflicted upon that country one of the
worst disasters in its history . Thousands of people were deported and
settled in the Sagaing and Amarapura districts of Upper Burma.
From this time the astrologers at the Court of Ava were Manipuri
Brahmans, while Manipuris formed a cavalry' regiment in the Burmese
armjv

The last exploit of Alaungpaya^s stormy career w'as an invasion of
Riam. M'he destruction of ihe Mon kingdom had caused a further
great exodus of its inhabitants to Siam, and the border districts in
consequence w^cre in a state of constant disorder. In reviving the old
struggle with Ayul^ta Alaungpaya"s motives were strikingly similar to
those which had inspired Bayinnaung in the sixteenth century. He
hoped to regain control over Chiengmai. He seems also to have
planned to repopulate the delta districts by large-scale deportations
from Siam.

The Siamese were expecting his invasion and had massed to defend
the w'cstward approaches to their capital. The Burmese, howeveti
took them by surprise by an attack from the south. Alaungpaya*s
force w ent by w^ay of ^Favoy to Tcnasscrim, croi^sed over to the Gulf
of Siam, and then marched northwards to Ayut'ia, which St encircled
in April 1760, During the following month the king was desperately
wounded by the bursting of a siege-gun while he was directing the
fire of a battery. The siege was at once abandoned and the army began
a hurried retreat homewards. The king died at Taikkala Jui^t before
* EIjJJ, p. j 16. * Ibid.^ p. 1 [9.

CH. 21 THE KONHAUJJG DYNASTY IN HUH-^iA, 1752-8:2 351

reaching the Salween. His iMMiy was borne back to Shwebo and
buried there in the presence of a va&t cunconrsc of his mourning sub¬
jects. He had been a great leader who had restored the self-respect of
the Burmese after the disasters they had suffered at the hands of the
Manipurisp the Shans and the Mons, He had abo given them a tmtt.
for miUtary glory which for over half a century was to make them the
terror of their neighbours.

Naungdawgyij Alaungpaya^s son and successor^ had a short and
troubled reign, full of rebcliions. The most serious was led by one of
his father^ generaU, I\Iiakaung Nawrahta, who seized Ava and
planned to restore the Toungoo dynasty. While the siege was in pro¬
gress Captain Walter Alves arrived from India to seek permission to
remove the East India Company's effects at Basscin, and to request
the surrender of a number of English prisoners. ^I'he new king was
most anxious for the Company to resume trading operations in his
country and sent Alves back to Calcutta tn ask Fort William to re¬
consider the decision to withdraw^ But it was to no purpose j the
Governor of Bengal was under firm orders from home to liquidate the^
Burma venture. When Alves returned to Burma in the following
year his requests were granted^ With his departure relations between
the Company and the Court of j\va erased for a long term of years^

Naungdawg)i^s brother and successor, Hsinb^nshin (i 7 fj 3 “ 7 ^)s
transferred his capital fromShivcbo back to Ava. The troubles during
his predecessor's reign taught him that it Avas essential for the capital
in Upper Burma to be near to the vital Kyauksfc district* And although
he revived his father*3 project of conquering Biarut neither Pegu nor
Rangoon in the disaffected Mon country was considered suitable as a
capital. His plan waa to e.Acploit the northern approach to Ayut'ia by
subduing the Laos country and using it as a base of operations. Hence
in 17&4 the war began with campaigns which resulted in the conquest
of Chiengmai and Vicu Chang (Vientiane). Early in 1766 Ayut'ia was
besieged* It made a long and stubborn resistance. When at last it fell,
in March 1767, the Burmese reduced it to a heap of ruins. Even the
royal records were bumi. Thousands of captives and vast booty tvere
deported* 'The King of Hanthavvaddy [i^e* Bavinnaung] waged war
like a monaxcbp^ comments the Siamese chronideri ^but the King of
Ava like a robber* *

But again the Burmrae were unable to hold Siam in subjection*
Their incursion into the Laos country caused such a ferment among
the states bordering nn Yunnan that the Chinese were forced to inter¬
vene, and between 1766 and 1769 Burma had tn defend herself against

rm EAHLiER PHASE OE EUROFKAH EXPANSION

PT. U

35^

a scries of Chinese invasions. This diversion weakened her hold upon
Siam and enabled ihe Siamese under a leader P'ya Taksin (' Paya Tak'
in the Burmese chrimkies) to stage a rapid recovery^ and while Burma
was strainiitg ever\' nerv^e to repel the Chinese he began system¬
atically to exterminate their garrisons^ and by the end of 1768 had
regained AyutMa.

I'hc Shan states bad been disturbed for some years before 1764*
The Gwe Shans of Okpo-Madaya, the prime movers in the revolt of
1740 w hich bad brought the downfall of the Toungoo dynasty, had
caused so much trouble by raiding the northern states that in 1758-9
Alaungpaya himself had sent a punitive expedition against them. The
survivors settled in Mongmit, llsenwi and Menglicii^ a trans-Salween
stale* whence they carried their raids across the Chinese border*
"l"hc Chinese began to suspect that the Burmese were at the bottom of
the trouble* especially when in 1764 a Burmese army majrching
against the Laos states passed through Kengtung, which was at logger-
heads tvith Kenghung, a tributarj' of China. So much uneasiness was
caused by the Burmc^ invasion of Chiengniaj and Vien Chang that
"when in 1765 they sent a general to collect uftute from some minor
Salween sutes these complained to China. There was nothing un¬
usual in the Burmese demand. For centuries these states, though
under Chinese protection, had been accustomed to pay tribute to the
more powerful kingdoms near their borders. Hsinbyushin "$ ambitious
policy* however^ filled them with alarm.

The war began in 1766 with a punitive expedition directed by the
Yunnan viceroy against Kengtung^ the largest and most easterly of
the Shan states subject to Burma, With Burmese help the sawbw'a
drove out the Chinese. Thijs disaster caused the Viceroy of \'unnan
such loss of face that he committed suidde. Imperial China therefore
decided that Burma must be taught a severe lessoun Late in the same
year, in obedience to orders from Peking, a new viceroy, Yang Ying-
chu, led an invading force over the well-worn trade route through
Bhamo. only to be held up by Burmese frontier forces at Kaungton on
the Irrawaddy, south of the town. The arrival of reinforcements from
Ava enabled the defenders to take the offensive, and the Chinese w^ere
pushed back over their frontier. A larger Burmese force marched
through Mohnyin and Mogaung to VVaingmaw, south of Myitkyina,
and thence to the !Sammyin Creek, w here it defeated a Chinese detach¬
ment* Both Burmese forces thereupon entered Cliinese territory.

These embarrassing failures led to another change in the Y unnan
viceroyalty* Ming Jui+ a son-in-law of the rmperor, now took Yang

TH. 21 THF KONBAUNG DTNASTV IN BURMA, 1752-8^ 353

Ving-chu's place. Uh plan \s^ IQ launch a double attack on Burma
as noon as the rainy season of 1767 ended. While one force was to
attack through Bhaino, the main attack^ directed by Ming Jui in per¬
son, was to proceed by a more southerly route, passing through
Hscnwi and Hsipaw'. which the Manchu force had used a century
earlier when chasing the last Ming emperor \ ung-lL I his nearly
succeeded. After defeating tw'o Burmese armies Ming Jui got to Sin-
gaungi within thirty miles of Ava, and the situation became critical
(Febmajy 176S). But although large Burmese forces were tied up in
Siam, a third army managed to cut Ming Jui^s communications through
the Shan states. And when he turned to deal with the threat he got
into such difficulties that he lost the main body of hi$ army in tiy^ing to
Cut his way out of the trap that closed round him^ The other Chinese
army, which should have come to his assistance, wasted precious time
try ing to reduce the Kaungton ^itockade, and finally gave up the task
and retreated homewards. A frightful example was made of Us com¬
mander for hia part in the general debacle- Ming jtii could have
escaped, but rather than face his emperor he cut off his pigt^h s-enl it ^
to him, and then com mi tied suicide^

In 1769 the Chinese made a final attempt to wipeout these disasters-
This time their army made a third attempt to reach Ava by the Bhamo
route. Once more it was held up by ihe Kaungton stockade. Unable
Id take it, the Chinese built a great fortified camp at Shw^enyaungbin.
When the Burmese stormed this and drove them out they asked for
terms, and a peace treaty was signed on the spot early in tyyo. Under
its terms, which were never ratified by ECing Hsinbyushin, the Chinese
were to withdraw* trade was to be restored, and decennial missions
were lo be exchanged. The king w'ss furious when he heard that the
Chinese were to be allowed to return homej and the viciorious com^
manders dared not return to face his wrath. lo appease it they led
off their forces to attack Manipur. There they won a decisive Victor}'
which caused the raja to flee to Assam. Then, hsiving placed a Burmese
nominee on the thronej they deported thousands more Manipuris to
Burma.

The Kaungton IVeaty was a statesmanlike measure. Once more the
large caravans with hundreds of pack animals began to traverse the
'Old Burma Road^ while Sino-Burmese relations gained a new
cordiality which lasted until the end of the dynasty* and beyond. Burma
took immense pride in this fine achievement: it stimulated her ex¬
pansive ardour to a dangerous level. The remainder of Hsinbyushin s
reign* however, provided little glory' and much evidence of the need

354 E.\EUJHR OF FUFOFEAN ESPAN^ON PT, IT

for a ncTT policy. The war with Siam, w^hich only ceased with Haio-
hyushin^B doth in 1776, sawr nothing but dUastet^ for the Burmese.
Paya Tak drove them out of the Laos country* recovered Cbiengmai
and reunited Siam. In 1773 there another sudden Mon rising,
which shovved how precarious tvas the Burtoese hold on the south
country. Rangoon was burnt, together with a number of ships that
were being built there by French shipwrights. When the Burmese
recovered their strength and put down the rebellion thousands again
fled into Siam, where they were wdl received. A Burmese force
which pursued them along the Three Pagodas route was surrounded
and captured by the Siamese. In the follnwing year Hsinbyushin
made a state progress down tbe Irrawaddy to Rangoon. There he
put to death Binnya Dala, the captive Mon king, who had been taken
in 1757 when Pegu fell.

When fbinbyushJn died in t776 his chief coimnanderj Maha
Thihatbura^ had just suffered a disastrous defeat in Siairu His son
SingUp w^ho succeeded him, decided to bring the war to an end and
ordered the Burmese forces to evacuate Siamese territory. He was an
ineffident young man who was bored with palate routine and spent
hia time making pUgrimages to pagodas* In 1783* while he was absent
on one of these eKpedttions, a palace intrigue brought to the throne a
younger brother of Hsinbyushin* the Baduu Min, better known as
Bodawpaya* 'the great-gmtidfathcr king\ the epithet applied to him
in the Kt^nbautigstt Chromdf, compLted in the rdgn of his great-grand¬
son Mindon Min.

CHAPTER ZZ

ANNAM AND TONGKING. 1620-1820

(a) The sirttggk af Truih and Nguyen^ 16^0-1777

Th^ rivalry between the Trinh and the Nguyen led tu over half a
century of warfare in the aeventcenth century. The wearisome in*
decisive struggle went on from t620 to 1674.. On paper the Trinh
should have won comfortably* According to the accounts of the
Christian missionariesp they could muster toOjOOo men, 500 elephants
and 500 large junks^ and the numbers do not seem to liave been
e^caggerated- War was the sole occupation of the mandannSj and the
social system of the country was organked upon a military basis. But
the Nguyen armVi though much smaller^ was better equipped witl^
arms procured thmugh the Portuguese. The Nguyen fought defensive
wars and could count on the loyal support of their people. North of
Hue they built two great walls to block access from the norths and
for a long period these proved a serious obstacle to the Trinh force^i-
Moreover^ the presence of the small Mac principality in the norths
weak though it was^ was felt as a constant threat to Tongking.

The war began over the withholding of the revenues of Than-hoa
and Quang-nam from the capital by Nguyen Phuc-Nguyen (1613-35)^
better known to contemporary European writers as Sai Vuong. In
1630^ after a long period on the dcfensivep he took the offensive and
occupied southern Bochinh^ now the district of Ha*tirth. This re¬
mained for many years the great hone of contention between the two
sides^ It was temporarily recovered by the Tongkingers from Cong
Thuong Vuong (j63S--4S)p Sai Vuong’s successor, but lost again in
164S after their serious defeat at the of Tmong-duc, the more
southerly of the two great defence-works north of Hue. In 1655 they
made another attempt to recover it which brought so strong a reaction
on the part of the Nguyen that in the following year the situation
became serious for the Trinh, But the Nguyen could not gain a
decisive victory and the struggle continued for year after year with no
advantage to either side*

In 1659 Trinh Can, who had succeeded Trinh Trang two years
earlier, inflicted a double defeat on the Nguyen; but he in his turn

3 S 5

THE EARLIER PHASE OF EUROPEAN EXPANSION

FT.

356

was unable to follow this success up with a knock-out blow. In 1661
while attempting to deal one he was held up at the Doug-hri wall and
disastrously defeated. This brought a lull in the hghting for some
years, since the Nguyen were quite unable to strike back- In 167^
Trinh Can again took the offensive and a tremendous struggle took
place along the walls. But in the following year, finding Nguyen re¬
sistance UQConquerablep he called off the invasion, and the senseless
struggle ended. For upwards of a century peace reigned between the
north and the south. The Trinh concentrated upon developing their
authority in Tongking, while the Nguyen devoted their attention to
southwards eicpansion at the expense of the Chams and CambodLans
and to the spread of .Ann a mite influence-

The Portuguese had eslahlished regular trading connections with
both Annam and Tongking before the end of the sixteenth century.
They maintained no factories there, but used their settlement at Macao
in China as their base- They went to Tongking to buy raw silk for the
Japanc^ market, where the demand was so great that this commodity
had become one of the chief objects of trade in the Far East. Fai-fo*
dose to Quang-namj ^vas the commercial port of the Nguyen do¬
minions. It was a market rather than a dly^ When the Portuguese
began to trade there the Chinese and Japanese, who had long
frequented the place» formed the bulk of hs population, living each in
their separate quarter under their own magistrates. The foreign trade
of Annam and Tongking was almost entirely in the hands of
foreigners, who were given easy access by the rulers in each case. The
natives themselves engaged only in the coastal trade.

During the sixteenth century the Dominicans, who were making
energetic though unsuccessful efforts to spread their failh in Cam¬
bodia, made sporadic appearances in Annam, but without resulL In
the seventeenth century the Jesuits, expelled from Japan, began to
look to 1 ndo-China as a new field for their activities. l‘he practice had
been for Jesuits from Goa or Malacca to be trained for the Japanese
field at the Society's college at Macao, in 1614, in consequence of the
change of policy in Japan* several Jesuits found themselves im¬
mobilized at Macao. They gladly accepted the suggestion of a
Portuguese mercbanl from Fai-fo that they should go there instead.
Early in the next year they commenced operations there under the"
leadership of Francesco Busomi* a Neapolitan, who remained in the
country until 1639 under the tolerant patronage of Sai Vuong.

By i^zs the mission to Cochin China, the Portuguese name for the
Nguyen territories, promised so well that Jt was decided to open

CH. 22 ANNASt AND TONGKFNG, 1630-1820 357

Another in Tongking. ThU was the work of the celebrated Alexander
of Rhodes, who went there in 1627; but after a promising start he was
expelled by Trinh Trang in 1630,

For some 200 years, until after the suppression of the Society in
Europe, the Jesuits continued to work in the Vietnamese lands, often
up against bitter persecution, often secretly, living at Macao and
accompanying Portuguese trading ships disguised as merchants. The
'rrinh at Hanoi were their declared enemies, but the Nguyen, anxious
to obtain Portuguese support in their struggle for independence, were
less intolerant, though fundamentally hostile to the Christian faith.
Hien Vuong, who ivas annoyed because he had not received the hoped-
for support from Europeans in the campaigns of 1655^1 agamst the
Trinh, stopped missionary work and killed many native Christians.
During the latter part of the century there w'cre massacres of native
Christians, churches were burnt and missionaries imprisoned.

The early missionaries invented ^uoc-ngu, the Romanization of the
Vietnainese written language now in general use. Portuguese, the
commercial language used by Europeans of all kinds in their inter-*
course with the Vietnamese people, provided qtioc-ngu with its basic
values. One of the earliest w'orks to use it was Aie,\andcr of Rhodes’s
Vietnamese Catechism printed in Rome in the middle of the
century.

It w'aa through Alexander of Rhodes that the French entered the
Indo-Chinese mission field. His efforts to persuade the Pope to give
the Far Eastern Christians an independent organisation of their own
brought him up against such determined Portuguese opposition that
he turned to France for support. 'Fhere he stimulated such enthusiasm
that the boci^te dcs Missions Etrangires was formed, as tve have
noted in a previous chapter,^ and in 1662 established its base of opera¬
tions at . 4 yiit’ia. From there missionarica were sent to Cambodia,
Annam and Tongklng. Notwithstanding the opposition of both the
Jesuits and the Portuguese, they made headway while Lambert de la
Motte and Pallu lived to direct their endeavours. But they did so only
by posing as merchants in the employment of the Compagnie des Indes
Orientaux. When in thSa the Dutch forCftcl all their European com¬
petitors to leave Bantam, and shortly afterwards Rome forbade
inissianarics to engage in trade, a severe blow w'as dealt to French
influence in the Vietnamese lands. The failure of French intervention
in Siam was another cause of deciinc, and in 1 6^3 oriental vicarate
passed to the Spanish Dominicans at Manila.

* StiprOf p.

THE EAI^LTER phase QF ELIROPEAK EXPANSION

PT. 11

358

Still, the Sod etc continued to operate in the Far East, though in the
eighteenth century suffering from serious lack of men and resources.
■Fhc quarrels between the various missionary societies became so
Intense that m 1738 Pope Clement XII sent out a commission of
enquiry. As a result the decision was taken to assign separate terri-
toriiil Spheres to each* Under this arrangement the Jesuits received
Tongking and the northern provinces of Annamp while to the French
society was assigned the region from Hue aouthtvards^ But once again
the native rulers struck at the missuonaric?. The Trinh instituted
periodical persecutions and many missionaries lost their lives. The
Nguyen were 1 ms severe; and although in 1750 nearly all the mission¬
aries were rounded up and deported^ a few, who posSMsed expert
mathematical or scientific knowledge, were retained as government
servants.

Tbe Portuguese trade between Macao and Vietnam was challenged
in the seventeenth century by the Dutch. M soon as the latter were
established at Pataru and Ligor, the Nguyen, adw'ays on the look-out
£pr foreign aid, invited them to come and trade. At first, however^ the
main Dutch efforts in the Far East were made to secure direct trade
WTth China and Japaov Their first factory in the south was planted in
163^ at Qui-nam* In the next year they founded another in Tongking
at Hien-nam, and later a third at Ke-cho. Their connection with
Tongking, howeverp and the fear that they would listen to the appeals
for help made by the Trinhi led to trouble with the Nguyen* In 1641,
as the result of the harsh treatment given to the crews of two ships
which were wrecked near the Pulo Cham islands, they abandoned
their factory and for some years carried on a war of reprisals. An
attempt lo come to terms was made after Hien Vuong succeeded his
father in 1648. A treaty was signed in 1651 and a new factory opened
at Fai-fo. But again quarrels broke out, and in 1654 the factory was
dosed, this time finally.

I’he English made a disastrous attempl to open trade with the
Nguyen territoriM in 1613. Richard Cocks, the chief of the factory at
I lirado in Japan founded by John Saris, sent a junk to Fai-fo w^ith a
letter and presently from James I to the Hu£ ruler. But a$ soon as the
agent, Walter Carwarden^ and his interpreter landed they were
murdered by Annanutes. A few years later the Hirado factory sent a
trading expedition to 'Tongking, but it also was a failure. Far many
years Dutch hostility checked every attempt to open trade. In
however, Bantam took the initiative and sent William Gyfford to open
a factory in J*ongking.^ Gyfford was received by Le Gia-Ton and

CM. 11

AND TOSGKIKGp i620-i8j30 3S9

permitted to settle at Hien-nam. But the factory never achieved any
success* ^nd after being moved successively to Kc-cho and Anally to
Hanoi was closed in 1697. A letter written in t6So complains of bad
debts which could not be collected because there was no direct approach
to the king and the mandarins took what thcj^ wanted without pay¬
ment. There were the usual difficulties aming from Dutch opposition
and Portuguese intrigues, but the chiefs seem to have been bcapable
and there were dLssensionfl among the factors. And the expulsion of
the English from Bantam in i68z vv^a a blow from tvhich the factorv^
never recovered. The chief cause of failurCp however, lay in the
attitude of the ruling class^ and it is signiAcant that the Dutch also
failed to make their factory pay for the same reason and abandoned it
in 1700.

In 1695 Nathaniel Higginson, the Governor of Madras, sent Thomas
Bowyear to FaiTo on what may be described as a reconnoitring ex¬
pedition. Like Edward Fleetwood, who was sent to Ava in the same
year^ Bowyear was a private nicfchant and had no power to conclude
an agreement on behalf of the East India Company. Hia proposals «
were received wath the same sceptici$m as the Court of Av^a displayed
towards Fleetwood's. He was told that if the Company would establish
a factory suitable conditions of trade would then be discussed,
and he was entrusted with a letter couched in similar terms From Minh
Vuong to Higginson, His mission Jed to nothingp and soon after bis
return to Madras he was sent to assume control over the dockyard at
Syriam that was opened as a result of Fleetwood's missio-n.

During the century of peace which ensued after the Tongkingese
defeat by the Annamites in 1673 both ruling families continued to
hold undisputed sway in their respective temtones. In the north the
Trinh continued to make and unmake kings at will. Iheir rule was
firm and ensured peace and stability everywhere. They had Inherited
an administrative system which functioned ade<]uately and was well m
advance of any other native administration in South-East Asia« But
they did much to improve it- Trinh Ctiong (1709—29) commenced a
cadastral survey of land and renovated the taxation registers, thereby
reforming the collection of revenue from the products of the soil and
the mines. He reduced the power of the mandarins by forbidthng
them to create villages under their owm exclusive feudal jurisdiction*
He also improved the procedure of the courts and reduced the severity
of the penal code- His successor, Trinh Giang (t729-40), omied
through further financial reforms by regulating the salt trade and the
exploitation of the mines. He sought to reduce Chinese influence by

360 THE EAHLIEB PHASE OF EUHOPEAN EXPANSION PT. II

taxing Chinese settlers a higher rate than the Vietnamese and pro¬
hibiting the sale of Chinese books. He also had ediitions of the Viet¬
namese canonical and classical works and of the Annals printed.

Jn the south the Nguyen^ unlike the Trinh, had to create a largely
new admimstrative system in order ro unify their disersc territories.
As might be expected^ it was very similar to the one which had grown
up under the Le dynasty* For instance^ the census system and the
method of assessing the Und lax established by Ssi Vuong {1613-35)
were imitations of tho$e introduced by Le T^nh-Ton in 1465, In
fixing the land tax account had to be taken of the area of the fields,
which was officially measured^ the nature of the crop^ and the %'aJue gf
the lands. Hien Vuong (164S-S7) set up a bureau of agriculture which
classified cultivated lands and encouraged the cultivation of virgin
soil. Under Sai Vuong^s census system the population was divided
into eight categories and personal tax fixed according ig category'.
I^hose inscribed in the first two categories owed military' service. Great
attention was devoted to the army, which was organized on a terri-
^ tonal basis. Its basic unit was the f/myen, which was a platuon gf
thirty to fifty men draw n from the same village or neighbouring ones.
From tw'o to five ihuyen Went to make up a doi, or company. Doi in
turn would be grouped into a or regiment; though, more rarelv,
the latter might consist of from six to ten tkuyen without the inter¬
position of the dm. The largest group was the dinh^ or proviitciaf army.

in the middle of the eighteenth century', after expanding their
control over the south down to the Mekong delta, the Nguyen organized
their territory' into twelve provinces (dinh)^ with a governor {tr&n-thu}^
treasurer {eal-bo) and judge (ki-luc) at the head of each. From about
1632 the provincial mandarinate was recruited by examinations based
upon the Chinese model, In 1675 Hien Vuong strove to improve upon
this by inirodudng a sort of practical examination on the current
situation.

From time to time the Nguyen made attempts to secure recog¬
nition from China as independent rulers. On every' occasion, how-
ever^ the imperial reply tvas that tribute could not be accepted, nor
investiture accorded, while a legitimate Vietnamese dymasty was in
existence.

After the defeat of the Chams by Le Thanh-Ton in the second half
of the fifteenth century^, a few' Cham districts, as we have seen, still
maintained their independence. 'Fhese w^ere gradually absorbed hv
the Nguyen during the seventeenth century. They were fonmed into
the two diiih of 'Fran-hien and Thai-khang. A Cham kinglet still

Lir, 22 ANNAM AND TONCKINR, t62fl^l820 361

continued lo exist. In 169^1 dd doubt as a protest against the rigour
with which the Vietnamese were imposing their culture upon the
south, the Cham king, Ba Tranh, rebelled. He was defeated and
put to death together with all his ministers. The lertitories he had
ruled became the dinh of Thuan-thanh, later renamed Binh-thuan,
and were placed under a Cham prince as provincial governor. But
Vietnamese influence increased and the Chams were harshly treated.

I’he Vietnamese expansion at the expense of Cambodia followed
much the same pattern as in the case of Champa. Exiles, deserters
and other vagabonds infiltrated into the country. In time their num-
bens enabled them to form colonies, the inevitable prelude to annex¬
ation. 'J'hus in 1658 the provincial governor of Tran-bicn occupied
the colony of Moi-xui under the pretext that the King of Cambodia
had violated the \uetnaniese frontier. When King Ang Chan resorted
to arms he was defeated and captured and sent in a cage to Hue.
There, on paying homage as a vassal, he was liberated and escorted
back to his capital. His two brothers, however, refused to accept the
situation, chased the Vietnamese out of the disputed territory and set ^
themselves up as joint kings. In 1673 the inevitable succession dispute
gave the Vietnamese an opportunity to intervene effectively and install
two tributary rulers, one as king at L'dong and the other as second
king at Saigon.

The Saigon area, the Water Chen-Ia of the ancient Khmer kingdom,
was a tempting field for Vietnamese expansion. It had a population
of only about 40,000 families, so that there w‘ere vast empty spaces.
•Ang Non, the ruler of Saigon, attempted to seize the Cambodian throne
in 1679. but his cousin .Ang Sor called in Siamese aid and defeated
him, .At the moment when he arrived as a fugitive in Annam a large
fleet of junks carrying Chinese fugitives arrived at 1 ourane.

'Phev w'ere partisans of the defeated Mings under the command of two
officers, A^ang and Ch’en, who asked permission to settle under
Vietnamese authority. .Anxious to give them as wide a berth as
possible, Hicng Vuong passed them on to Ang Non, who led them
into his old appanage and settled them there. Ch en and his followers
established themselves at Bien-hoa, which they made into a prosperous
agricultural centre; Yang went to Mi-tho on the eastern branch of the
Mekong, where his followers adopted the more adventurous role of
river pirates. With their help .Ang Non made another bid for the
throne in 1682, but failed after some initial success. Some years later,
finding himself unable to control them, he called in Vietnamese help.
The Nguyen forces defeated the freebooters and killed Yang, They

iftz TJU! £AJlX.IFJt PHASE OF FLUOPEAM EXPANSION inr. 11

were then placed under the jurisdiction of the Bien-hoa chief, Ch’cn.
The Vietnameae then forced King Ang Sor to acknowledge Nguyen
overlordship. After this expedition the Water Chen-la passed under
Nguyen sway, and when Ang Non died his son Ang Em had to
admit a Vietnamese governor and his dominions were formed into
two dinhtt

This was not the end of %'ietnaraese expansion at the expense of
Cambodia. \ third Chinese refugee leader, Mac Cuu, settled in what is
now the Ha-tten region on the Gulf of Siam. Colonists docked to his
district and several prosperous villages were founded, notably Kampot.
In 171+ another succession dispute broke out at Lovck, and Siam
scisted the opportunity to gain control. The Chinese settlement at Ha-
tieii was attacked and Mac Cuu fled to Hui. Minh Vuong (1691-1725)
invested him ivith the governorship of Ha-tien, and a further spate of
Vietnamese invasions of Cambodia gave the Nguyen tivo more
provinces, Dinh-tuong and Long-ho, When Mac Cuu died in 1735.
his son Mac Thien Tu was conSrmed in his place by Hu6, and under
„his competent rule lia-tien prospered. In 1739 Cambodia attempted
to reassert its domination over the place, but Mac Thien Tu drove out
the invading forces. This gave the Vietnamese a further pretext for
intervention, and in 1749 Cambodia purchased peace only by abandon¬
ing all the territory south of Gia-dinh up to the arm of the Mekong
which passes Mi-tho.

The Burmese threat to Siam which developed under Alaungpaya
(1751-60) gave the Nguyen a fair field for demanding more territory
from Cambodia, and the provinces of Bassac and Prea-pateny were
yielded. But the tide of Vietnamese expansion had now reached its
high-water mark. Ayut’ia was captured and destroyed by the Burmese
in 1767; but almost immediately afterwards, under the impact of a
series of Chinese invasions, the conquerors lost their grip on Siam,
while that country foundalcader in P’y® Taksin, under whom it speedily
revived its strength. A misguided attempt by Mac Thien Tu in 1769
to place a pretender on the Siamese throne brought l"ya Taksin into his
dominions, and soon the Siam^e king, having reduced Ha-tien to
ruins, was essaying the role of kingmaker at Phnom Penh. The
Vietnamese thereupon invaded Cambodia and defeated the Siame.se.
But although they replaced Ang Tong, the vassal of the Nguyen, on the
throne, he was unable to maintain himself there, and in 1773 retired
in favour of .\ng Non, the Siamese nominee. And Mac 'rhien Tu made
his peace with P’ya Taksin, who withdrew the Siamese garrison from
Ha-tien. Everything was now set for a fresh trial of strength between

CH. IZ

ANN AM AND TONGKlNCt l62C^-lS20 363

Siam and the Ng^uyen for the control of Cambodia, and Ang Non
began to prepari? to meet another Vietnamese invasion* But sudden
disaster had ovetu'helmed the Nguyen lands and it was to be some
years before the Vietnamese were again in a position to challenge
Siamese influence in Cambodia-

In 1765 when Vo Vuong died a Court intrigue raised up as his
successor a boy of twelve who was the son of a concubine* Pow^er was
seized by a greedy minister^ Truong-Phuc-Loan, who prodaimed
himself regent. He proved unequal to the task^ and in 1773 in the
district of Tay-son a revolt began under three brothers, Nguyen Van-
Nhac, Nguyen Van-Lu and Nguyen Van-Hu^, which speedily attained
formidable strength. The rebel leaders^ who, though bearing the
family name of Nguyen, were unconnected with the ruling dynasty^
seized the city of Qui-nhon and defeated the government troops sent
against them-

In the following year the siluation was made worse by a Tong¬
kingese invasion launched by the'Trinh^ and early in 1775, w^hile the
Nguyen army was engaged with the rebels, the Tongking^e seized
Hut. Trinh Sum, when launching the ini^asion, proclaimed that his
intention was to help the Nguyen, but beyond occupying Hu^ and the
old Cham province of Quang-nam his forces could make no further
progress- For a time, indeed^ they were thrown on to the defensive,
since Van-Nhac, having inflicted another defeat on the Ng^iyen army,
made an alUout bid to gain possession of Hu< 5 . In thi$ he failed, but he
ne3ct turned hLs attention to the souths where his brother Van-Lu was
engaged in a struggle for the possession of Saigon. Early in 1776
Van-Lu had captured the city, only to be driven out by Mac Thien Tii
of Ha-ticn» who came fortvard as the champion of the Nguyen cause
and was joined there by the surviving members of the family. In 1777
the Tay-son leaders recaptured Saigon and hunted down the Nguyen,
killing three of them* The sole sur^'ivor, Nguyen Phuc-Anh, generally
known as Nguyen Anh, a boy of fifteen, got away to I he bland of
Pulo Panjang, helped by a French Catholic priegt, Pigneau de Behaine,
who was later to play an important part in his restoration* For the
time being, however, the Nguyen cause appeared to be lost- Every¬
where except in the Hue region the Tay-son brothers were dominant,
and Van-Nhac had even proclaimed himself 'emperor'.

The story of Nguyen Anh"s long struggle to recover his inheritance
and of his relations whh Pigneau de Uehaine belongs to a later section.
'Fhc present one must end with a brief reference to the attempts of the
European pow'crs to re-establish commercial relations with the

PT, [[

364 THE EARLIER PHASE Of EtfftOPEAN' EXPANSION

VtciHarness tands in the eighteenth century. The English had left
Tongking in 1697, the Dutch in 1700. The French were still repre¬
sented by niissionarics operating as traders, There were no European
factories in Cochin China, but the Portuguese of Macao continued to
send cargoes of porcelain, tea and tutenag and to receive in return
sugar, raw silk and eaglewood, while the Jesuits remained active
participants in this traffic. During the long period of peace between
the two rival houses the princes no longer needed European help and
hence made no effort to attract the European trader.

The English, ever on the look-out for places where Chinese goods
might be purchased, planted a settlement in *702 on the island of
Puto Condore, l^ng off the western mouth of the Mekong. The
French East India Company had in 1686 commissioned its agent in
Siam to look for a factory site on the route to China, and he had
reported that, since all the commerce of China, Tongking, Macao,
Manila and Cochin China moat pass close to the island, Pulo Condore
possessed the combined advantages of the Straits of Malacea and
Sunda. By settling there in 170a the English apparently forestalled a
French move to occupy the island. But three years later their facturv'
came to an early and sudden end. The Macassar troops of the garrison,
annoyed at being kept there beyond the term of their contract, mutinied
and slaughtered all the Europeans there save two, who made their escape
in a small boat to Johnre. 'I'he French East India Company in tyaj
sent an agent to examine the island. He submitted a very adverse
report, and as it was known that the English had no intention of
returning there the Company dropped the scheme.

NeV'ertheless the French were anxious for a settlement in the China
Hea, since their factors at Canton found their position almost un¬
endurable. In 1744 Dupleix’s nephew Friel, one of the Canton
merchants, visited Vo V uong at Hut and was encouraged to open trade
there. He went to Pondicherry to obtain Duplcix’s support, but the
war with the English East India Company, that broke out as a result
of the participation of Great Britain in the War of the .'Austrian
Succession, held up the project. In 1748, however, Dupleix sent an
agent to Cochin China. .‘Vt almost the same time Pierre Poivre dis¬
cussed a similar plan with the Minister of Marine at Paris and was
sent out to put it into operation. He arrived in Tourane in 1749
and went on to Hue, where he was well received by Vo Vuong, but
lost the major part of his cargo either by sheer theft or through
purchases tvithout payment. liis report caused the French East
India Company to abandon the idea of opening trade w'ith the Nguyen

rjl. 22 ANNAM AXD TONCKINGj l62O-tS^0 365

lands. DiipleiSt however^ still chcKshed the plan; and although the
agent he there in 175^^ a missioiiari" of ihc Missions Etrangeres,
was arrested and e^xpelled by Vo Vuung, he sent yet another^ but in
vain. His own recall to France and the outbreak of the Seven Veara
War caused the scheme to be put back once more into cold storage.

When the ^var ended, Choiseul tried to revive interest in it ‘pour
compenser les pertes sllbies^ as Maylxjn puts but failed to eitlbt
support. Then in 1774 Vetgennes, who became Minister of Foreign
Allairs on the accession of Louis XVI^ turned his attention to the
scheme, li was talked of as a way of freeing France from the supremacy
achieved by England in colonial wars by enabling her to intercept
English trade with China in time of war. As a result a ship was sent
in 177S from Chandemagore to examine the situation. 'The report that
its commander brought back to Chevalier, the energetic commandant
at Chandemagore, led him to write home that the situation in. Cochin
China offered a splendid career there for the French nation if inter¬
vention on behalf of the legitimate prince^ Xgnycn Anh^ were under¬
taken. He suggested that the policy ‘so happily pursued earlier' by
Dupleix in India should be applied in Indo-China.

At almost the same time the much-harassed VVarren Hastings in
Calcuitn was being urged to adopt the same plan, f.ate in 1777 an
English ship^ the returning from China to India, put in at

Tourane and took on board tw'o members of the Nguyen family who
were anxious to rejoin Nguyen Anh at SaigQn+ Unable to make the
entrance to the Saigon river, how^ever, the master took his passengers
on to Calcutta, where they were received by Warren Hastings. TTiey
were provided with a passage back to their country and were accom-
panted by an English agent, Charles Chapman, who w^as sent to
examine the prospects of opening trade there. Chapman had on
adventurous voyage. He found the whole country in the hands of the
'ray-son brothers. He liad an intervicTiv with Van-Nhac, who was
anxious to use his two ships in fighting Nguyen Anh, and only wnih
difficulty saved one from seizure. He returned to Calcutta in 2779
with an optimistic repKjrt. He strongly advised intervention with the
object of restoring Nguyen Anh, and stressed that if the English were
forced to abandon Canton and it became necessary to look for a place
where Chinese goods could be purchased they could be had in
Cochin China cheaper than at Canton. He pointed to the strategic
value of the Bay of Tourane* which^ he said, offered a splendid shelter
to ships and would be a useful base from which they could operate

^ Gh. Mayben, if Arxnam motfem£y p. i7?j.

366 THE EAKLIEft PHASE OF FirROPEAN £XFANn3m.N PT, 11

against encnues. Finally, lie warned Hastings that France intended to
gain influence in the country.

Neither France nor the Fast India Company could attend to th^e
suggestions; they were too deeply committed elsewhere at the rime.
But the matter did not rest there. For^ as we have seen^ a French
priest;p Pigneau de Behaine, had already been of service to the fugitive
Nguyen Anh, and out of their chance meeting a friendship was forged
which was to have immensely important results not only for the prince
but also, in the long run;^ for France.

(h) The fstabfishment of the Nguyen rmpire of Cothhi China ^
Anuam and Tongking^ 1777-1820

The French missionary Pierre-Joseph-Georges Pigoeauj who helped
the young Nguyen Anh to escape to Pulo Panjang after the second
capture of Saigon by the Tay-son rebels in t777i was bom in 1741 at
Behaine In the commune of Origny-en-Thierache, in ivhat later
became the depanement of the Aisne, He was trained ^ a missionary
in the Seminaire des Missions-Etrang^res and left France in 1765
for ivork in Cochin China. There he Joined the college at Hon-dat
in Ha-tien^ w^hich had been set up by refugee missionaries forced by
the Burmese invasions to leave Siam, It was a wretched little collection
of bamboo huts with $onie forty Annamite, Chinese and Siamese
pupils. And it was not kft long in peace, for in 1768 P^ya Taksin com¬
plained to Mae Thien Tu, the son of the founder of the Ha-tien
principalityj that it had afforded shelter to a refugee Siamese prince^
and the missiDnarics were all thrown into gaol for three months.

In the next year Chinese and Cambodian pirates attacked the
settlement, massacred a number of the studentu, and burned down all
the buildings^ Pigneau managed to escape with some of his pupils
and made his ivay via Malacca to Pondicherry- In 1770 he set up
another seminary at Virampatnam close by, and while there was
tiDnunated Bishop of Ad ran. Four years later, having been conse¬
crated Apostolic Vicar of Cochin China, he went to Macao to collect
personnel for staffing the Ha-rien mission, which he proposed to re-
establish.

In 1775 he arrived in Ha-^tien. He was hospitably received by Mac
Thien Tu and permitted to resume his w’^ork. Exactly how he came to
meet the fugitive Nguyen Anh the Annamite sources do not reveal,
and European writers do not agree- The young prince appears to have
been in hiding in a forest close to Pigneau/s seminary at Can-cao

CH, 22

annam and tongktng, 1620-1820 367

during; September -And October 1777 before getting a wav to Puto
Panjang. At tbe same time Mac Thicn 'Pup the champion of the Nguyen
cause, deciding that all lost, fled from Ila-tienj ultimately at the
invitation of P"ya I'aksin making his ivay to the Siamese CourL

At the ver>^ moment when he thus abandoned hope of die Nguyen
causc;, Nguyen Anh^ learning that the main body of the *ray-son army
had left the Saigon region, quietly slipped across to the imintand^
rejoined his supporters and regained possession of the dtj^. This
success w^as largely due to the efforts of a devoted supporter* Do Thanh-
N'hon, who had raised a new' army for the Nguyen cause after the
disaster at Saigon. During the year 1778 Do Thanh-Nhon again
proved his worth by clearing the rebel troops out of the province of
Gia-dinh and destroying their fleet. The situation began to look so
hupeful that Nguyen ^Vnh despatched a mission to Slam to propu^ a
treaty of friendahip.

Events in Cambodia, however* brought this move unexpectedly to a
hahn In 1779 the mandarins, under the leadership of Mu, Governor
of BafiSaCi rebelled against the Siamese puppet Ang Non and appealed
to Nguyen Anh for help* Do Thanh-Nhon, who vvas sent in response
to this request, assisted Mu to win a decisive victory, us a result of
which Ang Non was executed and Ang Eng, the infant son of his old
rival Ang Tong, placed on the throne, with Mu as regent. Do
Thanh-Nhon then returned to Saigon loaded w iih honours and began
to concentrate all his efforts upon the improvement of the Nguyen
navy.

Siam naturally could not allow the new set-up at Phnom Penh to go
unchaltcnged. In November 1780 three armies were sent to invade
Cambodia. In April tyS*, however, just when, having won some
initial successes^ they were about to meet a force sent by Nguyen Anh,
news came of P^ya Taksin^s madness, and the invasion was called
off.

At this juncture Nguyen Anh ruined his chances of success for many
years to come by having Do 'Fhanh^Nhon murdered, l^he cause of
this senseis crime is obscure. The most likely suggestion U that
the distinguished general put his young master too much in thci shade*
It w'as a most impolitic act: Do Thanh-Nhon was the one military
commander in the Nguyen sendee whom the Tay-son brotJicrs really
fearedp The eldest is said to have "leapt for joy* when he heard the
new^s. 'lire dead man’s supporters at once rebelled, and the Nguyen
cause was so badly weakened that a few' montba later the Tay-son
brothers again captured Saigon* Pigneau de Behaine escaped Into

368 TUK EARLIER PHASE OF FlfROFEAW EXPANSION PT* II

Cambodi^i. Nguyen Anh, after beating a lightiitg retreai into Ha-tien,
took refuge on the bland of Phiii-qiioc. Hh suppurters, htnvevcr,
continued to carry on gucnilU warfare against the Tay-iion.

In October 1782 fortune turned once again; the royal troops led by
Nguyen Man, Nguyen Anh^s younger brother^ succeeded in driving
the rebels out of Saigon. Nguyen Anh returned to the city, as also did
Pigneau. But the situation verj' precatious, and it was obvious
to both that when the inevitable counter-attack came there was no
hope of bolding it.

It came early in 17S3, and the Nguyen forces were defeated with
frightful losses. Prince Man was killed, Nguyen Anh again got away
to the island of Pliu-quoc, but his hiding-pbee was discovered, and he
only ju3t managed to escape the pursuing forces and take refuge on the
island of Koh-rong in the Bay of Kompongsom. Again bis sanctuary
was discovered. Fortune, however, still favoured him, for w'hcn his
island was completely encircled by the Tay-son fleet a typhoon
suddenly blew up, and in the darkness and confusion he got away to
another island.

Pigneau fled hr^t of ail to his seminary, but the approach of rebel
forces caused him to take refuge in Siam. He arrived at Chmntabun
in August (783^ and almost immediately afterwards received an
invitation to rejoin Ngujen Anh. I'he Annamitc Chrunicle says that
they had an intemew, at which the prince asked the bishop to obtain
French help to enable him to crush the Tay-son[ whereupon the
bishop asked for a pledge and the prince gave him his son Canh, who
was just four years old. The real story% how ever, is not so simple, and
the details are difficult to piece together, for Pigneau had to observe
the greatest discretion in the matter. As a missionary be was expected
to avoid any participation; in the politics of the country^ to which he
was posted, and there were already those who were eaLpressing dis-
satisfaccion with his conduct. Moreover, before anything was decided,
Nguyen Anh went early in 1784 to seek Siamese aid. Siam was
favourable and provided a contingent with which he returned 10 the
contest. His campaign, however^ failed, and he turned again to I he
the question of French aid. The upshot was that in December 17S4
Pigneau and i’rince Canh left the Nguyen headquarters on Pulo
Panjang on the first stage of a journey that was to take them ultimately
to Versailles. Soon afterw*ards, in April 1785, Nguyen Anh and has
suite left Pulo Panjang in five junks for Siam. His object seems to
have been to await there the results of Pigneau's mission.

Psgncau and his young protege arrived at Pandieherry in February

CR. AXNAM AND TON^rKIND^ 16^0™ 1 8^0 369

17S5 to find Coutcnceau des Algmms, the acting governor, uncom¬
promisingly hostile to iiitm^ention in Cochin China, *coinme elant
contraire aux interets de la nation^ a la s^aine politiquCt difficile et
tr^ mutile^ In any case PandJcherry could take no such action
out instructions from home. Pigneau therefore asked for a passage
to France, and after a long delay Governor de Cossigny granted his
request. In July 1786 he and Prince Canh left Pondicherry on board
the merchantman Malabar.

Their arrival in France in February 17S7 caused no little excitement
in the salons of Paris and Versailles. The world of fashion made: a
pet of the young prince. Pigneaii was received by Louis XVI and
submitted to the ministers his plan for an expedition to establish
Nguyen Anh on the throne of Annam^ It was turned down, chiefly on
the score of expense. France was tottering on the brink of the national
bankruptcy w'bich was to bring on the Revolution. But the project
w as seized on by a number of important people^ at the head of whom
was Pierre Poivre, who had been to Hue in 1749 and bad had a long
connection with Far Eastern affairs. Even with his enthusiastic ^
support, however^ Pigneau could obtain no more than paper promises.
On 28 November 17S7, in the name of Nguyen Anh, he concluded a
treaty of alJiance betw'ccn France and Cochin China. Ships, men and
arms Were promised. In relum France was to receive Pulo Condore
and territory in the Bay of Tpurane. ff French aid was vital to Nguyen
Anh, then his one ray of hope was the nomination of Pigneau de
Behaine as French Commtsaioner in Indo-China.

In December 17S7 Pigneau and his charge left for PondieherryH
'Phey arrived there in May of the following yean Again there tvas a
long hold-up. De Conway^ the governor, would not afford any help
and raised every possible obstacle to prevent the indomitable bishop
from collecting munitions and volunteers for the enteq>rise. But
with money he had raised in France from various sources, and help
received in Pondichenyt he managed to despatch four shiploads of
stores and several hundreds of volunteers. They arrived in September
tySS at an opportune moment, when Nguyen Anh had at long last
recaptured Saigon and needed to consolidate his position. The help
thus afforded turned the scale in his favour.

After Nguyen Anh went to Siam in April 17S5 important develop¬
ments had taken place in the Vietnam Iaiici$- Having made themselves
masters of Cochin China, the Tay-son brothers turned their attention,
to Mud* which had been in Tongkingese hands for a good number of
years. In July 17S6 they took the city. Their success emboldened

THE EARlJEft PHASE OF EUROPEAN FJtPANSION

PT. II

^70

them to strike north weirds against 'rongking itself^ where the Trinh
stiU held sway aitd eontrolkd the puppet Le emperor With remark¬
able speed they occupied Quang-tri and Qviang-binh^ defeated the
army sent against them by Trinh Khai, and seized HanoL They then
set about partitioning the empire^ Van-Hue taking l-ongking and
upper Annam, Van-Nhac the centre with Hue as bis capitalp and Van-
Lu Cochin China. Actually the l^rinh were not yet disposed of, and
the ww against them continued until late in 17SS. When at last all
opposition was stamped out, Van-Hui proclaimed himself emperor at
Hanoi, and the last roi-fmnrani, Le Man Hoang De, escaped to China.

Nguyen Anh remained in Siam until August 17S7. With a con¬
tingent of Annamite troops he sensed wiih distmedon in the Siainese
war against Bodawpaya of Burma. When the Tay-son brothers
embarked on their campaigns to gdn possession of Tongking their
garrison in Cochin Chinn was weakened by the withdrawal of troops
from Gia-dinh. King Rama I offered Nguyen Anh help to regain the
provincfe. In August 1787 he secretly left Siam for Cochin China. At
first he hoped to detach the Governor of Gia-dinh from the Tay-son
caui^ but the plan failed. Then he seized Mi-tho, which he made his
base of operations, and began to build up his strength for the re¬
conquest of his patrimony^ His early operations were directed agaiust
Saigon. Inhere was much stiff fighdng before the city fell on 7
September 17S8* The timely arrival of the help sent from Pondicherry
by Bigneau dc Behaine enabled him systematically to reduce Cochin
China to obedience. When Pigneau hitusclf arrived, on 24 July 1789,
its conquest had just been completed.

The help afforded by the French volunteers was of immense value
to the Nguyen causes Some of them performed notable scrtdcc in
helping to train and organize the army and navy. Thus Jean Marie
Dayot took command of the navy and welded it into a strong fighting
force, tvhich showed its worth by destroying the Tay-son fleet at
Quinhon in 179^- Olivier du Puymanel took charge of the training of
recruits for the army and of the planning and Construction of forti¬
fications. The * great master" himself became Nguyen Anh^s chief
minister and conducted his foreign correspondence.

For many years, however, the final outcome of the struggle lay in
the balance. Not until 1792 was Nguyen Anh strong enough to
attack the north. In that year Van-Hui, who had secured recognition
□f China as Emperor of Annamp died and was succeeded by his 3011
Uuang-Toan. The greatest obstacle was the fortress of Qui-nhon. Up to
1799 seenfted impregnable, but in that year it capitulated to an army

CH, 2Z

ANNAM ANl> 1620-1820 371

under the canmu^nd of Prince Canfi. Shortly afterwards Pigneau de
Behaine died tliere of dysentery at the age of fifty-eight. By that time
victory was assured^ though much hard fighting still to come.
For the Tay-son recaptured the city, and it did not finally come into
Nguyen hands until 1801, when the la$c great Tay-soti counter¬
attack was broken there.

Thereafter events moved rapidly. In June of that year Hue fell,
and Nguyen Anh was crowned there as King of Annam. He then
addressed himself to the task of overrunning Tongking. On 22 July
1802 Hanoi was taken and the work of conquest tva$ complete. Just
before that final triumph^ on r June 1802* Nguyen Anh proclaimed
himself Emperor of Vietnam at Hue and assumed the title of Gia-
Long. An embassy was despatched to China asking for formal investi¬
ture. This was granted in 1803 by the Emperor Kia-k'ing. He
stipulated that tribute must be sent everj' two years and homage
performed every four years. Phese conditions were faithfully ob¬
served by Gia-Long throughout his reign,

Nguyen Anh had fought almost unceasingly For a quarter of a
century. But the struggle had now raised his family to a position it
had never prev-iously occupied. For by the conquest of Tongldng he
had ^ added the kingdom of the suzerain to die fief of the vassalp and
realized to the full a project that none of his predecessors had wer
dared to contemplate*.^ By the ceremony enacted at Hue on i June
iSo2 he founded the dynasty which has continued to occupy the
throne until today.

The new^ state of Vietnam w^hich thus came into e^tistence coin-
prised three main regions, each with its administrative ht^dquarters.
'Phe old patrimony of the Nguyen formed the central part of the
empire. It comprised nine provinces, five of which were directly
governed by the sovereign. Its capital Hue was also the capital uf the
empire. Tongking. mth the adnunistrative scat of its imperial
governor-general at Bac-thanh. had thirteen provinces, and in the
delta the old officials of the Lc administration were continued in
office. Away in the extreme south Gia-dinhp the administrative centre
of the four provinces of Cochin China, was also the seat of an imperial
governar-gcneral [Tang-tm^i),

Under the emperor the central administration was divided arnong
six ministries I Public Affairs. Finance. Rites, War. Justice, and
Works. Each was under a presidentp assisted by two vice-presidents
and two or three councillors. The heads of the administration together

* MA!.^borip ftp. nt,, pji,

37 ^ earlier phase op expansion PT. 11

formed the or Supreme Cuiincil. A goveriiur-gejiiinil in

charge of a tiumher of provinces was aissisted by a treasurer-general
sjid a Chief of the Judicial Sen'ice. Throughout ihe empire the
provinces were ctassilied into tran, i.e* first class, and difih, i,e. second
class. They were divided into phu (prefectures) under tri-phu, and
these in turn subdivided into /myen and i:hau. These last two have
been described by French adxniniatrators as roughly equivalent to the
aTTondiii^ttient and commune respectively.

The task of re-establishing settled administration after so long a
period of civil war was an immense one, but like Henry Vll of
England Gia-Long was no innovator* He used the old familiar ad¬
ministrative framework arid methods that were hailotved by long
tradition* Tn such a society once disorder was stamped out the power
of self-adjustment was considerable^ but the supreme authority had to
be c%'er on the alert to see that the proper persons performed their
functions in the proper manner, llie confusion which reigned every¬
where has been vividly described by Mavbon, "The w^hcels of
^ adnunistration were warped or no longer existed; the cadres of
officials were empty, the hiemrehy destroyed- taxes were not being
co-llectcd, Ibts of communal property had disappeared, propri-
clary titles tvere lost, fields abandoned; roads^ bridges and public
granaries had not been maintained; work in the mines had ceased,
'l-he administration of justice had been interrupted, every province
was a prey to pirates, violation of law went unpunished, while even
the law'^ itself had become uncertain/^

With so complicated a task of reconstruction on his hands h is not
surprising that Cia-Long should have sought peaceable relations
with his neigbours. Perhaps his biggest external problem w*as Cam¬
bodia. Bereft of her former provinceSj through Annamiic conquest
and colonization, in what had come to be knotvn to Europeans as
Cochin China, she was only a pale shadow of her former self, and since
the middle of the seventeenth century had recognized the overlordship
of the Nguyen of Hue. Early in the eighteenth centuty Skm had
begun to compete with Hu^ for control over her, while both sides
were constantly looking for opportunities to filch slices of her territory-
'Prue, Siam*® ambitions of eastward expansion had been brought to a
temporary halt by the Burmese destruction of Ayut^ia in 1767. But her
rapid revival under P’ya Taksin had brought her back into Cambodia
just at the moment when Nguyen inffuence there was paralysed by the
Tay-son rebelUon^

CH. 2^ ANTJAM AND TONCKING, l 6 llO-lSzO 373

The eclip&e of N^yen power seemed to offer Siam a wonderful
oppoHunity to work her wilJ in Cambodia; but things did not go a$
welJ for her as might have been expected. Nguyen Anh's survival,
and his tempurary reoecupation of Saigon in 1777^ enabled the
mandarin Mu of Bassac to replace the Siamese puppet Ang Nhon by his
nephew Ang Eng- And P'ya "["aksin"& attempt at intervention against
this arrangement was frustrated by the rev^olution w^hich caused hia
death and the accession of General Chakn to the Siamese throne.
Still, at almost the s^me time as Nguyen Anh lost Saigon the youthful
Ang Eng*$ supporters lost control over the situation and Cambodia
fell a prey to disorder. Then^ while Siam was prevented from inter¬
vening by Kii^g Bodawpaya^s revival of the Burmese efforts to conquer
her, the Tay-son sebed the opportunity to invade and occupy a large
part of the ctiuch-sinned-against land-

This latest development played into the hands of Siam. The boy^
king Ang Eng, who had been placed on the throne by the pro-
Nguyen faetinn, was now removed to Bangkok for safety and grew
to manhood at the Court of Siam. In 1794 he was crowded at Bangkok *
and sent back to his own country vvith the support of a Siamese army
under the command of the mandarin Ben, Governor of Battambaug,
previously a Cambodian province^ which now, together with the
neighbouring province of Siemreap, once the h^irt of the empire of
Angkor, came under Siamese rule.

In 1796 Ang Eng died, leaving a young son, Ang Chan, who had
been bom in 1791. No successor^ however, was appointed to the
throne until r8oa, the year in which Gia-Long completed the unifica¬
tion of the Vietnam lands. T hen the cieven-v^ear^old boy was granted
formal Investiture by Siam, presumably in order to steal a march
upon Hue.

The new’ situation in Vietnam could not fail to have its effects
upon Cambodia. The young king's advisers were naturally most
anxious to prevent their country from again becoming a battleground
betw^een Siam and Vietnam. l^hcy therefore did their utm{:»st to
remain on good terms with both, and in the characteristic fashion of
small states in that region paid tribute and homage to both. In 1803
Gia-I^ng received at Hanoi a complimentary mission from Cambodia
and sent presents in return. l\vo year^ bter Ang Chan asked to be
permitted to pay homage annually to the sovereign of Vietnam, and
his request was granted.

In i8ob he went to Bangkok for hia coronation. This did not
prevent him from sending a mission to Hue in the following year

TJH! EARUFK PHASE OF EURDPEAH EXPANSION

FT. tt

374

bearing tribute and requesting investiture as a vassal of Gja*lj>ng.
The empemr at once responded by sending him an embassy baring
the bcMk of investiture together with a seal of gilded silver surmounted
by a lion. This evoked a further mission in 1808 from Cambodia
with thanks for the investiture thus accorded. Hardly a year went by
without a mission between the two Courts. So things might have
continued had it not been for the inevitable family squabble
which offered the ever-watchful Siam the longed-for opportunity to
intervene,

Ang Chan’s brother .Ang Snguon wanted to be nominated Second
King and receive part of the kingdom. When this was refused he
rebelled in iSta, and Rama U of Siam sent an army to support him.
Ang Chan thereupon fled to Saigon. In the following year Gia-Ijjng
sent so large a force to reinstate him that the Siamese prudently
retired, taking .Ang Snguon with them. He settled in Siam and died
there in 1822. As a guarantee against further disturbances aVietnamese
garrison was installed in the citadel at Phnom Penh.

Neither side allowed this incident to affect the strictly correct
diplomatic relations they had maintained with each other from the
moment when, having obtained possession of 'Jongking, Gia-IiOng
sent a mission in j8o 2 to announce the fact to Bangkok. A Siamese
mission was at once despatched to offer him formal congratulations,
and thereafter frequent embassies were exchanged throughout the
rest of his reign. Relations were never cordial, for Siam never
abandoned her hope of regaining control over Cambodia. But she
would not risk a clash with a monarch who had given such ample
demonstration of his ability to wage war.

Of the French volunteers who had given such valuable assistance
to Nguyen .Anh in his long struggle, four only remained in his service
after 1802. They were Philippe Vannier, Jean-Baptistc Chaigneau,
dc FoTsans, and the doctor Dcspku. All were given high rank as
mandarins and special privileges. The Treaty of Amiens was signed
in the year in which Nguyen Anh became the Emperor Gia-Long,
and Napoleon Bonaparte was urged by the now aged Charpentier de
Cossigny, once commandant at Pondicherry, to re-establish diplo¬
matic rclatiomi with Cochin China. TJltk came of the move, since
the resumption of the European war and the activities of the British
navy prevented l-’rance from doing anything effective in so distant a
quarter of the globe,

.After the downfall of Napoleon, however, Louis XVIH’s minister
the Due dc Richelieu was anxious to revive French commerce in the

Clf* 22

ANN AM AND TONGSLlNG, 1630-1820 375

China Sea, and in 1817 French merchantmen ha^d on Bordeau^x
began to trade with the ports of Vietnam. On one of the m Chaign^u
returned to France to diaeim with RichelJeu propoeala for opening
official relations with \^ctnairu Richelieu conferr^ on him the title
of consul and empowered him to negotiate a commercial treaty*
When, however, he arrived back in he learni that Gia-Long had
died in February 1820. Minh^Mang, hi$ son and successor, held a
very different view of Europeans from his father^s^ Hence the pro¬
jected treaty never materialised. In 1825 Chaigneau and Vannier,
the last of Pigneau de Behaine’s volunteers, left Vietnam to end their
days in France.

CHAPTER 23

THE KINGDOM OF LAOS, 1591-1836

While the empire built up by Bzyinnauug’s military prowess was in
a state of disintegration and his son Nanda Bayin was deeply involved
in his struggle with Naresuen of Ayut’ia^ the kingdom of Laos, far
away on the upper Mekong, had regained its independence under
Nokeo Koumanc. He was proclaimed king at Vientiane in 1591, and
in the following year his forces overcame the resistance of Luang
Frabang and reunited the realm. The little state of 'Fran Ninh also,
with its capital Chieng Khouang close to the Plain of Jars, recognized
the revived strength of the Laos kingdom by sending the traditional
1 tokens of allegiance. Incidentally, sandwiched as it was between two
states more powerful than itself, Laos and Annam, it paid tribute to
both. It is perhaps significant that while its acknowledgement of the
suzerainty of Vientiane was accorded every three years, Annam received
it annually.

Nokto Koumane reigned for only five years. His successor was
3 cousin by marriage, Vongsa, who took the title of T’ammikarat and
reigned until 1622. His reign had an unhappy end, Hw son Oupa-
gnouvaral became bo popular and began to assume so much control
over the government that his jealous father drove him into rebellion.
The army supported the young prince, who overcame his father and
put him to death. A year later he himself disappeared and the country
w'as plunged into a series of dynastic struggles lasting until 1A37.
During this period five kings reigned, but the dynastic annals arc so
obscure that little is known of (hem.

The competition for the throne reached its clima.x in 1637, when
Kouligna-Vongsa, one of five warring claimants, defeated his rivals
and seized power. He proved himself the strong man that the faction-
torn country needed. During his long reign of fifly^five years not only
was internai peace restored but excellent relations were cultivated with
all the neighbouring states. His firm and just rule gave his kingdom
a reputation for strength which was sufficient to deter any would-be
aggressor from risking an attack upon it. Ht was thus able to negotiate

' Huprit, dwpv 13, b.

37b

CH. S3 THR KINGDOM OF LAOS, 1591^1836 377

a series of agreements with his aeigbbours b>' which the frontieni of
his kingdom were exactly defined .

A rivid account of a visit to Vientiane during his reign has come to
us from the pen of the Dutchman van Wuysthofp who went there in
1641 from the Dutch factory at Phnom Penh with two ^sistants.
Govern or- General van Diemen at Batav^ia was arucious to tap the
resources of the 'land of gumlac and benaoin'. The difficult and
dangerous journey up the Mekong took from 20 July to 3 November.
The merchants wTre w^*Il received by the king at the That-Luong
Pagoda and treated to a gala exhibition of dancing, jousting and boat-
racing which delighted them. The delivery of huge supplies of gumlac
and lienzoin was promised. Van Wuysthofp profoundly impressed,
departed on 24 December, leaving his t^vo assistants to follow' later
with a Laos envoy and presents for van Diemen.

In \iew of the briefness of his stay it is difficult to know^ how much
value to attach to his statements about Laotian affairs, particularly
since his account of Souligna-Vongsa's accession is at complete
variance with the information given in the indigenous records, *
Regarding the government of the country, he mentions three great
ministers as sharing the highest authorit}' with the king, 'Phe hrst
was commander-in-chief of the army and commandant of the city
of Vientiane. A' an Wuysthof calls him * Tevinia-x^ssen \ which seems
to indicate Tian-'F^ala, the king's son-in-law, tvho was indeed the
chief ministern The second was the governor of Nakhone and was
viceroy over the southern part of the kingdom stretching down to the
Cambodian frontier. The third was the minister of the palace who
dealt iivith foreign envoys. I’herc was also a supreme tribunal, com¬
posed of five members of the royal family, which dealt w'ith civil and
criminal matters.

Van Wuyathof vvas the first European ever to visit Vientiane. His
notions of the geography of the kingdom were inaccurate and his
ignorance of Buddhism profound; but his journal seems to paint a
faithful picture of the prosperity of the kingdom as well as of tlie
number and beauty of its pagodas and other religious buildings. It
appears as a Buddhist arcadia, attracting pilgrims from far and
wide, ^

One other Euitipeani the Piedmontese Jesuit Father Giovanni-
Maria I^cria^ arrived in Vientiane in the year after van Wuysthof’s
visit. He tried without success to obtain permission to open a Christian,
mission in the country. Against the stiff opposition of the Buddhist
clergy he managed lo stay there for five years. liis memoirs were used

37® the EARLrER PHASE OF EtfROPEAN EXPAKSION FT. 11

by another Jesuit, Father Merifii. as the basis for his Relatim nwvellr
ct curiiust Jts myaumes de TQinpiin et d& Laos^ published in, Paris in
1666, Nothing came of tbi$ andden intrusion by Europeans into the
unknown regions of the upper Mekong. The river itself, with its
rapids, narrows and shifting sandbanksp was a sufficient deterrent
to the eslablbhinent of European trade, and BuddhL&m to the pene¬
tration of Christian missions. Not until 1861^ apparently, was the
next European prospector, Henri Mouhot, to set foot in the secluded
kingdom, and he travelled to Luang Prabang by bullock-waggon.

Only one war disturbed the profound peace maintained by the
firm hand of Souligna-Vongsa. In 1651 the King of Tran Ninh
refused his requ-^ for the hand of his daughter Nang Ken Chan in
marriage* After the request had been made several times with the
same result Souligna-Vongsa sent a detachment of troops, but it was
repulsed. Hence in 1652 a stronger expedition was sent, which
captured the capital, ChJeng Khouatig, and compelled the king to
yield* This unhappy incident caused a long and dlsEstrous feud betw^cen
■ the two states which lasted mto the nineteenth century* Apart from
this the reign of the greatest of the Laotian sovereigits was mainly
distinguished by notable achievements in the traditional culture of the
country. Music, architecture, sculpture, painting, gold and silver
work, basket work and weaving all Rourisked.

But even a king such as Souligna-Von^ could not ensure the
continuance of stability after his death. Hia only son, the crowTi
prince, $ediiced the wife of the chief of the corps of royal pages, a
crime pujushable by death. When tht royal tribunal condemned the
young man to death his father refused to interfere with the course of
justice, ■'fhe result was that when the king himself died in 1694 his
direct heire, his grandsons King-Kitsarat and Int^a-Som, w^ere too
young to rule, and the aged chief minister TJan-*r^a1a seized the throne.
Sisc years later, in 1700* he was dethroned and murdered by Nan-
T*arat, the Governor of Nakhone, who himself became king.

News of this coup reached the ears of a prince of the royal house
who had spent the whole of hia life as an exile at Bui, and since 1696
had been agitating for Vietnamese aid for an invasion of the Laos
kingdom* He was Sai-Ong-Hue, the son of Souligna-Vongsa^s eldest
brother Som-P*ou, who had been defeated in the struggle for the
throne in 1637- In 1700 with a Vietnamese force, and strongly re¬
inforced by partisans collected at Tran Ninh, he swooped down on
Vientiane, captured the city, put to death the usurper Nan-T'sirat,
and proclaimed himself king.

^3 THE KJKGnO^r OF LAOS, 159I-IS35 379

When Tian-'r"ala was dethroned in 1700 the twn grandsons of
Souligna-Vong^&a, Kmg-Khsarat and Int"a-Som, had fled to I^uang
Prabang. Sai-Ong-Ifiic^ on gaining the throne from Nan-T^arat^
sent hJs half-brother T'ao-Nong to take possession of Luang Prabang
in his name. The t\m young princes, unable to resist^ thereupon fled
to the Sip-Song‘PanasT where their cousin Rhamone-Noi^ %vho ruled
there, took them into his safe keeping. In 1707 with an anmy of 6,000
men, raised by Khamune-Noi, they drove T^ao-Nong out of Luang
Prabang. King-Ritsarat w'as then proclaimed king and sent an
ultimatum to Sai-Ong-Hue that in future the Laos provinces north
of Chi eng Khane would form a separate independent kingdom. And
Sai-Ong-Huc, preoccupied with the task of making good his rule
over the southern provinces, was in no position to dispute the
arrangement.

The once-powerful kingdom of SouJjgna'Vongsa ms no more.
From 1707 Luang Frabang and Vientiane were the capitals of two
separate and mutually hostile states. Each was decisively weakened
by the fairt that the Other was constantly looking for an opporiunity .
of restoring the former unity, and with this aim w’as seeking the aid
of neighbours such as Burma, Siam or Annam, all of whom at one
time or another during the next century or so adopted expansionist
policies.

Vientiane under Sai-Ong-Hue (^707-35) was in difflculties from
the start. Tran Ninh refused homage. An army was thereupon sent
to occupy Chieng Xhouang. The king fled and his younger brother
was raised to the throne. But as soon as the troops of Vientiane were
recalled the deposed king recovered his throne. He then decided 10
do the politic thing and make formal submission to Sai-Ong-Hue.
With Bassak and the provinces in the far south Sai-Ong-lIuc was
less successfuL Chao-Soi-Sisamout, who ruled there from 1713 to
1747, dose relations, with Siam and Camhodia, and Sai-Ong-
Hue, with his attention fixed upon the dynastic troubled in Luang
Prabang, left him in virtual independence.

In 1735 Sai-Ong-Huc was succeeded peaceably by his son Ong-
Ixmg. FI is reign of twenty-five year^ saw^ great convulsions in Burma,
Siam and Luang Frabang, but he managed to pursue a polig,y of
^safety first^ with success. When Alaungpaya, the Burmese con¬
queror, having crushed the independent Alon kingdom of Pegu, struck
eastwards in an attempt to revive the policy of Bavinnaung, Ong-Long
saved his kingdom from invasion by assisting the Burmcsi: expedition
which brought Luang Prabang to its knees.

380 Till EAFLiER PKME Of EUROPEAN EXPANSION FT. 11

He had trouble, however, with Tran bfinh- It was the old story
of a refusal of tribute followed by an invasion by the army of Vientiane.
This time, however, Atmam intcr%^ened to order the disputants to
cease fighting. Ong-Long therefore withdrew his forces and invited
King Chom-P'ou of I'ran Ninh to negotiate, Chom-P'ou^ suspecting
a trap, waited three years before going to meet his overlord* When
he did at last go he was kidnapped and kept a pri$onef at Vientiane.
Again in 1760 Annam inten'ened; Ong-Long was ordered to liberate
his prisoner, and did so. For the rest of hia reign Chom-P'ou paid
his tribute regularly and went personally every third year to render
homage.

Ong-I-ong died just before the Burmese raised the siege of Ayut'ia
owing to Ataungpaya's fatal wound. His son Ong-Boun eantinued
his father's policj^ of supporting Burma. At first all went well. King
nstnbyushin crushed the attempt of Luang Prabang to rebel and in
1767 destroyed Ayut^ia^ But his own kingdom was invaded by the
Chinee, and he lost his hold not only on Siam hut also on Chiengmai
and Luang Prabang, Vientiane was now in dire peril. In 1771 she
attacked by Luang Prabang* Luckily for her Hsinbyushin had by
this time disposed of the Chinese invadm by the Peace of Kaungton
(1770] and was able to send a strong foroe which defeated Luang
Prabang*

But P^ya Taksin^s movement to restore the power of Siam and drive
the Burmese out of the Laos states met with increasing success,
notwithstanding the efforts of Hsinbyushin to recover the ground lost
during his struggle ivith the Chinese. When* therefore, in 1774
Int'^a-Som of Luang Prabang allied with P'yaTaksin, Vientiane's only
safe course would have been to have abandoned her Burmese alliance
and to have made terms with Slam. Ong-Bounp howeverp chose the
foolish alternative of dcfiancCt and in consequence lost everything.
In 177S Siam seized on a convenient preiext to invade Vientiane.
After a few tnonths" siege General Chulalok captured the city and
proceeded to place the country under military occupation. Ong-
Boun escaped and made his way into exile.

In 1707^ when T'ao-Nong, Sai-Ong-Hui's half-^brother, had been
driven out of Luang Prabang by Klng-Kimrat and lnt*a-Som, he had
carrEcd away with him to Vientiane the famous Prabang image* 'the
Emerald Buddha\ carved from green jasper^ after which the city had
taken its name. Now in 1778 General Chulalok carried it off to the
Siamese capital. In due course* when the old royal palace built
ai Bangkokp its pr^ent temple was constructed for it in the palace

CH. 23 THE KrN(£!)0^f OP LAOii^ 1591-1836 3S1

precinqrt^. That W£k$ not the only loot taken from the ravaged
city. According to Wood,* the Siamese on this occasion rivalled the
Burmese in' frightfulness

In 1782^ when Taksin disappeared from the scene and General
Chakri seized the throne of Siam, the fugitive Ong-Boun made
formal submission. He was then permitted to return to Vientiane^ and
his eldest son Chao^Nan w^as invested with the government of the
kingdom as the vassal of Siam. In 1791 dynastic troubles in Luang
Prabang tempted the young man to interferCp He won a brilliant
success, took the city by assault, and annexed the Houa P’an cantons^
His overlord Rama however^ highly disapproved of his conduct.
On his return homep therefore, he was deposed and replaced by his
younger brother Chao-In (1792-1805).

Chao-in remained throughout his reign a loyal vassal. He assisted
the Siamese to expel the Burmese from Chiengsenp His brother, the
Oupahat Chao-. 4 nou, distinguished himself in the fighting and re¬
ceived the congratulations of the Court of Bangkok. When, therefore^
Chaoln died in 1805, Chao-Anou w'as at once recognized as king by
Siam^

Chao-Anou w'ss a man of outstanding ability, but his vaulting
ambition brought to his country the worst disaster of its whole history.
The military prowess he had displayed in Chiengsen endeared him to
the Siamese, but his great aim was to free his country from subordin¬
ation to Bangkok. For many years he cleverly concealed this while he
strengthened his position and beautified his capital, in 1819 he put
dow^n a revolt of the Khas in the Bassac region and obtained for hia son
Chao-Ngo the governorship of the pjroviq.ee. He then instigated Chao-
Ngo to fortify Ubon under the pretext that it %vas a measure designed
for the defence of Siam. He sent tokens of allegiance to the Emperor
Gia-Long of Annam, and in 1S20 offered Luang Prabang a secret
alliance against Siam. At his splendid new temple of Sisaket, founded
in 1824+ he held twice a year a grand assembly of all his feudatories
to pay him homage.

In TS25 he journeyed to Bangkok to attend the funera] rites of Rama
II. There he made a formal request for the repatriation of the Laos
families deported to Siam during the struggles of the previous century*
The refusal of so unreasonable a request was a foregone conclusion;
it was made merely for the sake of obtaining a useful pretext for the
highly dangerous step of renouncing his allegiance to his overlord.
In the following year Captain Henry Burney w'ent to Bangkok to

^ Hutory of SuitUf

gattju'av asd cmr ‘waix. at itxinAt

negotiate a treaty. While he was there an entirely baseless rumour
reached Vientiane that the negotiations had broken down and a
British Beet was about to threaten Bangkok. Anou at onoo decided
ihat now was the time to wring Ms independence from Siam at the
point of the atvortl.

His sudden attack caught the Siamese entirely unprepared. Three
armies atmultaneously began a inarch on Bangkok: one under Chao-
Ngo from Ubon^ a second under the Oupahat Tissa from Roi-Etp and
the third under Anou himself from Vientiane, Anou managed to get
as far as Korat by the simple device of proclaiming that he was march¬
ing to assist the King of Siam against a British attack. His advance
guards even threatened Saraburit only three days’ march from the
capital.

Bi^t the Siamese resistance soon began to stiBen and his donkey
gallop was over. Ilia advanced guards were driven back to Korat, and
the Siamese used the breathing space thus acquired to raise a large
army^ which was placed under the comtuarid of General P*ya Bodin.
When this force advanced on Kotat it met with no resistance: Anou
was found to be in full retreat northwards. His decision seems to

CH. 23

THE KINGDOM OF LAOS, I59I-1836 jSj

have been iakL>n as a result of the suprtse and defeat of one of his
marauding detachments by a small Siamese force in the Samrit plain.

P'ya Bodin^ with the imtiaUve in his hands, eaxfied out a ^stematic
campaign which involved first the stoiming of Ubon and the capture
of Chao-Ngo+ and finally in 1S27 the decisive battle of Nong-Boua-
Lampoon, where, after a desperate fight tasting seven days, the
Siamese army forced the orossing of the Mekong. That wq$ the end
of the struggle* Anou fled into the dense jungles, sending out vam
appeals for help to ChieDgmai, Luang Frabang amd Chieng Khouang.
The Siamese made a complete holocaust of \^entiane. They then pro¬
ceeded methodically to devastate the whole kingdom, driving otf the
population to repeople areas of their own country similarly treated by
the Burmese in the preceding period.

That was the end of the kingdom of \^entiiine. Tn 1828 Anou,
chased acro^ the Annamite Chain by the Siamese, appeared at Mue,
and the Emperor Minh-Mang promised to help him regain his king¬
dom. But most of the troops with which he set out on his return journey
deserted on the way. And as soon as be arrived in his ruined t^pital .
the approach of a Siamese force caused him once more to betake
himself to flighty this time into the territory of Tran Ninh. King Chao-
Noi therefore had ro choose between offending either Siam or Annam;
and since Siamese forces were actually threatening bis country, and he
himself had Inheiited the traditionaJ hatred of his family for the rulers
of Vientiane, he captured the fugitive and handed him over to
Siam.

Anou died in Bangkok in 1835 after fouryearH^ captivity. Pallegoix
says that he was exposed in an iron cage and eventually died of the
ill-treatment he received. But there are other conflicting stories, and
the matter remaina an unsolved niy$tcry* On Chao-Noi of Chieng
Khouang the vengeance of Annam fell speedily and relentlessly.
Summoned to Hu^ to explain his conduct, he sought to appease the
anger of Mtnh-Mang by sending an envoy with rich presents. But it
was to no avail. A Vietnamese force seked him and took him off to
Hue, where he was publicly excjcuted. His kingdom, Tran Ninh,
became a prefecture of the empire of Annam.

The story of the Luang Prabang kingdom from 1707 ontvard| may
be more briefly told. Its early yeans were troubied by dynastic squab-
blcs, through the attempts of Int'a-Som to oust from the throne first
his brother King-Kiti^arat (1707--36) and then his cousin Khamone^
Noi (1726-7), Khamone-Noi, an Interesting personality whose ad¬
venturous wanderinp are stiil the subject of much story-telling, had a

384 the haulier OF EUBOPEAN EXPANSION PT. U

passion for hunting. During one of his absences on a hunting ex¬
pedition Int'a-Som^ whom he had carelessly allowed to live in com¬
plete freedom at the capital, notwithstanding one attempt already to
seize the throne, staged a palace revolution and made himself king.
Khamone-Noi^ on learning what happened, went off to seek his
fortune in ChiengmaJi which ten years earlier had rebelled against
Burman There he ginned control over the kingdonin routed a Bur¬
mese army sent agaimt him in 1728^ and was crowned as king.

Int'a-Som had a long reign which lasted until 1776, Internally ii
was one of complete tranquillity. Externally. however^ he was faced
by serious dangers. His isolation led him to enter into diplomatic
relations w'ith China. 7 'he ehronicli^ of his reign attach much import¬
ance to the two embassies he sent to Peking in 1729 and 1734. In
1750 Annam claimed tributCt and when it was refused sent a detach¬
ment of troops to collect it. These, how ever^ were driven out of the
countrVi and there the matter ended. Intertial troubles in .Annam,
caused by the fact that the kings of the Le dynasty had lost all control
. over affairs of states have been taken to account for this display of
weakness.

But the greatest danger came from the revival of the Burmese power
under Akungpaya (1752-60) and his successors, Luang Prabang, as
tve have seen, was reduced to submission in 1753 and had to furnish
a large body of hostages, including Int'a-Som^s son Tiao-Vong. When
Alaungpaya died Int'a-Som attempted unsuccessfully to regain his
independence^ But the Chinese invasions of Burma and P"ya Taksin^s
victories in Siam brought a more favourable situation^ and he not only
renounced Burmese overlordship but in 1771 ventured to attack Vien¬
tiane^ Burma^s ally* A Burmese force defeated him at rhe batiEe of
Muong Kassy and relieved the beleaguered city, but returned home
without doing anything towards restoring Burmese suzerainty over
I>uang Prabang.

Int'a-Som was therefore emboldened to throw in his lot with P'ya
Taksin, and in 1774 entered into a defensive alliance with him against
the Burmese, lie had unwittingly taken a step too far, for when in
1778 the Siamese captured Vientiane and wiped out ils independence
they ^demanded of his son Sotika-Koumane (1776-81) the acceptance
of conditions such as reduced Luang Prabang also to a position of
dependence*

In 1781 Sotika-Koumane's younger brother, Tiao-Vong, forced him
to abdicate in his favour. Six years later the new king died prematurely
without issue, and for four years the country was distracted by a

CH. 23 KtNC£X>M OF LA0S» 1591-1836 385

succe^ion struggle between the remaining brtjthers. ThiS^ as we have
seen above, tempted ChaO'^Nan of Vientiane to intervene. One of the
squabbling brothenj, .Vnourout, Int'a-Som's second son^ organized the
resistance to the invader, but failed to save the city. On its fall he
escaped to Bangkok^ where for wo years (1791-j) he hved as a state
prisoner

Meanwhile King Chao-Nan, having carried out a large-scale
massacre in Luang Prabangp deported many households of people and
feturned home. He would have pushed hfs conquest farther, but
feared to incur the wrath of his suzerain. By attacking at all, however,
he had gone too far, and in consequence was deposed and ordered to
live in Bangkok- Shortly after his arrival there the fugitive Anoiiraut
was released at the request of imperial China and returned to rule
over Luang Prabaog. There he busied himself with repairing the
mins of the city and carrying out works of Buddhist merit. In 1S17
he abdicated in favour of his son Mant'a-T'ourat,

The new king, who was no longer young, having been horn in 1775,
was content to follow^ in his father's footsteps and reign quietly. He ^
was far too cautious to be drawn into the anti-Siamese alliance pro¬
posed by Anou of Vientiane. The Siamese triumph over Anou* hotv-
ever, and the downfall of Vientiane caused him to atlempt some re¬
direction of his policy. Hence in 1S31, and again in 1S33, he sent
missions to Hue offering the homage and traditional tribute of gold
and silver flowers which hia grandfather had so brusquely refused in

1750^

But it was to no purpose* The Siamese yoke was firmly fixed on
his shoulders, and Minh-Mang of Hue discreetly pigeonholed the
letters borne by hU envoys. Years later, however, they were a god¬
send to the French when they were seeking a pretext to extend their
control from Annam to the Laos lands across the Mekong,

When Mant^a-T’ourat died in 1836 a Siamese mimster attended his
cremation and publicly proclaimed Siam's rights of sovereignly. His
son and designaied successor, Souka-Seum, then living as a
hoatage at Bangkok. I-Ie was stgaificandy kept waiting three years
before receidng official investiture from the King of Siam and per¬
mission to return to his countryH

CllAFTER 24

SIAM FROM 168S TO 1851

P^RA P^ETRAJA^ the usurpcf who saved his ciQuntry fr^m French
dominatian, had a troubled reign of fifteen years.^ There were con¬
stant internal disorders and various parts of the kingdom were in¬
volved. They began with a dangeroos attempt in 1690 by an impostor,
pretending to be a brother of King Naraip to scixe AyTit^ian He gained
much support in the districts of Nakhon Nayok, Lopburi and Sara-
buri ■ but during his attack on the city the elephant he was tiding was
shot down and he himself w^ounded and captured. His foltowers then
disper^d. His defeat caused such panic in the rebellious districts that
there was a mass movement from them Into Burma. In the next year
two provincial governors rebelled^ one at Korat in the north and the
other at Nakhon Srit^ammarat in the Malay Peninsula. The Korat
rising w'as dealt with first. After much trouble the dty was subdued
by the novel method of dying kitesp to which flaming torches w^ere
attached^ over it and setting fire to the roofs of the housi^. The
rebel governor escaped and fled to join the Nakhon Srit^ammarat
rebels. These were attacked in 1692^ andp again with much difficulty*
subdued. The Governor of Korat w^as kUled in the early stages of
the fighting- The Governor of Nakhon Srit'ammarat, a Malay and
an old friend of the admiral commanding the royal fleet, w'hen
further resistance became impossible, killed his wife and family and
escaped in a boat with fifty followers by the connivance of hb friend.
The admiral paid for this whh his life, and his head was set over the
city gate.

Korat provided yet another insurrection in 1699^ this lime led by a
magician* who with only twenty-eight followers at first completely
terrorized the governor and people w'ith his magic powers. After some
time he was persuaded to transfer to Lopburi^ whither he went with
a force of about 3p000 men. When threatened by the royal forces they
surrendered their leader and his original twentj'-eight followers and
the movement collapsed^

^ There m $amc conflkt of O^iniofi tbout the date of his death,, which
tv^idan gives u See Wiiod^ 0/ Siami |}. 213^

3B6

CH. 24

SI 4 M FROM 1688 TO 1851 3S7

In 1700 a serious succession dispute broke out in the Laos kingdom
which ultimately led to it^ division into two mutualJy hostile parts
njled respectively by Luang Pm bang and Vien Cbang. 'Fhe Nguyen of
Hue helped one candidate to the throne of Vien Chang on condition
that he should recognize their overlordsbip. According to the Siamese,
they also sent him help, in return for which a princess was presented
and became the tvife of the Oparat.^ From this time onwards Vietnani
and Siam became competitors for the control of the Laos country.

The L'parat^ wrho succeeded his father as king in 17031 is known
to Siamese history aa PVachao SO a, *Kifig Tiger V He was a cruel and
depraved tyrant about Avhose excesses many stories have been pre¬
served, His reign contains nothing worthy of record.

The next reign, that of T*ai Sra (1709-33), P'rachao Sua"s eldest
son, is notable for a big effort to combat the growing influence of Hud
in Cambodia. In 1714 King Prea Srey Tbomea^ called by the Siamt^st:
Sri T^ammaraja, was driven out of his capital by his uncle Keo Fa
with the assbcance of Vietnameae and Laotian troops. l‘he king and
his younger brother fled to Ayutla. In 1715, and again in lyib, ^
Siamese forcK sent to restore them were defeated. In 1717 two large
Siamese expeditionary forces attacked Cambodia. One^ supported by
a large fleet, operated against the coastaJ districts; the other marched
overland against Udong, Keo Fa's capital. The southern force met
with disaster—one of tJie greatest disasters in Siamese history^ says
Wood,® who blames it to the incompetence and cowardice of the com¬
mander, The fleet, he says, fell into a panic owing to the loss of a few
ships and put out to sea, leaving the land force to be mopped up by
the CambodJans. According to the Annamite account, however, the
expedition* after <^pturing Ha-tien^, was destroyed by a storm,^ The
northern force, after defeating the Cambodians in a number of engage-
nients, threatened the capital. Thereupon Keo Fa offered his allegiance
to Siam and w^as left in posgeaaion of the kingdom. Apparently he hoped
in this way to obtain Siamese help against Hu^, Avho$e expansionist
policy at the expense of his country was costing it dear. But Siam
appears to have made no attempt to assist him, and the Nguyen
proceeded to make themselves masters of further Cambodian
provinces. ^

VVhen T^ai Sra died in 1733 a struggle for the throne broke out
between his younger brother, the Uparat, and his second Prince

^ CoiYlfiH.Clt IvC Bouloji^r, Hifioirr du triffn J^Viunfou, pp. 1 and Wood, ^ip. at,,
pp. ail-3.

■ Op. nt.f |>. 128,

■ Maybon, op, p, i^4-

38S THE HAR1.(ER PHASE OF EVJLOVEAS E!£FANSI0K IT^. 11

It was won by the Uparat, who ttiak the titJe of Maha T'amma-
raja 11 . but is usually referred to its King Boroiuokot. He took a fearfuL
revenge on his opponents^ but afterwards ruled so peaceably that lus
reign p which lasted until 17581 is described in the Siamese histories as
a golden age. While he was on the throne dramatic developments
were in progress in Burma. 'Fhe Mon rising of 1740 caused the
Burmese governors of Martaban and Tavoy to flee to Ayut'ia, As a
result friendly relations were established with Ava^ and in 1744, for
the first time in over a century^ a Burmese embassy was deputed to
xAvul^ia. Boromokot had refused to give a daughter in marriage to the
Mon kingp Smim Htaw—-"Saming T^oh* in the Siamese rendering—
and the Buimese hoped for help in subduing the rebels. Rut although
a Siamese return mission went to Ava in 1746, Boromokot mdnuined
strict neutrality. In the following year when ^Saming T'ob' lost his
throne he fled to Chiengmat. There, according to Wood/ he recruited
an army with which he made an unsuccesaful attempt to regain his
throne. Then in 1750 he made his way to Ayul'ia. But Boromokot
.would not help him and eventually put him on a Chinese junk bound
for China. He landed on the coast of Annam and made bis way back
to Chiengmai. In 1756 with a small band of supporters he offered his
services to Alaungpaya, vvho put him into safe custody until his death
isvo years later.

Boromokot was a peace-loving sovereign and a great patron of
Buddhism^ In 1753 the King of Kandy* invited him to send a depu¬
tation of Buddhist monks to purify Sinhalese Buddhism. A commis¬
sion of fifteen under the leadership of a monk named Upali w^as sent
to Ceylon, 'rhe success of the mission is attested by the fact that I he
sect which it founded, know^n as the Upaliwong or Sayamwong*
became the largest in Ceylon.

Before he died in *75® Boromokot made Itis second son, Prince
Ut'ump’ooT Uparat in preference to the elder one. But the new king
found his position so difficult that he retired to a monastery in favour
of his brother, who ascended the throne as Boromumja (175S-67).
1 le was the last king to reign at Ayut^ia. In the ycEu: after his accession
Alaungpaya invaded Siam and besieged the capital. The ostensible
reason^for the attack was the Siamese refusal to surrender Mon rebels
who had taken refuge in their country^ but AJaungpaya was looking

' op. tit-, ass-

* Kinn KinJ SgI sti baf lie vu i. gnat luppotttr of the rdiKion of hii

kinitdcHii, Finding the Bliddhin hi«nirchy d>«^«it, he tent deputqdonit to both
Burmit w:id Sum oalcinB Tot monhi ihmUKh whom ho VOi^hi itimuUte A jnclipoiu
fcvivjJ.

CH. 24 SIAM FHOM 16S8 TO 1851 jSg

for an excuse to revive the glories of Bayinnaung^s reign. The Siamese
assert that even had the Burmese monarch not been mortally wounded
he would hAve given up the siege^ since he was not prepared for a long
campaign and had decided to mum home before the onset of the wet
monsoon of 1760^ Ilia death merely postponed the nest invasion for
a few years^

As we have seen in a pimTous chapter/ as soon as Hslnhyushin
succeeded Naungdawgyi in 1763 he began to prepare for another
assault upon Ayut^ia. And even before his main army began to
approach its objective by way of Chiengimi^ another force, sent to
capture Mergul and Tenasserim, made such good progress that it
occupied all the Siamese states in the Malay Peninsula and its advance
was only checked at P'ctchaburi by General P'va Taksin/ w'ho was
later to achieve renown as the saviour of Siam. When the full-scale
campaign began^ late in 1765, Siam vvas Invaded by three Burmese
armieSi one from Cbiengmai+ a second by the Three Pagodas route
and the third from tiie south. Gradually they closed in round the
capital. The siege began in February 1766. The onset of the rainy ■
season brought no respite, for the Burmese were well supplied with
boats with which to carry on the fight when the surrounding country
was Hooded. At the end of the rains Burmese reinforcements poured
inp but the Siamesep who were refused an honourable surrender^ held
out desperately until April 1767. Before the end came^ PVa TatsiUp
who had come to loggerheads with the incompetent king, cut his way
out with 500 followers and escaped to Rayong cm the Gulf of Si amp
where he proceeded to raise a new army. The Burmese destroyed
everything they could lay hands on, except whal could be carried
away as plunder. The palace and principal buildings were burnt
along with thousands of private houses. The mined dty was never
rebuilt. When Siam recovered from the disaster a new capital arose
at Bangkok.

VVhert Ayutla fell Burma was already involved in serious trouble
with China. Early in 1768 Ming Jui's invasion threatened Ava and
the situation became critical. Siam was therefore presented with a
wonderful opportunity for recovery, provided the right leader was
available. During the final assault on the city King Boromor^ had
disappeared and was never heard of again.

Several members of the royal family had survived the disaster, but
there was no P'ra Naret among them. It waa P^ya Taksin. who, thcugli

' Chofi. SI.

* Called * Tfilc" bv the Burmejje.

390 THE PHASE OF EirROPEAN EXFA^ESION FT. tl

half Chioe^t became the leader of the resistance movement aguinst
Burmese domination. Immediately after the Fall of the city he had
begtin to e?ctend his control over the districts neighbouring Rayong.
In June 1767 he captured Chantabun. Thb success caused thoiisands
of followers to Join him« fn October he sailed up the Menam and
took T^anaburi (Bangkok)i executing the Siamese governor placed over
It by the Burmese- Finally he boldly attacked the camp of the main
Burmese occupation force at Three Bo Trees^ close 10 Ayut^iap and
won a complete victory.

This success led him to assume the royal power. At first hia idea
was to make Ayut^ia his capital, but to do so would have involved
greater resources than he had at his command as yet, Hb coronation,
therefore, was celebrated at T'anaburi- SiaiUj, however, had fallen
apart. The peninsular provinces were under the Governor of Nakhon
SritVmmaiat^ w^ho had proclaimed his independence and assumed the
title of King Atusica. Korat and the eastern provinces were controlled
by a son of King Boromokot* who abo pretended to royal power. So,
* too, did the Governor of P'itsanulok, w^ho called himself King Ruang,
while in the extreme north of his prodnee a Buddhist monk, Ruan,
had ^tablishcd a theocratic state called the kingdom of Fang. More-
over^ at Ratburi on the Mekhlong river the Burmese had a strong force
and a fioet of boats.

When the Chinese retreat from the Ava region began in 176S,
1 bmbyushin ordered the Burmese Governor of Tavoy to link up with
the Ratburi force tn an attack upon Bangkok. The plan failed com¬
pletely j P’^ya Taksin drove out the Governor of Tavoy's force and
captured Ratburi. *I'he whole of the Burmese fleet stationed there fell
into hta hands. He followed up this victory in May 1768 with an
attack on F^itsanulok. This time, however, he was unsuccessful,
'i'hereupon King Ruang staged a formal coronation and declared him¬
self King of Siam. But he died immediately afterwards, and the monk-
king of Fang sd^ed hb territory.

At the do^e of the wet monsoon I'aksin marched into the Korat
region, where Prince T^ep P^ip'it wt^s assisted by a Burmese force.
Here again he won a deebive victory . ITie Burmese commander Avas
killcc^in battle, and the princCi^ while fieeing toAvards Vien Chang, was
captured and executed.

There was still much to he done before Siam was unified, but at
this juncture affairs in Cambodia demanded attention^ A fugitive
king^ Rama T'lbodit better known as Ang Nou, driven out by his
brother Ang Tong Avith the assistance of Cochin-Chinese troops, fled

ItVIMa Of FBfiA AWr'UI

393 the EABLiHIt PIIASR OF iiLtfiOPEAN I^PANSIOS FT, tl

to Baiigkok. P'ya TaJcsin demanded tribute of the usurper* and when
this was refused sent his Korat foree to occupy Siemreap and Batiam-
bang, as a first step towards restoring the eseiled king. He himself was
at the time busy with preparations to reduce King Musica of Nakhon
Srit*ammarat, and hence for the time being had to leave evenu in
Cambodia to take their course- The operations against Nakhon
Srit'aramarat were speedily brought to a successful conclusion, but
when P'ya Taksin returned to his capital in March 1769 his armies
had been defeated and forced to leave Cambodia.

It was useless to attempt at once lo reassert Siamese sus^erainty
there; the Burmese tvere threatening from Chiengmai and the monk-
king of Pang had still to be dealt with. He decided to strike at Chieng-
raai first* But hJs attack failed, and while he was away in the north
Mac ITiien-Tu of Ha-tien attacked Chantabun and Trat in September
1769. An anack of plague in the invading force, however, saved
the situation and enabled P^ya Taksin to regain the initiative* He him¬
self led a large army to punish this incursion* while at the same time
sending an expedition to deal with the monk-king. The cxpcditioii
against P'itsanulok made short work of the kingdom of Fang. *rhc citv
itself was easily occupied, and when the monk-king^a stockaded capital
of Sawangburi was attacked he Sed away to the north and was never
heard of again. P'ya I’aksin's expedition was directed first against
Ha-tien, w bich he took. Then he proceeded up to Phnom Penh, drove
out Ang Tong and replaced him with Ang Non. In 1772, however,
with Vietnamese help Ang 7 'ong defeated the Siamese army and re¬
covered his capital. But, as we have seen above,* he failed to maimain
himself there and the Siamese nominee m 1773 w^as once more in¬
stalled aa king. And before the Nguyen could attempt to reimpose
coutrol over the distracted kingdom they themselves were over¬
whelmed by disaster at home^ Siam, now rapidly regaining its
strengthp remained the controlling power in Cambodia.

As ^on as peace was made with the Chinese in 1770, Hsinbyushin
of Burma had begun to prepare fresh aggressive moves against his
eastern neighbours. In 177x Vien Chang was besieged by the forces of
Luang Prabang and implurcti his help. At the approach of the Bur¬
mese^ army the siege w^as abandoned and a w^ay was thus opened for
further interference in northern Siam. In 1772 and 1773 attempts
were made to capture P'ijai, but Siamese resistanee caused both to fail
completely* The Mon rebell km of 1773 held up the Burmese plans
for a full-scpie invasion of Siam for n time, and P‘ya Taksin used the

* Page 2^1.

S[AM£3£ BHAbOW PUITET

394 E^RLIEH FltASE OF EXPANSrON P*r. 11

breathing-space thus afforded hiiri by marching northwards to deprive
the Burraese of their ChicngnLai base. In January 1775 he took the
dty and immediately hurried south to undertake the defence of the
horn eland ^ V’arious Burmese incursions across the border in pursuit of
Mon fugitives had been repulsed during 1774. In February' 1775 a
new attack was in progress, and a Burmese force had driven back the
Siamese frontier guard to Kanburi and established itself at Ratbun.
P*ya Taksin^s reappearance on the seene^ however, soon restored the
situation. In April he captured Ratbudp taking a large haul of
prisonerap while another Burmese force, which was raiding to the
nortbw'ards, only just made good i ts csrape. Late in the same year the
Burmese, w'ho had made Chiengaen their ba;se after losing Chiengmaip
made an attempt to recover the latter city, but a Siamese relieving
force drove them off.

At the end of the year the long-prepared full-scale invasion began
under Maha Thihathura. In January' 1776 he defeated a large Siamese
army near Sukhot^al and captured the city- He then besieged P'itsa-
^ nulok and beat off P"ya Taksin^s attempts to relieve it. Before its fall
the Siamese cut their way out, and the Burmese, suffering from
shortage of supplies, were soon forced on to the defensive. They had
10 abandon the pkoe and retreat homewards harried by the Siamese,
who inflicted defeat after defeat upon them. The remnant of their
army crossed the border in August 1776. In the previous June Hsin-
byu$hin had died. Hia son Singu, as w^e have seen, w'as opposed to
further adventures in Siam. But before calling a halt to the >var he
made one ftirther attempt to retake Chiengmai. It nearly succeeded;
hut in September 1776 the Siamese drove off the besiegers. By this
time the city w^as so impoverished that its governor and most of its
inhabitants left it and settled at Lampang, It remained practically
deserted for some twenty years,

P^ya Taksin had now^ reunited Slam and driven out the Burmese,
but his reign had been one long uninterrupted series of campaigns,
and the strain began to tell on him* He showed signs of mental dis¬
order* Moat of the victories in the Chiengmai struggle and the
operations against Maha ^lliihathura had been won by Genera!
Chakri, and as the king's insanity developed he became more and more
the director of the national effort. In 1778 an opportunity came tu
assert Siamese overlord^ihip over the two Laos kingdoms of Luang
Prabang and Vicnchang. An Incursion by the latter into Siamese
territory led to its conquest and at the same lime the King of Luang
Prabang was forced to accept Siamese suzerainty.

395

CIl. 24 SJAM FROM 1688 TO 1851

Soon afterwartls the arrangements made by P'ya Tatsin earlier in
his reign for the government of Cambodia broke down and an attempt
was made by the Cochin-Chinese lo regain power by setting up the
infant son of the e:t-king Ang Tong as king. In 1781 a Siamese army
led by GeneraJ ChakH went to restore Siamese snzerainQ^ and place
Prince In P’itok on the throne. Before he could carry out hia nussinn,
however, Chakri had to burry hometvards. A serious rebellion had
broken out at Ayut’ia. The rebels declared their intention to kill the
insane king and" place Chakri on the throne. An ambitious palace
official* P'ya Sank’aburi, had thereupon placed himself at iheir head,
entered Bangkok, taken possession of the king and forced him to
retire to a monastery. His object w^as to take advantage of Chakri‘s
absence to secure his own recognition as king-

Chakri received news of these events from the Governor of Korat,
P^ya Suriya, whom he ordered to repair at once to the capital and
ri^tort order. He himsdf arrived there in April 17S3 to find ihe
rebellion quelled and the would-be king 3 prisoner in PVa Suriya^s
hands. Chakri was at once hailed with joy by the populace and urged
to a^^sume the cro^vn* The chief difficulty lay in the pontiniied existence
of P^ya Takein* The mad monarch was still only forty-eight years old,
and after so glorious a reign might be expected to become a source of
serious internal disturbance. Accordingly in the general gorge of rebel
leaders which ensued the restorer of Siamese independence was him¬
self liquidated and General Chakri was elevated to the throne with
the title of Rama T’ibodi.

King Rama I (1782-18&9) was the founder of the present reigning
dynasty at Bangkok. His reign was to sec another great struggle with
Burma. In the month hefnre he ascended the throne of Siam a palace
revolution at Ava brought to the Burmese throne Bodawpaya, the
ablest of the sons of the great Alaungpaya. A man of boundless
ambition* he aimed at forcing all the neighbouring states to yield to
his stvay, and in 17S5 the wearisome struggle bettveen the two states
broke out once more and was to last for many years. But the Siam of
Rama I*s time was no longer the state that had been reduced to chaos
by Hsinbyushin^s devastating armies. It was a victorious power
governed by a tried leader of men* and the Burmese armies suffered
such disasters that the struggle gradually deteriorated into chronic
frontier raiding. The new King of Siam was too wise and too
Wary to attempt a major invasion of Burma in reply to Bodawpaya^s
disastrous expedition of 17S5. He was anxious to turn his attention
to the consolidation of his kingdom and the reorganissation of its

Thtte RCVAl. lUiJJl'p THMOM CAMHOPIA

adminiatratiDfi. He did indeed seek to rcgaia the TensiSiserim
provinces of Mergui ajid Tav^oy^ upon which his country bad real
claims. But after holding them for a brief period he had Anaiiy to
abandon them to Burma in 179a. And although Cbtengmai and
Kengtung in the north and the island of Puket (Junk CeyJon) in
the south remained bones of contention between the two kingdoms,
such operationa as took place were chiefly of the nature of mids by
local leaders.

Rama 1 was the founder of moderti Bangkok. P’ya Taksin's capital
had been at Dhoaburi^ on the west bank of the river Menam. Rama I
built himself a palace on the opposite side of the river at Bangkok
proper and surrounded it with a double line of fortificationSp and there
under the shelter of the outer the present city began to 11 rise.
Much was done to settle not only the administration of the provinces
but also the development of the central government along traditional
linesT, Long before he died his kingdom had @0 far reccncrcd from the
devastation caused by the Burmese invasions and the subsequent
struggles of I*"ya Taksin to assert his authority that at the beginning
of the nineteenth centun' Siam was more pnwerful than ever before.
And the time was «oon to come whrn she wuuld again pursue an

397

CH, 24 SIAM FROM 16SS TO 185I

irxpaniiiunifiit policy aiming at extending her control over the Laos
kingdoms of Pnibang and Vientiane in the norths the ancient

Khmer kingdom of Cambodia to the east, and the [VI a by states in the
south.

Rama I was offered an opportunity by cbeTay-son rebellion, and the
long eclipse of ihe power of the Nguyen^ 10 strengthen 4Siainese
influence in Cambodia. His early effons were severely hampered by
Rodawpaya*s attacks on his own country. But the pro-Mguyen boy-
king Ang Eng was a refugee at his Court. In 1794 he crow‘ned him
king at Bangkok, and in the following year sent him back to Udong,
the capital of Cambodia, with a Siamese army under the command of
Ben, the pro-Siamese governor of the frontier provinces of Bauam-
bang and Siemreap (Angkor). For some years Siam was undisputed
master of Cambodia. She tesok advantage of her position to gain
control of the three Cambodian provinces to the north of Battambang
— MongkolbaureVt Sisophon, and Korat. She ‘silently" annexed them
in 1795, writes Adhemard Lecl<>re-^ In 1795 also Battambang and
Siemreap (Angkor), under the iiemi-independent Ben, were trans¬
ferred from Cambodia to Siam; presumably they were the price with
which Ang Eng purchased his restoration.

The foundation of the empire of Vietnam by Gia-Long in 1803 gave
Siam once more a competitor for the control of Cambodia. The Cam¬
bodian ministers were resolved to give the Vielnamese no excuse for
turning their country' once more into a battleground. They therefore
sedulously sent homage and tribute to both Bangkok and Hue, and
Rama I wisely accepted this curtailment of his authorityp

'^rhis delicately poised situation lasted only until 1812. In that year
Rama II (1S09-24) intervened in support of a rebel brother of the
then king Ang Chan* who fled to Saigon. A strong Vietnamese force
reinstated him in the following year, and the Siamese pnidently
retired with their candidate, who lived out the rest of his day a at
Bangkok. A Vietnamese garrisun took over the citadel at Phnom
Penh* and for the time being Siamese influence there was in a state of
eclipse. But the Bangkok government remained ever on the alert for
an opportunity to regain control. Meanwhile it compensated itself by
sending an army in 1814 to Korat which proceeded to occupy alHhe
territory between the frontier of the province of Prohm-*rep and the
Dangrek niountainSi and in addition the provinces of Mlou-prey and
"I'onie-Repnu, which were too far distant from Udong to be effectively
under the control of the central government. There was no opposition*

^ C<ti*fbotig£, p. 402.

398 THE RAKUER l>HASE OF EUROPEAN PtPANSJON PT. II

and the Siamese army then proceeded to cross the Mekong and occupy
Stung 'Freng. By this operation Siam gained possession of a thick
slice of territory in the north of Cambodia and drove a wedge between
that kingdom and the kingdom of Vientiancj which a fm' years later
it was to absorb (1S2S).

Save for this Cambodian adventure Rama ITs reign iva^ free from
any major conflict- The Burmese \\^ went on, but it Avas chiefly a
matter of raiding and counter-raiding, and it affected only the iMalay
Pcmnsola- In tSio the Burmese captured the island of Puket {Junk
Ceylon} and besieged Jump'om, but they were expelled without
difficulty. Another Burmese attack was expected in iSi^p but it did
not materiali^. Their main energies w^erc now concentrated upon
gaining control over Assam, and Siam had nothing more to fear from
them.

Onc result of this scare was the deposition of the Sultan of Kedah,
Avho was discovered to have been in correspondence with the Burm^c,
Siam had never forgiven him for having ceded l^enang in 1786 and
Province Wellesley in iSoo to the British- In i8ai Siamese forces
invaded hb state and he fled to Penang. 'Phis was the beginning of a
period of more or less inttnaive Siamese pressure upon the Malay
states w'tiich alarmed the British and resulted in a good deal of activity
on both sides. The story, however, i$ more conveniently dealt with
in connection wntb the history of Malaya.^

Ever since the failure of the attempt of Louis XIV to gain control
over the old kingdom of AyyPia in the seventeenth century the
Siamese had become inordinately suspicious of Europeans, and every
possible restriction waa placed on their trade. During the first half
of the nineteenth century this attitude was firmly maintained. But
one may discern the faint beginnings of change in Rama IPs reign.
In 1818 he received a Portuguese envoy, Carlos Manuel Silveira, and
consented to make a commercial agreement whereby Silveini super¬
vised Portuguese trade in Siam* Wood describes his position as that
of Portuguese consul® but as it was not until the reign of Mongkui
(1851-68J that any appointment of such a sort by a foreign power was
permitted^ the definition cannot be accepted* Moreover, he was given
the Siamese title of ‘luang' and seema to have carried on his work
entirely under Siamese authority. The East India Company was at
the same lime sedting the removal of the restrictions upon die trade
of British subjects in Siam* Tetters to this effect and presents were
sent to Bangkok by the Government of India in 1818 and iStgp but

1 chap. 17, t» * itat^ry qf p. 476,

CH- ^4 51AM FROM i6S8 TO 1851 399

without avail In iSai^ there fore, Governor Phillips of Penang sent a
Singapore merchant named Morgan to Bangkok in a private capacity,
but w-ith the object of collecting information and sounding the Siamese
ministers w'ith regard to the possibiJity of alleviating conditions. But
the Government of India had also decided to move officially tn the
matter^ and in the same year John Cniwfurdj whose mission is dealt
with in a later chapter*^ made his abortive attempt to break the impasse.
Nevertheless British trade did begin to expand. The Siami;^^ like the
Burmese earlier on, were nnwilhng to commit themselves to an agree¬
ment in black and white* but they were willing to permit individual
traders to settle in their country. An English trader, John Hunter,
who took up residence in Siam at this time is said to have been the
first of his kind to live there^

Rama II died in July 1824 shortly after the opening of the fimt
Anglo-Burmese war^ Prince Maha Mongkot* his eldest son by a royal
mother, had been expected to succeed him. He was a Buddhist monk
at the time of his father^s death. A strong party at Court, however,
placed the dead king^'s eldest son^ though not by a royal mother, on
the throne, and he became Rama IIL Mongkut was to succeed him
in 1S51 and was one of the most rcitiarkable personalities that ever
occupied the Siamese throne.

Rama IITs reign has been described as a "somewhat unprogressive"
onCn* He represented the old-fashioned traditionalist altitude, which
was becoming dangerously out of date. Britain at first hoped that Siam
w^ould join her in the war with Burma, but Rama Ill's govemmefii
remained suspiciously aloof, conscious of its clash of interest with the
British in Malaya. This show^ed itsdf strongly in the reception
accorded to Captain Henry Burney, the second ambassador to be sent
to Bangkok by the East India Company. He did, however, manage
to conclude a treaty in iSafi. which is discussed in its proper context
of Malayan affairs in a later chapter^ There had been some thought
of offering to cede the conquered Burmese province of Tenasserim to
Siam, but the Siamese attitude on aJl matters was too intransigent, and
the subject vras not even introduced into the negotiations. When
Burney went to Siam the Government of India was considering the
question of reaurrecling the old Mon kingdom of Pegu in Lower
Burma. Aa it was knowm that there were thousands of refugee .^lons
living in Siam, he Ava.s instructed lo search for any members of the old
Mon royal family w^ho might be among them^ or any possible candi¬
dates for die throne from among the Mona holding high official posts
^ Chap- 27^ b. * Wood, op. rif.* p- 377- ’ Qmp. 37, b*

400 Tirn phase of EimoPtAN expansion pt. ii

in the Siamese serv^iee. His re|>Qit on this subject has considerable
interest, but he could find no traces of any members of the royal
family, nor any suitable candidate outside it.

In 1833 the United States of America sent an envoy to Bangkok
who managed to make a treaty regulating the treatment of American
dtizens who might visit Siaro. Both Burney and Roberts, the Ameri’'
can envoyt tried hard to persuade the king to agree to the establish¬
ment of consuls, but to no purpose.

It was in Rama llTs reign that the Laos kingdom of Vientiane was
extinguished and its capital destroyed A Tb^t w^as m tizi* This
success emboldened him to make an effort to restore Sisme^ control
over Cambodia. Accordingly* without any dcclsration of war, F"ya
Bodin, the conqueror of Vientiane, was sent in i S31 to lead an invasion,
which at the outset was completely successful. The Cambodian army
was defeated at Kompong-chhnang, King Ang Chan fled to Vinh-
long, and the Siamese occupied in rapid succes-^ioji Phnom Penh,
Oudong and Chaudoc. Then fortune turned against the Siamese^ The
eastern provinces rapidly armed against them; bands of partisans cut
off and destroyed the detachirients BodJn sent out to secure allegiance;
and in attempting to capture Vinh-long he lost his w^hole flotilla of
w'ar^boats. The ^mperor Minh-Mang sent t5iOOO Vietnamese troops
who drove out the Siamese pell-mell and replaced Ang Chan on his
throne. When in December 1834 Ang Chan died unexpectedly of
dysenterj' the V^ietnamese Resident. Ong Khom-Mang, by order of his
emperor, summoned the Cambodian magnates to elect his successor^
since his only son had died a few hours after birth. Siam was not even
informed. And as under Ong Kham-Mang's direction a young prin¬
cess* Ang Mey, was elected queen it was ohrious that Minh-Mang
intended to absorb what wa$ left of Cambodia Into his empire. In¬
deed, he proceeded to reorganize the administration completely*
dividing the kingdom into thirty-three provinces* all with new names
attached to Cochin China. His aim was* m Ledtre puts it, to dicam^
bodgiffiaisfr the country^*

The resentment which this policy inevitably caused played into the
hands of Siam. After seven years of suffering the Cambodians re¬
volted, massacred every V^ietnamese they could lay hands on, and the
magnates, meeting in secret, set up a provisional governing committee
which appealed to Siam for help and offered the crown to Prince Ang-
Duong, who w'aa living under Siamese protection. I’he aged General

' TTkc lut^MTt u tJcflIt wiiJii in chm|i. £3

^ iiu Camhod/[f^ p. 411.

CH. ^4 SIAM FRO?iI 1688 TO 185T 4OJ

Bodm was thercnp^>n in 1841 sent a second time to re-estabibh
Siamese influence.

It wjLs easy to instalL Ang-Duong as king^ Bui the Vietnamese were
a tough enemy and there were four years uf hard fighting before a
settlement was reached, 'l^hey had built more than fift^ forts with
which to hold down the country* These w^ere all captured by the
peasantry* but the king and his mentor Bodin could not drive out the
Vietnamese army. In 1845, therefore^ a compromise solution w'as
agreed to: Cambodia was to be under the joint protection of both Siam
and \^etnam. Two years later Ang-Duong was consecrated and in¬
vested with his royal regalia in the name of the sovereigns of Vietnam
and Siam by the deputies of tliose t^vo rulers. Such a solution de¬
pended for its success largely upon the personality of the Cambodian
king, for neither Siam nor \'ietnam abandoned their designs upon his
countr)^. Luckily he W'as a man of wii^dom and piety who w^as resolved
to give neither side the much-hoped-for opportunity for further
adventure at the expense of his impoverished and unhappy land. He
distrusted the Siamese^ regarding them as his enemies; he liated the
Vietnamese. Therefore it was to Bangkok that he-sent his eldest son
Ang Voley—later King Norodom^ 1860^1904—for his education.

Shortly before Rama IITs death both Britain and the United States
made furth^:r efforts to obtain more reasonable teim*^ for their mer¬
chants. The British w^ere disappointed w^tli the mults of the Bumey
treaty; they complained of royal monopolies, especially in sugar^ and
the prohibition of the teak trade. Sir James Brooke of Sarawak was
the British plenipotentiary, and he arrived in Bangkok in August 1850,
'J'he king was anxious for good relations with Britain, but w^as too ill
to take part in the negotiations. Brooke^s attempts to negotiate a
satisfacioiry treaty, however, failed. The reasons for this sound
strangely irrelevant. On the w^ay up the Menam one of his ships
grounded on the bar at PaknaTn, and he had to ask for assistance to
refioat. Further, runiuuni w^erc circulitud of his own lack of success
in Borneo. Most important of all, his letters were two years out of
date and were signed only by Lord Palmerston, not by Queen V'icioria
herself. But such things counted in dealing with monarchies such as
the Siamese of that time.

Brooke was followed by the Americari Ballestier^ who arrived iti a
United States sloop oF war with a commission from hfs government to
represent the grievances complained of by American citizens and
cditain a new and more favourable treaty. He failed even more abjectly
than Brooke, He was reFused an audience of the king and had to c

PT. I[

402 THE EAHLIER PHASE Op EUROFRAS tOtPANSION

without prcseiitin§[ the president’s letter. He was a merchimt who, as
Bowring puts it, ‘ had not been fortunate in his commercial openttions
at Singapore’,^ and the Bangkok ministers deemed it beneath their
dignity to have any dealings with him. Both Brooke and Ballestier
advised their governments that in their opinion only a warlike demon¬
stration would move the Siamese. But Rama III died in April 1S5*
and Siam entered upon a new era.

‘ Sir John Bowfinf, Ta* ik p. a

PART HI

TIIE PERIOD OF EUROPF^W TERRITORIAL EXPANSION

CHAPTER 25

INDONESIA FROM THE FALL OF THE V-O.C. TO THE
RECALL OF RAFFLES, 1799-1816

^Fhe disappearance of the * Rompcnie’ itiade at drat little difference
to the management of afFatrs in Indonesia. No matter how loudly the
Batavian Republic might echo the Freneh revolutionary doctrine that
liberty and equality were the inalienable rights of nien^ it was not
prepared to do anything calculated to destroy the value of its East
Indian empire to the home country. The security of that empire, it
was dimly convincedp depended upon keeping Its peoples in strict
subordination. Hence while Dirk van Hogetidorp^ an ex-governor of
the North-East Coast Province of Java and a determined opponent of
Ntderburgh, pleaded for the aeparadon of trade from government and
the abolition of forced deliveries and of the economic sen^itude known
as himndieii^ffTS, Nederburgh^s theory, that the native peoples were
naturally la^v ^nd compulsory^ labour was therefore essential for
their own welfare as vvcil as for Dutch commercial profits, was assured
of the stronger support.

The government took refuge in yet another committee, to which both
men were appointed. !t met in 1S02 and was charged with the task
of drafting a * charter for the Asiatle Settlements\ which wcjuld provide
for ‘the greatest possible welfare of the inhabitants of the Indies, the
greatest possible advantages for Dutch commerce, and the greatest
possible profits for the finances of the Dutch stale'.. Its nature may
easily be ganged from the fact that the draft accepted by the committee
was penned by Nederbnrgh. But it was never carried into effect.
l*he Napoleonic wars, which had temporarily ceased with the Treaty
of Amiens in 1802, were renewed in 1803 and put an end to alt trade
between the Batavian Republic and the colonies- And although ihe
Charter^ issued in 1804, was replaced by a slightly more liberal
Administrative Act, passed in i8o6, the rcpLcemcnt of the Batavian
Republic by the kingdom of Holland under Louts Bonaparte rendered
that also a dead letter. Louis Bonaparte's one object was to strengthen
the defence of Java against the British^ and at the suggestiun of his

EUSOPEAN TEtmiTORlAL EXPANSION FT, Ht

imp«rial brother he deputed Marshal Herman Willem Daendds with
dictatorial powers to carry out the task.

Meanwhile affairs in Indonesia had passed through critical phases.
Van Overstraten, who remained In office as governor-general after the
fall of the Company, was mainly concerned with the maintenance of
Java's independence against the threat of a British invasion- In iSoo
an English naval squadron actually blockaded Batavia^ but failed to
effect a landing. British preoccupation, firat with Napol^n's E^'ptian
expedition and afterwards with the internal situation in India, pre¬
vented the organization of a force strong enough to deal with Java,
but the remaining Dutch w'arships at the disposal of Batavia were all

destroyed, * r. i.

The Peace of Amiens in 1802 brought some relief, for all the Dutch
possessions previously taken over by Britain were restored, with the
sole exceptions of Ceylon and the Cape. The situation, indeed, was
better than might have been expected, for freed from the strict control
of the Board of Directors Batavia had been able to sell its products in
• the open market for good prices. Owing to the slave revolt in Haiti,
West Endian cofffec production was ruined and neutral shipping,
notably American and Danish, flocked to Batavia, The demand for
coffee was actually greater than Java could supply. Moreover,
relations with the native princes lettiained good, 'I'hc Sultan of
Bantam rallied to the support of Batavia when the English attacked
in t8oo. Sumitarta and Jogjakarta also remained on good terms with
the Dutch. There was indeed serious trouble in Cherifaon through
the succession to the throne of an illegitimate son of the sultan, who
died in 1797. But Dutch authority was not threalcncd, since the
hatred of the population vented itself upon the Chinese middlemen
employed by the sultan. Order was ultimately restored by the Dutch
governor of the North-East Giast Province, who re-established the
legitimate tine.

When the European war was resumed In 1803 the British rapidly
reconquered most of the territories they had surrendered. During the
peace interval a Dutch squadron under Hartsinck was sent to Java;
but it arrived in bad condition and inadequately manned. In t Sod it
was destroyed in the roadstead of Batavia by a powerful English fleet
under Admiral Pellew, but no attempt was made to conquer the island.
The one aim of the Dutch authorities at Batavia was to avoid giving
any support to the French and thereby force the British to invade java.
The accession of Louis Bonaparte to the Netherlands throne was
regarded by them with dismay. They wiahed for no change in the

CH. 25 INBONEEIA, 1799-^1816 407

posidcin of ^irti-indcpcfidcnce^ "which had brought them prosperity
and a fulJ ire^ury. But now Dacndd& was appointed to reor^nize
the administration and strengthen the milStaiy defences of Java In the
French interest.

The new governor-general had begun his career as an advocate at
Hattum* where he had headed the Patriots in their struggle against the
Princely Party^ When the stadhouderahip was restoreeb he had fled
to France and taken service in the French nirmy\ In 1793 he served
under Dumourie^ as commandant of the Batavian Legion in the
abortive attack on the republic^ He returned Avith the French in 1795
and proved such a mainstay of French pow er that Napoleon conferred
on him the rank of marshal. He was a great admirer of Napoleon, and
uitder hia influence had developed from a revolutionary demagogue
into a full-blooded supporter of military dictatorship* He arnA^ed in
Java on i January 18^ after a long and adventurous voyage via
Lisbon and Morocco,

Invested with spedal powers which made him supreme over the
Council of the Indies^ DaendeJs took full advantage of the fact that alt
communications with the homeland Avere cut to behave in a thoroughly
independent manner With tremendous energy he set about the task
of strengthening Java's defences- The army was increased and
improved, and, since it Avas impossible to obtain reinforcements from
Europe, new regiments of native troops were enrolled and trained.
Stern discipline was enforced, but at the same time better measures
for the welfare of the Troops were introduced than had ever been
knowTi under the Company's rule. Barracks and hospitals were built,
a gun foundry w^as opened at Semarang and an armus factory at
Surabaya, Surabaya itself was fortified, while Batavia was strengthened
by the construction of new forts at Wekevreden and Meester-Cornelia.
To improve tniUtary communications a great mailroad was constructed
from Anjcr to Panarukan, a distance of i^ooo kilometres. The overland
journey from east to Avest was thereby reduced from a matter of forty
lo six and a half days^ but the work had to be carried out by forced
labour and entailed immense loss of life. Fosises^cd of no warships
uAving to the destruction of Hartsinck^s squadron in 1E06, Daendels
built a Beet of small fast vessels based on MeeuAvenbaai and hler^baai
in the Sunda Straits, and in the cast at Surabaya. This eastern base
Avas further strengthened by a second foit, Fort T^odewijk, which-Avas
erected on as island in the Madura Straits.

Early on Daendels attempted a thoroughgoing reform of the adminis¬
tration uf Java. His aim was naturally to introduce the most complete

trL!KOPFAN TERRITORIAL EXPANSION

PT* 111

4di

urid rigid centralizaiion, and in order to carry it out he had no com¬
punction whatever in riding rotigbshod over everything that stood in
his way. 'Fhus he abolished the governorship of the North-East Coast
Province and divided the land into five divisions and thirty-eight
regencies, all of which were brought directly under the control of
Batavia. The whole island was parcelled out into nine divisions under
landdrosts standing directly under the central government, and the
native chiefti, known as regents, previously semi-autonomous native
rulers, were declared to be officials of the Dutch government, given
militar^^ rank and paid salarit^. The change^ designed to safeguard
them in their relations with European oftiriais, had the effect of
reducing both their incomes and their status in the eyes of thrir
people. I'he Residents in the native states, who had previously
received their instructions from the gov^'ernor of the North-East Coast
Province, now canxc directly under the control of Batavia, with their
title changed to that of minisirr.

Daendels' inslnictions, besides laying special emphasis upon his
military' mission, enlrusicd him with the task of examining the possi-
hi lit)' of abolishing the compubory cultivation of coffee and forced
delivcriest and of improving conditions of life among the native
people$p How much serious attention he gave to these matters is
doubtful, for he seems to have unqucstioningly accepted the stock
Dutch verdict on the Javanese as laz-y. Instead of abolishing the com¬
pulsory' cultivation of coffee he increased it to such an extern that the
number of coffee trees rofiC from 27 to 7a millioitp while the price for
the forced deliveries was reduced. But he did his utmost to suppress
illegal emoluments, and to see that all payments were made direct to
the cultivators. Inspectors were therefore appointed to check abuses^
and the coffee cultivator was freed fro|n all other forms of hirrendi^ti-
sttn. He also improved the lot of the bluftdong people, whose forced
labour in the teak forests was Ihtle better than slavery, by an issue
of rice and salt. But his belief was that the best means of ameliorating
the condition of the Javanese w'aa to stamp hard enough on comiplion.

"rhat the organization and practice of the judiciary of Batavia had
long needed complete overhaul was recognized by the Charter of iSo.^
In pi|rticular a proper system of justice for the native according to hia
itiiai custonuiT)^ usage) had never existed under the Company,
'rhis shameful situation [>aendets sought to end by establishing courts
in ev'er)' regcncv^ and division wherein justice woul

be dispensed according to mhiiffrfit. 1 hese were separate from the
Councils of Justice established at Batavia, Semarang and Surabaya

€H. 25 INDONESIA, 1799-1816 409

which dealt with cartes involving foreigners — i.e. EuropveanSj Chinese,
Arabs and any who were not natives of Java, !n these justice was in
accordance with Dutch-lndjan law. In the low'er native courts native
oilicials and priests sat on the bench. The prefecture courts w^ere pre¬
sided over by the landdrost with a Dutch official as secretary and a
number of nalive as$istant$. A system of appeal also from the lower
courts to the Councils of Justice was instituted. Daendels’ method
of segregation in matters of justice took root and was further developed
by his successors. But he was in office for too short a time to do
more than lay its foundations. He had in practice little respect for
legal processesj even such summary' ones as were conducted under
martial Iaw\

Both in his Itfctime and ever since opinion has been, sharply divided
on the question of the quality of Daendels* tvork in Java^ So pow^crful
were the accusations levelled against him that in 1814 he published an
apologia entitled Staat det Nfifrr/aMiijc/w OastwJische h^^^itliHgeH mider
het bcsiiiuf rtftt den G* G- /f. U\ Daendehf together with two immense
volumes of documents. I hrough no fault of his^ just when he was
doing his utmost to stimulate coffee production^ the British blockade
wms tightened to such an extent that the bottom fell out of the market
and he had millions of guilders' worth of unsaleable goods on hb hands.
Unfortunately his administration cost more to run than any previous
one, l^he expense of his military and naval preparations alone was
staggering. But he had also given substantial increases of pay to
government officials as one means of reducing corruptioii. His first
issue of paper money failed because the government had no credit
With which to back it. Hence he resorted to the expedient of selling
land to private persons. On the plea that all land not in the possession
of the native princes was government domain, he sold not only large
estates of land but also the rigbw over the cultivators previously
enjoyed by the government.

One of his most spectacular deals vvaa the sale of the Prabafingga
lands for a million rix-doilaiB million guilders) to the KapUfin^

Chine€S Han Ti Ko under an agreement whereby the capital sum w^as
payable in instalments. But his need of ready money caused him to
issue so many paper notes on the strength of this deal that ^efore
long his ' Frabalingga paper" was worth only a fraction of its face value,
and many people refused to accept it. In his frantic search for means
of acquiring an adequate revenue he Hoated forced loans, farmed out
opium dens and introduced a state rice mono poly + whereby all rice
had to be delivered to the government, which sold it at a profit to the

PT. Ill

EPHOFEAN TEMtlTOBlAL IStFANSlO:iJ

public. He even compelkd the banks to hand over their coin to the
treasury in return far paper.

His greatest weakness showed itself in his dealings with the native
princes. His dicutorial and tactless methods alienated them to such
a degree that when the inevitable British attack came they 'emulated
each other in disloyalty * to the Dutch rdgime. Flia demands for labour
brought strife with the Sultan of Bantam. When some of the sultan’s
Dutch guards were murdered together with their commandant,
Daendels personally led an army which stormed and plundered the
city. He shot the chief minister, banished the sultan to Amboina and
declared his state royal domain of the King of Holland. He issued new
regulations for ‘ceremonial and etiquette’ under which Dutch officials
were forbidden to pay the traditional marks of honour to the ruling
princes and must wear hats in their presence. This sort of treatment
did more to undermine their loyalty than almost anything else. His
high-handed treatment of ,\mangku Buwono li, Sultan of Jogjakarta,
threw that ruler into the arms of the British. A quarrel between the
. sultan and the Susuhunan of Surakarta caused the former to increase
his army beyond what Daendels considered reasonable. He therefore
found an excuse to invade the aukan’s dominions and depose him in
favour of the heir-apparent, who was appointed prince-regent. But
the deposed sultan had so much secret support that as soon as Daendels
was recalled to Europe he resumed his old position and entered into
cotrespondence with the British.

Daendels sacriheed everything to the defence of Java. Of the Dutch
stations in other parts of the Archipclagp, those difficult to defend or
unprofitable, such as Banjarmasin in Borneo, were abandoned. Others,
such as Palembang in Sumatra and Macassar in Celebes, had their
garrisons reduced to a minimum. For the spice-bearing Moluccas he
showed more concern, and Amboina was reinforced by the French
colonel Filz and 1,500 men, But the garrison lacked money and
provisions, and when the British attacked in iBio the native troops
were disloyal and Fib had to surrender. He had done his best under
impossible conditions, but on his return to Batavia the Iron Marshal
had him court-martialled and shot. Mutiny among the native trooj^
was a^so the cause of the fall of Tcrnate to the British. Then speedily
all the remaining Dutch posts outside Java fell.

It was now Java's turn i but before Lord Minto’s great expeditionary
force appeared off Batavia in 1811, the rowan Besar Guntur ( great
thundering lord*), as the Javanese dubbed him, had been ^lled. So
many complaints against him had been made by high officials to King

CIL 25 INMNESIA, 1799^1816 41 1

Louis that he appointed General Jan Willem Jaiussctis in his
stead.^ Janssens had been governor of Cape Colony when it fell for the
second time to the British* He was now faced with a second hopeless
task.

In August iSio the English East India Company's Board of Control
issued instrucdoris to Lord Minto^ the Governor-General of India,
that *the enemy" was to be expelled from Java. There was no thought
in their minds of the permanent occupation of the Dutch empire:
their one object was to counter Napoleon's designs for the encircle¬
ment of India. The work of Dacndeb in Java was the direct cause of
the expedition launched against the island in i8rr. Dutch histarical
writers- have represented this step as the result of the persuasive
powers of the young Thomas Stamford Eaffles^ a junior official at
Penang, who was employed by Minto to prepare the way for the
enterprise by establishing relations with discontented native princes
throughout the Archipelago.

Raffles was thirty years old at the time of the Java expedition. At
tile age of fourteen he had entered the East India Company's office in *
London as a clerk. His immense industry earned him rapid promotion,
and in 1805 he was sent to Penang as assistant secretary with a salary of
^ 1,500 a year. Penang had j uat been raised to the status of a presidency
with 3 governor and cGiind! and was expected to become a great
trading centre for the East Indian islands- On the outward voyage
he made an intensive study of the Malay language, and soon after his
arrival in Penang his proficiency in it tvas considered remarkable by
people who met him. Through personal contacts with Malays and the
study of their culture and histoiy he became an expert in w'hat was
then to the Britisher a little-known oriental field.

Lord Minto's attention was first drawn to Raffles by his feUotv-
countr^'man Dr. John Leyden, also an accomplished student of Malay,
and in 1810 Raffles himself took leave from his duties in Penang and
paid a visit to Calcutta, where he met the governor-general in person
and discussed with him the situation in the Archipelago. His knowL
edge and enthusiasm so irnpressed Minto that before the end of the
year he was appointed '.Agent to the Governor-General w'iththe Malay
States^ Then, with his headquarters at Malacca, he began lo m^c his

* On hit rctum to Eunepe DamdeU terved with
ibn uf tSi2. After Nflpftleon's fnll he epEFcred Kw to Kintf VViHiaiil I of the

United NclheriftlldA, witn sent lilin a& y^vemOr of llic »etticxiienl» on the waat

coQBl of Afiica. Therr he diLsJ in iSiS.

^ F* \\\ StapcI: rwit NidrFlamiiik-Imfi^t I930p P- ai*- but

intom^^don of the evcnlS lndin|$ to the conquest of Jmn ia ntort dCCepUtble
liira, pp, 33 S-^>k See aim Coupbndr o/ SOsgiapore, p. 36.

Et'nOPEAN TEliaiTORIja EXPANSION FT. lit

plans for the annexation of Java to the East India Company’s eastern
empire.

Minta*s abjtctivc was tp give the emp grdre to French inflyence
in the East, not to incre^ the British empire, and his plans envisaged
taking over tlie administration of java iivilh Outch co-^pcration
wherever possible, Lci-den and RafHcs, however, were at one in their
belief that Dutch rule in the East was utterly pemidous, and that
British 'justice, humanity and moderation' should be used to give a
better life to the native peoples whom they had so long oppre^d.
RatBcs's origins! idea, therefore^ was that the Indonesian princes
could be prevailed upon voluntarily to accept the superimcridence of
the Government of India, which would ticercise its control in the
form of a protectorate of much the same kind as was to be introduced
later in Malaj^. It was in this spirit that he set about the task of
working upon the minds of the native rulers in the Dutch crnpirc.

janssens a^umed the management of affairs in Java in the full
knowledge that the British were preparing an in^^ion. He found the
i population restless and disconientedj and the princes so embittered
by Daendels' behaviour that thcit support could not be relied upon,
l"hc financial situation at Batavia was so desperate that he could
barely find the necessary money for the ordinary expenses of govern¬
ment, let alone any consideration of further defensive preparations-
make matters worse, Jumel, the commander of the few French
troops he had with him, was totally unfit for his post.

At the beginning of August iSi i the British fleet of about loo
ships carrying an expeditionary^ force of same 12,000 men appeared
before Batavia. I'he cit>' waa occupied without a blow, since the
incompetent Jumcl had taken up a defensive position at Nlcester
Comdis. Janssens then took over the command^ rejected Lord
Minto's call to surrenderj and for sixteen days pul up a splendid
resistance before being forced to beat a retreat in the direction of ^
Buitem^org. "Fhc retreat* however, soon degenerated Into a disorderly
fiightt despairing of making an effective stand in the west*
Janssens made his ^vay eastw'ards with all speed to organise the defence
of centra! Java^

On / September he arrived at Semarangt where he took up a good
position on a hill to the south of the city and awaited reinforcements
from the Javanese rulers. In this* however^ he was disappoiniedi ihc
preliminary" work carried out by Raffles had ooinplciely undermined
ihe loyalty of the princes. When the British landed at Somarang,
iherefore^ he was in a very difficult poakioni His troops panicked and

€H. ^5 INDOKESlAj 179^-1816 413^

killed rnany tli«ir Dutch officers. He himself with a small force
escaped to I’untangp where he was forced to ask for an armistice. By
the capitulatioii, signed at Semarang on 17 September^ he agreed to
surrender Java and all it$ dependent postSi including Palembang^
Timor and Macassar, to the British. It was further stipulated that all
officials w'ho were willing to transfer to the British scr^'icc might
Temam tn office.

Meanwhile Lord Minto had issued a prodamation setting forth the
principles upon which the new govemn’tent ^vas to be based. I'he
Bengal system of administration was to be established. The Dutch
legal system was to rernain in force* but torture was to be abolished.
The paper money issued under Dutch rule would be recognized, but
not that issued by Daendds after the annexation of the kingdom of the
Netherlands by France. The native peoples were promised an amelior¬
ation of their condition, and in particular the ahulition of contingencies
and forced deliveries.

Raffics, who had accompanied the expedition, was appointed
Lieutenant-Governor of Java and its dependenci^j Madura, Palem- «
bang. Banjaimasin and Macassar, He was to w^ork tvith the assistance
of an advisory council camposed of the commander-in-chief Gillespie
and the Dutchmen Cranssen and Muntinghe. The last-named, with
a fine record of service under DaenddSf proved the most influential
member of this group; hia ability and tvide knowledge of the Indies
were made full use of by Raffies, who w^as soon on such friendly temis
with his Dutch colleaguts that Gillespie^ already irritaied at having
to serve under so young a Company's senant, became uneasy and
hostile. On 19 October Lord Minto left for Bengal* 'While we are in
JavEi\ ht said 10 Raffles, ' let us do all the good wc can.^ Hardy in the
Fast India Company's history had a man of Raffies^s age been called
to a position of such htavy responsibility. Owing to the distance nf
Java from Bengal, his position was one of virtual independence.

M'he new lieutenant-governor's first eEorts had perforce to be
directed to the establishment of relations with the princes. I lb agents
had supported a rebel chief, Pangcran Ahmed, against the puppet
Sultan Mahommed set up by Dacndels when he made his spectacular
incursion into Bantam. He now decided to support Mahomn^d* and
accordingly atresled Ahmed and banished him to Banda- Mahommed,
however, was regarded by many of his subjects as illegal aiid found
himself unable to quell the chronic unrest in his territorioi. In 1813*
therefore, he surrendered his powers to Batavia in return for a large
annuity and the retention of the courtesiy title of sultan. Such was

A »DNGCEKO tm IMNCTIHC OIKL

(Rnmi:*: Hiitory iff jfttray

CIL 25 1799-1816 415

the end of the kingdom of Bantiuii. The Suliiin of Chen ton receivetl
similar treatment. He had oauaed the Dutch serioua trouble oa
account of his appalling misrule. Daendds had reduced him to
the rank of a regent. But his domintonB remained in a state of
unrest and RalBcs^s action provided the only logical solution of
the problem.

In Jogjatam the deposed Multan Sepuh resumed office from his
son, the prince-regent, aa soon as the British arrived, John, Crawfurd,
who became Resident at his Court, soon reported that both he and the
Susuhunan of Surakarta were disloyal, in December iSii RafHes
went to Semarang to deal with the affairs of the two states. There he
was met by the chief minister of the susuhunan r Sepuh^ however,
sent only a letter couched in such terms as to arouse serious suspicions
regarding hh intentions. RafHes WTnl personally to Surakarta to
settle tektiom with the tusubuTiaii. The affairs of Jogjakarta he
placed in the hands of the experienced Munringhe. With the susu¬
hunan Raffles made an agreement whereby he received back the
territories seized by Daendds, but subject to certain apedat con- ^
ditions. He was to recognize British overiordship on the same terms
as he had pre^^ously made with the Dutch, to accept the central
government's jurisdiction over all non-Javanese inhabitants of his
realm and iu supervision of his coirespandence.

With Sepuh Muntinghe made a similar arrangement. The terms
were better than Sepuh might have expected, having regard to his
arrogant attitude. He was foolish enough to think that such mild
treatment was a sign of weakness. He began to increase his armed
forces and fortify his capital. Raffles therefore resorted to stern
measures. With an army of i,zqo men under Gillespie be entered
Jogjakarta, deposed and banished Sepuh, and placed the former
prince-regent on the throne as Amangku Buwono 111 . Sepuh's
ireaauryj containing Spanish doUars to the value of 2 million guilders,
was confiscated as w^ar booty for the troops.

In the captured kraton Raffle discovered evidence of intrigue$ with
the susuhunan against British rule. He therefore marched on Surak¬
arta and forced that prince to make a new agreement whereby he lost
the districts previously restored to him and had to reduce his army
to the strength of a mere bodyguard. He had also to agree to vest the
appointment and dismissal of his chief minister in the hands of the
central government. In all the native states contingcncte^ and forced
deliveries were abolished, while tolls and the farming of opium were
taken over by the government in return for a cash compensation.

iaiRa]'£AN TERRITOBUI- EXPANSION

PT, III

416

[n asserting his authority over the dependent states such as Palcm-
bang, Madura, Bali, Baiijcrmasin and western Borneo, with all of
which he had intrigued against the Dutch before the invasion of Java,
Raffles had to deal with one very ugly incident for which the Dutch
liave laid much of the responsibility at his door, I'he Sultan of
Palembang, on learning of the British landing at Batavia, surprised
the Dutch garrison in his city and murdered them all, torgether with
the women and children. In the prer-ious year Raffles had indeed
written urging him to 'expel and annihilate all Hollanders'. When
Raffles’s commissioner, ignorant nf what had taken place, arrived to
demand the surrender of the Dutch fortress at Palembang the sultan
blandly announced that he had driven out the Dutch before the
capitulation of Janssens and was therefore independent. He refused
to make a treaty recognizing British overlordship. Raffles thereupon
announced publicly his intention to punish the sultan for the massacre.
In .\pril 181 a Gillespie, at the head of an expeditionar)' force, captured
the city, 'Fhe sultan escaped, and his brother , 4 hmcd Najam was
placed on the throne in his stead. A% compensation for the massacre
the new ruler had to cede the tin-bearing islands of Banka and Billiton
in return for a cash payment.

Only when he had firmly established British authority was Raffles
free to apply himself to the task of administrative reform. A close
study of his measures shows that they were a blend of British-Indian
methods and of proposals already made by Dirk van Hogendorp on the
basis of the Bengal system. He divided Java up into sixteen /anrf-
Jroslampts, entitled Residencies, among which both Surakarta and
Jogjakarta were included. The Resident performed administrative
and judicial functions and in addition acted as collector of government
revenue.

The greatest innovation was the introduction of a general tax on
land. Raffles’s aim was to substitute this for all compulsory services,
contingencies and forced deliveries. He declared the government the
sole owner «f the soil. The Javanese inhabitants therefore became
government tenants paying rent for the land they cultivated. The
rent tvas levied not <»n individuals but on desas, and was to be assessed
accorjling to the productivity of the soil. 'Fhc most productive land
was to pay half its yield, the worst a quarter only. 'I'he average was
estimated at two-fifths. The cultivator had the free disposal of the
remainder of his produce, w'hich was in moat cases rice, lie might
pay his dues in either rice or money. If the latter, he could make it to
the desa headman, who paid it into the divisional office. If in rice.

ciJ. 25 INDC^;^:SIA, i79g-i8ifi 417

he had to convoy it at hia own expense to the Roisidency headquarters.
Thus the local chief's opportunities for ;^nift were reduced, since he
no longer had a personal interest in the yield of the crops and lost
much of his power of demanding forced services. As a government
servant he was to receive a fixed salary.

But such a revolution in the lives of the great majority of the people
could not be carried out by a stroke of the pen* It was not until late
in tSij that preparations were far enough advanced for a start to he
made in practice. And it was found to he too difficulty or too incon¬
venient, to imroduce it into the imjwrtant cotfee-producing districts
of the Preanger^ where the system of compulsory cultivation and
deliveries was deeply rooted. At the time N'apoleon had his back to the
wall in Europe^ and the restoration of peace was calculated to cause a
boom in Java coffee. In view of the scarcity of money, therefore, it
looLs as if the hope of selling the cotfee at a huge profit was the real
determining factor in this case; for Java did not pay its way, and Raffles
well knew that there wag no hope of persuading the British government
to hold on to the island if he could not prove it to be an economic
proposition. In the teak-bearing districts also the old compulsory
services remained m force.

It was not long before Raffles realized that hia nc\v methods brought
neither the revenue increase nor the improvement in the position ol
the cultivator that be had hoped for. In the system of desa a$scssmeiit
the headman stilJ possessed too much power in the apportionment of
lands among the inhabitants. Raffles therefore went over to the
method of individual jissessmcnt. But the relations inside the deaa
were very complex, and without a detailed cadastral surv^ey it was
quite impossible to work out individual a^es^ments fairly. His
attempt to introduce such a survey failed through lack of time and
qualified staff. For instance, in Surabaya only 50 out of 2,700 villages
could be surveyed. Hence the revenue demand in most cases had to
be fixed according to the arbitrary^ estimates of the R^idents. In
practice also the abolition of all compulsory services proved unsvork-
able, and the previously existing arrangements for the maintenance
of roads and bridges by the people eontinued.

On the question of slavery Raffles, as a dLscipk of Wilberforce, had
strong views. The Institution, however^ Avas tew firmly eslalJiished
for him to attempt its complete abolition. Hence he had to take Avhat
practical steps he could towards aHevtaling the lot of slaves and in¬
creasing their chances of liberation. He began in 1812 by imposing a
lax on the keeping of slaves, and by issuing an order whereby the

EUROPEAN TTORLTOftlAL EXPANSION

PT, ni

418

imppmtion of new slaves, into Java and its dependencies waa for¬
bidden as from the beginning of January 1813. Shortly afterwards
he passed a regulation prohibiting the slave trade throughout the
Archipelago^ In 1815 he deprived the police of the power to hold an
unwilling slave under arrest at the request of the owner. One long¬
standing evil of native origin^ the pandetingsckupf whereby a debtor
with hU wife and children could be seized by his creditor for an un¬
paid debt and made to work for him without pay, was wholly forbidden.
Finally, in the year of his recall homei he founded the Java Benevolent
Institution to carry on propaganda against slavery. The net result of
his campaign was that, ^though slavery still existed, there was a great
reduction in the number of staves.

In his energetic overhaul of the whole range of the existing adminis-
tcatjon Raffles reported that Daendcis' reorgamzation of the judicial
system was ‘complicated and confused*. Much of it, however, had
never been carried out. In order to simplify procedure he abolished
the old Supreme Court and Court qf Aldermen and provided the three
large ports of Batavia, Semarang and Surabaya with a Court of Justice,
a Court of Requests and a Police Court. These courts administered
Dutch colonial law in civil cases, and in criminal cases used British
procedure with a jurj\ In all legal processes torture abolished.
In the matter of native jurisdiction he abolished the courts set up by
DaendeU and substituted for them sixteen Land Courts, one for each
Residency. Far criminal ca$ea involving the death penalty he instituted
a Court of Circuit {R^^hlbank van Ommegangy^ which conducted the
case at the place of the crime.

Finance had been one of the weakest features of Daeadels' adminis¬
tration. In his owm day Raffles was charged with financial ineflicicncy>
and the direciors of the East India Company accused him of rendering
the occupation of Java source of financial embarrassment to the
British government'. He believed that the introduction of the land-
rent system w^ould provide a surplus which would cover expenditure.
Revermo did indeed increase, but expenditure al^ increased* and
every year saw a deficit. He started off with one appalling handicap:
he had to carry out Lord Minto's promise to redeem the paper money
still in circulation from the Dutch period at the rate of 20 per cent
disedunt. The burden this imposed on the treasury prevented him
from carrj^ng out his proposal to abolish the oppressive toll-gates
and free internal trade. The establishment of a state monopoly in
salt together with an import duly of 10 per cent, on all imports into
Java Jailed to cover the deficit. Hence he had to adopt Daendels*

CII. 25 IN 1 X)NESTA, 419

expedient of veiling government bnd to private persons. But it
brought little profit, partly because the land was sold in very l;rrge
plots to purchasers with inadequate capital at their disposal. Morcoverp
there vvas so much discontent with the landlords created by Dacndels*
sales that he had to redeem much of the land sold to them. The land
salesp however, were merely a temporary expedient for dealing with
an immediate need. His land-revenue system must be judged by its
long-term results. It was retained by the Dutch when Java was
restored to thenip and ultimately justified Raffles^'s own expectations.
As Fumivall, himself an expert in land-revenue matters, puts it,
RafScs^s calculations were not wrong but merely too optiraistic.^

The range of Raffles^s activities was too great for an adequate
survey to be attempted in a work of this kind. The literature that
has accumulated on the subject, in Dutch as well as in English, is
consrtlcrable,* and to ihh the reader is referred for further light on
what is only touched on here. Geneml GiUespie, who repeatedly
disagreed with him^ left for Bengal at the end of 1813^ and soon
afterwards began a series of spiteful attacks upon him which caused
the directors of the East India Company to conduct an inquiry into
his administration. Although he was cleared of all the charges, both
the directors and Lord Moira, Minto's successor as Governor-
General of India, were so dissatisfied with his work that early in 1816
he was removed from office and returned home.

He had dreamed of making Batavia the centre of a new British
empire of the ishuids. But soon after the introduction of hts land-rent
system Mapoleon fell and the Nelherlands regained independence.
Lord CasUereagh’s announced aim, long before the meeting of the
Congress of Vienna, was to create a strong kingdom of the Netherlands
as part of hi$ plan to render impossible any further movcmenl of
French aggression in Europe. Hence he turned a deaf ear to suggestions
that Britain should retain the Dutch eastern empire, and by the
Convention of London, signed in August 1S14, Briuin promised to
restore it to the Netherlands. But the Dutch hopes of receiving it
back were temporarily shattered by NapoIeon^s escape from Elba,

^ India, 77 .

■ See efpwully l-*dy Mffmtrir of ihx U/e and Ptihli£ Smdta 0 / Sir

Sttim/ard Raffias (1930); T. S. Subiiantr of rt Mimiif record^ on n Friary

ami other doiurKinU (1814)- Bioai^ftphica by Demccnui Charles Bauliscv
It. E. H«non J. A- Betbtme CcHik (igiS) and Sir R^girMad CouplEnd (lyift).

!■- w, Hit TtmrhffSrtttmr w voL v of hit %vn

tamiKh InSu L. Voat D«r«ilcr, Hit Mederlandschge^att OixrJtxiM rft oitqTe/-

kocrighiden tidtrf tdn H. D. l^y*ftohn Norman, Dr Bntiicht ^r^roc^ff/i/ipy

m;rry£Tf?a ert Ondrihoonghedrii (lG j7).

42C

EUROPEAK TERRITORIAL EXPANSION

PT. Ill

and Raffles seked the opportunity to send home a comprehensive
exposition of java's importance to Britain, '['he dircclora* however^
faced by the undeniabLe fact that he had so far faikd to mahe ends
meet in Java, were in no mood to oppose Castlcreagh's deciaioni and
after the final defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo arrangements were made
to hand over the Netherlands Indies^ Before that took placOp in
August i8i6^ Raffles had left Java^ and it fell to hU successor^ John
Fendall, to carry out the promise made two years earlier.

Some idea of the importance of Raffles's work in Java may be
gained from the fact that on regaining control the Dutch accepted most
of bis administrative and judicial reforms, though wilh certain changes.
But in the long run it was the spirit in which he had laboured that had
the most lasting effect, for it touched the imagination of the more
liberal-minded Dutchmen and inspired them with hb phiianthropic
ideab. He had set the welfare of the native peoples as the supreme
end of government. Moreover^ although he was in Java for slightly
less than five full years, he was able to accumulate a knowledge of its
people, languages, institutions and history which was beyond praise*
especially when one takes into account the fact that at the time they
were badly neglected by the Dutch themselves. It was he indeed who
ordered the fiirt survxy of the magnificent Bonobodur and dretv
attention to the need to preserve the ancient monumems that aroused
hb admiration when he toured the island. He was nut only a very
active president of the Batavian Society of Arts and Science but he
gave powerful support to the researches of scholars such as Thomas
Honifield, the American naturalist; John Crawfurdj the author of
many distinguished contributions to oriental knowledge;* and Colin
Mackenaie^ w ho in the course of investigating land ownership collected
scientific material and studied Javanese antiquities. Rafflesb own
flhiory of first published in 1817^ was the first comprehenaive
\vork on its subject, ‘fn scientific acumen", w^rites F, W. Stapel,
'Raffles stands head and shoulders above earlier Dutch goveniorsJ*

* Hia fif thf itHft/iH mArchiprfii^ vtba publi&hctj in iS^o. In 18561 he expanded

it to foiTli hu Still Valuable Dairripthv Dfttiesmry of imfitin -ArrMptf*^ atui Adflitrfif
(Jouittrift.

■ Giichirdemi Nfdfri&ttAsfk Indii edition), p. 332.

CHAPTER 36

BRITISH BEGINNINGS IN MALAYAN BACKGROUND
TO SINGAPORE

The acquisition of Pen&iig in 17S6 by the English East India Company
was dictated by motives of naval strategy. Commercial considerations
were, of course^ invoh’cdt but they bore small relation to the trade of
the Malay Peninsula* and the Company had no intention whatever of
expanding its political control over Malaya. Pitt's India Act of i 7®4
had firmly laid down the doctrine of non-intervention, and Warren
Hastings' successor, Lord ComwalliSt was determined to observ'e it
to the utmost of his ability. Moreover, since the abandonment of the
factory at Patani in 1633 the Company had lost interest in Malay a.
Great things had been expected of the Patani factory when it was
founded by the Gloh^ in 1612.^ It was regarded as one of the key
places for trade in the East^ along with Surat, the Coromandel Coast
and Bantam. Its function was envisaged as the headquarters of the
Company's trade in Siam, Cambodia* Cochin China, Borneo and
Japan. When Dutch competition forced its abandonment no further
effort was made to establish a trading post in the Peninsulap save for a
small, short-lived agency planted at Kedah in 1669 for the purchiase
of tin.

Ever since about the year 1686 strsteglc considerations rendered it
increasingly necessary for the British to have a naval station on the
eastern aide of the Bay of Bengal Up till then the west coast of India
had been the chief centre of British power, and Bombay the sole im¬
portant naval station. But in ifiSfi* with the sudden appearance in the
Indian Ocean of a powerful PVench fleet bound for Sbm, and the
subsequent French sebmre of control over Mergui for use as a naval
repair depot,® a new phase in the na>’at strategy of the East India
Company may be said to have begun. For Madras at once reahzed
the danger to the British factories on the Coromandel Coast that such
a depot constituted. And although Louis XtV's Siamese adventure

^ The mewt comprdiicruiivE account of EurviJiran trade at Pii;dm 11 H. Teipatra'a
/ir Foiicrij drr C&mpanU Putam^ VerH«ndelir#co van het Konin^kluK

Jmtiniut, '^^GraVrnhaEr,

» Supr^i, pp, 3gg.

EIJROPEAK THRUrrORIAL

PT. ill

4:22

came to a Siidden and sorty end, it provided the British vnth an object
lesson p too little heeded at but later to become increasingly im-
portant when the Anglo-French struggle for the upper hand in India
found to depend very largely upon the question of naval control
over the Bay of Bengal.

In this contest the east coast of India^ and especially the Coromandel
Coast, became the centre of gravity. Now not only was there no good
roadstead for ships on the Coromandel Coast, but with the changeover
from the south-w'est to the north-east mnnsnon in October they all
became positively dangerous owning to the violent hurricanes which
blew up during that month and November. Hence a fleet must retire
to a safe port early in October—not later than the lath, said naval
experts. During the south-east monsoon^ which b^ns to show itsdf
early in May, the Coromandel Coast w as quite safe for ships^ though
at times the continuous high surf would prevent communication with
the shore. This might be very inconvenient for ships undergoing
repairs; for there was no dockyard available, and repairs had to be
undertaken in an open roadstead. Seriously disabled ship-s, therefore,
which could not be repaired while riding at anchori must make their
w^ay to Bombay.

During the eighteenth century, w^ith naval battles generally being
fought in the Bay of Bengal during the period of the south-west mon-
sooHi the need for a repair depot on its eastern coast became a matter
of urgency. For after the break imposed by the storms of October and
November the side which could have a squadron in the Bay the
earliest—and the Coromandel Coast was safe from January onwards^—
scored an immense advantage in attacking the other’'s settlements and
sea-borne commerce. For I he British this became a particularly
acute problem from 1740 onwards, when the development uf the ex¬
cellent harbour at Mauritius by l^bourdonnais gave the French a
decided adt^ntage, which Dupfeix waa quick to seize during the War
of the Austrian Succession.* British experience showed that a fleet
could not leave the Coromandel Coast to refit at Bombay and be at its
staijon again before the beginning of April. In this w ay three valuable
months w^erc lost, when an enemy fleet w^hich had refitted at a more
convenient depot could dominate the Bay,

During the hostilities between the English East India Company and
Siam resulting from the depredations carried out by the Mergui free¬
booters in the sixteen-eighties, the Madras Council had considered the
island of NegraiSp Just south of the mouth of the Basse!n river, as a

^ Du4in'i;1l, DupJfht nurfd Olh'f; hv hIw Ct^bridge Hiitory^ oj y, pph 3

CH. 26 BamSH BEGINNINGS IN 'MALAYA 4^3

possible naval repair station and a base from which to deal with enemy
activities on the eastern ^de of the bay. But the attempt to occupy
the island miacamed, and the dedsion taken to seize Mcrgui
Itself, After the ‘Mergui massacre' of 1687 it was decided to give the
Mon port of Syriam a triab and in September 1689 the frigate Diamond
was sent there for repair^. This was, as we have seen above/ the
beginning of a long association with the port as a repair depot.

The French alsOp at Dupleix^s instigationp opened a dockyard at
Syriam, and between 1730 and 1740 both nations were building ships
there. Then came the Mon revolt, which offered Dupleis a tempting
opportunity to intervenep once his hands were freed by the conclusion
of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in Europe. So wt have the som story
of the British settlement at Negrais and the abortive French attempt
to save the Mon kingdom from disaster. Alaungpaya, the conqueror of
the Mons, destroyed both Syriam and the Negrais settlement, and the
East India Company cut its losses in Burma and concentrated on
defeating the French in India, for these events occurred during the
Seven Years War*

British eitperience in that war underlined the need fur a repair depot
in at least a more convenient place than Bombay. In October 1758*
after a campaign on the Coromandel Coast against d’Ache's squad ron^
the British admiral Pocock had to take his squadron off to Bombay for
refitting and was absent until the end of April 1739. During his
absence a French squadron appeared in the bay and Lallyp attacking
Madras by land, was able to besiege the city for sisty-six days. Luckily
for the British, six Company's ships arrived from Europe on 16
February and Lailv at once abandoned the siege- It is not surprisingp
thereforCi that when the war ended in 17^3 directors of the Com^
pany sent orders for a search to be made for a suitable port on the
eastern side of the bay*

Under these circumstances one might at first vronder why no
gcation is heard of a possible rtitirn to Borma. Alaungpaya, it will be
rcmemberedi had died in t7^» his successor, Naungdawg^d, had
tried to persuade the Calcutta authorities to reopen trade with his
country. The French indeed did go back after a discreet intervaL
The prisoners taken from their ships decoyed up the river when
Bvriatnfell performedusefuI sen^ice to the Court of Ava, and some rose
to ponitions of responsibility ^ Through one of thenit Pierre Mi lard,
who became Captain of the Royal Guard, good rebtioris were estab¬
lished with Pondicherry, and in 1768 a French envoy named Lefevre

■ Cluipler iM-

EITROPEAN TERRITORIAL EXPANSION

lEJ

424

cibtsiiiied from King Hsinbyushin permission to open a dockyard At
Rangoon. Little is known of the history of this venture, but it
produced a number of excellent teak ships, one of which, the
Liiuristm of 1,500 tons, took part with some success in the French
naval operations in Indian waters during the War of American
Independence*

British attention, however^ was now directed to quite a different
quarter. New factories resulting from the commercial revolution
which occurred in the Indian Ocean in the mid^eighteenth century
began to exercise a predominant influence* These were the rapid
expansion of trade betw'een India and China un the one hand, and on
the other the \veakening of Dutch control over the trade of Malay a
and Indonesia. I’he revolution was the work of British private cap¬
tains and merchants, who, while the East India Company was engaged
in defeating the French and laying the foundations of its territorial
dominion in India^ gained control over her "country" trade and played
a vital part in developing her commercial relations with China.

The expansion of India's trade with the Far East arose out of the
diiScuIties experienced by the European East India Companies in
finding means of financing their purchases of Chinese goods mthout
exporting silver from Europe. I'hc 'country* traders helped to solve
their problem by exporting ratv cotton from Bombay to ChinSp by
taking Indian wares — notably Coromandel Coast piece-goocU and
Bengal opium — to Malaya and Indonesia, where they exchanged
them for dollars or other commodities in demand at Canton and
Macao, and, in the end, by smuggling opium into ChinaJ Under
these circumstances the clear need in the second half of the eighteenth
century was for a harbour which would combine the advantages of
a repair station w 4 th those of a trading centre for the Malay Archipel¬
ago, and at the same time would he on a main sea route to China.

When the Dutch forced the English East India Ckimpany to with¬
draw from Bantam in 16^2.^ it planted a settlcirient at Bcneoolen on the
west coast of Sumatra, Unfortunately this proved to he too Far away
from the principal trade routes, and British ships in need had normally
to seek the shelter of Batavia. The exorbitant charge of the Dutch
there were the source of hitter complaints* Nor^ as it turned out,
could their friendship be relied on. Thus the expanding trade with
China could be threatened by their control over the straits of Malacca
and Sunda,

* (‘urbsr. yfihn Citmfuytty tH IVftrk ( 5, Tlic ' CwuiRry' Tnidi: of

IndiiL

CH. 26 OTlTISil BEGINNINGS IN MALAYA 4^3

All kinds of projects for combating ibis difficultj' came under con¬
sideration from time to time. One, which attracted the attention of
both the English and French East India Companies tov^ards the end
of the seventeenth centurj', was to occupy the island known as Pulo
Condore lying off the wcstcTn mouth of the Mekong. When the
British tried the osperimenl in 1702. however, it proved a failure.^
Another, which was fathered by the Madras authorities during the
Seven Years ’War, was to look for a site either in the Sulu islands or in
the islands immediately to the north of Borneo. 1 he idea arose out of
Cominodore Wilson's discovery in 1757-S of what came to be known
as the eastern or ‘outer* passage to China. On a voyage to China in
the Fitt he had arrived at Batavia in 1757 too late to goto China hy the
usual course through the South China Sea* He had therefore sailed
eastwards with a north-west wind through the hloluccas, and thence
by the coast of New Guinea in order to pick up the north-east wind in
ihe Pacific. With this he had then kept well to the eastwards of the
Philippines and passed between Luion and Formosa, cv’entually reach¬
ing Canton in a shorter time than by the usual route. His report on the
islands he had seen or heard of induced the Madras Secret Committee
to send Alexander Dalrymplc in the Cttiidalmre to establish relations
with the Bugis Sultan of Sulu and seek for an establishment some-
where in his dominions. He was also to report on the harbour used by
traders in the Nicobars.

Dalrymple left Madras in 1759, On i8 January 1761 he ennebded
a treaty of friendship and commerce with the Sultan of Sub, under
which the Company was granted permission 10 purchase g^und for
a trading station on condition that it would assist the Sultan if he were
attacked. In the following November be made a separate agreement
with the Dato Bendahara, who was the principal merchant in Sulu,
whereby he was to bring a cargo of Indian goods, in exchange for
which he was to obtain a cargo of Sulu goods for sale in China. He
expected to make a profit of 41^ psr cent on his original outlay. It
seems doubtful if the venture realixcd the hopes placed in it, but
bis Second voyage, made in 1762 in order to carry it through,
enabled him to make up his mind as to the most suitable site to become
the Company's headquarters for trade in the Malay .Archipelago*^ This
was the island of Balambangan in the Sulu Sea. just thirteen milej
distant from the most northerly point of Borneo.

In Scpteml'ier 1762 he made a treaty with the Sultan of Sulu for the
cession of the island, and shortly aftcrw'ards went there and hoisted

1 Sk alKivc, chap. 22 k V-

iXmOPEAN TEBaiTORlAL EXPANSIOS

PT. in

4^6

the UniDH Jack. In that same year Manila uas captured from the
Spauuird^ by Combh and Draper's expediuon coming from Madras^
Dalry^mplct who present at the capture of the city, found that the
legitiruate Sultan of Suly, Alimud Din^ was a prisoner there^ and that
the suJtan^ Bantila, with whom he had been dealing was a usurper.
The legitimate suftan was so delighted at being set at liberty by the
British that he gladly conhrmed all Bantila^s eDn€essioti:&^ DalrympleT
to whom fell the task of restoring him to his throne^ was able to
negotiate with him a new treaty' containing still larger cessions of
territory. But It was some time before he could take any steps towards
rcali^mg them in practice^ for under the TriKity of Paris {1763), which
ended the Seven Years War, Manila was to be restored to Spain, and
in 176+ he w as appointed prodsional deputy governor for the purpose
of superintending the transfer. After carrying out this task he paid a
visit to Canton before returning to Madras.

To his great disappointment Madr-aa accorded a Cold reception to his
proposals. He accordingly returned to England in 1765^ hoping to per¬
suade the directors of the East India Company to ratify his treaty and
establish a settlement on Balambangan. They, however, wanted a site in
a much less remote region, 'l^hey were particularly interested in Achch
in Sumatra, and missions had been sent there in 1762 and r76_|_ But the
sultan was unswervingly hostile to any plan for a European fort to be
erected in his country. Attempts to find a suitable site were made in the
Sun da Straits and to the south of themn But the search was fruitless.

The failure of all the$e attempts made the directors more amenabk
to Dalrytnple^fl arguments* Moreover, in 1767 he published a pamphlet^
*An Account of Discoveries in the South Pacific Ocean before t764\
which probably helped his cause. Soon afterwards he applied for the
command of the expedition fitted out in 176S by the Admiralty to
observe the transit of the planet Venus, but was turned dow'n by i^ord
Hawke in fa vour of Captain James Cook. Then it was that the directors
decided to plant a settlement on the island of Balatnbangan and
offered him the management of it*

Dalryinplc* who, according to Sir John Laughton/ held a higher
opinion of the value of his Ker\'iocs than other people* now mined his
chances of leading the expedition by quarrelling violently with the
direefurs regarding his powers^ and further by publishing his version
of the controversy in pamphlet form.* He had been turned down by

■'An Accoujit uf whit pA'Ucd between ilic hidiA Coini>Mfi>- JJirrctof^ ami

Alexander DBlr^'itipIc',

BRITISI] beginnings IN MALAYA

427

cii. z6

Lord Hawke for demanding a Royal Na^-y commission. Now he
insisted that the absolute management of the venture should he vested
in him without control. The quarrel culminated in March 177 * with
bis dismissal on the grounds that he had failed to pay due deference
and obedience to the Court of Directors.*

The plan for a settlement, however, was actually carried through;
in December 1773 the Britannia, under the command of Captain John
Herbert, arrived at Balambangan to establish a settlement there,
Herbert's mismanagement of the business entrusted to him was
scandalous, but it was not the cause of the ignominious end of the
settlement a little more than a year after its foundation. I’he island
tvas found to be in the heart of a pirate-infested region, and in
February 1775 the settlement was surprised and completely wiped
out by Sulu pirates. Herbert and a few survivors got away to Brunei.
They persuaded the sultan of that state to cede the Ldand of Lahuan
to the East India Company, and in April 1775 actually took possession
of it. In the following Novemher. however, they were withdrawn
under orders from the direclor&^

The Balamfaangan scheme vnis to be revived.later under very
different circumstances. But even if it had succeeded it would not
have solved the naval problem of the defence of British interests
in the Indian Ocean. It would have assisted the China trade and
provided an entrepot for the trade of the Malay world. There were,
however, those who hoped to find a place which would satis^^ all three
requirements. In 1769 Francis Light came forward as an exponent
of this school of thought. He suggested that the island of Bintang,
south of Singapore, was from this point of view the best place for a
settlement.

Light was a merchant captain in the service of the firm of jourdain,
Sullivan and De Souaa of Madras, which carried on trade with the
ports in the Straits of Malacca. Like so many of the ‘country- captains'
of his time, he was an ex-naval officer. He bad an intimate knowledge
of the various Malay states, and the pressure he brought to bear upon
the East India Company did at last attract its attention to the region in
which he wras interested. In 1771 the director instructed Madras tn
inquire into the nature of the trade that private firms were carrying on
with Acheh, Kedah and other places nearby, and consider making a
further approach to the Sultan of Acheh.

’ Tlic BilainbUHKIui •tvry lit* been t<Jd by jDluinn« WilJl nf Cab in Tkr tiorty
Rrifttima Ettglanii niiA Bomto fo f&»J II- Ofwl SShne, Ijai),

B tluscrtdtion lubmiltDfd to ihc Univertity of Beme for tiw doetpr* degree.

ITLTRDPEAN" TEanlTOKlAL EXPANSION

FT* 11]

428

Madras was natiirsHy sceptical of the prospects of doing anything
in Acheh, hut w^hen^ in 1771, Light was iti Kedah he found the sultan
very anxious to secure European help against the neighbouring state
of Clangor, whose forces had invaded his territor}\ At Light's sug¬
gestion he wrote a letter to the Governor of Madras, hut received a
noncommittal reply. Light therefore wrote to his firm asking them to
let [-'ort St, George know that in return for help the sultan was willing
to cede the port of Kedah to the Company. Then^ finding that this
drew no respottse from the Fort St. George authorities^ and fearing lest
the Dutch might get wind of the proposal, he WTOte on j 7 January 1772
direct to ^Varren Hastings urging immediate acceptance of the ofier.

\Mien at last, as a result of alt this pressure, Madras did act, it sent
accredited agents to both Acheh and Kedah. Both missions failed.
The Sultan of Achch refused m discuss the'proposals submitted to
him hy Charles Desvoeux. The Sultan of Kedah, on the other hand,
was only too anxious to co-operate in return for a guarantee of as¬
sistance in case of an attack by Selangor Light negotiated an agree-
menl in such terms, and knowing well that the Company would refuse
to accept anything involving military commitments, yet at the same
time convinced the mere promise of help would be suffidcni to deter
any would-be aggressor, skilfully persuaded the Madras agent, the
Hon* Edward iMonckton, to initial it. But the Madras Council flatly
refused to confirm the agreement, offering as thetr excuse a baseless
rumour that the Sultan of Selangor, in anticipation of trouble* had
called upon the Dutch fur help. And although Monckton went on to
sound the rulers of Trengganu and Riau, it was to no purpose, since
The stuttering boy\ as the disappointed Sultan of Kedah dubbed himi
could not bind the Company to the one condition without which no
Malay ruler would grant the facilities sought.

For iw'elve years l^ight^s project languished^ It was^ of course,
shortly after the failure of the missions of Deavoeux and Monckton
that tite ill-starred attempt to settle on Balambangan was made, "["hen
followed the ^Var of American Independence w^ilh the consequent
revival of the Anglo-French struggle, not to mention the fourth Anglo-
Dutch war tif 17S0-4. Warren Hastings was far too harassed with
other mattes^ to pay attention to the project' and although Light saw
him personally in Calcutta in 17S0, and this time urged the occupation
of Junk Cevlon, where he had settled as a private trader on his own
account, neither troops nor money could he spared,

'The renewed war with France was soon ti> furnish Hoistings with
fresh tjbject lessons, if indeed he needed anVi of the dangers to which

€1L

BRITISil aEGJN^’lNGS TN MAL^VA

429

the Coromandel Coast %vas exposed when French naval operations were
directed by a leader as redoublahlt as de Suffren, Between February and
September 17B2 the French admiral fought a series of four indecisive
engagements with Sir Edward Hughes, Then he took his fleet off to
pAcheh Roads to refit. Hughes remained off the Coromandel Coast
in case his opponent should dedde on yet another attack. He stayed
too long. In the middle of October his squadron was so severely
damaged by a hurricane that he had to make hb way to Bombay to
refit. Before he could return in the following year* de Sufl^ren had
driven British commerce out of the Bay of Bengal and nearly succeeded
in blockading Calcutta.

Another interesting incident occurred in 1783. The French Arro¬
gant and the British I Vr/'cribur fought a duel, after which the former
pm into Mergui to refit* while her rival had to go all the way to Bom¬
bay. Thus does Mergui return to the picturt. It had been wrested
from Siam by Alaungpaya in 1759. Bui its importance w as slight now
that it was no longer the gateway from the Indian Ocean to Siam.
The capture of the French settlements during the w-ar had led to the
abandonment of the French dockyard at Rangoon^ Mauritius there¬
fore developed a dose connection with MerguL This was to cau$e the
British further trouble during the struggle tvith revolutionary France
w^hieh began in 1793.

As soon as the Peace of Versailles wa$ concluded in 1783, Hastings
himself began to take positive act ion. In 17S4 a further agent* Kinloch,
was sent to Acheh, white another^ l-orrest, went to Riau. Several
other sites also came under review^ — the Andamans, the Nicobars.
Trincomalee in Ceylon, and the Hugh. In t7S5 the directors appointed
a committee to examine the New^ Harbour in the Hugh* After sitting
for three years they reported that not only was the site unsuitable for
a naval base but also there was not one an)wvhcre on the Indian side
of the Bay of Bengal.

Meanwhile both the mission & sent to the other side of the bay in
1784 had failed. The Sultan of Acheh. when approached about the
base previously used by the French, was as hostile as ever. The Sultan
of Kiau was under effective Dutch control. For the Dutch, thoroughly
alarmed by thetr naval wcaknessi in the 'Fourth English War', were
engaged upon a series of efforts to restore their supremacy in Indo¬
nesian waters, Forrest therefore found himsdf forestalled at Riau by-
van Braam^s squadron.

It was at this juncture that 1 right came forward vrith his suggestion of
Penang, The acting Governor-General of India, Sir John Maepherson*

EUROPEAN TERRITORIAL EXPANSION

PT. Ill

43<=

had his eye on Junk Ceylon, but Light persuaded him that
Penang was preferable, [t was closer to the Straits of Malacca and
only a week's sail from the Coromandel Coast. Maepherson recom¬
mended the scheme to the directors and suggested the appo-intment of
Light as superintendent of the proposed settlement. The directors
agreed, but made it quite clear that they did not regard the occupation
of the island as a solution of the naval question. To them it was a
move towards breaking the Dutch mono poly ^ a means of helping
Malay rulers tn resist rDutch artempta to ensbve them*, and of
securing the greater safety of the China shipping. Naval opinion for
another ten years considered the Andamans preferable as a base. In
17S6 the island was occupied by agreement with the Sultan of Kedah.^
It w^as during the war with revolutionary France that naval opinion
changed in favour of Penang. 'Fhe French invasion of the Nether¬
lands, and the consequent issue of the ^Kew Letters' of February'
1755, led to the British occupation of a large number of Dutch forts
and factories, including Malacca, Amboma, Banda and the stations on
the west coast of Sumatra. Penang and Bencoolen were used as bases
for the naval expcfiitions carrying out these operations. And when in
1797 it was decided to send an expedition commanded by Arthur
Wellesley to destroy Spanish shipping at Manila in the Philippines,
Penang was its rendezvous^ Wellesley himself sent a highly favourable
report on the place to the Government of India. Every possible effort
was made to divert the trade of captured Malacca to Penang, and in
tSoo, in order to develop its harbour, the territorj' opp<>siie on the
mainland was purchased from the Sultan of Kedah and became
Province Wellesley. The height of the boom period in the hopes
cherished for the port was reached in 1805, when it was raised to the
status of a fourth Indian presidency+

Then came gradual disillusiori- Raffles, who arrived there as
assistant secretary in September 1805^ was not long in realising that
it by too far to the west of the Archipelago to become a great trading
centre for the islands: the pirate-infested watera of the Straits were
too grave a deterrent to native shipping. Moreover, so far as the
Dutch empire was concemedi Penang was ‘ outside the gates '. Malacca
lay in the narrowest part of the Straits, and in iSoS, when he visited
the efty, he was shocked by the efforts that were being made to destroy
it as an emporium in favour of Penang. As a naval base also Penang
ultimately justified the scepticism expressed by the directors in 1786.
Dockyards could not be built there and the local tifiihcr was unsuitable

^ Infra, ch^p, 17, i.

HL 26

BRITISH IN l-tAlAVA

43 ^

for shipbuilding. In iSio Malacai was the centre from which+ as
agent-general for Lord Minto, Raiflrs organised the oonquest of Java,
and in the following year the rendm^ous of the expedition which
carried Out the operation. In 1812 the plan for making Penang a naval
station was Snally abandoned.

By that time Raffles, as Lieuteriant-Govemorof Java and its depen¬
dencies, was already planning the permanent substitution of British
for Dutch rule throughout the Maby Archipelago, iind the whole
situation had become revolutionized. When later lus dream was
shattered by the decision of the home government to restore the
Netherlands Indies to the new kingdom of the United Netherlands,
and the disappointed empire-builder was relegated to Bencoolen, the
new" scheme that began to take shape in his fertile brain envisaged
once more the acquisition of a station that should be * inside the gates'
of the Dutch empire.

There were notv several schemes in the air. If may go back a
few years* the Treaty of Amiens of 1802 had provided for the re$iora-
tion to the Dutch of all the powers and privileges they had possessed
before the year 1795- But the British possession of the Moluccas had
proved of great value to the China trade. Hence in 1803, when faced
with the necessity of handing them back, Lord Wellesley, the Governor-
General of India, decided to rcoccupy the island of Balambangan, It
had a good harbour for sheltering and provisioning a fleet in the
eastern seas* and he thought it might be a useful place from which to
keep a watch upon die Dutch in the Moluccas and the Spanish in the
Philippines.

Accordingly R. J- Farquhar, the British Resident st Amboina, on
receiving instructions to restore that island to the Dutch* was told to
take charge of an expedition to resettle Balambangan* This he accom¬
plished at the end of September 1803. Then on 7 December he w^ent
on to Penang to become its lieutenant-governor, leaving behind a com¬
missioner in charge of the settlement. In the course of the next year
BaJambangan was placed under the jurisdiction of Pcnang+ and Far-
quhar drew' up an outline scheme for the complete reorganization of
British trade in the Malay ArchipelagOp It involved the fortifleation of
Halambangan and the formation of a network of treaties w^ith all the
rulers of the Archipelago.

In 1805, how^ever, the settlement was abandoned. The Court of
Directors had vetoed Wellcaky's plan to reoccupy the ialand as goon
as the information reached them. I'he renewal of ^var with France
and the Batavian Republic involved the reoccupation of the Dutch

FI'HOPEAN TEWRllOltrAL EXPANSION

PT. Ill

43 ^

islands and settlementSp and troops and ships could noE be sp^ired for
such a venture.. Farquhar protrsLtrd against the abandonment of the
island and commented bitterly upon the Company's indifference to
the problem of piracy. But the attention of the Board of Directors was
concentrated upon India^ and cx^ry question was examined purely in
the light of its bearing upon the British position there. Men such as
Raffles and Farquhar, with a South-East .4sian, as distinct from an
Indian, uutlook. laboured under a severe handicap.

Thus when the decision was made to restore the Dutch empire not
only Raffles but Farquhar as well was on the Jook-out for a station
' Inside the gatesh In i8i8 while Resident at Malacca* Farquhar cast
his eye on the west coast of Borneo. The Dutch* however, got w ind of
his intentions and forestalled him at Pontianak. the only feasible place
hir his purpose. He also visited Riau and advised the Bugis under¬
king to summon BrUbh help immediately if the Dutch attacked.

In that same year Raffles paid a visit to Calcutta and won over the
govemor-genetah the Marquess of Hastings* to his project for estab¬
lishing *a station beyond Malacca, such as may command the southern
entrance to those*Sirails\ Riau was the place that both had in mind.
But in case the Dutch were to forestall him* as they had Warren
Hastings's agent Forresi in 17S4, Raffles was instructed to ^open a
negotiation with the Chief of Johore^ for a site in hLs dominions.
Furthermore^ before dealing with the southern end of the Straits
he was to mate one more effort to persuade Achch to permit the
Company to plant a settlement.

On arrival at Penang Raffles learnt that the Dutch had beaten him to
Riau. Bannerman, the governor, was violently opposed to the whole
scheme. Raffles therefore decided that no time must be lost in carr)nng
out the plan for a station to the south of the Siraits! ihc Acheh negotia-
liuna must wait. He accordingly sailed southwards, picking up on his
way Colonel Farquhar, who. having surrendered Malacca to the
Dutch, had been instructed by Calcutta to postpone his departure on
furlough and join with Raffles In hi$ mission.

Farquhar's suggestion was to try the Carimon fsbnds at the csttremc
sKJuthcm end of the Straits. But they were found unsuitable. So also
was Siak on the coast of Sumatra. So they sailed for Johore. and on
the ^ay. ^either by accident or design'* says Swettenham,^ landed on
the island of Singapore on 28 January 1819. Raffles at once decided
that here was the ideal site for his purpose. 'I'he Malay chief there
was the Date Temenggong of Johore. He was willing to permit the

^ p. 6^,

cii. 26

BRITISH aEGINNlN<;=3 IN MALAYA

433

British to plaat 2 scttlenricnt nn thts island^ and two days later a ^Pre¬
liminary Agreement’ was signed by both parties. It was clear^ how¬
ever, that this could only Itave force of law if confirmed by the Sukan
of Johore. The question was^ who was the Sultan of Johore?

It will be recalled that at the end of the eighteenth century the
empire of Johore had split into three main division^.^ The sultan had
become the puppet of the Bugis Raja Muda^ the Governor of Rian,
and hia effectual rule was limited to the Riau-I.ingga Archipelago. The
sultanas continental dominions were divided between two great officers
of state, the Temenggong of Johore and the Bcndahara of Pahang, In
1803 Sultan Mahmud II had installed the Bugis Raja Ali as Raja
Muda, or under-kiiig, and entrusted him wdth the guardianship of his
yuudger son^ I'engku Abdur-Rahman, The elder son, flussein^ who
was hia destined aucceaadt^ he had entrusted to Engku Aiuda to bring
up. The ynuBg man had married a sister of the tcmenggong and a
daughter of tlie bendahara, and, as Winstedt puts it^ Mahmud had^
by marrying him to relatives of the two greatest Malay chiefs in the
empire, clearly planned to enable him as emperor to maintain the
balance of power against the Bugis.®

While Hussein was away in Pahang in iSia.for the celebration of
his marriage with the bendahara’s daughter * however, Sultan Mahmud
died, and Raja Ja'far^ who had succeeded Raja Ali as under-king,
persuaded Tengku Abdur-Rahnian to accept the throne. When Hus¬
sein returned home he was unable to recover his rights, x'^nd the
Dutch, in obtaining control over Riau in iBiS, ignored him and made
their treaty with Abdur-Rahman. Raffles ascertained that the pro¬
visions of the treaty applied only to Riau+ and concluded that the
Dutch could lay no claim to Singapore* He chose^ therefore, to regard
fiussein as the rightful sovereign and invited liim to be installed at
Singapore as Sultan of johore.

Hussein had no difficulty in leaving Riau, where he had been living
in poverty, and on 6 February 1819 tvas proclaimed sultan at Singa¬
pore. On the same day he and the temenggong signed a treaty con¬
firming the 'PreUminary Agreement" made un 3,0 January. In return
for granting the East India Company liberty to plant factories in his
dominions, he was to receive an annual allowance of 5*000 dollars and
the temenggong one of 3iOOO* *

Thus did Raffles acquire Singapore for Britain. He instailcd Far-
quhar as its first governor and Avrotc home; *\\'hat Malta is in the
West, that may Singapore become in the East/

* thiip. 17. ■ lliilcry af

CHAPTER ^7

THE STRAITS SEITLEMENTS AND BORNEO, 1766-1867

(a) From the acqumtion &/ Pemtig to the Aftglo-Duick ireaiy of 162+

When Francis Light took of the island of Penang on 11

August 1786 and rernmed it Prince of Wales Island he and Sir John
Maepherson, the acting Governor-General of India^ were under no
illusions regarding the fact that the young Sultan of Kedah made the
grant almost entirely for the sake of obtaining assistance to maintain
Ids independence.^ This had been made perfectly dear in a letter
written in the previous year by the sultan to the Government of Indist
wherein be explained the terms upon which he was willing to permit
the British to settli^on the klatidp In accepting the grant the Gnvem-
ment of India sent the sultan assurances so worded as to induce him
to believe that it also accepted the obligation involved. Light himself
certainly hoped, possibly believed, that the sultan could count on the
assistance of the Company should the kind of occasion arise that was
envisaged, namely an attack by Siam. Soon after taking nver he
assured the sultan that while the British Avere there thc}^ would assist
him if distressed.

Neverthdissa in January 17S7 the Government of India decided not
to make a defensive alliance with Kedah. And although for the rest of
his life Light continued to urge that the Company Avas in honour
bound to grant the sultanas request, and the auitan himself became so
lingrj' that in 1791 he made an abortive attempt to espd the British
from Penang, the Company firmly maintained its attitude. The
matter assumed real importance in iSzij when Siamese forces invaded
Kedah, drove out the suhon, and indulged in an orgy of frightfulness
against his subjects. The Company refused to assist him; and not¬
withstanding the series of definite refusals by the Company from 1787
onwards to commit iteelf to a defensive agreement, the sultan con¬
tended that it had broken its word to him.

^ The maUET m dcoJt with It lenatJi in Sir Frujik Swctttnham., Brtiiih pp*

36-54; L. Ah MilLii Brimh pp, 53^41: “id Sit Richard Winitedi,

A IlUtory 0/ pp. 174-83.

434

ca. ^7 THE STUAITS SETTLEMENTS AND BORNEO, r 786-1867 +35

The most striking thing is that his contention was supported by a
number of British officials, among whom were John Anderson, Robert
Fullerton and Raffles himself* besides the great majority of non-
offlda) Europeans in Malaya^ From the point of view of strict legality
the sultan was undoubtedly wrong, but there citn be equally no doubt
that In i^ceupying Penang the Company assumed a moral responsi¬
bility towards Kedah Avhich it shamefully refused to recognize, and
thereby* to quote Swettenham's wordSt 'sullied the British name and
weakened m influence mth the Malays for many yeanj\ To a practical
man such as Light the Company's attitude wus heyond comprehension.
"Two companies of sepoys/ be wTote to the governor-general, "with
four six-pounder field pieces* a supply of small arms and ammunition,
will effectually defend this country against the Siamese." lih own
belief was that neither Siam nor Burma would attack Kedah so long
as they thought that Britain would support the sultan. The history of
Siamese relauona with the Malay sultanates in the nineteenth century
goes far to show tlial his confidence was justified.

'I'he original agreement under which Penang was occupied by the
British did not take the form of a treaty. When in* 1791, after Light
had defeated the sultan*s weak effort to retake the island, he signed a
treaty ceding it in return for a pension of 6,000 dollars a year, the
document contained no prorision for the protection of Kedah by the
Last India Company, In iSoo a second treaty made by which
the suhan ceded a strip of land on the opposite rnmnland, and his
pension was raised to J:0*000 dollars a year. Again there was no
mention of a defensive alliance. The Company merely bound itself
to refuse shelter to rebels or traitors from Kedah and to protect the
coast from 'enemies, robbers or pirates* that might attack it by sea,
q^he omission, however* did not mean that the sultan had abandoned
his claim to protection. He had defined his position in his original
letter of 1785 laying down the conditions upon which he was prepared
to permit the occupation of the island.

The question of whether Kedah in 17S6 was an independent stale
and had the power to cede territory to the East India Company has
also been the subject of much debate. The fact that Siam could dlegc
ancient claims to overlordship over the whole of the Pensinsula and
the states therein is of no consequence. China could make ^milar
claims to the whole of South-East jksia, mduding Siam herself. Burma
in 1786 actually ckimed the allegiance of Siam by virtue of conquest as
recent as 1767 and waa attempting to vindicate her claims by force of
arms. Kedah sent the Bunga Mas* the ornamental plants with leaves

4^6 E 11 R 0 PJL\N TtttRITORlAL EXPANSJOS PT, Ul

and flowers of gold and sil ver, ihrev years to the Siamese capital.

She might abu he called on for contributions of men and money. But
such obligations must not be judged by European ideas of intemationaJ
law. They were common practice throughout Indo-China; weaker
states vvould undertake them towards stronger neighbours as a form
of insurance against interfererice ; often^ as in the ease of Cambodia in
her relations with Siam and Vietnam^ with more than one superior
simultaneously, Eicaclly what the Bunga Mas signified cannot be
precisely defined, but Siam herself in sending it tricnnially to Peking
would have flouted the notion that she thereby demonstrated that she
was not an independent state. So much depended upon circum¬
stances. In lySh Siam had long before expelled her Burmese con¬
querors, but wa$ still in no position to pursue a fonvard policy in
Malaya. Kedah w'as thus to all practical purposes independent. But
Siam was recovering rapidly and was soon to make a powerful effort
to assert her pretension^ over the states of Malaya.

Under rranda Light as its first superintendent until his death in
1794 the new settlement flourished. Immigrants flowed in steadily,
and die system o£ free trade^ which was in force up to iSos:* enabled
it rapidly to become a valuable distribution centre, where the products
of India and Britain were exchanged for Straits produce such as riccj
tin, spices, rattans, gold dust, ivoiy, ebony and pepper. In rySg the
total value of its imports and exports amounted to £53,59^ Spanish
doJJars and five years later was nearly double this figure. Light was
anxious to introduce the growth of spices. His attempts to grotv
cloves, nutmeg and cinnamon tailed, but with his encouragement and
financial support a Chinc?s<r introduced pepper plants from Achch, and
the experiment w^s ultimately crowned with success. Penang^s chief
weakness lay in the fact that it could not produce enough food for its
increasing population. Its dangerous dependence upon Kedah for
supplies w as one of the reasons for the acquisition of territory' on the
mainland in iSoo^ The hope was that suflictent rice Could be grown
iri Province Wellesley, as the new territory was named, to make it
independent of foreign imports.

l.ight had had no previous experience of administration. He alien¬
ated land unconditionally and hittiself appropriated large estates. Xo
land ifias reserved for public purposes and there w'as no land revenue.
Ow 4 ng to the heavy mortality rate much land came upon the market,
only to he bought up by the firm of Light's friend, James Scott, which
had almost a monopoly of the import and export trade and of banking.
Not until 1S07 did Penang have legally established courts or a code of

Cll, ZJ TOE STRAITS ^FrVLE^%TS^ A?iD BOIlXEO. I7S6-1867 4J7

law. The Government of India iti *788, and again in 17941 issued a
few general rules laying down the mode of trial in criminal cases and
the nature of the punishments. Light had to preserve order by im¬
prisonment and other common punishments. He could not deal with
murder or offences by British subjects. Each nationality on the island
had its own system of bw^ and petty civil cases were tried by the
captains of the different communities, Cluncse, Malay or Tamil. More
important ones were dealt with by the superintendent's European
assistants. Not a single magistrate was a trained b^vyer until John
Dickens, a Calcutta barrister, was sent to the settlement in iSoo. He
stated that the only law in force was the Jaw of naturet a later com-
mentator more appropriately described iL as a rough-and-ready appli¬
cation of the dictates of common sense. In 1807, after over twenty
years of chaosi, the directory obtained the sanction of the British
Parliament to establish a Recorder's Court at Penang. Along with it
British civil and criminal bw^ w^as introduced, subject to the proviso
that in its procedure the court must consult native religions and
usages in so far as they were compatible with the spirit of English
latv.

From 17S6 until 1803 Penang was a dependency of Bengal. During
the early part of this period the Company was unable to make up its
mind whether the island W'as suitable for a naval base. The capture
of Malacca in 1795 raised expectations that its trade would be trans¬
ferred to Penang* its use in 1797 as a rende^ous for the force in¬
tended for an expedition against ManiJap and Arthur Wellesley's
glowing recommendation, caused opinion as to its prospects to swing
over from cautious hesitation to extravagant optimism. At last the
much-sought-for site for a naval base had been found. Hence the
acquisition of Province Wellesley in 1800 10 give control over both
sides of the harbour and make Penang as far as possible independent
of external food supplies.

In 1805, Avhen hopes for the future of the island were at their
highest, but when there were no public bulliiingis save temporary
structures, no schools, no proper legal system, and the settlement was
far from pa)dng its w^ay, it was raised tu the rank of a fourth Indian
presidency with mure than Mxy officials, among whom wTre cove¬
nanted civil sert^ants from India. Naturally the extravagant hopes soon
began to give way to disappointment and disillusion. The harbour
was excellent, but It \vas found to be quite unsuitable for a naval base.
Dockyards could not be constructed there, and Burma w^as the nearest
source of good timber. Then its commerce did not develop according

EUROPEAN TESRrrORlAL BtPANSION

PT. Ilf

43S

to expectation. It was badly placed for trade wth the Archipelago;
it was too far to the west for native ve^ls to run the gauntlet of the
pinte-infested waters of the Straits w hen nearer harbours were avail¬
able, As these disadvantages became clearer so did official alarm at the
cost of its upkeep increase. For it had far too many officials and an
average deficit of £80,000, Some pruning took place in 1836 when
Malacca and Singapore were transferred from Rengal to Penang, and
the presidency of the Straits Settlements was formed. Four years
later, however, the presidency waa abolished. The Straits Settle¬
ments become a Residency under the Go%'emnr and C-ouncil of Bengal.
Then in 1S32 thdr capital was transferred to the rapidly developing
Singapore.

The history of Malacca under British rule during the Napoleonic
period has yet to be written. In the year before the outbreak of the
French Revolution an Anglo-Dulcb treaty was signed which provided
that should a European war break out either party might occupy the
colonies of the other as a defence against a common enemy, It w-as in
accordance with this agreement that the exited Stadhouder, William
V, signed the * Kew Letters’ in February 1795 authoriang the Dutch
colonies to admit British forces, to prevent them from falling into
French hands* The consequent British occupation of Malacca was
unopposed by the Dutch. The Dutch governor and troops left, bur
the council was retained in order that the administration might be
continued in accordance with Dutch methods. .Already Malacca’s
population had declined to r,500 compared with Penang's level of
20,000 reached in that year.

Not only w as everything possible done to attract trade from Malacca
to Penang, but in British hands the opportunity was seized of demolish¬
ing the splendid old fort A Kamosa lest one day the British might have
to attack the city. Even more vandalism might have been committL-d
had not Raffles gone on a holiday there from Penang in tSoS and
written a report which, as Wtnstedt puts it, saved Malacca. Inci¬
dentally he vastly overestimated its strategic value when he advised
the Company that it should be retained 'until we are actually obliged
10 give it up'. Malacca wa* to have been restored to the Dutch under
the Treaty of Amiens (1802), hut the war with Napoleon started up
again before it was handed over, and it was not until 1818 that the
Dutch received it back.

Raffies's visit to Malacca in 180S had more important corscquencea
than the salvaging of an ancient city, for hia report aroused the interest
of Lord Mlnto, the Governor-General of India, in its writer and led

Cll. zj THE STRA^tTS SETTLEMENTS AXP BORNEOp 1786-1867 4^9

to hh iippointment in 1810 as Governor-Generarg Agent to the Malay
States. His task was to soften up Java's rabtance to the projected
British invasion by establishing relations with native rulers. Thus
was the way prepared for his reimirkablc career and its greatest
achievement, the foundation of Singapore.

The difficulties which beset the new settlement in 1819 w^ere for¬
midable. Not only might ^rious Dutch opposition be expected, but
there were many on Rafflea's own side who were more than capable
of selling the pass. Some of his old colleagues in Penang were so
jealous of hifi meteoric rise that they liad done their utmost to prevent
him from carrying out his scheme to pJant a settlement south of the
Straits, ColoneJ Banncrman, the Governor of Penang, who had tried
hard to persuade him to abandon the scheme, was so consumed with
jealousyp both of Raffles and of what he rightly suspected w^as to prove
a successful rivaJ to Penang, that when, in fear of a Dutch attack^
Colonel Farquhar,. the Resident of SingapMjre, appealed to him for
reinforcements he refused them. He even ^vent so far as to urge
Farquhar to abandon the place, and to advise Lord Hastings to restore
it to the Dutch, who* he averred^ were its lawful owners.^

'Phe Dutch, as might have been expected, protested in the strongest
possible terms against Raffles's action. But their arguments regarding
the \-alidity of their claims did not convince the govemor-generalr
though he was extremely annoyed with Raffles for involving him in a
quarrel with them. And their bluff, together with Bannennan^s
obvious jealousy^ made him only the more decided that an immediate
withdrawal could not be countenanced. He delivered the Governor
and Council of Penang $0 crushing a rebuke that they despatched the
required reinforcements at once to Farquhar. And he also saved the
exasperated directors from allowing their feelings about RafHcs's/mV
uccompli to get the upper hand to such an extent as to give an order
which they would have deeply repented afterwards.

For it soon became obvious that Singapore had a great future.
Never again would the Dutch be able to build up a monopoly such as
they had once exerciiMsd; Singapore as a free-trade port would break
the s^pelL No longer would it be possible for them to close the Straits
in the cvcnl of war and threaten the China trade. By June 1S19 the
population numbered over 5,000, aud a year later it w'as consitTerably
above 10,000.* And right from the start the Chinese formed the great

' L. A. Mkllii, JS24-1S67, p. 60.

*■ T. BmddeiL in iSwtufia oj iht BriHih in tiit Straits 45/ Mttfacca (1861),

lltiltks Uinti fl^urta^ which repreMni uwn nnigh calciikriue, mi EXMe^rtliQn,

440 EURDS'EAN TERRITORIAL EKRANfilON FT. HI

majority* Trade increased at an amazing rate; in ihe vaJue of
impcirts and export^ totalled well over 13 ttiillion dollai^. More con¬
vincing even, from the point of view of a government perhaps a little
too much concerned with immediate questions of profit and loss, was
the fact that by Augtjst i8zo Singapore's revenue was already adequate
to cover the costs of its administration. Elencc it may be said with
all truth that Singapore won it^ own victom The storm with the
Dutch blcw^ itself out. d'he directors changed their niindis about the
validity of the Dutch claims. .And in 1824 both sides dedded to put
an end to their constant friction in the East by making a treaty that
would fairly and squarely draw a dividing line between their respective
spheres of mfluence*

Under its first Resident, Colonel Farquhar* Singapore was adminis¬
tered subject to the general supervision of RafHes as Lieutenant-
Governor of Bencoolen. He paid his second visit there from October
182a to June 1823 and worked like a Trojan to by the foundations
of its future prosperin’. The most pressing problem was that, with itw
few ofHciab and a painfully inadequate police force, lawlessness was
rife, fie issued a r^tgubtion appointing twelve magistrates from among
the principal British merchants and drew up a provisional code of
law^ based upon English lawr, but with special pro vision for native
customs regarding such matters as religion, marriage and inheritance.
He drafted regulations for a bnd registry^ for the management of the
port, for the prevention of the slave trade^ for the police force, for the
suppression of gaming-houses and cockpits and fur an institution
which was to teach the languages of Cltina, Slam and tlie Malay
Archipelago and serve as a means to the "improvement of the moral
and inteUectua] condition of the peoples of those cpuntries\ He also
busied himself with ^remodelling and laying out my new city*, as he
put it. The w’isdom of some of his efforts as a town-planner has been
called in question, and John Craw^fiirdi whom he appointed to succeed
Farquhar in 1823^ successfully challenged the legality of his regulations
for the maintenance of law and order. But the problem was so urgent
that any stop-gap arrangement %vas better than nothing, until such
time os the directors could provide a proper It^l system. And that
svas not until 1826*

Before leaving in 1^%$ he arranged for Sultan Iluascin to receive a
pension nf 1,500 dollars a month and the temenggong Roo dollars,
h\ return for which they surrendered the monopolies and dues they
had previously imposed on trade and phiced Singapore entirely under
British control. The provisions of the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1824

cn, 27 THE STRAJtS SETTLF-MENTS AND RORSKO, 1786- 1 S67 44 1

rendered it necegaar)' tQ revise this sirrangemcnt, far both men had
cUims to territones placed finally within the Dutch sphere of in¬
fluence. Hence in August of that year Crawfurd made a treaty w hereby
the sultan and temenggong alienated the island of Singapore for ever
to the East India Company. In return the sultan received a lump sum
of 33,^™ dollars and a pension of 1^300 dollars a month for life, and
the temenggong a lump sum of 26,8oci dollars and 700 dollars a month
for life. They promised further to enter into no alliance with any
foreign power without the consent of the East India CompanVi and to
admit British eommercc freely into all the ports of Johorc on most-
fa vuu red-nation terms.

The Anglo-Dutch treaty concluded in London on 17 March 1824
represents primarily an effort on the part of the British government to
secure the friendship of the kingdom of the Dniied Netherlands in
European affairs by putting an end once and for all to the rivalry ami
hostility of the two nations in the East. As such it was the natural
consequence of the Convention of 1814, whereby the Dutch empire
in Indonesia had been restored to the new kingdom. Under its
territorial provisions the Netherlands ceded to Britain all her factories
in India, withdrew' her objections to the occupation nf Singapore,
ceded Malacca, and engaged never to form any establishment on the
Malay Peninsula or conclude any treaty with any of its rulers. The
British ceded to the Netherlands Bencuolcn and all the East India
Company's posisesaions in Sumatra, and pledged themselves never to
farm any settlement on the isIsrLd or make any treaty with any of its
rulers. I'hey gave the same undertaking with regard to the Carimon
Islands, the Riau-Lingga Archipelago or ‘any other islands south of
the Straits of Singapore*. None of the ceded territories was to be
transferred at any time to any other power, and if either of the parties
should ever abandon the ceded possessions the right of occupation
should at once pass to the Other For the future it was agreed that the
officials on both sides were to be warned * not to form any new settle¬
ment on any of the blands in the Eastern Seas without previous
authority' from their respective governments in Europe^ There was
thus a dear recognition of two quite separate spheres of infliicncc,
and of the principle that each side must refrain from interference in
the otheris sphere.

The commercial clauses of the treaty provided that the Netherlands
should make no attempt to establish a commercial monopoly in the
Archipelago and should never discriminate unfairly against
trade- Both sides agreed to grant each other most-favoured-nation

EOTOPEAN TERRtTOMAL EXPANSION

FT. Til

442

Uf^tment in India, Ceylon and the Archipelaga, and general mies
regarding the amount of cu$toms duty were laid dow'n. Moreover,
they were to make no treaties with any native mler in the Eastern Seas
aiming at e^dudixig the trade of the other party from his ports.
Britain, however^ agreed to exclude the Moluccas from the scope of
these proviftions and recognized the Dutch right to the spice monopoly
in the islands. ITie concession uras of little importance since Europe
now had other sources of supply and the trade had lost much of its
old \^ue. Finally both powers bound themselves to co-operate
effectually in repr^ing piracy.

The territorial clauses of the treaty w^re of the utmost importance
in removing one of the greatest Causes of frictioii. But for many years
aftertvards there were constant complaints that the Dutch were
evading the commercial clauses and were hampering British trade
with the Archipelago wherever possible. In a materia! sense the Dutch
were the greater gamers by the treaty^ for when it was made Sumatra
and many other islands in the Archipelago were as yet unoccupied by
them- But British policy was wise in forgoing the opportunity to
build a vast empire in the Archipelago, and in gaining thereby the
guarantee that the Dutch would refrain from all inteifetence in the
Pemnsula. On a point of detail Britain lost nothing hy giving up the
moribund station of Bencoolen and gained little by taking over the
strategically worthless Malacca- The Straits were now dominated by
Penang at one end and Singapore at the other. And the commercial
development of both ports left Malacca with only a a mall fraction of
her previous trade. Her harbour was napidly ailting, and she became
little more than a collecting centre of Straits produce for Penang and
Singapore. SriB, the exclusion of the Dutch from Malacca was a
great advantage; it had been their centre for extending control over
the Peninsulu.

Winstedt*s quip^ that the hUtoiy of Singapore is written mainly
in statistics is an apt commentary' upon the policy of its governors^
certainly up to the middle of the centurjv Their great concern was
to mcreaec its commercial importance. It throve on the policy of free
trade laid down with almost religioua fervour by Raffles. In its early
years it attracted to itself much of the commerce of the Netherlands
Indies and developed important tradmg connections with Chimit Siam,
Indo-China and the Philippines. It was cssentialiy an entrepot with
w^orld-wide connections and depended hardly at all upon the trade of
the undeveloped Malay Peninsula.

* iira/£0'V 'Frtet FJl HiifOry^ p. 60.

€Jr. 27 THE STRAITS SKTTLPMEPTTS ANt> ElOIlNKO, 1786-1867 443

With the treaty of 1S24 the ghost of the former empire of Johore was
finally laid. "Fhe Lingga or Riau Sultan, as he was called, mled over its
island possessions lying witliin the Dutch sphere, but could do nothing
to enforce his claims to Johore and Pahang. Husseiri:^ known as the
Singapore Sultaji from the fact that hc lived there, exercised no
authority wliatever. The temenggong ruled Johore and the bendahara
Pahang, and neither would allow him to interfere. The temenggong
died in 1S25 and ^vas succeeded by his able $on Tun Ibrahim.
[Jussein died ten years later, after having moved his residence to
Malacca. His son All was too young to succeed and for twenty years
the title was held in suspense. This led to a duel of claims between
the young man and Ibrahim which caused the British administration
no little embarrassment. It was settled in 1S55 by an arrangement
ceding full sovereignty' over Johore to Ibrahim* Ah received the
sultan's title^ a small strip of land between the Kesang and Muar
rivers and a pension- The title died wHth him in 1S77, the land and
pensions passing to his heirs and successonj in perpetuity.

Immediately after the occupation of Singapore Raffles had negoti- •
ated a treaty with the Sultan of Acheh. Nothing" came of it, for the
central government in the slate had broken down and the country
was passing through one of its recurrent periods of lawlessness*
Actually a flourishing trade gfe^v up between Acheh and Penang
w hich was in no way connected with the treaty' but was due to the fact
that the various vassal mjas of Acheh in asserting their independence
gladly threw open their ports to British trade. Under the x'Vnglo-
Dutch treaty of 1824 Britain agreed to abrogate Raffle^'s treaty on the
grounds that it had been designed to exclude Dutch trade frcim
Acheh. In return the Dutch guaranteed to respect the independence
of Acheh* The l^enang Council decided that it was unnecessary
to negotiate a further agreement with Acheh.

(6) T 7 je Straits Settieminis from 1824 to 1S67

'rhe period from the concliiainn of the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1S24
to the beginnings of the Residential system in Mabya has been some¬
what inappropriatety described as "a half-ccntury of inactivity Until
in 192^ L. A. Mills published his careful study entitled British MalayOj
1824-i36j it tended to be neglected, presumably because after the
heroic period of Raffles the developmenls and personalities of the

* Rupert tlmcTHtin, Attihyim, ,'J Study in irfdi/ent New York, 19^37,

EVROPEAN TEHRtTORlAL EXPANSION

PT. Ill

444

ensuing period seemed somewhal flat until the resumption of a forward
polic)' in the cighteen-s«'enties revived interest again. And, after all,
to the people of the period itself Malayan affairs seemed such very
small beer compared with the great events which were taking place in
India, or even with the struggles to open China to British commerce.
Nevertheless one has only to glance through the many volumes of
records relating to the period to realise that even if there was little
or no spectacular achievement there was plenty of actittty, and of a
sort which the historian is wise not to neglect.

Even if by ‘inactivity’ is meant the pursuit of a non-intervention
policy in native affairs, the term is misleading. If, however, it is
intended merely to indicate that the period tvas one in which Britain
made no further important territorial advances, then the same is true
of the Dutch; but even less than the British could they be described
as inactive at the time. It seems to be one of those words which
occasionally slip out from the pens of American writers and uncon¬
sciously betray their conception of British imperialism.

It was a period during which Singapore grew with astonishing
rapidity, Penang developed at a more modest rate, and Malacca
stagnated. But in addition to such things there were two out.standiog
problems, Siamese activities and piracy, which forced the East India
Company, much against its will, to pursue an active policy. Its
constantly reiterated instructions to its servants forbade them to
intervene in the affairs of the Malay states. Increase of territory was
absolutely forbidden; political alliances with the sultans were frowned
on; in fact the Company was resolutely opposed to anything w/hich
might in any way increase its responsibilities in Malaya. It was
ignurant of, or ignored, the fact that the Malay states were in a state
of chronic unrest, external and internal, and had become completely
incapable of putting theit house m order. Intervention, therefore,
could not be avoided. There was indeed constant intervention,
notwith.standing all the rules to the contrary and all the thunders of
Calcutta and l^st India House.

The situation that was mainly responsible for this was that Siam at
the beginning of the nineteenth century’had so far recovered from the
Burmese invasions that she was reviving her ancient claims to dominion
over llie whole Peninsula. Ever since her failure to prevent the rise
of the sultanate of Malacca they had been kept in cold storage. But
under the Chakri dynasty she was more powerful than at any other
lime in her history, and the Governors of Penang feared that much of
th e Pe n i nsu la would fal I under her yoke. U nder Bodawpaya Burma also

cil. ^7 Till- STRAITS ^riTLEMKNTS AND BORNEO, I7S6-1867 445

had ambitions to expand southwards at the expense of Siam into the
Peninsnla, But from about 1816 her efforts were coticcntrated on Assam
and tts neighbours and no longer constituted a serious threat to the
growing power of Siam» Still, she continued to intrigue with the ^lalay
rulers against Bangkok^ and even in tSt j threatened to invade Siani.

Bangkok^ therefore! did not lack excuses for interference in Malaya.
Had the East India Company not been so obtuse to refuse to follow
Franci$ Eight's advice regarding Kedah, it might have saved its
serv'anta a great deal of trouble at a later date. For in iSiS Bangkok
ordered the Suhan of Kedah to invade Perak^ his neighbour, and force
its sultan to send the Bunga Mas. Siam's claims to Perak were without
any foundation and there w^s no cause of quarrel between the two
Malay states. Then in the Sultan of Kedah was ordered to go to
Bangkok to answxT a number of charges^ including one of intriguing
with Burnut. When he refused to obey, a Siamese army made a
sudden attack upon his atate^^ conquered it and laid it waste with
frightful barbarities^ The sultan took refuge in Penang, Thousands
of refugees poured Into Province Wellesley, followed by the Siamese# ^
But aa ^on as a company of sepoys was sent to the scene of trouble
the Siamese fled headlong back into Kedah. The Kaja of Ligor, who
was in command of the Siamese force^ demanded the surrender of the
sultan, but the Governor of Penang flatly refused to take such a step.
The sultan, finding that the Company turned a deaf ear to his request
for help in recovering his ihrune^ got into touch with the Burmese
and preparaiioas were made for a joint attack on Siam by Burma^
Selangor and other Malay states. This so disturbed the British
authorities at Penang that they reported the matter to the Raja of I Jgor
and nothing came of the intrigue.

*rhe Siamese conquest of Kedah caused much appreliension at Pen¬
ang regarding its food supply. All attempts to nuikc the scitlement
self-sufficing had failed and it still imported most of its food from
Kcdali. For some time also Penang had been attempting to obtain
more favourable trading conditions with Siam. It had an important
trade in tin with Perak^ Patani and Junk Ceylon, all dependencies of
Siamt and difficulties had arisen in the case of Junk Ceylon, whence
its principal supply came. Hence Calcutta was persuaded to send a
full-dress mission to Bangkok to discuss all the outstanding questions.
For this task John Crawfurd was chosen. lie had already served
under Raffles in ]a\^ and was later to become Farquhar's successor
ut Singapore, He had joined the Bengal Medical Service in 1803
and had become a recognized authority on Malayan affairs.

44^ EUROPEAN tERHETORlAL EXPANSION PT. Ml

Crawfutd went to B^ingkok in iSzz with in^tmctions not only to
negotiitte but also to collect much infarmation 2^ possible about the
country. His attempts to obtain the rc&tonition of the Sultan of
Kedah and the removal of restrictions upon British trade completely
failed, hut indirectly he secured some sort of recognition of the British
possession of Penang^i His reports were of the greatest value^ as abo
the book which he subsequently published in London entitled A
Jourttal of an Embmsy from ihe C&ternQr-Ceneral of India to the
Courts of Siam and Cochin-China (iS28).^ He \vas able to show that
Siamese power was far weaker than the Penang government had
believed, and chat there was nothing to be feared from the Siamese in
Kedah^ Had the Company opposed by force the invasion of Kedah
in iSaip he said, the Siamese would have w'ithdrawn*

In 1824 the Anglo-Bimoese war began, and the Government of
India instructed the Penang authaitcles to approach Siam as a possible
ally* Penang sent a couple of envoys to try to persuade the Raja
of Ligor to send a force against Burma. They failed^ but Lieutenant
Low^ in his report on the mission explained that the raja wtis not a
semi^independent culer, as had been thought, but a Siamese official.
He warned Penang that Siam aimed at gaining control not only over
Perak but over Selangor as w^ell. When his report came into the hands
of Robert Fullerton, the energetic and capable new Governor of
Penang^ he urged Calcutta to restore the Raja of Kedah and extend
British protection to all the ihreatened Malay states against Siam.
But the Government of India refused to be swayed by his arguments.

Meanw'hile Perak had regained its independence in 1822 with the
aid of Sultan Ibrahim of Selangor. Early In ^825 Fullerton learned
that the Raja of Ligor was about to send a fleet to conquer Selangor
and Perak, ile accordingly warned the raja that the British* as the
inheritors of the previous Dutch treaiy-righta with the two stated,
might re&Ut an attack upon them. His threat went unheeded. Hence
in May 1825, on receiving news that the raja's fleet of 300 galleys was
about to set out from the Trang river, he sent gunboats to watch the
river moutb. The ruse w^as completely successful; the expediiion was
called off.

Fullerton's envoy to IJgor was Captain Burney* a nephew' of Fanny
Bumc)'^ Madame d^\^blay* He had been military secretary to the
Governor of Penang from 1818 to 1824 and had earned the praise of

^ father book on the mwtiofi inm the pm of in rmumluit, Finlayun,

publubcd tn Lfindoo in etirldcd Mitsion Siaim and jf'/tf Vapitid vf

Cochin-China, in thcycarj

CH. 27 THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS AND BORNEO, 17S&-1867 447

the Govemmcjit of India for the valuable InforDiatiori he had collected
about the politics and geography of the Malay Peninsula. His mission
to Ligor paved the way for a second approach directly to Bangkokp
w^hich Fullciton was strongly advCH:attngp and a vhit that he paid to
Calcutta after his return from Ligor convinced the governor-general
that he was the best man to go to the Siamese capital should a
decision be tiaken to follow up FuUerton^s suggestion.

Before anything w'as ftnally decided Bumey was sent again to Ligor,
where he found that the raja was now preparing to send a land force to
*help^ the Sultan of Perak against Sultan Ibrahim. Burney resorted to
the same kind of bluff aa FuUerton had previously used. He w^amed
the raja that such a move would involve a quarrel with the British and
persuaded him to sign a preliminar)' treaty promising not to attack
Perak or Sdangor in return for a British guarantee not to interfere
in Kedah. This was signed on 31 July 1825 on the understanding that
Burney would submit it personally to the Government of India, and
if it were approved would return with it to Ligor and go w'lth the raja
to Bangkok, where it would serve as a basis for the negotiation of a
settlement of issues between the Company and Siam. Burney wtis
fully aware that his action in negotiating such a treaty was completely
out of step w^iih the doctrine of non-intervention. Accordingly he wrote
to the Penang Council explaining tliat the policy he had pursued could
not be avoided and its inconveniencies would be slight "compared
with the greater evil of permitting Siam to overrun the territories of
our Selangor neighbours^ to turn the inhabitants of ihem into pirates,
and to disturb for many years all native trade\ Furthermore, it would
not entail war with Siam. In negotiating the treaty he gained a further
valuable point by persuading the Raja of Ligor to leave the Sultan of
Perak free to decide whether or not to send the Bunga Mas to Bangkok.

Governor Fullerton was delighted w ith Burney's treaty and at once
sent John Anderson to settle the disputes that had arisen between
Perak and Selangor so as to leave no way open for Ligor to break his
promise. In both states Anderson was received with enthusiasm
and concluded treaties whereby each guaranteed not to Interfere with
the other and agreed to the Bemam river as their common boundary,
Idle Raja of Ligor, however, made one more attempt to deal with
Perak. Under the pretence of sending an embassy to the suilan he
despatched a small armed force, which was a clear infraction of the
treaty. Fullerton ordered its recall, but the raja made an evasive reply,
and while the matter was still undecided news came from Calcutta
that Burney was to go as British envoy to Bangkok.

EUROPEAN TERRITORIAL EXPANSION

PT. Ut

448

The Governrnem of India fully approved the measures taken by
Bumey and FuHeitoTi, It even went so far as to ratify Burney's
preliminary treaty with Ligor. But it had no great hopes of the outcome
□f his mission to Bangkok- It chief object in sending him ^vas to
reassure the Siamese government that the British successes in the war
with Burma, and the conquest of Tenasserim, were in no w'ay a threat
to Siam, and that the East India Company had no intention of extend¬
ing its sway over the Malay Peninauia. Fullerton, who had been
authorized to add his ovra instructions 10 tho^ of Calcutta, ordered
him to deal onergeticaiJy with all the questions concerning the inde¬
pendence of the states in the area that came later under BritLsh controL

Bumey arrived in Bangkok at the end of 1825 and remained there
until June 1826. Siamese fear^ of a possible British attack were so
great that everything he did was regarded with the utmost suspicion.
But his patience and firmness achieved more than Crawfurd had
succeeded in doing. He had to permit the ministers to draft the treaty
they were at last persuaded to concede in Siamese, and they intro¬
duced into it a vagueness which stood out so prominently in the
English translation that the sceptical Fullerton refused to take any of
the concessions ai their face value^ The commerda! ebusea granted
British trade slightly more favourable terms than Crawvfurd had
managed to obtain, but were so systematically violated aftenvards by
the Siamese as to justify Fullerton's criticisms. Both sides guaranteed
Perak against attack^ recognized the sultanas right to govern his
countrj' according to his own will, and agreed that he should not be
prevented from sending the Bunga Mas to Bangkok if he desired to do
ao. Rumej' failed completely to persuade the ministers to tvithdmw
the Siamese garrison from Kedah and permit the sultan to return.
.■\nd he had to give in to their demand that the British should prevent
him from attacking Kedali and remove him from Penang to some
place w^herc he would be unable to be a nuisance to Stamp This raised
a atorm of protest in Penang* but the Government of India ratified
it and the sultan was removed to Malacca*

Inhere was almost as strong feeling against the agreement he finally
reached regarding Trengganu and Kelantan after months of wrangling^
It read:' SLim shall not go and obstruct or interrupt commerce in ihe
states of Tringano and Calantan; English merchants and subjects shall
have trade and intercourse in future with the same facility and freedom
as they have heretofore had; and the English shall not go and molest
attack or disturb those states upon any pretence whatever/^ The fact

* Ar[k:li; X11 af tlm: treaty.

trEI, 27 THE STRAITS SirrTl-FAfKNTS ASD BOKNIiO, 1786-1867 449

that nothing was said about the Bunga Mas led the critics to declare
that it amounted to an admission of their dependence upon Siam-
Burney, however, comen Jed that it gave the British the right to
prevent Siam from interfering in those states, and thus made them the
protectors of their independence. Fullerton remained unconvinced,
but the Government of India accepted Burney’s interpretation.

After Burney’s return to Penang it soon became obvious that the
Siamese did not intend to honour the agreement regarding Perak.
In September 1826, therefore, Governor Fullerton sent Captain James
Low with forty sepoys and a smaJl warship to assure the sultan that he
need not send the Bunga Mas if he had no desire to do so, and might
rely on British aid to maintain his independence. Hie sultan, who was
threatened by a pro-Siamese faction at Court and detachments of
Siamese troops in his country, was only loo glad to take a firm line
provided the British guarantee were made in the form of a treaty. To
this proposal Low readily agreed, and on 18 October 1826 signed a
treaty of alliance with the sultan. It provided that in return for
British assistance against anyone threatening his independence the
sulun would have no communication ivith Siam, Ligor, Selangor or
any other Nlalav state on political alTairs, and would refrain from send¬
ing the Bunga Mas or any other form of tribute to Siam.

This treaty, coupled with the fact that on Low’s advice the sultan
had dismissed all hia pro-Siamese officials, settled the Perak tjuestion.
The Siamese troops left the aiate and the sultan regained his independ¬
ence. But l,ow had, in his fervour for checkmating Siam, blithely
disregarded not only his instructions but also the express orders of the
Company regarding non-intervention. The grateful stiHan offered
to cede Pulo Dinding, Pangkor and other islands off the Perak coast.
And before the Government of India’s comments on Low’s actions
arrived in Penang he had placed the sultan farther in debt to the
British by destroying a pirate nc$t on the Kurau river from which
raids were being made upon Penang harbour. The pirate chief,
Nakhoda I ^din, who was captured, was as a Siamese subject sent to the
Raja of Ligor for trial. It turned out that he was a henchman of the
raja's engaged upon the task of destroying the authority of the Sultan
of Perak, aitd the enraged raja cajoled Burney into accepting a version
of the story, which when reported to Colcutta led the Government of
India to suspend Low from all political employment.

Fullerton, however, had no difficulty in proving that nothing less
drastic than Low’s action could have saved Perak's independence, and,
moreover, that Udin really was a pirate. He neatly spiked Burney’s

450 EL-BOPEAN TERRITORIAL EXPANSION PT. lU

guns by using the btter'& own report and map to demonstrate that
Kurau was in the territory of Perak. The Government of India there¬
fore revoked its censure on Low; and although tt continued for some
time to condemn his treaty as unauthorised, and never formally
ratified it, no attempt was made to negotiate a substitute. In time,
therefore, it came to be regarded as actually binding, and on no less
than three occasionsr—in 1844, 1853, and 1874—when appeals were
made under it by Perak for Eritish assistance^ both Calcutta and
London recognized its validity.

After this incident the Siamese abandoned their attempts to gain
control over the Malay states on the west coast and transferred their
atteptions to Kelantan and Trengganu on the east coast. But it was
not until much later, in i£62, that matters really came to a head there.
Over Kedah British assistance was frequently called on by the
Siamese because of the frequent attacks on them by supporters of the
exiled sultan and the alarming development of piracy, which they
could not check. The worst revolt was in 1S31 and was planned in
Penang right under the noses of the British authorilies. Governor
ibbetson by his energetic blockade of the Kedah coast gave valuable
help to the Siamese in crushing the revolt which might otherwise
have been successftil.

Again in 1S3G and 1838 Penang co-operated with the Siamese in the
ungrateful task of preventing Malays from recovering control over a
Malay state. But this series of revolts made the Siamese weary' of their
resimnee to the claims of the sultan, and when finally he was per¬
suaded by the British to offer his submission to Siam, and his son weni
to Bangkok with a letter from the Straits Government w'aming the
Siamese that they could expect no further help should another revolt
occur, the Siameiy^ government accepted the situation and in 1842
reinstated him.

In the following year, with a perversity which forcibly illustrates
what has been described as the process of hara-kiri prevalent among
the Malay states after the fall of the Johore empire^ he seized the
district of Krian from his neighbour Perak. The Sultan of Perak
would have fought, and appealed for British help under the Low
treaty. But the Govemmeni of the Straits Settlements persuaded
him to hold his hand, and eventually in 1848 compelled Kedah to
restore the occupied territory.

Meanwhile Kelantan and Trengganu were struggling against the
slow- but persistent pressure of Siamese efforts at control Kelantan
was stated in 1836 to have 'almost succumbed to the Siam^ yoke\

CH. Z’J THE STRAITS SETTLEMESTTS AMD BORNEO, 1786-1867 451

'I'renggana for some lime offered a successful resistance to the devious
and obscure manceuvres which characterised Siamese policy, 'rbcu
in 1858 there broke out in Pahang one of those family quarrels which
have so often changed the history of states in South-£ast Asia.. 1 he
hendahara of Pahang died and his two sons fought for the inheritance.
Colonel Cavanagh, the Governor of the Straits Settlements, offered
mediation, since the Singapore merchants were complaining of
stoppage of trade, but his offer was rejected, and finally in the middle
of t86l the elder drox^e the younger son out. He made his w'ay to
Bangkok, where he found another refugee pretender, a Sultan of
Lingga, banished by the Dutch; but by virtue of the fact that he was
a descendant of the Abdur-Rahman who had been recognized fay them
in iSiS, and repudiated by Raffles when he proclaimed bis brother
Hussein sultan in 1819 at Singapore, he insisted that he was the right¬
ful ruler of Pahang and Johore.

Colonel Cavanagh received information that strongly pointed to a
Siamese plan to obtain control over both Pahang and Iren^anu,
using the two exiles as their tools. The ex-Sultan of Lingga was to be
substituted for the Sultan of Trengganu, who had refused to toe the
line. Wan .Ahmad, the claimant to Pahang, was to he assisted to make
another attempt against bis brother. In July 1862 the ex-Sultan of
Lingga was taken to Trengganu in a Siamese warship accompanied
by Wan .Ahmad and a fleet of praus. Sir Robert Schombiirgk, the
British minister in Bangkok, was assured that the ex-sultan was on a
purely personal visit to hie mother. But the evidence against this bland
assertion began to mount up, especially when Wan .Ahmad, at the
instigatioti of the ex-sultan, invaded Pahang. Before strong pressure
applied through Schombiirgk by Cavanagh, backed up by the Govern-
rnem of India, the Siamese promised to remove the ex^sultan, but did
nothing towards carrying their promise into effect. It soon became
obvious that they were waiting for the change of monsoon in the middle
of November, which would render the cast coast of Malaya dangerous
and so give them an excuse for not sending a ship to bring away the
e.x-sultan. He and Wan Ahmad would thus have the period until the
follomng April in which to carry through their plans.

Cavanagh therefore yielded to the hea vy pressure brought to bear on
him by the Singapore Chamber of Commerce and sent a warship to
threaten Trengganu with bombardment unless the ex-Sultan of
Lingga were handed over and the sultan promised to give no further
assistance to Wan Ahmad, When his ultimatum was rejected the
British warship shelled the sultan's fort. But the show of force

mr. II [

£i:i|iOPEAN rKiUlITORlAL ESPANSION

iiMscarried: the ex^uHan fled inland; and although the coast was
blockaded for some weeks, it was without effect, tlltimaiely in
March 1S63 the Siamese removed the ex-sultan after protcating to
the British government that the bombardment was a violation nf
their territorial rights. But Siam made no further overt attempts to
bring 'rrengganu under her control. As for the Pahang civil war, it
petered out; and when the bendahara died a few yrars later, his
brother Wan Ahmad succeeded him and the British government raised
no objection.

Cavanagh’s action in bombarding the fort at Trengganu caused
something like an uproar in Britain. In t86o he had intervened in the
Menangkabau states of Sungei Ujong and Rembau to protect Chinese
miners, and again in Perak in i 36 a to force a settlement in the case of
the trouble that had arisen over the Chinese miner? in the Lai^t
area. After two debates in the House of Commons he was given strict
orders against any further mten'ention. Small wonder that people
with interests in Malaya were agitating for the transfer of the Straits
Settlements from the India Office to the Colonial Office. They felt
that Malayan affairs were neglected. For many years men on the spot
who realised the need for a stronger policy in relation to the native
sutes pursued it not only at their own risk, but with odds against
them so far as their own government was concerned. The fact was
that the Government of India was not interested in Malaya.

The agitation for transfer was mainly the work of Singapore, and it
drew its impulse from the feeling that British interests were being
foolishly sacrificed so long as the keystone of her coinmercial suprem¬
acy in Eastern Asia was treated as ‘ a third-rate Residency in an isolated
quarter of the Indian Empire’.' In face of the grmving strength of the
Dutch in Indonesia and the appearance of France as an imperialist
power in Indo-China, control by the Government of India and the
India Office, with the consequent fettering of the hands of the Singa¬
pore government in its relations with the IVlalay states, became an
intolerable grievance. But the immediate cause of the agitation which
led to the actual transfer in 1867 lay in the misguided attempts of the
Indian government to interfere with the policy of free trade, which
was the cardinal point in Rafflea's plans for the development of Singa¬
pore and the chief cause of its miraculous success.*

IL..^. 163-4. . tut , ■ 1 -j

* ri$^, chap, xiv, a nnidyni of iHt IMlOrt involved*

CH, 27 'THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS AND BORNEO, 1786-1867 453

By Article V of the Aiiglo*Dutcb treaty of 1824 the two powers
bound themselves ‘to concur effectually in repressing’ piracy* How
great had become the need for concerted action against this appalling
evil may be realized merely by glandng through the indices 10 the
many volumes of the Straits Settlements records. It is one of the most
prominent subjects of correspondence. In the Malay world it was an
evil so old, so widespread and with so many facets that even when the
European powers in the nineteenth century decided that it must be
stamped out it baffled all their efforts for many years. For it was an
honourable profession which was connived at, promoted, or even
directly engaged in by the highest potentates in that strange Malay
world of Raja Brooke’s memoirs and Joseph Conrad's early novels.
And nowhere eke in the world is geography so favourable to piracy-
Therc can be no doubt, however, that the particular phase that was
acute in the eighteenth century and 'a great and blighting curse in
the nineteenth arose mainly out of the disorganization of the native
commerce in the Archipelago by the impact of the Portuguese and the
Dutch in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. And by compansoti
with the Portuguese filibustering methods of enriching themselves, the
systematic and carefully calculated methods by which the Dutch built
up their trading monopoly caused so much ruin to the native peoples
and disintegration to their governments as to have constituted the
biggest singfe factor in the situation. Thus it was that, with the wesken-
ing of the control of the V.O.C, itself over its island empire during the
eighteenth century, the way was open for piracy to incrca^ to what
must have been unexampled proportions. And it is ridiculous to
attempt to explain it away by the argument that it was only in the
eighteenth century that turopean writers began to make a clear
distinction between a pirate and an honest trader,^

In the eighteenth century the Bugis, who gained so great an ascend¬
ancy in the Malay states and were described by Francis Light as ‘the
best merchants among the eastern islands', were also the terror of the
Archipelago as pirates. It was the Dutch treatment of Macassar in
1667 and the ruin of the Moluccas which started them on their career
as freebooters. And it was a passing phase; for in the nineteenth
century no more is heard of them as pirates.

Even more formidable w ere the Morus or I llanos of the Sulu
Archipelago. In the nineteenth century they were referred to as the

1 Vltilikc, NuiitaltiTa, pp. lillS- 1 >.

454 El^ROt'EA.Ji* TERRITORIAL EXPANSION IT. Itl

Babnintr froin the j$l^tnd group which was their home. Like the
LauunSp or "Pirates of the Lagoon", who came from the great bay
of that name in the south of the island of Mindanao, they used
praus of 40 to lOo tons with crews of 40 to 60, These were, in facE,
the regular nativre war-boats in use all over South-East Asia, ^‘he
Lanuns and Balanim sent out fleets of several hundreds of them every
year. The smaller junks and the native trading praus were their prey^
they seldom attacked European ships or even the larger Chinese junks.
Sulu was their commercial headquarters. By far thoh worst raids, for
slaves and boot)', were upon the Philippines; and although the Spanish
sent many punitive expeditions which destroyed their strorigholds and
burnt their villages, they could never bring them under effective control.

For their operations against the Malay Archipelago the Lanun
Beets sailed first to Tampassuk on the coast of north-west Borneo,
where they divided into squacLrons, each with its own special beat.
Every year the ‘pirates* wind^ brought them to the Straits of Malacca
to lie in wait for praus bound for Singapore. The Riau-Lingga
Archipelago was a regular hunting-ground forthenii and whole islands
were depopulated by their slave raids. I'hey ’v'isited Penang and the
Kedah coast as late as 1835* They wrought incalculable havoc and
damage.

I’he most bitter enemies of the T^min and Balanini were the Malay
pirates of the Riau-Lingga x^rchipelago^ the Carimons, and other
islands near the southern entrance of the Straits of Malacca. Pulo
Calang was their principal market for the $alc of captured goods and
slaves. The Lingga Sultan was suspected of encouraging them; his
chief officers equipped pirate fleets, as also did the sultans of Sumatra
and the Peninsula. Pirate praus would seem to have been fitted out
even at Singapore* l^he Malay praus, however^ were much sitialler
than the large Lanun and Bajanini war-boats and carried fewer men.
Compared with the operations of their rivaJs, Malay piracy was on a
much smaller scale.

In the early part of the nineteenth century the north-west coast uf
Borneo was one of the most notorious pirate centres. The actual
piracy was carried on by the Sea-Dyaks, the Orang Laiii^ but tbev
were employed and directed by the Malay chieftains and individual
Arabs who had settled among them. They and the La nuns, whose
strongholds were north of Bnmei, were the pirates against whom the
efforts of Raja James Brooke came chiefly to be directed.

As in the case of the Moorish corsairs of the Mediterranean in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries^ it was the lack uf concerted action

CH. 17 THE srSAlTS SmT-EMEYTS AND BORNEO, 1786-1867 455

against them by the European naval powers that enabled piracy to
aunive as long and as successfully as il did» The co-operaaon provided
for in the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1824 never materialized, I’he
British for long had inadequate naval forces at their disposal because
the East India Company after 1835, when it ceased to be a trading
concern, was unwilling to incur expense on the Straits Settlements,
from which it received no revenue. The Dutch, who had far more
warships in the Archipelago than the British, did more chan any other
nation to suppress piracy, but they confined tbeir efforta to th&r own
area. The Spanbh in the same way conoetjtratcd upon protecting the
Philippines against the LanunS- In 1848 they expeUed the Balanini
from their islands. In 1S51 they captured Sulu and forced the Lanuns
to transfer their trading centre elsewhere. But it was only later, when
they gradually brought the Sulu Archipelago and Mindanao under
their conuol, that the Lanun raids on the Philippines came to an end.

The devcli^ment of Singapore brought so much native trade there
that it increased the prosperity of the pirate profession. From 1S19 to
1830 the Straits Settlements had only a few gunboats and schooners,
which were quite inadequate to cope with the* evil. The Bugis
merchants of Singapore complained of their inadequate protection
in 1831 and threatened to abandon their voyages. So difficult was the
situation that in 1832 the Chinese of Singapore were permitted to
fit out four ships of their own for service against pirates. In 1835
petitions for better protection were made to the British parliament
and the Government of India by the European and Chinese merchants
of Singapore and the Bengal Chamber of Commerce. As a result
H.M.S. Andromache was sent out to the Straits of Malacca, while her
captain and the Governor of the Straits Settlements were appointed
joint commissioners for the suppression of piracy. In 1836 two more
warships and three gunboats were sent to Singapore, and as a result
of their efforts severe blows were dealt at Malay pirate centres. In
particular the Galang centre was destroyed. In 1837 the Government
of India stationed a permanent force of two Royal Naiy ships and five
gunboats in the Straits. But more important still Wto the arrival of
the small steamship Diana there in that year. It was steam power
alone that could cope adequately vrith the galley, which could out-
manceuvre the sailing ship by using its oars.

For some years there was a notable decrease of piracy near the
Straits Settlements. But in 1S43 a great rectudesoence of Malay and
Lamm activities occurred. In the meantime, however, a new per¬
sonality had arrived on the scene in 1839. =^*1 ""'ier his inspiring

KrROPEAS TERBlTORrAL EXPANSION

PT. ill

45 *

leadership the operations against piracy took on a vigour which in a few
years reduced it to insignificance. James Brooke was ihe son of a
member of the Bengal Civil Service and had himself sciv^ed in the East
I ndia Company's army ia the Assam operations during the first Anglo-
Burmese war. A serious wound in an engagement near Rangpur
caused him to return to England in tSafip and soon aftenvards he left
the Company's sendee. In 1830 he sailed to Chinas and w:hile passing
tJirough the Malay Archipelago he was so deeply impressed with its
beauty and the devastation wrought by piracy and internecine warfare
that when his father died»Icaring him a large property» he invested in a
yachtp the Royalist of 140 tons burden, trained a picked crew^ and in
1S39 arrived in Borneo with the immediate object of carrying on ex¬
ploration and scientific research.

He found the district of Sarawak in revolt against die Sultan of
Brunei^ whose uncle^ Pangenin Muda Hashimt had just failed to sup¬
press the rebel I i PUS Dyaks, Muda Hashim and Brooke became firm
friends, and in the following year Muda Hashim offered him the
governorship of Sarawak in return for his proffered help in dealing
with the rebels. Brooke not only crushed the rebellion but won the
allegiance of the Malays and Dyaks+ who had long suffered under the
misrule of Brunei. After some delay, due to the opposition of the
existing governor, he received his appointment in September 1S41,
and in the following year it was confirmed by the sultan^

While engaged with conspicuous success upon the task of introducing
just and humane government into the territory entrusted to him he was
busy trying to interest the British government in Brunei. Vyhh the
growth of steamship traffic* to China the need had arisen for a coal¬
ing station between Singapore and Hong Kong, which had been
acquired in 1841. In thusc days ships consumed such large quantities
of coal that ils storage took up valuable cargo space, and it was
essential to have coaling stations aT nut too great a distance from each
other so as to reduce tlie amount that it was necessary' to carry. Brunei
itself and the island of Labuan both possessed seams of excellent coal,
and Brooke learnt that the Dutch were casting longing eyes upon
them. In 1S44 Suhan Omar offered to cede Labuan to Britain, and
Brqokc auggested that not only should the offer be accepted but al^ a
Britisff Resident should be appointed to Brunei as adviser to the
sultan. 'Phe idea that was germinating in his mind was something
along the lines of the Residential system thai w as later introduced into
Malaya. And it is of no small significance that Sir Hugh Low', who
in 1877 became Resident of Berak and was the real creator of the

Cll. 27 I HF. STltAlTS S^^Tl-E^^E.'^TS AMJ BORNFn, 1786^-1867 457

Resideriey system in Malaya, sened his apprenticeship under Brcmkc
in Sarawak,

Meanwhile in 1846 matters tame to a crisis in Brunei. The sultan,
under the influence of the piratical faction of the Malay nobles, who
saw in Brooke’s measures against piracy the end of their profitable
enterprise, had Pangeran Muda Hashim and all his supporters
murdered. He attempted to procure Brooke’s murder also and to
kidnap Admiral Cochrane, whose squadron had in the previous year
dealt Borneo piracy its heaviest blow by the capture of the Lanun
stronghold of Marudu. The Lanun leader, Sharif Osman, who had
been killed in the fight, was the ally of Pangeran Usop, the sultan's
favourite- Usop himself had in 1845 led an attack on Muda liashim,
but had been captured and put to death.

The measures against piracy which brought matters to a head in
this wav had begun with the decisive defeat of the raids of the Sea-
Dyaks on Saraw-ak. ‘fhe sultan's governors of the Sea-Dyaks were
four Arab aharifs, who were pirate chiefs and slavers. They planned
a big attack on Brooke in 1843 and were supported by Usop and
Makuta, the es-Govemor of Sarawak, whose misrule had caused the
rebellion into which Brooke had run in 1839. Their plot, however,
misfired, because before it could be carried out Captain Keppel
arrived in mdo to investigate attacks that bad been made on

Singapore prausoff the Borneo coast, and Brooke at once advised an
attack on the Serebas and the Sekarran, the two tribes into which the
Sea-Dyaks were divided, 'thcreupoti the Dido, with Brooke’s
llotilla of Sarawak Malays, set about destroying the strongholds of the
Serebas. Before the fight could be carried into the Sekarran country
the Dido had to proceed to China. But she returned in 1844 and
dealt with the Sekarran in the same way as she had with the Serebas.
I'hen in the following year, as we have seen. Admiral Cochrane's
squadron dealt the Lanun a staggering blow by destroying their
fortified settlement at Marudu.

'I’he triumph of the piratical party at Brunei in 1846 was short-
lived. Brooke and Cochrane appeared at the entrance to the river on
which Brunei town stands, the sultan refused to negotiate, and after
a short sharp fight the town was captured and the sultan fled inland.
He was allowed to return, since the piratical party which hadTorced
his hand was now powerless and he waa willing to co-operate with the
British for the suppression of piracy and slaving. Hence, leaving
Captain Mundy behind to negotiate. Admiral Cochrane departed
for China. On his way his squadron destroyed the tw'o important

45 ® EIJFOFEAN TUmiTORlAL CXFA}4^0N FT. Ill

Lanun settlements of Tampassgk and Pandassam At the same time
Mundy, in H.M.S. Jris, completed the work of stamping out the
Lanun power in north-west Borneo by the systematic destruction
of the settlement that tlaji baman, one of the leaders of the piratical
party at Brunei, had established in the Mambakut river. .As a result
every La nun settlement in north-west Borneo was abandoned, and the
refugees made their way round to the north-east coast to establish a
new centre at Tunku.

On being restored to his throne Sultan Omar ceded Sarawak in full
sovereignty to Raja Brooke. .Almost at the same time a despatch from
Lord Palmerston authorized the acceptance of the sultan's offer to
cede Labuan and the conclusion of a commercial treaty, but rejected
the proposal for estabtishing a British Resideni at Brunei. The
treaties that were signed in as a result of the ensuing negutiations
pledged the sultan to suppress piracy and slavery, granted British
commerce most-favoured-nation treatment, and provided that there
should be no alienatiun of territory by the sultan without British con¬
sent. Brooke then returned to Britain in triumph. He was knighted
and appointed Governor of Labuan and commissioner and consul-
general to the sukan and independent chiefs of Borneo.

Right from the start the Dutch had watched Brooke's actions in
north-west Borneo with growing apprehension. In the years 1845-6
in a series of notes to the British Government they put forward the
surprising contention that the British operations in Brunei, and in
particular the acquisition of Labuan, constituted a breach of the treaty
of 1824. The correspondence became somewhat heated, since Britain
not only refuted the Dutch claim by pointing out that the treaty
guaranteed the Netherlands’ rights south of the Malacca Straits, and
that Sarawak and Brunei were situated on a higher degree of latitude
than Singapore, but reminded the Dutch of tbdr own continual
violations of the commercial provisions of the treaty. On the subject
of Borneo the Dutch put forward an argument which went much
farther than mere quest ions of latitude: they claimed that wherever
there was a Dutch post on an island in the Archipelago the British
might not plant an cstablUhcnent anywhere on the same island,
even in an independent state, '

Thd Lanuns had been driven atvay from the north-west coast of
Borneo, but Sea-Dyak piracy once more lifted its head in 1847. The
reason was that once again Rronke had inadequate forces at his com¬
mand. and the China squadron, which had given such effective help
ill the previous period, was too small to tarty out all the duties

CH. 27 THE STRAITS 5ETTLI■^UL?^TS AND BORNEO, 1786-1867 459

required of it. At the very time when Malay and Lanun pirac)' was
being suppressed Chinese piracy began to rise to formidable propor¬
tions, and from about 1S40 to r86o the native trade of the Straits
Settlements suffered from the attacks of their large well-arraed junks,
which attacked European vesseb. Not until J849 could Brooke
again secure the help of a British warahip.

Early in 1849^ at the request of the Sultan of Brunei^ Brooke and
his Malays^ iivith the boata of the H.C. steamer A'tmestSj^ raided the
Sea-Dyak country» but were too weak to inflict a decisive blow. Soon
aftenvardSp however, Adnrtiral Coltierp in command of the China
squadron;, managed to send two Royal Naw warships and two Com¬
pany's steamers, and with these Sea-Dykk piracy was ruthlessly
stamped out, 'Fhc decisive action took place at Batang Maru, where
3 pirate fleet of over a hundred war-boats was ambushed and des¬
troyed. Then over a wide area Serebas and Sekarran villages were
burnt and the country ravaged. Out of 4,000 pirates^ their total loss
was estimated at no more than 800. It would have been at least three
times that number had not Brooke deliberately allowed large numbers
to escapen The Serebos and the Sekarran made, their submission,
the chiefs who WTre opposed to piracy regained power, and in order
that a firm hand might be kept on the Sea-Dyaks^, to prevent the
piratical party from organizing iheir forays once more, the Sultan
of Brunei ceded their land to Brooke in return for half its surplus
revenue.

The effect of this victory on the trade of the Straits Settlements was
marked. For not only was the native trade freed^ but also Singapore
developed a new trading connection of great value with Sarawak .ind
Bninei. Brooke, however^ found bimself the object of a furiouss press
attack in Singapore and London for his action against the Bca-Dy^ks^
It began in the Straits Tiwes in 1849 and was taken up by the London
i)mty Netsfs. Ultimately David the Peace Society^ the Abori¬

gines Protection Society^ Sydney Herbert and Gladstone himself were
drawn into the fray against Brooke, and Titf TimiSj Lord Palmerston,
I..ord Grey, Keppel and Mondy in his defence* In iRs+p however, he
was completely cleared by a royal commissiofi- What had happened
was that Bruokeb former agent, Henry Wise, had put up a needy
journalist, Robert Wood^ to prim a flagrantly false pccount*of the
Batang Mani operation in the Slntits which was copied by the

Daily Neusi. Wise had .also managed to obtain the confidence of David

* H.C. C t^onoumbllc dnmpflnv'al wg* used todwtin^uli fhe t-laat ladb
idiips from xhmc of die Rciynl Nftv^*

EimOPEAN TEHHITORIAL EXPANSION

PT, [It

460

HumCp who welcorocd the opportuaity of gaining notoriety by attack¬
ing the much-lionized hero. Brooke had broken with Wise in 1S48 for
fraudulent dealings in connection with the lattcr'si Eastern Archipelago
Company^ founded in 1847* The campaignp therefore, was inspired
by Wise's desire for revenge on Brooke because of his refusal p in his
own wordsp *to shut my eyes, say nolhingp and see what God will send
nie% In 1853 Brooke successfully prosecuted the Eastern Archipelago
Company for fraud. As a result its charter was cancelled and the
company dissolved.

One lamentable result of this attack on Brooke was lhat the belief
became current in Sarawak that in case of further trouble he would
receive no support from the British Navy* Hence in 1857 the Chinese
secret society there stimulated a revolt. Kuching, the capita] of Sara¬
wak, was burnt and many Europeans and natives butchered before it
was suppressed. Two ye^ bter some discontented Malay chiefs
anempted a rising. It is significant that throughout these troubles the
Sea-Dyaks remained staunchly loyal to the man who had cured them
of piracy.

€*IAPTEH 28

THE RESTORED DUTCH REGIME IN INDONESIA
AND THE CULTURE SYSTEM. 1S16-48

After Napoleon's defeat at I.cip/Jg in 1813 the Dutch had joined in
the general revolt against him. Van fiugendorp's younger brother^
argaitbed a provisional government and recalled tfilliam VI of Orange^
the son of the old Stadhouder^ from England. As sovereign prince
under the new Fundamental Law adopted in 1814, he was given
extensive powers, which included not only the management of the
state's hnanc^is but also * exclusive control' over the colonies. In the
following year, when by the union of Belgium and Holland the king¬
dom of the United Netherlands was formed under the provkions of
the Treaw of Vienna^ William's rank was raised to^that of king.

By the Con vend on of London^ accepted by both sides on 13 August
1814. provision was made for the restitution by Britain of all the
former colonies of the Dutch East India Company 'conquered from
Holland since 1803', $ave the Cape Colony, Ceylon was excluded
from this agreement, since it had already two ceded to Britain in rSoa
by the Peace of -'Vniiens. The tin-bearing island of Banka off the east
coast of Sumatra, which had been conquered in 1812^ was exchanged
for Cochin on the Malabar Coast of India. The remark was once made
that Britain acquired her empire in the nineteenth century in a fit of
abisent minded ness. In much the same vein h StapePs suggestion that
the reason why there was no opposition iti Britain to the restitution
of Java was because the British bad no idea of its value and beauty**
To take over the government of the Dutch islands the king ap¬
pointed three commissioners-generah Cornelia Thcodorus Elout.
Baron van der Capellen, a statesm^^n of high reputation, and A* A.
Buyskes, previously lieutenant governor-general under Daendek,
Elout, the chairman^ waK a liberal of the orthodox school of the day—
he. a humanitartan and a follower of Adam Smith. When the others
relumed home van der Capellen was to remain behind as governor-
general. In January 1815 the king Furnished the commissioners with

^ Glj^bcrt KarcL The -nnlotiiAl irfonntr DlHi+

■ In hif singk-Vdikmic t™ fndic, 1^3 isJitian, p, 335,

461

EUROPEAN TERRITORIAL EXPANSION

IT* tM

462

a Reg^Tingi-rfgleHiatl—‘'i.c. constitutional regulation—modelled on the
charter of > 803 and based on the principle of freedom of cultivation
and trade, A month later he issued a decree throwing open the trade
of the Netherlands Indies*

Napoleon’s return from Elba and the Waterloo campaign delayed
the departure of the commissi oners, and when they* arrived in Java,
in April 1816, John Fendall, Raffles’s successor, had received no
instructions to hand over. Not until 19 August did the oflidal cere¬
mony of rendition take place. There were further difficulties and
ddavs in the case of the other settlements, especially those in or about
Sumatra, for in March 1818 Raffles returned to the scene as Lieu¬
tenant-Governor of-BencOolcn and began to work with might and
main against the restoration of Dutch power there. Calcutta, how¬
ever, supported the Dutch against him, and after the surrender of
Malacca in September 1818 all their old stations were handed over
speedily except Padang, which Raffles managed to retain until May
1819.

The new^ government found its task a heav-y one. The Dutch had
lost much of their old prestige. 'I'he home counip.' was too poor to
give adequate financial support, and the commissioners had no fleet
at their disposal and only a very small army. Overseas trade was
mainly in British and American hands* Moreover, under the liberal
system introduced by Raffles the cultivation of espon crops, which
had been the chief aim of the old Dutch admJniStratton, had fallen
into decay*

The financial question was perhaps the moat pressing one. Under
both Daendels and Raffles the colony had failed to pay its way. El out
found that the British 'taxation system’, as opposed to the Dutch
‘trade system', was much more profitable for the individual than for
the state. As a liberal he was predisposed to favour free peasant culti¬
vation. So, he found, was Muntinghe, when the question was referred
to the Council of the Indies. Hence, after a prolonged tour of in¬
spection, the decision was taken to retain Raffles’s land-rent system,
using the desa method of assessment. The system was to be gradually
improved by measuring up and valuing the land, and in order to help
the taxpayer to keep out of the hands of the moneylender he was to be
free to pay Ids tax in either money or kind.

These principles were embodied in Land-rent Ordinances pub¬
lished in 18(8 and 1819. They determined the framework of the
system of territorial administration -which was laid down by the
commissioncrs-general in a Regerings-rtgltment issued in December

CH, 28 ruE Restored nirrcH in indojjesia 463

iSiS. This rctairttd framework of Roiidcncics* Districts,

Divisions and Villages, with the District renamed ‘Regency^ and the
Division ' District! But w^hereas Rafhes’s system had tended towards
direct rule, with the Regent and his native staff subordinate to the
Resident, the new arrangements reverted to the method of * super¬
vision! the old dual systeiTit whereby the Regent, though shorn of
many of his attributes as a hereditary noble, was in charge of a separate
branch of tlie administration.^ And his subordination to the Resident
tended once again to become feudal rather than adminmrative^ He
was to be treated as a 'younger brother'—j-e- a vassal ruler in the
accepted meaning of a term that was current throughout South-East
Asia. Thesse arrangements applied only to Java, Elsewhere, in what
the Dutch called the * Outer Provinces! the native peoples remained
under the rule of their own chieftains, w’ho themselves were under the
supervision of the Dutch provincial governora,

I’hc system of justice underwent a more thoroughgoing revision,
though here again much of Raffles'a system was retained. The old
dual system of different law and separate courts for Europeans and
natives was revived and strengthenedp and where Ratios had appointed
a single judge or magtstratep sitting alone with either a jury or asses¬
sors, the old method of a bench of judges* each with a vote, was
restored. For natives the Residency Courts and Circuit Courts of the
Raffles regime were retained, "^rhe former was renamed Landrand and
consisted of a bench of native judges under the presidency of a Dutch
official. For Europeans the Courts of Justice established by Raffles at
ihe porta of Bataviap Semarang and Surabaya were retained, while
others were set up at Amboina, Macassar, Malacca andj in 3825,
Padang. That of Batavia became a High Court with general appellate
jurisdiction for the tvhole of the Netherlands Indies.

'fhe commissioners-general made all manner of regulations for the
protection of the native. Native officials were to be remunerated by
the method of fixed salaries instead of by assignments of land worked
fur them by serf labour. They might not engage in trade or industry,
nor might desa headmen hire out the labour of theLr villages under
any pretext whatever. The slave-trade %vas forbidden, and Kailles's
regulations regarding slavery were confirmed. Dnfortunatdyp how-
ever, the safeguards were more honoured in precept than in practice-
Andj like RaffleSp the restored Dutch regime found it necessary to
retain the forced coffee tailturc in the Preanger, and the hl^^dmg

^ See FumrnlJ't ui^yiia of the pnndpka tppUtd by tli« of iSiS

in Nsihfrkmdt India, pp.

lUHOPEA^^ TEHRITORIAU EXPANSION

PT. IN

ifM

people's serfdom m the teak forests. Worse still, in 1830, with tlie
introduirtiori of the Culture Systern, the principle of free peasant
cultivation was abandoned completely.

By the beginning of 1S19 nearly all the Dutch possessions outside
Java had been handed over and the work of the conimissioneirs-gericril
was finished, Elout and Buvskes therefore returned home, leaving
van der Capelkn behind as goverttnr-gcocraJ. He was the least pro-
gxessive of the three, and as early as 1820 gave the native chiefs greater
powers over their people, in direct contravention of the policy bid
down by the Re^erirtg^-rtg/ement. He disliked the fact that an increase
ing number of Europeans was taking up planting in Java. He refused
to allow them to settle in the Freanger, for fear of their competiiion
with the government's system of coffee culture, which he was extend¬
ing considerably^ And because those who already owned estates there
paid higher nite$ for their Javanese labour than the government; he
farced them to sell their coffee to the government at the same price
as the Javanese himself.

He was on stronger ground in excluding Europeans and Chinese
from all trade in ih^ Preangcr* By advancing money to the cultivators
they could buy thdr crops at imich lower prices. This practice,
besides impoverisliing the cultivator, hit the government, for he was
unable to pay his taxes in full and tended to sell to private capitalists
coffee that was really government proper]^'.

In 1822+ while on a tour of java, van der Capellen found that
Europeans unable to obtain land from the government could rent it
in the native states under agreements knowri as 'contracts of land-
tenancy^ which gave the tenant not only the use of the land but also
power to exercise the lord's rights over the cultivators attached to it*
In the following year he decreed that all such conlract-s were to hecoitir
null and void as from t January 1824* llis action aroused great
indignation. Most of the contracts were long-term ones, in respeci of
which the native chiefs had received large advances, which they would
now have to repay. And since they had already spent the money, they
could only discharge their debts by further pressing the already de¬
pressed cultivator, "rhis bred much dLscontent and a apirit of resent¬
ment against the goverumentt especially m the Jogjakarta area.

'fd make matters w'orse, the post-w’ar boom, w'hich had raised the
prices of coffee and sugar and brought an increasing number of ships
to Javanese ports, gave way to a slump* and hence revenue^ which
had showm a surplus up to 1S22, began to show^ an annua] deficit
thereafter. Incidentally; it is interesting to note that Eand-revenue

CH. 2S Till-: Rf^ORED DlTTCri ROJlME IS iNUuNlilSlA 465

cantinucd to increase; it was a fall in revenue from other sources
that caused the deheit^

Part of the trouble h.y in the fact that the new admioistnition was far
more costly than that of Raffles and spent money ttjo freely on roads
and other public works. And it so happened that just when a policy
of retrenchnient was urgently needed van tier Capellen had to deal
with a number of outbreaks of unrest m the Moluccas, Borneo, Cele*
bes, PaJembang and on the west coast of Sumatra, all of which were
a drain upon his diminishing financial resources.

From the point of view of most Dutchmen the chief source of
grievance was the fact that overseas trade w as mainly in foreign hands.
Dutch trade was specially favoured by the preferential system of
customs duties adopted in 1817; hut the superiority of Fnghsh piece-
goods over those produced in the Netherlands enabled British mer¬
chants to retain their domimiting position. In the hope of dealing a
blow at British competition Muntinghe suggested that the Dutch
tncrchanta should pool their cesources by setting up a big national
company with the king at its head. William jumped at the idea, and
in 1825 the Nederkndsche Handelmaatschappij came into existence
with a capital initially fixed at 37 million guilders, a guaranteed
dividend of 4! per cent, and the king himself as a principal share¬
holder. It was a far more ambitious project than Muntinghe had
envisaged. In its early years at least it proved just as incapable as the
private merchants of combating British competition.

Van der Capellen's efforts to help the native peoples led him to
attempt to reduce the evil effects of the spice monopoly upon the
Moluccas. He paid the islands a visit in 1824 and announced the
abolition of the hated by means of which the number

of spice trees hod been kept diitvn to the level required for re¬
stricting supply and maintaining prices, tie hoped to persuade
the home government to abuLish the monopoly altogether, but
failed lo do so.

Van der Capellen also failed to make ends meet. Hence in 1825 it
w'as decided to remove him from office on the score of the inefficiency
of his financial adnunistnUioft. King William felt that a special effort
was needed to cope with the continued annual deficit, and to this end
conferred on his successor^ Du Dus dc Gisignicis, the rank of com¬
missioner-general with special powers to carrj' through such reforms
os he might consider necessary. Van der Capellen should have returned
home in 1825^ but his departure was delayed by the outbreak of a
serious rebellion in central Java.

^66 Bt-ROP^:AN TBRRITOFIUL l■XFA^^ruN FT. ill

'rhe Java ^Var of 1S25-30 arose froni a variety of causes. DiscQnient
had risen to a high pilch in the native states, and particularly in Jog¬
jakarta p where the consctju,ences of van der Capellen s cancellation of
contracts for land-lease had hit all classes of people^ .Another strong
grievance was over the tolls levied at the boundaries between native
and government territons and the vexatious exactionB o^ the Chinese
to whom they were farmed. '^I'he general iinrist came to a head iindcr
the leadership of a prince of the royal house of Jogjakarta, Dipo
Negoro, who had personal reasons for hating the Dotch.

Pangcran Anta Wiriap belter known as Dipo KegorOp was the eldest
&on of Amangku Biiwono U 1 + who had been placed on the throne hy
RafHes when in 1810 his fatherp Sultan Sepu, had been banished to
Penang. Amangku Buivono 111 had died in i 8 i 4 » accordance

with Javanese adat law had been succeeded by a younger son Djarot
because his mother was a queen of higher rank than Dipsj Negoros.
But Raffles, in order tn pacify the elder brother, who was a man of
outstanding infiuencct had prunnsed lym the eventual succession tn
the event of Djarot's previous deaths Wheiip however, Djarot (Aman-
gku Buwono IV) died in 1822, the Dutch government passed over
Dipo Negoro's claim and recognised the dead sultan's two-year-old
son as Amangku Buwono They would appear to have been genu¬
inely ignorant of Raffles's promise, for they appointed Dipo Negoro
and another member of the royal house, Mangku Bumip as joint
guardians of ihc young sultan.

Not long afterwards Dipo Negoro fell foul of the Dutch Resident
over an incident which occurred as a result uf van dc Capellen s
abolition of land-lease cnntracts. Bui w hat finally caused him to raise
the standard of revolt was the decision of the government to make a
road ovcT some of his property where a sacred tomb was situated, lie
was a religious fanatic, given tu solitary meditation in sacred caves^
and felt himself deeply injured when the Dutch refused to recognise
him as religious head of Java. As the chosen of Allah tu drive out the
' kaffirs* he aroused widespread sympathy among the common peoplci
who saw in him the prince-liberator of ancient legend.

The molt began when Dipo Negoro, hb co-guardian Mangku
Bumi and other discontents 'went to the mountains*. When he
suddenly appeared before Jogjalf.arla with a powerful force the popu¬
lation rose in his support, the Dutch carried away the young sultan,
and there was a massacre uf Eiiropeana and Chinese toll-farmem. 1 he
Dutch w'ere caught on the w'tong foot, for a large part of their army
was a%vav on an expedition to Palcmbang and Boni, General dc Kock

Cll. 28 THE RESTOREU IlUTUIt IS INDON’JSIA 467

was setii to central Java w'ith so small a force that he could do little
to prevent the spread of the conflagration. He did, however, by
negotiation persuade the Susuhiinan of Surakarta from making
common cause with Dipo Negoro.

There were no pitched battles; Dipo Negoro and his nephew
shoived themselves adepts in guerrilla tactics, and even after dc Kock
was reinforced, continued to maintain the upper hand. In vain did
the Dutch restore to the throne Saltan Sepuh, whom Raffles had
deposed. He could gain no support and died in 182S.

Gradually, however, dc Kock learnt how to deal with the revolt.
He began to establish a system of strong-points {iH-nffrigstelstf} in
territory recovered from the rebels. T hese were linked up by good
roads on which flying columns operated. Du Rns de Gisignies dis¬
liked the high coat of the system, but de Kock was adamant in defend¬
ing it, and it produced decisive results. In 182S, notwithstanding hb
assumption of the rank of sultan, Dipo Negoro was losing ground
rapidly, the devastation was appalling, and there were frightful out¬
breaks of cholera. In 1829 Mangku Bumi and Sentot, Dipo Negoro’s
principal lieutenants, finding their position hnpelpss, deserted to the
Dutch. In the next year Dipo Negoro offered to negotiate. At the
conference he refused to gi%'e up the title of sultan and protector of
Islam in Java, and after much delay de Kock broke the impasse by
arresting him. He w*as banished to Menado in the north ol Celebes,
and later removed to Macassar, w'herc he died in 185 5 "

'[’o prevent a recurrence of trouble the Dutch annexed much terri¬
tory—Banjumas, Bagelen, Madiun and Kcdiri—-from Jogjakarta and
Surakarta* Compensation tvsa paid to both rulers for the loss of
territory, but the susuhunan, indignant at the shabby treatment he
had received in return for bis loyalty, left his kniton and went into
retreat. The Dutch, fearful of another outbreak, banished him to
Amboina. His successor, Pakubuw'ono VII, without ado signed the
treaty offered him by Batavia, and there was no further trouble.

ITie Java War prevented any real restoration of the financial situa¬
tion by Du Bus dc Gisignies. It had cost 20 million florins and had
been financed entirely by loans. He did manage to effect some much-
nccdcd reduction in the cost of administration and the number of
Residencies; and the establbhmcnt of the Java Hank and* a new
currency was calculated to bring good results in the long run. He
also withdrew the prohibition of the land-lease contracts which had
caused so much unrest. But at the moment when the financial
situation in Java was working up to a crisis Belgium revolted

KU{tUP£A.V TUtKlTORIAL £Xl‘AV6ION

tT, ill

468

against Hoibnd, and the bonw government was threatened with
bankruptcy'.

This final development, however, was unroreseen when Xing
William, aware that some quite new approach must be made to the
problem of the Java finances, had appointed Johannes van den Bosch to
succeed Du Bus de Cbignieaas govemor-gcncTal and, acting on his ad¬
vice, had in 1829 issued a Regmngs-rtgkment which was to usher in a
change of profound importance in economic policy. Van den Bosch
was a self-made man who had risen from the ranks of the army in Java,
reclaimed a derelict estate near Batavia, quarrelled with Dacndcls and
been deported to Europe in i8io, spent two years as a prisoner-of-war
in England, risen to be Chief of the General Stall in the kingdom of
the United Netherlands, and then retired to study political economy.

In his writings he was a great critic of the 'perverted Liberalism’ of
Daendels and RalBes. lie was a practical reformer ratlicr than a philo¬
sopher, and as the founder of the Benevolent Society did much to
relieve the appalling urban poverty in his own country hy settling
self-supporting colonies in the less cultivated districts of Friesland and
Drente. In 1827 h^ was sent on a special mission to restore prosperity
in the Dutch West Indies, and a year later returned with a report in
which he showed how to make them yield a large annual profit to the
mother country. This so impressed William that he appointed him as
the successor to Du Bus de Gisignies in order that be might try out
in the East Indies the ideas he had e.xpounded.

The new governor-gcneral landed in Java in January 183®
proceeded at once to carry into effect a project that became known as
the ’Culture System’ {CuUutir-siekfJ). In many ways it was the old
system of forced deliveries and contingencies with a new look, I'he
Javanese peasant was held to he too ignorant to make the best of his
land; he must therefore he compelled to devote a portion of it to the
cultivation of export crops as directed by the government, and the
latter would take the product in lieu of land-rent in cash, 'fhe supplies
thus raised were to be handled by Dutch merchants, shipped in Dutch
vessels, and sold in the Netherlands, which would by this means
become once more a world market for tropical produce. At the same
time home industry was to be stimulated by being given a closed
marke: in the colonies.

'I'hc principles of the system in its application to the cultivator
were outlined thus by van den Bosch:*

' tluolcd from the Itnimh Stuatibtud by ColeitbfanJcr, <StuMrdemi, iii,

PP- iT-U-

rn. nil' si^torfd mttcfi rkgjmk in inwntsia 4fn)

1. Agreements arc made with the people for setting iipurt a por¬
tion of thdr rice-fields for the cuhivatton of products suitable for
the European market.

2. The portion set apart shall amount to one-fifth of the culti¬
vated grou nd of each Jtsa.

3. The cultivation of products suitable for the European market
must not entail more labour than the cuItiv*ation of rice*

4. 'fhe land apart is free of land-rent.

3* The cultivated product is delivered to the district, and when¬
ever its assessed value is greater than the land-rent that has been
remitted the difference is credited to the people,

6. Crop failure, when not due to lack of ?!eal or industry', is the
government's liability*

7. ^rhe native works under the direction of his chiefs. Super¬
vision by European officials is limited to the control of the working
of the fields, the har%^esting and transport of crops on timt^ iiud the
finding of a suitable place.

8. The labour must be distributed in such a manner that a part
of the people is responsible for bringing the" crop to maturity,
another part for hanesring it, a third for its transport, and a fourth
for work in the factory% but the last only if there are insufficient free
labourers available.

9. Where the system still encounters difficulties in its practical
application, freedom from land-rent shall he firmly maintained, and
the people shall be considered to have dtstharged their obligation
when they have brought tlie product to maturity; the harvesting and
finishing shall then be the subject of separate agreements.

'rhe system was introduced under favourabte circumstances, for the
Java War had brniight much new^ territory under Dutch rule* Van den
Bosch began with indigo and sugar, 'fhe Residents held conferences
of l^eads of desas and elders and explained the system. Coniracts were
made whh Chinese and Europeans to receive the produce for deliver}'
to the government at fixed prices, llie experiment was a success, and
accordingly van den Bosch added coffee, tea, tobacco, pepper, dnna-
moop cotton and cochineal to the list of products to be ciiltiv^cd for
the government. I'here was opposition to the scheme from the highest
to the lowest, but the enormous cost of the Belgian war provided
an unanswerable argument for its continuance* In 1832, therefore,
van den Bosch was invested \rith dictatorial powers, and his system
became The lifebelt on which the Netherlands kept afloat ^ This

FITIOPEAN TraniTOFlAL FSPAN’SION tir

iinfortunatctv changed its character; it had comc into being as an
expedient for saving Java From bankruptcy. It now became one for
saving Holland, and, in time, for enriching her at Java’s expense.

From 1832 onwards the element of compulsion was increased.
Each Residency must deliver export produce to the value of two
guilders 3 head of its population- From January 1833 all coffee
produced in addition to the government quota must he sold to
the government at a fixed price- This was in direct contravention of
the original promise that after the cultivator bad satisfied the require¬
ment to cultivate an agreed govemment product on one-fifth of his
land he was free to do what he liked with the rest and could dispose of
its produce how he liked- Moreover, although van deft Bosch a third
principle laid down that the cultivation of government products must
not entail more labour than the cultiv'ation of rice, in practice, since
the cultures were in several cases new to the Javanese, they cost
him more time and trouble than rice cultivation, and in any case the
cultivation of coffee, sugar and indigo demanded more labour than rice.

The govemment in its need for money turned a blind eye to such
things as these; in' fact all the safeguards provided in the original
scheme were thrown overboard. 'Fhe European and native officials
who superintended the system received a percentage of the products of
their districts; hence th^' tvere anxious to raise the proceeds as high
as possible and used means forbidden by government decrees and
promises to the people. For instance, often more than one-fifth
of the acreage of a desa was set apart for government cultures, and the
best land was chosen for the purpose. Worse still, the cultivator must
cultivate government land before starting on his own, hood pro¬
duction therefore diminished because the Javanese had inauflicient
time to cultivate their nwn iatetih. For although van den Bosch
laid down that a maximum of sixty-six days a year wtjs ncMssary for
labour on land set apart for government cultures, at least ninety days
were required by coffee cultivation; and since the AiVrenJ/rwJfrii
(forced labour) remained in force for the upkeep of roads and bridges,
in some districts the cukivatnr had to work more than aoo days 3
year for the government. During the years 1848-50 there was wide¬
spread-famine in central Java for this reason. Stapel suggests that
the worst abuse lay in the fact that, in spile of the clear prohibition
contained in the fourth and ninth principles, land-rent was collected
almost without exception.

The financial reiiulta of the new system right from the start ful¬
filled expectations to the utmost, early as 1833 a profit of 3 million

CIL 2R tub RT3TORI-D nUTCR IN INOON^IA +7t

guilders wm pmd to llic Niftlierlands. Tt came to lx: known as the
hatig sal Jo f the aurpltjs, and it has been estimated that tn all the home
country’s exchequer benefited to the extent of some 900 million
guilders- It ^vas used for the repayment of the national debt and the
construction of the Dutch railways. The Culture System also revived
the fortunes of the Nederbndsche Handelmaatschappijp which ob¬
tained the sole right to ship the government products to Holland,
rhe Government of the Netherlands Indies shared in this prosptritVp
for under an arrangement known as the ^Consignment Sj^slem a
portion of its proceeds had to be made over to the treasury at Batavia.

^ I he CuUurc System't writes FumivalL^ Nvas succeeded by a
Liberal reaclionp and the writers of this school depicted it in its
darkest colours; since then it has never been critically re-examined,
d’his fact has been too often overlooked by Dutch historians, ■ The
Indies gained nothing; but the consequences were prejudicial/ seems
to reflect the general view% It is about aa I me as the statement that
George IH lost the American colonies- The population of Java in^
creased under the Culture System from 6 miIIions to qi millions. I he
rice export figures show that its cultivation most have increased-
There was a rise in the revenue from salt and baiiaar dues, and a large
increase in the import of cotton textiles* The intrcKlucdon of many
new export cropSi and the experimentation carried out by the Depart^
ment of Agrirrulturep especially in tea cultivation, w^as of undoubted
benefit to Java.

G'ne must beware of general ideations. In some areas,^ notably liast
Java^ w here the officials paid as much attention to rice as tu Sugar, there
was prosperity. In others, where they attended only lo the cullivation
of export crops and ncglccied rice, there was famine- I here were
good officials who thought in terms of the welfare of the people;
unfortunatelv there were too many who allowed their comniission on
cx|>ort cropSp or their good repute vvith the government to dominate
their outliKjk. From the point of view of Indonesia a.^ a whole, during
the period of the full application of the system, roughly from iSjo
to tSfiOp tw'o very serious charges may be levelled at Dutch rule.
The Outer Settlements were neglected: the Dutch concentrated on
Javii more than everj and in the middle of the century^ showed little
concern for the other inlands, n'hcy also failed to tackle systcniStically
the vast problem of piracy.

it was the scries of rice famines between iS4j and 184S that first
brought people up against the fact that something was seriously

* /m/rVi, p, I jji

RTOOFFAN TEHUITORIAU FXP^LNSIOK

FT. Ml

472

wrong. I he trouble began In Cheribon, a ricc-groviing area, which
under the Culture System w'as forced to produce coffee, sugar, indigo,
tea and dnnamon. In 1843 rice was Included among the export
crops^ and the tax on rice-land was collected in kind. This caused a
serious famine and a large exodus of people. Other areas in centra!
Java experienced even worse conditions in the succession of famioca
which followed- 'l‘hese cau^njd an agitation against the system which
little by little grew' in intensity. Governor-General Rochussen was
forced to reduce the cultures in the affected areas and did bi$ utmost to
see that van den Rosch*s originat instnieliori, that due attention should
be paid to rice cultivationp was carried out.

But of far greater effect in the long run was the fundamental
constitutional change that took place in Holland in 1848 under the
inhutnee of the revolutionarj' movement.^ which shook all Europe
during that ycar^ A constitutional revision took away from the king
the sole responsibility for the colonics and vested it in the Staies-
GeneraJ. This enabled the grow-jng opposition to come to a head
under the leadership of Baron van Hoe veil in the Second Chamber-
Liberal opinion w’Us that the system had been out of da[e by 1840+
'I'herc was a long road to be travelled yet before tt was finally abolished^
and, some would say, before anything really effective was done to
mitigate its evils. But the chorus of voices demanding that the
interests of the native peoples should be the first care of the govern¬
ment w^as rising; and notwithstanding a succession of reactionary
governments at The Hague, the Colonial Opposition began to workout
a constructive Liberal policy* This w^as in due course to sweep away a
system which, as the antithesis of private efiierprisc, the Liberal
panacea, was to their way of thinking 'rooted in unrighteousness’.

CHAPTHk 29

THi; BRITISH FORWARD MOVEMENT EN MALAYA

Tuom people who h^tl ablated for the traosfor of ihe rcaponslbdity
for the Straits Settlements from the India Office to the Colonial
Office must hav^e been disappointed at the imniediate results of the
change^ for during the term of the first Colonial Office governor, Sir
Harry Ord, from 1S67 to 1873. the policy of iion-interLention was
maintained even more rigidly than before. Ord himself the un¬
willing instrument of the home government in this matter and com¬
plained later that he had been unduly hampere^l in hLs dealings with
the Malay rulers. For he was a helpless spectator of the growing
disorder and disintegration to which most of the Malay states were a
prey^ and was only too well aware of the strong feeling among the
mercantile cormriujiities in the Straits Settlements that the interior Oif
the Fenitiaula tvas rich in natural resources and^ given peace and order,
was rapable of far greater trade than then existed.

lies ides the internecine fends among the Malay chiefs themselves,
there W'a$ the growing problem of the mass invasion of Chinese miners
in the tin areas from the middle of the century^ Mining camps tviih
thousands of miners had sprung up at Larui in Peralc, Kuala Lumpur
and Klang in Selangor, and Simgei Ujong in the Negri bembilan, the
loose confederation of nine Minangkabau stated. Lamt had been
governctl from 1S50 by a chief* Long Ja*far, who had persuaded
thousands of Chinese to come to the tin mines there. 1 hey were
divided lietw^een two great hostile societies, the Ghi Hins and the Hai
Sans, and under his son Ngah Ibrahim's rule their faction fights had
become intolerable. Moreover, there was serious danger of Penang
becoming involved, since the headquarters of both societies were
there, and it w’^as through Penang that they imported arms and
supplies. Piracy became rampant on the Perak coast, and there w'Crc
dan fights in the streets of Penang Itself. To make matters woSe, the
sultan died in 1871 and a quarrel broke out regarding the succession.
And when Sir Harry Ord, in the hope of securing a cessation ul the
hostilities, suggested summoning a meeting of the chiefs to settle the
matter they refused to come, and he w'as powerless to interfere further.

FITIOPEAK TI^RITORTAL FXPANSIOS'

?T. ni

474

The normal state of Selangor has been described by Sir Frank
Swettenham as one of “ robbery, battle and murder\ In Ord's lime a
bloodthirsty struggle was in progress between Raja Mahdi, a member
of the ruling family* and the sultan's progressive soii-in 4 aw^ a brother
of the Sultan of Kedah, whom he had created viceroy. In 1871 an act
of piracy by Chinese from Kuala ScLangor against a junk trading
under British colours brought ibc inter%'ention of H.M.S. Rinaldo,
Other Malay states joined in the faction fight, and the disorder became
so serious that the tin supplies of the Malacca and Singapore merchants
werti threatened. Again Ord's attempt to negotiate a settlement
failed. When the Singapore Chamber of Commerce complained
about the impossibility of trading in the Peninsula^ the Secretary' of
State instructed him to tell them that no interference was possible
except to suppress piracy or repel aggression against British persons
or territory.

In 1873 he received a petition from 248 Chinese* who inclndcd
every leading Chinese merchant in the Straits Settlements^ asking for
protection for their legitimate trade, and in reporting the matter to
Lord Kimber!ey% the Secretary of State for the Colonies in the Glad¬
stone administration, he used almost their exact words: ' In fact the
present state of affairs in the Malay Peninsula is * + * that the richest
part of it is in the hands of the lawlcsa and turbulent and, with the
exception of Johore, it is only in those states dependent in a certain
degree on Siam that order is prcserx^cd.^

In 1863 Britain hegan what has been called a ^serious diplomatic
battle'' with the Dutch concerning their alleged \-iolations of the
treaty of 1S24 by extending their possessions in Sumatra. The Singa¬
pore Chamber of Commerce bad complained that in bringing under
control certain east-coast ports which were open to British trade the
Dutch had told the rajas that the engagements entered into by their
predecessors were no longer in force. In the course of the exchanges
it transpired that the l>utch were willing to meet the British demands
in return for a free hand to deal with Acheh, whoae piracies had
caused trouble to both sides for half a century.

The matter became all the more important to the Dutch when they
learnt that in 1S69 the Sultan of Acheh had unsuccessfully applied to
Turkey for help against them- In ihat year, also, with the opening of
the Sue?- Canal the position of Acheh at the northern tip of Sumatra
became of far greater strategic importance than ever before. In iSyt
a bargain was struck by which, in return for the cession of the Dutch

* gufitirt Emrrtftll', p. jSo.

CII. 29

475

T1JF BFlTlSiT FORW.WID ^MOVFMFXT IN' MALAYA

ptwscssions on the Gold Coast io West Africa, the Dutch were
given a free hand in Sumatra, on the understanding (hat the British
trade in the Archipelago was to be treated on exactly the same basis as

Dutch. .

The Sumatra Treaty, as it was called, was signed on z November
tSji and inaugurated a new forward movement by the Dutch in
Indonesia, In 1873 they’ began a long war of conquest in Acheh. In
September of the same year Lord Kimberley inaugurated a change
of policy in Malayan affairs which involved the open abandonment of
non-intervention. In his instructions to Ord’s successor as Govcrrior
of the Straits Settlements, General Sir Andrew Clarke, he told him
to use his influence with the native princes to rescue their fertile and
productive countries from the ruin that must befall them if the present
disorders continue unchecked’, 'I’he change was not in any way due
to the adoption of a forward policy by the Dutch, though it coincided
so closely with it in point of time. It was due entirely to local con¬
ditions. But, as Rupert Emerson puts it,* both the Dutch and the
British advances to establish greater control in their respective spheres
of interest ‘were symptomatic of the new imperialist spirit which was
beginning to be felt at the time', and vvas likewise manifest in the
renewal of the French advance in Indo-China at exactly the same

time. . .

A further paragraph in Sir Andrew Clarke’s instructions contained
a dcfitiitc Euggeauon regarding a line of approach to the problem.
After requesting him to ascertain the actual condition of affairs in
each state and report on possible steps to be taken to restore order and
protect trade. Lord Kimberley went on: * 1 should wish youfspccially
to consider whether it would be advisable to appoint a British Officer
to reside in anv of the States. Such an appointment could, of courae,
only be made with the futi consent of the Native Government, and
the expenses connected w'ith it would have to be defrayed by the
Government of the Straits Settlements.’ A request for a British
officer to teach him huw to nile the country had already been made to
Sir Harry Ord by Abdullah, one of the claimants to the sultanate of
Perak. He was induced to repeat it to Sir Andrew Clarke. It was in
Perak, therefore, that the first steps were taken. *

Clarke was a man of action; he did not send in propo.sals and wait
for instructions. Ills first enquiries showed that the problem of the
L'hinesc immigrants was more than the Malay rulers could tackle.
Accordingly he sent his officer in charge of Chinese affairs, W, A,

^ Op. ffr.4. fi. 11 ti

FlTfinPF-AS TFSHITORIAL FXPANSIOS

VT. }U

Pickeriiigp to Penang to persuade the heads of the wajring L^mt
factions to accept his urbitration. When they agrecdp he called a joint
meeting of Perak chiefs to be held on the island of Pangkor, off the
mouth of the Perak river, in January' 1S74. There he proceeded to
recognise Abdullah, the legitimate claimant, as sultan, notwithstandiTig
the fact that he commanded liitle support in the country, and to
negotiate the famous Pangkor Engagement by which he accepted a
British Resident.

This important document, which ushered [n the new order,
provided for British intervention to protect Perak and assist its miens,
'f wo clauses established the basic principles of the Residential system.
Clause 6 laid down 'that the Sultan receive and provide a suitable
residence for a British OfRcerj to be called Resident, who shall be
accredited to his Court, and whose adrice must be asked and acted
upon in all questions other than those touching Malay religion and
custom\ Clause 10 provided 'That the collection and control of all
revenues and the general administration of the Countn' he regulated
under the advice of these Residents ^

The beads of the Chinese factions were also present at the meeting
and signed a bond undertaking, under a heavy penalty* to disarm
completely and keep the peace. The Mantri of Larut, who had been
appointed by Abdullah, with the subsequent approval of Sir Harry
Ord, was confirmed in his appointment and provided with an Assistant
Resident- Having acted. Sir Andrew Clarke reported his proceedings
to Lord Carnarvon, the new Secretary of State for the Colonies in
Disraeirs recently formed administration^ Necdlesa to say, he had
gone a considerable distance beyond anything envisaged by I-.ord
Kimberley in starting the ball rolling. But the arrangements down
on paper had yet to become established in practice.

Selangor was next dealt with. The immediate excuse', says Sir
Richard Winstedt, Svaa a particularly atrocious piracy at Kuala
Langal against a Malacca boat, resulting in the murder of eight
British subjects by pirates in the employment of a son of the sultan".
Jn February 1874 Sir Charles Shadwell, the Admiral of the China
Fleet, was invited to join Sir Andrew Clarke in a naval demonstration,
as a result of which the sultan consented to the trial of the accused
men» though attempting to dismiss the affair as ^bays" play"* and to
receive a Resident. In this case darkens first action was to leave
young Frank Swettenham as informal adviser. There w^as no formal
agreement like the Pangkor Engagement, but Swettenham's tact and
understanding so won the heart of the saltan ihat he wrote to the

CIL 29 THE BRITISH FDRWARU MOVEMENT IN MALAYA 477

(governor» * 1 shcmld be very ^lad if niy friend iv^ould set iny country'
to rj||;ht and collect all its taxes*. An official Resident, j. G* Davidson,
was therefore appointed with Swettenham as hi$ Assistant Resident.

The third slate to oome into the new system was Sungei Ujong, the
most important member of the Minangkabau Negri Sembilan con¬
federation lying behind Malacca. Illegal tax-gatherers were pestering
Chinese miners on the LinggI river, and m April 1874 Clarke inter¬
vened and persuaded the Chiefs of Sungei LJjong and Unggi to sign
a bond to abandon the practice and keep the peace in return, for
British prateetjon. The Dalo Klana Pulra of Sungei Cjong thcre'*^
upon asked for a British officer^ and Laptain Tatham was appointed
.'VssLStant Resident in his state. Civil war resulted^ since the Dato
Bandar, who had drawn his revenues from oppressing the Chinese
miners,^ naturally objected to the new arrangement, A small British
force, thereforCi bad to be sent to deal with the trouble, and after
some guerrilla skirmishing the region was brought under control.

In the following year finn action! had also to be taken in Perak,
w'here on 2 November J, W. W* Birch, its first Resident, was murdered.
Sir .Andrew Clarke had left Singapore in the previops May to become
a. member of the Govcrnor^Genenil^s Council in ]ndia+ His successor^
Sir William Jervois^ was anxious to move somewhat faster in dealing
w'ith the old privileges and rights of the chiefs^ which w'erc the main
obstacle to any improvement in the condition of the people,, and Birch,
when he should have shown tact and raution, had proceeded to
ride roughshod over them in his zeal for cleaning up what from the
point of view' of a European administrator was an Augean stable of
abuses.

He travelled all over the state with boundless cnerg>' enquiring into
cases of uppression, particularly the institution of debtof’Slavejy,
which w'as intrinsically bad in any cascp but in Perak w^as exploited in
such a w^ay by Abdullah and his chiefs as to be a foul and intolerable
evil. The measures he took against it and for the proper collection
of taxes led to a conspiracy on the part of the offended chiefs to get
rid of him. But Ie?t it should be thought that Birch's own attitude
and actions were the cause of his undoings it must be clearly stated
that the conspiracy' was rather against the Pangkor Engagement itself
than against the agent chosen to carry' it out- The chiefs who Altered
the Engagement, it has been well $aid,^ either did not fully realize
w hat Avas involved or^ if they did, had no serious intention of honouring
the contracts

* The Lieuleiumt^pvEnlor of t^cniuiiKp quoled by Emciion, df., p. 125.

47S TERKITORIAL EXf-ANSlON PT, 111

The rising was s-uppressed by a strong cr^Lpedition which hunted
down the murderers and their abcttorsn For a time there was danger
of a general Malay rbing and it took several years to restore law and
order. Three chiefs were hanged; three others, including Sultan
Abdullah himself* were banished- Governor Jerv^ois^ who had
advocated annexation, or, fading that, the conversion of the Residents
into Queen's Commissioners^ governing the states in the name of the
$uUan^^ was censured by Lord Carnavon for giving the Re^^idents
powers greater than the Colonial Office had sanctioned. The result
w;is an acrimcinious struggle between the governor and the Secretary
of State over the functions of Residents. 'Fhe governor a position
was that the sysEcm was unworkable if Residents w'ere to he mere
advisers; and although Lord Camavon refused lo alter his theory
concerning the fundamental principles of indirect rule, in practice the
Residents became more and more the actual rulers in their states.

In 1878, when a Resident was held to have exceeded his powers
in a particular case, the governor laid down the rule that if a Resident
disregarded the principle by which he was an adviser only and exercised
the functions of a.ruler he w'ould be held responsible for any trouble
arising therefrom. This was approved by the Secretary of State, and
there the matter ended 30 far as the home government was concerned.
For after the Perak War there was no further trouble. I'hc Malays
gave in, the rebeJIious chiefs had been removed^ and the Residents
were able to go ahead with the task of reconstruction under much
more favourable conditions.

In Selangor the new system gut under way without any difficulty,
since the viceroy and Davidson were old friends. A government
Ireasuiy^ was set up with a proper syslem of accounts, a police force
was organized, and the Kapitan China loyally maintained order in the
mining community of the Kuala Lumpur area. In Sungci Lfjong the
l.>ato" Klana seems to have been only toy anxious to do eveiythJng
according to llritish methods. Moreover, ihe introduction of British
administration brought prosperity such as had not been knoW'Ti
previously^ The abolition of slavery and of the many vexatious
imposts that had fettered trade, the maintenance of order by a tellable
police force, and the substitution of fixed allowances tnr the sultans
and orher chiefs in place of arbitrary exact ions, not to mention the
beginnings of education and the introduction of modern public health
measures, did much to improve the lot of the ordinary people-

Perak after so disastrous a beginning was transformed into a peace¬
ful and flourishing state by Mr^ (later Sir) flugh Low, whose methods

479

CH. 29

THIi EdlTlSsH FORWARD MOVFAIKNT IN MALAYA

during hh long tenure of the Residency (1877-89) provided the mode!
for the administration of ali the other protected sutes. ’How much
of his policy was original,' writes Winsledt,^ ‘how much was due to
the governor and how much to Oow'ning htreet has not jet been
explored/ His method was never to dictate but to gain the co¬
operation of the chiefs by establishing dose friendly relations with
them * llie difficulties which he had to face on taking office were
immense, since although the rebellious chiefs had been removed
there were others who eould stimulate ejuite cfFeetivc piissiv^e resist-
nhce. Moreovefi he himself was a strtuiger to Malays when he wcnl
to Perak. His previous sei^'iee had been in Borneo.

( 3 ne original cause of trouble had been the loss by the chiefs of
their feudal dues without compermlion. Ij>w sought to remedy this
-injustice by giving them adminstrative posts and a percentage of the
government revenue collecied in their districts. Another measure
which greatly improved relations was the establishment of a Slate
Council on the model of the Indian councils created by the Act of
iS 6 t. The sultan was its president; the Resident, the major Malay
chiefs and tw^o or three leiading Chinese businessmen were members *
The business was conducted in Malay, and the Council discussed all
important matters. Its work w^as mainly legislative and it passed all
the state legislation. The annual estimates of revenue and expenditure
were laid before it. All death sentences had to be referred to it for
confirmation or modification* 'Phe appointments and salaries of all
Malay chiefs and headmen were subject to its decision. It served itn
puqpose so well that similar councils with identical procedure were

instituted in other states. ■

The greatest innovation was the institution of courts of justice
presided over by l^uropean magistrates, often w'iih the assistance of
Malay magistrates. U'hc Penal Code of the StraiiSj, which was adapted
from the Indian Penal CVjde, was administered, together with codes
of criminal and civil procedure drafted according to Indian and
colonial patterns. Kach slate was divided into districts under European
and Malay magistrates. The districts in turn were subdivided into
Mukim and villages with Malay headmen. As a measure of economy
police duties were given to headmen. 'Phis enabled the police force
to be reduced and many village police stations to be cloficd. It signified
the abandonment of a policy of intimidation for one of co-operation.

^ arvf itt Uinfjry, pr j •t

^^I^'cllcnhiim rmUtA rhe ptnctrauiiit comment rtl Urw ■ i Q

K»{n their it i* w iheni ut Iwt a» muchcoiuitlmiitm iw if

they n-erc EuropcjilU, JMid inlinitcty more futtence' (of. «!.* R. 353),

430 t-l RtiriiAN H^RITORIAL EXi-ANSlOS" PT. Ill

Debtor slavtrj^ was still the great evil when Low became Resident;
it was not abolished until i Januan^ 1S84. in the other states it was
more easily got rid of. The establishment of the state finances on a
satisfactory basi$ also presented great difficulties. 'I'he state was
saddled with a debt of £160^000 in 1877. Low'^s achievement in
paying this off in six years was a notable one. The rapid increase of
Perak's population was a further tribute to his work. The official
estimate w as SopOOO in 1879 and 195,000 in 1889. The census in iSgi
showed a population of 3141254.^

In Larut Captain Speedy had practically a free hand. There were
almost no Malays in the neighbourhood, hence, although he consulted
the Mantri, who was the local chief, in every matter of importance:,
he made his owm decisions and acted accordingly- Slis measures
mcluded the creatton of a police force, the establishment of a magis¬
trate's court, a treasury^ a customs service and a Land and Survey
Office. Larut prospered; the Chinese were only too glad to settle
dowm to w^ork, and the community was unaffected by the disturbances
which shook ihe rest of Perak. In 1SS4 the first railway to be buik in
Malaya connected ^^Faipcng, the Larut mining centre, with Sa-petang
on the Lamt river, a distance of eight miles. Incidentally Selangor
immediately followed it upj constructing one from its mining centre,
Kuala Lumpur, to Klang, a matter of twenty-two miles.

As all the protected states depended upon their tin mines for a
revenue, everything possible had to be done to provide them with
means of transport. Pending adequate provision of roads, use w^as
made of many navigable streams by clearing them of the accumulation
of forest trees which had fallen across them in the courae of the ages.
Hut every possible effort was put into road construction and all surplus
me^^enue devoted to it.

Until practically the end of the century the economic development
of the Peninsula was almost exclui^ively in Chinese hands., l‘hcir
capitalists did much to develop the protected states. Tin-mining was
their chief occupation^ and their primitive methods w^cre most
effective. The lack of labourers w'as a great difficulty and led to
negotiations with the Government of India for the recruitment of
Indian coolies. In 1884 agreement W’as reached which permitted
recruitTnent for the protected slates. Efforts were made to induce
European miners and planters to open up the countrv\ hut at first
these met with little response. A French company began to mine
tin in the Kinta district of Perak in i88z, and later extended its
operations eiseivhercK Other European companies fuHowed, but the

in. 29 THE BRITISIE KOKWAftli ?iiaVEMENT IN MAL.WA 481

great obstadc to Europtati enterpri^;^ b these eurly years before
ferieration seems to have been the inadequaej' of the labour supply.

'I'he earliest Residents spent mijsl of their time touring the country
and from time to time reporting to the Governor of the Straits
Setilemenis. 'Fhey built up the administration of their stales with
little interference from above and with merely routine references to
the governor. At first the Resident was quite alone. Then he recruited
a clerk or two, an N.C.Q. in charge of his police, a Eurasian apothecary'
for the first hospital to be established* and a Maby \\^rder to look
after prisoners. So writer Swettenham, who was closely associated
with the evolution of the Residenttai system from its inception.*
Owing to lack of communications it was very difficult for Singuporc
to control and co-ordinale the w^ork of its servants in the three states,
From 1876 to iSS^ the governor had a Secretary for Malay .Affairs
who periodically visited the states to audit accounts and to secure
uniformity of method, but after 188a there was no one in the Singa¬
pore secretariat with enough personal knowledge of the Alaby stales
for this procedure to be continued.

During the fir^t ten years of the system Residents kept daily journals
a$ a method of supplying information to the governor, but as ^heir
work increased no time was left for coruitiuing the practice. 1 heir
annual budgets had to be regularly submitted for the approval of the
governor. Besides furnishing this and bis annual report, say^ Sw'etten-
ham, *tbe correspondence of the Resident wnth Singapore was mainH
occupied with the appointment, promotional salari^, and complaints
of Government officers*, ITiere was only one w'ay for a governor w'ho
was interested in the Malay statics to e?{;ercise any influence over their
administration^ and that was by visiting them and studying conditions
nn the sput. Until 190J1 when the main trunk railway line came i^u^
operation with its tcimimis in Provittce Wellesley, the difficulties of
correspondence between the states and Singapore, as well as with each
other, forced each Re.sident largely to follow his own line. Sir
Frederick W'eld (1878-S7), who spent much time travdling m the
states, came to the conclusion that the large aulhnriiy the Residents
had gradually acquired could be safely left in their handSk I here was
to come a time, however, W'hen the lack of co-ordination resulting
from the abolition of the Secretaryship for Native .Affairs was iTi bring
Such differcfices between states as to lead to federation^

In tSSS the number of protected states was augmented by the
addition of Pahang^ n very' large but tinderdcvcloped state with a

^ Mftlnyn, pp. i45-7i'

El'ItOPEAN TKHRTTORIAL EXPANSION

PT. Ill

population of only 50,000 Malays and a few hundred Chine^sse. Mls-
govemment was so rife there that in 18^7 Weld Kad persuaded the
sultan to make a treaw under which he received a British consular
agent. In the following year^ howevefi the murder of a Chinese
British subject led to further pressure from Singapore, as a result of
which the ^nltank very unwillingly^ requested the appointment of a
Resident. The application of the new system caused some of the
chiefs to rebel and resulted in long and expensive operations w^hich
ended only with their being hunted out into the Siamese states of
Kelantan and Trengganu^ where the sunivora were captured and
deported to Siamn Young Hugh Clifford, w ho later rose to positions of
great distinction and produced valuable studies of the w'ork and
cxperience$ of the pioneers who opened up IMalaya and Indo-China,
took a prominent part in these operations.

Similar pressure to that brought to bear on Pahang exerted in
the case of the Minangkabau states^ with the result that by a trcat>^
made in August 18^5 all nine agreed to form the confederation of
Negri Sembilan under British protection, and to follow^ the advice of
a British Resident in all matters of administration save those touching
the Mahommedan religion. This new^ turn of policy^ came largely ^
the result of a careful review of the Residential system made by Sir
Frederick Weld in 18S0, The alternatives, he said^ were to retire or to
annex. The former was out of the question, since immigration and the
investment of foreign capital were taking place in the confidence that
British control would remain. Annexation he was opposed to on the
grounds that a colonial system of government was inappropriate to
the states in their existing condition* lienee he recommended the
extension of the Residential system to further states and the open
recognition of the real functions of Residents.

Weld made it clear that annexation Was not the proper solution of the
problems of Malaya. But it was Swettenham who made it equally
clear that the Residential system could not he left to develnp indefin¬
itely without co-ordination* In 1893 he submitted a scheme for
federation to Governor Sir Cecil CIcmenti Smithy I'his went up to
the Colonial Office, with the result that Smith's successor. Sir Charles
Mitchell, was asked to report on the propo^aU. After two yeans^
consideration Mitchell in 1S95 recommended that, aubject to the
approval of the Malay rulers concerned, the scheme should be
adopted.

He argued that the four protected states w^re drifting seriously
apart in matters of jusricei taxation and land settlement, and that in

cii, aq Tilt: British toRvvAHi* movkment in' malaya +83

the absence of some centralizing power administrative uniformity
was impossible. governor, he pointed out. dealing with four
separate Residents cither left them to their own devices or was over¬
whelmed with %voTk. He therefore recommended that a Resident-
General should be appointed as chief executive officer to supervise
the administration of the states, but to act only through the individual
Residents; that while legislation should be left in the hands of the
State Councils there should be occasional meetings of an assembly of
chiefs and Residents with a competence entirely advisory. Instead of
appointing oflicers to separate states there should be a common civil
service acting under the departmental heads of the federal govern¬
ment. fiach state, however, should remain financially autononious.

Frank Swettenhara, then Resident of Perak, had the task of per¬
suading the rulers to accept the plan and was instructed by the
Secretary of State to explain that in so doing they would in no way
diminish their own powers and privileges, nor curtail the rights of
self-government which they enjoyed. On this fictitious basis , as it
has been described, Swertenham easily performed his task, and the
Treaty of Federation was concluded whereby, Perak, Selangor,
Pahang and Negri Sembilan were united to form the Federated Malay
States. Its glaring inconsistencies from the point of view of con¬
stitutional theory are obvious. There w;is no differentiation hetween
the respective powers of the states and of the hedcration as in the
narmal federative enactment. It provided against the curtailnient of
the powers of the ruler but placed a Resident-General in control
of 'matters of administration other than those touching the Muham-
medan religionthough the actual word'control ’ is carefully omitted.
It expressly stated that the new arrangement did not alter the existing
relations between the individual states and the British empire, hut in
fact they were made into an iidntiriLstrative uniou*

But notwithstanding the dberepandcs between theory and fact
the siultPo» were satisfieds They retained their offices w^ith added
guaranteesj larger incomes and enhanced pomp and ceremony. And
the British built up at Kuab Lumpur a large and efficient central
administration, in the approved modern stylCi in which the suites
had little or no say. Yet against the claini:ts of the rapidly increasing
Chinese population the theorj^ that they were Malay state# under
sovereign Malay rulers was a most convenient device for refusing to
take action likely lo be resented by the Malaya^

Sir I'Vank Swettenham became the first Resident-General when
the Federation wiLa Snauguraled on t July 1896. Ills adminiatration

KUROPEAN TERhJTORIAI. HXPA.VSJON

IT, IJl

484

sdon blossorru-d out with 3 Legal Adviser, a Secretary fur Chinese
Affairs, a Financial Commissioner, a Judicial Cummissioner, a
Commissioner of Police and a Director of Public Works. As time went
on other departments were added. The Resident-General himself,
though aubordioated to both the Governor of the Straits Settlements
in his function as High Commissioner of the Federation and the
Secretary of State for the Colonies, managed in practice Co maintain
great freedom of action- And since the treaty placed no limits on his
competence, save in the matter of the Mahommedan religion, the
real substance of legislative power was in his hands.

The first of the promised conferences of Maky rulers wa,^ held nl
Kuala Kangsar^ in Perak* in 1897^ I^evcr before in hlaby history
had such an assembly met, and as the proceedings were in Malay
the Alalay members took a full share in the debates^ A number of
important subjects for legislation came up for discussiorit and as they
were unanimously agreed to, thej^ were passed on to the State Councils
for legislative enactment in identical terms. 'I'hus Kuala Lumpur
became the legislative as well as the administrative centre, acid the
position of the Staje Coundls, which had been so vital a feature of
the old Residency system, necessarily deteriorated before the inevitable
growth of centraliaation.

'Phe second conference of Malay rulers, held at Kuala Lumpur in
1903, brought up the question of Malay participarion in the govern¬
ment p and the Sultan of Perak regretted that no way had been found
of handing over to Malays any considerable portion of the adminis¬
tration. He also made a dignified and fair-minded protest against
ovcrccntralixation whicli drew attention to the growing need for
reforms in the fcdeml structure. The departmentalbation of the
government and the urge for uniformity could have only one results
the lightening of centml control. For the Judicial Commissioner
framed the procedure of the state courts, the Financial Commissioner
reorganized the w hnie financial system, the Public Works Departments
in ai] the states were fused into one under the Director at Kuab
Lumpur, railway construction came Under the Federal Director of
Railways, forest conservation was systemsiiTied under the central
Ftmest Department, and agriculture and education under federal
direaoni.

The increase in efficiency was marked and the records of prosperity
impressive. The population of the four states rose from 4^4,218 in
1S91 to 678,595 in 190J. The revenue increased from just under 8i
million dollars in 1895 to just under 24 million dollars in 1905 and

CH. 29 THE BRITISH FOB WARD MOVEMENT IN MALAYA 485

there was an appreciable surplus of revenue over expenditure. In
1874 the Slates did not boast of a single post office. In 1904 their
pwsta] ser\‘ices dealt with ro million covers, issued money orders for
more than i i million dollars, had in thdr savings banks depo&I^ of
275,000 dollars, and maintained over 2,000 miles of telegraph wires.
There were hospitals treating many thousands of patients and schools
attended by 13,000 children. There were over 2.4QO miles of good
roads and 34O miles of railway built nut of cuixent revenue. ‘ It may
he questioned', wrote Sir Frank Swettenham with justifiable pride,
■whether it is possible to find, in the histmy' of British administration
overseas, a parallel to this record.'^

But the opponents of centralization argued that British pledges to
the sultans had been ignored and that there was a tendency to forget
that the powers exercised by the gmemmenl were derived entirely
from their gift. There was an uncomfortable feeling that the Resident*
General was not under any effective control. And, moreover, the
rapid increase of the commercial, mining and planting communities
had led to a desire on their part to obtain representation in the govern*
ment. Hence in 1909 an Constitution of a Federal

Council w'PB laid before the rulers and accepted by them.

The new body was to be under the presidency of the High Com¬
missioner. Its membership comprised the Resident-General and the
four Residents, the four sultans and four unoflicial membere to be
nominated by the High Commissioner with the approval of the king,
'llie High Commissioner was also empowered, if he thought il
desirable, to add to the Council one or more heads of departments,
but if he’ made an official addition in this way he must add another
unofficial member. 'I’hc Council was given the task of dealing w^th
the draft estimates of revenue and expenditure of each slate. It was a
legislative body, but its legislative powers are referted to only incident¬
ally and indirectly in the document. There is a statement m the
preamble about the proper enactment of all laws intended to have
force throughout the Federation, or in more than one slate, and the
provision in the body of the document that laws passed by the State
Councils w’cre to continue to have full force and effect, save w'herc
repugnant to laws passed by the Federal Council- The «clusive
jurisdiction of the State Councils over questions concerning the
Mahommedan religion and certain matters involving Malay customs
was confirmed, with the addition of the words' and any other questions
%vhich In the opinion of the High Commissioner affect the rights and

FITIOPEAN TRRUrrOJltAL EXPAN'SfO?!

t*T. m

486

prerogatives of any of the above-named Ruters or which for other
reasons he considers should properly be dealt with only by the State
Councils*.

There has been much comment on the legal Inconsistenctes of the
document, about the propriety of the governor of a Crown Colony
acting as president of a council controlling the affairs of a federation
of protected states under their own rulers, and about the fact that the
nominated members of the Council were to be appointed subject to
the approval of the Crown and not of the rulers of the states. But the
practical effect of the measure w’as further to decrease the importance
of the sultans and of the State Coundla. On the h’ederal Council the
sultana were reduced to the same level as any ordinary member. 'I'hey
could not preside over it; they had no veto; the Council legislated
whether they were present or not, and the hills passed were signed
by the High Commissioner and not by them. As for the State Councils,
their new position has been summarised thus: 'The hederal Council
apportioned the combined revenue of the four states as it saw tit
and later informed the State Councils of its decisions. 'I’he legislative
furiction of State Councils ended, since all laws of any imprtrtance
were henceforth passed by the Federal Council.**

The High Commissioner, Sir John Anderson, who introduced these
changes, which had an effect so different from what he had intended,
follow'cd them up by changing the title of the Resident-General to
Chief Secretary, hoping thereby to reduce the independence of the
holder of the post. But this measure also misiired. Of the four
non^officials there were three British and one Chinese. In 1913 the
Legal .\dviser and a further unofficial member were added and in
1920 the 'I’reasurtr and another official niembcr. Ultimately before
the reform of the Council in 1937 there were eight non-official
members: five Europeans, tw-o Chinese, and a Malay chief,

'I'he main factor tvhich was instrumental in producing the change
in the position of the Malay rulers was the economic revolution w’hich
during the first twenty years of the twentieth century brought Malaya
right into the forefront of world commercial development, and her
states face to face with conditions that their rulers with their mediaeval
outlook were unable to grasp. Malaria control, agricultural chemistry,
modern educational policy, the world price of lin and rubber, and
suchlike questions became the main concern of the government, and
they could no longer be dealt with by the ohl method of a Resident
using his persuasive powers upon sultans and chiefs. Everywhere

M.. A. Milt*. Brilhh Hull fn Rtfifrn -fmi, p. JO.

CH. 29 TUF atllTISH FORWARD MOVEMENT IN MALAYA 487

iKfoughout (he world it was an era of greater, rather than less,

centralisation. ^ ^ ^

During the last ten years of the nineteenth century tm mining was
beginning to pass from the primitive form of opeii*cast extraction to
that of large-scale escavation by modem Western machinery* The
world demand for tin became ao great and the price so high that a
vast amount of foreign capital, mainly British and Chinese, was
invested in the industry, and a huge immigration of labour, mainly
from China, was stimulated. Malaya’s exports, which had risen to
26,000 tons in 1889, were 51.733 tons in 1904 and just under 70,000
tons in 1929. By the beginning of the century Malaya’s output of
tin was over 50 per cent of the total world output.

Her tin industry, however, was now rivalled by rubber, the pro¬
duction of which was stimulated by the invention of the motor-car
□sing rubber tyres and the universal popularity of the bicj'cle. Rubber
had been introduced to Malaya as early as 1877, when the Royal
Botanic Gardens at Kew had sent two cases of seedlings to the
Botanic Gardens at Singapore for experimental purposes. But
although government nurseries were established and seedlings offered
to planters little headway was made, and by 1897 only 345 acres were
under rubber. By 1905 the acreage under rubber had risen to 50,000,
and 200 tons were exported. ’I hat was a mere drop in the ocean
compared with the 62,145 jungle rubber produced elsewhere

in the world. Then came a period of rapid development, stimulated
by Braxilian speculators, w-ho forced up the price so that immense
profits were made by existing plantations, and there was a rush to
float new rubber companies in Ijindon. 'I'bat was during the great
boom of 1910-12. T.aiid was easily available, and by 1914 the Malayan
plantation could deliver rubber in New York at a price lower than
that of Jungle rubber from South .America.

Jn 1920 Malaya exported 196.OQO tons of rubber, or 53 per cem
of total world production. In the plantations the need for labour was
met by the recruitment of thousands of immigrant coolies—Indian
in this case. 1 n the newly developed areas the Malay was in a minority.
His country was dominated by British and Chinese entrepreneurs,
capitalists and bufiineaamen. Its labour force was composed mainly
of Chinese and Indians, who were ultimately 10 form a majoritT of the
population, while the hulk of the Malays"remained small rice fatmera
growing in addition some rubber and coconuts as cash crops. The
racial character of the Peninsula had been changed within one genera¬
tion, and the Malays, unable to adapt themscivea to the sudden

EtlRaPEA?^ TFRRITORJAl. EXPANSION^

PT, III

4RS

changCt found themselves both politically and economically 'pu&hed
out of their otvn house on to the doorstepV’^

'rhe greater part of the tin mines and rubber plantatiorts were in the
four fedemted states. In 1913 thdr total expons had risen to the value
of iS4i974i'95 Straits dollais and their government revenues to
44,332,71 [. In the general rush of development and the consequent
increase of prosperity political issues dropped into the background.
Not until after the First World War did the old issues concerning
centraliiiation, burcaurracy and the position of the Malay sultans
return again to the forefront.

Against this background it is significant that when in 1909 the
four northern states of Kedah, Pcriis, Kelantan ^nd Trengganu came
under British control, under the terms of the Auglo-Siamcse Treaty
of that year, their rulers aJl refused to join the Federation. Actually»
in taking them over Britain confined her power to the right to advi&c,
thereby conferring on them a large degree of internal independence*
They enjoyed privili^cs—notably that of financial autonoiny—that
contrasted strongly with the subjection to Kuala Lumpur that was the
lot of the federated states.

Johore also would have no part in a federation. Ever since the
foundation of Singapore in 1819 it had been clusety associated with
the British. Not until 1914 did h have a General Adviser, but in 1895
its sultan, Ahubakar, gave it a written constitution that wras drafted
by British lawyers. This, with its one amendment introduced in 1914,
became the pattern of what in Malay opinion should have been the
constitution of all protected states. Tn its original form it had a Council
of .Ministers, all of whom must be Malays professing the faith of
Islantp and a Council of i^tate^ membership of which was limited to
Johorc subjects irrespective of race or religion* in 1914 membership
was thrown open, and British oEcials could sit on it without taking
the oath of allegiance to the sultan, '[’he Council of Ministers was
purely consultative body; the Council of State enjoyed the functions
of a legislative; council. 3 n 1912 a third body, an Executive Council,
was added. It was modelled on the executive councils in British
ccionial Administration,

.All the ’Unfederated States bad Advisers whose functions were
different from those of Residents- The Adviser had the right to be
consulted by the ruler on all questions, but did not issue any orders,
lie could insist that the ruler should follow his advice, but usually

' 1 j. a, MiHi and An^Kl-dtef, xVt'tip af SvUikfttxt jltHh Minnwpolii and

1.miidnn, 177^

CH. 29 nTF. fiRITtSH FORWARD MOVEMEMT JN MALAYA 489

made an effort to persuade him to accept his view and used his power
as little as possible, e^’cn gis-ing way if the matter were not one of
prime importance.

There were thus up to the Second World War three types of con¬
stitution in Malaya:

The Straits Settlements, a British Colony, compriring Singapore
Island, Penang and Province Wellesley, and the territory of Malacca,
including Naningr

'rhe Fedcriited Malay Statc^nf Perakp Selangor, Negri Sembilan
and Pahang and:

The Unfederated Malay States of Kedah, Pcrlis, Kdantan, rreng-
ganu and Johorc.

CHAPTER 30

THE DUTCH FORWARD MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA

Under Article 59 of the Dutch conatitutional revision of 18+S, while
the king was recogrijzed as the supreme authority over the colonics the
stipulation added that a colonial constitution must be established
by law, and that the chambers of the Dutch Parliament were to have
specific rights of legislation over colonial currency and finance and such
other matters as might be necessary^ Article 60 laid down that the king
must report annually on colonial affairs. These important changes in
the relationship bettveen the mother country and the colonics had at
first very little effect upon conditions in the Indies. The Colonial
Department w^as in the grip of officiai]i with a eonservative outlook»and
the chambers for some time had too little knowledge of colonial affairs
to exert any effective influence. But the Rtgmngi-r^gkmmt, or Con¬
stitutional Regulation, w hich was passed in 1854 and came into effect
in 1856, made one significant change in the colonial government by
entrusting the chief power in the Indies to the governor-general and
Council* This abolished the rule inttoduced in iSjfi, whereby the
Council had been reduced to the position of a mere advisoiy' body.
Moreover, the Regulation looked for'ivard to the ultimate abandonment
of the Culture System and showed clearly that state cultivation was no
longer to be fostered by the government. The govemor-gcnenil was
instructed to see that the cull ores did not interfere with the production
of adequate means of subsistence, and that the oppression connected
with ihenv was removed.

Still, the movement for reform moved incredibly slowly. Baron van
Hoevelh a past prcsidcni of the Batavia Society of Arts and Sciences
and the founder of the newspaper TiJiisthrSfl v&n Indirj

who bad stoutly opposed corruption in giving contracts in java, was a
member of the Second Chamber from 1849 to 1862. There he not only
championed ihe cause of the J avanese people but helped to form what
came to be known as the 'Colonial Opposition', But for a long time
the ConRer^'ative& dominated the home government and there was
painfully little progress in actual reform.

CH. 30 THE DltTCIT FORWARD MOVEMENT IS INDONESIA 49^

In 1860 the stniBsIc the Culture System received new life

as a result of two publicatiosis. One was a novel, Ilav^laar,

written bv Hdward Douwes Dekkcr under the pseudonym of Multa-
tuli’ In'it Dekker idls the story of his career as an insubordinate
pflicLal in West java who had been dismissed, according to his account,
for defending the Javanese against the oppression practised against
them under the Culture System. Quite apart from its propaganda
value, it is a work of high literary value, one of the most striking con¬
tributions to Dutch prose literature in the nineteenth century. It
stirred up wide support for the Liberal campaign against govern men t
control over cultures in Java- Its effect was enhanced by the
of Isaac Fransen van dcr Pulte, and especially one entitled 7 he Regu-
hthn of Sugar C'oniror/r j« Java. He had been employed by a sugar
factory dealing with the product of cultures and had afterwards, as a
tobacco planter in the extreme east of Java, become acquainted with
free cultivation. He showed in his writings so intimate a knowledge ot
conditions there that in i86j the Liberal leader 'rhorbecke appointed
him Minister of Colonies in his Cabinet.

During van dcr Putte’s term of office (1863-6) things began to move
in the direction of free enterprise, the Idheral specific to end economic
oppression. His oivn view' was that direct taxation should take the
place of deliveries under forced culture, and that private enterpnse
should have free access to land and labour. What he and his sup-
porters did riut advocate was the abolitton of the infamous saldQ.
Moreover, the cultures that were abolished during this period—
pepper in iRfia, cloves and nutmeg in 1S63, indigo, tea, cinnamon and
cochineal in 1865, and tobacco in 1866—were no longer profitable.
The forced culture of sugar and coffee, the chief source of Dutch
profits, was retained. Some serious abuses, however, were removed,
rhe percentage svstem, for instance, whereby European officials re¬
ceived commission on the proceeds of the forced cullures, was
ubolishedt and it was fprbidd<sn for more thon one-fifth of th* cuU
livator's land to be used for government crops. .\ big step forward
was made by the passage of the ComptabilitrUncrt (Accounts Law) ol
1S64, which provided that from 1867 onwards the budget for the
Indies must be passed annually by the home parliament. Another
useful measure was Oie abolition in 1865 of cpmpulsory laboui-m the

forest districts. ^ ■ - r

De Waal’s Sugar Law of 1870 represents the culminating point of

the struggle against the Culture System. It provided that the
government was l« withdraw from sugar cultivation in twelve

EimOFKAN TfJlillTOllIAL

PT* m

493

amriiuil atagirs beginnmg in 1878^ and p^rrmittcd the free ?3le of
$tigar in Java. Again one notes the exceptional caution shoivn
by the Dutch in this matter, and the striking fact that cofTce,
which brought by far the greatest profit from the syslefn, re¬
mained a forced culture until i January 1917* The same almost
incredible slowness \va$ shown in the case of the various profitable
monopolies which inflicted so much hardship on the people^ The
revenue from the sale of these in the eighteen-forties was over
15 million guilders. A beginning was made by Governor-General
van Twist (jS5t—6) by the abolition of the much-detested farming
of bazaars, and fishery auctJon$, But the opium and pawn-shop
farmSf w^hich were the most profitable^ continued. By 19Z7 the
gross revenue from the monopulies of opium, salt and pawnshops
amounted to no less than 82.6 million guilders. It Is obvious^ there¬
fore* that Dutch Libendism differed very considerably from its con¬
temporary Gladstonian Liberalisin in Britain.

The Dutch outlook, in fact, in the matter of colonies was com¬
pletely different from the British. Even the Liberals regarded them as
a business concern^ and their advocacy of private enterprise in place
of govcmmcnt-controiled cultures was largely inspired by the desire
of the individual Dutchman to have a greater share in the concern.
More and more privately owned or run estates were coming into
existence, and the private capitalists were demanding the removal of all
rotrictions to their actiAities* Van 'Twist, who w^ais anxious to open
up Java to private capital, allowed them to make collective contracts
with the tillages for labour. But the practice gave rise to such abuses,
through advances of money to vilbge headmen, that it had to be
abolished in 1863. The truth was that the Liberab had two largely
contradictory objects—-to free the native from oppression and to
make the Indies safe for the individual capitalist

De WaaTs Agrarian Law of 1870 ushered in the great age of private
enterprise. It aimed at giving greater freedom and security to private
enterprise by enabling capitalists to obtain from the goveniment herit¬
able leases for periods up to seventy-five yearst and to hire land from
nati\T ovruers on short-term agreements subject to certain conditions.
This opened the door for an Immense expansion of private enterprise,
and tht export figures for plantation products are illuminating, as the
following table shows:

CH. 30

THE DL'TtJt FORWAKU MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA

493

Comparative Value of State and Thi vate Exports in Millions

OF Gltujehs*

Sitih

Pi kale

1S56

64.4

34-3

1S70

4 ft .5

6t-3

1*75

41.4

130-7

1885

16,3

t68.7

Even more ioiportiint by eomparisoji with what happened in Efcrich
Indo-China and British Burma was the elause which prohibited the
selling of land belonging to Indonesians to non-Indonesians. The
immediate reason was that there was such a msb on the part of
Europeans to cultivate culture products for the home market that
there was a danger that land needed for the production of food stuffs
for the native population would be used for other purposes.

In 1869 the Suea Canal was opened. The development of large-
scale cultivation combined with the increasing use,of steamships to
produce a constant expansion of trade. It w'as in this period that the
Netherlands Steam Navigation Company (1870) and the Rotterdam
Lloyd (1875) were founded.

iTie development of Java between 1830 and 1870 is in striking con¬
trast to the neglect of the Outer Settlements that cbaractciizes the
same period. The Java War followed by the struggle with Belgium
prevertid an energetic policy from being carried out. It was only vvith
the greatest difficulty that General Cochius was able to muster
adequate strength to bring the Padri wars to an end in 1837 with the
siege and capture of Bondjol. 'I'hen the home government sent in¬
structions that in the future there was to be as little interference as
pnssible with the powers of the native chiefs outside Java. 'I’hc native
populations were thus left the victims of despotic or quarrelsome
chiefs, who lost respect for a government which failed to intervene.

Worse still from the Dutch point of view were the activities of Raja
James Brooke in Sarawak and Brunei and ihe acquisition of the island
of Labuan by Britain. Governor-General Rochussen (1845-51) feared
lest this might open the door for other powers to occupy partstif the
Archipelago. He proposed, therefore, that Dutch power should be
effectively established over the whole of Indonesia, l-'or Bnancial
reasons alone the home government eould not permit so ambitious a
• 'I'jlken frnin Pumiv^ll, Nethrthitdi India, p. 169.

EUROPEAN TEaHltOftlAL KNPANSION

PT. Itl

4^4

scheme. It was nilling to sancuun a display of militao' powers where
the ciroumstances warranted it, but the Batavian authorities pointetl
out that punitive expeditions were useless unless followed up by
continuous occupation.

Nevertheless the establishment of British power in nuith-west
Borneo did stir the Dutch to adopt a mute energetic polic>% Th^ age
of steam kd to a search for coalfields, sviih rewarding results. Mines
were ope net! in south-west Borneo near Banjermasin and in the east
of the island at Kutei, and when the working of the Banjermasin
mine led to a quarrel with the sultan and a w ar (i:Ss9-63) hia dominions
were annexed, The Dutch were taking no chances in that region. In
1854 and 1855 they intervened to stop the diBOrders in the suUanates
of Sambas and Pontianak caused by the feuds betw^ecn the Chinese
gold-mining kongsis. Moreover^ the discovery of rich tin deposits
in the island of Billiton led to its occupation in 1851 and the exploitation
of its tin by the Billiton Tin Company.

Elsewhere there was enough activity to make it clear that the Dutch
Were becoming moTe and more aware of the need to maintain a
dordinant posiriqn in the Archipelago^ if only to prevent ourxidc
interference. They w^cre worried by the proud, indepeadeni attitude
of the rulers of Bali^ whose internecine war and slave trade went on
unchecked, Dutch expeditions to the island in 184& and 1849 en¬
countered fierce tesistance. In consequence of the latter they annexed
some territory^ and the chiefs of the remainder made formal recognition
of Hoi land suzerainty. I'he Biigis rulers in Celebes also [gave much
trouble, and there was heavy fighting in 1858 and 1S59 against Bont
before Dutch authority was made more or less dominant over the
south-west parts of the island, mainly through the loyalty of the dynasty
of the Am Palaccas. But more trouble was to come later.

It tvaa on Sumatrap however, that Dutch attention came to he
chiefly focused as time went by, Pirac>^ and the slave-trade were rife
in Achehp Pakmbang, Ikncoolcn and the Lampungs, hVoni 1S56
onwards the Dutch began a scries of moves designed to bring more
and more of the island under controL In that year the Lampongs
districts were subdued, 'Fwo years later the Batak districts received
similartrcatrnent, and in 1R6S Bencoolen. Palembang had been brought
under direct Dutch nik in 1825, but like Bencookn had become a
prey to disorder. So Dutch control had to be tightened there. Siak
gave the Dutch a severe shock in 1856 ivhen its sultan, at loggerheads
with his brother, the vice-suJian, called in the help of an Englishman
named Wilsun, who enlisted a force of Bugis in Singapore, defeated

cn. 30 TSIK ULitai HWARii SIOVKMEST !N INDONKIA 495

the vicc-suitaii and took conirol over the state. '1 he Duteb had to
send a warship to enforce his expulsion, 'rhen in 185S they «iade f
treaty with the sotlan whereby his state and us dependencies-Deh,
Serd'anE l^ngkat and Assahan -eamc under their sovereignty. I he
acquisition of this territory to the north of Siak was an immense step
forward for Dutch power on the east coast of Sumatra, i^n Lnropean
enterprise was to make a start there with tobacco-planting, which vv^
to make that region one of the richest distncls m the Netherlands

liut the Siak 'I'rcatv brought strained relations with Acheh. which
claimed the state as ^ne of its dependencies. 'I'he weak spot there
was that \cheh was not strong enough to control ctfcctivdy the places
over which she made such claims, though they had at one time
recognized her ovcrlordship. The way in which the Dutch enforced
their control over these places affected adversely the trade that had
long been carried on by the merchants of Singapore and Malacca,
and their loud complaints forced the British government to take
action. Its protest at I'he Hague led to the negotiations which pro-
duced the epoch-making treaty of 1871. dealt will? in the previous
chapter. With its signature a new period of Dutch e.\pansian m
Indonesia begins. It ivas happily one in which, with the passage of
van dcr Putte's 'fariff Law abolishing differential rates of customs
duties between Dutch and foreign trade, better relations grew up
between liolbiitl and Britain.

Acbehi, tbe swnm enemy of the Portuguese in tbe sixteenth cenlurj^
had become under Sultan Iskander early in the seventeenth century
A powerful state ruling much of Sumatra. After his death the kingdom
declined. In the nineteenth century it was divided into several states
under praclicallv independent chiefs. The sultan’s capital was at the
present town of Kutaraja; his main revenues came from port dura.
'I hc 'I'reaty of London (1824) had given the Dutch the task
guarding the seas around .Achch against piracy, but they argued with
cogenq- that as the Achinesc were the chief piratea there they could
not carry out ihclr task satisfactorily without occupying the pnncipal
ports of the country- Under the treaty they could not do so because
they had undertaken to respect the sovereignty of the state. 1 he
number of piratical attacks on shipping—off Sumatra's west «ast m
particular—was legion, and British. Dutch. .American and [talian ships
%vcrc plundered.

Matters came to a head through the attempts of the sultan to obtain
foreign aid against the Dutch, llis application to the Porte failed

49^ HUROPF_AN TEBRITORIAL tLXPANSmN FT. Ill

because Turkey 3t the time needed Eurapeon help against the threat
4)f Russb. After the treaty of 1871 the Govemment of Batavia made
an attempt to settle matters with Acheh by negotiation. The sultan
sent an embassy for talks with the Dutch Resident on the island of
Riati. On its return journey the rrussion stopped at Singapore^ where
the envoys entered into secrti discussions with the American and
Italian consulsn The Italian consul turned down their proposals^ but
the American consul-general, Mr. Studer> drafted with the envoys
the preliminaries of a commercial treaty. The Dutch consul-general
sent to Batavia what later lumed out to be a false report that Studer
had asked for warships to be despatched to the Sumatran coast to
protect American interests. This led to a sharp passage of amis
between The Hague and the American Secretary of State. It led also
to a final attempt on the part of Batavia to obtain an agreement with
the sultan^ and, when the latteris attitude proved uncompromising^
to a declaration of tvar.

The tvar proved to be one of the longest and toughest in Dutch
colonial history. It also attracted more public interest in Holland than
any previous colonial struggle. It began in April 1873 with the despatch
of a small Dutch expeditionaiy force, which was too iveak for its
task and had to withdraw'* In December of the same year a larger one
under General van Svvieten landed in Acheh and in a few wxeks
captured the sultan's kraton. When, shortly afterwards, he dkd
operations tverc suspctidcd in the hope that his successor would sign a
treaty accepting Dutch sovereignty subject to a guarantee of his
autonomy in internal affairs. Instead, however, the Dutch found
themselves faced by a general revolt, in which the local chiefs and the
religious leaders everywhere temk the lead. Guerrilla fighting became
the order of the day, and the Dutch found themselves faced by a
seemingly insoluble problem. When they won a few successes and
tried to negotiate, the fighting would break out afresh. Their troops
were decimated by cholera, and the hands of their con^manders were
tied by orders from above to limit military operations as far as possible.

Between 1878 and iS8t General Karel van der Heyden forced so
many chiefs to submit that Batavia jumped to the conclusion that the
resistance was broken^ It began, therefore, to set up civil government.
T'he cl':cisiaii was a disastrous one; the fighting flared up ngatn with all
its old vigour, and the religious leaders proclaimed a holy war against
the infidel.

l*he Dutch had once again to pour into the country a very^ large
furce and undertake immensely costly operation^. As a measure of

CK. 30 Tilt DUTfll FORWAftU MOYKIHENT IN ISUONE^IA 497

economv ii was decided to concentrate the forces in a strong defensive
position, and a line of strong-points connected by a railway was
established, stretching across froni ihe east to the ^vest coast in the
form of a ring covering Kutaraja. The system was conipleted in
March 1S85 and the Dutch troops were withdrawn behind it, not
without suffering severe casualties. But the hope that this would
enable the Dutch to negotiate from strength a plan tcir the restoration
of the sultanate proved vain, since the chiets looked upon the new
defensive syistem as a sign of weakness.

Meanwhile the yeaj^ were slipping by and Dutch policy changed
with each new* governor of Kutaraja. Governor Dcmnieni tried
pacification by Ufting the naval blockade of the cuastal regions; but
this only made matters worse. His successor, van Tcijn (1886-91),
re versed thi ^policy and coerced many of the chiefs into aubmiffision.
Pom pc van Meerdervoort^ who next held office for a few months
(1S91-2), reverted to the policy of leniency; the Achinese response,
however, convinced Batavia that only by force could a solution be
aehievedL But how could force be employed with effect?

Colonel Deykerhoff, who took office in January *1892, believed that
the best method was to win over a powerful chief and provide him
with the supplies necessary to enable him to conquer the recalcitrant.
In 1893 'ruku Uma, a chief who had auhmitted, W'as taken into the
pay of the government and allo^ved to form a vvclbairmed legion of
2^0 men+ His operations were successful, and the Dutch forces
occupied the reconquered districts and established a neW' line. Then
suddenly in March 1896 he with his legion w ent over to the enemy.

The Dutch now realized that nothing short of an all-out effort of
conquest would suffice. ’'Pwo books of a very different size and nature,
which achieved a wide circulation at this time, helped to put an end to
hesilancy. The first, Dc Aijrhm, written by the famous Arabic
scholar Dr. Siiouck Hurgronje, appeared in 1893. It was in the form
of a repurt put together by him as a result of a visit to Acheh in 1891-2,
(Juire apart from its infiuence upon the conflict through its advocacy'
of strong measures, the book has immense intrinsic value as a descrip¬
tion of native customs and inalituticins. Ii is a classical w ork of cultural
anthropologv'.

The other book was a brochure written by Major Joanni^s Bene-
dictus van Heutsz, who had been van Tcijn's chief of staff. In it he
explained the methods Avhich he advocated for the complete conquest
of the country, without using mtire troops than were already in
otx'u patio n of the * concentrated system".

ttIlOl»liAN TK«RIT<>RJAL DiPASStOK

PT. lU

498

But before a fomard move could be made the damage caused by
'I'uku Uma’s treachery' had to be repaired. "I'he whole populace, both
■within and without the Gei:on€rntrfrrde Lmie, as it was called^ had
gone over to his side. General Vetter^ who took command in April
1896, commenced a series of large-scale operations with a greatly
augmented army which by March of the following year gave him
control over the area terrorized by I'ultu Lima and forced the btier
to flee to Daya on the w^est cuost. Van lieutsz played a distinguished
part in these operations^ and it was finally decided to put him in
charge of the whole campaign^ In March 1898 he was appointed
Governor of Acheh, with Snouck Uurgronje as his adviser for native
affairs.

Heutsz completely revolutionized the morale of the Dutch tnwps.
His first operations resulted in the conquest of the disi^ict of Pidic,
the very heart of the rebellion, where the claimant to the sultanate,
'ruku f Tma, and Panglima Polem, another leader, had joined forces.
By the beginning of tSgg the Dutch dominated Achch proper and
the rebellious chiefs were being chased into the outer territories of the
Gayo and Alas lands. Early in the year 'Fuku Uraa, a ftigitive since
the conquest of Pidie^ was ambushed on the west coast and killed.
During that year and the following one all resistance was crushed and
large-scale operations w ere abandoned. Lightly armed flying columns
were then organized alike fur the mamtenance of internal peace and
the haras.sing of the chiefs who still held out. Re]5catcd expeditions of
this sort had to be .sent to the Gayo lands, where the claimant to the
sultanate had taken refuge. In Januarv' 1903 he made hia submission,
and at about the same time the great Panglima Palcm surrendered.

■'rhe final operations were then handed over by van fteutsz to
I.teutenant-Colonel van Daalen. in June 1904, when van Ikuts^ left
Acheh to become gnvemoT-gcncralp most of the more important chiefs
had submitted, but the opposition had still not been stamtH:d out.
Insurrections^—some of them serious—continued until 1908, and
were cmly brought to an end by the exile of the claimant to the
sultanate and a number of other chiefs to Amboina. Even then it was
necessary to maintain military^ government for another ten years.

The outbreak of the war had caused something like a sen sat Ion in
the islamic w orld, and, followed as it w as by the victories of the Mahdi
of Kordofan in the Sudan, played its part in stimulating a revival of
Muslim fanaticism in Africa and .-Arabian Thousands of Indonesian
pilgrims went to Mecca annually, and Snuuck Hurgronjc found a large
colony of' Djawahs* in the holy dly when he visited it in 1SS5. Hence

CII. 30 THE DLTCIt FORWARD MOVEMENT IN INDONEStA 499

one cssscniial element in the padficiition of Acheh was for the Dutch
to cultivate good relations with Mecca. 'I'his they did by encouraging
the pilgrimages which brought such profits to the Meccans, and by
appointing an Indonesian vice-consul as the representative of Batavia
there.

The Dutch forward movement in the latter part of the nineteenth
century did not confine itself to the task of conquering northern
Bumatra, heavy though it proved to be. Notwithstanding the opposi¬
tion of the home authorities to any expansion of territory there, much
was done to open up the Outer Settlements. Governor-General
Lansberge {1875-81) gave much attention to the Moluccas and the
Lesser Sun da tsisntk, where piracy, wrecking and the slave trade
ivere still rife. Much also was done to consolidate the Dutch hold on
the rest of Sumatra outside the Acheh territories. They were con¬
stantly apprehensive of attempts by foreign powers to establish
settlements in their preserves, and kept an eagle eye on the small
islands fringing Sumatra, to the interior, to the south of Lake Toba,
the work of the Rhenish Missionary Society in converting the Battak
region of Silindung caused strife w'ith the Padri sect, and in 187®
Singa Mangaraja, a local chieftain w'ho threatened the Christians, was
driven out by the Dutch and a new Residency, Tapanuli, formed.

Bali, which bad taught the Dutch expensive lessons on the subject
of interference with its independence, caused Batavia much heart¬
burning from time to lime owing to its cruel oppression of the Sasaks
of l,ombok, who were Mahommedans. A general rebellion broke out
in iSgi, and after fruitless attempts at mediation a Dntch expedition
in 1894 established control over Lombok. This marked the final
abandonment of the policj' of non-intervention. Van Ileutsit in 1898
had introduced a new system in Acheh, known as the ‘Short Declara¬
tion*, whereby a chief who recognized the authority of Batavia was
confirmed in his rule, in the period up to 1911 this was used so
extensively that some 300 self-governing states came under Dutch
control. It was during this period that the remainder of Bali was
brought to heel.

The extension of Dutch rule in these territories a^ultcd in an
immense amount of survey and development work. The Topo¬
graphical Service laid out toads and mapped previously uticharted
regions. Experts carried out researches into the manner of life, the
customs and religion of the various peoples, as well as into the nature
of the soil and of the vegetable and animal life. The expeditions of
A. W. Nieuwenhuis to the interior of Borneo (1893-8) and the

EirROPEAN TFfmiTOPIAL EKPANsSdN

PT. in

500

researches of the Swiss scholars Paul and Fritz Sarasm in Celebes
{1S93-1903), under the auspices of the Royal Netherlands Geograph¬
ical SocictYi opened the way for trade and industry and made valuable
contributions to knowledge.

From 1870 onwards the economic development of the Netherlands
Indies was impressive. Much land previously cultivated for the state
was handed over to private planters; there was a rush to produce sugar^
and many new factories were built. Tobacco-growing also expanded
rapidly. Coffee held its own^ and copra, palm-oilf fibres, pepper^
cassava^ fcapok, tea and cocoa provided important exports to world
markets. Save for the sugar factories there was little large-scale
industry. The moat important native industries to aurvivc the
competition of Europesm manufactured goodb were pottery, spinning,
and weaving.

Construction on the first railways—from Semarning to Surakarta
and from Batavia to Buiienzoj^—was begun in the ‘sixties, but the
two lines were not completed until 1S73. l^he planters everyw^here
clamoured for railways^ and in 1375 a state railway to open up the
sugar area from Spfabaya to Malang was begun. At about the same
time the strategic line in Acheh was constructed. In 1883 the pros¬
perous Deli Tobacco Company began to build a railway on the east
coast of Sumatra, and in 1887 a state railway was constructed between
the Ombilin coalfield and Padang. Between 1S90 and 1900 much
greater progress made and the total length rose from t^ 5 oo to
3,500 kilometres.

The first inland telegraph service was opened in (856, and the
inland postal service commenced operations in 1S66. In the next
period the greatest prepress was made with the development of
tel e p hn nic commu nications. ^ The fi rst telephone com pa ny w’as fo u nd cd
in 1882, ro be follow^ed in the next few years by no less than thirty-four
more. The state thereupon intervened in 1898 and took over the
whole ftcr^nce.

The opening of the Surz Canal and the freeing of the sugar trade
wrought a revolution in the Dutch shipping trade. I'hc Dutch sailing
ships had to face the competition of steamships^ mostly flying the
English flag. Even the Nether]andis-lndies Steamship Company was
linked up with the British^India Steam Navigation Company and all ils
repair work executed at Singapore, ^’he Dutch therefore had to set
about building an entirely new' fleet; and although the Nederland
Steamship Company w^as founded in 1870, it had for many years to
buy its steamers from abroad and engage foreigners to run them.

501

ClI. 30 THE DUTCH FORWARD MOVEMENT IS INTX>J^JA

Until 1S91, when the last contract of the Neiherlands“lndi^ Company
expired, It enjoyed a practical monopoly* of the inter-island traffic.
Then the contract was transferred to ihe Koninklajk Paketvaart
Maatschappij^ which had been founded in xS8S.

The growth of steamship traffic called for a vast improvement in
harbour facilities. In 1873 a beginning was made on building a new
harbour for Batavia at I'anjong Priok. This was completed in 1893.
By that time similar work was going ahead at Surabaya, Maca^ar,
Beiaw'anp Emmahaven (for Padang) and Sabang.

In 1883 the first concession for the exploitation of petrolcmn was
made to the Royal N'etherlands Company. Oil had then been dis¬
covered In paying quantities in Sumatra, Java, and Borneo. But it was
not until the next century that the great advances were made. The
development of coal-mining, however, made great progress during the
second half of the nineteenth century in west cm Sumatra^ south
Borneo and the Palcmbang area. Efforts to persuade private capital
to exploit the tin that was found in great quantities in Banka, Billiton
and Singkep met with little response, notmthstanding the rich profits
made by the largely govcmmenl-owncd Billiton Cbmpany, which was
founded in 185^^ The Singkep Company was founded in 1889, but
achieved Uttle during its early years.

The results of all this progress, expressed in terms of imports and
exports, show the export trade more than doubled in vahie betw^een
1870 and iqoo^ and the import trade quadrupled. The total value of
exports rose from i07‘57 million guildens in 1870 to 258 23 million m
1900; that of imports rose from 44'45 million guilders to 176^07 million
over the same period. I'he great feature to the expansion of imports
lay in the fact that it w"as mainly accounted for by such goods as
fertilizers, iron, steclfmechincry and tools, tvhichall tended to enhance
Indonesia's productive capacity.

CHAPTER JI

THE REIGN" OF BODAWPAVA AND THE FIRST
ANGLO^BURMESE WAR, 1782-182^^

The king known to history as Bodawpaya used a great variety of titles
during his own reign. 'Fhe one which came |ci be most commonly
applied \^‘as Mintayagj^i Paya, H^ord of the Great Law*. 1 [e was the
third son of Alaungpaya and possibly the ablest statesman of his line.
But Michael Symes, who was twice deputed to his Court as the
representative of the Government of India, describwd him as 'a child
in his ideas, a tyrant in his principles^ and a madman in his actions'.
His long reign, which lasted until 1819, had a decisive influence upon
his country’s histurj'.

It began with a blood-halh, in which he made a clean sweep of all
possible rivals in the royal family* But a brother tvbo escaped the
ceremonial mas&acrc plotted with Maha Thihathura, one of Hsin-
byushin^s most distinguished generaisp to overthrow him. 'Phis
caused a second blood-bath, in which they, with e\'ery member of
their families and all their sen^ants^ were done to death. Late in the
same year 1782 a pretender* Nga Myat Ron, who claimed descent
from the Toiingoo dynasty* scaled the palace w^Ils with 200 desperate
men* He and his band were overcome and killed by the palace guard.
Then the district of Faungga near Sagaing, where they had hatched
their plot, was punished by the destruction of'every living thing—
human beingSp animalsp fiuit trees and standing crops—save for a
few people who were made pagoda slaves.

To atone for so much bloodshed the king built a new pagoda at
Sagaing. He also abandoned the palace at Ava^ frarlng that it had
come under an evil spelL A new royal city was laid out al Amarapura^
about six miles north-east of Ava, and thither the Court was transferred
wdth due ceremonial in May 1783- In the following September Mons
of the Bassein province made a surprise attack on Rangoon, which they
captured and held for a timCp Intending to rev ive their old monarchy*
A Burmese counter-attack was successful, and the city tvas retaken
after desperate fighting—only just in lime, for it soon became obvious
that a much wider movement had been nipped in the bud.

Cl I. BOPAWPAVA and the FHKT ANGtO-nURMESF. WAR 503

One of Bodawpaya’s earliest acts after rcsioriiig order in his turbulent
kingdom was to institute a general revenue inquest. 'The register that
Trasj compiled by his coiiimissiuncrs, after taking the evidence of
myothugyis and village headmen throughout the land, has been called
the Burmese Domesday Book. It provided the king with a record of
his countrv’*s taxable capacity, and the first use to which he put it
was for an extraordinary payment towards the repair and regilding of
pagodas and monasteries of royal foundation, ^ot since Ihaluns
reign {1629-48) had such a simey been made, and, unfortunately for
students of histeny, none of its original records sunives. Bodawpaya
followed up his survey of 1784 with a further one in 1803. Many of
the records on patm-leaf and poraftm** thus collected are still extant
and afford firsl-hand evidence, of a sort too rarely encountered in
Soiith-Ea.st .^sia, of social and economic conditions.

* Budawpaya's next big enterprise was the conquest of Arakan.
There had been no let-up in the long anarchy which had prevailed
ever since the murder of Bandawiiiaya in 1731. Village fought against
village, and everywhere dacoity was rife. From time to time refugee
leaders appeared at the Court of v\va seeking help, in 1784 Bodaw-paya
decided that the time was ripe for annexation: the countty would be
an easv prey. Nevertheless he made careful preparations. In October
Arakan was attacked by three land columns and a powerful flotilla of
war vessels. By the end of December the conquest was complete and
King 'rhamada a fugitive in the jungle. month later he was captured,

and in February 1785 he, his family and no less than 20,txjo of his
people were deported to Burma, together with the famous Mahamuni
image, now' in the Arakun Pagoda at Mandalay, .•\iiakan became a
province under a viceroy supported by a Burmese garrison. Its
subjugation wa-S the most far-reaching event of Bndawpaya’s reign:
it brought the frontier of Burma up to that of British India and ushered
in a new period of Anglo-Burmese relations with immense conse¬
quences.

Uodawpaya’s easy success in faction-tom .\Takan seems to have
gone to his head, for before the year 1785 was out he launched a full-
scale invasion of Siam. The chronicles of his reign are full of the
white-elephant myth. He was publicly proclaimed as .Arimittiya,
the coining Buddha, and it may be that for a short time really
believed himself destined to be a world conqueror. If so. the illusion
was soon rudely shattered. His grandiose plan tn overwhelm Siam
by four simultaneous attacks came tu grief mainly through his own
* A vety local-niiJile pafHsr.

FLTflOPEAX TflURITORIAL F-^PAN5lCJN

1 ^. IIJ

504

incampfrtcnce as a commander. E-or though completely lacking in
mjHiaj-v training Qt experience^ he personaJly led the main attack over
the Three Pagodas Pass, and through his ignorance of even the
elementary principles of logistics suffered disaster so overtv helming
that he himself barely escaped capture.

Two of his attacking forces^—one marching overland from Tavoy
and the other going by sea to occupy the island of Junk Ceylon-
aimed at cutting off the Siamese provinces in the Malay Peninsula,
in expelling them the Siamese reasserted control overPatani, Kedah,
Kelantan and Trenggami. It was during this campaign in 1786 that
ihc Sultan of Kedah^ hoping for British support against Siam, Eianded
over the island of Penang to the East India Company^

I’he fourth Burmese force, operating in the Chiengmai region,
won some initial successes, occupied Chiengsen and Chicngrai, but
got no further. For many year^ there was backwards-and-fonvards
fighting throughout this area. Chiengmai was the main Burmese
objective. They staged two fairly large-scale offensives—one in 1787
and the other in 1797—but l>olh failed. Finally in 1802 the Siamese,
based on Chiengmai, cleared their Laos provinces of the Burmese,
But by that time the state of Chiengsen was so depopulated that it
never recovered^ In the south the Siameae made great efforts to regain
the Tavoy and Mergui regions, but failed. Their raids into the area
continued until after the British csccupation of Tenasscrim in 1824*
'rhe effect of all this upon the king w^as to increase his religious
mania. lie persecuted heretica^ and even decreed the death penalty
for ^uch things as drinking intoxicants, smoking opium and killing
ati ox or a buffalo. When the Buddhist clergy attempted to moderate
some of the worst of his excesses he announced plans to reform the
Order and confiscated monastic lands. He bulk dozens of pagodas,
and at Mingun, on the west bank of the Irrawaddy some miles to the
north of his capital, he began to erect an enormous pagoda whicht
if finished, w^ould have been 500 feet high* For seven years thousands
of Ar^anese and other deportees worked oit its construction under
his personal supervision. Eiis wars and his buildings made him
insatiable in bis demands for man-power. 'I’be drain on Upper Burma,
as well as on the Mon counrr>^* w^as so serious that, as Harvey puts it,
"the frafmework of society c^ackcd^ No proper arrangements were
made for the supply of food and necessaries to his armed forces or his
labour gatigg. Thousands died of starv'ation, there was wholesale
desertion, whole villages fled to the jungle to escape enrolment, and
dacoity became widespread.

€11* 3* BOPAWPAVA ANB TItK KTfUn" ANlCLO-BtTftMESE WAB 505

It ivus in Arakan that the mo&l serious consequences of this extrava¬
gant and cruel policy showed themselves, rhcrc the inordinate
demands for forced labour and conscript service drove the tough and
unruly Arakanese into open revolt. In 1794 a general rising broke out
and the rebels were assisted by armed bands from the Chittagong
districtn tvhere some thousands of refugees had already settled.
Against the strong reinforcements sent from Burma the rebellion
collapsed, and again large numbers of refugees poured into British
territory. They were closely pursued by a large Burmese fore*,
which crossed the river Naaf and ^tablisheJ a base on the Hritish
side of the frontier* Colonel Erskine was sent by Calcutta to deal w'ith
the incursion. The Burmese commander offered 10 retire peaceably
if three refugee leaders Tiverc apprehended and handed over* Erskine
had too small a force to lake Strong measures. Be promised, there¬
fore, to arrest the three wanted men; and if on investigation the charges
against them were deemed to be truct to surrender them. This was
done and the Burmese returned to their own territory with their prey.

This disturbing incident caused the British -1 ndian government
to awake to the fact that the Arakan frontier coostituted a serious
potential danger* Sir John Shore, the governor-general, accordingly
took the ptecaotionary step of addressing a letter to the Court of Ava
with a detailed analysis of the situation as it appeared 10 him. After
waiting in vain for several months for a reply he decided that the
matter was one of sufficient urgency for him to break the long dip¬
lomatic impasse that had lasted ever since the vvithdrawal of the Bassein
factory in 176a, l ie feared that unless some approach were made to
the Burma government the French, w'hn were again at w^ar Avith
Britain, tvould seek to use Burmese ports as bases against British
shipping in the Bay of BengaL

'I^his ivaa indeed what had happened during the War of American
Independence,^ And although the French dockyard at Rangoon had
had to be abandonedt Admiral de Suffren and Charles Castlenau de
Bussy, who had been sent out in 17S2 in a vain attempt lo restore
French fortunes in south India+ had made a determined effort to
persuade Versailles that Burma offered a more Inviting field than India
for an cxpansicmi$i policy and was the best place from Avhich to attack
the British in India. In 1783 de Bussy had sent an envoy to conclude
a commercial treaty Avith [iurma. Nothing had actually come of these

^ On thi* iubjerct tec Sotittertt^ oiix iWrt Ontntufa rf CAiJit (1Vol,

itn Pr 43: Hmn CtJrdicr* ilhlon^ut xihr^i dn rfiiiiwm iti BnUt^nt irr^r (a

Binfumte (ESi|4)i p. S; -tuid LUfnDiul G^iidart, da Mtmutrril$ det .IwiV-ifiiri

/IrcArtYT i& vol. ' Pqiidkhi:r>'^ 16110- e^Sij

HUCErriON OJ> nRlTJfiH ENVOV AT TUB TAIAOI AT AMARAPLrRA

CJt. 31 B 01 >AWPAVA and the FtHST ANGLO-HLTOTESE WAR 5*7

moves, but (be French in Mauritius had used Mergni as a repair
depot since its transfer from Siamese to Burmese hands^

Shore's envoy, Captain Michae! Synie$, who went to Burma in
^ 79S» charged viith the task of removing the causes of misunder-
standing over the Arakan frontier incident^ and .of persuading the
Court of Ava to close its ports to French Avarships. In particular he
was to negotiate a commercial treaty under whii^h a Company's agent
would be pcrmiited to reside ai Rangoon to supcnise British trade.
Symes vim treated wth a tnixtune of studied rudeness and friendly
hospitality. He was given clearly to understand that it was beneath
the dignity of the Court of Ava to treat on terms of e^juality with the
representative of a mere governor-gcncrah

He took back with him a royal letter, in which the king informed the
Calcutta authorities that it was understood (hat in future Arakanese
refugees settled in Chittagong who crossed over the border to commit
crimes in Burmese territory were, on written application, to be
surrendered, rermission was granted for the Company *to depute
a person to reside in Rangoon* to superintend mercantile affairSp
maintain a friendly intercourse, and for^tTird letter;^to the Presence'.
But the king flatly refused to close his harbours to French vessels.
Symes published the account of hia mission in a delightful book
w^hich was the first fulUscalc account of Burma ever to appear in a
European JanguagcA

In October 1796 Captain Hiram Cox arrived in Rangoon to take
up bis duties as British Resident in accordance with the agreement
made by Symes. Before leaving Calcutta he had had a sharp tussle
tvith his government regarding his status. He had refused to accept
the Burmese definition of it as set down in the royal letter and con¬
tended that a Resident was equal to an envoy or minister of the second
class, and far above an agent or consul.^ The Government of India,
however, had told him plainly that he was not an ambassador and had
specifically warned him not to attempt to procure any relaxation of
ceremonial '^as practised tow^arda Captain Symes'.

Nevcrtlielcss he went to Burma determined to uphold his own
interpretation of his status, and, what was more, to refuse to repeat
w hat he termed *thc humiliating concessions^ to Court etiquette made
by Symes. He thereby played into the hands of suspicious officials,
who, in his ow'n words, regarded his appoimment as 'an attempt to

^ .4*1 Acdoutii Hrf (jjf to thr of .'iivi rrJft hy Goirntm-^Gmetai of

Imfta in flieytar fWi iSoo.

^ B^Hfcal Piifitfoaf Coninlkithm^ T Mareb 179^, na. 5+

EUHOPFJ^N TEHHITORIAL EXPANSION

pr. rri

50S

smuggle the u-oodeo horse of Troy iMo their Donumons^ After a
long oiid incrrasitigly unhappy aojoum at Amampum/ whither he
had gone in a vain endeavour to pef^uade the Court to accord him the
kind of rccognhion he soughtp he announced his intention to leave
the country, only to- find on returning to Rangoon that a royal order
for his arrest had been publicly proeLaimed. His defiance of the
local officials caused them to declare a state of emergency^ and in a
moment of despair he sent an urgent message to Calcutta asking for
the despatch of an armed frigate to rescue him, since his life was in
danger^

'rhe Government of India on receiving this news proceeded vvith
the utmost caution. It was com,-iiided that his conduct had been
provocative. An order was therefore sent recaUing him, and he was
strictly charged to avoid all uncondliatoiy' language or anything that
might lead the Court of Ava to suspect that hostile action might be
taken against it. At the same time the king w^as requested to facilitate
Cox^s departure; the letter to him, though guardedly phrased, ivas
apologetic in tone* But long before the arrival of these missives the
excitement at Raltgoon had died dawn, and by the time of
departure in April 179S his relations with the local authorities had
become most friendly.

On returning to Calcutta he warned the Government of India that if
the Arakan frontier question were not dealt whh according to their
wishes the Burmese threatened to invade Bengal p and that the king
was actually planning intervention in Assam. He attributed his failure
partly to the fact that he had incurred the hostility of the party at
Court that was behind these schemest ^nce he had warned them that
pursuit of such a policy would force the British to intervene*

But the chief cause of his troublesp he claimed, lay in the fact that
Captain Symes had grossly misled the Government of India regarding
the Burmese. appeared 10 me that he had Avandered in a ma^e of
error from the beginning to the end of his ncgoclationi and If some
glimmerings of light occasionally reached him, that it had been
quench'd by false shame, Avhich forbid his revealing it*, he wrote in
a most intemperate attack upon his predecessor. Shore was only too
well aware of the extent to w hich Cox had been personally responsible
for the difficulties he had encountered^ but Lord Wellcslcyp who had
become governor-general Avhen Cox arrived back in Calcutta, had
expressed bis entire satisfaction with hts conduct. He felt it to be
unwise, hoAVcver, to court further insults by sending another Resident

* Captain! Hiram"Cera, Jaurmtl in fhf Hurmlma Kmpirf, iBaii

nil. J t HODAWPAYA ASl} T(JK FIUST A^NGLO-BUHiMEziE WAR 509

to Rsngoon^ i Iis attention conct^Jltraud upon th^ flirtation of Tipii
SuLtan of JMysore with Mauritiiis and Vans. He fondly hqpedT
therefore, that a policy" of inaction in regard to the Arakan frontier
might prove the safest way of avoiding complications.

While the govemor-gcneral was away in Madras superintending
preparations to invade My^aore trouble again flared up in Arakan-
An influential Arakanese chieftain^ when ordered to comply with a
Burmese demand for a large contingent for service against Siam, fled
to Chittagong, His flight started another mass esodus* Once more a
Burmese pursuit force crossed the frontier and stockaded itself on
British territory^ *rhe magistrate at Chittagong attempted negoti¬
ations, hut they broke down. Next he sent a small force of sepoys to
attack the Burmese position^ hut they were repulsed* I'hen suddenly
the Burmese decamped and returned to their side of the border*
Wellesley, vetth tus hands full in Indb^ sent Captain Thomas Hill
to parley with the Burmese Viceroy of Arakan at Mrohaung, 'Fhat
was in June 1799* Meanwhile the plight of the refugees wus so
desperate that Captain Hiram Cox was deputed to Chittagong to
superintend relief measures and settle the iitimigr^nls in the neigh¬
bourhood of the Bagholi river, where land was a vailable for cultivation.
Cox’s Bazar, named after him^, remains today a memorial of hb
labours^ and of his death while engaged upon them.

Hill found that the viceroy w'ould consider no other settlement of
the problem than the total expulsion of the immigrants from British
territory. When he broke off negoiiatioiis ihe viceroy sent a delegate
to Calcutta in March 1800 to present the demand to the governor-
generaL Wellesley in reply pointed out the impossibility of carrying
out the request, but promised to close the frontier to al] further
immigrants from Burmese territory- He was playing for lime; for
ahhough Tipu Sulraii had been disposed of in ihe shambles of
Scringapatami his attention was now absorbed by the growing
anarchy in the Maratha dominions- He began, however, to contem¬
plate a further embassy to the Golden Feet, and commii^iancd Major
William Francklin^ an orientalist of some repute, to study the Burma
files and suggest a new method of approach to the Court of .\va.

Franckiin^s report# submitted in July iSoip advised that the dis¬
contented Araik anese leaders likely ter disturb the peace of the frontier
should be removed to the interior of Bengal, and that an offer of
subsidiary^ alliance should be made to Burma by an ambassador pro¬
vided with an escort of such magnificence as would demonstrate to the
Court of Ava the full dignity and power of the Government of India.

Eliaot-EAN maiTORJAL EXPANSION

PT, HE

510

Wellesley, however* pigeon-holed the report and seems to have
deliberately retiirned to the policy of procrastination^

He had reckoned without the Burmese. In January while he
was on a visit to Cawnpore, a letter was fort^'arded to him from the
Viceroy of Arakan demanding in the king's name the expulsion of all
the x‘\rakanesc from Chittagong, and threatening armed invasion
should the demand be rejected. Wellesley at once ordered the frontier
guards to be strongly reinforced^ and called on Symes, who had just
returned from a long furlough in England and was in Cawnpore %vith
hb regiment, to undertake a second mission to Amampiira. WTiy he
chose Symes in preference to j'Vancklin the records do not say. Why
lie chose Symes at all* after the strictures passed upon his first mission
by Hiram Cox, is a matter for surmise. All that is known is that after
a personal intervievv he announced the appointment of Symes svith
the intriguing remark that his 'abilities, personal experience, and com¬
plete knowledge of the affairs of the Government of Ava* qualified him
*in a peculiar degree* for the task with which he was charged. Events
were to show tliat he could not have made a more appropriate choice.

Symes arrived in Burma at the end of May iSo^ with the embarras¬
singly large escort suggested by Francklin^ and a draft treaty of
subsidiary alliance in his portfolio. His immediate lask was to seek
some clarification of the Arakan viceroy's threat to invade ilcngal,
and to give the Court of Ava an opportunity to disclaim responsibility
for it. He was also to explain why the Government uf India could not
agree to the demand for the total expiibion of the refugees. Regarding
the subsidiary' alliance proposal, a special set of additional instructions
of a highly confidential nature informed him that there wax reason lo
believe that King Oodaw'paya seriously contemplated abdication^ and
that in such an event the Toungoo Prince might be expected to
attempt to deprive his brother, the heir-apparent, of the succession*
Me was therefore to offer military' support to the heir-apparent against
such a contingency. On this last point it may he remarked here that
Symesb enquiries showed that the rumour of the tung^s intended
abdication was baseless^ and he wax far too discreet to pursue the line
laid down in his instructions.

On arrival at the capital he was kept for a matter of months waiting
for rectjgnjiion. He le^mt that the king had only with difficulty been
persuaded from sending him ignominiously back to Calcutta. His
instructions permitted him to wind up his mission and leave the
country should his further stay there appear to he useless* But he
decided that such action would render war inevitable, and that the

5 ^^

ttl. 31 ROUAWPAYA AND THE FIRST ANGLO-BCrRMKSF WAR

Utmost patience and forbearance must be his best weapons. It turned
out that before paying any attention to him the king proposed to stage
the pantomime of receiving a bogu$ French mission, specially rigged
up for the occasion. Symes's dignified restraint, however* won him
the support of the heir-apparent and the most inHuenttal people at
Court, and their advice ultimately prevailed. 'Fhe French ‘mission'
was received without ceremony and hastily dismissed, ''t^hen ^lymes
was accorded a full-dress reception, at which the king departed from
the usual procedure by making a short speech. He paid Symes a
personal compliment and remarked that, having seen his face again,
he would 'forget every cause of umbrage".

Symes relumed to Calcutta with an official letter, the contents of
which he summed up thus: "llie King was displeased at the conduct
of Capt, Cos,. . but he is now^ pleased to be reconciled." It contained
no reference to the V'ictrny of Arakan^s threat of w ar: that matter was
disposed of by a ‘verbal communicatiuit' made to Symes in the king^s
name assuring him that the viceroy had not been instructed to demand
the fugitives in such terms as he had used, and renouncing for ever
the claim for their wholesale expulsion. Sjmies^s advice to his govern¬
ment was that ‘a paramount influence in the government and adminis¬
tration of Ava, obtain it how we may^ is now become indispensably
necessarv' to the interest and security of the British possessions in
the East".

The king^s letter per mi tied the re-establish ment of a British
Resident at Rangoon, and Lieutenant John Canning, who had
accompanied Symes to Ava, was deputed lo go there in that capacity^
Bui so as to avoid involving the Government of India, should things
go wrong* he was sent as Symes's private agent and not as an nfficial
delegate of the East India Company. He arrived at the end of May
1R03. The Viceroy of Hanthawaddy* w'bo had been a good friend to
Syines, had been recalled to the capital, and his deputy made things
so difficult for Canning that in the following “November the latter
returned to Calcutta.

The expedient of maintaining a Resident in Rangoon w-as there¬
upon abandoned as useless. The Arakan frontier, however, remained
at peace for some years. l*he firmer control exercised by the British
authorities was mainly responsible for tHs. Moreover, the Btirme&e
kept their word: there were no further demands or threats. The
Burma question receded info the background. The evidence of both
Svmes and Canning showed that French influence and activirics
there were negUgibk. In 1809, when Lord Minto instituted a blockade

El-KCH'EAN TKHRITORIAL tJiV.\SS\nS

PT. Ill

5*2

of Mauritilis and Bourbon bcfort proct^dini^ to conquer thcrui Cann¬
ing was again deputed to Burma, this time to reassure the Court of
Ava regarding British policy, lie was received with the greatest
cord^aht>^ He discovered that for some years there had been a com¬
plete cessation of relations between the bbneb and Burmese ports.
From the signs of depopulation and misery that he saw on his vvay
to and from the capital he came to the conclusion that Burmese pow er
was in rapid decline. Nevertheless he warned his governmcni; that
King BodawpavTi cherished as one of his aims the ultimate conquest
of Chittagong and eastern Bengal.

Had the Calcutta authorities but paid serious attention to his warning
much trouble might have been saved. But the iVr;iiaii frontier region
was one of dense jungle intersected by innumerable crcclys, and a
breeding-pi ace for the most malignant forms of malaria. Hence at an
early date the additional forces stationed ihere in iSoz were withdrawn
and the policy of neglect re$umed. After years of deceptive calm the
inevitable nemesis came in i8i i. A new' leader, Ciiin Byan,* scion of
an important myothugyi family of northern Arakan* secretly collected
a powerful force pn British territory^ and made a surprise attack on
Mrohanng, which he captured. From the ancient capital he sent an
urgent appeal for help to Calcutta, offering in reiurn to hold the
kingdom under British suzerainty.

The Government of India flatly refused his nffer and in September
iSi i sent Captain Canning once more to Bumia^ this time to assure
the Court of Ava that the British authorttie?i had in no way iniiiigatcd
or aided the rising. Canning was confronted by the Burmese with
evidence which they considered proof positive of British aid to the
rebels. U certainly pointed to serious negligence on the part of the
local officers at Chittagong. Tti make matters worsCt while Canning
was at Amarapura assuring the ministers that effective me.^sures
would be taken to prevent any further movement of refugees aerciss the
frontier the Burmese forces in Arakan proceeded to crush the rebellion,
and Chin By an, with a Urge body of his followers, escaped back into
British territory with the greatest ease*

Once more Burmese pursuit parties crossed the frontier, and the
V iceroy of Arakan threatened to invade Chittagong with a force of
80,000* men if the fugitives were not handed over, together with Dr.
McRae, the civil surgeon at Chittagong, whom he accused of aiding
Chin By an to make his original incursion. l*he British rushed rcin-
forcements to the centre of disturbance and made fnintic efforts to

* IK p4inni, "KifiB-biting'. J vol. mii, J933.

Ol. J

BtlSAWPAVA ANIJ nit FIRst ANr,LO-BUKMESE WAR 5'3

capture the elusive rebel leader. But he evaded all his pursuers, and
with the approach of the wet monsoon of 1812 the Burmese retired to
their own territorj' and the British gave up the chase.

No sooner bad thev done so than Chin Byan occupied one of the
frontier posts from which the Company's troops had just been with^
drawn, and, using it as his headquarters, made an attack upon Maung-
daw. This time the Magistrate of Chittagong sent a timely warning
to the Burmese, w-ho routed the invaders. As refugees came seeping
back into British territory the Company's forces arrested many of
them. But through the connivance of the local population Chtn
Byan and most of his lieutenants escaped and were soon plundering
the countryside for food-

■['his sort of thing continued throughout the years 1812, 1813 and,
I8^^^ I.ate in 1813 the British crippled Chin Byan's ability to wage
large-scale operations by capturing his whole fleet of 150 war boats.
But they could neither stop him nur capture him- And the Burmese,
though able to defeat all his incursions, failed equally to lay their
hands upon him. Nevertheless, beihre the double pressure of the
Burmese and the Companv’s troops the rebetSion was obviously
petering out by the end of 1814. When, therefore, in January 1813
Chin Byan died the movement collapsed completely.

It had wrought irreparable harm 10 Anglo-Burmese relations. The
Burmese, unable to realize the extent to which the hands of the
British were tied by eomnutments elsewhere, in Java, the Maratha
country and Nepal, developed an unfortunate contempt for their
power, which one determined patriot leader had so long so impudently
dtfied After Capt^it Canping^s return from Amiirapuni in 1812 nu
further attempts were made to establish settled diplnmatic relaiiotis
between I’urt William and the Court of Ava. Both sides became
increasinglv suspicious of each other. 'I'he seeds of the first Anglo-
Burmesc war had already been sown; but Bod nw pay a was far too
shrewd to provoke war with the British, and until the Marathas had
been finally dealt with the Govemincnt of India was not in a position
to adopt a strong line with Burma. In 1819. however. Bodawpaya
died and the last disorderly elements in central India were cn^hed.

Bv that time Burmese policy had created in Assam a situation
essentially the same as tn Arakan. The Ahom monarchy had been
sinking into decline since the seventeenth century. In the later ycara
of the eighteenth century the rebellion of the persecuted sect of the
Moimarias who denied Brahman supremacy, and the tncapaeity of
ihe imbecile (^aurinaih Singh (17^0-94} brought so mtokmble a

EUROPEAN TERRlTOJllAE EXPANSION

FT. Jll

Slate of disorder that British help was sought. But Captain Welch+
sent there in *792 hy Lord Cornwallis, reported that nothing effective
could be done short of complete annexation. 'I'hat was out of the
question, and he was accordingly withdrawn.

Conditions, however, showed no &ign of improving^ and in 1798,
as we have seen, Captain fliram Cox reported that King Bodawpaya
xvas contemplating intervention. But he held his hand fur a consider¬
able time, possibly because Cox had warned him that such action on
his part would be strongly resented by the British. Shortly after
the close of the Chin Byan affair the Bar Phukan, who had fled from
Assam, appeared at Calcutta to solicit British aid against the Biirha
Gohain. When Fort William turned down his request he appealed
to Bodawpaya. This time the Burmese king decided to act. In March
1817 a Burmese army marched to Jorhat and pbccd his nominee on the
thronep As goon as the Burmese left, however^ their candidate was
depo$cd. In 1S19 they returned, reinstaLcd the original raja, Chand-
rakanta Singh, and again went home. Again as soon as their backs
were turned disorder broke loose* and C hand rakanta, unable (□
maintain himself^ fled to British territory+

The situation in Burma had now radically changed, Rodawpaya's
weak and amiable grandson Bagyidaw^ had succeeded to the throne,
and under the influence of the brilliant and ambitious general Mahn
Bandula he had no scruples about a forward policy in Assam. So a
Burmese army returned there once again^ this time to stay, and Bandula
assumed control over the country. W'hen this happened two Assamese
pretenders* Chandrakanta Singh and Purandar Singh, both refugees
in British territory, were engaged upon collecting troops and arms in
order to drive out the Biirmesep and the British magistrate at Kangpur
was vainly urging Calcutta to assist one or the other. Both invasions
failed, and, as in the case of Arakan, Burmese troops chasing refugees
crossed the frontier into British India. That wa» early in In

July of that year Maha Bandula sent an envoy to Calcutta to demand
the surrender of the Assamese leaders, who were sheltering in British
territory.

Assam, however, was not the only state suffering from this fresh
outbreak of Burmese pugnacity* The failure of the Raja of Manipur
to attend Bagyidaw^*$ coronation was used as an cxcuae to dethrone
him and devastate his country. He and thousands of his people fled
into the neighbouring state of Caebar* 'Phe Raja of Cachar, with his
state plundered by hordes of desperate refugees and threatened by the
Burmese, thereupon fled to British territory and besought aid of the

L'H. 31 BCJl>AWrAVA AND TME FIRST ANGLO-BirRMEat WAR 515

Government of Indiii. Fort Wiltiam, bearing in mind that with the
pas^c^ of Cachar in their possession a Rurmese attack upon eastern
Bengal would be greatly facilitated, decided that the time had come t»
make a firm stand. Hence a British protectorate was declared over
both Cachar and its northern neighbour, the little bill state of Jaintia,
which was also threatened by the Burmese.

Bagj'idaw’s accession to the throne was also the signal for an out¬
break of further trouble on the Arakan frontier. Burniese troops
began to cross into the Raniu region and seize the Fast India Com¬
pany's elcpham hunters on the pretext that they were trespassing on
Burmese terriiori'. These and other incidents caused the British to
strengthen their frontier post at 'I’ek Naaf and station an outpost on
the island of Shahpiiri at the river mouth, 'I'he Burmese replied by
seizing the island in September 1S23. A British force reoccupied it.
but an ctfort to set up a boundary commission failed and further
outrages occurred.

Meanwhile fighting had already begun in Cachar. .\otwithstanding
a warning from David Scott, the British frontier officer, that the state
would be defended by the British, the Burmese staged a full-scale
invasion. Greatly outnumbered, the British forces there could barely
hold tlieir own, but their fighting retreat was enough to cause the
Burmese to call off the operation and retire into Manipur. I'hat was
in February' 1824. In the previous month Maha Bandula bad assumed
command in Arakan and begun operations preparatory to an attack
on Chittagong. Lord .-Amherst, the governor-general, now' realized
that the Burmese were bent on war. Hence on 5 March 1824 Fort
William declared war on Burma, The truth was that Bandub, ever
since taking control in .Assam, had been directing the frontier moves
from the Brahmaputra to the Naaf as a co-ordinated plan for the
conquest of Bengal.

The British plan of campaign was to draw away Ibiidulas forces
from the Indian frontier by concentrating upon a large-scale sea¬
borne invasion of Lower Burma, while conducting subsidiary oper¬
ations for the conquest of Assam, Manipur, Arakan and the Tenasserim
coastal strip. 'I’he main drive was to proceed up the Irrawaddy in the
direction of the capital. The expeditionary' force, secretly assembled
at a rendezvous in the Andaman Islands, achieved a compleiL-strategic
surprise when on 10 May it passed up the river to occupy Rangoon
without a blow. Meanwhile, completely unaware of what waa afoot,
Bandula had crossed the Naaf and gained a sucet^ .tgainsl a detach¬
ment of Company's troops, causing something like panic in Calcutta.

F-UHt)PtA« TKHHJTORIAL KXPANSIOS pr. U(

That was as far as he was to go, for the news of the British capture of
Rangoon caused him to halt his offensive and hinry off southwards.

But the campaign, which had begun so well for the British, soon
began to show serious defects of planning. Sir .^chibald Campbell's
force was so badly supplied with transport that it was tied down to
Rangoon, unable to press through, to Upper Burma before the wet
monsoon rendered a campaign up the Irrawaddy impossible. It had
been rashly assumed that the Mons of the deha region could be relied
upon to supply not only the necessary transport but plentiful fresh
food as well. But the hlons, fearing Burmese vengeance, did not stir
a finger to help. Thus for six months during the height of the rams
the invaders were held up at Rangoon, while dysentery and feter
wrought such havoc that out of the original force of 11,000 men only
some hundreds were fit for operations.

'Fhe Court of Ava’s initial plan seems to ha%'e been to contain the
Biitish in Rangoon by building a ring of stockades placed at strategic
points between Kemmendine and the Pazundaung river, in the hope
of forcing them to abandon the campaign. But when two successive
commanders, the TJvonba Wungyi and the Kyi Wungyi, had failed
before British attacks on thdr stockades it was realized that an all-out
effort was needed. Bandula was then thrown in with a force of 60,000
men and a considerable artillery train. Against him the British could
muster less than .pooo men, supported by gunboats on the Rangoon
river and the Pazundaung creek.

On I December 1*14 Bandula attacked and was decisively repulsed.
A few' days later his main position at Kokine was stormed and bis army
began to disintegrate. With 7^000 picked men he retired on Oanubyu.
By this time reinforcements were rapidly arriving for Sir .Archibald
Campbell, and he was able to organize a field force with Promc as its
objective. On t .April 1825 Bandula was lulled while try-ing to make a
stand at Danubyu and his army fled in disorder. *J’he British then
occupied Prome and went into cantonments for the rainy season.

IVlcanw'hilc, in the other theatres of w'ar much progress had lieen
achieved. During the hold-up in Rangoon forces were detached which
occupied Syriam, Martaban, Ye, Tavoy and Mergui. Soon it was
possible to send supplies of fresh food to the beleaguered army in
Rangoon,. Early in 1825 the Arakanese capital of Mrohaung was taken
and the systematic occupation of the country carried out. But the
hope that an attack on the Burmese capital could be launched across
the Arakan A'oma had to be abandoned owing to the lack of a practicable
route across the mountains.

CH, 3 t BOPAWPAYA ASD THE FIRST ANGl*P'BL'R^reSE WAR jl?

CaptajH Canning bad made the interesting suggestion that Amara-
pura might be reached bv a column marching through Manipur to
the Chindwn valley. Bm when the Burmese had been dnven mit of
Cachar, which they had again invaded, the attempt to follow them up
through Manipur was abandoned because of the difficulties of the
countrv and the heavy rains. Instead the exiled raja was provided
with troops and some British officers, and with their aid gradually
recovered his principality- Other forces drove the Burmese out of
Assnm Vkith little difficulty-

Bandula-s death and the British occupation of Prome caused the
utmu^t consternaunn at Aniarapura. Fe\ fiTish efforts \%ere mnde to
raise fresh armies- In 1825^ at the end of the mins, under cover of
armistice proposals the Burmese tried to launch a surprise attack on
Prome. But the ruse was discovered, and after some heavy ^fighting
the Burmese army was again defeated. The way to the capital now
lay open; the last serious resistance had been quelled. Moreover, bir
\rchibald Campbell now had adequate river transport, and mpid

progress ^v^l$ made upstrcain.

\i Malun peace talks were resumed. But ihe •British peace terms
—ihe cession of Arakan, Tenasserim, .Assam and Manipur, together
with the payment of an indemnity in rupees equal to a million sterlmg
—SO staggered the Burmese commissioners that they ined every
possible means to persuade the British to reduce their demands, and
especially to delete the clauses relating to Arakan and the mdemnity.
But the British were adamant, and the adrance on the capital was re¬
sumed. Not until the British army arrived at Yandaho, only a few
days* march from the capital, did the Burm^e finally accept the
terms. On aa February 1826 the Treaty of \andabo w-as ratified
and the British advance came to a Halt. In addition to the large
cessions of territory* and the crippling indemni^—for Burma had no
coinage and the royal revenue came mainly in kind—the Court ot .■Ava
had to promise to refrain from all interference in the states on the north¬
eastern frontier of British India, to receive a British Resident at
Amampura, and to depute a Burmese envoy to reside m Calcutta.
It was also stipulated that immediate negotiations were to begin for
a separate treaty to regulate commercial relations.

The war, strategically so well conceived, operationally so mis¬
managed in its early stages, had been won at a very* heavy cost m men
and treasure. No less than 15,000 "tit of the 40.000 men serv*mg m

an.l dv»Mtrv. But il had also exp""*! 'h' weak"'” "f B“™

FLTROPEAN TERRrrORIAL FXPANSrON

FT* m

st8

three-quarters of a century of expansionist efforts which had cornpletely
exhausted her. Not even the genfus of BanduLa, had he surv^tved*
could have saved her.

Burmese history was now to take an entirely new turn. She still
kept her three chief ports of Bassetn^ Rangoon and Martaban* But
she had lost her two large coastal provinces to the expanding British
empire in India with its sea-power now’ dominating the Indian Ocean.
0 >uld she adjust herself to this strange situation, or must the tradiuon-
alism, pride and ignorance of the Court of Ava provoke the British
to further intervention?

CHAFTER 3^

BURMA FROM THE TREATY OF YANDABO TO THE
CREATION OF THE PROVINCE OF BRITISH BURMA,

Burma’s defeat in her Avar with the British had far-reaching conae-
quences. Her territorial losses were great, but even greater vsas the
blow to her national pride. Her military power, once the terror of all
her neighbours, was broken beyond recovery. 'I'he British, having
wrested from her Tenasserim and Andoin, not to mention her more
recently acquired territories in Assam and Manipur, were in 1852 to
take from her the rich province of Pegu, and finally in 1885 to bring
the Alatingpaya dynasty to an end and annex all that remained of its

dominions, *

Yet such was not the Intention at the outset; no Macchiavclban
policy of expanrion was involved. British official records show only
too clearly that just as they had striven to avoid war before 1824, so
after Yandabo they continued to search for ways and means of
establishing peaceable relations. What they failed to realize that
once they had a foothold in the countjy the sheer force of circum¬
stances was bound ultimately to bring about complete annexation,
no matter how unwilling they were to extend their territorial commit¬
ments. The only way of avoiding it would have been to hand back all
the conquered teiritoVies tliat could reasonably be considered to belong
to the kingdom of Burma; but while this would have been an easy
matter in the case of Tenasserim, the safety of India’s north-cast
frontier demanded the retention of .Arakan. The Company hoped that
peace could be established on a basis of direct relations and, notwith¬
standing the failures of the pre-war period in this respect, stipulated
in the Treaty of Yandabo that a British Resident must be entertained
in the Burmese capital and a Burmese ambassador in Calcutta.

Such a stipulation assumed that the shock of defeat would have a
salutary effect upon the Court of Ava and lead it to mend its ways.
Quite the reverse happened. King Bagyidaw became subject to
recurring fits of melancholia, which ultimately led to insanity. 'J‘he
cniel loss of face that it bad suffered made the Court not less but more

520

EUROPEAN TERRITORIAL EXPANSION

IT. Ill

arrogant 'rherc was the same elementary ignorance of the outside
world, the same refusal to learn. Above alj, Burmese pride continued
to revolt against the humiliation of having to carrv on diplomatic
relations with a mere viceroy, tience the ministers found ejccuse after
excuse for failing to open an embassy in Calcutta, and no amount of
persuasion could prevail upon them to carry out this item of the
treaty.

J here was considerable delay in appointing a British Resident to
the Court of Ava, hie should have been put upon a proper footing
before the British army left Vandabo. Instead, however, the expedient
w'as adopted of sending an envoy to negotiate the separate commercial
treaty provided for at \andabu and repurt on the feasibility of
establishing a permanent Residency. The envoy chosen was Raffles*a
old colleague John Cmwfurd, who had been Resident at Singapore
from 1823 to t826, and thereafter had spent six months as Civil
Commissioner at Rangoon.

He airived at the capital on 30 September 1826 to find that the
Court had already begun to recover from its first fright, and that all
the old arts of subterfuge and evasion were once more to be employed
to render his business nugatory. He was a distinguished scholar hut
a bad negotiator. Hence while, as in the case of his previous mission
to Bangkok, the treaty he negotiated was practically worthless, the hook
he wrote on his experiences extremely vduable. It takes its
place with the works of Symts and Yule as one of the best accounts of
the old kingdom of Burma.'

Craw'furds reception by the king took place on an ordinary kotiatD

i-e. beg-pardon'—day, when his vassals assembled to make
customary offerings. The official presents from the governor-general
were described as a token of his submission to the Golden h’eet and
his desire for pardon for past offences. Over the extremely simple
and miu^uous draft commercial treaty which Crawfurd presented to
the ministers they haggled for weeks, seeking to barter commercial
concessions against the cancellation of the unpaid portion of the
indemnity and the restoration of the ceded territories. Of the original
twenty-two articles, four only appeared in the final treaty that was
signed on 24 November 1826.

In the/liscussions the ministers brought up a whole list of matters
arising out of the fact that the Treaty of Yandabo had been clumsily
drafted with regard to frontier lines. There were genuine problems

‘ Jnitnatafan Etih^iiiyJrnm fJn* fli/prrnar fitJin hi tlir Cifurt of .-Old in tiir

yntr Ijfttidon,

CH. THE GRFu^TION OF THE PROVINCE OF BRITISH BtRMA 5ZI

to be $cttlcd. But Crawfurd, with his rigid ideas of diplomatic
correct ness j had become weary of Burmese methods. He pleaded that
his instructions did not permit him to deal with political matters
arising out of the treaty. On his return to Calcutta, however;, the
Government of India did not take the same narrow view of the scope
of his powders and criticized him for not having made a better attempt
to establish political relations on a proper footing before leaving the
country.

His ad vice—that it was ineitpedientto appoint a permanent Resident
—led the Government of India to shelve the matter for the time being.
He argued that an officer no less than 1,^00 miles distant by water
from Calcutta would be an ohject of perpetual jealousy to a govern¬
ment 'indescribably ignorant and suspicious^ and his position would
be 'little better dian honourable confinementh He thought that
relations with Ava could be carried on by ji political officer stationed
at Moultticin, the capital of the new British province of Tenasserim.

But the fate of Tenasseritn w’as in the balance^ The original idea
had been to offer it to Siam. But the Siamese attitude towards the
various matters at issue in their relations with the British had caused
that idea to be dropped. Now- the directors, finding that its revenues
were quite inadequate to meet the cost of its establishment, were
anxious that Us possible retrocession to Burma should be considered,
■'rhere w^ere other matters also which could only bo properly dealt
with by a duly accredited representative at Amarapura. For instance,
when a Burmese mission appeared in Calcutta to go into the questions
which Crawfurd had refused to discuss—the unpaid half of the in¬
demnity and the frontiers of Arakan and Manipur—it wa$ found to
have no power to settle the points at issue but must refer everything
back to Ava.

The boundary questions caused no little friction. I’he Burmese
claimed the Kabaxv vatky betw-een the river Chindwin and the Mani¬
pur mountains^ w'hich had been occupied by Gambbir Singh when he
had driven them out of his country during the war. An Anglo-
Burmese boundary commission failed to agree, and Pemberton, the
British expert on the north-east frontier regions of India, declared
that the map used by the Buimese commissioners w^as a fake. When
a further meeting to check up the map was arranged the Bunflese did
not turn upt and the Government of India proceeded to give its
decision in favour of the Raja of Manipur^ When, a year later, the
commission did meet again and the Burmese found that the British
had planted boundary' flags on the right bank of the Chind^vin their

EtTlOPEAN TEJlRlTOHTAL E5CPAKS10?J

FT. m

protests were so strong that the go%enirn.ent postponed further action
until the matter could he thoroughly investigated in the Burmese
records at the tapitah

By the end of the year 1829 it had become quite clear that mattens
of this sort could not he dealt ^vith by a political agent in MoulmeJn,
hut only by the Resident provided for in the Treaty of Yandabo. For
this task the Government of India cho^e Major Ilenr>' Burney, who
had already won its high praise for his tactful handling of the Raja
of fjgor and the Court of Bangkok. He arrived at .\marapura in
April 1S30, charged with the duty of dealing with all outstanding
matters—the indemnitVt the frontier questions, the retrocession
suggestion, and trade. And, as every previous attempt to place
relations between Ava and Calcutta on a satisfactory footing had
failcdt the situation with svhich he had to cope was enough to daunt
the most sanguine man.^

In matters of Court etiquette his attitude was firm hut reasonable^
He made it quite clear^ however^ that he would not he received on a
kodaw day. He won his point. Before long he had established such
cordial relations w'kh the ministers of the Hlutdaw, the supreme council
of the realm, that they would come to the Residency to dine with him.
King Bagyidaw' himseif went so far as to have frequent private
conversations with him. In Februarj^ 1S31 their relations w'ere so
friendly that the king conferred on him the rank of Wundauk,^

On the main matters in dispute discussions took place in boih Ava
and Calcutta, The Burmese attempts to scale dowm the amount of
the indemnity failed, and the final instalment was handed over in
October 1S32. A Burmese deputation went to India and waited upon
the governor-general to appeal against the Kahaw^ valley decision^ In
1832 Burney was recalled to Calcutta to join in the discussions. His
study of the records of the Court of Ava had led him to the conclusion
that the Burmese caac w^as a sound one^ notwithstanding Pemberton’s
opposition. In March 1833 the Government of India accepted his
argument and the valley was restored to Burma, ahhough it had been
occupied by the Manipuris since the end of the war.

On the subject of Tenasserim he coiiltl not persuade the ministers

to offer reasonable terms for its retrocwsion. 'J'hey were aw'are that
*

^ For P detaJed sTudy of Bumc^yV miuioa based oa the India Offiop recerda
Wi S. tliititfy oj ihe BFTtiih Rniiifirfy m itjurmn, Uoivertit)^ of

^ of ihc S<«iod Clmu, nest jn rank lo WuxiRyj. S« tt/

Ifufary (C, H, Philsiri, pdilnr), Roy^l Hislnncql HJSI, lao-B,

a.v. Mintirtciii nf Slate iB).

eu. 32 TfIR CREATION OF TtfK FROVIN'CE OF BRITISH BrBMA 523

financially it was a dead loss to the East India Company, and mis¬
takenly supposed that they had only to wait long enough for the
Company to hand it back as a free gift. Even the warning that the
Siamese might be willing to make a good offer for the territory failed
to shake their resolution. Hurney failed also to persuade them to
appoint a resident minister in Calcutta. 'I'he argument that it was
contrary to Burmese custom was final in their eyes, and nothing
he could tell them about diplomatic practice elsewhere availed.

To make matters worse, before the end of 1S31 King Bagyidaw
began to display symptoms of the insanity that was later to incapacitate
him. Power therefore tended to get more and more into the hands of
the chief queen and her brother, the Minthagyi, both of low origin,
who dominated the Council of Regency. Under the strain of h$s
difficult task Burney's health broke down. In a letter written in 1834
he indicated clearly the impossible situation with which he was faced:

■ When any important'event or discussion arises here, the consideration
that there exists no certain means of communicating with your own
Government, which possesses less knowledge of the real character and
customs of this than of any other Indian Court, greatly enhances, in
such a climate and situation, near a crazy King, and an ignorant and
trembling set of Ministers, the mental anxiety which preys upon the
health of a public scr^'^ant holding a responsible office.’ He was
granted furlough.

In July 1835, when he returned to Burma, though his reception by
the ministers was flattering to a degree, the king’s malady had become
so severe that he could no longer bear to meet the representative of
the power that had caused him such acute humiliation. Matters came
to a climax early in 1837, when the king’s brother, the 'I'barrawaddy
Prince, convinced that the Minthagyi aimed at seizing the throne,
Bed to'shwebo and raised the standard of rebellion, lie was a friend
of Burney’s and hoped for his support. Bumey had to explain that
the rules of his government forbade him to interfere.

His one wish now was to retire from the capital and leave the
opposing sides to fight it out. But the panic-stricken ministers re¬
fused to let him go. He then undertook the role of mediator and
negotiated the surrender of the capital on condition that there should
be no bloodshed. On obtaining possession of Amarapura lliaTra-
wsiddy broke his promise, and Burney bad again to interxene to .stop
the executions. But five ministers had been done to death, and the
wife and daughters of the Minthagyi horribly tortured, before his
protests availed. ‘These hat-wearing people cannot bear to sec or

5^4 EtTROPRAN- TEfUltTOHIAL EXPANSION* FT. In

hear of women being beaten or maltreated,’ was Tharrawaddy’s
contemptliotts comment, and be never forgave Burney for interfering
with his royal right to break a promise.

During the war of 1824-^ Tharrawaddy had been in favour of an
early termination of hostilities, and he regarded the bard terms of the
‘1 reaty of Yandabo as due to his brother’s refusal to take his advice.
On coming to the throne, therefore, he announced his repudiation
of the treaty, and Burney learnt with consternation that there was a
party at Court which advocated the recovery of the lost pro^Hnees hy
force of arms. His position had become intolerable; he was completely
cold-shouldered by the king. In June 1837, therefore, on a plea of
ill-health, he removed the Residency to Rangoon. He had become
afraid that if it rcinained at Amarapura some outrage would occur
which would endanger peace. He advised Calcutta that it should not
be re-established at the capital until the king undertook to recognize
the Treaty of Yandabo, He reported that Tharrawaddy was buying
arms and calling up more men to the colours than were necessary In
peacetime. He recommended, therefore, that some form of coercive
military action shguld be undertaken.

Lord Auckland, the governor-general, refused to consider such a
coui« of action. He was far from satisfied with Burney’s conduct in
leaving Amarapura. Burney was accordingly recalled and a successor.
Colonel Richard Benson, appointed with instructions to re-establish
the Residency at the capital. When he arrived then* his official
position was ignored, and he was assigned a residence on a sandbank
which was fiooded to a depth of several feet by the overflow' of the
Irrawaddy during the w'ct monsoon. He complained to Calcutta that
his treatment was * such as no English gentleman, or, more extensively,
no British subject, ought to be exposed to’.

In March 1839, on a plea of ill-health, he mired to Rangoon,
leaving his assistant, Captain William McLeod, in charge at .Amara¬
pura. When the monsoon broke and the ministers refused to find
him more suitable quarters he also left for Rangoon, in July 1839.
By that time the breakdown of every Resident’s health at his capital
had become one of Tharrawaddy’s stock Jokes. Early in the following
year the Government of India withdrew the Residency and severed
diplomatic relations with the Court of Ava.

Was war now* inevitable? Benson, like Hurnev', warned Calcutta
that nothing short of invasion would bring the Burmese government
to its senses. But the Afghan War made it Impossible to take a firm
line with the Court of Ava. On the other hand, the British disasters

UIL 32 J\i¥. l-ftKATION OF THH PROVIXCR OF BRITISH BL'R}^IA 525

in that war were seized m by the war party at Tharrawaddy's Court
as argilmenta in favour of a more energetic pobdy\ Two rebellions—
one in Lower Burma in 1838^ and the other in the Shan countiy in
1840—gave the king an excuse to get rid of all the people he had
intended to put out of the way in 1S37 when Burney had inten^ened
to save their lives. The es-queen was trampled to death by elephants,
and her brother^ the Minthag^in even more barbarously executed.
A significant outbreak of dacoity in the Salween neighbourhood gave
rise to wild rumours of a Burmese plan to invade Tenasserim^ A
roval visit to Rangoon in 1841, which was of the nature of a military
demonstrationp caused so much apprehension tlial the British garrisons
in Arakan and Tenas$erim w^cre reinforced.

Nothing came of these incidents. Tbarrawaddy was playing with
fire, but was shrewd enough not to push things too far. Blundell,
the Commissioner of Tenasserimj warned the Government of India
that the dacoities in the Salween area were officially instigated in
order to spread alarm on the British side of the frontier; and that no
matter how forcibly he might stamp them out, adJon of a far more
comprehensive kind was really called for. But the Government of
India^ having brought the Afghan War to an end, had its? attention
fixed on Sind and the Sikhs and was unwilling to risk adventures in
Burma.

How long the uneasy peace would have continued had 'i'harra-
waddy continued to direct affairs is a matter for surmise. But like his
brother he became insane. His madness showed itself in fits of
ungovernable rage, during which he committed abominable cruelties*
'J'hcsc became so serious that in 1845 his sons put him under restraint,
^rhe struggle for power which then ensued was won by Fagan .Min,
who killed off those of his brothers whom he considered dangerous*
together with cvetv' meinber of their households.

In 1846 Tbarrawaddy died and Pagan Alin became king. His
tyranny and atrocities were far worse than those of Thihaw' anti
Supsyalat which so shocked a later generation of Britishers. His first
chief ministers, Maung Baing Zai and Maung Bhcin, carried out a
systematic spoliation of his richer subjects by procuring their deaths on
trumped-up charges. During thetr two years of power more than
6,000 people are said to have been put out of the w^y, and the public
fury' at last rose to such a pitch that to save himself the king handed
over his favourites to be tortured to death, fie rarely attended to
business, and iocal officers could do much as they pleased so long as
the due amount of revenue was paid regularly to the capital. Local

EITROPEAS TtimiTORiAL liXPANiilON

FT- Ml

526

officev^ liti: Gating GyT of Th^rraw^ddy^ latrr a famous dacnii leader
against the British regimep were as independent as mediBcval marcher
lords m Europe.

tt was this breakdown of central control which w'as finally in&tm-
mental in bringing on the long-threatened war with the East India
Company. After the withdrawal of the Residency in 1840, Calcutta
began to be plagued with complaints about the ill-treatment cif British
subjects at Rangoon. Some were frivolous. others eAiaggerated^ hut
hlaung Ok, the Governor of Pegu appointed by Pagan Min at the
beginning of his reign, gained a bad name for e.xtortton. In July and
.August 1851 two particularly bad cases of this occurredp in which^
by allowing frivolous charges of murder and embezzlement to he
brought against t>Yo British sea-captains^ Sheppard of the Mofiarch
Lewis of the CAamphft, and members of their crews, he collected
from them sums totalling Just short of 1,000 rupees. His acts were
not mere clumsy attempts to enrich himseffi his aim was publicly to
degrade Britishers.

It was a singularly inopportune moment to stage an anti-Jlritish
demonstration. AVhen claims for damages were submitted by the
injured parties to the Government of India Lord Dalhousie was
governor-general and had recently defeated the Sikhs, Compared with
all the provocations of the earlier period the affair was trifling, but he
knew^ that the Court of Ava would most certainly reject a demand
for reparation made in the ordinary^ way, and he felt that if this kind of
thing were permitted to continue it might seriously affect British
prestige in the East. *Thc Government of India\ he wTote in a
minutep ’could neveCp consistently with its ow^n safety, permit itself to
stand for a single day in an attitude of inferiority tui.vards a native
poAver, and lerast of all towards the Court of Ava.' Ncnce he decided
to serve the claim in such a way as he believed would make it impossible
for the Burmese government to reject it. He sent Commodore
Lambert, the deputy commander-in-chief of the East India Company's
naval forceSp in H.M.S, F&x^ together with two Company's warships^
the Prostrpine and the Ttnasserimf to Rangoon with o demand addressed
to the king not only for compensation but also for the removal of
Maung Ok-

The- Government of Burma promised redress and promptly re¬
called Maung Ok. The appearance of British warships in Rangoon
harbour, however, caused a state of alarm. Large detachments of
troops were sent to Bassein and Martaban, and Maung Ok*$ successor
brought with him a considerable foa^e. Unfortunately he belonged

CIl. 32 THK CIIEATION OF THE f'ROVtNTK OF BRITISH BURMA 5^7

to Ibc violctillv sinti-Brittsh party at the capital and came with the
imention of adopting an uncompromising attitud^ reg^less of
consCQitetiCK. When Commodore Lambert sent an ofli^al deputation
tu wail on him to discuss the claim to compensation it was refused
admission in a grossly insulting manner, and the governor sent a
written protest to the commodore complaining that a party of drunken
officers had rudely attempted to interrupt his sk-ata.

The ‘combustible commodore", as Ualhuusie later desenned
Lambert, at once declared a blockade of the port and proceeded to
take reprisals on Burmese shipping. When tlie shore batteries fired a
few shots he silenced them with a broadside from the I'ox. Then,
having deatroYcd every- Burmese war-boat wdlhin reach, he returned
to Calcultii. ‘So all that fat is in the fire,* commented the pvemor-
Keneral, and preparations for war were at once set on foot, " We can t
afford to be shown to the door anywhere in the Last, he wrote to a

^”flk next step was to despatch a strong expeditionary force to
Rangoon It bore with it an ultimatum demanding compensation,
this time to the tune of ten takhs of rupees,! estimated cost of the
war preparations. His letters show that he still hoped against hope
that the C'oiirt of Ava would consent to negotiate. But on i April
185a the ullimalum expired without a sign from the Golden Feet
4 few days later Rangoon and Martaban were occupied. Richard
Cobden in a famous pamphlet* strongly censured the Government of
India for sending a commodore of the Royal N'avy to negotiate m the
first place, and then for raising the sum demanded as compensation to
a hundred times the original amount. Dalhouaie admitted his error
in the choice of an emissary, hut contended that l .amiscrt was not the
cause of the war In his view war had long been incvjtobte. Actualiy
he bad disapproved of Lambert’s action and reprimanded him.

The war which followed was in complete contrast to the previous
one* Dalhouaie tackled with masterly zeal the problems of organiza¬
tion transport and co-operation created by the employment of two
separate nival and military scrvices-those of the Crown and thrwe
of the Company. Hia measures for safeguarding the health ol the
cxpedilionarv' force were so effective that the mortality from sickness

■-H™ i” Hxiiu«it!ir CiiMrti, London. iJj*7. vol.

k PP. 1 of (tic war i» in Sir WilUalM InM-Wiinicds t4f* the

1 hfl di«i, sii. Lor ihc Klllfmcnt after Iho war ««

HflluSl hi* DalhMaie-Phiryn Corrtifwndeitcc, London. l(i3a.

KUHOPLAN TERKilORtAL EXPANSION

PT. Ill

538

was actuaJly tower than the peacetime average in India. Materials
were prepared ahead for the rapid construction of barracks. Plentiful
supplies of fresh food were collected at Amherst, hospitals built there,
and a regular service of fast steamers kept them in close touch with the
expeditionary force. His biggest difficulry iay in the personality of
the commander-in'chief, General Godwin, a septuagenarian, who
disagreed with the whole plan of campaign and tvas notorious for
his jealousy of the Navy, on whose co-aperatton he was entirely
dependent.

The initial plan of campaign was to seize Rangoon, Martaban and
DaMeln before the onset of the wet monsoon, and thus force Pagan
Min to negodatc. There was no intention to annex more territory.
But as the rains dragged on their weary course and the Court of Ava
made no move Dalhousie realized that the Burmese also were playing
a waiting game. In July 1852 he went personally to Rangoon to
confer with General Godwin and Commodore Lambert. Godwin
wanted to dictate terms in Amarapura itself and wa.x loudly supported
by the London press. Dalhousie, however, preferred a more limited
objective. It was useless to hold the three captured ports without a
hinterland. Hence he suggested to I^ndon the feasibility of annexing
the old yngdom of Pegu. This would strengthen the British position
in Burma by linking up .^rakan and Tcnasseiim, and reduce the Court
of Ava to impotence. The brilliantly reasoned minute in which he
conveyed this proposal to the home government won its complete
assent.

When, in Novetnber 1852, its reply arrived Godwin had occupied
Prome. after sweeping aside the main Burmese armv under the
amiable but incompetent son of the great Bandula, who prudently
surrendered rather than face the fate of a defeated commander at the
bands of his own government. During the next few weeks the re¬
mainder of the proyinct of Pegu was systematically occupied against
slight rraistance. The home government, in sanctioning the anne.xa-
tion, stipulated that the Court ot .Ava must be made to sign a treaty
recognizing the fact. Dalhousie, on the other hand, was convinced
that a King of Burma would never sign away territory unless his
capital were directly threatened: and aa he considered'a march on
Amaranura would sene no useful purpose, the only thing to do was
to proclaim the annexation of Pegu and present the Court of Ava
with a/tr/r actompli. On 20 December 1852 the proclamation was read
with due ceremonial at Rangoon by Major .Arthur Purves Phayre,
whom Dalhousie had chosen to be the first Commissioner of Pegu*

CH, 3 ^ THE CKEATION' OF THK PROVtSCF OK BRITISH BORMA 529

Still no sign came from the Golden Feet. Dalhouaie therefore be^n
most rductamly to make plans for a march ofi the capital. ActoaUy,
however, ail unknown to him, a revolution was m progress in Lpper
Burma. The Mindon Prince, half-brother to the king, was the le^er
of a party at Court which had opposed the war from the s^- 1 he
news of the British advance to Prome made him a popular idol, who,
it was hoped, would restore the situation. 'I'he king therefore tned to
get rid of him, but on 17 December 1752 Mindon an^d bis brother, the
Lnaung Prince, fled to Shwebo, as Tharrawaddy had done in 1837.
and raised the standard of revolt. After confused fighting
some weeks the Magwe Mingvi, Pagan's chief minister, suddenly
declared for Mindon on 18 February 1853, took pinion of Ai^ra-
pura and deposed the king. Mindon thereupon left hhwebo and was
crowned at the capital amidst general rejoicing.

The new king was a sincere Buddhist who hated bloodshed. He
permitted Pagan Min to retire into honourable captivity. He
survived until 1881. He also signalized his accession by rel^sing all
the Europeans imprisoned at the capital and sending two of them, the
Italian priests Father Domingo Tarolly and Father ^Abbona. ^st haste
down the Irrawaddy to meet the British commander-in-chief with the
announcement that a peace delegation wnnld be dwpatche
as possible. They found him not at Prome, as they had expected, but
fifty miles higher up the river at Myede. in the absence of any wor
from Amarapura. it had been decided to annex 3^1 another slice of
Burmese territory, which included a rich belt of teak forest, t c
envoys were sent back to Mindon with a ropy of the proclamation ot

□nnesation and an invitation to accept the inevitable.

Mindon Min could not believe that the British seriously intended to
keep Pegu. At the end of March 1853 the Burmese peace delegation,
headed by the Magwe Mingyi. met the British commiKiouere,
Phayre. Godwin and Lambert, and begged them to give back the
territory they had taken. They pleaded that the new king was an
entirely ditferem kind of man from his predecessor and was only t(»
anxious to be on friendly terms with Britain. .As a forlorn hope Dal-
btiusie authorized the commissioners to offer to give up the additional
territory that had been occupied north of Prome m return for a^^ealy
recogniring the British possession of Pegu. But as he had pr^Jpheied
i^sirlicri when the treaty question was first mooted in London Min on
would on no account ^gn a treaty y ielding Burmese^ temtory to a
foreign power. So in May 1833 negotiations were broken off and
the Mv^de boundary' retained.

EUFtOPFAN TLSktTOftlAL fcXI’ANiitON

FT, HI

53 ^

At first the ^armist^ prophesied a rcnc^s'al of the war. The Kan-
sung MiQp who had become heir-apparetit. was in favour of it. But
Mindon, who had more political sagacity than any of his adviser^^
vetoed any hostile move and sent a reassuring letter to Phayre tehing
him that frontier officials had been ordered to prevent any further
hostilities. Lord DaJhousie accordingly announced the official termina¬
tion of hostilities. ' All that is knoivn of his character and past history^,
he WTOte of Mindon, 'mark him among Burmese rulers as a prince of
rare sagacity, humanity and forbearance^ and stamp hh present
declarations with the seal of sincerity/

But the army in Pegu had to remain on a war footing. Rebellion
flared up everywhere in the annexed territory* I^ocal myothugyis, the
heads of the old district administration^ became the leaders of a
stubborn resistance movement which seriously hindered attempts to
establish civil government, w^hile Burmese officials from across the
border t^ded frontier villages. Myat Tun and Gaung Gyi, the two
most daring leaderSp put up a magnificent fight which vrning admira¬
tion from Dalhousle bimsclt It took three years to bring ihe province
under controU ^

Meanwhile both Dalhousie and his able lieutenant Phayre had come
to the conclusion that positive action mu^i be taken to prevent a drift
back Into war. On both sides of the frontier the air was full of alarmist
rumours. It remained to be seen also whether Mindon could maintain
himself on the throne* If the diplomatic impasse could not be broken
it was urgent to find aome informal mear^s of direct contact with the
new* king so that tmst\vorthy intelligence could be purv^eyed by each
side to the other and mutual confidence built up. Among the Europ¬
eans released by Mindon was a burly bearded Scotiiah trader named
Thomas Spears, with a Burmese Wife and a good reputation in
Amarapura. Phayre interviewed him at Rangoon and was so impressed
with his matter-of-fact good sense that he suggested to Dalhousie that
Spears should be appointed unofficial neWTs-writer at the Burmese
capitaU Dalhoufiic at first fought shy of the proposal. Spears in such
a po&ition, he felt^ might he liable to outrage and thus involve the
Government of India in unwelcome responsibilities* Other possible
candidates were considered and turned down. Late in 1^53^ on his
second i^isit to Rangoon, Dalhousic met Spears and decided to try the
experiment, provided it met with Mindon's full approval-

Elappily Mindon knew Spears well personally and welcomed his
appoinlmenl. His task was simply to keep Phay re, as Commissioner of
Pegu and Governor-GeneraPs Agent^ informed of conditions at the

CB, 32 THE creation of THE PROVINCE Of HRITISH BURMA 53 1

capital. But his position demanded almost superhuman tact, for not
only did Mindon give him absolute liberty to write completelj^un-
censored despatches but he constantly sought to use him a$ hts official
channel of communication with the British. There were occasions
when the wary Dalhousic had to warn Phayre that Spea«
a news-writer without any official standing. Nevertheless both Mmdon
and Pbayre came to rely absolutely upon his good judgment and com¬
mon sense. Mindon discussed with him every matter affecting Bntish
relations before talring action, and Phayre apprised him of cvcry tlung
of importance from the British side for the information of tlwt king.
And although the king never acquiesced in the loss of Pegu, frontier
neace was gradually established and friendly relations promoted be¬
tween Rangoon and the Court of Ava. This eitcellent arrangement
lasted without interruption until i86i. when Spears went home on

in March 1854 Dalhousie was able to write home to his friend Sir
George Couper: ' 1 ‘here is perfect quiescence, and the King is
actually withdrawing from the frontier his whole trMps-

During that year relations improved so welt that Mmdon sent a good¬
will mission lo’Calcutta headed by the Dalla Wiio, Its real object was
to persuade the governor-general to consider the retrocesston o egu,
which Mindon felt he could reasonably e.'ipcct after the practice
demonstration he had given of his peaceable intentions. And although
Lord Dalhousie’s uncompromising refusal was deeply disappointing,
the report taken back by the Burmese delegation of their courteous
treatment at Calcutta so impressed Mindon that he at once
Government of India to depute a return mission to his capital. Photo¬
graphy was coming into vogue, and the king was much interested m the
ioll^tion of photographs the envoy and his suite brought back with

return mission, headed by Phayre, to the Court of Ava in 1855
achieved fame through the splendid volume from the pen of its
sccretarv. Colonel (later Sir) Henry Yule, who not only reported its
proceedings fully but also included in his scope a vast amount of in¬
formation of every kind about Burma and the Burmese.* trom the
point of view of the East India Company, which constantly harped
on the subject of a treaty, the mission was a failure. Por aotwith-
sianding long private talks with the king, Phayre was unable to per¬
suade him to sign even a general treaty of fnendship. making no

1 A Nafttilivf «f the tfftt by tht Goitrmr-atnfr^l of tndiu W iht Court of

At'U irt London,

ECRdPfcAX TKRRtTORIAL PtPAN^lOX

PT. Ill

532

allusion whatever to any lo$s of territor)'. On the other hand, as a step
towards better Anplo-Burmese understanding the misaion w as an out¬
standing success. Is ever before in Hurmese histors' had so genuinely
friendly a welcome been bestowed upon the envoys of a foreign
power.

Much of the credit for thb must go to Phayre himself, who spolce
Burmese fluently^ had an intimate knowledge of the literature^ religion
and history* of the Burmese, and a great reputation w^ith them for
courtesy and kindliness. But an equal share must be given to Mindon.
The Crimean War w'as in progress^ and die Amicnian community at
Amarapura was busily engaged in spreading rumours that a great
Russian invasion of India was imminent and British rule there was
* finishedShady French adventurers also, such as * General d’Orgoni\
were capping this by playing up British weakness in the Crimea and
repntfsenting that it was only the French army that ivas saving them
from defeat. But the king^s shreivdtie$$ was proof against such assaults;
he was convinced that the only safe policy was to cultivate good
relations with the British. And he found the sound common sense
of Thomas Spears^an unerring guide.

Lord Dalhousie was more than satisfied with the reauUs of the
mi^sipn^ In his minute summing them up he wrote: ' From its first
entrance into Burmese waters until its return to our frontier the
Mission was treated w^ith the highest distinctiun and with the utmoiat
hospitality and liberality , . , and I desire to record my firm conviction
that peace with Burma is to the full as secure as any written treaty
could have made it.' *llie good understanding born of these friendly
e!cchangcs sur\dved the even greater strain of the Indian Mutiny of
1857-8. When the British garrison in Lower Burma was depleted
through India's need for reinforcements Mindon was urged hy his
advisers to invade Pegu. 'We do not strike a friend when he is in
distress*^ he is reported to have said.

The India Office records contain a vast mass of material on his reign*
and it shows quite clearly that his position w^as never an easy one. J^hc
traditionalist elements at his Court constantly worked against him, and
in the face of the plots and disorders that were rife throughout hij^
reign his hands were weakened by the crippling loss his kingdom had
sustained in the wan He needed peace for the task of setting his own
house in order* and of coming to terms with the new nrder that the
European impact was forcing upon Asia, Like his contemporary»
Mongkut of Siam^ he felt the chaLlenge of the West* but in his

' Hw Hiiliiry of l^onitan, 1SS3, b a rfiriAdcnb]? picC« ut pk>nccr work.

flf. J2 THK C-REATION OF THE FtlOVINfE OF UllITtSlI BlfRMA 533

land-locked kingdom, now more than ever isolated from the out¬
side world, his handicap in the effort to meet it w'as immeasurably
greater.

When Arakan and Tenasserim were annexed in 182b they were
separately administered under the direct supervision of the Govern¬
ment of India. In Arakan’s case the arrangement did not last ver>'
long, for it was found tobemorcconvenient to transler it to the Bengal
administration. From 1S28 it was under the charge of a superin¬
tendent, who worked under the supervision of the Commissioner of
Chittagong. Tenasserim remained directly under the Government of
India until 1834. Bur its connection with India was slight, since its
Buropcan administrators up to 1843 came from Penang. Thus while
Indian administrative methods were speedily introduced in Arakan, in
Tenasserim's case, partly because for some time the question of re¬
trocession was in the air, Burmese officials and administrative methods
were largely retained.^

It was the age of Liberalism, when men such as Sir Stamford
Raffles, Sir ‘Bhomas Munro, Mountstuan Elphinstone and Lord
William Cavendish-Bentinck, who was Govemoi^General of India
from 182S to 1S35, accepted the ideals of economic freedom, equality
before the law. and the general welfare of the governed as the guiding
principles of government. A* D. Maingv*, the first Civil Commissioner
of Tenasserim, was an enthusiast for these things; and although he
found that [.iberaUsm and Burmese custom did not always agree, and
that where they clashed the latter tended to prevail, he was able to
introduce administrative methods which contributed to the welfare of
the people. And whatever may he said in criticism of the new ad¬
ministration, the fact remains that in both Arakan and Tenasserim
official oppression and extortion became-illegal, banditry was sup¬
pressed far more energetically than before, while security of life and
property became established features of the governmental system.

Under the Burmese system, while the heads of the provincial
government were appointed by the king, actual administration was
largely in the hands of hereditary local magnates such as the myo-
thiigvis. Thus in Tenasserim at first the system of administration
was kin to the indirect rule of the Dutch in Java, with Europeans
supervising a native administration functioning on tradition'll lines.
In 1834, however, the judicial and revenue adnumstratitm came under
Bengal, and in consequence siandardistation on Indian lines was

* Th* cartv «clitliTii*(Mtive history of Tctissaerim it tinted in detail in J. Burni-
vall's I'asihioning of in voJ. Sxix, IQ} 9 i

El-ROPEAN TERRITORIAL I^XPANSIOK

rr. Ill

534

incrc^iRingly applied. Stilly a surprising amount of the older Bunne^e
practice managed sturdily to survive.

When Pegu was annexed in iS $2 it bec^e a separate eommissmner-
ship under the govemor-gcneni]. Phityre framed its administration
on the Tenasseriiti modeL The province was divided into five
districts under deputy commissioners. These in turn were sub¬
divided into townships under myo-oks. Each tow™bip comprised a
number of ^circles’’ under taikthugyis, who supervised the subordinate
officials in the villages. As, howevefp most of the British officers
appointed to admini$^tr3tive posts had held commissions in the Bengal
and Madras armies and spoke little or no Burmese, the administration
tended to develop more and more along the approved Indian lin^.

The method of three separate commissioner's divisions was costly
and inconvenient. Hence in r86a they were amalgamated to form
the province of British Burmat of which Rangoon was the capital and
Phayre the first Chief Commissioner. Ill is naturally resulted in
greater uniformity of administratton. It w as also the beginning of the
gradual reorganization of the government into departments. But,
significantly enough, the circle under the taikthugyi remained the
real unit of local government^ a$ it had done under Burmese nile.
Indirect rule thus continued to be the general practice, and the life of
the ordinary villager went on much a$ it had done under Burmese
nile.

Tenaaserim and Arakan at the time of their annexation in
were of slight economic value. In the seventeenth century Arakan
had driven a considerable export trade in rice. The instability of the
government in the eighteenth century had caused this to decline.
Under Burmese rule quite half of its population had emigrated, and
in any case the Burmese government did not permit the export of rice.
British rule brought more settled conditions and the removal of the
restrictions on export: hence the proximity of the Indian market
caused a revival of ricc-planting. Akyab, the administrative head¬
quarters, soon became a flourishing commercial centre.

Tenasserim had a very sparse population living mainly on sub¬
sistence agriculture- Its valuable teak forests w^re thrown open to
licensed private enterprise, and for a rime Moulmcin became a thriving
port wtih saw-mills and shipbuilding yards. But the rapid develop¬
ment of Rangoon after 1852 soon brought about the eclipse of Moul-
mein. Lord Dalhousie^s work aa the creator of modern Rangoon
shows up by comparison with Raffles's at Singapore as a compre¬
hensive and efficient professional job against a slapdash amateur one.

CH, 3 2 THE CREATION OF TH& FROVlNCE OF HHlTlSH BURMA 535

In hh plans Rangoon's was envisaged aa liot only a great port

but also 'one of the most beautiful cities and stations within the whole
bounds of India*. But bis most sanguine hopes for the dty^s develop¬
ment must have fatten far short of reality when Rangoon became the
world *s greatest rice port as a result of expansion of culdvation in the
Irrawaddy delta region that was to be one of the most spectacular
developments in the recent economic history of Asia*

CHArrm 33

THE LAST DAYS OF THE KONEAUNG DYNASIT
AT MANDALAY, xmSs

Mindon, who was a aoo of Hiarrawaddy, had been twelve years of age
when Arakan and Tenasserim w^ere annexed in 1826. He was raised
to the throne jtist after Pegy and a deep strip of territory to the north
of the Burmese province had gone the same way- His kingdom was
still a large one stretching many miles wp the Irrawaddy and its great
tributary, the Chindwin. It contained what was par txcdlen^e the
Burmese homeland, together with a fringe of mouniainous areas
occupied by other peoples, principally ShanSi China and Rachins.
Of these the Sbans were far the most importajit, and the thick wedge
of their feudatory slattrs paying allegiance to Burma stretched far
across the river Salween to the borders of Yunnan, and in the case of
Kcngtung Reached to the upper Mekong. But Mindon was painfully
aware of his w eaknes$* He wras cut off from the sea; not a vestige of
the old military strength of Burma remained, and he himself was a man
of peace* not a soldien He realized, therefore, that it was essential for
him to remain on good terms with the Britishi and he did so.

His greatest persona] interest w'as in Buddhism. Though not a
profound scholar of Buddhist learning, he was deeply imbued with its
doarines and had a more genuinely religious outlook than any other
ruler of hia house. In 1857 he chose a new^ site for a royal city on the
plain lying to the south-west of Mandalay Hill and transferred his
capital there from Amarapura. He strove to make it a principal
centre of the Buddhist culture, reviving and conserving the best tradi“
tions of the past. In and around it he built large teak monasteries
richly adorned with wood carvings displaying pure Burmese art at
its best. Among the many religious buildings with which he adorned
his new capital perhaps the most interesting and significant was the
compl^Tx of pagodas known as the Kuthodaw (* great work of royal
merit*)* where, around a central pagoda, are grouped 733 smaller ones
containing upright marble siahs^ each engraved ivith vensea of the Pah
scriptures, and together forming a complete copy of the Tripitaka, the
"three baskets' of the Buddhist "bible": the Hutta, the Vinaya, and the

53^

t’H, 33 the i-ast days of the konbavno dynasty 537

AbhidammapitAka. In the central pagoda was enshrined the Pali
CoHiinenury inscribed on leaves of gold and silver. To the BurTnesc
Mandalay was Shwetnyo, 'the golden city'; its official Pali name was
Yadanabon, ‘cluster of gems’. The royal city containing the palace
was a walled square with each side a mile and a quarter long, and with
mud-mortar-built machicolated vialls twenty-aU feet high, sur¬
mounted by wooden look-out towers of traditional Burmese design.
The walls were pierced by twelve gates, three on each side, and sur¬
rounded by a wide moat.

Thomas Spears continued to act as British Correspondent to the
Court of Ava until iSfit, when he left fora long visit to Europe.* In ^e
following year Colonel Phayre, the neiv Chief Commissioner of British
Burma, i^e to Mandalay to negotiate a commercial treaty. British
policy now aimed at developing trade with western China along the
old Burma Road running into Yunnan from Bhamo. The idea of
discovering a practicable overland route to China had been revived,
Symes, in repotting his first mission to .Ava in 1795, had mentioned
that Burma carried on an extensive cotton trade with Yunnan. >lirani.
Cox had followed this up by making careful enquiries, on the results
of which he wrote a fairly detailed report, which Major Francklin
published in 1811 in a collection of papers on Burma.*

The acquisition of Tenasserim in 1826 led to great efforts to
stimulate the trade of Moulmein, and attempts were made to discover
its overland connexions, Crawfurd’s estimate, in his report of his
mission to Ava in 1827, that Burmese exports amounted to an annual
value of jfa28,ooo brought to the fore the feasibility of finding a way
there from Moulmein. It also aroused the interest of the Government
of India in the ancient land route from Bengal to China, and the Cal¬
cutta authorities published a map showing possible routes to Yunnan-
fu. Numerous surt'eys were made and a vast amount of information

piled up. ,

In (831 Captain Spryc suggested the Salween route to China from

Moulmein via Kenghung, and in 1837 Captain McLeod followed up
his suggestion by making the journey with six elephants, thus be¬
coming the first European to penetrate China by the Salween route.
Another doughty explorer of this period was Dr. David Richardson,
who made three visits to Chiengmai from Moulmein and* was ap¬
parently the first Britisher to visit that dty since the unfortunate

> He r<! Rspimoon in 1 !it»7 snJ 'li*'! there rttly ihe nest year.

> \V FruncUio. Tractt, Fo/iflVflt. Gef««ijSW anJ Commacial, on jAe of

•Im Wtd :kr ,VnrtA-ireitiTW flirO «/ ttindoiUiuH, I jmdim. iSl I.

53® EUROPE A« TERaiTORIAL EtPANSiDN PT. m

Samud in i 5 i 5 . Other gallant adv£ntyrer$ explored routes rrom
rndia to Upper Burma. In iSjo, for instaneCt Licutenatit Pemberton,
the author of an invaluable Report on thr Eastern Frontier of British
India crossed ibe mountains from Manipur by the Akui route to
Kindat and made his ^vay down the Cliindwio to Ava. Five years
later Captain Hannay travelled from Bengal to Bhamo by the route
across northern Burma. But after 'I'harrai^Tiddy came to the throne
in 1837 all hope? of developing this route were quenched for a genera¬
tion, and all attempts to develop the overland trade of Moulmem in
the direction of Chiengmai or Yunnan failed.

The journals of these esplorers were studied by Colanel Henry
Yule in connection with Phayre^s mission to the Court of Mindon Min
in SS55* One of the objects hoped for from the mission was the sig¬
nature of a treaty permitting trans-Burma trade with China. But the
king was not to he persuaded to agree to any plan w^hich might provide
excuses for further British interference. Moreover, Yule found that
Burma's trade with Yunnan was declining, and soon afterwards it
came to a complete standstiU through the Pant hay rebellion. Spjyc^
on the other hand, Continued to recommend his route From MouLmein
to Kenghung and thence on to S^umao, though without avail, since it
passed through thinly populated, malarious areas, and in any case
Lord Dalhousie’s plan to develop Rangoon as a port in preferenoe
to Moulmein, together with the obvious advantages of the Irrawaddy
over the Salween, caused attention to he focused more and more upon
overcoming the opposirion of the Court of Ava,

In i860 the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, in the belief that
western China would prove a good market far Lancashire cotton
goods, asked ihc British government to take practical measures to open
the Moulmein-Yunnan route. Almost at the same time an English
army sui^geon. Dr. Clement VVilliams, while stationed at Thayetmyo,
had been studying Burmese accounts of the old trade between China
and Upper Burma^ and found the theme so fasrdnating that he went lo
Mandalay on furlough to find out more about it. Thenceforward he
became an enthuaiast for the Bhamo route.

Jn response to all this pressure the Governmem of India sent
Phayre on a nussion to Mandalay in The union of the three

divisions of Arakan, Tenasserim and Pegu in that year to form the
province of British Burma had made a deep impression an Mindon
Min^s mind. He realiiscd that the time had come for a darilication of
his relations with the British. He regarded Phayre as an old friend,

* Publiihed in Calcutta ifi

CH. 33 THt lA&T DAYS 0 ¥ THH KONBAUNG DY'NASTY 539

Williams also he liked. Ffence he was prevailed upon to sign a com¬
mercial treaty- it was based upon the principle of reciprocity. Britain
undertook to abolish within a year the customs duties on goods
coming down the Irrawaddy from Upper Burma. Mindon agreed to
make redprocal concesaions, if he felt inclined^ within a rather longer
period* Rice was to be imported imo Upper Burma free of duty.
Traders from British territory were to be permitted to operate along
the whole course of the Irrawaddy in Upper Burma in return for a
guarantee of similar privileges to traders from Upper Burma along the
British section of the riverni The most important clause, howeverp was
one which penriiitcd a British .\gent to reside in Mandalay to remove
any misunderstandings that might arise.

Both Mindon and Phayre would have preferred to niaintain the un¬
official method of communication sn ably conducted by Spears* But
there was no suitable man- Hence the appointment of an official
Agent resorted lo as the be$t arrangement under the circum¬
stances, and Clement Williams was seconded from the army to become
High Commissioner's Agent at the Court of Ava* His first object on
assuming his duties in 1S62 was to persuade the king to allow him to
sun^ey the upper part of the Irra^ddy, In this he was successful and
started off in January 1S63. At Bbamo his inquiries con\rinced him
that the trade route was practicable. He was unable, however, to make
a journey to the Chinese border because an insurrection occurred at
hlandalsy and Mindon recalled him. Bui he forwarded a Memoran¬
dum to the Government of India^ and began an intensive canvass for
his scheme in British mercantile circles. * Burmah proper is no longer a
barrier/ he wrote* 'but a gangway, open to the use of whoever will
avail themselves of it/*

This Avas mere wishful thinking. The obstacles forming the barrier
had only been slightly dislodged. Moat of the ministers were against
the king in this matter, and all attempts to carry out further surveys
failed before the difficulties raised by local officials. Trade also was
badly hampered by the system under which nearly every staple
article of produce was a royal monopoly, and as Auch could be sold
only through royal brokers or by special pertoisaion of the local
authorities. And the Court of Ava found w?ays and means of post¬
poning indefinitely its part of the agreement regarding the Iboittion
of customs duties.

The king, unfortunately* was up against practically insuperable

' Tlifl Rial of it » Bivrw in tii* book Thrnugh Hurmali (o H'eif<Tn China ^ London, iB*H.

« Ibid., p, 6.

QtEEN'iS <}0LDfiX MQS'WTITPI^ MANDALAY

CH. last UAVS of THF KOKBAC^NO DVKASTV 541

difficutdes, insurrectiDns were rife, and at any moment a palace re¬
volution might deprive him of his throne. He almost alone at his
Court realized that before the insistent pressure of European expansion
the old isolationism must lead tu disaster. But unlike his eontem-
porarj% Mongkut of Stam^ vvhoac country had not been defeated and
car^^ed up by a European power, any move he made towards relaxing
the rigid traditionalism of his government was bound to look in the
eyes of his ministers like selling the pass.

In 1866 an attempted revolution came su near to success that the
king Was badly shaken. On Z August^ tvhen he wa^ at the Summer
Palace a few miles out of Mandalay^ two of his sons, with armed
followers, rushed into the temporar)' Hlutdaw building, where a meet¬
ing was in progress, and killed the crovyn prince, who was presiding,
one of the VVungyis and the two princes who stood next in the aue-
e^ssion, Nlindon escaped on foot to Nlandalay, where he was besieged
in the royal palace all night by the insurgents until his guards managed
to drive them off. Major Sladen, the British Agent, was in the Rummer
Palace when the outbreak occurred^ but managed to escape. The
situation remained so tense that the king suggested that RIaden should
evacuate all the Europeans to Rangoon^ and he took them down on a
merchant steamer [hat was moored off Mandalay city.

Later in the same year Phayre went to Mandalay with the object of
negotiating a new commercial treaty^ but the king pleaded that the
country' was still too unsettled and impoverished for him to forgo any
of his monopolies or reduce the frontier duties. In March 18G7
Phayre retired, and was succeeded as High Commissioner by Colonel
Albert Fytche, a descendant of the Elizabethan prospector and a
cousin of Alfred Tennyson, the poet laureate. !lc had far kss ability
and insight into the Burmese character than Phayre^ but a great deal
more self-assurance. And his hist act was to resume the negotiations
that Phayre had had to break off. The situation had now changed; the
king wanted steamers and arms to guard against further trouble, and
naturally turned to Britain for them*

Fytche took his wife up W'ith him, and both were received
very^ graciouslyJ The treaty that he concluded was on paper a great
advance on the i8Gz one. The king promised to abandon all his mono¬
polies save those on rubies, earth^’Oti and timber, and to reduf^ all the
frontier customs duties to 5 per cent ad valorfm. He also granted
certain rights of extra-territoriality, w"hereby the British Agent re¬
ceived full jurisdiction over civil cases bet^veen British subjects at
^ Phayrt ncinilined o buchclat all hln Ur^.

542

EUROPEAN TERRITORJAE E^PAXStON

FT. in

the capital, while those between British subjects and Burmese sub¬
jects were to be tried by a niixed court coiuposed of the Agent and a
Burmese officer of high rank. It was further arranged that British
officers were to sit as obserAXTS in Burmese customs-houses and
Burmese officers in British customs-houses.

The king made further concessions that were not embodied in the
treaty.^ A British Agent was to r^idc at Bhamo, British steamers were
to be pCLiTnitted to navigate the Irrawaddy beyond Mandalay, and
British explorers to sur\'ey the route from Bhamo into western China.
When this agreement was negotiated Don dart dc Lagrce and Francis
Gamier had already made their epoch-making journey up the M ekongp
the Sue 5 t Canal was nearing completion, as also the first American
trans-continenta] railway to the Pacific. The keenest competition
for the China trade was developing between Britain^ France and the
United States, and the agitation in Britain and at Rangoon for the
opening of an overland route to western China had become very
powerful.

In November tS68 Captain Strover assumed the duties of British
Agent at Bhamo.^ Before his arrival however^ Major Sladcn, the
Poliiiail Agent at Mandalay, had brushed aside all the difficulties
raised by the Burmese frontier officials and made his w^ay via Bhamo
to Momein (Tengyueh). The Panthay rebellion prevented him from
going further, but Fytche wrote to the Viceroy of India in a spirit of
unrestrained optimism that Burma promised ^to furnish a hightvay to
China," and after alluding to the threat of American competition in
the Pacific he urged that Britain 'should he in a position to substitute
a western ingress to China". The enthusiasts went further* they now
advocated the constmetion of a railw^ay through Burma to Shanghai.
It is not without significance that Slade n^s expedition had been partly
financed by the Rangoon Chamber of Commerce, which from now
onwards pressed for Stronger measures in dealing with the Court of
Avrh There were even those in the British service who advocated that
Britain should take over the direction of its foreign telationSi

Lord Lawrence, however, viewed Sladen's exploit with disfavour;
he was strongly opposed to any further expansion tikdy to involve
difficulties with Burma. His successor, Lord Mayo, virarned Fytche
that the scheme he had in mind was a generation too carly^ Hopes
were damped also by Strover "s disappointing reports of British trade
at Bhamc consequent upon the opening of steamer traffic there.

^ A dc!ti.ilcd McciHuit of the riffgetiadQii* u ifiven in Albert Fyidie, Burma Fmt aud
Prarnt, ii, ^ppenduc C; pp. ifa-Ss.

CJI. 33 THE LAST DAVS OF TllE KOISEAUNC DYNASTY 543

They revived in 1874 when Lord SMisbuiyp the Seereiatj- of State
for India in Disraeli's newly-formed administration^ in response to a
petition from the British A^ociated Chambers of Commercep ordered
a fresh survey to be undertaken along either Sprye's route or some
other. The Government of India thereupon decided in favour of the
Bhatno route. The plan was for a double expeditionp Colonel Horace
Browne, with the geographer Ney Elias and Dr. John Anderson, was
to start from Bhamo, and Augustus Margary from Shanghai, Margary
completed his journey and arrived at Bhamo on 17 January 1875,
before Browne^s departure. He therefore started back a day ahead of
the Bhamo party in order to make arrangements for them. But on
a I February at Manwyine, halfw'ay to Tengy ueh, he was murdered
by Chinese tribesmen, incensed by the report that the object of the
expedition was to arrange for a railway to be buih through China.
The threat of a still larger Chinese attack causod Browne's party to
return to Bhamo, and the expedition was CflUed off.

This was the last attempt made during the period of the Burmese
kingship to penetrate China by the Bhamo route. The British agents
sent from Hankow to Yunnan to investigate the Margary murder
reported that the route was unsuitable for railway construction.
Thibaw^s accession in 1S7S, the i^ubsequent withdrawal of the
British Agent from Bhamo, and the dosing of the Mandalay Residency
rendered it impossible for the time being to search for a better route
through Upper Burma, and attention w^as accordingly transferred to
the Moulmein route.

Min don Min was r^arded by both Burmese and British as the
best of his line. A fenent Buddhist, he achieved the dearest wish of
his life in i Syt by convoking at Mandalay the Fifth Buddhist Council
in the history of the religion. There, in the presence of a vast con¬
course of monks, ihe Bidagat Thonbon** ‘the Three Baskets of the
Law', was solemnly recited. A dedsion was also taken to erect a new
hti\ * umbrella', on the summit of the famous Shwe Dagon Fagoda at
Rangoon. The British authoritieSn realizing tliai it was intended as a
nationalist demonstration uniting all Burm^ Buddhists in allegiance
to the king, sanctioned the ceremony subject to the one condition that
he himself should not be present. It was carried out by his envoys
amidst tbe greatest rejoicings. "l‘he All, studded with jewels ^timated
then to be worth £6z*ooo, still surmounts the majestic stupa.

Mindon's relations with the British, notwithstanding many dis¬
appointments, were alwap correct. He had hoped to induce Britain
^ 'tlie Bujtnrtc v-cmion of she Puli Tf ipililu<

54 +

ELiaOPMN TERHiTOfllAl. EXPAN'STON

PT. U(

lo restore Pegu, but patiently bowed to the inc^-itablt. After the
rebellion of 1866 he was particularly disappointed at the obstacles
raised by the British in the way of his importation of arms. He felt
that they ought lo have adopted a more sympathetic attitude in face
of his serious internal difficulties. Hence with great astuteness he
cultivated relations with other European states, notably France and
Italy, as a counterpoise to British power. In 1873, partly as a resull
of the friendly letters he received from Queen Victoria, he sent the
Kinwun Mingyi, his chief minister, on a visit to England, The
Mingyi was the first member of the Hlutdaw Council ever to visit
England, but his visit did little to improve Anglo^Burmese relations.
For one thing he was deeply disappointed because at his official
reception by Queen Victoria he was introduced by the Secretary of
State for India instead of by the Foreign Secretary, For another, the
British government was somewhat piqued by the fact that on his w-ay
to London he had negotiated treaties with France and Italy. French
technicians had long been employed at Mandalay. They had helped
to construct the pnlace-city, superintended the miming of Mindon's
new coinage, and ran his arms factor}'.

'rhe French without delay sent Out the Comte de Kochechouart
to obtain ratification of the draft commercial treaty signed in Paris.
On his way to Mandalay in 1873 he crossed India. At Agra, where he
met the viccrov, he gave the firmest assurances that France had no
designs on Burma. But the negotiations did not result in a treaty,
for Burma wanted a full alliance providing for the import oi arms,
while the French wanted to take over tlie ruby mines of Mogok,
hitherto one of the most rigid royal monopolies. Agreement, however,
was reached on three secret articles. By the first France promised her
good offices to settle disputes to which Burma was a party; the second
provided that France would supply officers to train the Burmese
army, and the third that Frenchmen in Burma were to be subject to the
Burmese courts of law. These exceeded the envoy’s instructions and
were accordingly disavowed by the French Foreign Minister.

With Italy a harmless commercial treaty was concluded in 1872.
This diplomatic activity is chiefly accounted for by Mindon’s ardent
desire to demonstrate Burma’s independence. 'I'be British govern¬
ment’s dr:cision in 1871 that its relations with the Court of Ava were
to be conducted through the Viceroy of India injured his pride. He
resented being treated like the ruler of a native state in India. With
a little more imagination and insight on the British side, Angb-
Burmese relations could have been so much happier, and the marked

S# EttHflPFAN TERJUtORlAL EXPANSION PT. Hi

detcHoratioQ ’which set in some y^rs before Mbdon's de^ith need
never have occurred.

The atmosphere was not improved by the attitude of the businm
community itt Rangoon * which w^as annoyed at the failure of the
various efforts to open trade with China, and in a state of constant
agitation against the king's commercial methods. Notwithstanding
the promise in the treaty of 1S67 to abolish monopolies, the royal
control was never relaxed over articles of ex:port such as cotton, whe^tt
palm~sug;ar» pickled tea, cutch and ivotyj, and the esportcr had to pay
substantially above the open market rates for these commodities. A
further source of annoyance was the practice of the king's agents in
buying rice directly in the delta instead of through the big brokers,
and in making purchases nf piece-goods in Calcutta when the Ran¬
goon prices were too high.

But the real turning-point^ after which it became impossible to
restore proper relations, came as a result of Sir Douglas Forsyth's
mission to Mandalay In iSyj, In fixing the frontier between British
and Burmese territory at the end of the Second Anglo-Bunne^ War
Lord Dalhousie had agreed to respect the claim to independence put
forward by the chiefs of the Red Karens, whose tribes inhabited the
hill tracts known as Western Karcnni* 'I'hey were, however, slave-
raiders who made a business of collecting Burmese and Shan slaves
for Sale in Siam, I'here was constant friction between Rangoon and
Mandalay owing to the fact that Burmese local oiHcials Instigated
them to commit depredations into British territory.

In 1873 Min dun ^ent troops to occupy Western Karencii, and since
Lord Dalhoijsie had promised to protect the tribes from aggression
from the north n British objection was lodged at Mandalay, I^jindou
replied by datming auKcrainty over the area. The matter ivas settled
in 1875 Forsyth Ml^ion„ w'hich negotiated an agreement

whereby the independence of the Red Karens was recognised by both
sides- On his return from Mandalay Forsjih protested against having
to take off his shoes and sit on the floor at royal audiences. The ^ Shoe
QuKtton*, as it was called, had long been a grievance with British
envoys, but the requirements of Burmese etiquette in the matter had
been so much reduced as to impose no hardship on Europeans^ and^
in Burmese eyes, no indignity. Unfortunately, hoAvever, a time had
come in British history when a new pride in empire was being in^
stilled, and with it a narional arrogance which in matters of this $orl
could make mountains out of motehilb.

Later in that same year Burmese envoys went to the grand durbar

CH. 33 THE IJLST PAYS OF TltH KONBAUNC DYKASTV 547

at Calcutta in honour of the Prince of Wales, later Edward VII, on
the occasion of his official tout of India. At the ceremony they were,
as a matter of course, accommodated with chairs and wore their shoes.
Then, in an attempt to force Mindon’s hand, the Governtnent of India
issued instructions that in future the British Resident at Mandalay
was not to take off his shoes on going into the royal presence. Before
such an ulrimatum Mindon could not give way. Henceforward the
British Resident could no longer be received in audience. The loss
of direct personal contact with the king was disastrous for both
sides.

During Mindon’s reign the first steps were taken towards modern¬
izing Burmese administratiori by the substitution of fixed salaries
for higher ofHeials instead of the traditional practice of assigning them
feudal appanages for their maintenance. To raise the necessary
revenue for financing this new measure Mindon introduced the
Thatfiameda tax on the household, with an assessment variable from
year to year, in which such factors as a failure of monsoon rains or
damage by fire were taken into consideration. It was a notable
advance on previous practice, but Mindon was himself too ignorant of
other systems of administration to carry out any far-reaching reforms
in this direction^ and, unlike Mongkut of Siam, he knew no European
language and did not employ Eoglish tutors for his children,

Mindon died in 1878 without having settled the succession to the
throne. There was no hard-and-fast rule of priniogeniture; it was a
matter for the exercise of the royal pre relative. But after the murder of
hit brother, the heir-apparent, in t866 the king had been afraid to
appoint another, though frequently urged to do so by the British
Resident, The most popular candidate was the Nyaungyan Prince.
When the king was dying he summoned this prince to the palace,
presumably with the intention of nominating him as his successor.
But the prince, learning that ihcre was a plot afoot to place the
'Phibaw Prince on the throne, and fearing a trap, took sanctuary with
hia younger brother at the British Residency. The Kinwun Mingyi
sent a formal demand for their surrender, but, most unwisely, it
would seem, the Resident sent them away to Calcutta, where they
became Britbh penrioners.

The dying king then suggested that three of the roy^l princes
should be nominated as joint rulers, but the Kinwun Mingyi and his
colleagues would not consent to a measure which they felt would
certainly cause a civil war. At this juncture they fell in with the plot
to make Thibaw king. He was a complete nonentity, and the M ungyis

fUROFKAK TlittillTOklAL EXPANSION

FT* III

54S

planned to establish a form Df minis^tenal control such as they were
dimly aware existed in the case of constitmJonaJ monarchies. Even
the British Resident allowed himself to indulge in the fond hope that
in this way the beginnings of constitutional reform might be intro-
duced.

The Kinwun Mingyi's trump cord was to have been to depose
Thibaw should he prove troublesome. Bui he had failed completely to
reckon with the Princess Supayakt, whom the conspirators had
arranged for Thibaw^ to take as his principal wife. As soon as she
became queen she prevailed upon her husband to imprisonj and
ultimately, in February^ 1879, tnassaeret about eighty members of
ihc royal family^ on the grounds that there was imminent danger
of a rebeUJon. The Kinw^im Mingy! and his colleagues made no
real attempt to prevent this atrocious deed; they seem to have
believed that it orould simplify their task of gaining control over the
government. UencCp when the now completely disillusioned Resident,
Shaw% sent in a strong protest the Kinwun Mingy^i replied chat the
king, as an independent sovereign, had a right to take such measures
as were necessary' to prevent disturbances in his own countrv% and
that there were very good precedents for his action. Nevertheless
Shatv's threat to haul down the British flag and break off ail relations
caused something like a panic at the Courts and troops w'cre hastily
mobilized for fear of a British march on Mandalay.

It was not long before the ministerial party discovered that far
from reducing Thibaiv to impotence they themselves were reduced [o
that position by the strong-willed queen and the ruthless men who
were behind her. For she proceeded to place her minions, notably the
Taingda Mingyi, in key positions in the palace. The Kinwun Mingyi
remained the senior member of the government, for the king dared
not risk a revolt by dismissing him, but the Taingda Mingyi and the
palace clique surrounding the queen wielded all the power. -Supay-
alatk influence over the weak Thibaw' was so complete that she
actually prevented him from taking the regulation number of wives
considered necessary for the royal dignity.

Jn some way's the most tragic aspect of the situation was the
impotence of the British Resident because of the Government of
India's stupid ruling on the subject of footwear. Shaw' died of
rheumatic fever in June 1S79 and was succeeded by Colonel Horace
Browne* who spoke Burmese well and had had tong experience of the
country. The comment he made in his journal shortly after his
arrival at the capitel gives a good idea of what had been lost. He wrote;

CH. 33 the last days of the KONBAirsc hynastt 549

‘As the old Kin^ was his own Minister of Foreign Affairs, and no
negotiations were ever concluded except at personal intervTews with
him, this sudden change [i e. the footwear rulingl put an absolute stop

to all important business_'I'hc frequent visits of former Residents

to the palace, and their unconstrained intercourse with the King and
his entourage, formed the best, and, indeed, the only means of
ascertaining exactly what was going on outside our rampart of mat
walls/

On receiving news of the massacre Lard Lytton^ the viceroy*
reinforced the Burma garrison and urged the home government to
adopt a strong line. But Britain was already fighting, somewhat
ingloriously, two wars—one against Afghanistan, and the other
against the Zulu warlord Cetewayo. And trouble with the Boers was
brewing in South Africa. War with Burma, therefore, was not to be
risked. It would be easy to take Mandalay, said the military experts,
but thousands more men than were at present available in Burma
would be required for the subseciuent ' pacification’. In the light of
this advice the British Cabinet enjoined upon the Government of
India a poliev of extreme ‘forbearance’. But so much concern was
felt for the safety of the British Residency that an armed steamboat
was kept at the frontier, ready to rush aid in case of trouble. Ibenc
was a general exodus of Britishers from Matidalay. .At the end of
.August 1879 Culonel Browne himself was allowed to hand over charge
to his assistant, Mr. St, Barbc, and return to British Burma, In the
following month Sir I.ouis Cavagnari, the British Resident at Kabul,
was murdered, and the Government of India, fearing that Thibaw
might be tempted to imitate the Afghans, hurriedly withdrew St,
Barbe and his whole staff.

'Fhe Court of Ava, suddenly sobered by the seriousness of this step,
deputed an ambassador with a letter and presents to the viceroy. The
British frontier authorities, however, held him up in order that the
nature of his mission might be clarified. He was told that only if he
were empowered to negotiate a new treaty would the viceroy consent
to receive him. F<*r six months he remained at 'rhayetmyo as the
guest of the British while his powers were being debated between
Calcutta and Mandalay. At last, when it became obvious that the
Court of ,Ava had no acceptable proposals to offer for a scttIdVncni of
the outstanding difficulties, he relumed to Mandalay.

A further opportunity to establish better relations occurred in 1882,
when the Kabaw valley question caused ’I’hibaw to send an envoy
to Calcutta. After the surrender of the valley to Burma in 1834 no

SyO EtJROPEAiV TERfllTORlAL EXPANSION PT* [M

precise demarcation of the boundary' line with Manipur had been
made. After 'Fhibaw's aece$sion a series of frontier disturbances
caused by the Burmese led the Goveminent of India in i88i to suggest
a joint boundary commission. Wlien this wa^ rejected a British
commission proceeded to mark out the boundary. The Burmese were
found lo be in occupation of a village claimed by Manipur^ A Burmese
envoy was thereupon ^em to Calcutta to discuss the matter^ He was
given a most friendly reception by Lord Ripon; but just when hopes
of a satisfactory^ settlement were beginning to rise he W4$ suddenly
recalled. Tbibaw'^^s attitude in fact became so provocative that re-
mforccment$ w^eresent to the Raja of Manipuip and he was authorized
to resist any Burmese action by force of arms. There were no further
disturbances. But the hoped-for improvement in Anglo-Burmese
relations disappeared.

Meanwhile Upper Burma was in a state little short of chaos.
Dacoity w^as rife, the KaebJns rebelledt Chinese guerrillas burnt
BhamOp and most of the feudatory Shan sawbwas threw off their
allegiance lo Ava. There were movements to dethrone Thibaw,
The Myingun Prince, who was a strong candidate for the throne, was
at Pondicherry. He was invited to lead a rebellion, but the French
interned him- In 1884, when a movement in his favour was suspected,
I he slaughters at Mandalay increased to such a pitch that the British
and Chinese mercantile communities at Rangoon demanded a change
of government in Upper Burma or annexation, and Dr, Marks, the
most prominent Anglican divine there, thundered from his pulpit
against Thibaw^s misdeeds. But Sir Charles Bernard, the High
Commissioner, was opposed to annexation. He thought that the
Nyaungyan Prince would prove an acceptable ruler and recommended
intervention on his behalf. The Government of India^ however,
refused to movej it argued that internal mi&govemment did not justify
interv'cnrioni In 1SS5 the prince died, and with him the hope of
establishing a satisfactory king at Mandalay.

Thibaw^s sudden withdrawal from the Manipur negotiations was
the result of a disastrous decision to play off France against Britain. He
knew that Britain had become very' uneasy about French activities in
Annam and Tongkingt and foolishly believed he could force the
British ro climb down by resuming the negotiations with France that
had been broken off during his father's reign. In May 1883 he sent
a mission to Europe, ostensibly to collect information about industry
and science. When it arrived in Paris the British government learnt
that the old question of the import of arms had a^n been raised.

Tl« GtS.IJKN5 PALACE, NANftAlAY

The British ambassador was accordingly instructed to ask Jules
Ferry for a guarantee that in the event of a Franco-Burmese treaty
being concluded no facilities would be granted for the purchase of
arms. He gave full assurances.

ITie Burmese mifision, however, remained in Paris, and as the
months passed by British suspicions mounted. Again and again the
British ambassador sought from Ferry a clarification of the situation.
After a long period of fencing Ferry at lost admitted, in July 1884,
that the Burmese wanted nothing less than a full political alliance,
together with facilities for the purchase of arms. He promised,
however, that no such alliance would he concluded.

In the following January, since the Burmese mission was still in
Paris, the British ambassador again saw Ferry. He said that the
Burinese were causing such difficulties for the Government of India
that should Britain be compelled to use force to bring the Court of
Ava to a due regard for its obligations it would be most unfortunate if a
treaty between Burma and 1 'ranee were the cause for such action.
Ferry replied that a purely commercial treaty bad just been agreed to,
but it contained no political or military commitments. • A French

ELROFEJIN TERJltTORlAL EXPANSION

PT; rtt

55 ^

he st^jcLt ^va!s to be staiitined at ^MandalaVi but his exac^t powers
had not yet been settled. He assured the ambassador that the treaty
was a vtry hamdess affair.

I'he announceTTient in no way allayed British suspicions^ !n May
1885 Frederic Haas arrived in Mandalay to a^ume his duties as
consuL It soon became clear that very extensive concessions^ damaging
to British interests, had been agreed to* and that even more were in
the air. In July the Secretaii' of State for India cabled to the vice¬
roy that under the terms of the treaty' the French w'ere to establish
a bank at Mandalay and to finance the construction of a railway from
Mandalay 10 Tonngoo in British Burma. Meanwhile Haas was urging
Thiba^v to improve his relations with the British and receive again a
British Resident, 'fhen, under the cloak of better relations, he
should negotiate treaties with France* Germany and Italy, proclaiming
his kingdom to be neutral territori% This advice, hoW'ever, W'as
rejected.

Meanwhile rumour had become very active. The French, it was
said, were negotiating to take over the management of the royal
monopolies^ contriil the postal system, run river steamers in com¬
petition with the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company, obtain a lease of the
ruby mines, and open up overland irade with Tongking. But the
climax was reached at the beginning of August, w^hen the text of a
secret letter, handed by Ferry to the Burmese envoy when the treaty
had been signed in Paris in the prcviotis January, leaked out. It
contatned a guarded promise that as soon as peace and order should
be restored in Tongking arms and military stores of all kinds would
be delivered to Burma through that country.

When this dramatic disclosure w^as made Ferry was no longer in
power; a revulsion of feeling against his rash policy had forced his
resignation in the previous March, France was up against great
difiicultica in Tongking and had wars with China and in Madagascar
on her hands. Hence w'hen Lord Salisbury confronted the French
ambassador in London with a copy of Ferry's secret letter and told
him plainly that Britain would not agree to the proposed French
concessions in Burma the French government repudiated ail Haas's
acts and in October removed him from his post.

When that happened T'hihaWp on the strength of his agreement with
France, was fully committed to a course of action against a British firm
w^hich ivas bound to bring hia relations with the British governmenl
to a crisis. 'Fhe Bombay Burmah Trading Corporarion, with its chief
office and timber mills in Rangoon, had for many years worked the

fll. 33 THK LAST DAYS OF THE KOSBAVN^ DYNASTY 553

Ningjan teak forests north of 'I'oungoo and somewhat beyond the
British*Burma frontier, under a contract with the Mandday govern¬
ment, Karly in his reign, under severe financial stress, 1 hibaw had
adopted the expedient of squeezing the corporation for higher pay¬
ments. New- contracts, involving substantially higher payments, were
made tn 1880, iSSa and 1SS3, and inevitably caused a certain amount
of confusion. This made it easy for the Court of Ava tn trump up a c^
against the corporation. It was accused of extracting more than twice
the number of logs paid for, of bribing the local officials, and of
failing to pay its Burmese foresters their due amount. The Toungoo
Forest Office was ivilling for its records to be examined and to produce
the acquittances signed by Us employees.

I'he case came before the Hlutdaw, which, on the information that
a French syndicate was being formed to take over the forests if the
corporation were evicted, proceeded to give an ex parte judgement
that it had defrauded the king of the equivalent in English money of
^73.333 and the foresters of £33.333- The corporation was accord¬
ingly fined double the amount of the first sum and ordered to pay the
second to the foresters, [n default the corporatipn’s timber in the
Ningyan forests was to be seized- The case was a false one; its object
was not to secure justice, and no real attempt was made to sift the

evidence. , u - - t.

The Hlutdaw’s decision tvas published in August 1885. I he Bntfsn

government at once asked the Court of Ava to submit tht matter to
arbitration. No reply was received from Mandalay until the middle of
October, when, still hoping for French support, the Burmese govern¬
ment summarily rejected the proposal. For some years the Military
Department at Calcutta had had a plan ready for the invasion of Upper
Burma should the need arise, 'Fhe governor-general. Lord Dufferin,
ihereforc was in a position to deliver an ultimatum to the Court of Ava.
It was received on 30 October and was due to expire on 10 November,
The Court of Ava was caught completely unprepared. 'Fhe king wnt
a blustering reply, refusing to reopen the case against the corporation,
but stating that if the British government wished to reappoint an
agent he might 'come and gn as in former times’. '1 o the demand in
the ultimatum that he must place the external relations of his govern¬
ment under the control of the Government of India, as in the case of
\fghanistan, he made the uncompromising reply that ' friendly rc-
lutlons with France, Italy and other states have been, arc being, and
will be maintained’.

This was taken as a rejection of the British terms, and the army was

ordered to march on Mandalay, Operations began on 14 November,
and a fortnight later, after an almost bloodtesa campaign, Mandalay
was occupied and I’hibaw surrendered, Burma neither threatened
nor was prepared for war, and it has been argued that French dif¬
ficulties in Tongking presented Britain with a heaven-sent opportunity
to clinch mattem with Thibaw. But in view of the French rivalrv with
Britain for supremacy in the Indo-Chinese peninsula, which wa^ soon
to develop to a further stage, involving the v'alJcys of the upper Mek¬
ong and the Mcnam, the British action, in FumivalJ's judgement,
can best be Justified as removing at an opportune moment a potential
«usc of a European war*. The refusal to reopen the Bombay Burmah
Corporation case was, in all the circumstances, a sufficient fdifiif Mii
but the challenging assertion that friendly relations with France, Italy
and other states ' have been, are being, and will be maintained’, could
be met by no other reply than a showdown.

With the king gone the fate of his yngdom remained to be settled.
A provisional government headed by a Council of State composed of
thirteen ministers was first set up under General Prendergast, the
^mmander-in-chief of the army of occupation. The Government of
India would have preferred to place the countiy under a protectorate,
with an approved member of the royal family on the throne. But there

*■

i'll. 33. THE LAST HATS OF THE KONBAHNO DYHASTT 55 ?

was no suitable candidate. Hence on i January tS8(i a proclamation
was issued annexing the tctritories fonnerly governed by King
Thibaw' to the British dominions. After a further consultation, in
February 1&S6 it was decided that the annexed territory should be
directly administered. Burma therefore was united as a province of
British India, with Sir Charles Bernard as its Chief Commissioner.

CHAPTER 34

VIETNAM AND THE BEGINNINGS OF FRENCH
EXPANSION IN INDO-CHINA,

Prince Canh, the eldest son of the Emperor Gia^Long, who had
accompanied Ptgneau de Behatne to the Court of Versailles, died in
1801. His brother, Minh-Mang, who succeeded to the throne in 1820,
hated the 'barbarians from the West'. He refused to conclude a
commercial treaty with France, or even to receive the letter on the
subject which Louis XVI11 sent him in 1825. Three French attempts
to renew commercial relations with his country were made during his
reign: by Bougainville in (825, by dc Ker^n'ou in 1827. and by
Admiral L.ap!ace in i8ji. All were unceremoniously rejected. In
1826 he refused to.recetve a French consul and broke official relations
with France,

When he died Gia^Long had enjoined upon his successor that there
Was to be no persecution of the three religions established in his
empire—Confucianism, Buddhism, and Christianity. Minh-Mang,
however, was a strict Confucian and an admirer of Chinese culture
He revived the eighteenth-century Nguyen policy of persecuting
Christianity. I’herc was much opposition among the mandarins to
this rciersal of his father's policy. Many of them had been friends of
the Great Master, as they called Pigneau, and Lc Van-Duyet, the Gov¬
ernor of Cochin China, once Grand Eunuch in Gia-Long 's palace, was
courageous enough to write a letter of protest to the emperor. ‘W'c
still have between our teeth’, he wrote, ‘the rice which the mission¬
aries gave us when we were staning.’ His firm .stand was successful;
the emperor held his hand so far as the sis southern provinces were
concerned. But Le Van-Duyet died in 1833, and in the following vear
an edict was issued for a general persecution of Christians, Le Van-
Duyet's tomb was even desecrated at Minh-Mang’s orders. This
outrage provoked a revolt at Gia-dinh. It was crueily repressed and
several missionaries were actually put to death.

I owardsthe end of his life Mtnh-Mang seems to have changed his
mind regarding the European question and to have sought ways and
means of establishing contacts with European slates. In November

556

Cll. 34 VIFTNAM AND THE OF FRENCH EXPANSION 557

183^ war had broken out between Britain and China^ and it may be
that the British occupation of Cbusan and their attack on the Taku
forts at the mouth of the Pei river made him realize that his rigid
isolationist attitude might have dangerous consequences. But he died
in januarv'^ ^nd his successor. Thitu-Tri (1841-7)^ revived the

policy of persecution with even greater rigour. He was a man of less
intelligence than hla father and failed to realize that the British acqui¬
sition of Hong Kong in the very month of his accession, and the opening
up of five Chinese pons to European trade, had introduced a new era
in the Far East. The French were no longer willing to submit to the
treatment meted out to their missionaries and traders by Minh-Mang.

'Thus in Februar)' 1843, when five missionaries were awaiting death
in a Hue pristiii^ a corvette^ the under Commandant Leveque,

suddenLv appeared before Tourane, in the name of Admiral Cecile,
the commander of the I’rench naval division in the China Sea,
demanded^ and obtained, their release. And in the same year the
Aianent^ delivered yet another condemned missionary. Fhese actions
were symptomatic of a new attitude on the pan of the European
nations and the United States of America that was causing a growing
demand for eslra-territorial rights. In- 1844* inslancep the U.S.A.
obtained such rights for its residents in China under the Treaty of
Wanghsiap and in the same year by the Treat)' of hampoa France
secured from China toleration for Catholics,

In 1845 .\dniiral Cecile again intencned at Tourane. this time to
force the release of Mgr. LefevTCi the Bishop .Apostolic of the w'estern
part of Cochin China. Again the emperor gave way> under threat
of the bombardmern of the city. The bishop was taken to Singapore,
where he managed to persuade the master of a Cochin-Chinese ship
to smuggle him back into the country'. The Straits Settlements
Records contain an interesting document^ account of the

sequel to thia rash adventure *pour rhonneur de son pays\ as one
French account describes it,"

Governor Butterworth. tn a letter of 1 j March 1847^ reported to the
Government of India that trading vessels coming from Cochin China
had brought notice of new stringent regulations against foreigners
ihere, and that he told the mandarin in charge of them that "the
English sovereign would be displeased", if they were put m force
against British subjects. ' I’he mandarin', he contmued, 'at once gave
me to understand that the regulations originated in the visit to Turon

^ CitiVtffnor'f Leltrrt to R. J 4 . *3 Matdi iS47‘

* Gkiy Chajlck Un Sii(U d"EpJ3j*/t in p. 63 .

mRQPEWi TERRITOHIAL EXPANSION

FT, rij

sss

Bay of the AmeHcan ship Constfiutwa^ when that vessel fir^d upon the
town and destroyed scvciaJ of the inhabitants, because the demand of
her commander to have a French missionary bishop, then in prison,
given up to him, was not complied with. And that the restrictions in
question must be \ievved as a bit of polity on the part of the king, who
was anxious to show hh subjects that the insult otfered to him had
not been passed over with impunity. In proof of this he gave me a
letter from the Chief Mandarin in charge of the Marine Department
. . . intimating that he had sent, and wished to hand over to me^ the
very bishop above referred to^ who had again made his way to Cochin
China, after being released from prison by a French ship sent for the
purpose*'

'Fhe governor then went on to say that Bkhap Lefevre had called to
aee him^ *as he had done about one year sinoe^ on his release from the
Cochin Chinese prison as previously mentioned', and that he had
forbidden him 'from any further movement towards Cochin China,
more especially as the unfortunate Naquodah^^ w'ho took the bishop
back to that country on the last occasion, had his head chopped off,
and every other C^hin Chinese on board was sent into confinement
with hard labour'* 'But\ he commented, * these Jesuits are little
scrupulous about the means so long as they effect the end in view, and
1 must add that they are not sparing of themselves/ He was, how ever,
of opinion that on this occasion the bishop would not find a boat lo
convey him back to Cochin China.

In that year 1847 France attempted to force Thieu-Tri to climb
down by staging another naval demonstration at Tourane. Comman¬
dant Lapierre, with the GfnVeand the Victmeusef came with a demand
in the name of the French government for guarantees for the safety of
French nationats* 1 'hieu^Tri kept him waiting a month for an answer.
During that time he assembled a large body of troops at Tourane on
the pretext of paying honour to the envoys of France. He invited the
officers of the two ships to an entertainment, where they were to be
assassinated. I heir vessels 'ivere then to be completely destroyed hy
burning. When the invitation was refused the Vietnamese vessels in
the port attacked the two ships and tried to set them on fire. In the
fight w'hich ensued the French ships destroyed a large number of junks
and othpr vessels and then sailed awayH

It was under Thieu-Tri *a son and successor, l*u-Duc (1848-83),
that matters came finally to 3 head. A pious and learned Confucian,
he was even more devoted than his predecessors to the ideal of sealing

* Ship'i imiuf.

CH, 3+ V irrNAW /LMi TII^ BECINNINCS tw FKtNCIi l;XPA>rS10N 559

up his country against all European influtncep At firsts however^ Ke
hcsitatctl before carrying out the policy of violence urged upon him
by his mother and the literati but frowned on by two of hi^ most
influential servants, ihe Governors of 'longking and Cochin China.
Finally he decided to take the plunge and issued edicts for the dis¬
persal of ail Chnstian communiticfit the destruction of their villages,
and the redistribution of their lands. Men were to be separated from
women* and each person was to be branded on the left cheek with the
character ' Ta Dao^ (infidel) and on the right with the name of the
district to which he or she was banished^ Many thousands died of the
treatment they received*

At the same time he turned on the European missionaries. In
1S51-3: two French priests %verc pul to deaths AI. de Montigny* the
French consul to the governments of Siam and Cambodia, was there¬
upon ordered to proceed to Hue and lodge a verj' strong protest.
When this w^as rejected another French warship, the Catmaij bom¬
barded the forts at Tourane.

This stiffer attitude towards Europeans coincided with a similar
move in China, where Britain, France and the Ujiited States were
making a concerted effort to obtain a revision of treaties. It was the
period when Coimnissioner Yeh Ming-shen of Canton W'as flouting
every^ attempt at negotiation and encouraging acts of violence against
Europeans. There can be no doubt that Tu-Duc took hi& cue from
China and was too simple-minded to realiice that the consequences
for his country w ould be far more serious than those of the blustering
Yeh's exhortations to exterminate the Engli&b devils for China. In
1856 a French Catholic missionary was tortured and killed for alleged
complicity in a rebcUious society in Kwangsi province. Minh-Mang's
victims had been executed on a similar charge, une may note in passing.
In 1857 Tu-Duc had the Spanish Bishop of Tongking^ Mgr. Dias:,
put to death.

It was a piece of crass stupidity^ France under the 'Fhird Empire
was looking for a pretext for sei^diiig territory' in Annam. She already
had a strong naval squadron in Chinese waters which, as a result of
the murder of her missionary in 1856, wa$ co-operating w'^ith the
British against Commissioner Yeh of Canton. Spain had a base nearby
in ihc Philippines and was anxious to join with France in dealing
with Annam.

In 1857 for the second rime de Monttgny ivas sent to Hue, He
presented three demands to ^Fu-Dut: (0 guarantee of religious
liberty fur Christians, (2) permission to establish a French commercial

5^ EUROPEAT* TERRITORIAL EXPANSION pj. in

agenc>- at Hue, and (3) sanction for the appointment of a French
consuJ there. His terms were sullenly rejected. In any case his mission
iN'as sent merely to justify action that France had already decided on.
As soon as Canton had been seized by the Anglo-French task force
early in 1858 and the Treaty of Tientsin wrung out of China in June
of that year, a Franco-Spanlsh force under .\dnurd] Rigault dc
Genouilly made its way 10 Tourane. It arrived there on 31 August
1S5S. The forts were soon put out of action and a small occupation
force was landed.

Then difficulties began to pile up. The .Annamites in evacuating
Tourane had stripped it of everything. Supplies were unobtainable.
Sickness began to take serious toll of the garrison. It was too w'eak to
attack Hue. After considering the feasibility of a demonstration in
Tongking the admiral decided to seize Saigon, the granary of Annam.
Tourane accordingly was evacuated, and in February (859 Saigon was
captured.

Further large-scale operations ivere then held up by the resumption
of hosdlUiesinChina, which culminated in the occupation of Peking by
an Anglo-French army in October 1860, Meanw hile in November 1859
Rigault de Genouilly was replaced by .Admiral Page who had received
instructions to negotiate with Tu-Duc, 'I’hc original demands were
HOW' increased. There were to be French consuls in three parts of the
Vietnamese empire and a charge d’affaires at Hue. Tu-Duc tried
delaying tactics, whereupon Page proceeded to Tourane and des¬
troyed some more forts. Hr had. however, to go on to assist the
French torces in China, leaving a Franco-Spaniah garrison of less
than 1.000 men at Saigon, For nearly a year ^March iS6o-Pebnjary
i 85 i) the small garrison had to hold out unaided against a besieging
force of 12,000 Vietnamese.

The China war ended in January x86t. and at once .Admiral
Charner, with a strong naval squadron and 3,000 troops, left for
Saigon. On 25 February, at the battle of Cbi-hoa, he defeated the
besiegers and relieved the chy. This was followed in April by the
capture of Mi-tho. Then followed the occupation of Gia-dinh,
Thu-dau-mot and part of the provinces of Bien-hoa aud Go-cong.
In November 1861 Admiral Bonard took over from Charner and in
a few months had made himself master of the whole of I,owcr Cochin
China, together with Pulo Condore and all the small islands at the
entrances to the Mekong delta.

In .May 1862 Tu-Duc sent tw'o envoys to ask for terms. 'I’he
emperor, they explained, was involved in difliculties in IVmgking

Oir. 34 VihTTSAM AND TltK BKfJINNINGS OF FKENCIi FAfAKiiilOM 561

and wlshtd tti end the struggle in the south. In the follovfing month
a draft treaty was sigftcd at Saigon by which Tu-Duc ceded to France
three eastern ptos'inocs of Cochin China and agreed to pay a heaty
indemnity in instalments over ten years. He promised the free
exercise of the Catholic religion in his dominions and to open the
porta of Tourane, Balat and Kuaiig-.A.n to French trade.

There was considerable delay in obtaining the ratiheation of the
treaty by the Emperor Xapolcon Ill, since the ship carrying the
delegates to France was held up by a severe storm. In the meantime
Bonard committed the error of replacing the French Residents,
appointed by his predecessor to super\'ise the native administration
in each province, by Vietnamese mandarins. The result was a crop
of rebellions everywhere in December 1S62. Hence, when the treaty
signed by Napoleon IIt arrived from Paris Tu-Duc at first refused
to add his ow'n ratification, and Bonard, who had taken the documents
to Hue for its final confirmation, only secured it by threatening to
send French aid to the rebels in Tongkitig.

When the next admiral-governor, Lagrandiere, took over the new
colony in 1863 the situation was perilous in the cipttcme. One rebel
leader terrorized the province of Bten-hoa^ another held the Cambodian
frontier. Moreover, Tu-Duc, before ratifying the treaty, had already
sent the mandarin who negotiated it, Phan Thanh-Gian, to Paris
to plead for the restoration of the ceded territory in return for an
increased indemnity. In France herself there was growing opposition
to the poUcy of colonial expansion, while the supporters of the Mexican
adventure wanted Indo-China to be abandoned in favour of their pet
scheme. Even Napoleon Ill himself cherished grave doubts of the
wisdom of the Far Eastern project. He was won over to it by the
unyielding attitude of the Ministre de la Marine, Comte de Chasse-
loup-Laubat, who threatened to resign if Cochin China were re¬
linquished, and by the clumsy attempts of Tu-Duc to evade the
commitments he had undertaken.

While Rear-Admiral Lagrandiere was engaged on the task of
restoring order in his three provinces and settling their adminis¬
tration a further important advance in French influence in Indo-
China occurred. King Norodom of Cambodia, who had come to the
throne in 1S60, had run into serious difficulties in 1861, when his
youngest brother. Si Voiha. revolted and forced him to take refuge
at Battambang. For many years, as we have seen, Cambodia had
maintained an uneasy existence betw'een her two more powerful
neighbours, Siam and Vietnam, Her kings had attempted to maintain

562 F.IIROPFAN TERHITOPIAL EXPAN'SK^S PT. 11 J

some semblance of independenct^ by paying homage and tribute
to both Sides. But there were constant dynastic squabbles which
invited intervention.

On this occasion the refugee king made his way to Bangkok, seeking
for armed support with which to regain his throne. His application
was supported by Mgr. Miche, Vicar ApostoUc of Cambodia^ who
wrote to the French consul at Bangkok to approach the Siamese
government in the matter, 'fhe Siamese government sent Norodom
back to Kampot in a atcamerp and in March 1862 he re-entered bis
capital. Mgr. Michels dtmar^he was frow'ned on by the French
authontie$. Their great aim now w^as for France to assume the role
of * protector' of Cambodia. Luckily Siam did not supply armed
forces, I'he situation in Cambodia permitted Norodom to return
peaceably. The rebels were badly led^ and the king's second brother
soon had the situation well in hand.^ A French gunboat also, which
Admiral Chamer despatched to Phnom Penh to protect French
missionaries therc^ had helped in bringing about the discomfiture
of the rebels, for they took its appearance to indicate French support
for the royal cause.

Interest in the Cambodian situation had been shown by Chamer
os early as March 1861, when he sent one of his officers 10 tell Noro¬
dom that France had decided permanently to occupy Cochin China
and W'os anxious to help Cambodia to maintain her freedom. I he
king in reply had told the envoy that hh kingdom owed its continued
existence to the Siamese, who had saved it from Vietnamese domin^
ante. Notw'ithstanding the king's assurances that in his relations with
Siam he was a free man, it appeared that the latter kept a tight hold
over him by maintaining a Resident at his capital.

in September i86z Bonard himself paid Norodom a visit and
suggested that through conquering Cochin China France considered
that she now had a right to the tribute he had preriously paid to Hue.
France* it seemed^ was much more concerned with preying her claims
than with saf^uarding the independence of Cambodia, fn April
1S53 Bonard took a decisive step towards the establishment of French
influence there by sending a naval lieutenant, Doudart de Lagree, as
Resident, lie instructed turn to make a geographical survey of the
countryj- and to establish close contacts with the king. The new^
Resident reported to Saigon that the King of Siam was more pow erful
in Oudong than the King of Cambodia himselL

ThU news caused Bonard's successor^ Lagrandjcre* to decide that
any further delay would give Siam time sdit further to strengthen

r]l. 34 VIETNAM ANh THE bSEKlXSlNCS OE PKENt lf F.XFAN^10N 565

htT hold on Cambodia. Accordingly in July 1863 he paid a p^r^onal
visit to Norodom at Oudong and offered him Frcticb protection in
order to safeguard hh indepefidence again^ Siam. The king hesitated.
He wclcoined the offer of French help, for his position was still
perilous in the cjttreme. He distrusted his brother Ang Sor, who had
defeated the rebels during his absence. He also feared lest the agitator
Po KombOp who was gis-ing the French trouble on his frontier^ might
attempt to seize the crown from him. But howr would he stand if he
threw over both Siam and Vietnam for France» and the French tvere
then to evacuate Cochin China? Lagrandi^^re. howeveri overcame
his semples on this point and he was persuaded to sign a treaty
placing his kingdom under French protection.

The treaty was at once despatched to Paris for Napoleon IITs
signature. Then the mevitable difGcultics arose. The French
Minister of Foreign Affairs hesitated to advise ratification; Siam, sup¬
ported by Britain, had raised the objection that, since Cambodia w^as her
vassal state, communications between Norodom and the French could
only be made through her as the intermediary. And wrhilc the matier
was undecided the Siamese Resident at Oudong^prevailfid upon the
w'eak king to sign a document not merely recognizing his vassalage
to Siam hut asserting that his true title should be * Viceroy of Cam-
bodia^ In return the King of Siam announced that he proposed lo
go himself to superintend Norodom's coronation and receive his
homage. As much of the regalia, including the sacred sword, which
was used in the ceremony, had been left in Siamese safe-keeping by
Norodom when he returned home after his fiighl to Bangkok, the
position was indeed delicate. But Lagrandiire declared that the
action proposed by the King of Siam constituted a new claim to
sovereignty which had no justificatianH King Mongkut therefore
compromised by insisting that Norodom should go personally to
Bangkok to receive his crowTi.

Norodom decided on 3 March 1864 as the date of his departure for
Bangkok. Doudart de Lagree, on hearing of this decision, threatened to
take possession of the capital by force and sent off in haste to Saigon
for reinforcements- And when, in spite of this, Norodom started on hijj
way French marines occupied the royal palace at Oudong and hoisted
the tricolour, "^I'he distracted King changed his mind and«returncd.
He found the treaty establishing a French protectorate over his
kingdom awaiting him on his return, duly signed by the Emperor
Napoleon, '['here w-as nothing to be done but accept the inevitable^
and on *7 April 1S64 the ratifications were completed.

tCROl'EAN FXPASSION

KF. IK

5fj4

King Mttngkut* pressed by the French govemmem to restore the
insignia to Cambodiii, agreed to do $0 on contliuon that Norodom
should he crowned by the rcprescntaiives of Siam and France, Admiral
Lagrandierc accepted the condkion, and on 3 June 1864 the ceremony
took place. Doudart de I^-agTce^ however, refused to allow the Siamese
delegate to place the crown on the kingV hcad^ and on the following
day the Siamese departed home, but not before he had made a formal
statement of his king's claims to suzerainty over Cambodia and to the
possession of her two westerly provinces of Bat tarn bang and Angkor.
A few months later Norodom paid a state %'i$it to Saigon, where he
was received by Admiral Lagrandiere, Then in April 1865 he went
to Kampot to fulfil a promise he had made to pay homage to
Mongkiii. Such is Maapero's explanation of the incident*^ Leclcre,
however, says that he went there in response to an invitation from
Mongkut to a conference^ Doudart de Lagree, having failed to
persuade him to reject the invitation, accompanied him. *rhe King
of Siam did not turn up.

Meanwhile negotiations \verein progress between Paris and Bangkok
on the vexed question of the status of Cambodia, They ended in 1867
in a treaty whereby, in return for the surrender by Siam of all rights
to stizerainiy over the kingdom, France, on behalf of Cambodia,
abandoned claims to the provinces of Battambahg and Angkor,
usually known in modern times as Siemreap, which, according to the
French interpretation of Cambodian hjstor>^ Siam had held * irregu¬
larly' since 1795* Norodom, w^ho had not been consulted, protested
in vain^ The French at the time considered it a good bargain.

Jn 1866 the priest-^pretender* who had for long disturbed the
border between Cambodia and Cochin China, had gained enough
support to make a bid for the throne. The name he took, Pu Kombo,
was that of a prince of the Cambodian royal family who had died a
few hours after birth. His imposture attracted wide support. He
collected a large harem, pul to death the Governors uf Kratie and
Sambor when they refused allegiance^ and fortified himself at the
village of Choeuteal-phlos in the province of Kanhehor. In June
1866 he defeated a royal army at Ba-phnom, but was himself sub¬
sequently defeated. I'hen for many months he played hide-and-scek
with both the Cambodian and French forces sent against him. Every
time I hey defeated him he disappeared, only to reappear a few' weeks
later and carry on a fresh struggle, until at last in December 1867 he

^ l.'lndocltint^ vdI. l4$<

CH. 34 Vr£T^"AM ASB THE BHGINSJNGS OF FRENCH EXFANiiaN 565

vva$ caught ajid killed by the inhabitanu of Konipoiig-thoiiiT where
he had taken refuge.

While this quite senou5t resistance movement was in pto^ttss in
Cambodia the French had their handa full with the same kind of unrest
in Cochin China. . 4 rmcd hands came over from the regions of Go-
cong and the Plaine des Jones into French territory and terroris^ed
the population. The Court of Hue attempted to alky French sus¬
picions of its complicity by appointing Phan Thanh-Gian, the ambaa-
sador to Napoleon III in as viceroy of the three province of

western Cochin China, but there was no improvement in ihe shuation,
and in June 1866 Admiral Lagrandi^re decided to take possession of
them, Within a week, 17-74 June, his troops occupied in suceessiDn
Vinh-lotig, Chau-doc a.nd Ha-tien. 'The population received tis
without fear and without repugnance\ records Georges Maspero.^
The viceroy committed suicide-

The French were now well act for building up a new empire in
Indn-China. The next big move^ undertaken while they were settling
the administration of the territories under their contrul, was 10 e?tpIore
the course of the river Mekong. Hardly anything was known of it
save that it flowed down from Tibet. Possession of its delta was a
challenge to the French to rival the British, who occupied the delta
of the Irtawaddy, in a race for the trade of western China. Phayrek
mission to the Court of Mindon Min in 1S55 had had as one of its
aims that of persuading the king to permit trans-Burma trade with
China. The development of a short cut to China by an overland route
to Yunnan had interested the Dutch in the seventeenth century. But
van Wuysthoff^s teport on the Mekong, and Burma's refusal of trading
facilities at Bhamo^ had killed the project. The British had become
interested in fhe idea at the time of the First Burmese War^ and
surveys had been made from Assam in the north and Moulmein in
the south, though without success,’

Min don was at first positively opposed to the scheme. But the
immense pressure exerted by the textile industry in Britain from about
1860^ led 10 further efforts by Phayreand his successor, Major-General
Albert Fyiche, which'resulted in the establishment of a British Agent
at Bhamo in [S6B and further attempts to find a suitable trade route
into China. The agitation that finally moved the French airfhorities

* Op. iiu h p-

* J. Chnatian, Burmat, rjJ.

* Stf< Qn thb point Clement Willianu^ Thrmigh Burma io GhiHUt. itof^

c/ ujfrurnry in fhe practirMify of a iradr rmir thr

and fht London, iSfrS.

566

EUROPEAN TEHRfTOIlIAL EXPANSION

Pt. lit

in Saigon to $tnd a surveying expedition up the Mekong In 1866 was
largely the work of a young naval officer, Francis Gamier, who had
served on Admiral Chanter's staff in the China war and afterwards
at the relief of Saigon, and in 1863 district officer in charge of

Choleni a suburb of Saigon. He w^as inspired by two equally powerful
emotions^ a pa^ionate desire to explore the unknown and a burning
hatred of Britain ai^ a colonizing powder—the colossus with rotten feet,
as he described her. ' Shake her and she will fall/* As he tvas con¬
sidered too young to be entrusted with command of the expedition,
it was vested in Doudait de Lagree.

The expedition, composed of ten Frenchmen and a number of native
interpreters^ left Saigon on 5 June- On leaving Cambodian territory
it was held up by the need for Siamese passes and money% and spent
the time studying the ruins of Angkor, with which Doudart de Lagrce
had become familiar during his &er\'ice at Oudong Thdr exi$tence
had been discxivered by a Catholic missionary in 1570, but although
the word "Onco* appears in a number of sevenleenth^enturj' maps
it was the French naturalist and photographer Henri Mouhot who
for the first time drew the attention of the West to their importance
in an account of his travels published in the Tour du Monde in 1863.“
His account of them* hoviTver, was that of an amateur enthusiast.
It was Doudait de Lagrce*s mission which gave the earliest exact
data, and this was published in Francis Gamier'a book in 1873.

After leaving Angkor the expedition proceeded slowly upstream to
the ruins of the city of Vientiane, which were found lo be completely
overgrown with jungle- Then on to Luang Prabang and the nearby
village of Ban Naphao^ where Mouhol had died five years earlier and
was buried. King Tiantha Koumane treated the members of the
mission well* but warned them against pushing on into Yunnan
because of the disorders there caused by the Panthay rebellion. He
had paid no tribute to China since the revolt had begun in 1S55 on the
grounds that the roads were impassahlen and on that account alone was
anxious that the French travellers should not demonstrate the thinness
of his pretext.

But at this stage no warnings could relieve Gamier uf the obsession
that he describes as *la monomanie du Mekong*, and he persuaded
Doudan" de I-agree to push on into Chinese territory* I'here his

^ ^ Sir HurU Cliffnrd, Ftifihr^r IndiOf p. r 3 J r CliiFord nivn k nicilurMq Me ■.cc^iunt of
hb aubitcquenf Hb own Kcchunr of i E is Entitled I tt*Explumtioa fn

Indo-Ckituf, ^relui pttidfiHt fa anjt^ei tdfiS, £l taSiS, fic., i voli., F«ru, 1S73.

^ ,\ year liter publiabni, in Hn^lbh, Trarih m t/i£ Crwir^/ Partt 1^ Indo^Cfrt»U
(7<3rnbodiii xtnd ditrins 3 toJs., l.oTkJiin, j!i&4.

cir. 34 vit-rxAAi and the beginnings of frencji expansion 567

leader died, worn out by the fatigue and depnvatiofks of the journey.
And when the expedition, now directed fay Gamier himself^ arrived at
Talifu the Chinese authorities courteously but firmly refused to allow
it to proceed further. Gamier had, willy-nillyi to renounce his am¬
bition of exploring the sources of the Mekong. It was obvious, too,
that the river was utterly useless as a trade route connecting Saigon
With Yunnan. That dream was shattered^

A new one^ howeverp began to fornii which was to have a notable
influence upon the policy of the Third Republic* Gamier and his
companions made their way across the Vunnan plateau and down to
the Yang“tse, where they procured boats and quickly made their w^y
* down to Hankow* They had left Tdifu on 4 March 1868, They
arrived at Hankow on 27 May- Iti Yunnan they acquired from Chinese
mandarins and French missionaries most \aluable information con¬
cerning the waterways w^hich linked that province with the Red River
of Tongktng, French interest, therefore, in the approach to w'estern
China w’as transferred from the Mekong to Tongking. And the
Franco-Prussian War of i87<3-i forms a convenient dividing line
between two quite distinct phases in French expansion in the Far
Hast*

CilAPTEK 35

THE SECOND STAGE OF FRENCH EXPANSION
IN INDO-CHINA, 1870^1900

In May 1868, when he was at tiankow on his rccum journey from
Yunnan-fup Francis Gamier met a French merchant Jean Diipub*
The discoveries made by the Doudait de Lagree-Gamier mUsion
interested Dupuis in the possibility of opening up a trade route into
Yunnan by means of the Red River (Song-Koih and he seems almost
immediately to have set out for Yunnan. During 1868-9 in the

protHnect but^ as in Gamicros case, the disturbed state of the country'
consequent upon the Panthay rebellion (1855-73) prevented him from
going beyond Yunnan-fu, In February 1871 he left Yunnan-fu for
tlanoi in order to carry out a contract to supply the Chinese army in
Yunnan with arms and ammunition. Proceeding southw^ards, he
struck the Song-koi at Mang-hao, and from there managed to navigate
it to the sea*

In the folJowing year^ notwithstanding much opposition from the
Tongklng mandarins and the difHcuJties of the route, he delivered his
cargo of military stores to the Yunnan government. Then he pur¬
chased a cargo of tin and copper at Yunnan-sen for sale in Hanoi and
undertook to bring back a return one of salt from that city. Salt, how¬
ever, was a monopoly of the mandarins, and they refused to let him
have any. Thereupon Dupuis and his followers, a mixed collection of
Chinese and Filipinos^ proceeded to occupy a part of the city by force
and appealed 10 Saigon for help. The Court of Hue also appealed to
Saigon; it claimed that the presence of Dupuis in Tongking was
contrary to existing treaty arrangements with France and requested
Admiral Dupr^p the Governor of Cochin China, to put a stop to his
activities.

Tongklng was at the time in a deplorable state^ After the 'f ^ai
P*mg vebellion (1850-64)* which had caused devaBtation over vast
areas of China, especjally in the south, where anti-Manchu sentiment
Was strongest, bands of rebels had escaped over the border into
northern Tongking and were making a living by terroriising the local
population. The Emperor Tu-Duc, quite unable to cope with them,

J<i8

CH, THE SECONIJ STAGE OP FRENCH E^Ct^ANSlON 569

Kad called on the \'iceroy of C'anton for help, and the latter had sent
regular troops, who* instead of carrying out their task, had joined with
the msurgencs in ihe game of pillage, AH these robber bands, whether
regulars or irregulars, came to be known to the French as the Black
Flags, Admiral Dupre saw' in this staie of affairs an admirable
opportunir)^ for inter^entionp and Dupuis's grievance as a heaven-sent
excuse. He asked hia government for a free hand, but was told to
avoid armed intervention, Nevertheless he sent the impulsive Francis
Gamier to Hanoi with a small force of iSS French and 24 Cochin
Chinese troops, and instructions to arbitrate between Dupuis and the
mandarins.

Gamier arrived on 5 November 1873. His attempt at arbitration
lasted only a few days. Finding the mandarins obdurate, he issued a
proclamation declaring the Song-koi open to general commerce*
'Fhis unwarranted action goaded them into making militarv' pre¬
parations, to which Gamier replied on ^o November by seizing the
citadel by assault. His reckless audacity succeeded so well that with
the additional volunteers he enrolled he was able to gain possession of
five atronghold$, including Hai-phong and Ninh-binh, and to control
the administration of Lower Tongking^ The Court of Hue was now
ready to negotiate, but the mandarins of Hanoi called on the Black
Flags for assistance. They appeared before the city on 21 December
1S73, and Gamier svas killed'w'hile heading a sortie against them. He
had impetuously rushed so far ahead of his men that he was ambushed
and killed before they could reach him^

Had he Jived the French conquest of Tongking would have begun
ten years earlier than it did, for he went there determined to force
France's hand. Her prestige had become dangerously low^ in Asia as a
result of her o%'envhclming defeat in the Prussian war of 1870-1, and
men sueh as Gamier believed that the best way to revive it was to re¬
start the movement of expansion that had been interrupted by her
debacle in Europe.

The French government, howder, was bound to disavow such a
rash act of war as the seizure of the citadel at Hanoi, and as soon as
he heard of it Admiral Dupre despatched an inspector of native
affairs named Philastre to order Gamier to refrain from further acts of
aggression and to negotiate a settlement with the Court* of Hue.
Philastre had been a personal friend of Gamier*s^ but he had an
immense admiration for Chinese culture and had been no profoundly
shocked by his friend^s coup that he had written to him; mal
est irreparable et pour vous et pour Ic hut que Ton se propose en

EUROPEAN TERRITORIAL EKPANSLON

FT, III

570

France. Vouu vous etes done laisad seduire, tromper, et mener par
CO Dupuis?’^

Phila^strc reached Hanoi on 3 January 1874, and at once ordered
ihe cvacmtion of all iKe forts held by the French- He realized to the
full the blow this would deal to i'rench prestige, but "justice

above all things" was his motto. Dupuis's vessels were sequestrated.
Then Philastre proceeded to negotiate a treaty with Tu-Duc, On 15
March 1874 it was signed at Saigon by Adimml Dupre- I'u-Duc
recognisfed French sovereignty over Cochin China. He agreed to
receive a French Resident at Hue, to open the ports of Qui-nonh,
'Fourane and Hanoi to French trade, and conceded to France the
right to appoint a consul at each with an escort for hi$ protection. The
nas-igation of the Red River was declared free up to Yunnan. Once
again Tu-Duc promised freedom to Christians^ In return for all these
favours France released him from his obligations with regard to the
unpaid balance of the indemnity and agreed to supply him with gun¬
boats^ arras and instructors to enable him to deal more effectively
w^ith the Black Flags. A supplcinentary treaty of commerce tvas also
concluded which granted French vessels and trade more favourable
terms than those of other nationalities and provided for the appointment
of French officers to key positions in the Vietnamese customs semce.

On paper the concessions were considcrabJe^ but in his zeal for
justice Phi last re had overlooked the fact that in Vietnamese eyes his
actions were taken to be a sign of tveakness on the part of France.
I lence soon as the French forces had left 'I ongking Tu-Duc renewed
the persecutions of Christiana, subjected the newr French con^ub to
the greatest indignities, and punished all who had been French
partisans during the Gamier adv^enture. Aforeover, as a counterpoise
to the French threat he moved closer to China, renewing his de¬
claration of allegiance to the emperor and seeking a fresh investiture
as his vassal.

Meanwhile, wilhthe final defeat of the Panthay rebellion in Yunnan,
fresh hordes of refugees, chased out by Chinese armies, were swelling
the numbers of the insurgents in neighbmiring states. Their de¬
predations aifected the Laos states just as much as Tongking. There
were Black Flags, Yellow Flags and Red Flags, besides professional
pirates, vktivecn them they rendered nuU and void the clause of the
1874 treaty declaring the freedom of the navigation of the Red River.

^ Tht Utter u qu<tted in fuJl im C- B. Namun'R r^TflAfn at FraM£4 m tht EtUi, Lon¬
don, 1SS4, pp, 14^-j. For n occount of this prHod *?« Clwge* Mi^prO] (ed.)

t/ Puti* ci , 19JO, vol. i, pp. 150-j and vel. ii, pp. 1-15.

CK. 35 THE EEC 02 SD STAGE OE FRENCH E 3 tPANStON 571

To add to the confllsion^, a revolt against the Nguyen emperor was
stirred up by partisans of the old Le dynaety that had been brought to
an cud in 1^4. Tu-Duc himself played the double game of en¬
couraging banditry as a counterpoise to the French, and of asking for
Chinese aid in suppressing it^ fondly hoping that should France make
a further move she would find herself embroiled with both.

The French were acutely conscious that any move to annex the
remainder of the empire of Vietnam wajs calculated to arouse strong
opposition on the part of China. They felt also that Peking would
resent the clause in Philastre's treaty opening the Red River to
Furopean commerce as constituting an infringement of the Treaty of
Tientsin (1S58). French ambassador at Peking w’as accordingly
instructed to do hia utmost to lull the suspicions of the Chinese
govemmcni. But when news arrived of the murder of the Englishman
Margary while attempting to explore a trade route from Burma across
Yunnan, France decided tn go ^1 out for the recognition of the 1S74
treaty. She jumped to the conclusion that Britain would use the
murder as a means of forcing Peking to open Y'unrLan to British trade
via Burma.

France's attitude towards China stiffened still further when in 1876
it Avas reported thatj* without any reference tn her^ Tu-Duc had
despatched an embassy to l^eking bearing the customary tritnrual
tribute. Earlier, when the French ambassador had asked the Peking
government to recall its troops fromTongking the latter had promised
to do so, but in such terms as to show plainly that it regarded Vietnam
as its vassal and entirely independent of France. The fact was that
France, in spite of the declaration of Tu-Duc's independence in the
Philastre treaty* was trying to stake the claim that the real effect of
that document was to transfer the protectorate of Vietnam from
Peking to Paris. Fkr representaUves on the spott hoAVeveft were well
aware that any move in this direction was bound to cause an open
rupture with China.

But the Tongking siuiation had to be dealt with^ and without
assistance Tu-Duc was powerless to suppress the insurgents. He
called on China for further assistance, and it was granted^ Then in
iSSo the Peking government publicly restated China's position. It
announced that the insurgents in Tongking had been defeatAl by the
armies she had sent to the aid of her vassal I'u-Duc, whose investiture
as such had been granted by the Emperor of China. In response la
this 1ti-Duc sent an embassy to present his humble gratitude to the
emperor.

572 HUROPEAX TERRITOHIAL EXPAXSION PT. Ill

Dc Frcycinet was tiovv Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paris, He was
an advMate of the new expansionist policy that was producing an
unparatkled movement of European economic imperialism and bring¬
ing vast territories into the colonial empires of the great powders. The
choicei as be saw it* was between complete withdrawal from '['ongking
and further annexation. He was determined to revive French power
in the East at the point of the bayonet. France %vas rapidly recovering
from the knock-out blow she had received at the hands of Hismarck-
In July j8Si both chambers uf her Parliament voted the credits
necessary for a renewal of military uperattons in Tongking.

In the next year the French attack was launched. Their difficulties
in 'Fongking were increasing so rapidly that they had an excellent
excuse for armed interv’cntion. On the plea that the insurgent activities
were menacing the safety of French subjects in Hanoi, Captain Henri
Riviere was sent with an expeditianary force to operate against the
bands of Biack Flags infesting the Red River. His real object svas to
begin again the conquest of Tongking which Francis Gamier had
essayed in the previous period.

Ri\^i:re seii^cd Hanoi in April 18S2 and Nam-dinh in March of the
following year. But the redoubtable Black Flags in the pay of Tu-Duc
again laid siege to Hanoi^ and again ihe French leader was killed in a
sortie against them. Jules Ferry, the chief exponent of the views of
the 'colonial party\ was now Prime Minister of France. He decided
that not only must Tongking be conquered but the Court of Hue
itself must be brought under French controL A strong expeditionary
force was despatched to the Hast, General Bouet sent to take
command at Hanoi, and Admiral Courbet placed in charge of the
fleet. Dr. !larmand, who had been one of Garnier's colleagues, was
commissioned to organise the protectorate which was to be established
over Annam and Tongking.

nouet found Hanoi so closely invested by Black Flags that at fir^t
he cuuld do little mure than stand on the defensive until such time
as Courbet's fleet should arrive with reinforcements* On iS August
p88j Courbet appeared before the mouth of the Hue river and pro¬
ceeded to attack the forts guarding it- I'he French gave no quarter,
and the capture uf the forts involved such fearful loss of life to the
defendefi that the Vietnamese Foreign Minister came personally
under a flag of irudc to negotiate^ It transpired that Tu-Duc had
died in the previous month, and his death had been followed by a
dynastic crisis. Prince Ung-Chan, whom he had designated as his
Successor^ had been deposed by the Council of Regency after a reign

Cil. 35 THR SKCOIMD STACSF ClF FRENCH EJiPANSlON 573

of only three days and replaced by Frince Hon|^-Dat, who had been
raised to the throne as the Emperor Htep-Hoa on 30 July.

An armistice was cpneluded, under whtch all forts and war vessels
in the neighbourhood of Hue \vere to be surrendered to the French
and a new treaty was lo be drawn up immediately. A few^ day’s Jaterp
on 25 Augustp this document was signed by Hiep-Hoaand Harmand
acting on behalf of France. Under its provisions Vietnam recognised
the French protectorate and surrendered control over her external
relations to France. French Residents with suitable garrisons were to
be appointed to all the chief tow ns and were lo have jurisdiction over
the Vietnamese authorities everywhere. 'Fhc French were to occupy
ihc forts of the Hue river and all forts deemed necessary tor the
preser^aiion of peace in Tongking. Tht customs service was to be
placed under French administration. All Annamite troops serving
in Tongking were to be immediatefy recalled, w’hile France undertook
the task of opening the Red River to commerce, suppressing rebel lion
and pi racy t and repelling all foreign aggression. V'lctnam ceded to
France the province of Binh-thuan bordering on Cochin China* all
her ships of W'ar* and agreed to pay an indemnity to cover the cost of
the French occupation. Pending its payment France was to retain
all the proceeds of customs duesi.

The lir^t result of this action was a formal protest by China. She
pointed out that no treaty with Vietnam was valid without the
approval of the Peking government. The Qutu d^OrsaVt however^
brushed this aside as a matter of no importance. Reinforcements were
hurried to the East and General Bouet was told to act with vigour.
China therefore replied with vigour by sending troops from ’b'unnan
to the Vietnamese bases of Son-tay and Bac-ninh and placing orders
for warships and ammunition in Europe and America. General
Bouet thereupon advanced in the direction of Bon ^Fay as far as
Pallen, which he captured from its Chinese and Vietnamese defenders,
but could go no further owing to the inundations caused by the enemy.
He was up against regulars, but chose to regard them as insurgents,
and hence beheaded all hJs prisoners.

While his operations were held up in this way Bouet suddenly
and without warning left for I-ranee. The official announcement was
that he had gone to report on the state of affairs in Tongkin^ Later
it transpired that he had quarrelled with Harmand, the Civil Com¬
missi oner* The management of operations \\-^ taken over by Admiral
Courbet* and in December 1883 he captured Son-tay from the
Chinese. Soon reinforcements vvere pouring in, and three generals —

57+ ^nftOPRAN TFJlRlTrpBIAIp EXPANSION PX. tlf

Millot^ dc Ncgner, and Bri^rc de Liale™a$$mxied charge of separate
columns as the fighting moved further inlands Eac-ninh was taken
in March 1884 and Thai-nguyen soon after« Then while one column
cleared the Black River region another in June gained possession of
Tuyen-quang.

In that same month a new treaty was signed with the Court of
Hui. which in some degree modified the harsh terms of the Harmand
'Freaty. For instance, the province of Binh-thuan, which had been
annexed to Cochin China, was restored to Annam. Annam itself
remained a proieciorate, but France was given the right to occupy
militarily any place in it. The administration of Tongking became a
French responsibility: the emperor was left with nominal suzerainty
only. But the northern Annamite provinces, which had been linked
with Tongking by the Harmand treaty, were now restored to Annam,

Meanwhile, with a difficult struggle on their hands in Tongking
and considerable unrest in Annam, the French became involved in an
undeclared war with China. The capture of the important towns of
Son-tay and Bac-ninh^ garrisoned by Chinese troops, was regarded
by China as an act of war. An attempt, howeverp to bring about 3
settlement was made by Li Hung Chang and the peace party at
Peking* Commandant Fournier of the French navy, a personal friend
of the Chinese statesman, met him in Peking for diseussjona. On n
May tS 8 + they signed a draft convention. France was to guarantee
China^s southern frontier, and, in case of need, protect it: China in
return was to withdraw her troops from Tongking^

The convention satisfied neither side. The Chinese Foreign Office
wanted to maintain China^s suzerainty over Vietnam and to close the
Yunnan frontier to French trade* Wonse still, a quarrel developed
over the date on which the Chinese troops were to be evacuated, and
Colonel Dugeune, the commander of the French troops in the
Lang-son area, clashed with a Chinese force at Bac-le and sustained
a serious defeat. War, thercforcp was resumed. General de Negrier
took the field against the Chinese in the Lang-son area, and after much
hard fighting captured the place on 13 February 1885*

Admiral Courbet, after an unsuccessful attack on the port of Kelung
on the northern coast of Formosa, steamed across 10 Foochow, w^hcre
he destroyed the Chinese fleets as it lay at anchor, and the new arsenal
there. Then, returning to the blockade of Formosa, he made attack
upon attack on the Kelung forts until at last, in March 1885, he
captured them. Soon after^vards he occupied the Pescadores.

By this time both sides were utterly war-weary* 'Fhe French^

CIL 35 THE SECOKP STAGE OF FHtNCIi 575

engaged in exhausting guerrilla warfare with the Black Flag^jp. had
begun to register some progress. But on 2,8 March 1S85 their forces
at Lang-son suffered a terrible defeat at the hands of the Chinese.
General de Negrier, while on a cavalry reconnaissance outside the
town* was attacked and w'ounded* His second-iii-cominand. Captain
Erbinger, on taUng over, decided to evacuate the place. His troops
panicked, abandoned all their baggage and guns, and fled to the
mountains.

The news of this disaster, telegraphed to Paris^ caused such con¬
sternation that on 31 Marchp before the attack of Clemenceau, Jules
Feriy^s Cabinet felL At almost the same moment negotiations which
were already in progress between China and France resulted in the
signing of a peace protocoL On 9 junei after the details of a settlement
had been agreed between Li Hung Chang and M. Patenotre, the
French Minister at Peking, the Treaty of Tientsin was signed.
Ironically enough, the agreement which it brought into effect was
almost identical with the one reached a year earlier between Li and
Fournier. France restored Formosa and the Pescadores to China.

Throughout the period since Tu-Duc's death iu July 18S3 one
crisis after another had arisen at the Court of Hu^. HEep-Hoap w*hd
had signed the Harmand Treaty at the point of the bayonet, was
murdered by patrio[s in the follotving November. He was succeeded
by Kien-PhuCt who reigned until July 1884^ when he w^as deposed and
replaced by Ham-Nghi. [ n July of the fgllownng year there wag further
trouble in the palace» and Elam-Nghi fled to the Laos. Thereupon
the French intervened and placed their own candidate, Dong-Khanh,
on the throne. With him they made a convention whereby they
installed Residents in each province of Annam. Jn January iS 36 the
tightening-up process went a stage further' two Rfsidenls Parliculim
were appointed, one for Tongting and the other for Annani, to work
under the Resident-General. In the following month a corp$ of Civil
Residents common to both countries was created.

A similar tightening up process had been going on in Cambodia.
I'homson, the Governor of Cochin China, made the abuses of the
mandarinate the excuse for imposing on King Norodom a convention
whereby he agreed lo accept such reforms of the administration of
his kingdom as the Freoch might consider necessary. He,was per¬
mitted to retain his Court ceremonies and other prerogatives but had
to transfer the real government to the French Rmdrftt Suphieur^ who
could ignore the assembly of miniatem if he chose. In addition each
province of his realm received a Resident, whose task it wa$ to

$j6 f-THOPEAN TERRITOHIAL JLVKAN'SION I'T, Jl[

supervise the hietarchv of native officers and councils forming iu
administration.

The agreement was signed in June 1884. It created a crop of fresh
dLfiicuJties at a moment when the French had enough on their hands
elsewhere. I'hc popiilatLon rose in revolt under a prince of the royal
house^ Si \'attha. They tvere already thoroughly discontented through
the forcing upon the king of a number of previous conventions dealing
with the traffic in arms, the suppre5^^ion of the capitation tax on
Vietnamese* and the collection of opium and alcohol dues. They
were determined to prevent the establishment of the new officers.
Armed bands broke over the frontier in places and the military escort.^
of Cochin-Chinese troops provided for the Residents were massacred.
The rebellion, which began in January 1885, lasted for eighteen
months and caused the French hca%y losses. Then St Vattha became
a hunted man; but not until 189^^ when he was at the end of his
resources, did he surrender.

White this revolt wag in progress the French hold on Cochin
China went through a critical period. Drained of troops for service
in Tongking, and wjth the Cambodian situation making large demands
on those that were left. Cochin China w'as threatened with invasion
by armed bands of insurgents who had assembled in the Annamite
province of Binh-thuan. 'Fhen at an avvkw^ard moment, when ihe
authorities had only 300 troops at iheir disposal in the citVp a revolt
broke out in Saigon also. When this wag. suppressed the governor
called for native volunteers to make up a force for the invasion of
Binh-thuau and Phu-yen^ fn response to this the Tong-doc Tran
Ba-Loc, w'ho wag loyal to the French regime, left Saigon in July t8S6
at the head of a force of partisans, stiffened by a handful of regulars,
and treated the two provinces to a dose of such frightful ness that they
were ‘entirely pacified*. Ilia merciless repression was Jong remem¬
bered. Everyw'here indeed in the new' French empire unrest and
rebellion were constant factors for many years. Not until 1895 was
Tongking completely her dUcontented elements found a

formidable leader in De-Tham, who proved a gore thom in the flegh
to the French.

The administrative arrangements were rounded off by decrees
issued iri/)c!tober 18S7* These placed the Protectorates of Annam and
Tongking in the hands of the Minister of Marine and Colonies in
Pari a and brought together Cambodia, Cochin China, Annam and
Tongking to form the Lhifon [ndachtn&lte. The higher administration
of this was emrusted to 3 civilian governor-general and w'aa divided

CH. 35 tim SBC-OND STAG£ OF fR^NTCM JEXPANStON 577

mlp five depattments under the C^tumattilani sup^ieur Jes troupes^
the Cammandant sitpirieur dt ta Marin^^ the Stcritaire gineraL the
Chef du Smiice judidaire^ and the Dirtcteur dts Doiames et regies^
respectively. Under the direct authority of the governor-general
Cochin China had a lieuteiiant-govemorp Annam and Tongking com¬
bined a resident-general, and Cambodia a resident-genera!. Each of
these units maintained an autonomous organisation and had its
separate budget.

CHAPTER 36

SIAM UNDER MONGKUT AND
CHULALONGKORN* 1851-1910

Mongkxit, who Avas the rightful heir 10 the thratte when Rama II
died in 1854, ^ Buddhist monk Avhen his elder brotherp Pra Nang

KJao, seized the throne and became Rama III. He was then twenty
years old and quite inexperienced in matters of state. Though he had
entered a monastery' only for the short period that was customafy
for aH young men* he now remained in the order and eventually
became Sangkaret BaAvaraniw'ste. In his early years as a monk he
became famous for his knowledge of the Pali scriptureSp and later for
the reformed sect, the D'ammayutika, which he founded* Soon he
began to widen the scope of his studies, learning Latinp mathematics
and astronomy from the scholarly French missionary Bishop Pallegoix+
and English from the American missionaries Caswell, Bradley and
House. He became an enthusiast for the study of English, which be¬
came his second language; as a king he signed all state papers in roman
characters, and his fluent, ungrammatical style mites hia letters
delicious reading, ' My gracious friend/ he tvrote to Sir John Bow ring^
the British envoy, who came to negotiate a treaty in 1855, 'it give me
today most rejoyful pleasure to Icam your Excellency's arrival here., *.
Please allow our respects according to Siamese manners. Your
Excellency's residence here was already prepared. We are longly
already for acceptance of your Excellency/^

'rhese years of study gave Mongkut something which no previous
King of Siam had had-—-a range of contacts beyond the almost prison-
like isolation of life in the royal palace. As a monk his pilgrimages
and preaching brought him into touch with all sorts and conditions of
people, AvhJIe from his European teachers and books—for he was a
voracious reader—he gained information about foreign countries and
international relations which was to prove of the utmost value to him
and his Country. It is perliaps not loo much to say that Siam owed
to Mongkut more than anyone else the fact that she preserved her

A CAeiiinilr the IcHcr h in Bowrin^% Kintctlam mtd Siam, Landau,

va|, attathcil lii p.

57S

riL SIAM VNttm MONGKIT ANSI C!ltfLALt>NGlC<mN 579

independence vth^n by the end of the nineteenth century 2.II the other
states of South-East Asia had tx^me under European control. For he
almost alone among his people could see dearly that if China had failed
to maintain her isolation against European pressure, Siam must come
to terms with the external forces threatening her and begin to accom¬
modate herself to the new world, in which Asian tradjlionalisin
appeared outworn and inefficient.

King Nang Klao had sons of his own and intended that the eldest
should succeed him. But ’when he by dying a meeting of the chief
princes of the royal family and the highest officials of the realm
in>nted Mongkut to accept the crown^ and after some hesitation he
agreed on condition that bis brother^ Prince Itsarate Rangsan^ should
be appointed Second King. Prince Itsarate, whose English was
perfect, and whose home was built and furnished tn European style,
never took a prominent part in public affairs; but as an adviser to
the government his influence was great. He had more advanced
political ideas than his brother and a mind at least as acute.

The introduction of W^tem ideas and methods, even on a limited
scale^ caused a double conflict—one betw^een the king and the ruling
classes, and the other in the lunges own mind,'"where Western pro¬
gressive ideas clashed with oriental coiiscrvatlsm» leaving him a mass
of contradictions. The picture of him portrayed by the excellent
Mrs. Leonowena, the English governess he engaged in i86z as tutor
for the royal children, gives some idea of the contradictions^ although
the lady w as gifted with more imagination than insight in her descrip¬
tion of his domestic life> The Siamese memory of him today is
certainly not of a revengeful or cruel man, nor of one needlessly
suspicious. Judged against the background of his own people, he
emerges both morally and intellectually head and shoulders above the
level of the Siamese aristtKracy of his day. It is not too much to claim
that among the benevolent despots of the world he ranks high.

Mongkut opened the door for European influence when in 1855
he concluded the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce with Britain.
In thdr resentment at the treatment they had received both "Raja*
Brooke and the American envoys, who had failed with Pra Nang Klao,
had fooliably advised that only warlike demonstrations would move the
Siamese. An interesting sidelight on this is the fact that tn the
negotiations with Sir John Bowring one of the greatest obstacles in

^ An EngUih CwtfyjKW nf ihr CoufS of Siam, 1870. M^rgnfct

Landon'* Ama and the King of Stam, wMch u bnned Oft it, a even wm unfair to
Mofiftlcut Ttic &ir«t wtinwre of him it tn Nf■J gdJih Smiih'i A ai ikr

l^oodon, tq4h.

580 tTLROPEAS TKaRlTORlAL F-XFA^33IO;^ PT. HI

the WAV agreement Mongkut’s fc!^ar thAt Siam’s rival Vietnam
would assume that ht had bt:en intimidated by the British into signing
a treaty. Bowring^s task was rendered easier by the simple fact that hb
plenary powers had been conferred on him by Queen V'sctoiia^ whose
sign manual was afli.ted to his doenmentSp But Kia greatest asset
came from the fact that he Liked and respected the Siameae and won
the personal friendship of the king. 'Fhe overriding fact w^as that
Mongkut waa particularly anxious for the friendship of Britain.

ftAMA IV (kINR ^TONGKUT) OF ptAM

The treaty* which contained more important concessions than
Siam had ever granted to a foreign power, tvas negotiated in less than
a month. It limited the duty payable on goods imported by Briiiah
merchants to y per cent ad valorem, permitted the Impart of opium
duty-free but subject to certain necessary restrictions, and laid down
that expo^s were to be subject to duties according to an agreed
schedule, British subjects were to he permitted to purchase or rent
Land near the capital, and no additional charge of any kind might bKe
imposed on them, save with the sanction of both the supreme Siamese
rnthorities—i.e. the First and Second Kings—and the British consul.

CH. 36 SIAM tXtJER MONCKIT AND CHLTLALONUKDRN 58 1

Uowring claimed thai these provisions ‘involved a total revolution
in all the hnancial maohinerj- of the Govenunent'. They he

thought, bring about a complete change in the whole system of taxa¬
tion, seeing that they affected a large proportion of the existing
sources of revenue and would uproot a great number of long-estab¬
lished privileges and monopolies held by the most induential nobles
and the highest functionaries in the state. Both Mongknt and his
successor, Chulalongkorn, carried out the treaty faithfully,

*rhe other main concession was the establishment of the extra¬
territorial system tor British subjects, I be treaty laid dow'n that a
British consul was to reside at Bangkok and exercise civil and criminal
jurisdiction over all British subjects in biam, who were thus made
independent of the Siamese courts and answerable to the consul
alone. This was not a complete novelty in Siam's relations with
European powera; the Dutch had extorted a similar concession, though
not in identical tertns, from King Naral in the seventeenth century.
But by Bowring's time it had Jong Fallen into desuetude. In the days
of the great chartered companies of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries rulers in South-East Asia had preferred that each community
of foreign merchants—and this included the Chinese as well—should
be under the control of a chief, with whom the ruler could deal
directly in all matters concerning them. Mongkut’s initial hesitation
to accept the svstem lav mainly in lus fear that he would be unable
to control the consul, but he accepted Bowring’s assurance that only
men worthy of his confidence would be appointed, ^

The conclusion of this treaty was epoch-making- It speedily
attracted the attention of other powers, and during the next few years
a spate of similar treaties came into being. I hey were made with
France and the United States in 1S56, Denmark and the Hanseatic
cities in 1858, Portugal in 1859, Holland in i860, and with Prussia m
1862. In 186S Sir John Bowring himself was commissioned to
conclude treaties on behalf of Siam with Belgium, Italy, and Nonvay
and Sweden. British trade reaped the greatest harvest from this
revolutionary change in Siamese policy. Singapore and Hong Kong
began to caiW on a thriving trade with Siamese ports- The British
Bombay-Burmah Corporation secured a preponderating share of the
teak industry in the forests of northern Siam. British firms Alid most
of the foreign business in Bangkok, and Britain soon came to have by
far the largest capital investment in the coiintiy’.

Important as these treaties were in introducing new commodities to
Siam and providing new contacts, they probably contributed less to

5*2 EUROPEAN TERSITOIlIAL EXPANSiON" PT. HE

the modernization of the country than Mongkut^a policy of emplaying
Europeana to reorganize the government sen'ices. They came in aa
advisers and teachers, but, in the absence of Siamese officers with
technical training or the right kind of administrative experience,
many of them became heads of depanments. In this matter Chula-
longkorn went even farther than his father. Most of his foreign
advisers were British, since their experience in India and Burma
suited them for the conditions of work prevailing in Siam. But he
also appointed Belgians and Danes. His General Adviser* who carried
through most of his reforms* was Rolin-Jaequemins, a Belgian
lawyer of repute, who had been Miniater of the Interior at Brussels.
One of his most efficient servants, a Dane, liVas head of the provincial
gendarmerie. The Italian Major Gerini, who was in charge of the
military cadet school, achieved distinction for his scholarly con¬
tributions to Siamese history and archacologVt and later for a pioneer
study of the section of Ptolemy's G^ograpkid rebdng to South-East
Asia.

With France Mongkut's relations were at first quite cordial, and
Napoleon llVs envoy was given a splendid reception at Bangkok in
1856* French missionaries were given much freedom to build schools,
seminariea and churches^ though the king and hia Court remained
ferv'ently Buddhist. But French trade failed to make much headw'ay
in face of British competition^ and when France began to expand in
Cochin China and her interesta clashed with those of Siam in Cam¬
bodia Mongkut became decidedly uneasy. The treaty of 1867* w here¬
by Siam surrendered her claims over Cambodia in return for France^s
recognition of her rights over the old Cambodian provinces of Battam-
bang and Siemreap, and the French exploration of the middle and
upper Mekong only served to increase hia suspicions concerning the
trend of Napoleon Ill's imperial ambitions, and to strengthen his
desire for closer co-operation with Britain.

Mongkutb intense interest in science w^as the cause of his death in
1868. A total eclipse of the sun w^as due to occur on 18 August of that
yeart and as it was to be visible from peninsular Siam a French
scientific expedition chose Sam Roi Yot, on the Gulf of Siam J40
miles south of Bangkok, as the spot from w'hich to study it, Mongkut
did all hftcouid to make the tixpedition a succesii by clearing the jungle
and erecting houses for his guests and himself. Sir Hany^ Ord* the
Governor of the Straits Settlements, and his wife attended by special
invitation of the king, %vho also invited all the Europeans in Bangkok
to witness ihc eclipse. It was, he felt, a wonderful opportunity for

CM. 36 SIAM MONQKLT AND CHULALOJiCKORN 583

demonstrating Co his subjects the importance of scientific knowledge.
Everything went well, the eclipse was seen under perfect conditions,
and the king’s jov was unbounded. But it was a malarial spot, and the
king went down with fever as soon as he reached home. He died in the
following month.

He had promoted the digging of canals, the construction of roads,
shipbuildingp and especially the teaching of foreign languages. He had
established a mint in the palace, and from iS6t minted flat coins in
substitution for the rounded lumps of gold or silver previously in
czrculation. Was it a coincidence that Mindun of Burma had bt^un
to mint coins in the previous year? He had patronized the printing
press introduced by Christian missions, constructed buildings in a
European style, and begun the reorganization of the army.

An immense amount still remained to be done. Siam was still
in 186S a backward oriental country, unready in general for such
violent changes as the adoption of European models in the various
public sers^ices must inevitably bring. The situation which faced
Chulalongkom has been summed up thus:

♦

* There was no fixed code of laws; no system of general education;
no proper control of revenue and finance; no postal or telegraph
service. Debt slavery was not fully abolished; the opium laws were
badly administered; there was no medical organization to took
after the health of the city. There was no army on modeni lines;
there was no navy at all; there were no railways and almost no roads.
The calendar was out of step with the rest of the world. *rhe list
could be extended,'*

Chulalongkom was only sixteen years old tvhen his father died and
he became King Rama V, His education had begun under Mrs,
Leonowens, who had never ceased to instil into him her views on the
reforms necessary in his country. Later he had been placed under the
absolute authority of an English tutor, Robert Morant, but owing to
his father’s death this discipline lasted only a year and a half. As he
was a minor, the government was under a regency until 1873, and he
seized the opportunity to travel and Study on the spot methods of
administration in Java and India. This tour made a deep intpression
on his mind. He returned home far more enlightened than almost
any of His subjects, and at once began to put into operation a series of
reforms which in the long run introduced radical changes into every

■ MAlcdin iinuth, i^p. riJ.p p(>. 85-6,

584 KLTtOPEAN TeRFtlTORrAL EXPANSION PT. HI

di^paitment of the national life. He realized forcibly that if his country
were lo presen'e her independence ahe musT, willy-nilly, put her hou^
in order according to the prevailing European notions, or at least keep
up the appearance of doing $0.

His first essay in this direction was the dramatic announcement al
his coronation in 1873 of the abolition of the practice of prostration
in the royal presence. Hia father had done something towards
Increasing the monarch's accessibility by aboHsbing the ancient taboo
against looking on the royal face or watching a royal procession. Rama
III had the palace only once a year for a ceremonial visit to the
temples of the city. He had travelled by w^ter, but the people had had
to shut themselves in their houses out of sight, and the route to be
traversed by the royal barge was cleared of all craft, Chulalongkorn
often drove about in public and had informal conversations, but he
made no attempt to rid him&elf of the traditional harem lifet which
tended to isolate him in a sacred city of women and children and
scn-'ile oftidab, with its atmosphere poisoned by jealousy.

Like the abolition of prostration, his early reforms sprang from a
realization that there vv^ere certain abuses which it was not to his
interest to tolerate any longer. The ignorance of the aristocracy was
one, and he forced them to send their children to the two schools with
European curricula which he established at the palace. These
produced a few men of outstanding attainments such as Prince
Devawongse, the first Siamese Foreign Minister to speak European
languages, and Prince Damrong, who as .Minister of the Interior
introduced European efficiency into his office and iranaformcd the
whole system of local administration.

Slavery w^as another intolerable abuse. Though not as harsh as
the plantation system of America, and governed by the precepts of
the Laws of IVtanu, its abolition was an obvious essential of the
modernizing process. Mongkut had issued regulations to mitigate
the lot of the slave, but Cbulalongkarn in 1874 struck a powerful blow
at its root by decreeing that thenceforward no one could be born a
slave^ and that the practice of selling oneself for debt was illegal.
There was, however, still much to be done to root it nut and check its
persistence under other names. Gambling was ius chief cause, and it
was only the abolition of public gambling-houses and the placing of
restrictions on moneylenders that rendered the decree cfTecti^^e.
These reforms did not come until the present century.

Along with slavery' disappeared the compulsory services of the iVm
and Sj/i classes in the army and police^ and in private labour for the

CM. 36 SIAM VNDER MOKGKUT AND CHUIALOSGKORN 585

profit of the Crown- In their case it was the reform of the military
svstem and the introduction of modern forms of taxation that revolu¬
tionized their life. The long-term results of th^ measures have been
most striking, especiallv bv contrast with Siam’s two neighbours,
French Indo China and British Burma. The Siamese peasantry
became, in Graham’s words, 'a sturdy and independent class free
from the ancient thraldom, owning its own land, depositing money
in the savings bank, in fact, acquiring a stake in the countjy.'i

The corruption and peculation prevalent among the officials gave
Siam the reputation of being one of the worst-governed countries in the
world. One of the moat pressing needs was to put the country's
finances in order. And it was not simply a case of bringing into the
Treasury the money that was finding its way into the pockets of
e-UortiuTiate officials, but of controlling expenditure, setting up a
proper system of audit and accounts, and reorganizing the Customs
and the Inland Revenue. This problem was for long beyond the
competence of the govemmem, until in 1896 the services of a financial
adviser were obtained from the British government, and after him
those of a former Accountant-General of Burma.

Even then it was not until 1901 government’s first budget

was published. Before the fiscal system was modernized it was
estimated that from five to six millions sterling were squeezed annually
out of the people bv tax-gatherers and monopolists, while of this
amount only £1,200,™ ultimately reached the Treasury. A favourite
money-making device was to collect land ra-xes without giving receipts,
so that the tax could be forcibly collected several times over- Writing
in iqoa. J. G. D. Campbell was able to say that even Siam’s worst
encmie^ would admit that the improvemeiu in the collection of taxes
had been enormous, and as a result the people were 'immeasurably
better off’ than they had been ten years earlier.*

Provincial administration was an equally black spot. Under the old
system provinces were largely autonomous; in practice so long as the
provincial governors regularly remitted the due amount of revenue to
the capital they were left alone. The great evik were the fanning of
dues, feudal privileges—especially In the matter of forced labour—
and general inefficiency. The abuses of local justice were also, from
a European point of view, flagrant. In 1892, therefore, the whole
system of administration was centralized under the Ministry of the
Interior, and the direct collection of practically all the taxes was

^ Siam in thr Ttr/n^rth C^nttay, London, lljaa.

■ p- 180.

5 *^^ E(JH 0 P£.O( TERRITOHIAL EXPANSION' |>T. Ill

substituted for the old farming system. The reform of local administra¬
tion was then carried out by Prince Damrong, who introduced the
system developed by the British in Burma. The whole kingdom was
divided into eighteen monthom, each with a resident High Com¬
missioner at its head, 'J'hese were subdivided into prorinces, >'illagcs
and hamlets. Each hamlet of about twenty familtes was placed under
an elder, and the elders together elected the headman of the whole
village.

The reorganization of the administration of justice was ma inly due
to the efforts of RoEin-Jacquemtns, who called In the assistance of a
number of Belgian lawyers to advise the judges. He was ably seconded
by Prince Rabi as Minister of Justice, Rabi ivas one of hundreds of
young men whom Chulalongkom sent abroad to learn Western
methods. He was educated in England and took his degree at Oxford.
One of his achievements as minister was to establish a legal school for
the training of Siamese lawyers, for the immediate result of the
modernization of the legal system had been to throw the chief legal
business into the hands of foreigners. X further result of the judicial
reforms was the reform of the prison system and the modernization of
the police force. Kor the last-named task oEcers were recruited from
the Imperial Police Service of India and Burma.

Waterways w'cre the main mode of transport in Siam, and rulers
who gave their attention to the improvement of communications
concentrated on cutting canals to link up rivers and creeks rather than
on roads. Villages were built along the banks of w'aterways. Prorincial
tow'ns were simply larger settlements on a maze of waterways w-itb
many houses on Boating pontoons. When Chulalongkom came to
the throne. Bangkok had hardly any streets and was called the Venice
of the East. The best roads were simply bullock-cart tracks usable in
the dry .season, or mountain tracks for pack animals. Under such
conditions the railway age was late in arriving. Chulalongkom first
became aware of the importance of railways through the British efforts
to survey routes from Burma to western China. But the first railway in
Siam w'as not completed until 1893. Itcovered the sixteen miles between
Bangkok and Paknam and was built by private enteqnise, though
with valuable financial help from the king.

France's encroachments upon Siam's eastern frontier in the
eighteen-nineties caused so much alarm that the govern ment decided
to build a strategic railway from Bangkok to Korat. Chubtongkom
himself cut the first sod in 1892, and a Royal Railway Department was
formed to control the work, which was under an English contractor

BBfCKAMA DOFIIITp KAKQKOK

KUROPEAN TKHklTORrAL EXPAN^^ION

Pt, lit

5S8

with experience of similar work in Ceylon and Malaya. Unfortunately
the department was under a German who had unsuccessfully tendered
for the contract, and he quarrelled SO much with his English rival that
ultimately in [Sq6 the government cartcelled the contract and com¬
pleted the work with its own engineers. The first section—from
Bangkok to the old capital of Ayut'ia—was only compietetl in 189^7,
The remainder of the work was completed before the end of 1900, and
in opening the railway Chulalongkam proudly said that he counted
the day one of the most auspicious in his life. A further section
carrying the railway to Lophurip seventy miles north of Bangkok^ was
opened in 1901, This northern line was gradually extended to
Utaradit and Sawankalok in 19C9. The first section of the future
Peninsula Railway that was ultimately to link up with the Malayan
Railways and connect Bangkok with Singapore was begun in 1900
and reached Petchaburi in 1903. The agreement for its extension to
the frontier of British Makya w as made in 1909 with the Government
of the Federated MaJay States,

As in the case uf Burma^ Siamk education in the past was conducted
entirely in the Budfihist monasteries. The missionaries were the first
to introduce secular education of a more advanced type. In 1891
Prince Damrong w'as sent to study educational methods in Europe,
and on his return a government Department of Education W’as set up.
This later became the Ministry of Public Instruction. Its initial task
was to improve primary education, and it did so by adapting the
monastic school buildings to educational needs and providing
apparatus. The task of developing secondary^ and higher education
was more difficult owing to the absence of textbooks in the Siamese
language. English was considered the best medium for higher
education; hence the original provision for state secondary edutation
was for a dual system of schook. One type was to give a course in
Siamese for boys proceeding no further; the other was to provide a
five-year course in English as a preliminary to the scientific study of a
special subject.

In [^9 the Siamese government applied for the loan of a British
civil servant to reorganiKe the educational system* and the Board of
Education sent out Mr. J. G. D. Campbell 10 act as adviser to Prince
Damrong^for two years. So much effort^ however, was being con¬
centrated upon the other departments of state that the Education
Department made little progress, and when Campbell left the Siamese
service he reported that education w^as still in a very backward state.
Secondary and higher education were almost non-existent outside

riu 3 f» SIAM I'XMR MONKWT AND C UWLAMWOKfmX 5^9

Bangkok, and even there school accommodation was inadequate and of
a low standard, there was a dearth of quaJified teachers, and systematic

inspection was only in its earliest beginnings.

Notahlc advances were made by the establishment during the
’nineties of three government schcxiU entirely controlled by English
teachers. One of these was a school for girU, Sunandalaya. This and
one of the boys’ schools, King's College, were boarding schools for
the children of the nobility. The other was a boys' day school for
sons of middle-class parents. The curriculum was largely that of the
similar class of school in England, and the object was to transplant
the English public-school system into Bangkok. When these schools
were founded a fairly large number of Siamese boys had received
their education at leading English public schools, and among the new
generation at the end of the century' there were many enthusiasts
who believed that the upper classes in their country' needed a strong
dose of the qualities, such as etpril df corpt., manliness and honour,
which the English system inculcated.

Siam had no university in Chuklongkorn’s day. and only a very few
Siamese proceeded to British universities, rhere were, however,
departmental schools for training in specialist subjects, law and
medical schools, a survey school, and military and naval cadet schools.
But until much later Siam had no technical school and no institution
for the systematic study of art. The great deveiopmcnis in education
were to come after Chulalongkom s death. His reign saw only the
small-scale beginnings of things and the gropings after a policy, T he
monastic schools catered only for boys, and the hopelessly inadequate
sums of money the Education Department had at its disposal crippled
its efforts, notwithstanding the immense leal vv'hich two Englishmen
on its permanent staff, R. L. flater Sir Robert) Morant, Rrlrs, Lcon-
owens's successor as tutor to the roy'al children, and W, G. Johnson,
who rcurgani2cd primary education, displayed in combating enormous
difficLihiea.

The recruitment of so large a corps of European advisers w as indeed
a step of the utmost importance, but it can hardly be said that the
best use was made of their abilities and experience. Few biamese
officials gladly co-operated with them. There was wrhat Campbell has
called q universal horror' of anything of the nature of a permanent
European Civil Service in the country.* It arose from the Tear that
such a step might lead to loss of independence. Ilcncc the path of the
European adviser was strewn with the subtle forms of obstruction,

' Ibid., p.

Rl-»OPEAN tliftItiTORlAL ESPANSIO?!

in', lU

59<J

the technique of which the shrewd Siamese knows m wei]. But in the
light of later developmentSp and against the background of deeply-
itigraiued traditioualisirip one may assess the achievements of Chula-
longkom's reign as truly remarkahk. And if one refuses to attribute
to him personally the for reform that his admirera have praised in
somewhat exaggerated cermSp the fact remains that the real progre^
that was made was possible only through the exercise of his absolute
power.

CHAFTEK 37

BRITAIN, FRANCE .\ND THE SIAMESE QUESTION
(a) Litang Prabang

The French conquest of Cochin China wrought a profound change in
Franco-Siamese relations. In the first place it brought Siam’s eaat-
wards expansion to a stop, France took the place of Vietnam as the
competitor with Siam for dominance o\'er Cambodia, and within
the briefest possible time won the contest decisively. King Norodom,
who had already accepted Siamese suzerainty, was literally forced by
the French in 1863 to accept their protection—a position which, he
was soon to find, was tantamount to complete control—^and four years
later Siam signed a treaty with France accepting the inevitable, though
with Battambang and Siemreap ss a quid pro quo. Siam’s attempts
to expand southwards and secure a dominant position in Malaya had
likewise been stopped by British action to secure the independence
of the threatened states. Unlike France in Indo-Chiiia, Britain was in
no hurry to force her 'protection' on the Malay rulers. The contrast
between them as empire-builders, one may venture to comment, was to
become even clearer as French expansionist efforts in Indo-Ghina
progressed. ‘Britain’, it has been well said,^ ‘annexed areas where
she had interests to protect, whereas France annexed areas where she
viished to have interests to protect, and so had to shut out compedtion
from the start.’

The French thesis regarding Siam was that her policy was ex¬
pansionist, and that, finding her ambition thwarted on the caist by
France and on the west and south by Britain, she naturally began to
concentrate her attention upon the Laos states in the north A
Auguste Pa vie, who played so important a part in French expansion in¬
to these Laos states, seems to have been the first to have expressed this
viewi hU belief was that Siam’s adrance, checked in one region, would
be sure to break out elsewhere. It was a most plausible theory, and
extremely convenient propaganda for French empire-builders. For

E. V. G, Kiemaiit Briiah in Cnpibpid^,

■ Ltf Dcni3All,g«r; du Law 4th Piru, Thb lh«i* hw been

uiuxiticaUr^ ifcepled hf Vi^mU ITionipion In Thaituftd^ r/jw jVrte .^1^, pp. 1

593

KCJROPF-AN Tt'liltlTORlAL KSPAXSION

IT, [l

the time wjm to come when they would be at pains to show that the
Siamese suaeiainty over the I,ao5 state of [^uang Prabang constituted
an unw'arranted deniaJ of the older and better claims of the empire of
Vietnam to its allegiance, 'I'hc fundamental fallacy in such an argu-
ment lay in reading European diplomatic ideas into the relationships
bciw'cen the states of the Indo-Chinese peninsula. But the Prench did
it consciously and deliberately, and with the single-minded aim of
exploiting to the full any situation that could be used to their advantage.

In 1817 the Siamese armies under P’ya Budin had extinguished the
Laos kingdom of Vientiane for attempting to assert its independence,
V\’hen this occurred \'ientiane’s sister state of Luang Prabang, which
had acknowledged the suzerainty of Siam for half a century, became
restive, and in i8ji, and again in 1832, offered homage to Hui in the
hope of gaining independence by playing off the one against the
other.* Nothing came of this effort, however, for Minh-Mang had too
much on his hands in Cochin China and Cambodia to risk serious
entanglements elsewhere,’

Souka Scum, ivho succeeded to the throne of Luang Prabang in
1S36, had lived for ten years as a hostage at Bangkok and did not
receive Siamese recognition and permission to return until 1839.
Annamitc sources contain a story that during the iniert'al between his
father’s death and his own return home a prince of Luang Prabang took
advantage of a rebellion against Minh-Mang in Tongking to ravage the
the provinces of Thai-nguyen, Cao-bang and Lang-son round about
1836-7, but wa,s finally defeated and burnt alive in the woods in w hich
he took refuge, fioiika Seiun, who reigned until 1850, was a prudent
man who made no attempt to take advantage of Siam's concentration
upon Cambodia by pursuing a heroic policy. Throtighout his reign
his kingdom maintained strict peace and well-being.

His brother, Tiantha Koumane, who succeeded him in 1S51,
received the I’rench explorer Henri Mouhoi in 1861, and it was in the
little village of Ban Naphao, not far from his capital, that Mouhoi died
of fever in October of that year,* During his reign also other European
explorers busied themselves with surveys of his countrv. There was a
Dutchman, Duyshart, who w'as employed by the Siamese government,
and whose papers, never published, were presumably utilized by

* See 3 j.

* Rtc flboi'c, chmp. Z4.

■ Mquhqt dcacribcd at a ' Jdidau^ tittle town' in n charniittif iliuh^

tienp with about ti.ooo iEihebitantB. Hia Trm eh iw iht Ctnfmt 0/ hi^o-
CAt'iwi Cwahodia^ anti Laai duri^ rjiSS^ wa* publkhed 111 London in iHb-p.

For ihrirtEr locDuiits hb work sw Kir Hugh CliHord'a Fmlhrr Ittdia, pp. aoS-ii'
nod BoLilAnucr'i //uldji' du LumJ' Fruftfoiff pp.

ril, 37 flBITAIS. FRANCL AND THE giTiiTlIJN S93

James ATCarthy in the preparation of the deuiled map of Siam
published by the Roy^ Geographical Society in iSSS. 1 here was
abo the Doudart dc Lagree-Gamier expedition^ which arrived at
Luang Prabang in April 1867 on iU way to Yunnan.

Garnier'^s anglophobia had been ablaz^c at reports that they had
been forestalled by a party of English explorers, about forty in
number^ who had cut in above them from Burma; but near Chieng
Kang, as the Frenchmen were pushing on determined to die rather
than suffer themselves to be outdonc> they met Duyshart journeying
downstream, a sulitary Dutchman with his native staffs and realized to
their immense relief that his activities were the cause of the rumours
which bad so greatly disturbed their minds. The incident is interesting
for the light it throws upon the French outlook in the matter of Indo-
China. "The term * Anglo-French rivaln^" has been too loosely used in
this connection. The rivalry tvas mainly from the side of the French^,
who shivered at the thought of an imaginary Englishman already
ahead of them in whichever diTection they proposed to expand. I'heir
actions again and again forced the British to react in defence of svhat
they regarded as their legitimate interests^ as in the case of the march
to ^landalay in 1885^

During Tiantha Koumane*s reign the Tran Ninh question came to a
head again. The kingdom of Chieng^Khouang^ had been extinguished
in 1832 by Minh-Mang and its territories annexed to Vietnam, It was
brought into strict $er\'1tudc by the most bnital methods, and every^-
thing possible w^as done, even to forcing its people to wear Annaniite
dress, in order to crush out all traces of hs long-prized individuality.
^I'his played into the hands of Siamese secret agents, ivho stirred up
a revolt in which the Vietnamese governor was killed^ After restoring
Order ^"ietnam wan over Chao Pho^ the eldest son of the previous
king, Chao Xoi-, and in 1855 placed him in control of the adminis¬
tration of Chtcng-Khouangt with the rank of 'imperial rnanda-
tor>' prince^ This caused Hantha Koumane to take up the position
that ihc old kingdom had been restored and must therefore resume
payment of its ancient tribute to Luang Prabang, After lengthy
negotiations, which were rendered easier for Tiantha Koumane by the
fact that the Emperor Tu-Duc became deeply involved in trouble
with the [■Vench, Cbao Pho agreed to pay triennial tribute Luang
Prabang, wbik continuing to pay annual tribute to S^ietnain.

^ The itwtlf is often referteJ to hy Lhe nrime of ii^ enpLiJil, Chiec^f-Khouaiig,

or^ in rvutny Kian4i

’ tk« ehip. 13.

EtJHOPEAN^ TKRRI IOHIAL EXPAMi^ION

PT. Lll

S9i

Tiantha Koutmne^s Iasi years were rendered happy by the gracious
act of King Mongkut in restoring the famous Prabang image of the
£uddha to its historic home* It had been carried away from Luang
Prabang to Vientiane in 1707^ when the division of the oid kingdom
into two occurred. In 1778 it had been taken away from the latter
place by the Siamese general Chublok, but restored four years later.
Then when P*ya Bod in destroyed Vientiane in 182S it had been
brought to Bangkok.

In iS64p five yeans before I’iantha Koumane'a death, refugees
began to pour out of western China into Tongking and the various
Laos states. Tongking was the first to suffer when they began to
organi'/e themselves into armed bands known by the colours of their
flags. The turn of Luang Prabang and Tran Ninh was to come early
in the reign of Tiantha Koumane's successor, Oun Kham (187^-87).^
Among the I'hai peoples they were known by a word transliterated as
or ‘Haw'^ and meaning *Chiiicse\ In 1871 a band of some
2,000 Hos, belonging to the Red Klag organization, w'as driven away
from the Black River of I'ongking by the Yd low' Flag;s . They there¬
upon made their way across country into Tran Ninh and built them**
selves a fortified camp at Tung-Clyieng-Kam, some three days"
march from the capital. Having defeated the combined forces of
Luang Prabang and Tran Ninh, supported by a Vietnamese con¬
tingent, they captured Chieng Kham and Chieng Khouang and
devastated the country so thoroughly that they soon had to look else¬
where for booty-

'They next threatened Luang Prabang„ but suddenly turned south¬
wards to Vientiane and Nongkai. Almost simultaneously in 1872 the
Biamese government received frantic appeals for help from King Oun
Kham and its owm Governor of Nongkai* A Siamese army was
accordingly sent to co-opcrate with the l.uang Prabang forces. The
campaign, successful at first, soon petered out when the ITos retired
on their forlilicd strongholds. The Siamese therefore called off the
campaign on receiving a vague recognition of the suzerainty of Bang¬
kok and evacuated the survivors of the local population to Siam.

Luang Prabang wa$ spared for the nioment, but complete anarchy
reigned on its northern and eastern borders, especially in Dinh^binh-
phu an 4 the Sip-song Chu-Thai running along the aouth-westem
side of the Black River. Oun Kham, who wjts powerless to deal with
the growing diaorder in his own territories, found himiself forced to

^ HU rcifiji bcfiiiu ofEcUny only in 1872 when he iVCcivtd mvesdture from Siam.
Xumlhn Keuiiumc: hud died in

CH. 37 BRITAIN, IrRANCE AND THE SJAM^K QUEUTJDN §95

rely more and mare on Siamese support, especially when his friend
Cam-Sinh, the Chief of ihe Sip-song Chu-Thai, having driven off
the attacks of the Yellow Flags from his own territoryi w'33 dta'vn into
the guerrilla warfare which the exploits of Francb Gamier and ileori
Riviere had aroused in the delta region of Tongking^

'fhe French advance in 'rongking very naturally caused the Siamese
to lighten their hold on the Laos countryp In 1883, the year in which
the French forced Vietnam to become a protectorate, a force of
Laotians and Siamese made a further attempt to storm the Ho strong¬
holds in *rran Ninh and were so severely defeated that Chulalongkom
decided to send a large anny to occupy all the country to the north and
east of Luang Prahang right up to the basin of the Black River. 'Phis
arrived at m destination in October 18S5, and its commander-in-chief^
Chao Mun Vai Voronat, appointed two Siamese commissioners lo
superintend the administration of the kingdom at the side of the
ageing Oun Kham.^

The Siamese expedition had been prepared so secretly that the
Comte de Kergaradec, the French representative in Bangkok^ only
learnt of it after its departure. Le Boulanger asserts that this step was
taken on the suggestion of Chtdalongkom’s British advisers^ because
Britain regarded French penetration into the Red River region with
jealousy owing to its obvious threat to their plans for commercial
penetration into Yunnan.^ Graham, however, is much nearer the
point in drawing attention to the fact that the 'unofficial advocates' of
French colonial expansion were already beginning to advance the
theory that the territor)'' held by Siam to the east of the river Mekongp
having at one time formed part of . 4 nfiam, should be restored now
that \^ietnam was a French protectorate."^

A young British journalist, Mr. (later Sir) James George Scott, who
had been witb the I'Vench forces in Tongking and was shortly to join
the Burma Commission, took the matter rnuch further in a book,
France and Tattgking, w^hich he published in 1S85.* After staling that
'it was the encroachment of the French on the eastern borders that
decided the fate of Upper Burma \ he showed that Siam was now
threatened by France. *It cannot he tw strongly urged \ he wrote,
‘that the w'hole French procedure in regard to Siam is as scientifically

Thm between seventy- anil icvcrttl'-fivc; the date of hia birth Will iomew|»i?rc
between i$l l wid
■ CJp, fif,, pp, 1151-3.

* Op. CtLf if p.T.20r

* Quoted in G. B. .Mittan (Lcidr Scott), Stoii of iht Stwit Le^idon, 1936, pp.

EL’ROPEAN Ti:HRlT<JHUL I^XKANi^HlN

VT^ U1

y¥>

mapped out a game of draughts. Kver>’ counter-move been
calculated and provided for, and we are no disinterested speciatorsi
we do not want SLam and have no particular hankering for the Shan
states but we do w^ant to keep France out of them/ His advice w'as
that a railway connecting Moulmein with Chiengmaiji and Chiengmai
with Bangkok^ would supply all that was wanted, 'Siam would then
be connected with us directly^ and so much capital would be involved
that she would cease to be the safe quarry she is now for sinister
French designs. If anything is to be done it must be done at once,

I n a year or two Siam will be $o surrounded $hc w ill be unable to stir^'
"rhey were strangely prophetic words, but no one heeded them ihen^
'i"he Siamese action caused the Quai d^Orsay tu issue a warning
note to Bangkok and to invite the Hue government to formulate its
claims on Luaug Prabang^ Siam in reply stated that her sole aims in
sending an army there were to defend the region against the fios^
Hue claimed the region on the score of payment of tribute since the
seventeenth centuryn France therefore asked Siam to agree to a joint
commission to examine the boundaries of Luang Prabang on the spot.
On 7 May 1886 a provisional agreement was concluded sanctioning
the creation of 3 French vice-consulate at Luang Prabang—a method
of approach to the question w’hich, be it noted, implicitly recognized
Siamese authority over ihc ditsputed principality*

"^Fhe French choke for the new post was Auguste Pavic^ w'ho was to
achieve a great reputation for his scholarly w'urk of fLxplotatiun in the
Mekong valley^ He had started his career with a commission in the
Marines. In 186S he had transferred to the Postal and "Felegraphie
Department of Cochin China. After the Franco-Prussian War he was
stationed at Kampot^ the Cambodian port on the Gulf of Siam, where
he had attracted attention by his study of the old Khmer civilization.
In 1880 he had been entrusted w^ilh the constructiun of a telegraph
line from Phnom Penh to Bangkok. For the next five years he had
busied himself with detailed survey a of Cambodia. M’he wfirk of
Mouhotp Gamier and others had inspired him with a great ambitiun
to follow in their footsteps by exploring the Laos country^ His Im¬
mediate instructians w'erc to explore routes connecting the upper
Mekong valley wmh "fongking and huld himself in readiness to join
the frontier commission, if and when it maleriaiized.

*rhe Bangkok government, only too painfully aware of the direction
of French policy, kept Pa vie waiting six months for hts permit, in the
hope that ^"al V^oronai would have lime to coxnplele his mission before
the F renchTTLan's arrival,

cr*. 37 HRITAIN, FBA^CC AND TflE SIAMESE QIT^ON 5^7

Meanwhile the Siairiese siege of the Ho stronghold of Tung-
ChieriE-Kam had failed in 1885. In the following year they staged a
much stronger effort with reinforcements which achieved no little
success. And soon after Pavie arrived in Luang Prabang in February
1887, Vai \"oronai appeared in triumph to announce that the whole
country had been cleared of the invaders, and with a map showing
exactly the territories owing allegiance to King Oun Kham. There was
obviously to be no joint frontier commission. Pavie therefore went
ahead with preparations far exploring a practicable route from the
Mekong into Tongking.

He left at the end of March 18S7, but had not gone far before news
reached him of an impending attack by armed bands on ihe capital
itself* He at once sent a courier back to warn the Siamese commander-
in-chrefi but received the reply that while no importance need be
attached to the rumour, he would be wise to return to Luang Prabang^
as the season was unfavourable for the survey w^ork he had in hand.
■Accordingly he retraced his steps, only to find on arrival at the capital
that Vai Voronat and the Siamese chief commissioner bad already
left for Bangkok with the main body of the army^ a number of Ho
hostages and the eldest sons of the king and the Oupahat-

Viki Voronat^s easy assumption that his task w^as oompkled w'as
soon to be proved mere wishful thinking. For in carrying out the
task of pacification he had foolishly alienated the most powerful chief
of the cantons of the Black River region. Cam Sitih of Muong-
Lai'. The old chief was a firm friend of King Oun Kham and had
entrusted him w ith the upbringing of two of his sons. Bui he was the
enemy of both the French in "l ongking and the Siamese. Vai Voronat
had therefore completely failed 10 persuade him to recognize Siame;ic
ovcrlordship. He had then taken the drastic step nf kidnapping some
of the old chief's sons and carrying them off as hostages.

Now Cam Sinh employed in his sendee a band of iilack Flags*
They w'crc commanded by his eldest son, Cam Oum, or Deo-van-TriT
as he was know n by the \ictname&e. Early in June, with 600 follow ers,
he appeared at the city of Luang Prabang to demand the release of
bis brothers. Finding that they were no longer there, he sacked the
city* The king, his Siamese adviser and Pavie took refuge at Paklay,
near the Siamese horder,^ but Deo-van-Tri made no attempt at
conquest.

On receipt of new%^ of the disaster Chulalongkorn invited Oun
Kham to Bangkok^ where he was received with honour^ Vai Voronat,
who had received the title of P'ya Burrissak, was ordered to mobili^Ec

FTTTIOFFAN TTtMrTOftlAL ESMNSION

FT. ITl

598

another army to restore order in the principality* The captive princes
of Muong-Lal were liberated, and one of them was entrusted with a
condliatory message to his father. Late in the year the boundary
commission, consisting of PavJe and tw o French officers together with
three Siamese commissioners, was appointed-

Pavie now began to take matters vtry much into his own handSp
Tw^o French columns under Colonel Pemot and Commandant Oudri
tvere engaged on the pacification of the upper region of Tongfcing
bordering on the Sip-song Chu-Thai* Pavie therefore got into touch
w^ilh Pemot, who w^as engaged in some stiff lighting with Deo-van-Tri
and his Black Flags in the Muong-Lat region. They met in the middle
of February i8SS and agreed on a plan of action which involved the
annexation of the twelve T^ai cantons to the French empire. And to
cut a long story short, Parie returned 10 Luang Prabang at the end of
March and announced to P^ya Surrissat, w ho was once more engaged
upon the military occupation of the principalityt that he intended to
rccoraniend the annexation of the T ai cantons by France on the
grounds that they were dependencies pf Vielnam* He then made
his way to ffanDii where General Begin entrusted to him the task
of organizing the annexed territory.

In October of the same year he received the submission of the
Black Flags, and in the following December PS a SurrLssak made
formal surrender of the cantons on behalf of Siam. In January 18&9
he w^as back in Luang Prabang to wkneads the reinstatement of the
aged Oun Kham on his return from Bangkok. Then he began the
jmestigation of France's claims to a further tract of territory , this time
in " Middle Laos^—the cantons of Camkeut and Gammon, once part
of the kingdom of Vientiane. Bui Siamese forces were in control of
them, and it was impossible for him to attempt again the methods
which had been so successful in the Black River region. In June 1889,
therefore, he wound up his first ^ rtussion' and retiimed to France on
furlough* Inhere he strove to convert the Quai d'Orsay to the view
that it should aim at extending the bnimdaries of its Indo-Chinese
empire to the river Mekong.

7 '/i£ Mekong Queniion

Pavie's second 'mission", which he began to organize as soon as
he arrived back in France^ tvas planned as a scientific expedition on the
big scale not only to study the geography of the Laos country but alsio
*to investigate land and river routes, create trading depots, collect

Cl I. 37 aurTATN, francf an^d tut. QW^rroK 599

sped mens, esf amine existing cwmmerci^ procedure, and produce a
definite statement on the nature and value of the products of the
Mekong basin*. In close association with his project a Syndicat
fran^ais du Haut-Laos was formed* which placed fifteen tons of
merchandize at the disposal of the mission. The results nf the
itussLon's work as set forth in Pavie's monumental Mission Povk^ were
of immense importance as comributLons to knowledge* But the
ultimate aim of the Avork w as to pave the way for another big annexa¬
tion of tenitory by France.

The mission began w^ork in January^ 1890* The party Avas split
Into several groups AVorking separately in Tran Ninh, Cammon and
Stung I'reng, and Avith the leader himself in Luang Prabang, where
after six months all the members were to meet to co-ordinate their
work. Late in the year he made his way dow n the Mekong to Saigon,
and thence to Bangkok, where he hoped to continue the softening
process by talks Avith the government. But the Siamese politely
evaded his advances. Thty were alarmed at the way the tVench were
striving to increase their infiuence among the Laos people, and at the
agitation that Avaa being worked up in France for,‘the incontestable
rights of Annam" to all the lerrifor)^ east of the Mekong**

The Siamese suggestion* made at the time w^ben Pa vie wound up
his first mission in the previous year, had been that the disputed
territory should be regarded as neutral until the frontier could be
properly delimited; and an agreement to this effect bad been made.
But both sides then began to accuse each other of infringing it. The
French theory was that Siam was encroaching upon territory she had
never previously occupied in order lo contpyensale lierselt for Avhat
she had had m surrender in the Black River region. But it reflects
too closely the outlook of the French themselves. .Actually Siam's
actions were capable of the simple explanation that they Avere entirely
defensive, Paiie, hoAVcYer* before the end of the year 1890 was descrih-^
ing them as The Siamese inA^asion" and was urging Governor-General
Piquet to instruct French frontier posts to do their best to slop them,
while avoiding any clash. During the first half of 1891 he was engaged
in the north upon a study of condidous in the Sip-song Pannas.
There neAVS reached him that Siam was summoning additional troops
to the colour^, laying in supplies of arms and con_structin|^ fortified
posts. On the grounds that these constiiuted real preparations for
Avar* he broke off his Avork to return to l^aris, declining on his way an

* iMmtun Indoc^iine 11 Volf., L^ri», l 8 v^-1 9 1 9 .

* Ar ihui Stt£e only tlip middle Mckemg wm lii qUestiun.

(&LEUk)

PAjfuthia

#crnrM.p

lAj1|ikOT|

CAMS
PFifham'
^ PSih

Ur' !^ ^

^ Pibh C^0fMb#v^

THE FRANCO-SIAHESE
QUESTION, mj

_ I1IL£^

kSQ W

ffHCh inyiwtoy fffPJ,.

$ism btf^i 1993 .

CH. 37 BKITA1N% FRANCE AND TfJF SIAMESE QUESTION 6oi

offer by the Bangkok government xq discus the matter. Thus ended
his second mission.

The annexation of Upper Burma by Britain at the beginning of the
year 1886 invaived the large block of Shan states which had paid alle¬
giance to the Court of Ava ever since the sixteenth centu^1,^ This
brought the eastern frontier line under anxious consideration. Military
opinion favoured the Salween as the eastern boundary of British
Burma, but some of the states which had been subject to the Burmese
monarchy stretched across that river, and the two most important
trans-Salween states, Kengtung and Kiang Hungt claimed territory
east nf the Mekong; in fact Kiang Hung's richest part lay on the far
side of the river.

Hut the further question arose: what would become of the trans-
Sahveen territories if Britain declined responsibility for them ? China
and Siam, it was argued, might be invited to absorb them and thus
place a buffer belt between British territory and Tonglung. China,
howTvert did not favour such a solution, and Siam, though favourable,
was weak; and the fear was that if such a plan were carried out France
might then be tempted to push her boundary up to the Salween.
It was therefore decided that Brhain must accept her full responsi-
bilitics* and measures w^ere accordingly taken to secure the allegiance
of all the States, 'f he last to be brought under control was Kengtung;
Scott w'as sent there in 1890 and at a durbar presented the sawbwa
with his patent of appointment*

Hritain bad two anxieties in this matter: to avoid a frontier running
with French Indo-China, and to reach an amicable agreement with
Siam on all frontier questions. 'Ihere were several delicate questions
to be solved with regard to Siam. In 1S89, therefore. Britain appointed
the Ney Klias Commission to suix^ey the .Anglo-Siamcae frontier and
settle disputes with Siam. No Siamese officials were sent in reply to
Britain's invitation for co-operation; but the commission completed
its work and t^iam accepted its decisions.^ With France, hoAvever*
difficulties cropped up.

In 1S89 M. Waddington> the French ambassador in London, called
on the prime minister. Lord Salisbury', with ihe suggestion that it
w ould be 10 the ad\Tinlagc of both countries to declare Siam a buffer
stale between their respective empires, tie thought that ii^ the first
instance the frontier between Cochin China and Siam should be
fixed and a settlement made of the boundaries of Burma, Regarding

* A »uTTimar>^ nf ihif ^'ort thr u by Sir Cluirlfs CrTMthuaitv in

hw Th^ Ptinflc 4 ift(iji tif Hiitmtt, tendon, tyti, |tf . 21^-21.

602

FE7HOPF.AN TFHRITORTAL EKPANSinv

PT. Ill

Luang Prabangr he said^ his government proposed io draw a line
from a point nearly due east of that place southwards to the Mekong,
and below that point to make the river the dividing IJne between
French and Siamese territory until it entered the territory' of Cambodia,
The boundaries of Siam should be defined up to the Chinese frontier
on both the British and the French sides.

Salisbury's immediate reply was sympalhetic on the subject of a
buffer state* With regard to the other proposals, however^ he said he
had insufficient ev'tdenee on which to e?tpress an opinion, hut tvould
be grateful for exact details of the proposed frontier line between
Cochin China and Siam. After consultation with the India Office
Sali$burj" sent a considered reply to Waddingtoit on 27 August.
Britain, he indicated^ would welcome measures which would establish
a strong independent kingdom of Siam with welUdefined boundaries;
and he fonvarded a map showing the India Office view of her bound¬
aries. The western one w^as clearly demarcated up to the northern
limit of British Burma before the annexation of Thibaw's kingdom.
'J'hose on the north and north-west were shown as approximate.
He asked for the \iews of the French government on the subject of
the east and north-east ones, saying that as soon as he received them
he would be prepared to discuss with Waddington the next step for
carry'ing his proposal into effect. He warned him* however, that
Siam's territorial claims could only be settled in communication
with her government.

Before we proceed to deal with the next phase of the atory two
points must be emphasized. In the first place Luang Prabsng had
been tinder Siamese suzerainty for a century at leasts and in the
French official maps in use up to the date of this exchange of views
was marked as part of Siam.^ In the second place the Convention of
7 May 1886, providing for the appointment of a vice-consul there,
had implicitly acknowledged the sovereignty of Siam.

Waddington never replied to Salisbury's communication of
27 August 1889. The matter indeed w^as not taken up again until
February 1S92. During the intenul Pavic was sent on his * second
mission\ and there can be no doubt that France's sudden lapse into
silence on the Siamese question was a result of the decision to despatch
it- Before the next approach w^as made to the Foreign Office in
February 1892, the Quai d’Orsay had taken certain significant steps.
It had increased its agencies in Siam by opening scmJ-commercial,

^ J. G. D. CjunpbcU, Siitm in f/r^r Tffp'wiiVfA iliuAtrates ihu potni vkith a

ftkttcK-map (p, 293) nnd a mlouf-eil folding map (p^.

Ctl, 37 BRITAIN, ITHNCF AND THE SIAMESE QtJESTION fi03

semi-political bureaux at Utene, Bassac and Stung Trcjig; U had also
appointed Pavic lo be resident Tiuniiter at Bangkok. The reason for
these moves is not far to seek. Sbm had leamt that France had made
approaches to both London and Peking regarding tbe Mekong ques¬
tion. She had therefore begun to atiffcn her attitude considerably'
and to play for British support. Hence the object of Pavie's new
‘ mission* was to apply the softening-up process at the centre. And
it is no mere coincidence that on j6 February 1892, the day after the
announcement of his appointment lo Bangkok, VVaddington broke
the long silence between London and Paris on the Mekong question
by suddenly coming forward with a new proposal.

His government, he explained, was concerned to avoid further
difficulties with Britain in the matter, and thought that the best
method w'ould be for each power to bind itself not to extend its
influence beyond the upper Mekong. ITie implications of this
proposal were so unwarrantable that Lord Salisbury proffered the
obvious objection that French influence did not extend to the upper
Mekong. This evoked from "Waddington what can only be described
as a deliberately lame explanation of his proposal. .It was, he said, of
the nature of a prophylactic; he did not intend to imply that the actual
sphere of influence of either France or Britain did indeed extend up
to the Mekong.

Before the discussion could go further Salisbury’s government fell
and Gladstone returned to power. Lord Rosebery took over the
management of foreign affairs, in due course Waddington in a
personal conversation took up the matter of the French proposal.
I.ord Rosebery accordingly made a considered statement of the
British position. It was contained in two notes delivered respcaively
in December 1892 and April 1893. He explained that through il.s
annexation of the kingdom of Ava the British govemment had acquired
rights in certain districts east of the Mekong. I’hus Keng Cheng, a
dependency of Kengtung, extended east of that river, as also did
the district of Kiang Hung, the northern portion of Kengtung. He
went on to say that Britain proposed to limit her frontier to the
Mekong by transferring Kiang Hung to China and Keng Cheng to
Siam. He warned Waddington that an engagement along the lines
suggested by France tvould cause alarm and suspicion in !yam, and
stated categorically that until France explained quite clearly her
views regarding Siam's eastern and north-eastern frontiers Britain
could not consider the conclusion of a formal agreement.

On this note negotiations broke down a second time, but not

tUSGPF-AN TF«RrTORlAL r.\P\SAlOS

PT. n r

A04

before WaJdbgton, m 3 conversation with Rosebery in March rSgj,
had lei the cat out of the bag regarding the real nature of French
intentions. His government, he said, did not admit that any part of
Siam lay on the left bank of the Mekong, since all the country lying
on that side belwged to Metnam. Rosebery's attitude in face of this
astounding voUc-facc was one of cautious diplomatic resen'e. The
Siamese have never ceased to deplore the weakness which he showed
at this moment, when in their view a firmer stand would have saved
so much subsequent trouble. There can he little doubt that his failure
to pursue a more positive line actually encouraged France to go ahead
alone. But the accusation made by French writers that Britain backed
down after encouraging Siam to oppose France^ is a complete travesty
of the facts. 'Ffiroughout this period Britain w^as urging the Siamese
to do nothing likely to precipitate a rupture with France.

Meanwhile ^incidents* had been taking place on the spot, and were
being played up as much as possible in France with the object of
rousing public opinion in favour of a forward move. To this more
dUillusioncd age they appear mher petty. Two that caused a violent
Storm in the Chamber of Deputies were the evpulsion by the Siamese
authorities of two French agents, Champenois and Esquikt, from
Oudone without explanation, and the death of Massie, the l-Vench
agent at Luang Prabaugt after leaving the place in despair at the diffi¬
culties placed in his way by the Siamese repfcscntarives there. His
death was due to natural causes; there was no suggestion of foul play.
But the Colonial Party was looking for martyrs.

The agitation caused by these incidents led the French go%'er7iment
in February 1893 lo authorize the Governor-General of Indo-China
to take energetic action on the Siamese frontier if immediate repara¬
tion tvere not obtained. In the following month, it will he remem-
hered, Waddington told Lord Rosebery that in the French view' all
the territory on the left bank of the Mekong belonged by right to
Vietnam. At the same time Pavie, under instructions from the Quai
d’Orsay, made the same claim 10 the Foteign Office at Eangkolu
The Siamese protested, 'Fhey offered to refer any doubtful matters

^ Thk view hfls been accept aJ uncnticmny by VjiTtinw TliompMfi in Thailand,

(p. 187) giv» a cwtpicrciv picture of the ncuctintioiu
bemeea France and BHlam. The French ardiWea relating t*> thii qursnen
never beennibroWn open to the public and onijr ft H'Fecvion of thttn hii been published,
DfKitmffiti Dipii^matiqtin, Affttira da Siam 4 t <^Jii Haul Paris, j^j and tfty6.

The Britiah urchivea tire yp lo 1 bui dehnitive ntuJr subject h&s yet

b«fn puhJttbed. T^e« is an ufipybiisbcd Pb.D. thetii by K.S.M Murti^ Atrvla^
Fmth RrLjfitMU tttfh Siam^ -which waa succeasFully iubmitteJ T<l thu

Lrnivenity tif lyindnn irt 195= and is based on a detsited Study of ibc etlenaivc nuitcrials
in ihe Public KeCord -Office.

CH. 37 \SU TilB QrHSTlON fj05

to arbi I ration. But Fa vie demanded I he immediate evacuation of all
positions held by Siam in the disputed temtorv'.

In April the French followed up their claim by organising three
columns to occupy, by force if necessary, the leiritory on the Lower
Mekong which they claimed. One under Captain 'Fhoreux seised
Slung I’reng on the Mekong inside the Siamese frontier, and shortly
aftenvards the island of Rhone below the rapids. I'he second began
an advance towards Muong-Fhine, and the third went to the Cammon
region.

Bangkok, faced by this critical situation, and with an army quite
incapable of standing up to the French, continued to offer arbitration,
while at the same time making frantic appeals for help to Britain,
l.ord Rosebeiy'^s reply« which he also communicated to the Quai
d^OrsaVr was eminently correct. He urged the Siamese to avoid
anything that might provoke France to reson to %var. But it cold
comfort to the harassed Prince Devawongse, And the inevitablc
frontier incidents occurred. There was an attack on the French
position at Khone. The French commander, Thoreux, was taken
prisoner and some Vietnamese soldiers killed. The Siamese tried to
place the reponsibiliiy for it upon the $cmi-barbarous tribes in the
neighbourhood. Then they changed their tune and contended that
Captain Thoreux had been in command of an aggressive expedition
and his capture w as justified. Lord Robbery, however, supported the
French demand for his surrender, and as an act of grace the Siamese
handed him over,

'rhe systematic advance of the French columns along the Mekong
brought a whole series of incidents. It seems impossible to establish
the Imth about them; and since their propaganda value to France was
high, one naturally distrusts the French version. The French were
looking for trouble in order to turn it to their own ends. The most
publicised incident was one in which, according to the French account,
the Siamese murdered a F^rench official, M, Grosgurin, while he was
conducting one of their frontier gartisiitis from an abandoned post
back to the Mekong* Subsequent investigation established the fact
that the attack had been made by the French party on the Siamese.
But long before this w^as known the French version of the affair caused
the agitation in France against Siam to reach such a pitclj^ that the
government was able to take the drastic action which w'as the object
of all this manceuvring.

EUROPEAN TERRITORIAL EXPANSION

PT. Ill

boft

(f) Pakiiam ami after

By April 1883 the tension in Bangkok had become so acute that
a BntJiih gunboat, the Steift, was sent there to protect British lives
and property in case of trouble. Two months later there w'cre rumours
that the French intended to send a naval sc^uadron to close the port.
It was feared that if such action were indeed to be taken there would
be a mass outbreak of the lower classes of the Chinese population
in the city, A further British ivarship, the Palius^ was accordingly
despatched from Singapore. A full explanation of these mom was
sent to the French government and assurances were given that the
British government was doing its utmost to persuade Siam to come
to a friendly agreement with France. The French government in
return gave Britain an undertaking to report at once to her any move*
merits of its fleet in the neighbourhood of Siam.

A 1 reneh gunboat, the Lutitt, w'as anchored in the Nlenam off the
French legation. Early in July Favie notified the Siamese government
that two more French gunboats were being despatched and would
arrive at Paknam on the 13th, He asked for pilots to bring them up
to Bangkok. The Siamese government rcpli^ that under its treaty
with France no warships of any foreign power could proceed further
than Paknam without iu consent. This was certainly the intention of
the clause in the Franco-Siamese treaty of 1856 dealing with the
subject, though it may be conceded that its wording was not so clear
as in the Anglo-Siamese treaty of the previous year. Pavie, however,
brushed aside the Siamese objection and informed them that the
/flrortrtflwt would priced up to Bangkok, even in face of opposition.

On receiving this inforntation the Siamese began to close the mouth
of the river, while Lord Rosebery reminded the French of their
promise to keep hU government informed of any movements of their
fleet and made it clear that the additional British ships sent from
Singapore would not go beyond Paknam, In response to this warning
the French Foreign Minister, M. Devcllc, telegraphed Rosebery
that the additional F rench ships u'ould also remain outside the bar
at Paknam, anti on the morning of 13 July Pavie in Bangkok gave a
similar a^urance to Prince iJevaw'ongse.

On that same day the larwataTit and Comete arrived at Paknam
to find the British warships lying at anchor there. Captain Macleod,
the British commander, informed the French that thev might expect
msuuctums to wait tmUidc the bar. The French commander, how-

CH. 37 BRiTAINp FHANCE AND THE fK>7

c^ eri disrcgardi;il this advice, and after a twenty minutes' engagement
with the Pakaam fort, In which both sides sulfered casuatiies, the
two warships made their way up the river to Bangkok, 'J’be best
account of the incident is given by Warrington. Smyth in his Five
VVflrj ift Smm^ He was an eye-witness. Captain Macleod in reporting
the incident declared that the French commander actually received
in^tmetions to remain at Paknam before entering ihe river. Be that
as it may, the Siamese committed the serioii;S blunder of firing the
first shots in the encounter^ By disregarding Robbery's reiterated
advice they had played into the hands of the French. 'Phe tw'q ships
anchored olTthc French legation at Bangkok. At this critical moment
Prince Devawongse rose to the occasion by congratulating their com¬
mander on his skill and daring in forcing an entrance. His admirable
suavity and restraint probably saved the situation^

Pavie at once sei'/ed the opportunity to demand that the Siamese
troops should be withdrawn from the Mekong and all hostilities
suspended. IMncc Devawongse agreed to the demand, but tht French
government at home was by no means satisfied. It instructed Pa vie to
deliver an ultimatum demanding that the whole of the territory on the
left bank of the Mekong, including the principality of Luang Prabang,
should be ceded to France, that an Indemnity of three rnillioit francs^
should be paid in respect of the casualties inflicEed on the French
ships, and that the officers responsible for the firing at Paknam and
the murderers of Grosgurin should be punished. Failing this a
blockade of the Menam would be established.

The ultimatum w^as delivered on 20 July. 'Fhc Siamese government
accepted the second and third demands but offered a compromise in
place of the first. Pa^'ie, however^ refuged to bargain and announced
that he would leave Bangkok on the a 6 th if the demands were not met
in toto. It was now^ Britain's turn to be alarmed. She had optimisti¬
cally believed that the French dispute with Siam was concerned
merely with the frontier on the lower Mekong. Now she saw that
if France annexed all the territory covered by the first demand, not
only was the question of the lAtcgritj' of the Siamese dominions
mvolvcd, but on the upper Mekong the French would come directly
into contact with Burma and their claims would clash with British
interests in that region^ ^

I'he British ambassador in Paris was accordingly instructed to obtain
from M. Develle a clear statement re^rding France*s aims. Devclle

‘ Ne« Yofie. iM

* ejcdtiinge rate pf the franc ivi» then i^cnty-livc to ihi: £,

6o8

l-tKOl'hilN TliHHITUHlAL EXPANSION

rf. Jil

rcpJletl lliai since the terms of the ulttmatum had been puhlishcii to the
lA^rld France could not, in the excited state of her own public opinion,
climb down. He assured the ambassador, however, that when Siam
had accepted the terms the way would be open for the establishment
of a buffer state between the French and British empires, Not¬
withstanding its previous experience of the value of French promises
regarding the Mekong question, the British government accepted the
trench assurance. DevelJe indeed promised that France w'ouEd
respect the independence of Siam. Lord Rosebery therefore went so
far as to urge the Siamese to accept the French deittands.

On 25 July, when the Siamese governnicnt had given no sign of
acceptance, the French proceeded to blockade the Menam. Two days
later Chulalongkom, who had been in a state of collapse throughout
the crisis and had left matters entirety to Prince Devawongse, accepted
the terms of the ultimatum unconditionally. On 3 August the blockade
was called off, but Chulalongkom had to agree to further stipulations
throw'n in as guarantees. Pending the Siamese evacuation of the east
bank of the I^Iekong France was to occupy Chsintabun. Moreover,
Siam was to withdraw her forces to a distance of twenty-five kilo¬
metres from the west bank, and in addition evacuate the provinces of
Battambang and Siemreap (Angkor), which had once belonged to
Cambodia.

Even then the state of tension was in no way relaxed. When
negotiations began for a treaty in which all these concessions were to
be embodied France attempted to insert a number of supplementary
ternvi, ostensibly designed as additional guarantees, but, in I^ird
Rosebery 5 w'ords, calculated to infringe materially the independence
and integrity of Siam, which she had pledged herself to respect.
Throughout the negotiations Britain constantly applied pressure on
France to modify her deniands. Chulalongkom, htiwever, had hoped
for much mure positive support and was bitterly disappointed at what
he regarded as British neutrality. The Siamese government did its
utmost to resist the French demands, and it was not until France had
scj^'ed a further ultimatum upon him that Chulalongkom, acting on
British advice, gave way and on 3 October accepted the treaty.

J ranee had scored a dipliimattc triumph over Britain, whose hands
were tied^by the fear that firmer actiun on her part w'ould lead to a
European war. From the moment wiien the Biamese fired their first
salvo at Paknam the game was in I-'rance’s hands, and in the opinion of
shrewd observers Rosebery went as far as he could consistently with
prudence. What Lord Curzon described as *ihe fiery Chauvinism

CJI. 37 BBIT.MN, tRAXCK ANU fllK i^lAAIb^l- QVhSTlOS fj 09

of the Colonial Jingoes of I'tingking and Saigon'^ had risen to a
dangerous pitch. They were demanding control o%Tr Baltambang and
Siemreap, and further resistance by Siam might have resulted not only
in their loss to France but also in a real threat to her independence.
l-[ad matters reached such a pas^ it b an interesting speculation vvhal
action Btiiain would kave taken. As it was^ Siam owed her salvation
not a little to the consistency with which British diplomacy con¬
centrated upon obtaining from France a guarantee of the independence
of the basin of the Menam^

After the immediate crisis had passed^ Britain’s interest was in the
creation of the promised buffer state on the upper Alekong. In August
1893 J. G. Scott was recalled from his special work in the Shan states
and sent to take charge of the legation at Bangkok so that in due course
he might represent Britain on the Buffer State Commission. His
opposite number was to be Auguste Pavie, Since the previous year
arrangements had been in progress between Britain^ China and Siam
for the rectification of Burma’s eastern frontier. Kiang Hung and
Mong Lem had been ceded to China on condition that they were not
to be alienated to another country' without British permission. When,
however, France forced Sbm to surrender her territory on the upper
Mekong, China broke the treaty by ceding the trans-Alekong state of
Kiang I lung to France,

Britain had been about to make a similar arrangement for the
transfer to Stam of Keng Cheng w ith its capital Mong Sing. But now
under the IVanco-Siamese Treaty of 1S93 France daimed the state aa
being on the left bank of the Mekong. It was in this area that the
proposed buffer state was to be formed; Scotl and Pavie accordingly
arranged to meet at Mong Sing at the end of December i&94. The
little state was under a Myosa. He received so many contradictory
messages regarding both the actual and the future status of his
principality that he finally decided that the way of safety was to hoist
the French Hag over his But when members of the British

delegation began to arrive first he took fright and fled. "It was the
wisest thing he could do/ commented Scott. ^ Scott, w ho arrived there
on Christmas Day to find the French flag flying, promptly had it
hauted down. On 1 January 1895, when Pavie turned up. the Union
Jack was flying over the hatv. *rhe fat was then truly in the fire. The
petty little affair almost flared up into a first-lass intemationat
incident. 'Fhe Buffer State Commission broke up and the negotiations

^ Jx G. D. a'l-^ P- 311 ,

* MittQHk Scoilttf i/it Shm p, ai u

tl'HOriiAN TEHRITORIAL ^AFANSlO^i FT. Ill

had to be transferred to Europe. The plait for a buffer stale vanished
into thin air, Scott and Pavie could not agree on its limits, and on the
grounds that under any form of arrangement it would become a
dangerous focus of intrigue Scott persuaded the British government
to abandon the idea.

'I'he Mang Sing incident and the failure of the Buffer State Com¬
mission caused a hysterical outburst in France against Britain very
similar to the one that was three years later to be produced by the
Fashoda affair. The two countries actually came to the brink of war.
In the negotiations which began in June Britain traded her claims
to territory east of the Mekong for a joint guarantee of the independ¬
ence of the Menam valley. It was u good bargain, since she had
never intended to hold on to the trans-Mekong territory, .And Lord
Salisbury's idea of defining Siam in terms of the Metiam valley,
though denounced by indignant journalists/ did result in an effective
guarantee of the independence of the area which contained four-
fifths of her population and was economically one of the richest
regions in the Indo-Chinese peninsula. Moreover, France ivas fobbed
off with territories which, though large; were economically worthless.

The Anglo-French agreement was signed in January 1S96. Mdng
Sing went to France. Both states guaranteed the independence of the
Menam valley and promised to seek no exclusive advantages in Siam.
The agreement did not affect the Komt plateau, the old Cambodian
provinces of Battambang and Siemreap, or the Malay Peninsula.
Salisbury was careful to point out that these were as int^ral parts of
Siam as the .Menam valley, but from the point of view of an agreement
with France concerning British interests were of no iroportaoce.*

It was only with the lapse of time that the soundness of this policy
became evident. I-ranee indeed soon discovered how worthless were
the Mekong territories she had acquired, compared with the Menam
valley. Her Colonial Party actually proclaimed, loudly and publicly,
that control over the Menam was essential to the economic success of
French Indo-Cbina. It was some years before the danger was really
averted. 'Fhcre were constant quarrels between France and Siam, and
the continued occupation of Chantabun, which was a heavy drain
on French colonial finances without any compensating advantages,
caused much heart-burning to both sides.

on ihr obsmdonmHK of Sinj wai that I,ord
Vfho WM, wiihout exception, the worst Foreign Swiemry wo ever hotl for
maiteni east of Siuta.. .. (gave up the whole question.'

Uii. »v’.n-cighihsnf

CH, 37 BHITAIN, FRANCE ASD THE SIAMESE QUESTION 6ll

The dangerous quarrel was over a badly-clfafted clause in the

treaty of 1893* under which Siam promised to hand over to the French
legation ai Bangkok at! such Annamite, Khmer and Laotian subjects of
France as were detained in the country^ and alloAv any deported
inhabitants of the Laos states to return home. The French consulate
thereupon went ahead with the enrolment of as many ^French
proteges^ as possible^ without any proper investigation of their cases.
It then complained to the Siamese government that they were being
prevented from receiving the protection of French jurisdiction*
The matter caused no little embarrassment to the SiamesCp since thdr
navy was manned largely by Khmers. flad it not been for her fear of
Britain's possible reaction to any attempt to sabotage the agreement of
1896^ this question could easily have afforded France a useful pretext
for extinguishing Biam^s independence.

Anglo-French bickering over the question of trade wdth Yunnan
gradually died a natural death, in 1897 an agreement permitted
the construction of a railway from French Jndo-China to Y^unnan and
provided for its ultimate conneclion with the Burma Railways. The
French built a line linking Tongking with Yunna^u (Kuniidng)^ but
went no farther. The British abandoned their surv eys beyond Bhamo
and Lashio respectively. Between 1894 and 190a Major H* R. Davies
surveyed all possible railway routes into Yunnan and produced an
extremely valuable bwk and map on the subject. He showed that the
country to be traversed was exceptionally dilhcuk and the profits of
the enterprise doubtful, but advocated construction. By this time,
however^ it had become quite clear that the best approach to Yunnan
was from Tongking, At the turn of the century also Britain had
become ton preoccupied with the Boer War on the one hand and Ger¬
man ambitions on the other to devote much attention to Indo-Chinese
affairs. When, therefore^ Lord Cunion as Governor-General of India
dubbed the idea of linking up the Burma Railways with Y'unnan
‘midsummer madness" and vetoed the proposal it was summarily
relegated to the limbo of lost illusions.

In April 1904 the conclusion of the Entente Cordiale wound up
finally the Franco-British controversy over Siam and left both sides
free thereafter to come to terms separately with Bangkok. In that same
year France concluded a new' treaty %vHth Siam whereby^ the l.aos
frontier was modified to her advantage. Siam renounced her
sovereignly over Luang Frabang and agreed to a joint commission tu
deal with the Cambodian frontier. In return France agreed to
evacuate Chantabun and reduced her demands in connection with her

G]2

EUROPEAN TERRITORIAL EXPANiilON

PT. ill

* proteges^ and the neutral zone. I'hls proved to be a turning-point in
the relations between the two countries, tn igoy they made a further
agreement whereby Siam surrendered the Cambodian provinces of
Battambang and Siemreap. France in return handed back some of the
territory' surrendered by Siam in 1904 and abandoned dl claims to
jurisdiction over her Asian subjects.

Britain also began discussions with Siam in 1904. 'Fhey resulted in
the conciusion tn 1909 of a treaty by w^hich she surrendered all her
extra-territorial rights in return for the abandonment by Siam of her
sovereign rights over the Malay states of Kelantan, Trengganu,
Kedah, and Perl is. She also granted a loan of four million sterling to
Siam for railway construction in the Peninsula. Siam was the gainer
on balance by the treaty i her rights over these states were vague, and
they had never been a paying proposition-

The story of what Graham appositely terms ‘the long-drawm-out
series of diplomatic contortions^ by which Siam fended off a ravenous
enemy at the co$t of sacrificing 90,000 square miles of teiritory is not a
pleasant one. It belongs to the most intense period of European
competition for cclonial possessions and reflects some of its worst
features. Siam^ it has been said, * gaLncd morally by this physical loss
in that she became a more compact and homogeneous country. She
had certainly not shown her best qualities in exercising dominion over
other peoples* The Anglo-French agreement of January 1896 did
much to raise Siam^s morale^ it inaugurated a new period of reform
largely influenced by British ideas.

* Vincinin ThcimpMiri, up, p, thy

PART IV

NATIONALISM AND THE CHALLENGE TO
EUROPEAN DOMINATION

CHAPTER 38

THE RESURGENCE OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA

At the beginning nf the twentieth century new factors of far-reaching
significance may be discerned in the histoiical development of Somh-
East Asia* Asia as a whole was becoming aware of itself as never
before. A fermentation was in proc^ chat in many ways bears a
striking resemblance to the European Renascence of the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries. Only in South-East Asians case^ unlike
Europe^ the attack upon traditionalism^ the introduction of new ways
of thinking and new techniques, and the break-up of the older
regimented^ feudal social order came as a result of the imposition of
alien political and economic domination. By the end of the nineteenih
century all her states save Siam had come under Eiynopcan control, and
Siam's own political independencCt threatened in !S93 by France^ was
still in jeopardy-

I’hc threat of European dominance had made itself felt from 151
when Albuquerque conquered IVIalacca. But the European states of
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were in no position to establish
territorial sway over immense regions so remote from their shoresp
Nor did they covet it at first. They planted ‘factories*. Thc^i'^ sought
to monopottze commerce^ not to exercise political power with all its
responsibilities^ Their eontrol was maintained by powerful fleets
and forts with garriaonfl. And when, like the Dutch towards the end
of the seventeenth century, they gained political ajntrol they did not
administer territories directly, but through native rulers. There %vaa
hardly any interference with native institutions, though in some
places coni^idemble interference with econoimc activities.

The Portuguese were pledged to a crusade against the infidel, but
against both Islam and Theravada Buddhism their missionaries had
strikingly little succe^^ I'he Dutch and English made no attempt
before the mnetcenth centuiy to interfere with the estahlishett^^hgionsp
The French, on the other hand, in the Latter half of the seventeenth
century^ launched a grandiose scheme of Catholic missionary enter¬
prise, using Ayut^ia aa their base. But Louis XIV's pet project to
cont err the t-ar East foundered on the rock of its deeper political

fitfi THE CHALLENGE TO ElrHOPFAN DOMINATION’ pj. IV

implications. It aroused intense ami-European xenophobia in Siam
which was not relaxed until the days of Maha Mongkut, 'I’hc
other states of the mainland also—notably Burma, Annam, and
'i ongking—developed this same tendency to an increasing degree.
'I'hey showed tlie greatest suspicion towards all types of European
aclivfty.

The nineteenth century brought a new phase in the European
impact, with a far more dangerous threat to the jealously guarded
independence of the South-East Asian states. It was a period of rapid
Western political and territorial advance, when Britain, France and
iiolland acquired colonial empires in South-East .\sia. 'I'he whole
situation changed. The great companies of commerce, the directors of
European enterprise in the earlier period, disappeared from the scene.
Government officials toot the place of merchants, territorial revenues
of trading profits, and at home control by ministers of state was sub¬
stituted for that of boards of directors.

There was extensive exploration of natural resources; foreign
capital, not all of ft European, was invested on an ever-incrcastng
scale; economic deyelopment, particularly that of interiors, was rapid
—breathlessly so in some cases. The effects upon native life were
revolutionary. Producers became dependent upon external markets
and the heartbreaking problem of agricultural indebtedness came to
assume ^gantic proponions. Foreign immigrahon, notably of Chinese
and Indians, on an immense scale caused deep resentments and acute
problems. For some time the indigenous peoples of the ‘colonial’
territories looked on helplessly as their economic subjectiun became
more and more complete. Their growing realization of their plight
gave impetus to the movemems for national independence which
characterized the first half of the twentieth century.

The response of the West to the nationalist challenge was not un-
ayrnpathetic. early as the year iqoo the Dutch publicly proclaimed
their adoption of the ' New Course*, whereby government itf the
Indies was to be_/i>r the Indies. T he French defined their function as
a WmoB eivitatricf. The British, in response to political developments
in India, promised to train the native peoples for self-government
according to W'estern democratic methods, and to introduce it by
gradual :|tagcs. All three powers expanded and liberalized their
colonial administration by adopting methods of social welfare similar
to those they were developing at home. .All three fostered the spread
of European education. Save in the case of British Malaya, how¬
ever, where there was no strong national movement until after the

nu 3S TRF RESLTRCENCB OF 617

Second World War, the new policy failed signal!y to arrest the j^row-
ing discontent with Western domination-

I'hc national Tnovements which attained such a pitch of intensity in
Burma, Indo-China and Indonesia were powerfully Influenced by
developments ebew^here in Asia, I'he Boxer Rising of 1S99 t^hina,
the emergence of Japan and her spectacular defeat of Russia in 1905,
the Chinese ret^olution of 1911 and the establishment of the Koomin-
sang Party by Sun Yat-Sen, the increasing dominance of the Swaraj
Party in the Indian National Congress, the rase of Mohandas Karam-
chand Gandhi and the launching of his non-co-operation movement
against British mle in India, aroused their enthusiasm with the sight of
Asia casting off her chains.

The upsurge of nationalism, however, was at this time by no means
confined to Asia. U'he peace conference at Versailles at the end of the
First World War had t^eri the lid off a hoiling cauldron of nationalist
claims in Europe itself- In remaking the map of Europe the nation¬
state was accepted as the guiding principle, though with the rather
flimsy safeguard of a League of Nations to restrain what the more
penetrating thinkers ominously described as its "giant egotism".
Nationalism, and the rights of small nations in particular, became
the main topic of discussion, and the increasing numbers of Burmese,
Vietnamese and Indonesia ns who reached the higher grades of
European education in their own countries or proceeded to famous
centres of learning in Europe inevitably imbibed the heady wine of
Western political thoughts

From their study of Western history they learnt of Britain^s consti¬
tutional struggles, the American War of Independence, and the
French Rcvolutionr They read John Stuart Mill's Essay oh IJberty;
they caught the thtill of Shakespeare's ardent patriotism when they
readt

7'his Er^liind Hfs er did, mr werer shall

Lit at the proud foot d/ a roaqueror^

and the flame of freedom scorched their souls. ^Fhey were the people
who became most acutely sensitive to the racial discrimination
practised by their \^'estern rulers, for they suffered most from it. It
was from their numbers, therefore, that the political agitatars, and
eventually the national leaders, were recruited. Thus the nationalist
movements acquired both means of expression and technique through
Western ediicatton.

Nationalism, however, was not born of the revolt against European

ftlS TITF CHALLFINOF TO FITROPEAN* TMIMTVATIOK PT. IV

claTTiination. ha cultural roots go as far back in South-East Asia as in
Europe. Notwithstanding the strength of the influences coming fnam
India on the one side and China on the other, the more advanced
peoples who absorbed them showed marked, iridividuality very early
in their history. The great cultures which flowered so richly, especially
in art and architecture, during the Middle Ages—Mon, Khmer, Cham,
Javanese, and Burmese—not only reflect that individuality hut even in
their earliest expression are quite distinct from Indian. And even in
the case of Vietnam, w'here it may be contended with reason that
Chinese was the parent culture, the diflerences arc significant, for the
Vietnamese struggle for political independence, which came to a
successful issue in the tenth century, was also a reaction against the
intense sinization systematically enforced by China.

Long before the arrival of the European the peoples mentioned
above were producing their own vernacular literatures. iSome—
notably Burmese, Mon, Javanese, and Balinese—e.xhibit a great
variety of forms and literary qualities of a high order. In Bali’s case it
is of interest to note that Stutterheim claims that just as in Europe
through the stimulus of the Greek and Roman classics the various
peoples developed their own national cultures, so out of Hinduism
the Balinese created ‘a proper, purely national culture*. The same can
be said with equal truth of the Burmese, Mon, Khmer, Cham, and
T’ai peoples.

It is perhaps questionable how far the great mediaeval states such
as Pagan, .Angkor, Ayut'ia or Majapahlt represented national ideas or
aspirations. The dynastic factor played a prominent part in their
history. But in the struggle of the Burmese against Shan damination,
of the Mons for independence against Burmese rule, and in the wars
between Burma and Siam in the sixteenth and eighteentli centuries,
national sentiment was evoked and played its part. Naresuen and P’ya
Faksin, for instance, were in a real sense national leaders. The struggle
bctw'cen the Chams and the Vietnamese in its later stages seems
pretty certainly also to assume a nationalist character. Nationalism
as a political sentiment does Bcem to show itself in these cases; but
the subject still awaits systematic investigation, and its discussion here
must be considered exploratory only.

1 here can Iw no doubt that much of the opposition the European
powers had to meet in their territorial expansion during the nine¬
teenth eentury had a strong nationalist content. Not a few of the
rebel leaders of that period are revered today as pioneers in the
struggle for freedom. A recent study of Gipo Negoro is w'orth

CIT. 3S HIT- RESUFGKXCF, OF AS(A 619

examination in this connection. At the beginning of the twentieth
century the great majority of people in Burma and Indo-China had
been born in the days before the final extinction of independence^ and
memories remained green of a time before European rule. All the
nationalist movemeitta gained some of their driving force from an
awareness of a historic past before the European intrusion. It was a
sedulously cultivated awarenesSp as was only to be expected^ of a
glorified past bearing little resemblance to sober history. And the
situation w^as not without its irony, for it was the European archae¬
ologist and historian who discovered the real achievements of the past
and rescued the historic monuments from decay and^ in not a few cascs^
obliv-ion.

In each country the nationalist movement pursued a lai^ely
independent coursCi There was practically no liaison betw^een the
leaders in one country and those in another, l^heir ties were much
closer with left-wing movements in the European countries under
whose sw^ay they lived. Moreover, the methods of the British^ Dutch
and French in dealing w^ith their respective areas differed con¬
siderably. Hence it is difficult to dravv comparisons between the
different movements and dangerous to generalize. Among the peoples
iheniselves there w^as much divergence of opinion regarding aims and
methods. Some were for gradual ness, others for revolution. There
were sincere patriots who w'ere anxious not to break the political ties
with the West* Few' indeed advocated the reinstatement of the
obsolete or obsolescent monarchies* And^ unlike in India, there were
extremely few opponents of Western techniques and scientific
methods. Traditionalism, however^ showed its infiuence in Buddhist
and Islamic revivalism^ and in Burma the Young Men^s Buddhist
Associatiems and in Indonesia Sarckat Tsbm played impnitant roles.
Buddhism became closely identified with national $entimcnt in both
Burma and Siam, and the patriotism of tho^ who belonged to other
religions was impugned. Partly fnr this reason Communism failed to
appeal to the great majority of people* Only in French tndo-China
did the Communists gain contml over the Vietnamese nationalist
movement^ and then only because of French intransigence.

CHAPTI-R 39

BRITISH BURMA, ias&^i942

Britain’s greatest mfstake in dealing with Burma was td attach the
country to the Indian empire. It ivas the natural thing to do, seeing
that each stage of the conquest was organttted and carried out by the
Government of India. But its inevitable result was the stindardination
of Burma’s administration according to the Indian model. In Malava
the mistake was avoided because the British fonvard move there came
after the transfer of the Straits Settlements to the Colonial Office.
Rven as late as iS86 it could have been avoided if, when the w^hole
country came under British mie, the fact had been adequately re¬
cognized that its culture, history and outlook gave it an individuality
w'hich It was the duty of the conquerors to preserve with all possible
care. But as few people knew anything about these things administra¬
tive convenience was the overruling consideration.

It used to be said that three generations in Ireland makes an Irish¬
man. It would be equally true of Burma. Moreover, the earliest
British administrators found that the only effective way of getting
anything done was to do it according to the Burmese method. The
Burman judged every thing according to the extent to which it con¬
formed to Burmese custom, and the reply, * It is not our custom', given
by the Court of - 4 va to a proposal made by a British envoy, was final.
It was useltss to argue further. Hence in Tenasserim after its annexa¬
tion in 1826. and in Pegu after 1852, although the administrative lay¬
out conformed to the Indian model, administrative practice tended to
conform to Burmese traditional methods- And although in theory the
Bengal metKod of direct rule emploved^ in practice indirect rule
not unlike the Dutch system in Java prevailed. ’ITie life of the ordi nary
villager went on much as it had under Burmese rule, and verv few
Burmans lived in towns.

\arioujj^ factors combined to bring a fundamental change in this
state of affairs. In the first place the process of standardization
according to the Indian model received cunstderable impetus from the
efforts that had to be made to quell disorder after the annexation of
t88f>. In the long run, however, the effects of this might not have been

621

CU, 2^1 iiKlTmi BLHMA, 1886 ly+2

decisivep iintl the traditional Hurmesc nielhads might in lime have
reassertcd themselves, had it nut been for the development of in¬
creasing specialization in functions and the additional responsibilities
which governments of the modern Western began to undertake
during the succeeding period, The old policj' of laissez-faire was
abandoned and new forms of governmenial interference^ aiming at
improved efficiency or social welfare, w'ere invented* And along with
them, aa a result of immensely improved communications, came
greater and ever greater central control — the control of the Rangoon
Secretariat over district administration, and the control of the Govern¬
ment of [ ndia over provincial administration.

The immediate problem after the annexation was that of disorder,
"i'he Burmese army disregarded the order to surrender and melted
asvay into the jungle villages w ith its arms to carry on guerrilla warfare
over a wide area. The ihugyis, w^ho had been the backbone of the
Burmese system of district administration, became the leadens of the
resistance movement, and at the head of marauding bands roamed far
and wide to prevent the establishmeni of settled government. No less
than five princes of the royal family, each claiming the throne* held
out in different regions^ And a serious rebclliuti Broke out in Lower
Burma. 'J'he abolition of the kingship* tvorthless as Thtbaw had
proved himself tu be, evoked a nation-wide reaction against foreign
rule. It took fixe years of bard campaigning to subdue the country^
and at the peak period of the resistance an army of 32,000 troops and
8,500 military police w'as fully engaged-

For purposes of civil administi'ation Upper Burma^ excluding the
Shan States and the extensive hill tracts inhabited by non^Burmese
peoples, was divided into fourteen districts, each under a Deputy or
AssiSlant Commissioner. So far as revenue and civil justice were
concerned, the original intention of Sir Charles Bernard was for these
to work through indigenous agencies according to local methods. But
Bernardos successor, Sir Charles Crosthw'aitc^ who came with firmly
fixed ideas of Indian administration, brought with him a ready-drafted
scheme for making the village, as in India, the basic social and political
unit. Hi& theory^ was that the circle headman of the older adminis¬
tration, known as inyothitgyis or taikthagy isy had, in the words of a
recent studyJ 'overshadowed and usurped the rightful power of the
village headman"* 1 lis plan, therefore, was to break up the circle into
villages and strengthen the village a$ an administrative unit, primarily
in order to use it for the resloralion of law and ordcfn Lor his
^ F. S. V. DunniBOTij 7VWir Aftmitjiiirtttion (jt Ltindun Ktid Ntiv York, 1*}$^,

62^

THE CHALLENGE TO ECHOFEAN DOMINATION

FT. IV

immi^diate intention was to liold the village community rc:>pon&]ble
for cdities committed uithin itK tract.

The new policy was set in motion by the Upper Burma ViJJage
Regulation of 1S87 and the Burma Village Act of 1889. which applied
it throughout the country. These two mea^ure^ imposed statutory
duties concerning the maintenance of order and the collection of
revenue upon the headman and villages. As a result uf their enforce-
ment the myofhugyis and tnikifyugyh were gradually tlimtnated. I he
largest indigenous social and political unit of the previous period was
thus destroyed and a stereotyped direct administration imposed^ with
the village tracts placed under the charge of a civil sen ant, the myo-Qk
or township officer,

Air. S, Funii^'aJh who during his long experience as an adminis*
irator in Burma not only had a dose view of the working of the new
system but also made a careful study of the existing indigenous
materials relating to the myofktigyi system^^ has summed up the effects
of the change in a recent ivork.® In the first place, he writes, the
villages had duties imposed upon them vvithout any compensating
rights^ In the second place, in order to equaliac headmen^s charge
so as to combine adequate emoluments with efficient administration
(from the point of vdew' of supervision by the a comprehen¬

sive scheme of amalgamation was carried through after 1909* The
merging of villages which this involved led to a reduction in the
number of headmen.by over 2,000 and made the 'village' a mere
artificial administrative unit. In the third place, w'ith the disappear¬
ance of the ftiyot/wgyi the habit of referring serious disputes between
adjacent villages to Ills arbitration as to arrive at a compromise
according to know^n custom^ tended to die out and The mechanical
logic uf ihc law courts was substituted^ His gcAeraJ conclusion is
that the popular self-government of Burmese times was replaced by
a foreign legal system^

It secni^ doubtful whether the semi-feudal power of the
can be rightly termed ^popular self-government*, though it must be
admitted that the ffiyat/mgyi was bound by local custom j be did not
give arbitrary decisions. But Avheiher the old Burmese institution was
capable of carrjdng out the new duties necessarily imposed by
twentieth-century conditions may also be doubted. The great evil of

’ Tilt* fndin rcc<ini» jire ii miH4i uf scvcTnl thc^aund liKUtnirnti known Miriam.
Limu-flII i^nnted jt Inij[e of thei«^ in ■ vdIuibc w-likh wm utiiiftrentSv nmr

luJUtkEli ll IhBul l.ur VI.,— __-L i. i ^ * - . “ . .

Crt, 39 BRITISH l8S6-194^

lilt new system that the my&~€k as a civil aer\ant was subject to
frequent transfer and rardy stayed Inng enough in one place to Icam
all that was necessary for good administration^ whereas the myothugyi
was a local man whose ancestors had held the office before him,

Burma's artificial connection with India had other unfortunate
results. Her first two Chief Commjssioners, Sir Arthur Bhayre and
Sir Albert Fytchc, had spent most of their previous careers in the
country; they spoke the language^ understood its religion and customs,
and Phayre wrote the fim standard history of Burma in English,
After Fytehe^s rctircnient in 1871^ however, the office of Chief
Commissioner^ and thereafter of Lieutenant-Governor^ was held by
men who had been trained in India and looked forward to returning
there on promotion. They never learnt the language and had only a
fimattering of knowledge of the country.

Moreover, the Indian connection imposed upon British adminis¬
trators in Burma a negative attitude towards the religion of the
country. Now Buddhism was not merely the religion of the people
but also the stale religion, and had been so ever since the reign of
Anavi^rahta of Pagan (1044-77). H«iice the abolition of the monarch
mlsed the important question of the position of the Buddhist organ¬
ization under the new regime. The men with long service in Burtna,
especially Colonel (later Sir Edward) Sladcn, who had known Mindon
intimatelyi urged that the new government should support the laivful
authority of the heads of the Buddhist Church, as the Burmese kings
had done. And responsible Burmese leaders added their pressure*
The head of the Buddhist ecclesiastical organization^ the 'rhathana-
baing, headed a deputation to Sir Frederick Roberts, the comraandcr^
in-chief, asking for confirmation of the jurisdiction of the ccclesiaslical
commission which had operated under the kings.

All he asked for was readily granted^ except the one crucial issue of
recognition of his own powers and of the ecclesiastical code by which
discipline over the monasteries of the order was maintained. The
Britbh contended that if they stepped into the king’s shots Ln this
matter it would constitute the kind of interference with religion which
the Queen’s Declaration of 1858 at the close of the Indian Mutiny had
expressly promised that her government would nhstain from. Dis¬
cipline and cohesion had already been losi by the Buddhist Church
in Lower Burma as a result of iis severance from its headquarters.
Now, with the disappearance of the last vestige of ecclesiastical
autonomy I went the only effective machinery for regulating admission
to the Order and expelling unruly members. The decay of monastic

^^4 "THE CIIALEENtiE TD EUROPEAN DOSIIN'ATJON PT. IV

discipline which rcs^ulted led to the rise of an ignorant^ titsorderiy etass
of monks who neglected the study of the Pali scriptures to preach
sedition and create unrest.

Ihe prornotion of the Chief Commbsioner in 1897 to the rank
of LieLitenant-Governor assisted by a Legislative Council of nine
nominated membersp induding five non-officials, was the prelude to,
though not the cause of, a considerable expansion in the functions of
govemment and a multiplication of neiv departments concerned with
social welfare, 1 here was also the gradual introduction of a judicial
system based upon the British principle of the separation of powers.
It began with the establishment of a Chief Court for I.ower Burma in
1900 and was followed in 1905 by the creation of a separate judicial
service to relieve local executive officeis of all ihdr civil aitd some of
their criminal cases. At first, for reasons of economy, the change was
not applied to Upper Bunnap where Divisional Commissioners sat
as sessions judges and Deputy Commisstonere tried ci\dl cases in the
remoter districts* Moreoverp the view was rightly held by many
people that the separation of powers below' High Court level was not in
the ml!crests of good governmentp and that, at least so far as the
Deputy Commissibner was concernedp it was better to concentrate
rather than disperse his authority.^

The increase of specialist departmentSp which began in 1899 with
the creation of a separate department to take over the management of
prisons from the Inspector-General of CivlJ f-lnspitals, came partly
from a new campaign for ^efficiency* inspired by Big Business and
partly from concern for social justice, which had Iseen growing through¬
out the nineteenth century among the more progressive sections of
the British people and ivas to have so pnw'erful an influence on policy
in the twentieth. ^Ihe Dutch felt this humanitarian impulse at the
Same time and proclaimed the *Xew Course' in Indonesia. In Burma
it was hurried on partly because the great increase of crime and
general lawlessness, which were the ordinary BLjrman*s protest against
the neiiV conditions introduced by alien rulep made it necessary to
free the hands of the general administrative officer for concentration
upon the campaign against the criminal.

In 19^ a Commissioner of Settlements and [«and Records was
appointed fur the more efficient handling of land revenue matters*
From 1900 also a cloeer control over educutiim was instituted and
a considerable extensiim of state education began. In 1904 the
Co-operative Credit Department was set up. In 1905 a Chief

F- V. tfft. cj|,, pp, 4&-1, hill Aamc useful ubtttrniiliQnii urt ihw nubjeet.

ClI. 39 BLTlAtA^ 1886-I94Z 625

Canfiervator of Forests was appointed and in 1906 a Director of Agri-
culture. Agricultural p Veterioiiry and Fisher>‘ deparnnents came into
beings while in 1908 a Sanitary Commissioner waj^ appointed and a
Public Health Department began to function as an organization distinct
from ita parent# the Medical Department. In Rangoon a large new
secretariat came into existence to link up all these departmentSp and
bureaucratic government became the order of the day*

Gladstonian Idberalism sought to foster the political education of
the people of India by the gradual introduction of local self-govern¬
ment. As early as 1874+ at the instance of the Government of India,
nominated Municipal Committees were established in a few Burmese
towns. In 1882 the electoral principle was introduced. Little progress,
however^ was made in self-government. The fact tltat urban popu¬
lations were composed of different communities—Burmese, Chinese^
and various types of Indian—made common action difficultn. T.ocal
opinion also was against any line of action which might increase
taxation^ and was often not in sympathy with the sort of amenities
that such committees existed to provide. Hence only in Rangoon^
with its relatively large European element and educated Asian com¬
munity^ was the system reasonably successful.

The rural District Committees, first established in 1S84 at the
instance also of the Government of India, failed rather badly as an
experiment in self-government. 'Fhe local officer had to retain a tight
hold over them, and as the great evil of frequent transfer prevented him
from gaining a thorough knowledge of his district the general result
was inefficiency^ and corruption among the subordinate officials.

In 19^09 the MintO'Morlcy reforms in the government of India
increased the size of the Burma T.egislative Council to a membership
of thirty with a non-officud majority. It could ask. questions, move
resolutions and take vuie$, but no resolution liad binding force on the
government. Notwithstanding Morley's own strongly expressed
dq$irc that the reforms should nut lead either directly or indirectly to
the introduction of the parliamentary system into India, It seems
obvious now that in 1909 Britain did in effect cross the Rubicon^
although the principle of popular election was not introduced. This
became clear when, under the stress of the First World War, Britain,
in order to hold India^ made promises of political advancement, with
responsible self-government as the ultimate aim.

The Montagu-Chelmsford Report, however, upon which the
Govemment of India Act of 1919 was based, recommended that
Burma^s case should he reserv'ed for special consideration, since her

626 THE fllALLEXCE TO EUlpl'KAN DU^Ili^ATIO^Z IT. JV

people wt:rc of :i different race, aI u different stage of political
development^ and with altogether different problems. The storm of
protest which suddenly arose in Burma when the nature of the alter’^
native proposals for her political development became known took
everybody by surprise* Burmese national sentiment was worked up
to fever pitch, boycotts were urgani^ed^ and a vociferous demand for
home rule went up.

In 1921, therefore, parliament decided to extend to Burma the
dyarchica] form of consUtution inttioduced into the other Indian
provinces by the Government of India Act of 1919.

A Burma Iteforms Committee under the presidency of Sir Frederick
Whyte was appointed to work out the details of the new arrangement
on the spot; and although the extremists among the Burmese politic¬
ians condemned dyarchy as inadequate, Burma became a governor's
province in 1923^ and subject to the exclusion of the Shan states,
Karenni and the Tribal Hills the first steps Avere taken towards "the
progressive realisatioti of responsible aclf-governmcnt'.

'Fhe main features of the new scheme were as follows: the Legis-
iative Council was increased to 103 members, of whom 79 were to be
elected cm a democratic franchise, t Avere cx offiao and 22 nominated:
the govcrtiment was entrusted to the governor xvith an Executive
Council of two Members in charge of Reserved Subjects, and two
Ministers, responsible to the legislature, in charge of Transferred
Subjects. The reserved subjects comprised defence, laAA’^ and order*
fi nance and revenue. The transfe rred de part m e nts 1 ncludcd educat ion
public healthy forests and excise. The transference of the important
Forest Department placed Burma ahead of all the other province*
except Bombay, The Franchise was granted to householders tvith-
out sex disqualification and mih eighteen aa the minimimi age
limit.

Why was so Ai^idc a franchise qualification intnHhiced, with an age
limit below that in any European democracy? Mr* FurnivalFs com¬
ments on it sum up succinctly the various attempts that have been
made to explain $0 surprising a stepj "The official expi a nation aa^os
that no qualifications of age* property or education could be devised;
simplicity welcomed it as evidence of faith in liberal ideals; cynics
ascribed jt to petulance* making the best of a bad job** or to as-
tuteness—if the people do not like bureaucracy, Icr thent have demo¬
cracy in full measure to disillusiou them. The kindest explanation is
that the government trusted, as it believed, the well-merited affeetion

^ Op, nr, p, 160.

CH. 39 BRITISH [886-1942 627

of the conservative element^' against the disatfection of a few
pernicious agitatorSn^

In additLoo Burma \va$ given five seats in the new Indian legislature
at New Delhi which dealt with what were known as ^central subjects'.
A great increase in self-governing local bodies was also provided for^
and the majority of members of both municipii committees and rural
district committees were to he elected. Moreover^ the wide range of
responsibilities entrusted to these bodies, including the maintenance
of roads other than main roads^ public Kealtht sanitation, the main¬
tenance of hospitals, the health of cattk, the provision and regulation
of slaughter-houses, the establishment and control of markets, the
operation of ferries and the creation of school boards, gave Burma a
very real degree of self-government in local affairs as ivell as at the
centre. The administration of justice was not affected, though at
almost the same time a High Court was created to replace the Chief
Court of Lower Burma and the Judicial Commissioner in Mandalay,
while the separate judicial service was extended in such a way that
divisional commissioners no longer held SessionsH.

In the Legislative Council right from the start there w^as a solid
natioaalUt bloc which normally commanded greater voting power
tlian the governments The dominant party was the People's Party,
□r the 'Twenty-one Party**' led by U Ba a moderate^ There was
also a small Independent Party, led by Sir J. A. Maung Gyi, which
tended to support the government* The extreme nationalists under
U Chit Hlaitig, the President of the Grand Council of Buddhist
Associations (the G.C.B.A.), boycotted the CounciL

The electorate w^as at first apathetic, and personal rivalries ami mg
the elected leaders weakened effective combination to conlnil the
government. 'Fhere was therefore no difficulty in obtaining candidates
for ministerial posts, even from the opposition. I'he earliest demands
of the dominant party were for improved education to fit Burmans for
self-governmentt rapid Burmanination of the public services, the
promotion of indigenous economic development, the curtailment of
foreign "exploitation\ and the provision of more money for the
' nation-building' departments and for agricultural credit. There was
notable progress in education and public healthy but the big economic
and racial problems remained as far from a solution as ever.^ Finance,
the crux of the situation, was a reserved subject; and while the trans-*
feired departments received their fair share of the allotment of money,
the fact that the heads had no responsibility for any additional burden
^ So called ffdm the number of thote who Bigncii ita progninutie.

628 THE CILALLHNGH TO lilllJOt^EAN IK>MlNATION rr. IV

impusL-d an the tax-payer meant that the working out of a com¬
prehensive miipnal policy of reconstruction, was supremely difficult.

Nevertheless dyarchy was a real step forward in the political
education of both sides. There was^ however, what has bwn de¬
scribed as 'an unsettling air of impermanence^* about it, for under the
Government of Burma Act of 1921 it w'a$ laid down that after ten
years a Statutory Commission should be appointed to consider the
possibility of a further instalment of reforms. Early on a demand
went up for its appointment sooner than the stipulated dat^t ^nd for
full responsible government and Reparation from India. The desire
for separation was natural^ for the increasing Indian immigration and
economic competition made the Burnian ftitr that his country might
one day become a vassal state of an Indian commonwealth go vended
by Indians.

In 1928 the " Simon Commission/ came to re^dew the working of the
reforms introduced in 5:923- It reported in favour of separation and a
number of constitutional advances. Then suddenly Burmese opinion
veered on the separation issue. A loudly-vocal section led by Dr. Ba
Msav, a young aspirant to political Itaderahip, proclaimed that if Burma
were separated from India her rate of constitutional progress might be
slow'Cf than India's. I'he fact that the government and Big Business
gave imqualihed support to separation aroused the deepi^t aitspiciDns.
Actually one of the chief reasons for the support given in official
circles to separation wag chat Indians share of the Burma revenues w^
considered too large. The central taxes^ such income-tax and
customs revenue, were capable of much greater expansion than pro*
vincial revenues.

While a special Burma Round Table Conference sat in London
between November 1931 and January 1932 to di$cu3& the main Hne^
of a constitution for a Burma separated from India^ the agitation in
Burma came lo a head with the formation of a strong Anti-Separation
League, which advocated joining the proposed Indian federation with
the option of secession^ At a general election held in November 1932
the League won a complete victo^y^ Hardly a single Burmese anti-
separationist was in favour of permanent union with India. Hence
when Britain made it clear tliat she was not prepared to give Burma
the option of contracting out of the Indian government at will, the
League executed a complete voltf-/act, and the Government of India
Act of 1935 provided for the separation of the two countries to take
effect on i April 1937.

CH. 39 BRITISH eiT^MA, f8S6-T942 629

The new constitution of gteparated Burmap outlined iu Part XIV and
Schedules X to XV of the GovcmmcriC of India Act, " was gi%^en body
in the Government of Burma Act+ ^935t spirit in the Instrument
of Instructions from His Majesty to the GovemmentV^ 'l‘he Burma
government came directly under the British Parliament^ the Secretary
of State for India became Secretary of State for India and Burma, and
a separate Burma Office was created under an Under-Seerctary for
Burma. The governor became solely rc$pDnsib]e for defence, cKternal
and internal, monetary policy, currency and coinage, foreign affairs
and the Excluded .Areas of the Shan states, Karenni and the Tribal
Hills. In all other matters, aave certain emergency powers entrusted
to his special responsibility, he was bound to act on the advice of
his ministers. General administration was entrusted to a cabinet of
ministers, limited to ten, under the leadership of a prime minister
and respanaiblt tn the legislature.

I'he legislature bicameraL The upper house was a Senate of
thirty"SLx members, half of whom were elected by tbc House of
Representatives and half nominated by the governor. The House of
Representatives contained 132 members, of whom^92 were elected by
territorial constituencies and the remainder represented communal and
other special Interests such as the University of Rangoon, commerce
and labour. I'he franchise was made even wider by including most
males over tw'enty^ne and all females over that age w ho could pass a
simple literac)'' test.

'I’he governorreserve powders were greater in theory than in
practice. The Instrument of Instructions counselled him * 30 to exercise
his powers as not to enable his Ministers to rely on his spccia] re¬
sponsibilities in order to relieve themselves of responsibilities w'hich
arc properly their own % And Avherever possible he was to consult them
even in matters left tu his special responsibility. It was hoped that his
'special responsibility' powers*, which included the prevention of grave
menace to internal peace, the protection of minorities, and the preven¬
tion of unfair discrimination against British subjects or their goods,
would as far as possible be held in abeyance.

The Burmese Cabinet and parliament now bad almost complete
control over internal aflaira. The first general election was keenly
contested. Dr. Ba Maw' was the first prime minister, and and his
colleagues gained office by promising to tackle the serious problems
of agrarian distress, corruption and village administratiom Their
early efforts were not very effective. But the ucw' system had no chance

^ I><mnv;«aL frp.fiL, p. 72,

THF CHALLIiN<5t^ Tf> ETT^QPEAK nOMtNATtON PT. IV

to settle down and its job, for the peace of the world was already
threatened fay Nazi Germany and the Japanese penetration into China.
And internally political life vv'as vitiated by the personal rivalries of
aspirants to pow'er^ with the consequent development of splinter
parties. Mr^ Donnfson, %vho served in Burma under the new
system, writes that *thc first reaction of the nevr Ministers to the
increased power conferred on them by the new Act* was to become
bolder, Jess scrupulous, and more cynical, interfering wJth the ad¬
ministration as a matter of course and even at times tampering with
the courts \

Britain had made an early start compared with the Dutch in tackling
the problems of indigenous education in Burma^ Phayre as first
Ct>mmi3sioner of British Burma aimed at building an educational
structure on the basis of the monastic schools, which^ as in Siam,
provided general elementary education for boys throughout the
country. But his scheme went aw^ry, for the first Director of Public
Instruction, w^ho had been appointed in i866^ died soon after, and his
$uccc$^r knew no Burmese.

The next plan was to substitute Jay schools for monastic ones-
Eventually both types were given grants-in-aid and inspected. But the
inevitable demand for English^ fostered by the demands of government
and business offices for derka, caused attention to be turned to the
development of Anglo-Vernacular education. Government schools
Avere founded In the "seventies and grants were made to the mission
schoob provided by the Roman Catholics, the Society for the Prop-
agation of the Gospel^ and in increasing numbers by the American
Baptist Mission. Some of their best pupils took the matriculation
examination of Calcutta University.

When in iSSo the whole ay stem w^as overhauled and provincial
examinations instituted, the Calcutta matriculation wtis the final aim
of most secondary schools; but the Rangoon Government Anglo-
Vernacular School, founded in 1875, developed a higher department,
Rangoon Government Colleget which in 1S84 began to prepare
students for the external degrees of Calcuna University, But depart¬
mental policy Avas to encourage voluntary schools raiher than found
government ones. In 1900 there were sixteea missionary secondary
schools apd a small Baptist college in Rangoon for the higher edu¬
cation of Karens* The Education Department maintained five
normal schools for the training of Icachers, and in addition to the
Rangoon Government High School and College, a number of
technical schools for surveying, clementaiy engineering, forestry and

CR. 39 BBTTrSH ELT^MAt I&86-I942

midwifery-; Throughout she country there were 17,000 vernacular
schoob, 34 T of them for the education of girls.

Tfi the twentieth century the increasing dernand for seeondar)'
education in English caused the serious neglect of monastic schools
and concentration upon the multiplication of secondary schools. This
inevitably brought the question of higher education to the forefront,
and the first big separation issue arose through the demand that Burma
should have its own independent university* This brought the
University of Rangoon into existence in 1920 as a teaching and
residential institution, blending the work of the two existing in-
stEtutions of higher education* Government College and the Baptist
College, which became its constituent colleges.

The universitv began its life at a moment of high political tension
over the question of dyarchy, and the refusal of the Education De¬
partment to countenance an institution after the Calcutta model,
granting external degrees and encouraging local affiliated intermediate
coHeges, combined with a simultaneous quarrel over anglo-vernacular
education to bring about a nation-wide boycott of government and
missionary educational institutions. An attempt^ was made by a
Council of National Education to create a complete educational system
free from government cuntrol. National education ivas to be the key
to unlock the door to national independence and self“gQ%xmment.

It was n most impressive movement, but after the introduction of
dyarchy and the transfer of education to the control of a Burmese
minister it lost its vitality. Etforta at conciliation succeeded, especially
Avhen in 1924 a University Amendment Act was passed giving Burmans
greater control. The boycott tvas called off and the more efficient
C.N.E, schools qualified for government grants^ The university also
was given enough money to expand its scope to include medicine,
engineering and forcstiy^ as well as to establish a large modern teachers^
training department, complete with practice schools. It gave immense
stimulus to education and culture throughout the country*^ Its
graduates notably improved the standards of the services to which
they were appointed.

But political pressure, often attempted before 1937, became far more
effective with the establishment of the new cunstitutton For Burma in

^ Dalinj4lUll’^a compljiint ((p>. fit., p. 70) that *the COUFm nf study provided were
often unrrdllJtic ttud imperfccUy rcimird to I he need* of the cai3ptjy\ irutrely refte^
the patheticaliy wTQiig-headed attitude uf the tLuropeaa community imiv'cniTy

education fer AaiilUr JUl reel criinc to them lay in the fact rhttt it K<it urLlvextity ed|i-
eation and not a aUprHnr fomi nf lechiiinaS education ‘ related ru the needs of the
cuunlry ^

632 THE CHALLENGE TO EUlJOPEAN DOAfTNATfON PT. TV

that year^ and inevitably the high standards that had been built up
against great difhciilttes in the earlier period began to deteriorate. The
Student^' Union al^ became a happy hunring-grtnind for the less
responsible type of political agitator, and discipline was tindermined^
The forcing of a new constitution upon the university in 1939 was
inspired by not a single honest educational object. The intention was
to use it to produce political agitators a^nst the British. Unfortun¬
ately, however, far loo much atteotioa has been directed to this aspect
of the question, so that the real value of the work done by the univer¬
sity during this period has tended to be obscured.^ The babble of
ilUinformed criticism is still too loud for a true appraisal of the facts.

^ A pcn&d of rwidcfice and work in tho itniveralty from December ig^i to M^irch
195 more fHno ever convinced the iitriter xhai ifiii ii the ow.

CHAPTER 40

THE DUTCH *NEVV COURSE^ AND NATIONALISM fN
INDONESIA, 1900-4:2

By 19CXJ Dutch opinion on colonial affairs had come to regard libeniL
i§m as out of date, i t was obvious that the supporters of pri vate enter¬
prise cared little about the interests of the Indonesians, and that the
immense power that private capital had come to wield %v’as in the hands
of a few great corporations able to take common action in defence of
their intere^s—the *over-might\^ subjects^ in mith, of modem times.
Dr, Abraham Kuyper^ who became prime minister in igoi, was the
writer of a pamphlet publbhed in iSSOi Oitr Program^ in which he
argued that the government must adopt a policy of moral responsibility
for native welfare. Thb idea he incorporated in the ‘ Speech from the
I'hrone* of that year. Thus was iaunched what b^ame knowm as the
* Ethical Po^ky ^

The first Socialists had by thU time entered the Dutch parliament
and were loudly proclaiming the doctrine of "Government of the
Indies for the Indies', with their eyes open to the ulrimate aim of
self-government. But a far deeper impression was made by the
Liberal Th. van Deventer, who not only drafted a new programme
for his parly, advocating welfare, deccntrali?.atian and ihe greater
employment of Indonesians in the administration^ but in 1S99 caused
a sensation by his article Eertschatd {*A debt of honour’), in
which he argued that all the money drawn from the Indies under the
batig salda since 1867, when parliament assumed responsibility for the
finances of the Indi^j should be repaid.

So once more, after a tremendous outpouring of noble sentiment»
a programme of 'decentralisation' and native welfare was set in motion,
with the same Jslmost incredible hesitation that had marked the
abandonment of the Culiurc System. ' Decentralization' was the new
gospel. It envisaged ihe delegation of powers from 'Fhe Ffague to
Batavia, from the governor-general to departments and loqpl officers^
and from European to Indonesian ofiicers. It also meant the estab¬
lishment of autonomous organs managing iheir own affairs in co-
uperation with the govtmment+ In practice, however, the Decentrali¬
sation Law^ of 1903 ;md the decrees of 1904-5 creating 1t>cal councils

634 the challenge to fiwphan domisation rr. iv

composed of Indonesians^ Europeans and Chinese went nothing like
as far as the decentralization $chcme which Governor-General Mijer
had submitted to the home government as far back as 1867. And up
to the outbreak of the First World War, which cut off Bata%'ia^s
communications with I'he Hague, the governor-general remained
completely under the control of the home government.

In 1903 the Deputy Director of the Civil Service^ de Graaff,
raided the question of the substitution of Indonesians for Europeans
and the anification of the two services, in connection with his proposal
for a reform of Java's territorial organization which would give local
officers greater power. But for the tinie being it was side-tracked.
In I9t4t he submitted a wider scheme embmeing the reorganization
of the whole of the Indies into twelve governments, each with a degree
of hnandal autonomy. This also was shelved, but his plan to give
Indonesian officers greater powers — the word actually used was
ontvoogding ^ ' emancipationgenerally approved. Nothings how ¬
ever, was done until 1921, when it was laid dowm that certain con¬
cessions might be made to regents in recognition of special merit.
But the first regent to be 'emancipated" declared that it made no
difference whatever to his position, and for another ten yearSi in the
words of Raden Djajadiningrat, ‘the European administration
remained just as before".^

Mcanw'hile the promoters of the 'ethical policy^ had turned to
the village as the lever for the improvement of native welfare. Begin¬
ning with dc Graaff^s Village Regulation of 1906* which provided for
a Village Government, comprising the headman and village officers,
and a Village Gathering competent to regulate village institutions
and provide for its requirements, measures were taken to improve
agricuitutal production and veterinary care, to establish village
schools, provide sound credit and promote public health. The most
elaborate village administration was built up. But it w'as on instrument
for such excessive interference from above that there was hardly
any village autonomy left, and the general effect was to turn vilbgcs
against Dutch rule. The Dutch method has been described by Mr^
Fumivall as "Jet me help you^ let me show you hoiv to do it, let me
do it for yoii\-

'[ he signs of an awakening national self-consciousness began
to shoTv themselves in Java early in the century. Such external

* Inditmiffks Grrumtifhap, ifjro, p, qunltij by J. S, Fumivflll in

}ndui, p. a6o.

* Op, ai-, p.

cn. 40

KAT[ONALmf IN INTXlJffiSJA, igCO-42

influences as the Boxer Rising in China, the Filipino revolt against
Spain, and the rise of Japan undoubtedly pbyed their part, for they
had a marked eflect on the minds of little groups of b'Urati in the
various countries of South-East Asia, who were worried by the inferior
status accorded to them under Western domination. It was significant
that in 1899 Japan claimed, and received, equal rights with Europeans

HAD£N ADjtNui iCiUrrrrsi

in the Netherlands Indies. But in each tounlTy the nationalist move¬
ment took on a special character of its own.

In Indonesia the predominance of Javap with two-thirds of the
total population crowded into one-fifteenth of the total area» v^m a
marked feature of its early stages. Cultural factors here were active^
an increased arrarenesa of the value of Javanese culture witi^ its roots
deeply in the far-distant pastp and a demand for the spread of cdocatlon*
regarding which the Dutch had shown themselves woefully negligent
before the twentieth centuiy. A new chapter in the native movement
opened w^ith the emergence in 1900 of the gifted Radcn Adjeng

(yjh THE CHALLENGE TO El'^ROPEAN DOMINATION FT, IV'

Kattjni, daughter of the Regent of Japara^ as a champion of education
for womeiiH Her letters,* published in 1911, stimulated the release
of a native spiritual energy which Jed to the foundation of Kartini
schools for girls. Both she and Dr^ Waidin Sudira Usada^ a retired
medical officer^ who began a campaign for the advancement of Java
m igo&T looked to the spread of Western education as the means of
salvation.

In 1908 Usada founded the first nationalist association^ Budl
Utomo ("High Endeavour"), with a memberahip mainly of intellectuals
and Javanese officials. It aimed at organizing schools on a national
basis and took its inspiration from the Indian poet Rabindranath
Tagore, and to some extent frotn Mahatma Gandhi, It was followed
in 19 ti by an association of a v^ry different character^ Sarckat Islam^
which was an offshoot of an Islamic revival among SumaEians and
Javanese, resulting from an intensification of Christian missionary
enterprise^ Sarekat Islam made its first appearance^, however^ as a
combination of Javanese batik traders against Chinese exploitation.
Its four originoi aims were announced as the promotion of Indonc^iian
commercial enterpi^s^t mutual economic support, the intellectual
and material well-being of Indonesians and the true religion of Islam,
It rapidly became a popular movement, and within a quarter of a
century^ bad a membership of two millions, ' Islam was the bond and
symbol of common action against other nationalities', writes Colcn-
brander^^ At its first congress, held at Surabaya in January 19x3, its
leader, Omar Said TJokro Aminoto, asserted forcibly that it was not
directed against Outch rule, and that it would pursue its aims in a
constitutional manner. I is first nation-w^ide congress was held in
1916, w^hen representatives of Bo local societies w'ith a membership
of 360,000 attended and passed a resolution demanding self-govern¬
ment on the basis of union with the Netherlands.

Meanwhile Socialism had made its appearance not only among
Indonesians but also among the Indus, or Dutch Eurasians. ^Fhe
Russian Revolution of 1917 had immediate effects upon the situation
in Java, Hendrik Sncevliei formed the Indian Social Democratic
Club with revolutionary aims, and Semaun, one of its members,
strove to w^in over Sarekat Islam to Communism. At the National
Congress/if October 1917 at Batavia Tjokro Aminoto changed his tone
to one of hostility to the government, though he still recommended

* The Dutch 11 Fntitlcd Dmr fiitiMterrtif tMt. Gedacht^ owf m t'Oivf hrf

JiTTOiimfhe Totk. Tlirrc il Mtt Hnvgliph cdilicn cntillcd Lelltri of a Jmratuit Prinrfst by
Rtfiirn AHrng K^irlinif NtW Yuit, Sht diird In lO&l ag^d fwenly-Evtf,

■ Kijhiinuit ttfjf AiWrmTfc lii, p, 1

CH. 40 NATJONALTSM 1 ^ JNtXUKliislA, iyOO-4^ 637

cqni^clliJtionaJ action. There Wiis strong dmppointinerit at the
postponement of the establishment of the long-promised VolJtsraad,
and with the limitation imposed by the Dutch nppn franchise regula¬
tions. War was declared on 'sinful capita 1 ism\ But Semaun, who had
organized an energetic Communist secdon (Secdon B) closeiy in
touch v^ith Moscow, failed to gain control of the movement and broke
away to form the Perserikatan Komunist Tndia (PhK,I*)+ which joined
the 'I'hird Iniemadonal of Moscow^ An outbreak of passive resistance
in the Preanger m Jidy 1919, coming afier an ugly incident in central
Celebes in which the Dutch contnolkr and some officials lost their
lives, led to an enquiry^, which showed that secret societies belonging
to Section B svere involvcdt and it was thereupon dissolved by the
government,

The struggle was now between the FvK.L and Sarckat Ishm, and
the religious question was the main issue. P,K,l,''s second congress
in 1920 decided that Communism was just as much opposed to Pan-
Islam ism as it was to Western domination. Communism* however,
was not a mass movement, and the Communists, though exceptionally
energede and intelligent, w'ere few in number. Hence their tactics
were to attempt to steal their influence from the leaders of Sarekat
Islam and towinoverthe trade unions. And Tan Malaka^ a Communist
leader exiled for inciting a strike of government paw nshop employees,
went to Moscow and tried to persuade the Comintern to accept Pan-
Islamism.

When the sixth national congress of Sarekat Islam met in October
i^zi at Surabaya, ^Ijokro Aminoto was under arrest because of his
connection with underground activities, and Abdul Muis and Hadjt
Agus Salim, who presided in his place, carried a motion forbidding
members of the Sarekat to belong to any other party. This forced
the Communisms out of the movement. But for five years Sarekat
Islam fought a losing fight against the relatively small group of Com¬
munists who went ahead organizing Sarekats of their ov™, supporting
strikes and making preparations for revolutionary action in parts of
northern and western Java. In 1922, under the influence of young
Indonesian graduates from Europe, who were discontented with their
status in the government services, Sarekat Islam established relations
with the Indian National Congress and adopted the policy of non-
co-operation.

The years 1923-6 saw a series of revolutionar}- attempts. The
post-war depression, with its crop of industrial disputes, presented
the extremists with excellent opportunities for bringing about the

638 niK CllALLENCI- TO EIW^PEAN DO^tlNATION tV

rnaximum dislocation of |>otitica] and econon'iic life in the hope that
it wuold enable them to seize power, Moscow at the time regarded
Java as a strategic centre of the highest importance. Through agents
in Singapore contain was made between the P-KJ. and the Chinese
Communist Party, For the time being the Communists became the
most ^ital force in the Indonesian movement^ and lawlessness and
intimidation were the order of the day. Against this Sarekat Islam
became increasingly hostile and turned more and more to religion as
a means of combating Communism#

I'he P, K with a large following among the trade unionSp organized
a railway strike in May jgzj which caused the government to amend
the penal code by providing heavy penalties for action hkely to dis¬
locate economic life^ But the policy of repression only encouraged
the spread of revolutionary views. In 1925 a strike in the metal
industry was forcibly suppressed, Jn the foil owning year, encouraged
by vague promises of assistance from Zinoviev and Bucharin, the
Communist leaders tried to start a revolution in ’West Java and
Sumatra, The operations were described as carefully planned and
widespread, Nevertheles$ they were easily suppressed^ and before
the measures of severe repression taken by the Dutch the whole
revolutionary movement collapsed. The Communist Party was ban-
ncd+ Communist meetings prohibited and about 1,300 members of the
party interned in New Guinea. Communism was not entirely sup^
pressed, but its leadership of the Indonesian movement was ended
and a new phase in the history of that movement began*

The failure of the revolutionary movement left Sarekat Islam as
the majti organ of nattonalLsm, though by this time a multiplicity of
parties had arisen—some locaJ, such as Sarekat-Am bon, Perserikatan-
Minahasa and the Sumatranen*Bond; others based upon the division
of pulitieal parties in Holland; and still others, such as the Indo-
Hiiropean League and various CliincKc societies, representing special
communal interests, Sarekat Islam now began tu pay more attention
to edueatian and economic conditions. It put great energy into the
foundation of "wild' schools and co-operative institutions, 'Fhis kind
of work, however, did not satisfy the aspirations of the discontented
students of the Indonesian Club in Holland, Through their influence,
and undef the leadership of Djipto Mangun Kusuma, the leader of
the Bandung Study Group, and of Sukarno^ a popular young dema¬
gogue of incciiTuptiblc character, a new" political party, reracrikatan
National Indonesia, came into being in 1927, It ^sought to rally all
the existing nationalist organizations behind a big non-co-operation

CH. 40 NATIONAI.lS?il JX iNtJONESJA^ 1^00 -42 639

movement on the Gandhi niodeL But when Sukarno began to show
revolutioiiarv' tendencies he and two of hia helpers were jailed in
December 1929, and aoce more the extremi&i attempt to capture the
nationalist movement failed' as a political force it came to an end for ihe
time being, t^ew leaders inleresied in social service and sucial justice
came forwards Ki Hadjar Dewantom ("teacher of all the gods^).^
to use the pseudonym he adopted as a public inan+ went ahead with
the planning and development of national educationp while Dr. Sutomo,
who as o young medical student had been associated with Dr. Siidira
Uisada in founding Budi LUomo, directed the energies of the National
Party into various types of construettve activity, and in particular
the struggle to free the peasantry' from the tyranny of the usurer.

Much of the trouble of these post-war yeans was the result of dis¬
appointment at Dutch unwillingness to effect any real transfer of
power. During the First World War, in response to insistent nationa¬
list demands for a grealer share in the govcrnmenl, a scheme for a
Volksraad was passed by the Netherlands Parliament in 1916^ and
what has been called an experiment in self-government- held its first
meeting in May 1918. Half of its members were elected by local and
city coundls^ and half were appointed by the governor-general. It
\vas in no real sense a representative body* il had a European majority,
and Its powers were limiied to the offering of advice, which the
governor-general could not accept without authorization from The
Hague. At its first meeting the disappointed deputies rejected a
proposal to address a loyal cable to the queen in token of gratitude.
And although under the Constitution {Siamsinriduing) of 1925 its
numbers were raised from forty-eight to sisty-one and it was given
an elective majority, Indonesians received only thirty seats and its
financial and legislative powers remained very slight, if indeed they
can be dignified by the name of "powers^

The reformed Volksraad must be seen in relatiun to the general
scheme of decentraUzation introduced by the Constitution of 1925.
A new system of provincial government was devised above the
residencies. As a first step Javans tiventy-two residencies were in
1929 combined so as to form three provinces, and each under a gover¬
nor assisted by a partly elected council with a non-European majority*
Regency councils also were created, and these, together with the
existing town councils, formed the electorates for both the Volksraad

^ Itsikn Mu Sii^\-ardl Surynalngj^t ; hr belonged to the [>finc^ly house of Fi^u
AJoia.

■ \nckkc, Nutitalimr^ p. J4*.

THt TO EUROPKAM DOMJNATION PT, IV

and the provincial cuuncils. Outside Javap in areas where the pulitical
development of the population was considered too backward for any
fonri of self-govemmcntp ‘governments^ without representative
councils were established instead rtf provinces, "fhe new' system was
a long time in taking shape and was only completed shortly before the
Japanese Invasion. It represented the utmost concessions the Dutch
w ere prepared to make before the coming of the deluge.

Dutch poliqf, like Conservative policy in Ireland in the 'nineties*
was to 'kill home rule by kindness". 7 'he energy and enthusiasm
in the cause of economic and social welfare showm by Dutch
administrators was quite outstanding. Their comparative lack of
success was due chiefly to the phenomenal rise in the population of
Java and the opposition of private interests in both flQlland and
Indonesia. But the effects of the great depression of the early
nincteen^thirtie$ led them to encourage native industry'; and when
the revival of trade and industry began^ a spirit of greater co-openition
began also to show itself between Dutch and Indonesians.

But though the political aimusphere was less heated, the Indonesian
movement continued to cherish its two aims of economic self-suffic¬
iency and political self-government with unabated ferv'our. In 193b
the \'o 1 kBraad passed a motion asking the Netherlands govern nicnt
to call an imperial conference to discui^ the method by which self-
government should come into effect, and to fix a time-limit. It was
characteristic of Dutch policy that no real response to this request was
made until July 1941, when Queen Wilhdmina and her government
were refugees in London, Under such a chastening experience it was
only natural that she should promise to hold such a conference
immediately after the war. But without undue scepticism the doubt
may he expressed whether in 1941 the Dutch government had the
serious intention of ever granting Indonesia real self-government.

Ijikc the French in Indo-C'hina^ the Dutch wxre not enthusiasts
fot native education beyond the elcmcntarv stage, i'car of stimulating
popular discontent made them alow in providing secomlary anti higher
education. Tht pressure exerted by Sarckat Islam pnicticallv forced
them to improve the Dutch-vernacular schools and thereby create a
demand for more advanced education. !n response to this M.UJ.r.0.
(More Es^ended lajwer Instruction) Sdtools were founded^ and in
1919 General Middle Schools, wrhich provided courses in Western
knguagesp mathematics, science and oriental literature leading up to
university entrance. But the rate of progress in the pro vision of
schools of this type was too slow- for the nationalists, tvho tried to fill

CIL 40 NATlQNALlaM I NliON Kiii I A, 1900-4^

in the Uy establUhing 'wild^ schools literaily by the thoii5and+
^Yht inefficiency of most of these, coupled with the fact that many
of them were used for the purpose of spreading political discontent,
compelled the government to take them more and more under its
controL Henetp when provincial councils were created^ education
w as not one of the subjects transferred to them-

From 1907 onwards immense efforts w^ere put into the foundation
of village schoolSi The practice was for the village, or group of
villages, to build the school often “^vith materials provided free of cost
by the government^ and to contribute ninety guilders annually tow^ards
its upkeep* "^The government provided the teachers and textbooks.
Parents were expected to pay a few cents a months but w^ere usually
exempted, since pressiire had to be brought on many of them to send
their children. By 1930 there were more than il million at these
schools. But they were so closely controlled that they w'ere organs of
the Central government rather than of the vill^c communities. Per¬
haps the most paternal feature of the whole system was its extremely
efficient provision of reading matter not only for the children but for
popular consuniption as a whole.

The extremely lardy development of higher education must be
understood in the light of the few opportunities that existed outside
government ser^-ice for Indonesians w^ith specialist qualifications* In
their early years fuiv Indonesians qualified for entrance to the Ban¬
dung 'Fechnical College opened in 19191 th^ Law College io 19241
the Medical College in 1926, and the government institutions teaching
agnculture and forestry. In 194^1 when the University of Batavia
(now the University of Indonesia) was formed, its enrolment of
Indonesian students wa* small. The instruction given at these
institutions maintained the very best traditions of Dutch scholarship^
hut from a British point of view it wa$ instruction mtber than educa¬
tion. There were no hostels for students coming from a long distance^
and no comnnmity life such as similar British institutions fostered.

Notwithstanding the great strides taken by the l^utch to extend
educatiaQ in Indonesia under the “New Course'1 the annual budget
allotment, compared with the Philippines, tvas very small. Moreover,
the provision of education failed to keep pace with the rise of popu¬
lation, and the number of illiterates was actually greater in^ 1940 than
it had been at the beginning of the centuiy'.

CtlAPTES 41

FRE^vCH ADMlNlSTRi\TION AND NATIONALISM
IN INDO-CniNA

I’liE fashioning of what has been appropriately described as "the neat
hierarchy of French colonial administration modelled on the Na¬
poleonic pattern** was largely the work of Paul Doumer, who held
the office of governor-general from 1S97 to ^902. He unified the
corps of civilian services, reconstittited the administration of Tong-
king, and organts&ed the government of the newly-acquired Laos
territories. In Tongking he wiped out the last vestiges of autonomy
by abolishing the offices of viceroy^ Tong-doc and Tiian-phu, and
transforming what w'as theoretically a protectorate into what became
for all practical purposes a directly administered colony* The Laos
territories became an * autonomous protectorate' under a risid^nt
supmtur responsible to the governor-general. From Doumcr's
regime, writes Georges Lamarre,* dates Htidocitine actuflit.

Two of Doumcr‘s pre-war successors strove to liberalise the
administration by native collaboration. Paul Beau (1902-7) re-estab¬
lished the Tong-doc and Tuan-phu in TongfcJng and set up an
indigenous consultative chamber there. He also created provincial
councils and schools for the training of native officials. Albert Sairaut
(1911-T4) went further tn the same direction by introducing the
method of ^association’I whereby more natives were recruited into
the subordinate services and public instruction was reorganlued so
as to increase the supply of native candidates for government service
and improve its quslityp He also established further consultative
chambers of natives in the protectorates similar to the Tongking one.
But the rigid structure built by Ooumer suivuved all attempts to check
ciKcessive centralization. In any case colonial self-government was
never the aim of French policy; a^imilation rather than association
was its keynote.

Theoretically the governor-general had quasi-absolute powers 1
but he waa under the close supervision of the Directorate of Control

^ Cbaricft A. Micuyd in Ttit AVk' M Wfrf of Asia^ p. 227.

* In CiKir^ Alupero {t4.) L^Indttchint, p, jS.

64J ’

CH, +I NATIIjSALIS:^! I\ IN*DO-CmMA 643

in the Ministry of Colonies, which periodically sent dui Inspectors of
Colonies to investigate his administration. And as he ivas not a
professional colonial administrator but usually a politician imac~
quainted with the internal problems of the territories he was called
upon to govern, his function was to pass on the dictates of his
superiors to the experienced permanent ofliciab who aeni'ed under
him.

*rhe governor 'general was assisted by 3 Grand Council of Economic
and Financial Interests. This was composed of high-ranking French
and Indo-Chinese officials together with representatives of the
Colonial Council of Cochin China and of the Chambers of Commerce
and Agriculture. It was a purely advisory body and could deal only
with matters brought before it by the ^vemor-generid; but the
general budget of the colony and those of its various divisions had to
be submitted to it. 'I'he bulk of the legislation for Indo-Chlna was
enacted by the French parliament or took the form of decrees isaoed
by the Ministry of Colonies.

'lechiiically Cochin China was the only one of the five divisions
to radk as a colony and tobe underdirect control. Annatn, Cambodia,
Laos and Tongking were all protectorates. Coclun China’s govern¬
ment was in the hands ol a governor, assisted by a Prixy Council and
a Colonial Council, 'fhe former approximated to an Executive Council,
the latter to a Legislative Council, in a British colony. The colony
of Cochin China was divided into major districts named provinces
with a French administrative officer at the head of each. Notwith¬
standing the policy of 'association’ enunciated by Albert Sarraut, the
percentage of native subordinate officials in the French service \va.s
much lower than in the case of the Dutch and British regimes in
South-East Asia. In Burma, for instance, while in 1900 Europeans
occupied nearly all the posts in the ' eovenanteJ' civil service, the vast
majority of the administrative posts were outside this in the' provincial'
services, and with a very few exceptions were filled by Bumicw or
Indians. After the iutroduction of dyarchy in i 9 ^ 3 » Btirmesc and
Indians were recruited in increasing numbers into the highest grade
of the administrative and police services.

In Annam, Cambodia and Laos the kings and their Courts, together
with their hierarchy of tnandarins, cotuinued to exist alongside the
French administration. The real control, however, in eaeff protecto¬
rate was in the hands of a r^sidmi supericur, assisted by a Privy Council
and a Protectorate Council with composition and powers similar to
those of their counterparts tn Cochin China. Each protectorate was

IT* IV

f»*|4 THE CHALLLNUE TD EL-RpPEA*N’ |10M1NATIO,V

divided into prm'inces under Residents, who were Frenchmen. In a
pcDtectnrate, however, the exercise of power was less direct than
in Cochin China* The actual administration was carried out by the
native ofBcials under the guidance of their French opposite numbers,
who never intervened directly unless it became absolutely necessary’.
The mandarins therefore were tn no sense figureheads, but French
control was absolute. Mutatii mutatuits the system w-a*s not unlike
the Dutch method of indirect rule in ludartesia* But in both cases
the distinction between direct and indirect rule was a legal rather
than a practical one.

The fa93de of native administration was imposing: it w'as also
useful in making foreign rule somewhat less unpalatable. T'he
Consultative Native Assembly, which assisted the r^siJeat svperieur,
is an excellent example of the system of camouflage used by the
French. Most of its members were elected, but by a narrow group
of officials and others of trusted loyalty’. Even then it could not debate
political subjects, while on other matters it could express its vjew% only
if the r^ndenl supmeur agreed to a debate. The budget estimates of
the protectorate were laid before it, but merely as a matter of form.

In Cochin China the chief aim of French educational policy' was
at first simply to train interpreters. Franco-vernacular schools were
accordingly opened in the larger centres* When it was found that
they were channels to promotion the sons of notables Hocked to them.

scheme drawn up in 1879 to promote the official policy of 'assirni'
lation* provided for secular elementary schools to be established in
every canton and village; but it made little progress, while left to
themselves the village schools of the traditional type were gradually
disappearing and leaving an unfilled gap. In the protectorates the
native systems continued to function and W^estern education made
very slow progress, A few Franco-vernacular schools were established
at provincial capitals for training native subordinates; their standards
were very low. As. in the case of the other colonial territories in South-
East Asia, Vietnamese nationalism seems to have been the special
product of the Franco-vernacular schools. In 1900 it was complained
that in Cochin China the cutves of crime and of European education
rose concuirently.'

Paul B^u founded the modem educational system by creating
in 1906 the Cmseit de Perjtctimntmtnt de I'Emtignttnent Indigene
to reorganize public instruction. It was to be based on the village

^ J, S. FumiviU, EcfufdiibPiii/ in rliia, p, 40, <|ucitmu JiiJ« Hur-

iTuind, DTintirmfion €t Cotartuaiion, 1910, p, ^64,

CM. 41 NATIONALISV IN INDO-CHINA 64S

clemenUry school leaching literacy by the use of cither Chinese
characteia or quoc-nga? The beat pupils were to go to Franco-
vernacular primary* and secondary schools; the rest might proceed
to a primary vernacular school at the headquarters of the canton,
where French was optional, or in a few cases to a secondary vernacular
school. This system was introduced first into Annatn and Tongking,
and later, in 1909-10. into Cochin China. But by 1913 there were
only 12,103 pupils in the government primary' schools; in. Annam and
Tongking private education was preferred. In Cambodia and Laos
the monastic schools remained the sole purveyors of elfimentary
education.

Cultural assimilation became still more the aim of French policy
during the First World War. In 1915 the traditional competitive
examinations for the mandarinate in Tongking were abolished. Sar-
raut. during his second term of office (1917-19), followed thU up by
introducing a scheme under which the state was to take over all
primary instruction and make the study of French universal. This
project, however, proved too expensive and had to be abandoned.
Hence the division into vernacular and Franco-vernacular schools
was restored in 1924; but ao slow was the actual progress in providing
state schools in the villages that in 1926 where there was no state
school a village was aUovved to provide its own,

Generally speaking, the French were not interested in vernacular
education; they aimed at injecting larger and ever larger doses of
French culture. There was a curious inconsistency about their policy
in this matter, for a comparatively small coterie of French schdiars
carried out remarkable researches into the languages and literatures,
the history and archaeology of the East, and made the Fcok Franyaise
d" Extreme Orient, established at Hanoi in 1S99, the finest centre of
oriental studies in the world. No praise can be too high for the work
it has done in discovering, caring for and restoring Indo-Chinese
historical monuments, and in particular revealing to the world the
glories of Khmer and Cham art and architecture.

The policy of assimilation had strangely different results from those
it was intended to produce. It has been said that the bitterest oppon¬
ents of the French were those who knew the language best. When
Faul Beau, as a concession to nationalism, founded the University of

The of ratnantMtlofi invenled hy in the fin^nteenth

century- , , , . - , *

KTht tenn -primiuy' in ihlA coniWCtlPFl rupresenta the mtage above
and mi»t nnt be inierpi^twl Hceatding to it* prcMnl meaTiinH in the Engikli ayalem af
education.

PT, IV

646 TltE CHALLENGE TO EUROPEAN DOMINATION

Hanoi in 1907, there iivas such an outburst of nationalistic assertiveness
among the students that in the following year it was closed, and not
reopened until Sarraui’s second term as governor-general.

The nationalist movement in Indo>China was almost entirely con¬
fined to the Vietnamese.! They were the most numerous of all the
peoples of the area, and by 1945 constituted about 75 per cent of
a population roughly estimated at 25 millions. They had a tradition
of nationalism dating from their long struggle for independence
a^inst China, Though their civilization remained predominantly
Chinese in character, after independence was achieved in 939, it
was no less their own, and in their expansion southwards into the
territories previously held by the Chams and the Khmers—i.e.
central and southern Annam and Cochin China—they substituted it
for the indianized culture they found in those areas.

The French established themselves in both Cochin China and
Tongking by conquest. In each case it was a long protracted struggle,
and when at last forced to give m the Vietnamese ne\'er lost the hope
that one day the hated foreigner would have to withdraw. Banditry
was never stamped out; there were constant plots, which the French
put down with heartless severity. The French colonists blamed the
liberal policy of Beau and Sarraut and demanded protection, Japan's
victory over Russia in 1905 created a wave of unrest, which came to a
head in the Gilbert Chieu conspiracy in the following year. The
\oung Annamiies protested against the Franco-Russian alliance. I’hc
intelligentsia, influenced by the writings of Chinese reformers such as
K’ang Yu Wei, who advocated the study of Western culture, turned
to the study of the French philosophical wrileni, notably Montesquieu
and RouMeau, and flocked to the University of Hanoi when it was
founded in 1907. But French measures of repression, including the
rounding up of suspects and their imprisonment on Pulo Condore,
and the closing of the university, brought what may be considered

the firet phase of the twentieth-centurv nationalist movement to

an ends

Sairaut’s liberal policy during his first tenure of office helped to
keep Indo-China relatively quiet during World War J. But Fnmcc
made generous promises which she wm not prepared to redeem after
the war. She also injured Vietnamese siwccptibilities by forcibly
recruiting no less than 100,000 of them for war senicc in Europe

* ^ Virrini. Thoirpsan'i »un-cy in Eimnwon, Milli and 'IWip«on

t>p, tcrslw Phitippe HijIoireJu

I trl.,Van .)e d ffljs, duips, it uiiJ i ii, '

CH. 41 NATIOJJALISM IS ISDO-CIIINA 647

Many of these on their return home brought back subversive ideas.
I'ht "political prisoners, who had been interned on Pulo Condore, were
also stimulated to rcnew'cd activities after the war by contacts with
Siamese and Chinese revolutionaries. The post-war penod therefore
saw the rise of political parties. The elite were stirred by the doctrine
of self-determination proclaimed by the victorious Allies. Some also
rook their inspiration from the Indian mang movement, while others
imbibed the teachings of the Cantonese Communists, There was a
Constitutionalist Party, led by Bui Quang-chicu, which advocated
reform along democratic lines, and a Tongkingese Party, led by
Pham Quynh, with a similar programiiie. The governmeni turned
down a programme of mild reform submitted by Pham Quynh. U
was then the turn of the extremists to steal the limelight from the
moderates.

In tgas the Revolutionary Party of Young Atmam was founded.
But lire mutual jealousies of its leaders paralysed it. and when its
Communist members seceded in 1929 it soon came to grief; for the
secessionists informed the police against their former comrades and
the party was suppressed, A Tongkingese party calling itself the
Nationalist Annamite Party came into being through Kuominiang
contacts. Half of its members were in government service. It had
A very limited following but hoped for foreign aid. It sought also to
win over the Vietnamese battalions in the army. In Januaiy 1929
it made an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Governor Pasquier,
and in the following month killed Bazin, the head of the Tjabour
Bureau. Its terrorist aciivkira brought the poUce so hot on ks trail
that it was forced to launch a rebellion with inadequate preparations.
'Phis began with the abortive Yenbay mutiny of February 1930, and
there were outbreaks of violence in many places. The French reached
with the most tremendous severity, Everj' kind of manifestation,
even unarmed demonstrations, was broken up by force, and so many
of its leaders were arrested that the party dissolved.

The ferocity of the suppression of the extremist outbreaks of 1930
forced Communism underground. I'he small party, which numbered
some 1,500 members in 1931, was ably led by Nguyen-Ai-Quoc,
better known as Ho Chi Minh, He had joined the Communist Party
in France before the First World War. After the armistice he w'cnt to
Russia, where he studied revolutionary technique. Then‘in Canton
he founded the Association of Revolutionary Annamite Youth. It
was composed of revolulionanes who went there for training at the
Wampoa Academy, His aim was the nationalist one of winning

648 the challenge to EtntOPEAN DOMINATION PT, IT

Vietnam^ independence. On ]ii» osvn showing^ this was to be
accomplished through a democratic bourgeois regime; Communism
was to be introduced at a later stage. He drew up a programme which
appealed to intellectuals and peasants alike. It included the reduction
of fiscal burdens, the redistribution of land among the peasantry,
and the aboltdan of the conscription of laboureis and native soldiers
for service abroad.

Self-effacing as a leader, he was a strict disciplinarian. Where other
leaders and their parties failed, hts firm, intelligent leadership
succwded; and although he was arrested by the British in Hong Kong
and imprisoned for three years, his movement persisted against all
attempts by the French to e!ttirpatc it. In 1939 it became Viet Minb,
or the League for the Independence of Vietnam. During the period
of the Japanese occupation it was to become the spearhead of the
nationalist movement. Thus while in the pre-war period Vietnamese
nationalism as a movement was ineScctive, and weakened by personal
or loi^ jeakuaics and rivalris, it was to find new life under the
direction of a leadw of inflerible will and tireless energy. The pity
was that French intransigence caused it to fall under Communist
leadership. 1 he Vietnamese, with their deep attachment to property
and the patriarchal family system, are not natural recruits to
Communism.

^ Nguyen-Ai-Quee, LfpratH Jt tu e^tomiatioitfftmfaiu, P 4 rt», if/a6.

cttAirrida 42

THE ECONOMIC ASPECT OF EUROPEAN DOXHNATION

Economic imperialbm provided the main stimulus to the extcfisioti of
European domination over the lands and islands of South-East Asia.
Europe's insatiable hunger for markets and for tropical products went
through a number of distinct phases between 1500 and 1900- The
must acute one coincided with the revolution in human life begun by
the railwaVi steamship and electric telegraphy and Intensified by the
motor car, aeroplane and wireless, European industry became more
and more dependent upon products that South-East Asia could supply
in abundancei such as oil, rubber and various metals, while Europe's
growing population made ever grealer demands on the rice, coffecj
tea and sugar of the area.

After 1870 the process of opening up intedoraNvas carried on with
rapidly increasing momentum. It was the age of science, and before
the advance of applied science all the barriers that had previously
prevented European esploitation of interiors were rapidly broken
dotvn. Thus traditional systems of economic life which for centuries
had resisted the European impact, and in which subsistence agricul¬
ture ^ cottage industries and barter w^ere dominating PeatureSy dis¬
appeared with startling suddenness, to b* succeeded by new conditions
under which crops, financed by money advances, were growm for a
world market, and the cultivator's home market wm flooded with
manufactured European goods to the detriment of his OW'n native
handicr^ts. This happened on a vast scale in the rice-growing
areas of South-East Asia and it had effects of fundanienta] im¬
portance in every country affected.

(it) Briihk Btirma

Before the British acquisitiun of the province of Pegu in 185a Burma
had never exported rice. Merchant vessels might take away with them
no more than they required for food until their next port of call.
Arakan, on the other band, grew rice for export in the seventeenth
century, and tvhen it came into British hands in the nineteenth

650 the CttM.MiNRE TO Et^Et^PEAN DOMINATIOM PT. IV

century the gracing Indian demand caused its rice cultivation to
flourish. I’he Irrawaddy delta region, however, was a land mainly of
swamp and jungle which had never recovered from the effects of the
Burmese policy towards the Mons in the late skteenth century. Its
sparse population grew paddy almost entirely for its own needs, and
when these were met any surplus crops for which there was no demand
might be left unreaped. Moreover, the immediate effect of the second
Anglo-Burmese war of <852 was a movement of population into
Upper Burma,

The Indian Mutiny of 1837-^8 seems to hatie caused the first upward
tendency in the production of rice in the delta. Rangoon, rapidly
developing its facilities as a port, could handle an increase of trade,
and^ immigrants came down from Upper Burma to take up rice
cultivation. The expansion of the acreage under rice in Lower Burma
was striking. The figure for 1845 is 354,000 acres, while for i860 it is
ii 333 »<»o- The American Civil War of 1861-5, wiuch cut off
Carolina’s rice exports to Europe, caused Britain to look to Burma to
make up the deficiency, and by 1870 the acreage figure had risen to
t»735'®®®' ITie opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 caused rice cultiva¬
tion to go ahead at an even faster rate. During the next fifteen years no
less than a million acres more came under rice, and the expansion
continued without a break up to the great world slump in 1930, when
the figure for both Upper and l^oiver Burma had risen to 12,370,000.
It was the most spectacular development of her economic histoiyv .At
the end of the century Burma exported 2J million tons of paddy!
by 1940 her total production was 4,94 mlHion tons.

There was a wild scramble for land. But the task of clearing it
involved hiring labour, for it was in most cases overgrown with heaw
jungle, and it took more than one harvest before the cost of cultivation
was recovered by the cultivator. As there were hardly any Burmese
with capital to spare, Indian money-lenders of the chettyar caste
stepped into the breach and provided cultivators not only with all the
money they needed at a conservative estimate, but up to the limit of
the security. The European exporters also adopted the practice of
giving out advances to ensure supplies. Under normal conditions in
the early days the cultivator could keep his head above water. But he
operated so near the danger level that a fall in world prices, the failure
of the monsoon rains, his own illness, or the death of his cattle, might
cause him to be sold up, and his land would pass to another^ for such
was the demand for land that it was easy to find another purchaser.

By 1895 land in the detla was constantly changing hands. At first

C«. 42 THE ECONOVUfT ASPECT OF EttROPEAX HOMINATIOX 651

one peasant proprietor would be supplanted by another. But specula¬
tion more and more took a hand in the business: traders and brokers
interested in the espon business bought land in order to control
supplies of paddy; Indian and Chinese merchants in the towns bought
it as an investment for their surplus money. Thus, as time went on,
an increasing number of cultivators did not own their holdings, and
peasant proprietorship began to break down. In 193^1 ">hen the great
world depression broke in full force on Burma, although only 27 per
cent of the occupied land was recorded as in the ownership of non-
agricuUural landlords, the difficulty of finding purchasere able to take
over holdings at anything like the full value of the outstanding loans
revealed the fact that practically half the cultivated land in Lower
Burma belonged to non-agricultural absentee landlords. The total
agricultural indebtedness was estimated at million.

Worse still, from the point of view of the Burmese, was the fact that
the demand for labour during the years of rapid expansion had
attracted increasing numbers of Indian immigrants. WHlh a much
lower standard of living than the Burmese, they were able to undercut
them in competition for land tenancy. Thus between i 9 t 5 ®Tvd 193®
native owners lost no less than 1,300,000 acres of delta land through
debt. At the same time the small Burmese rice-millers were being
driven out of business by the multiplication of large steam-driven mills
employing Indian coolie labour, the development of steam navigation
on the river and creeks in place of the native craft was forcing many
Burmese out of their traditional occupations, and cheap Indian lalmur
was driving them from the wharv'cs.

At the beginning of the twentieth century Indians were arriving in
Burma at the rate of 250,000 a year. The number rose each year until
in 1927 it reached the peak figure of 480,000. The majority came over
only for seasonal occupations on the land and returned home after¬
wards, or stayed only a year or two. But enough remained for each
decennial census to show a marked increase in the proportion of
Indians to the total population. The fact that Burma was a province
of the Indian empire made it welUnigh impossible for the government
to take effective safeguarding measures such as the Dutch took in 1S70
when they made it illegal for an Indonesian to alienate his land to a
Foreigner. The result, therefore, wa.s a dangerous development of
communal discord,

This flared up in 1930 in a frightful outbreak of anti-Indian riots
in Rangoon, when the Burmese, having heen used to break an Indian
dockyard strike, objected to being dismissed and in three days'

^ 5 ^ *nfE CHALLm<JE TO EtfROPEAN PT^ IV

fighting killed j£o Indiani^ and wounded 9^^ The agtiarian untest
also showed itself at the end of the ssame year when a formidable
rcbcUiQn broke out in the Tharrawaddy district under a leader called
Saya San and spread rapidly over most of the delta. Sava San was the
usual type of mmlaung (presender to the throne) that Burma has often
produced in times of unrest; he sought to overthrow the British
regime, but most of his adherents were concerned mainly with the
recovery of their lands from Indian money-leniders and tenants.

Early in the eighteen-eighties the government became concerned
for the defence of ihe peasant cultivator against the private money-
lender^ In i&Ez and 1883 legislative Acts were passed to provide
cultivatprs with loans at much lower rates of interest than those
charged by the chettis^ But the conditions imposed were too stringent,
and the chettis knew far better than gov'cmment officers how to manage
the improvident Burmese*

Then early in the twentieth century' the co-operative movement was
inaugt^ted as a further measure for combating the evil. A co¬
operative department was established to foster the developmeot of
co-operative societies of cultivators financed by land banks, 'rhousands
of these societies were formed in the first flush of enthusiasm for the
movement. Most of them failed, and when the great depression began
in 1930 the two most important land banks, the Burma Provincial
Co-operative Bant of Mandalay and Dawson^s Bank, with its head¬
quarters at Pyapon in the ddta, ran into serious difficulties* The govern¬
ment therefore revived the co-operative movement, and in 1935
pa^ed a measure making it possible for foreclosed land to be returned
to its original owners on payment of its actual market value spread over
a ^riod of fifteen years. This was followed in 1936 by a Debt Con¬
ciliation Act, which established boards for scaling down debts and
accumulated interest.

In i 937 i when Burma was separated from India and given almojit
complete control over her internal affairs, one of the fim acts of her
new ie^slature was to pass, against strong cfi^uyar opposition, a
Burma Fenancy Bill for the protection of tenanu. Settlement reports
had long stressed the fact that throughout Lower Burma, and Jo some
parts of Upper Burma, after subtracting rent, debt charges and cost
of cultivation^ most tenants had insufficieiit monev left from the ^Ic
of their produce to maintain a livelihood. The Bill was based upon the
fi ndi ngs^ of a commi ttee set up to i nvestigate the matter. B ut, acctirdi ng
to Fumivay, the measure was * not very wisely conceived\t and before
* Pittfey timi Praefirt^t PPr

CU. 42 THE tLXJMOMIC ASPECT^ UF EVkOPEAN DOMINATION

the still unsolved agrarian probkin could be dealt with more effec¬
tively the Japanese invasiofi took place.

Before the spectacular development of dee production in Burma
during the last quarter of the nineteenth century her chief article of
export was teak- The annexation of Pegu in 1S52 led to the first
important steps for the preservation of her forests, his began tvith
a sun^ey by Dr. Dietrich Brandis of the valuable forests in the Tharra-
waddy-Prome area and the I'oungoo dUtdet. He bid the foundation
of the Burma Forest DepartnientH The annexation of Upper Burma
in ifiSfi brought further forest areas within the scope of European
exploitation and conservation, A Forest Service of three grades of
officers came into being which ultimately disposed of a departmental
personnel of 2,000. The commercial output between 1919 and 19^4
averaged over 500,000 tons annually and only slightly less between
1925 and 1940. India took three-quarters of this. Besides teak the
forests produced other hardwoods^ notably pyinkad^ (irtm wood)i
w’hich was used for railw^ay sleepers in Burma and India- There were
also manv nunnr forest products, such as bamboo^ culch, lac, fire¬
wood us^ in steamcT^, nulls and railway engineSi aud charcoal in
universal use for cooking. It was estimated that "the Burma forests
could yield 787^000 tons of paper pulp per annutn^ but before the
Second World War little had been done in thb connection. The
forests provided as much as 20 per cent of the state revenue-

'Phe absence of suitable coal operated against attempts to in¬
dustrialise Burma^ The petroleum wells of the Yenangj^aung region
had been worked for many generations by hereditary Burmese owners
when Briiain took ovxr Upper Burma. T he ilutmah Oil Company, the
parent of the Anglo-Iranian Companyt was founded in 1S86. At first
it bought oil from the native drillers and confined itself to refining
and distribution. Expansion began in the present centuiy, when mod¬
em methods of drilling were introduced and large-scale production
began, A line of O'! I fields was opened up from Indaw on the Upper
Chindvvin through Sabe and Singu to Yenangyaungt and in 1908 a
pipeline of 275 miles was built from the oilfields on the Irrawaddy to
Syriam, the site of the refineries. Production by 1940 had risen to 270
million imperial gallons, which was .5 per cent of world production.
By that time other oil companies had joined ini but the B.O.C^ con¬
trolled threc-quarteis of the industry. Practically its whSle output
was absorbed by India and Burma-

Other large-scale industrial undertakings developed by British
capital and technical skill in Burma were the great lead-silver Baw dwin

FT. IV

G54 TJIE UHALLEPtfCJi TO EUROF£AX IK^MJNATION

mine in the Nanheni Shan StateSp worked by the Burma Corporation:
the Mawchi mine in Karentii, which produced haJf the tin and
tungsten in Burma: and other tin and tungsten ndnea in Tenasserim,

Before the British conquest Burma^3 main communications were
by her great rivers and Innomerable creeks. I'hese were the first to be
developed by British enterprise^ and the Irrawaddy FlotiBa Company^
founded in iS65^ operated a tiect which in the present century in¬
cluded fiome of the largest shallow-draught steamers in the w-orld.
T hey served the Irrawaddy up to Bhamo^ the Chindwin up to Homa-
lin, and the chief delta towns. Roads came late. By 191* there were
only 2jOOO miles of metalled roads in the country. I'hen came a big
expansionj and twenty yeans later there were 6jOOO miles of all-
weather roads plus another SpOCO to G^ooo miles that could be used by
motor irafhc in dry w^eather. Railways came after the opening of the
Canal. Phey w'ere built for the areas not served by water trans^
port. Before the end of the nineteenth century Pro me, Mondalay and
Myitkyina wxre connected with Rangoon, l^tcr lines w'ere built
through the Northern Shan States to Lashio and through the Soutlicm
Shan States to Shw^enyaung^ near Taunggyi. In all there were a,060
miles in 1941.

Burma was developed by foreign capital. Indians, Chinese and
Europeans owned all the large factories and industrial concerns, the
greater part of Burmapublic debt was forcign-held, and Indian
rhfttis in 1950 bad an investment of 750 million rupees in the delta
rice-lands. In 1939 foreign investments totalled iifi 55.25 million-
three times as much a$ in 1914. Ihe Kurupean corporatioiis owned
just over ^47 million of thisp the ^56 millionp the Chinese

1^2.8 million, and the government and municipal obligations amounted

jC 4S The Biinna Railways were built by the Government

of India, lattic of the capital cost had been repaid when Burma
separated from India in J937 and look over the debt to the extent of
344.5 "lillion rupets,

(A) French lnd&-Cfiim

French Indo-China contained two ancient centres of rice cultiva¬
tion, the deltas of the Red River of Tongking and of the Nlekoiig in
Cochin China/ French policy was rigidly pratecdonUt. In French
eyes the function of a colony was to supply the mother country with
raw materials and products which did not compete with her own. The
economy of hrench Indo-China therefore came to depend almost
completely on the interesu of France. Most of the population

Clt, 4Z THE ECONOMIC ASPECT JOF EUROPEAN DOMINATION 655

rtmained cultivators and were overcrowded in the two rice-producing
areas. If native industries survived, it was largely because the majority
of the people were too poor to buy French imported goods.

The Vietnamese were industrious farmers, good lishermen and
skilful workers; the Cambodians tended to be indifferent and inactive;
while the T'ai preferred hunting and Hshing. The population problem
in the crowded areas was very serious. Land in the hands ol the
peasantry was parcelled out in minute holdings. In Fongking the
entire farttung population cultivated only 4® cent of the total rice
area as smallholdings. Sixty per cent of the farmed owned less than
one acre of land; per cent of the tax-payers owned less than hall an.
acre or were landless. In Cochin China holdings were larger but
smallholdings only accounted for 45 cent of the total cultivated
area.

Before the French occupation inequalities in landed wealth were
counterbalanced by the joint communal responsibilities of the villages,
and people without rice-fields of their own could cultivate the
communal lands. French administration favoured the establishment
of large estates and European plantations. In Cochin China con¬
centration of land in this way went so far that the landed class came to
control over So per cent of the rice-fidds, with aoo.ooo f^lics
employed in share-cropping. The share-cropper worked for a French
landlord, who loaned him buffaloes, food and tools, and supplies of
seeds and manure. The hfidlord usually demanded exorbitant interest
on his capital, and the share-cropping tenant, discouraged and restless,
often disappeared after having squandered his advance payments.
1'hc large estates were normally formed through the purchase of
forfeited land or land on which loans at exorbitant interest rates had
been made. Hy various methods encroachments upon communal
land look place until far loo little was left, and when with the great
stump of 1930 many great land-ow ners became insolvent there was no
redistribiitton of land to the needy population. French policy pre¬
ferred the stabilisation and consolidation of large estates to the
redistribution of land.

The landlord-tenant relationship was feudal. The share-cropper
paid his landlord 40 percent of the crop, and in addition had to render
onerous gifts and services. When a landlord furnished credit to a
tenant it was usually at the rate of 50 per cent for a perida of from
eight months to one year. The system did not promote improved
methods of cultivation, since the landlord came to rely more on the
interest to be derived from his capital than on the productive capacity

VUE CilALLENOE Tl) KL'KOPE/lN DOMINATION’ tT. [V

of his fields. Hence estates were usually divided into minute farms
and leased to tenants for primitive, traditional cultivation.

Among the peasant proprietoi^ the same problems of indebtedness
were to be found as m Burma. Chinese middle-men monopolized the
purchase ot nce. Annamite and cfteltyar mone>’-lenders were readv to
lend money at rates of interest up to izo per cent per annum, French
legislation to hmit the rates of interest failed. Beginning in Cochin
China m 1913 mutual agricultural credit institutions were set up. But
as they could lend only on land security their activities rarely ttsichctl
the level of the tenants. They strengthened the landlord bv help-
ing Iitm to lend to tenants and farmers at higher rates titan those on
which he bi>rrowed the money,

A Credit Populaire system was established in 1926 and rcorganired
lit i933^under the name Credit Muiuel Agrimle, hut it did not operate
m Cochin China, It made loans to agricultural co-operatives, whose
activities included not only paddy but a great variety of products such
as tung, castor oil, maize, tobacco, tea, sugar, colfee, mulberry,
sttcklac and sugar, 'rhey collected their mcrabei^' crops and

sold them, and attempted to educate them in the use of selected seeds,
manure, etc. But m most cases the peasant was too poor to buy the
fertilizers and other improvements recommended to him. and in any
ca« the movement never got much beyond the experimental stage. '

1 he general picture was that of an upper class with an agricultural
proletariat densely packed into two areas in which too much labour
was employed on the land, '[’he evils of overpopulation and under¬
nourishment were aggravated by the improvements in sanitary and
medical control, which caused a great increase of population-
greater^ in than the mcrc^e in rice productiDji. There was a
coitstanl reductiim in the purchasing (wwer of the peasant. Rice, the
diet of almost the whole population, formed half the total exports of
the country and was subject to the same riska—faiiurc of the rains and
iiuetuation of the world price—as elsewhere,

I he 1-rench attempts to attract people away from tlie deltas to work
on inland plantations, notably rubber, failed, notwithstanding the
better living conditions on them. The Vietnamese cto not like moving
atray from the place w here their ancestor cult is carried on. Moreover,
the hinterland areas were malaria-ridden, there were difficulties of
transport; and the government had no comprehensive development
plan. 1 he fundamental weakness of French economic administration
IS well shown by the contrast between Indo-China and Java in rubber
production. In (he former large plantations owned by Frenchmen

CH. 4Z THE ECONOMIC ASEECT^OF ECEOPEAN DOMINATION 657

and financed by the Socirie Fin^rtdh^e des Caoutchoucs monopolized
the whole production. In Java 50 per cent of the rubber was produced
by natives on their own lands.

French economic expansion in Indo-China waft financed by two
methods: by money raised internally through ta^xation and by loans
eniLrciy subscribed in France. So successfully did ihe French resist
the investment of non-French European capital in their close preserve
that in 1938 they owned 95 per cent of the European capital invested
in business enterprises and all the capital invested in government
sectiitries. I'here waa^ however, a large Chinese in vest merit, which
accounted for 80 million dollars (American) out of a total investment
in business enterprises of 3S2 tnilUon dollars^ Government securities
added 82 million doUars to make a grand total of 464 million dollars.

No Statistics exist for French investments in Indo-China before
1914. Mines first attracted French capital. The coal industry attracted
8-9 million francs by the beginning of the centui^', T in mining
began in 1901-2 with 2 million francs capital^ zinc in 1906 with a
similar amount. An Artificial Portland Cement Company was founded
in 1899 with a capital of million francs. Other ventures w'hich
attracted capital early in the cenlur>^ vrere the distillation of alcohol
from rice, electrical works for urban consumption, the Yunnan Rail¬
way Company, which swallowed up lOt million piastres between
1901 and 19111 brewerieSi and tobacco and match factories. The big
French metallurgical companies also had branches in the colony.

From 1910 Onwards much capital was inv'csted in timber extraction
and rubber planting. At the end of the First World War a far more
comprehensive programme w'as set in motion. The depreciation of
the franc caused a great deal of French money to seek security in the
piastre, and between 19Z4 and 193^ some ^1870 million francs W'^ere
invested in the colony. The effect of the great slump, therefore^ was
very serious^ and through failures or reductions in capital losses
estimated at 1,255 francs were incurred. When after 1936 the

flow of capital investment was resumed it was far below the pre¬
slump level.

As time passed the economic ties between lndo-C>hina and France
grew progressively stronger. Between 1911 and 1920 an average of 19.6
per cent of Indo-Chiiia^a exports went to France; in 193S the amount
was 53 percent. Between 1911 and 1^2.0 Indo-China s imports from
Franc* averaged 29 6 per cent of the total; between 1931 and 1938
they averaged 57.1 per cent. The French textile industry^ had a power¬
ful influence over colonial policy; Indo-^China s imports of French

FT. IV

658 THE CHALLENGE TO EUfkOFEAN POJlflNATION

fabrics prepondemicd over those of other countries. The French
metal industry also found a prohtable market for its products in the
colony. These two industries together accounted for two-thirds of
French exports to Indo-Ctiim.

Before the competitma of French manufactured articles native
industries deteriorated. They might have disappeared had not the
great mass of the people been too poor to buy the imported arpcles*
Cotton and silk con tinned to be woven on primitive looms. Wood¬
working, stone-cuttingp pottery and basketry also survived as native
crafts, but on a reduced scale, aince the peasant craftsmen could not
afford to buy much raw materials France's economic aim for the
nativCh it has been said, was to raise hta standard of living to enable
him to buy more French goods and to afford more employment to the
French merchant marine.

(tf) The Nitkerlands Indies

In 19&0 in the Netherlands Indies production for the foreign market
vvas almost wholly^ agricuhiiral^—rubber, tira^ coffee^ copra, quinine,
tobacco, sugar—^and almost wholly Dutch. The native contribution
was negligible; it was carried on almost entireJy for home con¬
sumption, and rice predominated over all other crops. Java*s great
problem, like that of the Red River and Mekong deltas^ was over¬
population, but it affected the whole island^ so that it cotild only be
relieved by migration to other inlands or the Malay PenimuU. The
population of Java and Madum increased from 28.74 ndlliona in iqcxj
to an estimated 49 millions in 1941, and in the latter year its annual
rate of increase was in the region of 700,000+ No other comparable
^ea in the W'orld supported so large a population with so great a rate of
mcrcase^ There was a grim race between the increase of the popular
tion and the expansion of production.

In 1905 the Department of Agriculture, later a branch of the
Department of Economic Affait^^ was formed and wa$ charged with
the special task of devising measures for the permanent improvement
of native agriculture. Native producrioti, nminly of food crops^ was
multiplied by clearing new ground^ by ImprovemenTS in irrigationj
improved technical methods and a vast increase in secondary crops.
In 1918 the General Agricultural Experimental Station w*^ est^-
Hshed+ I he Department of Agriculture also b egan to develop
special sections, notably one dealing with Agricultural Economy and
another known as the Agricultural Information Service, w^hose

CH- 4 3 THE ECONOMIC ASPE^IJ OF EUROPEAN DQMlNATiON 659

expert Landbcmtiromutitfit^ its local officer, must be coftsulted with
regard to the probable effect on native interests before land could
be leaded to Europeans.

But notwithstanding these excellent admi mat rati ve measures the
food margin dwindled and production failed to keep pace with popula¬
tion increase. Between 19^9 193® while papulation increased by

15 per cent the increase of cultivation was only 3 *S and the

limit for expansion was already passed^ Deforestation had reduced the
forest area to 23 per cent, ivhere 30 per cent was considered csaential
to protect the island's water supply, while signs of soil exhansdon
through over-use were showing themselves- One difficulty lay in the
fact that individual holdings were too acnall for efficient cultivation#
The average at the beginning of the century vm only aj acres pet
family, aud it tended to diminish. This minute subdivisiori of the
cultivated area was nothing so bad as in the congested areas of French
Indo-China, but it meant that on the native lands agriculture was
overmanned and underequipped.

By the Agrarian Law of tSyo the Dutch had prevented the format
don of a landlord class such as was found ebewhere in South-East
Asia, but the substitudon of a cash economy forced the native popula¬
tion to live on credit. This was supplied mostly by Chinese pawn¬
brokers and Arab money-lenders at excessively high monthly rates O'!
interest. In 1898 de Wolff van Westerrode was put on apedal duty
to work out plans for state pawnshops and agricultural credit banks.
State pawnshops were established in 19™* four years later the
beginnings of a popular credit $y&tem introduced m the form of
*paddy banks' and iiillage cash banks. Civil servants were instructed
to regard the formation of these banks as one of their foremost duties.
By 1912 Java had 12,000 paddy bank^ and i,t 6 t village banks, and
the village co-operatives were run by the headmen under official
superx'ision.

But as elsewhere the co-nperative movement languished. The
private money-lender allowed rash borrowing and hss working
expenses were lower. The private money market continued at rates
from 10 to 15 p*r cent monthly, while, to make matters worse, the
earnings of the peasant through sale of his produce were reduced by
the operations of middle-men, whose share of the market price
averaged 50 per cent. The hard-pressed cultivator was often forced
to lease his land to a European plantation companyp and again the
government had to Step in to protect him by fixing minimum rentals
and limiting the amount of village Land that might be leased and the

66 o THE CHALLENGE TO EUROPEAN DOMINATION FT, IV

length of leases- Many migraited to work on the tobacco, $ugar and
tea plantatLciit$ of Sumatra and the rubber plafitations of Malaya, but
when these were hit by the great depre^on in thou^nds of
people returned to overcrowded Java.

. ^

aiCE l:VLTIVAT^n^£ IN JAVA

The erfeote of the great depression were not 50 severe on the
Indonesians as on the Europeanst owing to the former's concentration
On the cultivation of rice instead of export crops. But intense suffering
IVas cau^d to those connected with the sugar industry* After the

66 i

CH- 42 THE ECQPiOMlC ASPECT OF EUROFEAN DOMINATION

Winding up of the Culture System sugar production had developed
on estates composed of land rented from villagers. 'I*he slump caused
the are^ tinder sugar to be reduced from 200,000 to 28,000 hectares,^
ground rent fell from a total of 2J million guilders to one of 3.S million,
while wages dropped from just under 84 million guilders to
million. The industry never recovered. When production began
again to expand, countries such as India, China and Japan, which had
relied on Javanese supplies, had started to produce their own sugar.
But the Dutch adopted a 'crisis policy' with all kinds of measures to
stimulate native industry, stabilize the price of dee and promote
native welfare. And Sarekat Islam, the main organ of the nationalist
movement, threw its energies into the task of founding ‘wild*- schools
and 'wild' co-operative institutions. The general renascence of
national life was reflected in a remarkable development of native
agriculture. Judged by European standards the Javanese peasant's
earnings remained pitiably low, since all the economic benefits
introduced by the Dutch after 1900 were neutralized by the immense
increase of the popuktion. Fumivairs carefully considered opinion is
that his standard of comfort was at least as high as in Burma outside
the rice plains.

In Indonesia in 1900 the wholesale business and banking wxre
mainly in Dutch handSs with the Chinese as middlemen and money-
lenders. Natives were restricted to petty retail trade. The freedom
accorded late in the day to European enterprise led to an increase in
the numbers of non-Dutch settlers, especially after 1903. By 1930
these were 7^195 Japanese^ 6,867 Germans, and 2,414 British settlcni
in Indonesia. Foreign (i,e. non-Dutch) capital was invested mainly
in oil and rubber British investment in tea plantations in about
1900 represented tlie flrst introduction of foreign capital on a large
scale. From 1905 the British began to invest in rubber, and by 19T2
half the rubber companies in Java were in British hands. The develop¬
ment of tobacco in the Deli region of Sumatra attracted British, Swiss
and German capital. By 1913 the Dutch capital investment in east
Sumatra was only 109 million guitden? out of a total of 206 million,
Dutch capital dominated the sugar industry. Just before the great
slump the foreign capital invested in crops other than sugar was
just over 40 per cent of the whole. .\t the time the total amount of
foreign (including Dutch) capital invested in the Netherlands Indies
wa4^ estimated at 5,000 million guilders, l^he deflation caused by the

^ A hcclBrc L 5 ^ juiC Linder 2 1 acto (1.471 1 actva ),

* -■ based on voluntBr^' effort^ outsidE the ^ovemmerkt sysfem,

662 THE CHALLENGE TO EGRCkPEAN DOMINATION PT. IV

great slump reduced this amount considerably, and in 1939 the total
foreign capital was estimated at 2,875 J^dllon guilders. Of this amount
about 73 per cent was Dutch, 13.5 per cent British, and 2.5 per cent
American, In additioEt, foreign investors, mainly Dutch, held about
2,000 nulUan guilders* worth of Indies govcmmenl bonds.

The development of the Outer Settlements in the t^-ventieth century
was in marked contrast with their neglect until late in the nmeteenih.
Sumatra developed large rubber estates inland from Palembang and
Jambi, After the conquest of Acheb the oiJ-wells of the north-east
coast were exploited, and by 1940 Sumatra was yielding annually some
5 million tons of crude oil The rich alluvial tin deposiU in the islands
of Banka and Billiton attracted an influx of Chinese labour and by
1940 were producing 44,000 tons of ore annually. Smelting was
carried out on Banka, but most of the Ore went to Singapore until
the construdjon of the large Arnhem smelter in Holland. Bauxite
was extracted on the island of RJaUt and by 193S 273,000 tons were
produced annually. British oil production in Brunei stimulated the
Dutch to develop their secrion of Borneo. Samariuda provided one
of the largi^t oilflelds in Indonesia, and by 1940 was producing 12^
million barrels annually for refining at BaUkpapan. Gold, nickeL Jton
and petroleum were discovered in Celebes, but before the Second
World War were not worked to any extent.

(d) Mi^aya

Malaya had no problems of population pressure. Her chief agrarian
problem was that of the Malay continuing with subriatence farming
and refnsing to supply labour for the expanding rubber and tin
industries. Only 15.5 per cent of the land had been taken under crop
by 1940, and more than half of that was planted with rubber. The
average Malay holding was only about 2^ acres, but it was enough for
the normal family, for the Malay did not reiy solely on his rice; he
grew' much garden produce besides coconut and arcca palms and fruit
trees. He was also a fieherman and trapper.

At the beginning of the century, therefore, since the Malay was not
interested in producing rice beyond his own necds^ Malaya produced
only one-third of the rice it needed. The remainder was purchased
from Siam and Burma. After the First World War, and again after
the great stump, as a result of government encouragement more rice
w^as producedj but the ratio of local production to total consumption
remained unchanged. The root of the evil w-as again agricultural

CH. 41 THl ECONOMIC ASPECT OF EITROPEAN DOMlNATtOS 66j

indebtcdn^^—in this case to Chinese and Indian money-Jenders*
The government's answer to the problem was, as elsewhere, to
sponsor ctKopcrativK. A small beginning was made in this direction
in 1907, but the big effort to launch a co-operative movement was in
1922, when a Co-operative Scxiieties Department was set up at Kuala
Lumpur.

Malay individualism, however, wa^ a great obstacle, as also a
propensity for plunging into debt for a family celebration auch as a
wedding. The co-operative movement tberefone languished. When
after the great slump the government tried to induce the peasant to
cultivate more rice by protecting him against the price-fixing methods
of the Chinese millers^ he was far too dependent upon credit from
Indian or Chinese shopkeepers to respond. The danger that he would
become a landless farm worker was real* He could not come to terms
Avith the foreign industrial and capitalist system that had taken root
in his country. *lf money comes into a Malay's hands*, wrote C. F,
Strickland in reporting ait the Malayan co-operative movement in
1928, "he spends regardless of the time when he will need it
urgently/^

The original object in Founding rural comparative sodetiea in
Malaya was to free the cultivator from his burden of debt. After the
great slump it was felt that better methods of production and sale were
necessary. New types of societies therefore were devised and achieved
some success. They were general purposes societies, which promoted
all kinds of cooperative effort, and *better-ljving* societies, which
sought to stir up a public opinion against extravagant expenditure
and granted loans merely to tide the cultivator over the period betwTcn
sowing and harv'cst*

At the beginning of the twentieth ccntuiy labour in Malaya was
predominantly Chinese and Indian. The Chinese came to work in
the tin mines; then later, with the extension of rubber cultivation»
Indian coolies came to work on the estates. A brief statement of the
rise in thdr numbers will give some idea of the problem this has
created. (Sec following page.)

There was a strong Cliinese community in Malacca under Dutch
rule. ’When Penang was founded by Frands Light in 1786 many
Chinese were attracted there from Malacca. Singapore from its
foundation in 1819 attracted large numbers of Chinese, They came
from Dutch territory and also by direct iromigratiEin from China.
By T941 Penang and Singapore were predominantly Chinese. In the
^ L, A. MilU, Briliih Half in p.

664

THE CHALLFJVGE TO DOMINATION

FT, IV

1911 census

1921 census

1931 census

1941 census

Malays

1,437,000

lf 6 ^l,OQO

1^962*000

2,278,000

Chinese

916,000

1,174,000

1,709,000

2,379,000

Indians

267,000

471^000

624tOQO

744,000

Malay states the chief Chinese community before the nineteenth
century was in Johorc, where they went in order to be out of the wav
of the Dutch, The influx gf Chinese into the mining areas began from
about 183,0 and became a flood from about 1S50. Their secret
societies supplied practically their sole social organiaation. It was the
rivalry in the Land area of Perak between the Cantonese Ghee Hins
and the Ilakka Hal Sans which led to the carh'est British intervention
to establish a protectorate over a Malay state.

Under the protectorate system the economic development of Malaya
was mainly in Chinese hands. Europeans began to come into tin
mining from 1883, but the Chinese remained for long the chief
miners. They were also market gardeners, artisans, shopkeepers,
contractors, financiers and revenue farmers. When rubber planting
began they became in a few cases large-scale planters. Their import¬
ance was such that there were usually two Chinese representatives
on each of the state councils in the Federation.

At first they' regarded Malaya as a place tn tvhich to make money
so as to return home as soon as possible. In the twentieth century,
however, there was a growing number of Straits-bom Chinese who
regarded Malaya as their home. By the time of the Japanese invasion
in the Second World War about one-third of the Chinese in Malaya
had severed all connections with China save cultural ones. The
immigrants brought political problemst there were underground
organisations first of the Kuomintang and later of the Communist
P*ttty. V\ncn the Japanese invaded China in the 'thirties they were
strong advocates of direct action. They formed boycotting groups
which raided shops selling Japanese goods.

ITiej’ established many schools, in which the written vernacular.

CH. 42 TH 7 r ECONOMIC ASPEC^ OF EUROPEAN DOMINATION 665

the Kuo Yu^ or National Language, replaced the literajry LAnguage,
I'heir teachers were nearly all China-bom and taught Chinese
national!in an extreme form which was hoadlc to the govemments
of Malaya. Their textbooks were imported from China and Avere full
of subversive matter. The whole tone of the citmculum was unfavour¬
able to the cultivation of a sense of Malayan nationality-

The British had first to deal with the activities of the secret societies,
w'hich from time to time cau$ed serious disturbances. For a long time
they lacked the precise inforination on which to take effective action*
It was for this reason that the Chinese Protectorate Avas established in
1877 in the Straits settlements. From 18S3 onwards its scope w^as
gradually extended to look after the interests of Chinese labourers.
In 1884 a Secretary for Chinese Affairs was appointed, but as the first
holder of the post regarded the secret societies aa harmless * friendly
societies * performing the same useful functions as these organisa¬
tions did in contemporary Britain, little headw^ay Avas made for some
time in coping Arith the Chinese problem.

In the matter of the labourers special laAvs had to be passed
to deal with the appathng abusea of the "contract" system and the
ingenious devices of eontraclora and employers to * squeeze^ labourers.
It AA'as difficult, however, to enforce their provisions because of the
Chinese preference for piece-work, in Avhich there was scope for
trickery tn caJeuiatioo^ lo 1937 some 80 per cent in the mines of the
Federation were on piece-w^ork. I'he payment of wages, housing and
health svere subject to gov^emment inspection* At the end of 1936
there Avere serious strikes because the drastic reductions in Avages
made during the depression had not been restored. The government
intervened in the dispute and negotiated a settlement which pro¬
vided for an increase of wages. In 1937 an Advisory' Committee on
Chinese Labour was set up for the whole of Malaya*

Up to 1930 no restrictions Avere placed upon Chinese immigration.
But owing to the slump 167,903 unemployed labourers returned to
China, The Secretariat for Chinese Affairs, the name given to the
Chinese protectorates when they Averc later merged in 1934, repat¬
riated no Jess than 13,000 destitute labourers, Asp howev'cr, 242,149
fresh Chinese immigrants arrived in that year the policy of immigra¬
tion restriction was adopted. During 1931, 193^ and 1933 control
AA33 maintained by a quota system, under which the monthly number
of arrivals w'as gradually reduced to 1,000. In 1934, when conditions
began to improve, the number was raised, but the old system of
onre^tricted immigration aass not restored.

666 THE CHAIXENGE TO EUROPEAN DOMINATION FT. IV

I'he problem of Indian immigration was not so serious as in Burma,
but the numberB coming in—mainly for labour m the rubber planta¬
tions—rose steeply with the rubber boom of 1907^ and as the Malay
and Chinese population was also rising steeply the Indian population
tended la remain at about 14 per cent of the whole^ In 1907 the
demand for Indian labour was so great that an Indian ImmigratiDo
Fund was established to finance recruitment, and free passages from
India were granted to all labourers who applied for them, I'his
enabled the abuses of the older kangany system to be Polished, The
karrgany was a recruiting agent employed by Malay planters to recruit
labourers by advancing them their passage money and recovering it
from them out of their wages on the estate. In 1922 the Government
of India further regulated the system by passing an Emigration Act
under which ofHdals w^ere stationed m India and Malaya to control
immigration. The great slump caused assisted immigration to be
suspended, but by 1934 the recovery enabled the system of controlled
immigration to be re-established. Nationalist opinion in India, w hich
had caused the Government of India to interv^ene in 1922, was still
critied. of the treatment of Indian immigrants^ and in 1936 Srinivasa
Sastri, who had already investigated the position of Indians in South
Mrica, was appointed by the Government of India to examine the
condition of Indiaa labour in Malaya. He reported veiy favourably
and advised that there w'as no justification for preventing Indian
labour from going to Malaya. But he suggested that the kangany
system should be discontinued, and in 1938 it wai^ abolished.

Meanwhile great strides had been taken by the Labour and Health
Departments at Kuala Lumpur in improving housing and health
conditions on the estates, in the early days the death-rate from
malaria had been very high, but Malaya wras one of the first tropical
dependencies to take advantage of the discoveries of Sir Ronald Ross
and other pioneers of tropical medidne. In 1910 the Estate Health
Branch of the Medical Department was ^tabUshed, and in ten years
the annual death-rate among estate bbourers was reduced from 62,9
per ijOOO to t 3 . 37 * In 1937 the death-rate among Indian labourers
in Malaya was only 7.11 per i,000. It is noteworthy that the Europcafi
estates had a much better health record than the Asian-owned ones.
As in the case of the great majoriti^ of Chinese, the chief problem in
connection* with the Indians in Malaya lay in their political affili ations
with their motlier Country.

Out of all this immigration a serious problem was already taking
shape during the period between the two world wars. The 1941

cii. 4z THE economic aspect pp evtuopean domination 667

census showed that the MaJays wfcre outnumbered by Ae Chin^,
Before the British period they had been in an overwhelming majority^.
Actually they outnumbered the Chinese in the Malay states, sinoe it
was Singapore with its 77 per cent Chinese population that tipped the
scale. Excluding Singapore, the respective percentages were Malays
49 and Chinese 38, with Indians making up most of the reorder.
But the Malay population itself was not wholly indigenous, since for
many years there had been a modest but growing migration of
Javanese and other Indonesians from the Netherlands East indies.

Naturally the Malays regarded themselves as the people of the
country and the rest as aliens. But there was little idea of Malaya
as a political unit, since the ordinary Malay peasant’s loyalty was to
his sultan, and Malays from other states were foreigners to him.
Moreover, the great majority of Chinese and Indians who <^e to
Malaya regarded it as a place of temporary exile. Chiang Kai-shek’s
govemment did its best to inculcate that all Chinese living abroad
were citizens of China, even if their families for several generations
had been British dttzens. The Indians aJso were deeply impregnated
with their own nationalism. But in any case the Malays as Moslems,
able to be raised to a high pitch of fanaticism, though normally easy¬
going, nourished a latent hostility against both races aa heathen;
there was practically no intermarriage, and harmony was maintrined
only through the close co-operation of the sultans and the British.
,\loat of the Malays were head over heels in debt to the Chinese,
but at the same rime their leaders demanded that in the a^inis-
tration of the country no Chinese should be placed in authority over
Malays. Had there been a strong Malay nationalist movement things
must certainly have come to a head. But before the Japanese invasion
the Malays were the most unpoliricaUy-minded people in SouA-Easl
Asia. That blissful state of mind, however, was not to survive the
occupation period.

The history of Singapore since its early development as a free-
trade entrepot and the centre of British trade in the area from Sumatra
to New' Guinea and from Java to China was one of growing prosperity
and economic importance coupled with a shrinking trade area. Much
of its China trade tvas transferred to Hong Kong after 184a. Its
important trade with Indo-China was cut off by the French^conquest,
which resulted in the impoaition of heavy duties in foreign trade and
the establishment of direct steamabip services between the colony
and France. The somewhat belated establishment of Dutch steam¬
ship services between the principal ports of the Netherlands Indies

668

THE OIALLEKGE TO ELSROFEAK DOSSlNATtONT

FT. TV

and their overseas markets eonsiderabJy changed Singapore^$ relations
with that area. In the present century Port Swettenham began to
draw much of the trade of the Federation*

But Singapore remained the collecting and di^ributing centre of
the MaJay Peninaulat central Sumatra and Bameo^ and the immense
extension of rubber cultivation in Malaya and Sumatra has more than
compensated for the contraction of its trading area. It$ trade with
Java, Siam and indo-China still remained important. The condnuous
improvement of its port facilities one of the chief reasons for
the maintenance of its position, as also the fact that it is extremely
well placed on the principal trade route between Europe and the Far
East, For instance, with oil hecoming increasingly important it
proved lo be the most convenient centre for the distribution of the
oil produced in Sumatra, Dutch Borneo and Sarawak. Its total trade
reached the 2pOOO million dollars^ mark before the Second World
War.

'rhc economic development of Malaya was closely bound up wHlh
tin and rubber. Before 1900 tin mining had been carried on almost
entirely by the Chinese. After 1900 the industry was revolinionized by
British capital ^nd direction, the installation of machinery and the
application of scientific methods. Smelting was started as early as
1887 by the Straits Trading Company, and an American attempt at
the end of the century to transfer all smelting to the United States
and thereby gain complete control over Malayan tin production was
frustrated by an export duty on tin ore* As si result Singapore be¬
came the biggest centre of tin smelting in the world, receiving ore
for smelting from SiaiUt French Indo-China^ Burma, Australia, China,
and Central and South Afrita^

Tin production rose steadily in Malaya until 1926, when the peak
price of ^^284 7^ yd. a long ton wa$ reached. Then overproduction
brought the price down to £120, The difficulty lay partly in the fact
that the United States had become the Largest consumer of tin in
the world and her demand tended to fluctuate violently. 'Fhc Tin
Producers Asisodation, w^hich represented the mines in the four richest
areas—Malaya^ Bolivia, the N'cthcrlands East Indic^r and Nigeria—
w'orked out a restriction scheme, and in 1931 this came into force
under the Internationa] Tin Committee. The weak point in the
scheme was that it left out minor producer? such as Siam^ French
lodo-China and the Congo, with the result that they had to be
brought into the scheme on their own terms. From 1933 the demand
^ The Strmiti dollMr b worth 2.1.

CH. 42 TlJE ECONOMIC ASPECT .OF EUROPfiAN DOMINATION 669

began to increEse, and to keep the price stable the International Tin
Committee adopted the practice of manipulating a buffer stock of
15,000 tons. In 1938, the last normal year before the war, Malaya
produced 29 per cent of the world's tin, "her potential output b«ng
100,000 tons a year.

'I'he great development of Malaya as one of the chief world pro¬
ducers of rubber did not begin until 1905. Hence until the post-war
slump in 1920 its cultivation was extended by Europeans, Chinese,
and Malays. Malaya's export of 196,000 tons of rubber in 1920 was
53 per cent of the world total* Rubber production greatly increased
Malaya’s prosperity' and was the chief cause of the fact that between
1901 and 1921 her population doubled—though, as we have seen, this
was largely through immigration of non-Malays, I’o cope with the
problems raised by this rapid expansion of cultivation the Depart¬
ment of Agriculture at Kuala Lumpur had to develop new branches
for carrying out research and experimentation.

The slump of 1910 was due to overproduction, extravagance and
the post-war depression in Europe. The price of rubber fell from ar*
per lb. in 1920 to bd. in 1922. Britain thereupon act up the Stevenson
Committee of Inquiry, which advised that a restriction scheme
should be worked out with the co-operation of the Dutch and Ceylon.
The Dutch, however, refused, because they were encouraging their
Javanese smallholders to plant rubber. Malaya and Ceylon therefore,
on the strength of the fact that they produced 70 per cent of the world
production, decided 10 go on alone* This was a great mistake, as the
tin producers were to discover later on. After six years’ trial the
scheme had to be abandoned owing to Dutch competition and the
vast increase of native smallholders,

'I'hcn came the great depression, when the price dropped to 2 Jd.
per lb. The situation during 1931-3 serious than during

1920-2. The big estates were forced to reconsider the whole question
of costs of production. Again also international co-operation had to
be sought, and as a result of agreement in May 1934 between the
producing countries the International Rubber Regulation Committee
came into being to control research and restriction. In 1935 the price
rose to bd, per tb, and as a result of the improved methods they had
been forced to adopt to tide over the crisis this yielded the big estates
a profit* The armaments race and the immense development of the
American motor-car industry then caiwed the price to rise; but again,
as in the case of tin, it fluctuated too much according to conditions
in the United States. The Rubber Regulation Committee then tried

670 T1[E ClfALL£NGE TO EUROPEAN I>OMINATION PT. IV

to stubiUze the price at 9^. per lb., but had to abandon the effort
because the demand in the manufacturing countries was found to be
beyond its controL In 1938 Malaya bad 3,303,170 acrea under
lubber and produced 41 per cent of the world supply. Of her acreage,
2,026134s acres were owned by the big estates and 1,275,822 by small¬
holders, chiefly Malays. Her total production was 361,000 long tons,
but the total e^jport was 537,000 tons* This was because much of the
lubb^ produced in Siam, Sumatra and Borneo was sent to Singapore,
where it was graded and shipped overseas.

One lesson learnt from the great slump was the need to encourage
additional cultures to rice and rubber* The oil palm was found to be
an attractive alternative to rubber* But it had to be cultivated on
large estates, for it had no interc^ for the spuUlioldcr* Although palm
oil is more nutritious than coconut oil, the Malay refused to include
it in his diet. Coconut production w^as mainly carried on in small
holdings^ but large estates for the production of copra began to develop.
The production of oil was carried out mainly by power-driven mills
along the western coast.

The British have ne^^er imposed any restrictions on foreign invest¬
ment in Malaya, Before the Second World War American companies
owned large rubber plantations, much Australian capital w'as invested
in tin, and the Japanese controlled alt the iron minea^ The iron mines
were in Johore and Trengganu and in ^938 produced ore worth
£858,000. Western investments in Malaya reached a total of just over
£40 millions in 1914- In 1930 they stood at £116.5 niillions* British
investments accounted for some 70 per cent of the xvhok* Chinese
investments in 1937 totalled udl over £4t mUlions^

The great criticism of economic imperialism, or * colonialism', as it
is now ineptly iermed+ was that the foreign capitalist drained profits
aw'ay for the benefit of shareholders overseas instead of ploughing
them back into the country. This theory, loudly asserted by political
discontents, is plausible, but on close examination the facts are not
capable of quite so simple an explanation* The imperial powder?
provided a vast amount of capital and technical skill, without which
the development of the ^colonial' icrritotiea to their present economic
importance could never have taken place. They revolutionised
health conditions and delivered great masses of people from the de¬
cimating or enfeebling dominion of frightful diseasesr Their research
in tropical agriculture and theijr scientific inveatigation into other
TuattoTs of fundamental importance laid the sure foundations on which

CH. 42 TitE ECONt)MlC ASPECT; OF EOJtOPEAN POMIXATION 67!

prosperity &iicl higher staiidArds of life could be built up* Investi^tion
of their fabulous profits, so far as it has gone, has tended to show that,
as in aU fahlcs, iroaginatioit coosiderably outstripped reality, and that
the critics of' colonialism’ have not taken into account the heavy loi^
that have occurred from time to time. And in most cises foreign
investors contributed the major part of the state revenues. On the
facts, as they are at prsent available, the sober historian dare not
commit himself to the sweeping getieralizationa that are the weapons
in politital warfare.

It has been estimated that before the Second World War Europe s
annual imports from the United States amounted to some 500
million dollars inore than her exports in return, and that the greater
part of the funds needed to balance this account was piwided by the
South-East Asian trade. The total foreign investment in South-fi^t
Asia, including the Philippines, was about 4,370 million doll^. The
respective shares in the capital invested in business enterprises were
as follows:

European (principally Dutch in Indcmi^ia

f.943

million dollars

and French in Indo-China)

British

860

II T*

Chinese

640

United States

330

Japanese

it ti

The undertakings in whidi these sums were inv«ted provided
Europe and .4merica with important foodstuffs and vital raw materials
for industry. Through the Straits of Malacca and Sunda ran trade
mutes of the highest importance in the great commercial powers,
Singapore had fulfilled Raffles's expectations that it would become
another Malta. The London Imperial Conference of 1921 decided
to make it a firat-class naval base, and in 1938 the work was completed
at a cost of £20 million.

CHAPTER 43

SIAM IN TIL\NSITI 0 N, 1910-42

Thk title of the chapter k borrowed from Professor K. P* Landon^s
book' dealing with the revolution of 1932, which, besides substituting
a form of constitutional government for the old Chakri absolutism»
considerably hastened the process of adjusting Siam to modem world
conditions begun under Chulalongkorn. Chulalongkom had thirty-four
sans and forty-three daughters. In the early days of hU reign the sons
were sent to English publicschools^ universities or technical institutions.
Quite a number showed exceptional ability h Rome became specialists
in lavp\ agriculture or engineering. Others received training in the
British^ German. Russian and Danish arnues+ and the British navy.
Their father wrote a little pamphlet of advice for their benefit during
their sojourn abroaH.

Prince Maha \ajiravudh^ who succeeded his father in 1910. w'as
one of those who had received this training, going to Cambridge
University and sending for a time with the British army. As the
nearest direct heir according to the Chakri rules of succession, the
title of hdr-apparent wa$ conferred on him shortly before his return
to Siam in 1902. During his long slay abroad he had almost lost
contact with hia family, and on his relum he gathered about him as
his associates a band of young men who were not members of the royal
family. When he became king he discontinued his father*s practice
of $eeking the advice of the more distinguished members of his family^
His brothers and uncles were rarely consulted, and in order to counter¬
act their influence he not only appointed his favourites to important
positions in the government but also founded the ^Wild Tiger Scout
Corps", in which volunteers from amongst the civil officials were en¬
rolled on a quasi-military basis^ under the personal leadership of the
king as Chief Scout-General.

Vajiravudh was^ however, unconquerably shy and lacking in real
gifts of leadership. He was a lover of art and the theatre and wrote
or translated plays in polished T^aii But the appointment of his

tvcnncUri Perry Jh 4 IIIiIoii^ itt LjcknidDn, See bIjo htfl- contrihu--

tlOncM^ Suimto L. A. MitUand Auocidccs, TheNm W^MofSoulhgml A$i^^ pp. 346-?^.

671

Clf, 43 SIAM IN TR.iNSiTION'p 1910-4:1 673

&atclLitc^ td sinecures and the unparalleled corruptiOii that resulted
made his clique disliked and caused him much unpopulariry. Through¬
out his reign there Mas subdued discontent in the country'. There
were even uvo attempts to dethrone him. The first, in 1912, was an
assassination plot, nipped in the bud by his able brother, the Prince
of Pitsanulok. It was due to discontent in the army and navy at the
creation of the Wild Tiger Corps, The Bangkok troops were apparently
ready to mutiny and march on the palace. But the censorship was so
rigorous that even now the details are not known. Some sixty nrrny
officers were arrested. The second, in 19x7, was also a military plot,
caused by dislike of the king's pro-Allied sympathies on the part of
the pro-German section of the army.

He has been somewhat unaccountably called democratic.* On the
contrary, his attempts at tightening the royal absolutism were a con¬
tributing factor in bringing about the constitutional crisis of 1932.
The Cabinet of rninisters set up by Chulalcmgkom rarely met,
Minbtexs consulted the king individually and made individual
decisions. There xvas thus no co-ordination* And the king's pre¬
dilection for reviving old ceremonial together with ihe increasing
elaboration of state functions, betrayed an inordinate enjoyment of the
pomp and circumstance of his office.

He had a great sense of the dramatic and he consciously fostered
national pride. He realized the great value of the Boy Scout movemcm
for such a purpose, and through his encouragement—one might
almost say Vat his order^—the schools of SUm became Seoul-minded
and produced innumerable companies of 'Tiger's \Vhelps\ as they
were called, for they w^ere affiliated to the * Wild Tigers And as in the
contemporaneous naiional movements in Burma and Indoinesia, so in
Siam religion was called in as the great unifying force. 'Fhere is a
curious parallel between Siam and Burma in this matter, for in both
nationalist propaganda asserted that only a BuddhJst could be a true
patriot, Japan's victory over Russia in 1905 had a stimulating effect
upon Siam's national sentiment, and it seems likely that in his efforts
to carry' the process of modernization further Vajiravudh was fully
aware of the methods by w'hich Japan had made herself strong enough
to defeat a great European power.

Compared with his father, V'ajiravudh accomplished important
administrative reforms. His socbl reforms, however^ had far-
reaching consequences* They were introduced largely in order to
bring Siam into line with Western ideas and practices and thereby
^ Vir^nia TKchuphoHh ThaihAd: JVfrf Neti' p. 49^

674 the challenge TO EUROPEAN DOMINATION PT. IV

secure her acceptance into the comity of nations. This is the ex¬
planation of the recodification of law which was begun in Vajiravudh's
reignj and particularly of the draft law of moiiogamy which, at the
king’s instance^ vvas included in it. It did not spring from 2 single^
minded desire to emancipate women. One of his deepest concerns
was to obtain the abolldon of the extra-territoriality rules affecting
Europeans in his country, and he realized that to bring Siam's legal
system into doser conformity with accepted European notions was an
essential requirement of such a policy.

Some of his social reforms were undoubtedly due to ideas he had
imbibed during his long period of education in England. His edict in
1916 ordering all his subjects 10 adopt patronymics may certainly be
ascribed to this, as also his introduction of compulsory vaccination. It
was aJ$o largely through his mduence that women adopted European
hair styles and the skirt in place of short hair eit Anpjj? and the panung,
or waist-doth with the end pulled between their legs and tucked in at
the front. Other useful measures in the same spirit were the adoption
of the Gregorian calendar, the introduction of compulsory' elementary
education (in foundation of the Chulalongkorn University

(in 19^7)1 institution of the Red Cross Society* He was an

enthusiast for football and athletics. Football in particular becarnep
with his active support, immensely popular tbroughout the country,
and he himsdf organized cup-ties. His own personal contribution to
education was the foundation in Bangkok of the famous V^ajlravudh
School, a hoarding school for boys modelled dosdy on the English
public-school pattern and under a Siamese headmaster who wa.s a
product of Sander^n's Oundle.

Nest to social reform foreign policy absorbed most of Vajiravudh's
attention during his early years. When the Firat World War broke
out in 19^4 personal sympathies were with the Allies. But anti-
French sentiment was still very strong among the Siamese people, and
there was a po’werful pro-German section m the army. It was, how¬
ever, certamly not to Siam's advantage that she should be a centre
from which German intrigue radiated into the adjacent territories
belonging to Britain and France. In July 1917 therefore, in eon-
sequence of Germany'^ contemptuous rejection of a Siamese protest
against her piethods of submarine warfare, Vajlravudh took the plunge
and declared war. In the following year a small Siamese expeditionary
force w‘aa sent to France. Siam gained much fay joining the winning
aide. German shipping to the value of several millions sterling came
into her hands as booty, and she was able to free her railway system

CH. 43 SIAM IN THANSJTION, 1910^42 675

from the control that Germany had managed to obtain over it in the
pre-war period. Better still, she secured membership of the Lesague
of Nations^ and m igaa the United States made a fresh treaty abandon¬
ing all her extra-territorial righta in Siam.

Vajiravudh had always dlaUkcd the heavy work imposed upon him
by having to attend to daily matters of government routine. He left
much of the detailed work to hb uncle, Prince Devawongse^ who had
been his father^s closest companion and ^'as for some thirty years
Minbter of Foreign Afiairs. Dr. Malcolm Smith tells us that next to
the king he was the most powerful man in the country.* He was a man
of great intelltgence and devotion to duty and performed notable
sen-ices in the cause of Siam^s independence and progress. After his
death in 1923 the king relied mainly on Chao P'ya Yomarej, whose
meteoric me from an obscure post in the household of one of Chula-
longkoni‘3 brothers to become .Minister of the Interior waa the
measure of his remarkabk ability.

When Vajiravudh died in 1925 he left no $on to succeed him. He
had been a bachelor throughout most of his reign, to the great dis¬
appointment of hb mother. Queen Saowapa, who died in 1919. When
at last he did marry, in he failed to produce a male heir before
his death and was succeeded by Prince Prajadhipuk, his youngest
brother. Prajadhipok had never expected or desired to become king.
He was the seventy-sixth child of hb father and his last son. His
unde. Prince Vajirayan, the Supreme Patriarch of the Buddhbt
Church, had tried to persuade him to demote his life to religion so as to
qualify to become hb successor^ but after serving four months in 1917
as. a novice he left the monastery in shattered health and abandoned
the idea. He was a modest young man of liberal outlook and with a
high sense of responsibility.

ITie most pressing problem facing him at his acce^ion was the need
for economy in public cjcpcnditiitc. Vajiravudh'a extravagance had
played havoc with the state finances. Prajadhipok therefore dismissed
many of his brother^ favourites, reduced the Civil List and Royal
Household expenditure drastically, and cut dowm the Royal Corps
of Pag« from 3,000 to 300. Lhese measures, combined with increased
customs retuma resulting from new commercial treaties and prosperous
foreign trade, enabled the Treasury to balance its budget^ without the
necessity to negotiate foreign Joans or raise taxation* He also sec up a
Supreme Council, composed of five of the most important princes, as
an advisory body^ and revived the Cabinet. In 1927, in order to obtain

^ op. itt, p. tif.

676 THE CHALLEKCE TO EUROPEAN DOAIINATION FT. tV

advice from a wider circle of ad viscid, he created 3 large Privy Council,
with a committee of forty «o report to him on any matters he might
submit to them.

The early years of hia rdgn saw many interesting developments
such as the establishment of a wireless service, the preparation of the
Dom Muang airport for international air service, and the foundation of
the Royal Institute of r.iterature. Architecture and Fine .\rta, with its
excellent National Library and Museum. The tical was linked with
gold by a new Currency Act in 1928. Public Health laws were passed
and the qualificatioiis for the medical proftsssion made more stringent.
An Act for the Control of Commercial Undertakings of Public
Utility was passed to increase governmental control over insurance and
banking, and in 1930 Dr. Karl Zimmerman of Harvard University
made an economic survey of the kingdom.

The great slump, the more acute effects of which began to be felt
in that year, hit Siam in some ways less hard than other countries in
South-East Asia. The bottom fell out of the rice market, and Britain’s
abandonment of the gold standard, which affected Siam’s chief
competitor in rice exports, Burma, forced Siam herself to abandon it
in ^'lay 193^ after long hesitation. The consequent improvement in
her export trade, especially to the silver controlled markets, ultimately
benefited the cultivator and caused some criticbm of the government
for not acting earlier. But there was no serious unrest in the agri-
cultural areas. The country Lacked big industries; hence there was no
large mass of unemployed. Foreign commerce was in foreign hands
exclusively. The chief effects, therefore, of the depression were to
strengthen the nationalist demand for the rentoval of foreign control
over the country’s economic life,

T he government, however, got into serious financial difficulties.
In March 1931 fh® Minister of Finance liad to announce a budget
deficit of tt million ticals, As Siam failed in her attempts to raise
foreign. Joans in Parb and New York, she was forced to introduce
drastic economies involving salary cuts, which hit the junior official
class very hard. They were already discontented because the road to
middle-class promotion was blocked by the solid princely phalanx
which monopolized all the key positions. Many of them had adopted
democratic ideas through education in Europe and had become im¬
patient with the working of the old-fashioned royal absolutbm. At the
Same time, during the king's absence abroad for medical treatment in
1931^ serious rivalry developed in the Supreme Council between the
Minister of War, Prince Bovaradej, and the Minister of Commerce,

43 SIAM IN THANSmON, iqiO-42. 677

Prince Purachatra, over a question of economv. In October 1931 thb
produced a first-dass political enm which shook public confidence in
that princely dominated institution.

'Phis ms not all the discontent^ since there were those of the
official class who had lost their jobs through Frajadhipok's drastic
pruning of the Civil Service, and to them must be added a group of
army officers resentful of the salary cuts and hostile to princely
influence. In 193a these discontented elements found a leader in
Luang Pradist Manudharm^ better known by his personal name of
Pridi Banomyong, a brilliant young lawyer trained in Paris and
Professor of Law^ at the Chulalongkom University. He drafted a
constitution and with military help took control over Bangkok and
carried out a bloodless revolution on 24 June 193^.

The public took no part in the rowp save as spectators* The king,
who w'as away from the capital at the lime, returned tw'o days later and
at once accepted the provisional constitution. By it he losi all his
prerogatives save the right of pardon, the princea were excluded from
ministerial posts and the army, and the People's PartVt as Pridi and
his supporters named themseK'cs, took over the management of the
government. They nominated a Senate of seventy members, w^tuch
proceeded to appoint an Executive Council with power to promul¬
gate laws and Control ministers. The Senate w'as to be replaced by an
elected Assembly after a lapse of six months^ and there wa^ to be
universal suffrage after ten yearSn

The new^ government was therefore a party- dictatorship. But Pridi
and his lieu tenants did not take over the actual government. They
cboae P'ya Matiopakom as President of the Executive Council. He
had played no part in the revolution but had been a good President of
the Court of .appeal. His appointmentt like that of the President of the
Senate, a previous Minister of Education, was an attempt to appease
conserv^ative opinion. From the point of view- of the revolutionaries
the arrangement was not a success. P'ya Manopakom's policy was,
on his ow^n admission, a continuation of the pre-revolution regime's
retrenchment policy + No one was satisfied, there was an atmosphere
of alarm, and \vhcA the Communists and their Chinese supporters
tried to cash in on the situation the government adopted a policy of
repression. ^

The consen'aiive influence in the government showed itself quite
clearly in December 1933 when the new constitution, on which a
special committee had been at work since the revolution, was promul¬
gated. The committee had worked in close coilaboration with the

67® the challenge to eorofean domination et. iv

king, and the result Was a document in wKicbi the Foviil powet^ "vvere
considerably greater than had op^naJly been announced. Legislative
compettrice, control over financesp and the power to interpret the
constitution were vested in a unicameral Assembly of 156 members,
of which^ as a temporary measure, the king wras to appoint half,
flections were to be held cven^ four years. Candidates for sears must
be Siamese of at least twenty-three years of age« resident in their
constituendo* and able to fulfil certain edueatiood re^iuirements.
The law of citizenship w^as redefined go as to include the right to vote
among the privileges of the dtizen. Mmisters were to be responsible
to the Assembly I hut if a vote of confidence were moved the voting
must not take place on the day of the discussion. The king secured
three important powers. He could dissolve the Assembly without
Cabinet approval, but a new election must be held within three
months. He was given the right to veto legislation, but the Assembly
could override his veto by a second vote. He could also enact emer¬
gency decrees so long as they were countersigned by the minister
responsible.

The restrictions on the p rtnees of the royal familv were also relaxed.
While they were prohibited from aitting as deputiW or holding office
as ministers, they were permitted to act a$ advisers and hold diplomatic
posts. As a safeguard against party dictatorship a political party was
forbidden to issue orders to any of its membm with seats in the
Assembly. In 1933 a further step was taken at the king’s request.
The People^B Party was dissolved as a political party and became a
social club. This \va& an astute piece of political engineering. The
king had rejected a pctiricin by a number of army ofScers and high
officials to form a Nationalist Party and in consequence was able to
bring pressure to bear ou the Pcople^s Party. Apparently the petition
had been presented aoldy with that intention.

P’ya Manopakorn now sought to free his government from the
control of Pridi and his group. An unpublished schcjnc of national
economy prepared by Pridi was declared to be Communistic, and by a
WTll-preparcd coup he was forced into exile. Then the government
stole his thunder by announcing a national policy to exploit the
national resources and promising assignments of vacant land to the
unemployed^ But P’ya Manopakorn went too far by securing a
prorogation of the Assembly and assuming a morie and more dictatorial
attitude.

The rising alarm and the prime ministers preparation for another
purge led four army leaders, with P’ya Bahol at their head» to offer

CH. 43 SIAM IN TK^SmON^ 1^10-43 679

thdi re3LgmtidTi$. All Imd been colleagues of Fridi in the revolution of
the previous year. When their resignations were accepted they planned
another coup and on 10 June 1933 carried it through success¬

fully. P"ya Manopakom resigned and his place was laten by P"ya
BohoL A new Coundl compo^d of his followers was appointed and
the Assembly recalled. The government publicly proclaimed that it
was anti-Communist and would defend the constitution. The king^
who had been conveniently absent from the capital for the coup
returned and in the first radio speech ever made by a Siamese monarch
to his people urged that peace and unity should be maintained.

Irt ^ptember Pridi^ w^ho had become the darling of the peoplep
w^aa permitted to return and w^as given an enthusiastic reception.
A conunission was appointed to investigate the charges of Communism
that had been made against himp and in March 1934 its report com¬
pletely cleared him- Meanwhile in October 1933 the government was
faced by a serious military revolt led by the king's cousiut Prince
Bovaradej. The rebel forces occupied the Dom Muang airport and
demanded the resignation of P'ya Baho] and his associates. But the
premier's popularit)' with the army ensured the loyalty of the troops
guarding the capital, and when Luang P*ibun Son^ram, in command
of the government forces, recaptured Don Muang the rebel leaders
fled to Saigon and the revolt collapsed.

Throughout the crisis the king had maintained a neutral attitude.
It became known that he had been aw^e of what was brewing and
that most of the royal princes had given moral and financial support
to the rebels. He was never able to regain the confidence of his people,
and in January 1934 went abroad on the plea that he must have
specialist treatment for hb eyeaightp which was indeed causing him
serious amdety. The aristocracy abo did not recover its position.
On the other hand, the new middle-class movement became divided
by the growing rivalry between P'ibun Songgranv, who had risen to
prominence by restoring order at the time of the military revolti and
Fridi^ F'ibun was the leader of a group that was militarist and
nationalist, while Pridi led a section in which the civilian element
predominated. Only the strong personality of the prime minister^
whom everybody liked for his humane temperament^ held the govern¬
ment together.

In November t933 a general election was held in or<3br that the
government might seek to countenict the influence of the rebel
sympathizers by intensive ptopagandan Less than a tenth of the
electorate voted and comparatively few candidates offered themselves

68 o THE CHALLENGE TO EUROPEAN DOMINATION PT. IV

for election. Pridi's following apparently secured a majority of the
seats, Fridi was all for a radical economic policy * but there were
signs of unrest which caused much alarm, and P’ibun*s campaign
against what he called the Comnujnistic element in the government
caused much weariness of embarking on any fundamental changes.
In September J934 a crisis occurred when the Assembly threw out a
me^ure for ratifying a rubber agreement with BritaitL The Cabinet
resigned, but P'ya BahoPs popularity wag $0 great that he returned to
office with a reconstructed ministry which won a vote of confidence
w'ith a secure majority-

Soon aftenvarijU another crisis blew up which involved the king's
abdication. He vetoed a Bill which sought to abolish the need for his
signature to be appended to a death sentence, and wben the Assembly
objected he threatened to abdicate unless his conditions, involving the
resignation of the Assembly and a new' genera] election, were acceptedn
Attempts at a compromise failed and in March 1935 he announced his
abdication. His nephew, Prince Ananda Mahidol^ a ten-year-old
schoolboy in Switzerlandj w^ia proclaimed king and a Regency Council
of three members was appointed to act during his minority. Pra-
jadhipok and his wife were in England when this crisis occurred, and
he announced his intention of residing there in future with the title of
Prince of Sukhodaya,

During the succeeding period P'ibun's influence continued to
groAVp especially after Pridi’$ departure on a foreign tour in the middle
^935' The 5 t,ate Council w'as constantly weakened by quarrels
between its members, and a$ more and more posts in the civil ad^
ministration were given to army officers the government showed signs
of a trend towards a mtlilaiy dictatorship which seriously alarmed the
Assembly* P^ya Bahors sdministratjon survived another general
elation in 1937; but the new^ Assembly was determined to assert its
wilU and in December 19J® passed against the government an amend¬
ment to its procedure to compel a more detailed espLanation of the
budget. T his brought the t^ignatiofi of the Council and P\a Buhol
announced his retirement.

'rhe new government was headed by P^ihun, with Pridi as Minister
prevailing note ^vas an intensified nationalism.
Pridi s new Revenue Code, passed in March 1939, tvas an attempt to
lighten the burden of the peasant and free him from dependence upon
the money-lender. Much heavier taxation was levied on the
commercial class, represcnied mainly by the Chinese and partly by
European fimiB. It was followed by stringent regulations to check

CH^ 43 SIAM IN 1910^42 6S1

Chinese immlgralion and reserve for Siamese nationals a number of
occupations previously monopolbed by Chinese. The government
went so far as to close hundreds of Chinese schools^ suppress Chinese .
ite\^'spapers> deport thousands of opium addicts and even arrest some
of the leaders of the Chinese community. The reason given was that
the terrorist activities of the Chinese secret societies constituted a
menace to public order.

European interest^i were hit by the$e meaaurc&^ since they employed
Chinese labour in mining and forestry. Leases for the teak industrvi
which was under British management, were renewed on Jess favour¬
able terms and more forest areas w'ere reserved for Siamese enterprise.
An attempt was made to take over local shipping by buying vessels to
be operated by a state company and by legislation ruling that the
capitaJ of foreign shipping firms must be at least 70 per cent Siamese,
all vessels must be registered as Siamese and their crews 75 per cent
Siamese, State subsidies were given to private Siamese firms,
technical, commercial and agHculturaS schools were founded, and
many Siamese students sent abroad for technical training.

Other interesting manifestations of the new chauv'inism were the
change in the official name for the country froM Siam to I'hailand
in June 1939. The Siamese had always proudly referred to their
country as Muang Thai, *the land of the free*^ and it was now decreed
that foreigners also should use this name.^ P^Ebun also started a
campaign to inculcate Western manners and social practices,^ and a
series of pamphlets was issued to explain government policy in this
connection. Both sexes were required to wear European shoes and
hats m puhlic:, and a Westernized version of dress was prescribed.
Efforts were also made to stop the practice of chewing betel, ^I'he
education system was brought under the strictest control, .All schools
had to adopt the cunricula, textbooks and examinations rigidly pre¬
scribed by the Ministry of Education, and all teachers had to be
registered, I’hc movement to equate Buddhism with patriotism was
fostered, and there were many conversions from Christianity. It svas
made clear that non-Buddhists in government service were liable to
lose their posts or their hopes of promotion. The rule was also laid
dmvn that no official might murry an alien without special permission.

In foreign affairs efforts were made to win concessions from the
Western powers by threatening to co-operate with JajJan. Much
closer economic relations were formed with that country, and Japanese

^ In Stptcruber 19+5 it ch^nsiMl back to Siam, but in i^+S the nime Tb«ilitld
bcoMTic Again iu oRi^'bil

63^ THE CHALLEHCE TO EI/ROrMN DOMlNATtON FT, IV

goods began to flood the Siamese market. Siamese irredemism
stirred up* parriculady against French Indo-China, and demands were
made for the restoration of the Cambodian and Laos territories, which
France had farted Siam to yield in the earlier period.

The outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 and the consequent
cdncentrarion of Britain and France upon the German menace
enabled Fibun with Japanese assistance—it was officially called
'mediation* — to regain much territory. After the Japanese landings
in Indo-Chiaa aThai-Japanese pact was signed in December 1940, and
in the following March the French ceded the Cambodian prorinces of
Battambang and Siemreapj together with the Laotian territory to the
west of the river Mekong.

Instead of playing off Japan against the W^tem Powers* P’ibun
had now sold himself to the Japans. He and a small group of high-
placed officials adopted a policy of full coHjperation with Japan, the
natural result of which was the declaration of war by Siam against
Britain and the United States on 25 January 194^1

CHAPTER 44

THE JAPANESE IMPACT

When in November 1936 Germany and Japan signed the Anti-
Comintern Pact and in July of the following year Japan's second big
offensive began in China, another Russn-Japanese war acemed only
a matter of time. In the sumTTier of 1938 there was open warfare near
the junction of the borders of Manchuria^ Korea and Siberia, and a
state of severe tensian in Soviet-Japanese relatians+ Both sides were
making huge concentrations of troops in Manchuria and Siberia.

Then in September 193B came the Munich agreement. Its effects
upon Japanese policy' were immediate. She decided that the weakness
displayed by Britain and t'rance in face of the dictators indicated that
she could get away with a policy of expansion In South-East Asia.
Britain had the largest financial stake in China, and‘Japan was already
heartened by the extent to w'hich her determined advance there had
resulted in British measures of appeasement. Her hopc^ therefore,
was that she could achie^^e her aims without fuU^scale hostilities. That
was whv in the spring of 1939 she refused the invitation to join her
Anti-Comintern partners in a military pact,

Japan's southwards push began in the very month after Munich,
when she seis^ed Canton and isolated Hong Kong from the mainland.
'Phis the prelude to the seizure of strategic points in the South
China Sea^ Hain]in Island off the coast of French Indo-China on 10
February 1939, and the Sinnan Islands, including Spratley, on 30
March. Thus she sought to overcome the serious disadvantage under
which she had laboured through having no naval base nearer Singapore
than Formosa. Hainan brought her within 1^300 miles of it. Spratley
Island toot her 700 miles nearer stiU.

The big danger in the game that she was playing was from the
United States, where her actions had already aroused so much
apprehension that in I he previous January the American fleet had been
transferred from the Atlantic to the Pacific. But Genhany and
Russia signed their Non-Aggr^ion Pact on ai August, and within a
fortnight another gr^t war began in Europe, Japan was worried by
the possible implications of the pact; but she calculated that while there

684 THE CHAJ-LENGI- TO EUROPEAN DOMINATION FT. IV

was dangler of becoming involved in a war across the Atlantic America
would do everything possible to avoid one in the Pacific. She decided,
thereforef to commit herself fully to the South-East Asian gamble*

Her next move^ tn November 1939, was a big thrust inio Kw^angsi
province to capture the city of Nanning and cut China's strategic
road connection with French Indo-China. This left China with only
the newly opened Burma Road and the Hanoi-Kunming railway for
outlets to the sea, and Japan could threaten both from the air. French
Indo-China now became her major objective^ On 9 April 1940
Hitler’s tUtskri^g began. Only just over a week later Arita, the
Japanese Foreign Minister^ made some significant references to the
future of French fndo-Chlna and the Netherlands Indies in the event
of a German v ictor} . These evoked a sharp reply from Cordell Hull,
the American Secretary of State, But France and Holland fell, and
iheir possess ions in South-East Asia were left with quite irtadequate
defences against a possible Japanese attack.

In the same month that France fell, June 1940, Japan signed a treaty
of friendship with P'Lbun Songgram's government in Thailand* She
was now well placed to bring that country under control hy means of
her technique of irlfiltration^ pressure and menaces. Incidentally she
had her eye on the new naval base which Thailand was building ai
Singora. But it was to French Indo-China that she now turned; the
time had come to clinch matters.

In August 194^ Konoye Cabinet demanded special concessions
there. The V^ichy regime, tinder pressure from Berlin, signed an
agreement granting Japan permission to use Indo-Cluna's ports,
cities and airports for troop rnovements. In ^he following month
a ireaW was signed between Vichy and Tokyo which permitted
Japanese forces to occupy the northern part of Indo-China as far south
as Hanoi. In the same month Japan burnt her boats by forming a
military alliance with the Axis. The treaty was worded in such a way
as to warn .America against interference tn either Europe or the
I'acilic. In face of this American tsobtionlsm died a sudden death,
and Washington began to prepare for the worst.

Japan's next concern was to reach a neutrality agreement with
Russia and at the same time hold America off by negotiations. Mean¬
while she played upon P'ibun Songgram's revisionist ambitions by
permittin^a mock J hai offensive on the Cambodian and Laos frontiers
and then in January 1941 stepping in with an offer of *mcdiation^
\ ichy was forced to hand over the Cambodian provinces of Battam-
bang and Siemreap and the Laos tern to Jy on the west bank of the

CH. 44 THE JAPANESE IMPACT 6S5

Mekong* which Siam had lost at the time of the Pakiiam incident in
1893- In April 1941 Japan’s hoped-for Neutrality Pact Avith Russia
was safely concluded^ In that s^nic month American^ British^ Dutch,
Australian and Nevs^ Zealand officers met in Singapore for staff
conversations*

Then came a sudden check to Japan's pUna for a southward drive;
on zz June 1941 Hitler began hb surprise attack on Russia. Japan
notv hesitated, for a war on two fronts was something she was
extremely anxious to avoid. It soon appeared^ however^ that luck
was still on her side; for the overwhelming and rapid German
successes against Russia made it ohA^ious that she could resume her
southwards coum*. During July her troops occupied the whole of
French 1 ndo-China. But by now America’s attitude had hardened and
her military preparations tvere a $eriotia deterrent to a further step.

Japan therefore redoubled her efforts to lull the suapiciona of
the White House and the State Department. For some months
negotiations were c^ried on amid growing tension, Buth sides had
become convinced that war was inevitable. On b December 1941 as a
final despairing peace ctforE President RooscA^ek sent a personal
telegram to the Emperor of Japan. On the follovving day Japan made
her scLTprisc attack on Pearl Harbour and inflicred upon America one
of the most disastrous defeats she has ever sustained. Her Pacific fieet
Avas put out of action and Japan was free to go ahead with the conquest
of South-East Asia.

She planned a short and decisive war. She was in a hurry, for she
believed that a German victory in Europe was certain, and she wanted
to reach her objectives before America could revive her power in the
Pacific. After Pearl Hiirbourt therefore, her offensive went ahead with
breathless speed. On the following day her troops landed in 'rhaiknd,
and after a token resistance P'ibun's government capitulated and
agreed to declare war on the Allies* Before the end of December the
American bases of Guam and Wake and the British settlement of
Hong Kong had fallen. Simultaneously Avith these moves the
Japanese began, the invasion of ibe Philippine^. Only three days after
Pearl Harbour two British capital ships; the Prince of IVahs and the
Repntse^ on their way from Singapore to prcAxnt a Japanese landing
in north Malay^p were sunk by aeroplanes based on Indo-Chiria.
Japan now bad overAvhelming naval supremacy in the Pacific and East
Asiatic wafers.

The main Japanese army now moved doAvn the Malay Peninsula
towards Singapore, wdiik another force of specially trained veteran

686 THE CHALLENGE TO EIJROPEAN DOMINATION FT, JY

troops invaded Burma. In all these spheres—the PhilippineS;, MalaySp
and Burma—the invaders possessed decisive ground and air superiority^
While these campaigns were in progresa other forces were Landed in
Bali and Sumatra in preparation for the invasion of Java. Singapore
felL on 15 Februai)' 1942* The Burma iavasion b^n in the third
week of January with two thrusts from Siamese territor^^ into Ten-
asserim. The British made their first stand on the Salw een river around
Moulmein. Thence they w'ere driveo westwarcb along the coast
road through Thacon^ and across the Sittang to Pegu* A second defeat
I here led to the evacuation of Rangoon on 7 March and a retreat on
Prome.

By this time Java was in the throes of invasion, and on 9 March
organized resistance ended there. Meanwhile the Brirish forces in
Burma were fighting a rearguard action up the Irrawaddy valley,
while Chinese troops coming in by the Burma Road strove to co¬
operate with them by holding a line stretching across from Pyiumami
10 AUanmyo* In the Philippines the American and Filipino armies had
been forced back to the Bataan peninsula, while others held out at
Coiregidor in Manila Bay. In both places they fought a grim battle
against superior forces for some months.

In Burma the Japanese foiled the Anglo-Chinese attempt to
^tablish a line by driving a wedge between them. The British
thereupon fell back up the Chindwin valley towards Manipur. Sti!’-
well, the American general commanding the ChinesCi hoped to make
a stand in northern Burma, but the Japanese prevented this by
piercing the Shan hilU and defeating the Chinese at Loilem* Sdlweir^
forces then disintegrated. He himself with a ms?Led band of Americans,
Britishp Burmese and Chinese trekked off towards India^ crossing the
ChindwJn at HomalinK The remainder pushed off along the Bumia
Road into China. By the end of April the whole of the Irrawaddy valley
w'as in Japanese hands. By that time the war in the Philippines wna in
its last stages. Bataan had surrendered on 9 April. Corregidnr was to
surrender on 6 May. Five months after Pearl Harbour the Japanese
had conquered most of their "Greater East Asia co-prosperity
sphe^e^

Before her invasion of South-East Asia |apan bad failed to stimulate
nationalist rising against the Western Powers. Indonesia w^as^ for
its economic resources, the region she most coveted. She had tried
to persuade the Dutch, after the German conquest of Holland, to
play the same part in Indonesia as the French in Indo-China. In
September 194c lehizo Kobayashi^ the Japanese Minister of

THE JAP^’^ IMPACT

CH. 44

6S7

Commerce and Industry', had gone to Batavia to obtain full Dutch
co-operation m the co-proaperity plan. His hope was that Britain
would be forced to capitulate to Germany, and that he would then be
able to * persuade^ the Dutch to accept a Japanese 'protectorate* over
their Indonesian empire.

But Britain did not fall. Kobayashi tJierefore could not present his
ultimatum, and Dr, H. J. van Mook proved a doughty antagonist in
argument. When Xobayashi'a $uccea3r0r, Kenkichi Yoshizava,
arrived in January it soon became evident that the Dutch would
not "co-operate\ Japan^s great object had been to prevent the
destruction of Indonesia's oil industry and the car lying out of
other scorched-earth practices which would deny her the supplies of
raw materials she so much needed. Even when she knew she would
have to fight for Java her first plan had been to by-pa5s the Dutch
East Indies and occupy Australia^ Apparently it was the stubbornness
with which the Dutch prepared to defend their empire that caused
her to change her plan.

The Indonesians had no desire to exchange Dutch for Japanese
rule. The excessive demands made by Toshibava in his talks with van
Mook showed them the hollowness of the co-prosperity proposals. He
asked for nothing less than unlimited Japanese immigration into all
the islands outside Java^ and complete freedom of action in the
commerce and industrial development of Indonesia. Even the left-
wing Gerindo group of the old Partai Indonesia proclaimed that the
Greater East India idea had the one aim of depriving other peoples of
their freedom through the same forms of dominatJon as the Japanese
had used in Manchuria, China and Indo-China* When the Dutch
asked for 18,000 volunteers for Home and City Guards^^ e 00,000
presented themselves.

Nowhere were the invading Japanese materially assisted by national
movements. In Makya there was no fifth column and no authenticated
case of Malays firing on British troops* The stories to that effect arose
from the fact that in their infiltration tactics the Japanese dressed as
Malays. Only one battalion of the Malay Regiment was equipped and
trained, and it fought with the utmost gallantry* Over a thousand
Chinese helped in the defence of Singapore, but there was no equip¬
ment with which to arm them* As in Burma, the defotoe of the
country was the responsibility of the British army, and very^ little had
been done to recruit and train native forces.

The Burmese as a whole gave no support to the Japanese invasion.
Some rebellious groupSp organized by student nationalists of the

688 THE CHALLENGE TO EtTi^OPEA^f DOMINATION PT. IT

ThaJcin Party tnimed. in provided th^ Japanese vdlh guides and

topographical inleIJigence. The criminaJ dasaes fram the gaob ran
wild* looted their own people and murdered Indian refugees. But the
maas of the people looked on with dismay. The Burma Defence
Force was loyal, but it contained only +72 Burmese against 3,197
Karens, Chins and Kachins. The non-Burmese peoples gave every
assistance to the retreating British, and the Karens in particular
suffered horribly for their loyalty.

The amazing Japanese success and the rapidity with which it w'as
achieved did irreparabk harm to W^tern prestige. ‘Asia for the
Asians^ was the general theme of Japanese propagandap and she
sought the complete eradication of Western influence and culture. To
the Buddhbt countries of the mainland her propaganda m^de much
play with the fact chat she also was a Buddhist coutitrVi although the
differences between thdr Theravada and her Zen Buddhism of the
Northern school were irrecondUhle, Her relations with the Mahom-
medan peoples were less easy. In Indonesia she loudly proclaimed a
"Three A Movement" with three slogans: "Japan the Leader of Asia*,
"Japan the Protector of Asia\ and * Japan the Light of Asia*, but it
had to be abandoned for lack of support. The Japanese in Asia, like
the Germans in Europe, showed a genius for alienating any people
over whom they established controL In Malaj'a they relied on
stirring up Malay hostility against the Chinese, and with some success,
but they failed to arouse Malay hatred against the British, notwith¬
standing the extent to which thdr defeat had shattered their prestige.

In Burmab case practically the whole British element in the ad-
nunistratioUt and much of the Indian, escaped to India, The Burmese
members, together with those belonging to the non-Burmese indi¬
genous races, remained behind at their posts, as indeed they had been
expected to do. The Japanese retained the administration in operation
with few changes. Their method of ensuring that their requirements
were fulfilled was to appoint political commissars to w'ork along with
the civil administrators. Much of the work had lo be carried on in
English^ since Burmese and Japanese viCTc for the most part ignorant
of each other's languages.

Much the same things mutaiis rnutatidh^ happened to the British
administration in Malaya and the Dutch in Indonesia^ save that in
both cases the European members of the aditiinistmtlve corps were
interned in prison camps. In all three cases the Europeans had to be
replaced by generally inadequately trained,i and often hostile, Burmese*
Malays and Indonesians^ And as the military dominated every form of

CH. 44 THE IMPACT 689

activity and knew little or nothing of civil administration^ misery and
confusion resulted and an inevitable deterioration of economic con¬
ditions* Every^ihcre the Japanese attacked those parts of the ad-
ministTation where the European tradition was strongest,

ITie police came under the direction of the Kcmpeitai^^ and probably
no one wUl ever know the full extent of the terrorism carried on
against the native populations. Thoiisands of Chin«:e were massacred
soon after the surrender of Singapore, especially those who had any¬
thing to do with the China Relief Fund. Rape was a real scourge in
occupied Malaya. The Japanesep wTiles Victor Purcelh * conducted
r.ipe on the grand scale'. The requisitions for forced labour were
perhaps the worst form of tyranny. Thousands wxre used on the
construction of the infamous Meath railway^ connecting southern
Burma with Bangkok through Kanburi* Thousands of Indonesians
also Avere shipped to work for the Japanese forces in New Guinea
and the northern Moluccas. The European and Eurasian prisoners
of war were treated with unparalleled harshness. The immense
European cemeteries situated near the Bumia-Thailand railway are
today griiH reminders of the ineflicicocy and callous brutalit)' which
caused so many to be worked or stan^ed to death,'

There were re^btance groups everjivhertp for the dense jungle and
mountainous areas lent themselves to this form of activity^ They were
often led by European officetSp left behlrkd by the retreating armies
or parachuted in. In Malaya the Chinese Communists were the main¬
spring of the underground movement^ though Kuomintang Chinese
and Malays also played a part. As time went on they came to number
nearly 7^000 men and women together with about 300 British, most of
whom were dropped by parachute. The epic story of their struggle
has been told fay Lieutenant-Culond Spencer Chapman^ the T. E.
Law'fencc of the Malayan jungle.^ They gradually disrupted rail
traffic, and in 1945 were ready to paralyse the Japanese system of
communications when the British army attacki^d.

In Burma a Karen resistance movement led by British officers was
stamped out with appalling atrocities. But a large part of the Burmese
'Fhakin Partyi disgusted by the behaviour of the Japanese^ also went
underground, and by the end of 1943 were leading a small but well-
organised resistance movement. In their case also the Communists
tvere the leading spirits* In French Indo-China the Viet Minh
League, under the kadcmhlp of Ho Chi Minh, became the spearhead
of the resisiancc after the collapse of a number of nationalist risings.

^ Th*JuM^Uu NtwtT4ii.

690 THE CHALLQ^tOE TO EUROPEAN TOMTNATEON PT. tV

In the last stage of the conflict they received American weapons and
technical aid which enabled them to clear the Japanese out of several
provinces of northejn Tongking. In Cochin China Ho Chi Minh^s
giiemllas assisted the Resistance Committee which maintained touch
with the Allies,

In Indonesia at the outset the naLionalist leaders had, apparently by
agreement, divided into two groups. One, headed by Sukarno and
Hatta, co-operated with the Japanese as a mean^ of furthering the
nationaliat cause. The other, headed by Sjahrirand Sjarifuddiu, went
underground to organize a resistance movement, in which they kept
in touch with their comrades on the Japane^ side.

In Thailand Pridi, who resigned his position as Minister of Finance
when P^ibun capitulated to the Japanese, tried unsuccessfully to
establish an independent government in the north. He was then made
regent, and under cover of his privileged position organised an under¬
ground movement in secret touch with the Free Thai Movement in
the United Stat^ and Britain. Allied forces working through his
underground prepared airfields and imported arms ready for an attack
on the Japanese, which never came off owing to the suddenness of their
collapse in 1945* Members of the underground movement did much
to help European prisoners of war working on the 'death railway".

The Japanese success In overrunning territories bad been greater
than even they had batgained for, Tokyo therefore revised its plans
to include the conquest of further territories than had originally been
envisaged* In the central Pacific more island groups were added to
the list, in the hope of preventing the American navy from establishing
bases near to Asia, In Burma the Japanese began to build up theif
strength for an attack on India. 'Fhe original plan foe a movement by
sea had to be abandoned—partly because of trouble with the Indian
National Army^ wiuch had been recruited in Malaya and refused to
move without dear assurances that Indiana future independence
would be guaranteed*

To meet this the Allies had at first no co-ordinated plan. In the
dry weather of 394Z-3 a British attempt to setose northern Arakan
failed disastrously. The Americans, anxioua to relieve the pressure
on Chungkingi were al! for reopening the land route to China and
a drive to secure Myitkyina. The Bridsh were at first sceptical of the
wisdom of a north Burma offensive, bat finally agreed to the plan.
The Americans thereupon began feverishly to coilstruct the I>cdo
Road^ and at the same time to supply Chungking with Lend-Lease
materials by air over the Himalayan ^Hump\

CM* 44 THE JAFAKISE IMPACT 69 1

Meanwhile in the Pacific the Japanese rashness in over-extending
their line of advance brought them into difiicuLties. At the Battle of
Midway in June 194^ the American fleet sank the four aircraft-carriers
accompanying a $uperior Japanese fleet and forced it to flee* Thb
action has been taken a$ the turning of the tide in the Pacific war*^
Jt was followed by a limited counter-ofFensivc against northern New
Guinea and thc-^lomons. In 1943 the Allies were preparing for a
widespread offensive in the Pacific; with Japan itself aa the ultimate
goal* A co-ordinated plan also emerged for a campaign in Burma
envisaging a drive by StilMrell^s force for Myitkyina and a push across
the Chindwin from Manipur by the main Allied army that was being
built up in India*

In face of this threat the Japanese began to lose their confidence.
They decided that everything must be done to win over the peoples
of the occupied countries and enlist them to resist Allied attacks,
'rheir method was to set up puppet regimes with the semblance of
independence. On i August 1943 Burma became ^independem"
under the presidency of the former premier Dr. Ba Maw, who took
the title of ^Adipadi^ the Pali equivalent of FuJtrer. There ^^'as no
talk of reviving the Constitution of 1937* and in any case real control
was in the hands of Dr* Gotara Ogawa, formerly a Cabinet minister in
Tokyo* who became ^Supreme Adviser* to the Bunuese government.
A similar r^^gime was established in the Philippines on 15 October
1943 under Jose P. Laurel.

As Indonesia seemed unlikely to be threatened by an early Allied
attack^ the Japanese moved more slowly there. But the Indonesians
were promised a share in their government^ and in September 1943
a Central Advisory Council was established in Java under Sukarno,
with Mohammed Hatta as his deputy. .Advisory councils were also
set up in the various residencies and citi^. Sukamo^s position*
KuweTixr, was less that of an adviser than of a mouthpiece for the
interpretatioii and recommendation of Japanese policy to the general
public.^ At Singapore a Malayan Consultative Countil was brought
into being.

But these WTre all mere play-acting and failed to disguise the
hollowness pf Japane^ promises and propaganda. Of all the occupied

I On dlif iiibjcct Kt The of Padjic IFcjt* VVa&hin}{ton, 194^, BuUU

Rrf^wlf Pacific HW, published by th* U.J^. luid tJw detailed opemtioiviil hiatoHc*

under the direction of S. £. Moriton.

* Dr. £* 1 . J. vui Mooh^ The Siuka Demactcicy ui . 4 rui, London, 1059,

p. I ^ [ L Tllio bcKih conEima mi UiuiiimiilijLg cJoipIcr on the |opancs« trcatmenl of
[ndoueftLii-

THE CHAU-EKCE tO fURgiPtAN DO^tt^"ArtON

IT*, tv

692

countries Burma suffered worst ai the hands of the Japanese* Many
of her towns had been reduced to ashes by Japanese air-raids during
the invasion. Her oiI-we!Js, mines equipment and river transport
were destroyed by the retreating British so as to be useless to the
enemy. Allied air-raids kept her railways out of action. The Japanese
systematically looted the country of machincryt scientific apparatus
and even furniture. All her normal externa] niarkets were lost. The
complete stoppage of her rice export through the failure of the
Japanese to tike it led to mere.subsistence farming. The south
suffered from a glut of rice while the north stan'ed. Lower Burma
was almost completely deprived of the cooking oil which only the
dry £one could supply*

The inability of the Japanese to export Burma rice and import
urgently needed consumer goods caused the greatest distress^ which
was further aggravated by the chaos and uncontrollable iafiation caused
by the Japanese currency policy. The peasantry lost a large proportion
of their indispensable cattle through military requisition for food and an
epidemic of rinderpest* Malaria control measures ceased and the people
suffered heavily from the disease. There were cpidenuE^a of smaUpox^
cholera and bubonic plague^ against which the Japanese had to take
drastic prcvetilivc measures* Hence in ^944 the extremists,, w'ho had
assisted the Japanese invasion and were in positions of political
control, were secretly engaged in organizing a nation-wide Anti-
Fascist People^s Freedom League, w^hich only awaited a favourable
opportunity to come out openly against the oppressor.

In Malaya there was the same neglect of health measures with
a consequent increase in malaria and other diseascsi, accompanied by
a sharp rise in the death-rate^ All ihia w'as particularly noticeable
because the public health administration of Singapore and Malaya
had been unsurpassed anywhere in Asia. The Japanese looted the
hospitals of their modem up-to-date equipment and stores* The
schools also were thoroughly looted and some of the native teachers
executed. Famine and malnutrition in the towns were even worse
than in Buniia^ since pre-war Mstaya had imported two-thirds of its
ricei and the Japanese failed to import enough from the rice-producing
areas they controlled* There was abo the same appalling shortage
of consumer goods, and the same inflatiun through the uncontrolled
issue of paper money. The great dredges in the European-run tin
mines had been destroyed or pul out of action during the British
retreat in 1941-2, and there had been widespread destruction of
buildings and machinery^ on the rubber estates.

CH. 44 TK£ JAFAN^F IMPACT 693

Dr. Mwk has summed up the effects of Japanese misrule in
Indonesia in a statement which for vigour and conciseness cannot
be improved upon; ‘Those who suffered most were the common
people. Japanese economy was frightful, Japanese administration a
farce. '[ he country had been subdivided from the beginning into three
almost watertight compartments: two^ Java and Sumatra, under army
commanders, and a third, the rest, under the navy. But as food and
other commodities became scarce even the traffic between districts
and islands was prohibited in order to facilitate pillaging by the
military. The system of finance consisted of a number of printing
presses, turning out crude government notes; inflation acquired disas¬
trous proportions. Trade and export production were dead, because
Indonesia was cut off from the world markets and Japan, her shipping
going under the blows of allied submarines and aircraft, preferred to
fetch the products she needed from Indo-China, a thousand miles
nearer home. She remained interested only tn oil, nickel and bauxite-
Kstates and factories rusted and decayed; plantations were uprooted
to increase the food acreage; means of communicatioii that broke
down were no longer repaired; the import goods W'ere gone or hoarded;
clothing became almost unobtainable. This meant unemployment for
hundreds of thousands; it meant poverty, poverty, poverty, for all
but a few henchmen of the Japanese and a number of black
marketeers.'^

So far as the war was concerned, the year 1943 was mainly one of
.\llicd build-up, planning and try-outs. In the Pacific theatre plans
were made for two lines of attack converging upon the Japanese home¬
land. They envisaged by-passing Japanese island bases where air
control could be achieved. One route was via New Guinea to the
Philippines and thence to the southern islands of Japan. The other
was through the Island groups of the central Pacific, the Gilberts and
Alarshalls to the Japanese strongholds in the Marianas. These in
American hands were to be utilized aa bas«:s for widespread B-20
bombing attacks, which would include the Japanese cities in their
scope.

In Burma Wingate's small ‘Chindit* force of British, Burmese and
Gurkhas marched across from Tonhe on the Chindwin to carry out a
campaign of sabotage and destruction on the Mandalay-Myitkyina
railway in co-operation with a planned push in that direction from the
north by Stilwelt's forces. Unfortunately this operation had to be
cancelled, and the Chindit effort lost much of its purpose save as a

‘ Op, tit., pp. 154 ^ 5 '

PT< IV

694 THE CKMiENGB TO EURpFEAN 1X>M[NAT10N

magnificeTit demonstration of heroism. At the Quebec Conference
in August 1943 a big step forward was taken by the formation of the
South-East Asia Command, with Mountbatten as Supreme Com¬
mander and StilwelJ as Deputy Chief- Operation Capital for the
recovery of Burma from the north was then worked out. At the end
of the year a second British attempt on northern Arakan was made,
but was stopped by a Japanese counter-attack early in 1944.

China as a theatre of war was mainly inactive in 1943. America
made great efforts, by diplomacy and military aid, to keep Chinese
resistance alive. As the Burma Road was closed, supplies had to be
flown in from India ‘over the Hump'. The American airmen respon¬
sible for this perilous uridertakmg showed a gallantry' beyond praise,
although the trickle of supplies they managed to take to Chungking
was inadequate to stimulate offensive action against the Japanese by
Chiang Kai-shek. He was far more concerned ivith his struggle with
the Communists in Yenan than with an energetic anti-Japanese policy.
One rather overdue act of diplomatic ‘encouragement’ was the
abandonment by Britain and the United States of their e.’rtra-
territorial rights in China. Their example was fottow'cd in due course
by other European'states possessing such rights.

By the beginning of 1944 the Japanese had begun to realize some¬
thing of the magnitude of the Allied preparations for a counter¬
offensive. In the central Pacific and New Guinea during that year
thev were fully extended trying unsuccessfully to stem the Allied
advance. But in two other spheres they undertook major offen.sive
operations in efforts to disrupt their opponents' plans. In hath north
and south China they' struck hard to prevent the offenstve that Stilwell
was doing his utmost to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to launch, and to
secure complete control over the main arterial Peiping-Hankow-
Canton railway, which was their land link hctw'een Korea and Singa-
porc-

Their offensive caused a quarrel between Stilwell and Chiang Kai-
shek over the mtlitaty reforms which the former urged were necessary
in order to meet the threat and oppose the Japanese more effectively.
Chiang protested to Washington, and in the middle of the Burma
campaign ‘Vinegar Joe’ was relieved of his command. As the year
progressed it became only too obvious that the Allies must ignore
China in their strategic arrangements for crushing Japan. In Novem¬
ber, however, Hurley, the United States ambassador at Chungking,
made a somewhat gauche and completely abortive attempt to bring
about a compromise between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists.

CH* 44 THE JAP_A>’ESB IMPACT 695

The Othcj sphere in which the Japanese launched a major offensive
in J944 was the Burma-India border. In March they began a very
formidable movement into Manipur and Assam. It was not an all-
out effort to conquer India. It came two years too late for that,
when the Allies were gathering strength and Japan herself was fiilly
extended in the Pacific. Her great gamble had depended for its
ultimate success on Germany winning the war. But in 1944 Germany
was losing the war. The Japanese movement against India therefore
w’as undertaken merely to cause the postponement of the inevitable
counter-attack from that quarter.

The first objective of the invaders was Itnphal, the capture of which
would afford them a step ping-off ground for a push into Bengal. They
hoped also to isolate Stiiwell when he was poised in the north for his
drive southwards towards Myitfcyina, and again render fruit less a
further operation by Wingate’s Chindits. When the attack began
Sti I well's forces were mos'ing towards the Hukawng valley, and a
far more powerful Chindil force than the earlier one, this time air¬
borne, was attempting to soften up Japanese resistance to their
advance.

For some months the situation on the Indian frontier was critical,
with the Japanese besieging Imphal and striking at Kobima in a
desperate attempt to reach Diroapur Junction on the Assam Railway,
along which most of Stiiwell's supplies had to pass. It was a veritable
bloodbath, but by the end of June the Japanese were firmly held and
the road between Kohima and Imphal had been cleared.

This was the turn of the tide. Inside northern Burma Stihvell's
group, with the co-operation of the Chindit-s, was relentlessly pressing
tow'ards Myitkyina, which fell at the end of .August, But Wingate bad
been killed in an air accident at the beginning of the campaign, and
after the capture of Myitkyina Stiiwell was relieved of his command.
By this time the Japanese defeat at Imphal had liecome a disaster and
they were in disorderly flight, cicely pursued by the .Allied forces.
Then, as the cold season drew on with the end of the wet monsoon in
October, a third Arakan campaign began which cleared the Japanese
from the Kaladan valley and the Mayu peninsula. This was followed
in January 1943 by landings from the sea at Akyab and other places on
the coast go that the essential forward airfields could be prepared in
readiness for co-operation with the land invasion of Lowtfr Burma.

Meanwhile equally decisive operations had been taking place in the
two Pacific sectoi9. The Americans began an attack on Saipan in the
Marianas on June 15, and in three weeks were in complete possession

TWE CIIALLE^fGF TO EVTROPFA]^ OOMINATION

FT* IV

69^

of the Inland. Tlus was followed by the hheralion of Guam and the
conquest of 'Finlan* And in November the Japaiicse began to feel the
iunpact of long-range bomber attacks from the Marianas. Moreover,
the completion of the Allied conquest of New Guinea enabled
American troops on 17 October to Jand in the PhiUppines* Their
attack in this quarter began in the Gulf of Lejte in the central Philip¬
pines and had disastrous consequences for Japanese naval power. For
they had to risk their battle fleet in a desperate attempt to break up
the attack. Its repulse in a great naval battle was decisive. This
action was the last stand of the Japanese navy a$ an organised force.

On 31 January 1945 the first convoy from Ledo across northern
Burma arrived at Wanting, on the Burma-China border, and passed on
its way along the Burma Road towards Chungking, Th^ land route
to China was open. After their defeat at Myitkyina the Japanese
re-formed alBhamo and for some weeks held off attacks until Amertcan-
led^ Chinese-manned tanks stormed the town. Then more American
reinforcements poured into what had become knoivn as the Northern
Combat Area Command, A British division moved down the railway
corridor^ and the American Mars Task Force took the difficult route
down the east of the Irrawaddy. Other forces began to comb out the
Northern Shan States, and finidly reached Lashio. The Japanese
were retreating fast towards central Burma, where the decisive battle
of 1945 was to be fought.

It was, how^everi from the Manipur hills and the ChJndwin region
that the real blow came. General Slimes Fourteenth Army carried out
a masterly advance down the Chindwin to Mandalay and Meiktila in
the early part of the year. Mandalay fell in March. At the beginning
of ApriJ, when the Americans made their landing at Okinawa in the
Liuchiu Islands and brought about the fall of the Koiso Cabinet at
Tokyo, the Japanese main army in Burma wa$ so heavdly defeated
at Meiktila that it began to disintegrate. Some melted into the Shan
hills eastward* Others tried to get away soiithAvard across the Sittang*
Their Twenty-eighth Army in Arakan began hurriedly moving out
by the An and Taungup passes.

At this juncture the Burma National Army, organised and trained
by the Japanese, and under the command of Aung San, w^ent over to
the Allies. Its Burmese leaders had carried on lengthy clandestine
negotiatimSs whh. Mountbatten, and its changeover, as the Allied army
pushed rapidly down the Irrawaddy and Rittang valleya, was a carefully
concerted move skllfiilly carried out.

The advance now became a race, Mountbatten's aim had all along

cn. 44

THE JAPAKESE IMPACT 6^7

been to capture Rangoon before the oo^t of the wet monaoan. And
he achieved it. Prome was occupied before the Japanese Arakan army
had extricated it&elf from the passes across the Yoma; its main escape
route was thus sealed* Pegu was reached on i May* and on the follow¬
ing day Rangoon. The advance had been so swift that the plan for
a sea-borne assault on Rangoon was rendered unnecessary p When
the British advanced units arrived the Japanese had already evacuated
the city*

One more major operation only had to be fought, the ‘ Battle of the
Break-through^^ against 10^000 Japanese, whom General Koba
collected in the Pegu Yoma from the remnants of the army moving
out of Arakan and other forces on the w'est of the Prome-Rangoon
road. It took place during the latter part of Julyt when the principal
Allied powers were in session at Potsdam drafting their final answ‘er
to the requests for peace that Admiral Susniki Kantaro, the new
Japanese premier, had been proffering since the previous May,
Thereafter it was only a matter of stamping out the resistance of out¬
lying Japanese garrisons and chasing their forces through the moun¬
tains towards Siam.

The great gamble had failed. In May Cermahy had surrendered.
The Americans were preparing to invade Japan* In Manchuria a
million Japanese troops were awaiting a Russian declaration of war,
Mountbatten^s forces were preparing to land in Malaya and Sumatra*
On 26 July the Allies at Potsdam published their terms for the
Japanese surrender. When no answer was received the first atom
bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on 6 August. Two days later
Russia declared w^r on Japan, On 9 August an atom bomb was
dropped on Nagasaki* On the following day Japan intimated her
acceptance of the surrender terms.

CHAPTER 45

AFTER THE WAR. 1945-50

South-Eaft Asia before the Second World War was a liitle-known
region to the majority of people in the West. It completely ovcr^'
ahadowed by India and China. The use of such terms as Further
India or Indo-China to descnbe its mainland^ and even of Indonesia
or the Indian Archipetago for its island world, obscured its identity
and minimized its importance. Now for a short ttme all that was
changed. The Limelight was focused upon the unfamiliar scene and
broadcast announcers tried to master the strange^ musical names.
Burma, where the largest single land campaign was fought against
the Japanese, became front-page news and figured in countless letters
home. Thousands of Australian, British and Dutch families lost
relatives in the labour gangs which slaved on the Burma-Thailand
* death railway *; still more over a far wider area of the world, including
America and Africa, suffered bereavement through battle casualties,
'rhe post-war worldi therefore, had become aware of South-East
Asia as never before. And if this generalization is scaredy fair to
Holland, a large proportion of whose national pavings was invested in
Indonesia, or to France, who regarded her Indo-Chinese empire as
essential to the maintenance of her position in the world, the fact
remains that their attention was concentrated solely on the countries
they held.

So far as the peoples of the occupied territories w^crc concemed*
ihcir experience of Japanese rule gave immense stimulus to their
national movements. Moreover^ they had witnessed a defeat of
European forces by Asians which was so rapid, and at first so over¬
whelming, as to be almost incredible. And although the Asian
victory bad brought a vile tyi^,nny such as the European had never
practised, with plunder and famine instead of the much-advertised
^ CO- prosperity ^ nevertheless, with the possible exception of Malayat
it did not ^make them anxious for the restoration of white rule. In
Indonesia, Burma and Vietnam it strengthened the desire for inde¬
pendence. In these countries, indeed, political passions ran so high
that the hard facts of the economic situation were barely recogni^xd*

69S

CH. 4S

Ajrmt TH^ WAH, 1945-50 699

For although their plight desperate and measures to promote
economic recovery should have been given priority over everything
else, Indonesians, Burmese and Vietnamese were at one in their
determination that European trade with their countries should never
again be on the old footing, and in their belief that only through
poUticai independence could such an object be achieved^

(n) Mulayd

Malaya's case was in many ways, but not all, exceptional. Before
the war the Malays had been the least politically minded of all the
peoples of South-East Asia. The Brirish bureaucracy bad beeu jusi
and enlightened, and most of its members had tended to develop
strong pro-Malay sympathies. During the occupation period, how¬
ever ^ Malay national sentimetit had become a reality; it was strongly
anti-Chificsc, and its rallying cry, ‘^fa]aya for the Malays*, tran¬
scended the particularism of the individual states. It showed itself in a
most unpleasant form at the moment of Malayans release from Japanese
thraldom^ when in many places Malays began to kill any Chinese
on w'hom they could lay hands. The British military administnitLanp
w hiqh at first took over the management of the country* had to adopt
stern measures to repress these outbreaks of fanaticisrii.

But these were not the only problecns of bw and order* Under the
Japanese the Malay police force, which had been used against the
guerrilbs, had declined sadly in morale and efficiency* Firearms were
easy to obtain, the Chinese secret societies had flourished, and for
some time after the re$tor3tion of British rule there tvas an unparalleled
outbreak of violent crimei Behind the scenes also the leaders of the
Malayan Anti-Japanese Army, the M*P-AJ.A*, most of whom were
Communists, were making a determined bid for power. And although
in December 1945 the British disbanded and disarmed them* giving
each man a war gratuity of 350 dollars, their leaders resorted to the
strike weapon, which they used with great effect in 1946, cubing
in on the general discontent at high prices and the shortage of
food*

The food problem was acute. Malaya ^vas dependent upon supplies
of imported rice, which at firat were not available owing to the fall
in productiDn in Burma and the other rice-exporting countries. The
government did what it could to stimubte local cultivation by means
of subsidies, guaranteed prices and extensions of the irrigated areas.
Rationing was imposed^ and rice on the ration was sold at a price

FT. IT

700 THE CHAIXENGE TO EUKOPEAN DOMINATION

much lower than ita cost* But the amount per person was much
lower iharif had been consumed before the war. Native production,
however, increased, and by 194S was above the pre-war leveL

Immense efforts were put into reconstructian. The public healih
services were quickly revived, hospitals were re-equipped, sanitation
improved and anti-malarial measures reintroduceti They brought
immediaie results. In 1947* for mstance, the infant mortality rate
waa the lowest on record. Schools were reopened. The}' were so
overcrowded that they had to work by shifts^ with one school occupy¬
ing the buildings in the morning and another in the afternoon. The
shortage of teachers and equipment was truly formidable, and in
1946 the number of children attending school svas twice what it had
been before the war.

In both Kuala Lumpur and Singapore the Education Departments
went ahead with a vigorous policy of expansion which aimed at
ultimately providing free primary education for all children* The
creation of a common Malayan citizenship from among the diverse
racial groups in the country, without which political advance towards
self-government %vas recognized to l)p impossible, was the ntost urgent
problem of the ndw era, and special attention w-as directed to the
framing of an education policy which should contribute towards its
solution. This involved hnding some means of integrating the Chinese
schools, the breeding^ground alike of Chinese nationalism and of
Communism, into the general system of education. Another interest¬
ing step taken was that of making English the second language in all
vernacular schools. A scheme w-as also worked out for combining
Raffles College and the King Edw^ard VII College of Medicine to form
a university* and in October 1949 the University of Malaya commenced
its first session.

Equal energy w^as directed to the furtherance of economic recovely^
A vast programme of renovation was undertaken to put the railways,
roads and harbours again into working order. The revival of the tin
and rubber industries was of vital importance. I’he Chinese mines,
dependent mainly on hand labour^ got aw^ay to a quick start. But the
British-owmed mines, w'hich accounted for two-thirds of the normal
production, were up against serious problems. Their dredges had
been destroyed or put out of action early in the war. Now a dredge
cost nearly four times its pre-tvar price and took tw^o years to build.
Government compensation for war damage helped to the tune of
75 million dollarSj hut there %vaa long delay iti obtaining materials for
repairs. Against a pre-war production of 80,651 tons only 8,452 tons

CH, 45 AFrFR THt; WAHp I945-5O 7OI

were mined in 1946, But in the follnwing year 36^079 tons were pro¬
duced, and by 1950 the pre-war figure had been surpassed.

Rubber made a quicker recovery. I'he Japanese had cut down the
trees on only per cent of the total of 3,302^000 acres under culti¬
vation. 'rhe Malays, who owned 40 per cent of the acreagCi were able
to Stan production at once. On the big European estates, how'ever,
an immense outlay on buildings and machinery was entailed, and there
was an acute labour shortage. Nevertheless by 194S the industrj^ had
recovered its pre-war status and was going ahead with trees giving a
much higher yield. The Government of Britain made a large grant
tow^ards war compensation, and by 1950 rubber exports were three
times their pre-war value. The total acreage under rubber was
3059 ^^ 5 ^ production had risen to 692^585 cons against

372,000 tons in 1938. As tin and rubber together accounted tor 86
per cent of Malaya's exports, their rapid increase was the most
significant feature of her economic recovery. Moreover, she had
become more important to Britain than ever before on account of her
American dollar earnings. They rose from 519 millions in 194S to
1,195 millions in 1950. But much of this increase, it must be re¬
membered, was due to the enhanced prices of these two conomodities
resulting from the American rearmament programme.

During the reconstruction period much was algo done to expand
the production of palm-oil, copra^ pineapples and tea. The forests
loo played their part in aiding recovery. There was a big local de¬
mand for timber for new building and repairs, w^hile Hriiatn^s post¬
war housing programme caused her to make heavy purchases of
.Malayan light hardwoods as a substitute for softwoods from hard-
currency areas.

Long before the Second World War responsible officials had been
exercised in their minds enneeming the constitutional development
of Malaya. As early as 18S0 Governor Sir Frederick VVeld had made
the pertinent remark that wc were teaching the people of Malaya to
govern under our guidance, hut not to govern themselves. The ex¬
perience of trying to repel the Japanese invasion with ten separate
ad mi niflt rations in so small a countiy liad demonstrated the in¬
efficiency of such an arrangement at a time of crisis. The hope that
other states which had accepted British protection would join the
Federation had proved an illusion. In the Federation itself the pro¬
blem of safeguarding the sovereignty of the suItan;S w'hilc developing
a strong central government at Kuala Lumpur had caused strange
anomalies between theory and practice.

702 THE CHALXENGE TO EUWEAN DOMINATION FT. IV

After the FLriat World War attempts were made to solve this in¬
tractable problem by 'decentralization'. Bat these were vitiated by
the plain fact that from an administrative point of view what was
needed was a form of union which would reduce the friction and
expense of dealing with so large a number of separate adnunistnitions.
Such an arrangementp howeverp was outside the range nf practical
politics. The pardcutarLsm of the individual states was too strong*
After intermingle discussiorks of every aspect of the question through¬
out Sir Laurence Guillemafd*$ term of office as Governor and High
Commissioner^ 1920-^j the Federal Council w^as reconstituted in
1927* The Malay rulers, who had never taken part in its dbeussJons,
withdrew from it. Their places w'ere taken by the Principal Medical
Officer^ the Controller of Labour, the Director of Public Worts and
the Director of Education. Further unofficial membere were added,
and the new Council had a membership of thirteen officials and eleven
unofficiab. In future every Bill passed by the Council had to be
signed by each of the four rulers before corning into force.

But this was not decentralization in any sense. With Guillemsrdb
departure, says Rupert Emerson.,* it was ^tucked away in a cubby
hole'. * There was so much money'* writes Sir Richard Winstedt*
' that the Rulers fdt no inclination to criticize, The great depression,
how^ever, caused decentralization to become a living issue once more*
After further interminable dificussions it was decided in 1936 that the
post of Chief Secretary to the government was the greatest obstacle
in the way^ and it w’as accordingly abolished.. The office of Federal
Secretary' was substituted, with precedence after that of the four
Residents. His duties were those of liaison and co-ordination, while
the machinery' of the Federation was in future to he used merely to
facilitate the transaction of business common to all four states. It
Was not a good arrangement, for instead of uniting the country, while
safeguarding legitimate local intereatsT its tendency w'as to stimuUte
particularism at the expense of the common good* Moreover, it
disregarded the feelings and interests of the ^immigrant races'*
Victor Purcell*s complaint, that the matter was dealt with as if ^the
oidy poUacai realities were the states, their Sultans, and the treaties
with the King', has much justification^ as also his charge that *the
ruling caste w^as emphattcalEy '^Malay-minded'”,*

It is against this background that the MaeMichad pbn for a post¬
war Malayan Union must be seen. During the ¥?ar it seemed obvious

* Afij/tjyjM, p. 1 * Afni/ayel and iu Hkimy, p. pp.

Tkf Chinrit iJ! Soulhtajt . 4 ifd, p. iBz.

CH- 45 AFTER THE WAR* 1945-50 703

to the pJ^nner^ of rcooiistnictian thit the great need was to promote
a sense of seeurtty and common citizenship as a preparation for self-
government within the British CommonwealtL The intention was
excellent^ but the way it was carried out caused an explosion of Malay
national feeling as sudden and unexpected as the one with which a
quarter of a century ^rlier Burma had greeted the announcement that
she was to be excluded from the scope of the Indian constitutional
reforms of 1931.

In the new' Onion all nine Malay statesp together with Penang and
Malacca* were to be combined to form one protectorate. Singapore
was to remain a separate Crown colony. I’he sultan in each state
would retain his throne and little else. He was to preside over a Malay
Advisory Council, which w^ould deal mainly with matters affecting
the Mahommedan religion. Apart from that all power was to be
concentrated in the central government at Kuala Lumpur* the State
Councils would deal only with such mattum os wrere delegated to them,
and would be presided over in each case by a British Resident Council¬
lor. MacMichael, who went to Malaya armed with special powers to
inveatigate each sultan's conduct during the Japanese occupation and
decide nn hb suitabitity to tjccupy hia throne, wm eonsequently able
to negotiate treaties with all nine rulers, whereby they transferred
their complete rights of legal sovereignty to Britain.

The other main provision of the plan related to citizenship of the
Union. It was to be granted to (a) all persons born in the territory
of the Union or in Singapore, and (A) immigrants who had lived
there for ten out of the preceding fifteen years. Future immigrants
could qualify for it after only five years^ residence. Citizenship
was to involve full equality of rights, induding admisaion to the
administraiivc services. There w?as to be no discrimiciation of race
or creed.

The publication in January 1946 of a White Paper setting forth
these proposals caused the storm to burst. Under the Prime MlnUter
of Johore, Dato Onn Bin Jaiifar, the United Malay National Or¬
ganization, U.M.N.O., sprang into being with branches everywhere.
It w'os pledged to the task of ‘warding off the devastating ignominy
of nice extinction",* Malays wore mourning for a week and a
non-co-operation movement was threatened. These effort^, howm^er,
had less practical effect than those of a group of ex-Mdayan dril
servants, Including the nonagenarian Sir Frank Swettenham. who
brought their influence to bear on the British government and stirred

^ Dales Dim Bin Jaafur^i wordi eiuotcd by Purcelj, op. a't.. p, j®7.

704 CHALLENGE TO EUROPEAN DOMINATION PT. IV

Up public opinion on behalf of ihe Malays^ to such effect that the
treaties and the scheme for a Malayan Union were alike dropped.

The British government then committed the mistake of going too
far in the opposite direcUon, In April 1946 a Working Committee
composed of representatives of the administration and U.MpN.O. was
set up to draft mw proposals. Later, another composed of Chinese
and Indians uaA abo set up^ but only after the British government had
given conditional approval of the Working Committee's proposals.
In 1947 a revised constitution was drawn up on the basis of the re¬
commendations of the two bodies. Lcg^d sovereignty was banded
back to the sultans, but they were to govern in accordance with
British advice as previously. Singapore was to retain its separate
Status, Instead of a Union, all nine states, together with Penang and
Malacca, wxre to form a Federation under a High Commissioner and
Lxecutive and I^egislative Councils. In addition to the usual official
members the Executive Council was to have unofficial members
chosen from the various races in the countrv'. The Legislative Council
was to be composed of fifteen officials and sL\ty-one unofficial mem¬
bers, of whom thirty-one were to be Malays and the rest Europeans,
Chinese^ Indians and Eurasians. ^Phey were to be nominated by the
High Commissioner at ffrst, but as soon as possible election was to be
introduced. 1 he federal government tvas given very extensive
powders, w^hile those of the states w'erc correspondingly limited.

The qualifications for Malayan citizenship were stiffened up
appreciably, he people who automatically qualified for it in addition
to Malays w'ere Indians and Chinese British subjects of the second
generation bom in federal territory^ Immigrants could become
naturalized when they had lived in the Federation for at least fifteen
years, if they intended to make it their permanent home.

The Malays were opposed even to this concession, since there was
nothing to prevent the immigrants from retaining their original
nationality while becoming citisjcns of Malaya. Chinese law, in fact,
makes it impossible for a Chinese to divest hiimelf of Chinese
nationality. But the British government w^aa convinced that a law
permitting dual nationality was essential if the three races were to be
welded together into a political unit* The main difficulty was that
the Second^Wofld War had intensified national feelings But the three
racca lived so closely intermingled that their co-operation must be
assured if the ordinary amenities of life were to be preserved. Yet

^ Winitait Jii 111 lli$t€fry, pp. i4d“7, miiy be ram pa rH wiTh FunreiL

af*. pp. 3$^ on tJtij iubjwrt.

CH. 45 AFim THE WAR, 1945-^50 705

one of racca was placed in a specially privileged position^ for the
new conatitutiorif which came into effect on t February 1948, charged
the High Commissioner with the special fesponsibility of saJeguarding
the position of the Malays. And in view of all the dreuinstances it
is difficult to see what other arrangement could have been made.

The year in which the new Federation was inaugurated saw the
outbreak of the Communist revolt. The Communists, who were
comparatively few in numbers and almost Mclusively ChineacT had
received a setback to their attempt to paralpe economic recovery
and discredit the govcrnmeitt when in February 1946 firm mea;surcs
were taken by the military. They thereupon went underground.
Besides fomenting strikes they hatched political developments with
special interest, seeking to exploit any popubr dissatisfaction.

The Chinese campaign against the proposals for federation in 1947
gave them a good oportunity for increasing their influence. For some
months there were warnings of impending trouble. Then in June 1948
widespread outbreaks of violence occurred. European plantens and tin
miners and Chinese members of the Kuomintang party w^cre murdered.
This form of terrorisin was intended to pave the way for revolt. The
initial plan was to get a region under terrorist conirol and declare it an
independent Communist area, then gradually to extend this over the
whole country'. Captured documents indicated that the declaration
of a Communist Republic of IMabya was timed for3 . 4 ugust 1948.

Once the government had recovered from its initial surprise its
measures 10 deal with the threat show'cd the greatest energy and
dcterminatioiiH But the Communists had laid their plans w'ell. Thev
had hidden large quantities of arms and their tmelligence system was
excellent. They split up into small groups making hit-and-mn attacks
and could make rings round the troops who were new' to jungle war¬
fare and w'erc unable to speak the vernaculars of the eountn'side. And
the anti-Communist Chinese were in such fear of the terrorists that
they paid large sums of prolection money.

The recruitment of 26,tx>o Malay armed police and the systematic
training of the troops in jungle w arfare were among the measures that
gradually brought the situation more or less under control by the
middle of 1949* But the revolt was by no means broken, and the
rapid collapse of the Kuomintang in northern China in 194S, and
throughout the remainder of the country in 19491 pnt new heart into
the Communist movement in Malaya.

Nevertheless it w'aa a case of the revolt of a very few, never more
than 7t00o; and captured documents show'ed that the rebels had

7o6 the challenge to European domination it, iv

failed to win voluntary popular support and had been forced on to the
defensive. On the other hand, government's hope of victory
within one year proved illusory. The Communists abandoned the
more settled areas and went deeper into the jungle, whence at the
time of writing they had still not been completely cleared, notwith¬
standing the introduction of the comprehensive Briggs Plan and the
inspiring leadership of the High Commissioner, General Sir Gerald
Templcr.

(6) Burma

The Burmese had at hrst allowed themselves to hope that the
nominal independence accorded them by the Japanese in 1943 might
turn out to be the genuine article. They were soon disillusioned.
Hence the return of the British was hailed with joy. But while they
welcomed liberation from the Japanese granny, their experiences
during the occupation period made them impatient of any form of
foreign rule. At the end of the war Aung San, the commander of the
Burma National Army, became the focus of nationalist aspirations,
which found expre^ion in the broad-based political organization
known as the Anti-F^ist Peoples Freedom League, the A.F.P.F.L.

-Aung San had sprung to fame as the organizer of a students'
strike in the University of Rangoon in 1936, Thereafter he became
the leader of the lioboma Astayottt (' We Burmana' Association), the
extremist wing of the Burma Student Movement. The members of
the association adopted the title Thakin (‘lord’), the Burmese equi¬
valent of the Indian ‘Sahib*, used as a term of respect for Europeans.
Some of them were in contact with the Indian Communist Party and
propagated Marxist doctrines in a amall way. In 1940 some thirty
of the Thakina, including Aung San, went to Japan at the invitation
of the Japanese consul in Rangoon and received instruction in the
role they were to play when the Japanese invaded Burma. They re¬
turned with the Japanese armiest and when Dr. Ba Maw became
Adlpadi, Aung San was appointed Ministet of Defence, and his
brother-in-law lhan Tun Miniiiter of Transport and Suppiv, in the
Burm^e Cabinet, There they were in an excellent position to
organize the anti-Japanese swing of the Burma National . 4 nny. The
movement was kept secret even from the Adipadi himself, who had
planned for the army to detach itself from the Japanese as the British
advanced down the Irrawaddy valley, but thereafter to maintain a
neutr^ role, in the optimistic belief that he might somehow use it as a
bargaining eounier.

Ctl. 45 AFTEH TlfE WAS, 1^45-50 7^7

lia Maw rted ydth tKc Japanese into Siajn, leaving Aung San and
the A,F*P+FXh the most potent political force with which the British
military govemment had to deal when it took over. The function of
the military government, in which members of the administrative
services who had been evacuated to India were incorporated, was to
rally the personnel of the services that had remained in Burma
during the occupation and re-cstabliah administration on the old
footing as soon as po^ible. This w'as carried out with such apparent
success that in October 1945 civil government was officially restored.
The changeover wras made before effective measures to disarm the
popuLation had been taken. How unwise this was later even ts we re
amply to demonstrate*

British policy for Burma had been announced in a statement issued
on tj May 1945^ This reaffirmed the intention to grant full selfr
govcrtimciit within the British Common wealth. It envisaged a
relatively short period of direct British rule in co-opemtion with the
Burmese so that rehabilitation measures might be carried out which
would in due course permit a general election to be held. I’hen the
Constitution of 1937 would be re-established and the Burmese could
begin to dratv up a constitutton on the basis of setf-govemment. This
would be embodied in Icgislatiofi by the Imperial Paritament, and at
the same time a treaty w'ould be negotiated dealing with matters wrhieh
would remain the r^ponsibility of the British government after the
grant of self-government,

Right from the start, however, the profe^d aim of Aung San and
his party was complete independence^ Dominion status did not
app^ to them, for the>^ had a deep distrust of British motives and
feared that once British business interests regained their position in
the nation’s economy, self-government would prove lUusory. They
were by no means unaware of their need for British assistance, capit^
and expert knowledge, but they wanted to be in a position to keep it
under firm control. When, therefore, the governor began to form his
first ministry and offered the leaders of the A*F*P,F.Lp places in it they
demanded a majority of seats and the right for their representatives
to accept guidance from the supreme council of the party* This was
rejected, and they thereupon threw themselves into opposition.

Meanwhile Burma’s progress towards recovery' was held up by
various difficulties. Much was done to restore road and Ail transport
and recondition the docks. Bui the much-needed relief supplies were
very hard to obtain, and when the government cancelled the Japanese-
issued currency the cultivators w'ere ev'erywherc without funds. 'Phe

IT. tv

7&S THE CHALLENGE TO EUftQFEAN DOM IN AT JON

police were haropcrcd by need of arms and adequate transport, and
disorderly conditions militated against the revival of agriculture and
local trade. The Communists were becoming active, and before long
the government, instead of concentrating all its attention on the
recovery programme, was forced to deal with the poLiUcal issues. And
Governor Dorman-Smithes manoeuvres in encouraging the develop¬
ment of rival parties to the A FT.F.L. did not improve the situation.

In August 1946 General Sir Hubert Ranee, who as military governor
had earned the trust and goodwill of moat of the Burmese, succeeded
Dorman-Smith and came prepared to pursue the policy of con-
cilLaitonp which was already beginning to yield good results in India.
And although Aung San and his friends worked up a serious strike
threat which aifected the police and government officials^ they were
willing to enter into friendly negotiations with Sir Hubert. The
result of these was that he accepted the demand for an A.F.P.F.L.-
dominated Council of Ministers, and in October 1946 Aung San
became its leader.

The first act of the A.F«P.F.L. on coming into power was to exclude
Communists from their ranks. The maintenance of law and order,
the achievement of economic stabilit>% and the establishment of public
confidence were now Aung San’s respon&ibilityp and he found that
the sole aim of the Communists was revolution. This made it possible
for Britain to view his demands with greater sympathy, and when in
January 1947 a delegation to Inondon to confer with Attlee's

Labour Cabinet agreement was easily reached. There was to be a
general election in the following April, and the British government
bound itself to accept the verdict of the Burma electorate regarding the
form of self-government- Meanwhile the ministers in the Burma Cabinet
were to be given control over the armed forces and the budget.

This was a fair and reasonable agreement, honestly negotiated.
It fell far short of the extravagant demands that Aung San had made
as a revolutianaiy leader. But responsibility had caused his own
understanding of the situation to develop rapidly, and he im^
mcnsely impressed with the British government's sincerity, Hencep
although two of the members of his delegation—U Saw, a past premier
w’’ith great ambitions, and Ba Seiut a mere demagogue-—-refused to be
associated in the agreement, Aung San returned to Burma determined
to carry it out-

The task before him far from eaay. 'fhe disorderly elements
had got out of comtoh and the non-Burmese peoples^he Karens,
Shansp Kachins, and Chins—were ready to fight rather than come

CH* 45 AFTER TJffi WAR, t945-50 7 O 9

under Burmese controL Britain had written into the agreement a
proviso safeguarding their rights, but they were by no means re¬
assured. At the April genera] election the A.F.P.F.L. won a resounding
victory, and Aung San, who mote than any otlier Bunnese leader had
come to realize the need for a positive policy of conciliation towards
the hill peoples, allowed them practically to write their own terms
into the nctv constitution. The Karens alone, with the memory still

A^G SAX

fresh of their cruel treatment at the hands of the Burma Independence
Army, remained unsatislied. They stood out for a state of their own,
disregarding the fact that with the majority of them living in the
Irrawaddy and Tenasserim divisions, inextricably mixed with the
Burmese, snch a solution presented almost insuperabib difficulties
and was in any case of doub^l wisdom.

Aung San did Ins utmost to meet their more reasonable claims with
statesmanlike patience and understanding, and had he lived would

7*0 TUE CRAU.ESGE TO EUROPEAN DOMINATION PT. IV

undoubtedly lave succeeded in solving the problem. But on 19 July
1947 and six of hi* colleagues in the Cabinet were murdered by
hired ass^ina in the pay of the ambitious U Saw. It was a staggering
blow which well explains the scepticism of many well-informed
British regarding the efficacy of the method chosen for dealing with
Burmese nationalist aspirations. No Burman at the time commanded
such personal support or showed such gifts of leadership as Aung San,
and what Burma needed more than anything else was effective leader¬
ship. The idea of a sovereign people making its will effective was
entirely foreign to the political outlook of the country. Moreover,
there is reason to beheve that Aung San had determined to work out
a settlement which would enable Burma to remain within the British
Commonwealth. With him removed there was no leader left with
sufficient influence to carry the country' with him on such an issue.
A, F.P.F, L. propaganda had always asserted with the utmost vehemence
that nothing lisss than complete independence would sadafy Burma.

Sir Hubert ilance at once nominated Thakin Nu, vice-president of
ffie A.F.P.F.L., as Aung Sau’s successor. A deeply religious man who
had never aspired to the position he was now called upon to occupy
he assumed the diffiduli task of holding his party together and saving
the country from confusion. Under hi* leadership the Burma Con¬
stituent Assembly completed its work and on 24 September 1047
unanimously passed the new constitution. Its decision was for com¬
plete independence, and in mid-October 'rhakin Nu came to London
to negotiate Burma’* secession from the Commonwealth. The out-
rame the signa^re on 17 October 1947 of a treaty recognizing the
Keputuic of the Union of Buima as a fully independem state on a date
to be fixed by parliament. A Burma Independence Bill was accord¬
ingly passed through parliament, and on 4 Jaiman’ 1948 Sir Hubert
Ranee formally handed over charge to the republic’s first president,
a Shan chieftain, the Sawbwa of Yawnghwe, Sao Shwe Thaik.

Britain made a generoua financial settlement with the new state and
vt ittilJtary and air rnisaion for training its armed forces^

T, * -^ concluded a defence agreement whereby
Bntish force* were to have right of access to port* and airiiclds in
Burma should she need their assisunce. With an undemarcated
Yunnan border, many Burmese felt it was rtinnitig an unnecessary
tKk to assifme fiiU responaibility for defence before building up
adequate ^rmed forces.

The Nu-Attice Agreement was violently opposed by the Com-
mumsts a* well as by the more irresponsible political elements which

INIfEreNVCNCK MONirUICNT, tWS-qOON

FT. IV

712

THE CMALLENCE TO EUHpPEJlX DOMtMATtON

the rcvolutionaty movement had brought to birth. The A.F.P.F.L.
had stirred up an agitation stronger than it could ehedt. Disorder
developed into lebdlion, and the govemment lost control over much
of the country'. Rangoon itself was threatened, and when a number of
Burmese battalions went over to the rebels its defence depended upon
the Karen, Kachin and Chin contingents m the array. To make
maners worac, in September 1948 U Tin 'J’ut, by far the ablest and
moat experienced man in the government, was murdered, and with
his removal the direction of affairs was left mainly in the hands of
politicians tvhose training had been as agitators, with few gifts of
statesmanship and great ignorance of administration.

rAjJotr ^'EErau aku u nu

I'he worst blow came through mismanagement of the Karen
question. An attempt to disarm them caused them to rebel, and their
revolt became far more dangerous than any other rebel movement.
The year 1949. therefore, was a bad one. The goveraraent had
effective control only in Rangoon and a few widely-scattered parts of
the country. Road, rail and river communications were cut. The
export of rice was less than half its pre-war amount, and national
bankruptcy^eemed inevitable.

I'he usual escape from such a state of affairs through a military
dictatorship was not Burma’s fate for the simple reason that her
military forces were inadequate for such a purpose. Intervention by

CH. 45 after the war, 1945-50 713

the Chinese Conununists was feared, but they were too busy with
their own problems; and effective Chinese military dperations in
Burma arc not such an easy proposition as the alarmists are inclined
to suggest. Burma therefore was left to work our her ow'n salvation
in her ovvn way. Thakin Nu, through his transparent honesty and
devotion to his task, gradually etablished confidence in the govern'
ment. And as his team of young men gained experience and began to
adopt a firmer front, so, little by little, their rule became more effective.
By 1950 the critical corner had been turned. Since then, though
serious difficulties remain, there have been indications of hopeful
progress in a number of fields.

(r) French Jndo-Citirta

When in 1945 the defeat of Japan came within measurable distance
many French officers in Indo-China hoped to be in a position to co¬
operate with Allied forces in liberating the country, I’hc Japanese,
how'cver, forestalled such a move by staging a coup d’etat on 10 March
and taking over control From the French. They broadcast a statement
that the colonial status of Indo-China had ended. Thereupon the
Rmperor of Annam,- Bao Dai, and the Kings of Cambodia and Laos
issued declarations of independence. Ho Chi Minh, the leader of the
Viet Minh League, refused to recognise the emperor's declaration, and
with seven provinces of Tongking under his control and an active
resistance movement in Cochin China he w'a.s able to Seize Hanoi as
soon as the Japanese surrender was announced in August, while a
national committee assumed pow'cr in Saigon.

In the previous month the Potsdam Conference had made quite
different arrangements for the take-over fmm the Japanese Chinese
troops were to occupy the north down to the sixteenth parallel of
latitude, and British troops the remainder. General Gmcey, in com-
niand of the British contingent, arrived in Saigon on 13 September,
and with his help the French authorities resumed control over that
city and a number of others. But their writ ran no further, for the
whole countryside was in the hands of nationalist guerrillas. Early in
1946 Admiral d’Atgenlicu arrived as High Commissioner with General
Ledercas military commander, and the British forces were withdrawn.

In the Chinese sector above the sixteenth parallel it'was quite a
different story. The Chinese left Ho Chi Minh in control of the
administration and refused admission lo French troops. This situation
continued until 28 February 1946, when a Franco-Chinese agreement

714 THU CHALLENGE TO EUROPEAN DOMINATION PT. IV

was signed under which, in return for conceasiaru on the Yunnan^
Hanoi Railway and recogmtioQ of the special position of their nationals
in Indo-China, the Chinese agreed to withdraw their troops. Mean¬
while in the previous month the French had come 10 terms with the
King of Cambodia whereby his kingdom was to exercise a degree of
autonomy, subject to the control of the French governor. Shortly
aften^'ards a similar arrangement was made with the King of Laos.

Early in March an agreement was concluded with the Vietnam govern¬
ment at Hanoi. France recognized the Republic of Vietnam as a free
state forming part of the Indo-Chinese Federation, which it was pro¬
posed to create, and of the French Union r a referendum was to be held
in Cochin China to decide whether it should join the republic. It was
also arranged that a further conference should be held to decide such
matters as llie diplomatic relations of the republic, the future status of
Indo-China, and French cultural and economic interests in Vietnam.
This w'as held in April at Dalai in Cochin China, and it was at once
evident that the French interpretation of Vietnam's ‘independence*
was markedly different from that of the nationalist government.

On I June Admiral d'Argenlieu announced the creation of an
autonomous republic of Cochin China as a provisional measure. This
evoked a storm of protest as constituting an Infiingemeni of the
agreement whereby Cochin China was to be free to decide its future
status by referendum. Thereafter things went from bad to worse.
In July a conference opened betw*«n France and Vietnam at Fon¬
tainebleau, and while it was in progress d'Argenlieu held a second
Dalat conference with representatives of Cambodia, Cochin China,
Laos and southern Ann am. Vietnam was not invited to be represented,
*rhe Vietnam delegates walked out of the Fontainebleau conference
in protest without any decision being taken, save for an agreement,
signed on 14 September, providing for a cessation of hostilities and
the settlement of a number of cultural and economic qutistionfl.

The agreement to cease hostilities was soon broken. There was
violent agitation. The %netnamese leaders would consider nothing
less than full sovereignty and refused to budge an inch on the Cochin
China question. In November Dr, Nguyen Van Think committed
suicide as a protest against the 'unpatriotic* role he had found himself
forced to play as the French puppet ruler of Cochin China. Armed
uprisings brought French reprisals, and on 13 November they bombed
Haiphong, causing frightful casualties. On i(> December the Viet¬
namese staged a surprise attack on French garrisons in Tongkrng and
Annam, and full-scale war began.

HAD DAI AT T1£B HUt TAI^CK

French wvereigmy; he arped that the recognition of dominion statui
after the mqdd qi the BdtJsh Commonwealth wpijld start a daneemu]
precedent for North Africa and Madagascar. The form of federation
therefore, that was finally accepted by the French parliament providet
lor federal bodies with purely advisory funaiona. The French parlia
ment was to teUin legislative power over ajj important matters.

7*6 THE CUAULEMOE TO EtTROPEAS DOMINATION PT. tV

France s plan for Indo-Cbina was decided upon in a seri^ of
parliamentary debates in the summer of 19^6, when Georges Bidault
was prime rainister. The Left proposed that a federation should
gradually be formed by free negoriationa with the repre^ritatives
various states. They should be given equally of status and the
right of secession. Bidault^ however* insisted on the maintenance of

lio cm MisH

CH- 45 AFTHR THT-^WAR, I945-5O

On 24 IS’farch 1947 Ho Chi Minh made a firm statemtint of Viet-
namese policy'. If France would do to Vietnam, he said, what the
United States had done to the Philippines and Britain to India the
Vietnamese people would bring to France friendly co-operation. If
not, they would continue to resist. To this the reply of d 'Argenlieu's
succe^or, fimile Bollaert, was: *We shall remain. . . . The Con¬
stitution makes the French Union, of which Indo-China is an integral
part, an institution of the Republic.'

I he fact that Ho Chi Minh was a Communist was naturally a major
obstacle to a settlement. Only ten of the 300 members of the Viet¬
namese National Assembly w'cre known to be Communists, though the
key positions in the administration were thought to be Communist-
held, The movement, however, was primarily nationalist and de¬
pended for its main support on non-Communist nationalists. It ha,s
been the tragedy of Vietnam that its nationaltst movement ('afrir under
Communist direction. The su^estion has been made that in his
anxiety to reach an agreement with France Ho Chi Minh was willing
to fo^wear his Communism, But France would not enter into
negotiations with him.

On 10 September 1947 France made a 'last appeal' to the rebels in
Indo-China. She offered what she called a large degree of native
control over native affairs, subject to Indo-China remaining in the
French Union, with French control over military installations and the
direction of foreign policy. An amnesty was to be proclaimed and
prisoners exchanged. The appeal significantly made no reference to
the question of recognizing Ho Chi Minh’s government, or even of
negotiating with it. Naturally, therefore, the Vietnam government
rejected it. At the same time it appealed to the United Nations with
the offer of peace on the basis of the unification of the three Viet¬
namese-speaking regions of Tongking, Annam and Cochin China into
an indeperidem state within the Indo-Chinese Federation and the
French Union. France, however, successfully blocked the appeal.

'1‘he French made repeated overtures to Ban Dai to head a, pro-
French government in Vietnam. At first he refused to commit him¬
self, hut they went ahead with their preparations snd on 20 May 194!!
proclaimed the 'Central Frovisionat Vietnam Government' with
Nguyen Van Xuan, the head of the French-sponsored state of Cochin
China, as its president. Finally on S March 1949 Bao DJi was per¬
suaded to become the head of a new French 'dominion' composed
of Cochin China, Annam and Tongking, and officially took over on
30 December, It was, of course, yet another bogus version of

CHALLENGE TO ElJROPEUt! OOMINATfON PT. jv

ind«pen^en«’. Ho Chi Mioh’s position was in no way wc!akoned in
spue of the fact that be had weU over 100,000 of France’s best tiwps
fighting against him* He still held most of Tongking; elsewhere
French troops occupied the cities and maintained some lines of
commumcation- TTie economic life of the countiy was dislocated and
the strain on France herself was more than she could bear.

One of the first acts of the Communist government of China in the

K rf ■ ^550. to recogniac the

Viet Mmh government of Ho Chi Minh as the sovereign power in

\ietimm, Russia and her European satellites quickly followed suit,

^ o the tragedy of V letnam took a new tum, becoming merged into the
cold war between the American-led states and the Soviet bloc.

On 6 Febru^' 1950 Britain and the United States accorded formal
recognition to Bao Dai. Both had at the outset sympathized with the
Vietnam nationalist movement. Now France was to receive more and
more Amencan ^d to continue the struggle, and Tndo-Chinato become
a outpost m the strategy of the Penugon. Thus the generaJ
Arec^ of palicT slipped out of French hands into those of the State
Department at Washington.

(d) Indonesia

Japan announced her willingness to accept the Potsdam terms on
10 Au^ 1945. Two days earlier, at the inutation of Marshal

luXm'ri" of the Japanese armies in the

^T' Indonesian leader.

Hedi^nin^t, arrived m baigon to dUcuaa a declaration of In-

Prer™tioo'^ 7 T"?“'^'.i ^at a Commission for the

The “«t on 19 August in Batavia.

The delegates relumed to Java on 14 August. On the next dav there

EorhJSrm ' THo commission therefore

denre proclamation of indepen-

offid!n I=-ter was Japan's capitulation

of^ally announced by the Japanese commander in Java.

The origin^ Allied arrangement had been for the American forces
o occupy Indonesia, But this had to be abandoned, and instead the
task was ^sign^ to the Bntish. The sudden collapse of Japan came
M soon after this change of plan that it caught the British unprepared.

S’u^^tiT'r^T ti^nsport that no troops could be moved

"9 September. Ihcir task, when they began to arrive, was to
disarm and repatriate 383.000 Japanese and protect aoo.ooo Dutch

T^l^niENT EVKAANO (ftTni FUJI AGXm EAJUtA IK TiW, tIAOUlftDUND]

and Allied prisoners of war and internees. To cany it ont properly
their numbers were first far too few. It is not to be w^ondered at^
therefore^ that the British commandcTp General Christian, finding
Sukamn^s republican government in apparent controU requested its
co-operation. And although his colleague^ Vice-Admiral Patterson^
stated clearly that the British did not recogm^ the Sutamo regime^
his action was tolcen as tantamount to dt facto recognition and many
waverers of the pre-war administration decided to throw in thdr lot
with the republic.

A few days later Dr. van Mook arrived in Batavia. He wros prepared
to open negodations on the basis of Queen Wilhelmina^s 1942 broad-
castp but he announced that he would on no account parley with
Sukarno as a coIIaborarionJst. On 14 November Sukarno was re¬
placed as the head of the republican government by Sutan Sjahrir^ a
moderate^ an [iiteLlectuail^ and one who had 'gone to the mountains^
during the Japanese period. Informal discussions, therefore, w'ere
able to begin. A week before the change of government The Hague
had announced its basic programme in vague terms that were already
half a century out of date. Indoneda was to be a partner In a kingdom

7 ZO THE CilALLENGE TO El.iROPRAN DOMlNA'nO>; FT, iV

of the Neiherlanda so coitiainictcd that the nattonal sqlf-respect of all
Its participating peoples would be assured. Bukarno had summarilj^
rejected this. Sjahrir in his turn announced on 4 December 1945 that
his government's basic demand was for Dutch recognttiori of the
Indonesian Republic.

Meanwhile the British and Dutch fortes went steadily and care¬
fully ahead with the occupation of the islands^ while the republic on
its side expanded its forces, 'fhere were frequent ugly scenes and
clashes. Hea\y fighting took place when the British landed at Sura¬
baya^ and shortly after taking over General Mallaby was murdered.
Such was the state of disorder that Dutch women and children could
not be evacuated from many of the inland concentration camps w^here
the Japanese had herded them.

On 10 February 1946 the Dutch government made a detailed state¬
ment of its policy and offered to discuss it with authorized repre¬
sentatives of the republic. It proposed to set up a Commonwealth of
Indonesia, composed of territories with varying degrees of self-
government, and to create an Indonesian citizenship for all persons
bom there. Internal affairs were to be dealt with by a democraticalJv
elected parliament; in which Indonesians would have a substantial
majority. The ministry^ would he in political harmony w itJi parliament
hut would have a representative of the Crown at its head The
different regions of Indonesia would be linked together in a federal
structure and the Commonwealth would become a partner in the
Dutch Kingdom. The Netherlands would support Indonesia's
application for membership of the United Nations Organization*

Soon afterwards Sjahrir headed a small Indonesian delegation which
went to confer with the Dutch government at The Hague. Again he
made it dear that the startang-point for negotiations must be the re¬
cognition of the republic as a sovereign state. On that basis Indonesia
vrould be willing to enter into close relations with the Netherlands and
would co-operate in all fields, 'rhereupon the Dutch government
offered a compromise: it willing to recognize the republic as a
unit of the federative state to be crf?ated in conformity with the de¬
claration of 10 February, In addition it offered to recognize the de
facto rule of the republic over those parts of Java and Madura not
already under the protection of Allied troops. As Sjahrir was unable to
accept the^c terms, the conference broke up and he and hia colleagues
returned home.

In June 1946 a crisis occurred in the government of the republic.
The Communists^ under Tan Malaka, made an attempt to overthrow

CN. 4 S AfTFJR THK WAR, I945-SO 72 1

the C;abinet by kidnapping Sjahrir and severaJ of his colleagues.
The movc^ however^ was defeated by the prompt action of Sukamo as
president of the republic. He procLalrned a siate of emergency and
for some weeks exercised dictatorial powers. In the meantime, while
negutiatjoiis were at a standstill, the Dutch had assumed control over
Borneo and the Great East. In July a conference of representatives
of these territories met at MaJino, in Celebes^ under Dr. van Mook and
recommended tbe organization of the whole of Indonesia into a
federation with four parts: Java, Sumatra, Borneo, and the Great
East,

In August the Dutch government made another attempt to break
the impasse by appointing three cDmmmionors-general to go to
Java and assist van Mook in new discussions with representatives of
the republic. A conference between the two sides was held in October
and November under the neutral presidency' of the British special
commissioner^ Lord Killeam, at the hill station of Linggadjalip near
Cheribon. After considerable pressure—notably British—from abroad,
an agreement was reached on 15 November. I'he Dutch government
recognized the government of the republic as exercising de
authority over Java^ ^laduta^ and Sumatra. The ttvu governments
Avert to co-operate in establishing a sovereign democratic state on a
federal basis to be called the United States of Indonesia, Of this
Borneo and the Great East would form component parts. A con¬
stituent assembly was to come into beings composed of democratically
elected representatives of the republic and the other component parts*
'Ehe United States of Indonesia was in turn to form part of a Nether-
la ndE-Indonesian Union together with the Netherlands^ Surinam and
Curasao, 'rhia w^ould promote joint interests in foreign relations,
defence, finance^ and ecqntJmic and cultural matters. The United
States of Indonesia w ould apply for membership of UNO. Finally any
dispute ari$ing from the agreement was to be isettled by arbitration.

There was considerable opposition to the agreement in both the
Dutch parliament and the Central Indonesian National Committee,
but in December 1946 it waa passed by both, and on ay Afareh 1947
was signed at Batavia. It had been difficult enough to reach an agree¬
ment, but under the troubled conditions prevailing, and Avith frequent
outbreaks of vnolencep it was supremely difficult to put it ip to practice.
'I'he Dutch Averc sincere in their intention to carry it out, but they did
not believe that the republic seriously intended to do so. The im¬
portant Masjumi Party, representing Muslem religious interests, was
opposed to it and the republican government could not accept the

^ZZ THE CJIAIXENCJE TO EUftOPK^N I>OM I NATION FT* TV

Dutch assumption that uncU the projected Dnitcd States was actually
established the Netherlands government was the sovereign power
throughout Indonesia.

The Dutch accused the republic of not keeping its word^ and on 27
May 1947 sent their demands in the fomi of an ultimatum. When a
satbfactoni' reply not forthootning they proceeded to ‘ restore
order ^ by ' police action*. Their troops occupied important areas of
Java, Madura and Sumatra and cut off the repubbean forces in 10
small isolated segments. While fighting was still in progress the United
Nations Security Councilp at the instance of India and AustraliSf^
issued a ccaac-fire order on 1 August, and shortly aftenvards set up a
Committee of Good Offices, composed of representatives of Australia,
Belgium and the United States, to arbitrate in the dispute.

A conference took place in the United States warship i?eflt*jr 7 /e and
resulted in another agreement^ accepted by the disputants on 17
January 1948. There ^vas to be a irucse which provided for the estab¬
lishment of a deniditarbed zone. 'I’he United States of Indonesia
was to be set up, but on different lines from the Linggadjati arrange-
merits^ for plebiscites were to be conducted tu detenrune whether the
various groups in tfie main islands wished to join the republic or
some other part of the projected federation. Dutch sovereignty was
to remain over Indonesia until it was transferred to the United States
of Indonesia.

The Rrnvitie agreement, howeverj was no more successful than the
one negotiated at Linggadjati, Both sides accused each other of
violations of the truce, and the Indonesians accused the Dutch of
establishing a blockade with the intention of forcing them to surrender*
In July 1948 the Good Offices Committee^ which had remained on
the spot to supenase the implementation of the agreement, reported
that the Indonesian complaints were substantially tnie. The Dutch
then raised the Communist bogey* They asserted that the republic
was in Communist hmtds. This led to an immediate purge by the
republic of its Communist elements. Still the Dutch were not
satisfied. In December 1948 negotiations broke dowm completely and
they again resorted to ' police action^ They occupied the remainder of
republican territory and clapped the leaders of its government in gaol.

This actipn caused serious agitation not only in the ranks of the
I'nited Nations but also throughout Asia. I'he Asian Conference,
which met at New^ Delhi, asked the Security Council to intervene
once more. In victv of the pressure from many quarters the Security
Council again took action* It ordered a cease-fire and called upon

CH. 45 AFTER TJ!* WAR, 1945-5O 733

the Dutch lo return the republican capital cif Jogjakarta in central
Java. The Dutch obeyed the order* and once again die seemingly
mterminabie discussions began with the republican Eeaders. In
May they agreed to permit the republip to be reconstituted as a
part of the United States of Indonesia, and in July Jogjakarta was
handed over.

By this time trouble had arisen in a new direction: the non-
republican territories had begun to press for the establish mem of the
interim government provided for in the Ltnggadjati aj^eement. The
state of East Indonesia took the lead, and the agitation showed that
there was widespread suspicion of the repubiicr in which Javanese
interests predominated. J’he suggestian was made that the federation
should be completed, with or without the republic* This did not
mean that these territories wanted the continuance of Dutch ruk*
It showed that the Indonesian question was not to be solved by dealing
vrith the republic in the expectation that the rest of Indonesia would
toe the line*

The attempt at a solution by Ibrce had failed. The Dutch fdt
deeply aggrieved at the extent to which their actions had turned world
opinion against them. There was a strong revulsion of feeling in
Holland in favour of a round-table settlement whieh would satisfy
the aspirations of the Indonesian peoples. A conference accordingly
opened at 'Ihc Hague on 3:3 August 1949 to arrange for the transfer of
sovereignty^ 7 'he Netherlands go%'emmcnt^ the republic* and the
member states outside the republic were aU represented and had the
assistance of the United Nations Committee for Indonesia. Dutch
policy now was to grant independence, not grudgingly but, as Dr. van
Monk puts it, 'with good grace and liberality*.

On 2 November agreement was reached; on 27 December the
provisional government of the new national state was constituted.
Mr. Sukarno became its president, mth Mr. Mohammed Hatta as its
prime minister. The United Slates of Indonesia wa.s constituted as
a sovereign federal republic of sixteen states enjoying equal partner¬
ship with Holland under the Netherlands Crown. A system of co¬
operation with Holland by consultation was worked out and embodied
in tiic agreement, and the Necherlands government made generous
offers of assistance to its nevv partner.

Judged in the best light, the Dutch plan was 'to achieve a sufficient
riieasurc of internal security and economic reconstruction Ae/orj the
United States of Indonesia was to be declared independentBut

^ ^iuo 4 t, Qp. Wl., p. 263.

724 CHALLENGE TO EIHIOPEAN POMISATJON EC. lY

■

nsitioTialbi; ^ntimcni takes little heed of atich things wheit they are
dictated by an external authority> and under po&t-t^nr eonditmna in
South-East Asia few people beheved that once European authority
was re-established its promises of future independence would be
honoured.

(e) Siam

Sianip although Japan's ally and technically at war with the Allies,
found her position little better than that of a conquered countryv Her
trade ccasedp the Japanese confiscated whatever they required for their
war effort^ and completely failed to supply her with either the textiles
or the machinery that she so badly needed^ These facts, together
with P^ifaun*s haish treatment of ofiidala who refused co-operation,
aroused so much opposition to his regime that as soon as it became
obvious that the Japanese were losing the war his go%^emnient col¬
lapsed, in July 1944.

Pridi now' became the real head of the government, but exercised
his power through hb friend Khuang Aphaiwong, who wtis prime
minister until August 1945^ At the end of the w^ar the most urgent
problem was that of the readjustmeni of relation^ with the victorious
Allies. Khuang Aphaiwong fell foul of Pridi by attempting an in¬
dependent line of his own. In Septemberp therefore, he was dismissed
and hb place g[iven to Seni Pramoj, who had been leader of the Free
Thai Movement in the United States during the war and was now
considered the most acceptable man for bringing about rccondliatlon
with the Allies.

Pridi had already been paving the way towards the re-cslabbshmcnt
of good relations. He bad denounced Siam's deebrations of war on
the Allies, offered to return the territories annexed by P'ibun from
IVench Indo-China, and suggested that disputed boundary questions
ahuuld be referred to the United Nations. Brittsh commercial interests
had suffered heav’y losses in Siam, and there was naturally a demand
fur compensation. But unufficial American pressure was brought to
bear, which caused her to relax her demands. The United States had
never recognized the Siamese deebration of war and was consequently
in a good position to advance her interests at the expense of Biitaio,
vvho had done so. Britain's interests in Siam were much greater than
Americans but her claicns for war damage brought constant Americar.
intenention in order to assure must-favoured-nation treatment to
American trade. The post-war period therefore saw an immense
growth of Amcncan influence in Siam. America had dollars to offer

cit. 45 AFTFR "nre wak* 1945^50 7^5

and Wished to act the part of rich uncle. Britain^ impoverished by
her war efforta, was in no position to compete.

France would not resume friendly relations on any other terms than
the retrocession of the territories yielded by Vichy in May 1941- The
United States again acted as mediator. The matter was also dis¬
cussed in the United Nations before final settlement was reached at
Washington on 17 November 1946. In the following month the much-
disputed territories were returned to Indo-China and a conciliation
commission was appointed to examine the ethnic^ geographic and
economic questions involved. Its report showed clearly that Siam
had no real claim to the territories, but recommended that suitable
arrangements should be made for her to receive her due share of the
superabundant supplies of fish from the Great Lalce>

The signing of the Franco-Siantesc agreement removed one great
obstacle in the vvay of Slam^s membership of the United Nations.
France agreed to sponsor her application. But Russia now threatened
to obstruct her election unless she annulled her la against Cotmtiunism
and resumed diplomatic relations. Siam^s opportuaism was again
equal to the emergency: she accepted Russians terms. Russia there¬
fore held her hand and Siam was received into fnembership by the
General Assembly of 1947.

Siam^s chief internal post-war problem was the instability of her
governments. Seni's government lasted until only just after the
British-Siamese agreement of 1 January 1946* He had little ad-
minustrativc experience and no idea how to handle the various political
forces in the country. Pridi therefore tried Khuang Aphaiwong again
as prime minister. But he lasted only until the following Mareh^
when Pridi himself took over the post.

During his premiership ilie young King Ananda was found dead
on 9 June 1946 with a bullet-wound in his forehead. His death was
a mysteiy that has never been satisfactorily cleared up. The com¬
mission of enquiry could not decide as between suicide, accident or
murder. He was succeeded by his younger brother, the present King
Phumiphon Adundeti then being educated in Switzerland.

In the following August Pridi handed over the premiership to a
former coUeague, Thamrong Nawasasvat, who held odice until 8
November 1947^ when a military £OUp d'etat swept away Pridi
authority and placed P‘ibun once more in potver. At thf*efid of the
war he and a number of hia colleagues had been arrested as war
criminals. The courts how^cver, decided that there was no law under
which they could be tried, and they were accordingly released. P'ihuii

7*6 THE CHALLENGE TO EUROFEAN DOMTUATION PT. n'

>■

then began patiently and warily to build up his strength. The army
was behind him, and he was regarded as the strong man who could
give political stability. On both sides of Siam, in Burma on the one
hand and Vietnam on the other, the Communist challenge to estab¬
lished authority was causing paralysis. Down in Malaya also the
Communist threat n-as dearly to be seen.

When P’ibun decided that he could act without risk of serious
external repercussions his one-day revolution was bloodless. He
issued a new constitution, promis^ a general election in the near
future, and installed Khuang Aphaiwong as interim prime minister.
The election, held in January 194S, gave him the mandate he required
for going ahead. He showed respect for world opinion by hiding his
military dictatorship with the utmost care behind a ministry of all the
talents. The chief difficulty was Pridi, who, it was suggested, might
call in Chinese Communist or Viet Minh help in order to regain
political power. But Siam became too hot for him. The new govern¬
ment decided that King Anands had been murdered. Among others
Pridi was accused of complicity and his arrest was ordered. He dis-
appnred, however, and so effectively that in August 1948 no one
knew his whereabouts.

P’ibun managed successfully to hold on to pow'cr. Shortly after
winning the general election he took over the premiership himself.
He revived his previous policy of modernism and launched a com¬
prehensive scheme for the improvcnient of secondary education.
But his chief ciTorta went towards strengthening Siam’s military
forces and building a new military city just outside the old town of
Lopburi, where one may still see the mins of King Narai's palace
and Constant Phaulkon’s mansion in close proximity to Mon-Khmer
temples reminiscent of a time before the T’ai had set foot in that
region.

In 1950, where this survey ends, he had survived several attempts
to unseat him, and, compared with Burma, Vietnam and Malaya.
Siam appeared like an oasis of calm, contentment and prosperity,
Pridi was still in exile, and his sole chance of returning, it vvas thought,
would be through a revolution supported by the Chinese minority or
by an ini.'asion from Communist China, Beneath the surface all was
not so calm and contented. 'I’hc large Chinese community, with its
immense sfrare in the country’s commerce, had been deeply affected
by the Communist victory in China, and to many Siamese it appeared
to be more than ever a threat to the nation’s security.

APPENDIX

DYNASTIC LISTS, WITH GOVERNORS AND

governors-general

Burma and Arakan:

11 .

Cambodia:

Chamffa:

fndonnia and Malaya:

Tai Oynastia:

Rulers of Pagan before 1044
The Pagan dynasty, 1044-1^37
Myinsalngand Pmya, i298-t,;64
Stgabig, 1315-64
Ava, 1364-1555

'Fhe TfiungQQ dynasty, 1486-175^

The Aknn^^pava or Konhaung dyniMty, 175a-
iSSs

Mon nilera of Hanthau-addy (Pc^)

Amkpn

Funan

Chcfila

The Angkor monarchy
1*he post-Angkor period

Linyi

Champa

Java, Pre-Muslttn piriod
Java, Muslim period
Makeev
Acheh {Adi in)

Gove mom-General of the Netherlands East Indies

Sukhotki
Ayut’ia
Uangkok
Muong Swa
Lang Chang
Vicn Chang (Vientiane)
Luang Prabang
728

appf:ottx

7^9

Viftnam: *

A* '‘flic Hong-Bang, 2879-25^ B.tr.

R. The Thuc, 257-208 h.c,

Cp llic Tiieu, 207-1 1 1 BX.

D* The Earlier Lt, A*D. 544-602
EL The Ngo, 939-5+

F, The Duih^ 96S-79

G, The Earlier Tjc, 980-1009
EL *^1116 Later Li^ 1009-1225
L The TraUp 1225-1400

J* The ilOp 1400-J407
K. 'Hie restored "[‘ran^ 1407-18
li* The Later Le, 1418-1804

M. The MaCj 1527^1677

N. ^rhe Trinh* 1539^1787

O. ITic Tay-S^n, 1778-1802

P. The Nguyen

Q. Governors and governors-gencrat of French Indo-

China

APPENDIX

DYNASTIC LISTS

BURMA AND ABAKAN

A. Rulrrs Of Paga^ before 1044
(According to tli« Burmese chronicles)

6 .

Timinyi, son of t
Vimminpaik, son of 2
Paikthili^ son of ^ ,
Thinlikyaung, s&n of 4
Kyaungdurtl, son of 5
Thihtan^ son of 6 .

UJ9-^7 y^urpers)

to,

ri,

12.

' 4 -

IS-

16.

^ 7 -

18.

* 9 -

30 *

21 .

2 . 2 ,

35,

24 ‘

26.

27.
38 .

Tharamunhpya, grandson of 7
l*haiktaingp son of 8
Thtnlikyaungnge, son of 9
Thinlipaik, brother of lo
Hkanbungp brother of 10
HkanUt, brother of jo
Eltumaik, son of 13
Htunpyii, son of 14
Htunchi't^ son of 15
Popa Rawrabiui, usurping priest
fthwe Onthi* son-in-I aw of 17
Peitthonp brother of 18
Ngahkwe, son of 19
MyinkywCp usurper
Theinlikni of blotjd rnyal
Themsun^ son of 22
Sbwelaung, son of 23
Htunht^^^rtp son of 24
Shwemaukp son of 25
MunJat, brother of 26
Sawhkitihnit^ son of 27

730

daiE of
arttrnon
* 167

242
299

324

344

► 3S7

+ 12

+94

516

533

532
S+7
557
Sfig
. S*2

598

613

* 640
65a

* 710

« 716

. 726

73+

74+

753

762

. 785

> 80Z

APPENDIX

■

29, Jlketu, son of zS .

30. Pyinbya, brother of zq (founder of Papan, 84^)

31- Tannct, son of 30 ,

32^ Sale Ngahkwcj ueiuptr

33, Nyaung-u Sawrahan^ usurper

34, KujiKb3w Kyaunghpyti, son of 31 *

35, Kyiso, son of 33 ....

36, Sokka-tc, brother of 35 -

73 ^

dair of
aertsnon

« 829

846

878
« qo6

9 J 1

964

9S6

99a

B. TftE Pagan DyNASOr, 1044-1287
List cotnpiU'd from the chronic! esr

1. Anatwabta . . ^ .

2. Sawlug son of r . ^

3. Kyanzittha, son of i * , ,

4. Alaungaichu, grandson of 3 »

5. Narathu^ son of 4 - . . ,

6. NarathcLnhkfl, son of 5 «

7. Narapatiaithu^ brother of 6 ,

S, Nantanngtnya (Htilominlo)^ son of 7 , *

9. Kyagw^, son of 8 .

iQ, Uzana^Aonofq , . , ,

11* Narathikapatc (Tarokpyemin), son of 10

12. Kyamwa, son of ii

13. Sawhnit, son of 12 . , * ^

14. Uzana, son of 13 *

1044
J077
1084
1112
1167
1170

1210

1234

1250

1254

1287

1298

1325

List compiled from the Inscriptions by Professor G. IL Luce:

Kingtof Puham, 1044-1387

J. Aniruddha (Anawnahta)

2. Man Luian (8awlu)

3. Thiluin Man (Kyanzittha) ,

4. Cahsu I (Abungsithu)

5. Tmtaw Syah (Naratbu)

6. CaS^ii II (Narapatisitbu) , ^ ^

^ 7^ Katonmyip (Nantaungmya) son of 6

8. Narasihgha Uccana, (Naratheinhka) son of 7

9. Klacwa (Kyaswa), brother of 8 ,

10* Uccana, (Uzana) son of 8 -

11. Man Yan^ son of 10

12. TarukpJiy (Narathihapale), brother of 11

iq 44 ?^i 077 ?

1077 M084
1084-1113
1113-1165?

I165?-!174
1174-1211
1211-1231 i

^i23i?-i235
1235-1249? '

12491-1256?

. 1256

1256?-1287

732

APPENDIX

C. RttLEHS OF MyISSAINC AND PjNYA, 1298-1364

1. AtKinhkaya

2. VazathiDkyan

3. Thihathu

3. Thihathu, at Pinya ■ . . ,

+. UKaiut, son of Kyaniswa of Pagan ] ] *

5* Ngashishin, half-brother of 4

6. Kyaivswangic, son of 5 , , , '

7. Naiathu, brother of 6 . , '

8. Uzana Pyaung, brother of 6 , ’ j

9. Thadominbya, descendant of 3 (founder of Ava)

^ The Three Rhan Brothers

diitt ^

1298

1312
1324
^843
^350
13 SD
13*+

1364

D. Rdleiis of Sacainc, 1315-64

1. Sawyun, aon of iTithaihu .

2. Tatal^’agyi, stepbrother of t

3. f!hwetaungict, son of a , ’

4. Kyaawa, son of 1 ,

5- hiawrahtaminye, brother of 4 . ’

6* Tarabyangc, brother of 4 . . '

7. Miiihyauk Thihapatc, brother-in-Jaw of 6 ,

E, Ritlers of Ava, 1364-1555

1. Thadntntnbya (of Finn)

2. Nga Nu, usurper . , , [

3. Mitiky'iswasawice , . ^ *

4. Taiabya, son of 3 . . '

5. Nga Nauk Hsan, usurper

6 . Minhkaung, son of 3 .

7. Thihathu, son of 6

8. Minhlongc, son of 7

9. Kalckyctaungnyo, son of 4 , . *

to- Mohnyinthsdo

11. Minrekyawsws, son of to . [ |

12. Narapad, brother of 11 , '

13. ThihaUiura, son of 13

14. Minhkaung, son of 13 .

15. Shwciunkyawahin, son of 14 ] *

16. ThotunbAit, usurper

17. Hkonmaing, usurper

18. Mobyc Narapati, son of 17 , , ^

19. fikhukyawhttn, usurper .

* ^315

■ *323

• 1336

1340

• *35®

■ * 35 ®

* *352

■ *36+

1368

• 1401
1401

, i40t
1422

• 1426
1426

• ‘427

■ * 44 ®

■ *443

• *469

1481
> 1502

• 1527

• >543

. 1546

• 1552

APPENDIX

733

F. The 1 'cuncoo Dvnastv, 1486^175^

1, Mmkyifiyo ...... i486

a- Tabinshwchli, aon qf 1 * . , , ,

3. BayinnAung, brother-m-law of 2 , . . , 1551

+. Xaadabaym, wn of 3 . * . , , 1581

^ (IntcrrrcgTium 1599-1605}

5. AnaukpeUun, grandson of 3 . . . , 1605

6. Minrcdcippa^ son of 5 * . . ^ ^ 1628

7. ThaJun, bmther of 5 * , . * , 1629

8. Pindale, son of 7 . ^ , . . .164S

9. ?)■€, brother of 8 . * , . . 1661

10. Karawaia, son of 9 , . ^ , 1673

It. Mmrekyawdin, ncphc^v of 9 . , . , 1673

1 ^. ^ftne, son of 11 . * . , , ,

13. Taaioganwep son of I3 . . . » , 1714

14. AlaKadammaya^i Dipati, son of 13 , . . ^ 751~53

G* The Alauxcpaya or Xo^SiAUNO Dynasty. 175^-1835

Capitals at Shwcbo (175^-65). Avsk (1765-83), Amnrapura (1783-1823),
A^-a (1823^37)* AtT'arsptira {1837-57) Atanilalay (1857^5)

I , .^Vlaungpays of Shwebo

1. Naungdawgyip son of 1

3. HsinbyushJn. brother of z

4. 8iiigu Min, son of 3

5. Maung Maung, son of 4

(Reigned only seven days]

6. Bndawpaya, son of i

7. Bagyidaw, grandson of 6

8. Tharrai^addy, brodicr of 7

9. Pagan Min, son of 8

10. Min don Min, brother of y
] 1. TbJbaw, son of lo .

1753

1760

1763

177*

1781

1819

183S

[846

»«53

1S78

H. Mon Rulers of Hantkawaddy (Pegu)

u Ttiamata, legendary founder of Pegu

2. Wimala, brother of 1

3. Atba, nephew of 2 . * , . *

4. Areindama - . » . .

5. A mnnk » ^ .

S2S

»37

854

S6t

$85

73 +

6* Ccindii
7 * Migadcjppagyi
£. Gcbsadiya

9, Karawiktt

!0- Pjioasiala
Artaiha

12, Anuyatna

13. Migadcippangd
i+. Ekkathauianta

15. UppaJa

16. Pontarika

17. Tiasa

(N.B* up to this point the list h purely tradiiional)

18. WAreru, fiOd-id-Jaw of Rama Khambcdg of Sukhot'ai

19* Hkun Law, brother of 18
^o. Saw Oj nephew of ig
21* Saw brotlicr of 20

2aH Zein Pun^ usurper *

33. Saw E Gan Gaung, nephew of 21
2+ Biunya E Law, son of ig

25. Binnya U, sou of 24

26. Raxadarit, bop of 25

27. Binnyu DaTOfiiayassa^ son of 26
38. Binnya Ran, brother of 27

29. Binnp Waru» nephew of 28

30, Hinnya Kyau, couBin of 29 ,

31* Mawdaw, cousin 0/30
32. Shill Sawbu* daughter of 2&

33 ^ Oammazedi, son-in-law of 32

34. Binnya Ran, son of 33
35- Takjiyutpi, son of 34

(Burmese rule 1539-1550)

36* Smim Sawhtut, usurper
37- Smim Utaw, son of 34 .

(Burmese mic i5Si’-i74o)

38. Smim Htaw Buddhaked

39 ' Binnya Dala, father-in-law of 38 . ] ]

(Moil independence extinguished 1757)

tlau (/
onrHXMH
903
917
93 i

941

954

9*7

982

99+

[004.
* 1016
loiS
1043

1287

1306?

1310

13A4

1331

*33'

1331

1353

>383

* 4^3

1426

1446

1450

1453

>433

(472

1492

1526

1350
>55 >

1740

'747

APPEND13C

L RULE£iS OF AKARAS

735

The chronicIcB list ftfty-four kings of the Dkifiyavvadi first dviiasty
(^666 B.C.-815 B.C+, artd fifty-three king^ of die jN!coiid dynasty {825 b.c.—
A.D- 746)* These must be regarded as purely mythicaii Then follow:

%^esali dynasty^ 12 kings^ S7S-totS

First Pi'inaa dynasty^ 15 hingSt loiS—1103

Parin dynasty^ S 1103-67

Krii dynasty, 4 kings^ r 167-So

Second Pyinsa dynasty, 16 kings,, 1180^1237

Launggye^ dynasty^ 17 ktngs^ 1^37-1433

Mrohaung (Mrauk-u) dynasty^ J 433 “ *785

The complete list » in A. P. Phayre, History 0/ Burma, pp, 289-304.
G, E. Harveyt op ctLj pp. 369-72, gives it from a.d, 146^

From the Sanskrit inscriptloni of Arakan the late Professor E* IL
Johnston^ put together It^ti lists of rulers. The historicity of the first cannot
be checked^ but it is probably a Htlle nearer in fact than the lists of early
rulers in the chronicles. It runs!

ditralioti
0/ r«^

tin years

i. ... *

t20

3' 1 - . *

" 120

4. Bahubalin

^ 120

5. Raghupati

120

6. , * * ,

120

7* Candrodayn

S. The Annaveta kings

9 - ■ .

to. Rimbhyappa (^1 .

1 1* Kuverami or Kuvera^ s queen

12- Umavirya{?), husband of ii

13. Jugna(?)

14. Lanki . . , _

* 3

The second list b of a Candra dynasty, The coins of six of these rulers
have been found. Johnson suggests that the dynasty began between a.d.
330 and 360. The chronidcs show a Candra dynasty reigning bctw-cen 7SS
and loiS. But save for its name and length, 230 years, it beats no resemb¬
lance tq the other, Johnson’s comment is: ^ It would seem thatithe Chronicles ,
derived ultimately from an authentic list, which has sun^ived in a form
corrupted beyond hope of restoration/*

^' Seme Sandcrit biwiptioni of Ardkan% BSOAS,^ jti, a, pp^ IS7-S5,

■ JcK. cii., p,

At’i’HNDlX

73 S

Tht Cawira Dynasty {yahnsan's lUt]

I. Dven Candra

Juiatwn

d/ffjfrt

55 years

2. Rajacandra

3, Kalacandra

4. Dc^-acandra

5. Yaj^cniiilra

6. Cajidrabandhu ,

7. Bhumicandra

8. Bbuticartdra

9. Niticandra

IQ* VLryacandra

* ‘

It. Priticandra

12^ P^hvEcandia

13. Dbmcandra

The Afrohaang Dynasty

Nuram^ikhla^ aoji of King Rajathu

2. Ali Khan^ brather of 1

3. Basawpyu^ son of 2

4. Dawlya, son of 3 *

5 p Basawnyo, uncle of 4
6 p Yanaungp son of 4

7. Salmgatbii, uncle of 6 on mother's gJdc

8. Mitiyaza, son of 7 ,

9. K^hadt, son of S «
tp- Mifisaw Op brother of 7

11. Thatjua, of 4 ,

12. Mmbin, son of S

13. Dtkha, son of 12

14. Sawhkp son of 13 ,

15. Minsetya* brother of 14
i6« Minpnlaung, son of 12
17. iMinya^agyi, son of 16
iSp Minbkniriaung^ son of 17
iQd Thirithuiiarnrna^ son of eS
20p Minsanlp sou of 19 ^

21, Nanipatigyi, great-grandson of 11

22, Thado» tiephew of 21

23, Saadathudftmma, of 22

dfl/* id/

* 1404

‘ >434

. 1459

1482
. 1493

, 1494

1501

* JS23

- 1535

* 1525

* JS 3 i

^ 1553

- *555
1564

^ * 57 *

- *593

. 1612

1622
p 1638
163S

- >* 4 S
165*

AffPtKDIX

14. '‘rbirithuriya, son of ^3 *

25. Waradhammaro^, bmther of ^4

26. MimEthudhaiiuiiarazaf brother of 25
27* SandathuriyadhiUDma, bmther of 26
23 . Kawrahta^aWp son of 27

29. Mayokpiya^ usurper

30. KaUnUDdat, usurper

37. Najadipad/son of 27

32. SandawimaU, grandson of %z

33. Sandathuriya, grandson of 23

34. Sandawizaya^ usurper

35. Sandithuriya, son-^m-law of 34

36. Naradipadf son of 35
37* Narapawara, usurper

38. Sandawizaya, cousin of 37 .

39p Katya, usurper

40. Madarit, brother of 38

41. Nara-apaya, unde of 40
42* ThirithUp son of 41 .

43. Satidapayamap brother of 42

44. Apaya, brother-in-law of 43

45. Sajidaihumatia, brother-in-law of 44

46. Sandawinalap usurper

47. Sandathaditha

48. "I'hamada

737

{fair &f
aaaiion

16S4
. t68s
. 1692

. 169+

. l6()r&

169b
, 1697

1698
. 1700

1706
. I7TO

- 173*

* *734

* *735
*737

' *737

* *737
*74*

* 176T
1761

■ 1764

■ *773

- *777

* *777

. 1782

CAMBODIA
A. Funan

Kaundiiiya (Hnn-t'ien)

■ *

2. I luu F"an-h^uanE

3. P'an-p^an, son of 2 ,

(reigned three years)

4. Fan Shih-cnan, general
5* Fan Chin-sbeng, son of 4

6 , Fan Chan, usuq>cr

7. Fan Ch*angp son of 4

5. Fan tfsun, usurper ,

latter part of Rrst century a. d.

second Italf of second century
early tbird century

. * €. aoy-HT. aas

came to throne r. 240
reigning in 2B7

73® APPENBIX

■I

9, Chu Clmn-t'an

V T ■. V ,

10 - Kaunditiy^ 11

11. Che -1 i-pa-mo

♦ * a i ^

12 . (Kaimdinya] Jaya^-xirman
13* Rudiavanxian

reigning in 557

* V »

dkd before 434
embassica to China 434-5

W m- m

reigning in 4S4
died 514
succeeded to throne 514
reigning in 539

B- CuENLA

dnU <9/

1. Bhavavarman I, gnuid^n of Riidravarman of Funan » c. eto

z, Mahendravannan (ChUrasena), brother of j ^ f, 600

3- Isanavarman f, son of 2 * ^ ^ ^ ^

4. Bhavavarmati II, relationship unknown * . , b35(?J

5. Jaya^-arman C son of 4(?) , , , ^ ] f* 650

6. Jayadevi, widow of 5 , . . . reigning in 713

* (u) Amttdit&pum

Baladitya

Nripatindravarman, grandson of Baladitya, latter half of seventh
century

PuBhkanibha, son of above, manries heireas of Bambfiupura
(6) Sambhupura

Sambhuvarman^ son of Pushkaraksha, firat half eighth ototury^
Rajeudravannajif son of abovc^ died in last of eighth century

Mahipativarman, son of above

C. Tm A^eckor Monarchy

r. Jayavarman II

2. Jayavarraan III, son of i

3. Indravarman I, cousin of 2 *

4. Yasovarman I, aon of 3

5- l larBhaviirman I, sou of 4 ,

6. laanavamian 1 1, brother of 5

7. layavarman IV, usurper

8. Harahavarman II, son of 7 ,

9 . Rajendravarman II, grand&on of j

date
af&ssiM
. So 3 ( ?)
. 850

S77
SS9
900
i r. 922
928
942
944

AfFESmX

10. jdy^vsintian V* of 9 .

n, Udayadityavarmaji maternal nephew of 10

12. [Jayaviravanmajip ioo2( ?}]

13. Suryavarman usurper

14^ Udayadityavarmaik II, son of 13
15. lUrshavariuan Ell, brother of 14
16^ Jayavarinaji Vl» usurper

17. Dharanindravarmafi I, brother of 16

18. Suryavarman I maternal great-nephew of 17
19^ Dhaiauindravarmaxr II, cousin of iS

20, Yasovarman II, son of 19 .

21. Tribhuvanadityav^armaii, usurper
32* Jayavarman VII* son of 19 *

23. ludravarman If^ son of 22 ,

34^ Jayavarman Vlll* grandsonf^) of 23.

25* Indravarman III, son-Lo-law^ of 24 *

26. Indnijayavarman, a relative of 25

27* jayavarman Paramesvara, a relaiivr of 26

L. P. Briggs^'s list of the remaining

719

date q/

968

» IDOI

1002

* 1050

* 10&6
toSo

* 1107

. 1113

ligo
. 1160

* ] ]66
1181

. c , J219
. 1243

- 129s

* 1308

1327-53^0

28. Hou-eul-na

29. Samtdc Preali Phaya

30. Bamtac Chao Fhaya Phing-ya, Nippoan Bat
3Lampong, or Lampang Paramaraja .

32. Boiijovong, Surijong, or I^mbang *

33* Barom Rieha, or Gamkhat Ramadhipatl

34. Phommo-Soccorach, or Dharniasoka

35, Ponha Yat* or Gam Yat

reigning m E371
died 1^404 or 1405
1405-9

» 1 h|^9-i6

1416-25

1425-29

1429-31

143 a-

0 . The Post-Asgkor Period

Ponha Yat ( 5 ri Snryavamian) * * . . ,1432

Srcy-racha .*,.*** 1459

Dharmaraja ^ * * , - . , '1473

Srey Sokonthor Bat . , * * ^ - 15^4

Nay Kan, usurper ^ - « 150S-36

Ang Chan* at Pursat , , - * * 1516-28

at Lovck * . . - . 1528-66

Barom Racha (Sotha) * . * * - ^ * 1566

Chettha I . 157*

Prah Ramaj usurper * - * * . * 1594

Ponha Tan , * . - * - ^ tS 9 &

Ponha An - , ^ ^ * *S 9 ®

APPENDIX

740

Sray Sauryopor .

•1

d 47 U ff
aitatiaat

1600

Chctta II . . .

161S

Ponha To

i 6 zs

Ponha Nu

1630

Ang Noq

1640

Runa Thuppdcy Chan *

1643

Batom Racha

Chctthalll

1672

Ang Chey

1673

Aug Non

1674

Chttthii IV .

1673

Tbomma Racha * - ,

1701

Ang Em

1704

Thommo Racba {second reign) .

1706

Ang Em (second tcigti) .

lyto

Sottha II « , .

1733

Thommo Rachn (third reign)

1758

Ang Ton

1747

Chettha V . , ,

1749

Ang Ton (second reigh)

S 7 SS

Prah Oiitey

1758

Ang Non

*775

Ang Eng . . ,

1779

(Interregnum i796'-i8o2)
Ang Chan .....

[8OZ

Ang Mey

^834

Ang Duong

1841

Norodom

t8to

Siaovath «

1904

[928

AfonivDng

Norodom Sihanouk

1940

CHAMPA
A. Lin VI

K'iti-li«n , . , ,

Son ^ ....

Fait Hstun^ * .

Fan Y\ . . . ,

Wen (pm'ioijaly chief minister^

Fan Fo embassies to China . ,

Fan Hu.ta, son of Fan Fo

}

. 270

. C. 23 .)

336

377

APPENDIS

74*

B. Champa

According to G. Maspcro, Royaumt de ChamfiQ.

First />y«(Zf/yp‘A.n,

d^ie of aucfdon

tmetf

othrnew mdicalrd

Sri Mara

193

Xp 90d of Sri Mara

Son and grandson of X ,

■ *

Fan Hiong

■fil

reigning in ajo

Fan Yi .

end of reign 336

Second Dynasty^ ^ 36 - 42 o{?)

Fan Wen

336

Fan Fo *

3+9

Bhadrav^arman L

reigning in 377

Gangaraja

Mafiorathavarman

* m

Wen Ti

. ft

■m

Third Dynatiy^ 42 c(? 4 - 529 (?)

Seven rulers widi tide Fan

Devararmnn

reigning in 510

Vijaya^^rman * ft * , .

FonrfA DynaslVy S29£?)-757( ?)

reigning in 536-7

Rudravatttian 1 ^

• 5 a 9 (^)

Sambuvarmaii ft

reigning In 605

KaodharpadUamia ^ ■

, ft 6 i9{ 7 )

Bhosadharnia

end of reign 645

Bha J rc^vara vartnan

Daughter of Kandharpadharma .

Prak^adharma VikTantavarman 1

653

Vlkmntavannan 11

. 6 S 6 {fH 3 «(?)

Rudravarman IL

■

reigning in 749

Ftfit, £b’"«^y 7 ii 8 {?)-KS 9 {?)

Prithmdravannan

00^

Satya^rman

between 774 and 784

742

APPESDIS

rndravarman I .
Hanvarman T »
Vikramavarman IH

d&u d/ acrmon
vnlta

otliermie indicated
between 7S7 and Soi
lx tween Sojf?) and 817(1)
reigning in 854

Sixth Dynatty, 875(?)-99t(?)

Indravarman II .

Jay a Stnhavarman I
Java SaktJvarman
Bhadravarman II
Indravamian III
Jaya Indravannan 1
Pararoesvaravarman I
Indravarman TV
Lieoii Ki-Tsong

betvFccn S75 and SS9
between 8 qS and 90^

Tdgnlng in 910
end nf reign 959
between 960 and 965
end of reign 982
982

Uanvarman IJ .
Yan Pn Ku Vijaya
Harivarman 111
Parameavaravarman
Vikrantavarman IV
Jayasinhavarman 11

Seventh Dyftasty\ 99 i(?}-i 044 (?)

* 99 i(?)

between 999 and 1007
reigning in loio
reigning in iqiS
end of reign 1030
1044

Eighth Dynatty^ »044-74 (?)
Jaya Faramcavaravarman 1 . ,

Bhadravarman HE
Rudravarman n I

. 1044

reigning in lofii
. T061

I^Ianvarman IV .

Jaya Indravarman U (first reign) .
Paramabhodisatva
Jaya Indravarman IT (second reign)
Harivarman V . ,

Ninth Dynasty, 1074 (?)-f 139 (?)

. ' ^'‘74 (?)

> . loSo

lOSt

> , io 36
between 1114 and ttatj

Tmth Dynasty, 1139 (?)

Jaya Indravarman 111 ,

AFPENDUC

741

Elevtfith Dynatty, 1145 (l)-t3iS

SaU B/flffMcwt
oih^ftEise indtaiitd

Rudravami^n IV * * . . in 1145 (|J

Jaya HaHvnrman I , « . « « «

Jaya Harivarman II * ^ .

Jaya Indjavamiaji IV « « . . , 1167 (r)

(Division into two kingdoms)

A, K]Nai>DM OF VIJAYA

Sury^ajayavarman «
Jaya Indravarman V .

1190

itgi

B. KINOIKTM OF PAl^BANO

Surynvaiman , . ^ .

(Kingdom reunittd)

Surya^’arman (of Panning)

(A Khmer province 1103-20)

Jaya Paramesvafavarman U .

Jaya Indravarman VI .

Indravarman V . . » »

Jaya Sinhavarman II -
Jaya Sinhav^rman III

Che Nang ...» *

1190

1[91-1203

tiao

reigning in 1254
1265 {!)
end of reign 1307
. (307

* 1312-1318

Tmtflh Dynasty^ 1318-90

Che Anan .......

Tm Hoa » . - . , ^ 1341

Che Bong Nga . , . » » end of reign 1390

Thir^tenih Dynaiiy^ 1390-1458

Ko Cheng

Jaya Sinhavurman V
Maha Vijaya
Mnho Kouei-lat
Mnho Katici-yton

1400

1441

1446

Moho P'an- 1 o-y\jc
P^an-lo T^ou-tsHuan

FourlftHih Dynasty^ 1458-71

145S

1460

744

INDONESIA AND MALAYA

A, Java, Pm^Misum PEittoD

(Compiled from Krtim, Hiftiioe-Jarmntette CetchirdeHis)

—blanks indicate that no date it known).

1. IFiPJfJWw

Devavarman (?)
Pumavarman
P*o^to-jtfa
Dvaravarrnan ( ?)

* m

Jayabhupati

Niftkaiavastu
Deva Niskala
Ratu Devata ^

Sanghyang

ia A.tJ,

400

434

4 J 5

tojo

* 333-57

- 155^

//.

Simo (?)

Sanjaya^ RaJea Mataram .

Fancapana. Raka Panangkamn

Rafca PanunggalaD

Raki Varak

Rika Gam mg

R^ika Pikatan

Kaka Kaytivangi ^

Rakd Vam Huiiialang
Balitung. Raka Varukura
Dakaap Raica Hino
Tulodong, Raka Layamg
Vava, Raka Pangkaya

\iiddh JiiPii

III* Eait Java

Dtvaaimha

Gajayana - - * *

A ^ . qana ( ?) ,

SLndak. Raka of Hino .

674

73 ^

77S

tag or &;□
S64(?)
* ^79-^2

Sgs-910

- 919-21
. 924-28

760

, 9 = 9''47

APFF7TO1X

745

Sri Isanaiunggavljaya, daughter of Smdok (married to Lokapab) . 947 (?)
MakutavamBavardhanap san of above « ^ .

Dharmavam^ Anantavikrama . ^ , 991-1007

AirUngga , * , . ^ * 1019-49

Jiiru (? Janggab) , . ^ * lo^

Jayavaraa of Kediri ,.,*** 1104

Kamesvara 1 . . . * ^ - 1115-3^

Jayabhnya ...... ^^ 35^57

Sarwesvara , , . . p + * 1160

Aryycavara • ^ ^ - . 1171

KcoAcaryyadipa, Gandra . * . * ^ iiSi

Kame&vara II « * « . # » l lE$

Sarwovara II* Smgga , * ^ > 1190-1200

Kertajaya k - # . ^ * laib-aa

IV^ Sif^ouiri and Majapiihity 1222-1451

daSe

aCtaiiaFH

1, Rajasa (Ken Angtok) . p . , . 1222

2. Aousapati, ste(»on of i * * ^ . * 1227

3* Tohjaya, son of i ^ . - » 1 :^ 4 ®

h 4- Viabnuvardhana^ son of 2 ^ ^ » . * J24S

jj. Kertanagara^ son of 4 . . . « * 1268

6. Jayakdtwang of Kcdirip usurper „ , , , 129a

Kertarajasa Jayavardbana (Vijaya), nephew and son'indaw

of 5 * . . . p . K 293

3 * Jayanagm, son of 7 , , , . p 1309

9. Tribhuvana, daughter of 7 , , * * * 1329

Rajaaanagara (Hayam Wuruk)» son of 9 . . . 1350

lip Vikramavardhanap nephew' and son-in-law of 10 « « *389

12^ Suhxta, daughter of 11 * « ^ ^ 1429

13. Kemvijaya (Bhre Tuinapcl)* son of 11 ^ p 1447-51

BiistyaTii Kings ajirt 145!

Rajosavardhana^ Bhte Pamatan .

(Interregnum 1453

Hyang Purvavtsesa, Bhre Vengter
Singhavikramavardhanap Bhre Panda n Solar
Ranavijaya ^ * p «

Pateudm * . * . ♦

. • . 1456

. 1466-78 (?)

reigning in i486
reigning in 1516

7+6

AFPEm>[X

B. Java^ MtfSLm Period

1 .

3 -

5 ^

7 ^

SusuhtinAn Gunung Jjiti (FaJctahan)

Miulana Hasimucfdin (Patigeran SebakifiklAg) boh of i
iMaiijana Yufitlp (Pg. Pasare^), Mil of 2 . ,

Maulana Muhamjad {Pg, Sedangraoa), son of 3
Sultan Abdul Kadir^ son of 4
Abdui Fatab, Siilian Agung, son of 5
Abdu] Kabar^ Sutun Haji, son of 6 .

dau of

CU-fOflM

, 1526

(died fi 1570)
. e. 1550
. 1570

‘ 1596

* 1651

. 1682-7

II, Demak

5 *

Raden Patab Senapati Jlmbun^ swui of "Ursvijaya', last king of
Majapahit . * , , . ,

Adtpati YunuBp son of i ,

Pg. Sultan Tmnggana, brother of a .

Pg, Sultan Prawata, son of 3

Aria Pangiri (Ad^ti?), Bon of 4 * * . ,

Pangeran Mas (Vking of Java'), son of 5 .

(?)

151S

1511-46

0 )

(?)

Iff, Riilm of Afoiorfim

Sutavijaya Sennpnti - * ^ ,

Mas Djolang

1 jakrakusuma Ngabtlurnihman, Sultan Agung (1625 takes title of
Susuhunan) , ^ * . .

Prabu Amangkurat I, Sunan Tegalvvangi
Amangkurat U *

Amangkurat III, Sunan Mas - - . . ,

Pakubuwana I, Sunan Puger ^ ,

Amangkurat IV ^ - . , . .

PakubuwanaII ^ ^ ^

Pakubiu%-ana III

■ ^ 1 ■
(Division of ATataram into Surkarla and Jogjakarta. 1755)

158^

1601

1613

164s

1677

T703

170s

1719

1725

>749

JV^ Rulfn of Surakarta

Pakubuwana "ill (of Matamm) .
Pakubuwana IV
Pakubuwana V
Pakubuwana Vt

17S8

1820

1S23

APPFNDI^

Pakubtiwaria Ml
Pakubu\^na Vlll
Pakubtiwana IX
Pftkubu^na X
Pakubuwana XI
Fakubuwana XU

747

dale fi/
acttman

1830

185S

1861

*891

T939

^944

V, SuitaiuofJogjukarta

Abdurrahman AmanEkubuTs-ana I, Mangkubumi
Abdurrahman Amangkubuwana 11 . SulUn Scpub
Abdurrahman Amangkubuwana HI. Raja ^ -
Abdurrahman Amangkubuwana IV^ Seda Peaijar
Abdurrahman Amangkubuwana Mcnol -

Abdurrahman Amangkubuwana VI Mangkubumi
Abdurrahman Amangkiibawaua AH

Abdurrahm an Amangkubuwana VI 11
Abdurrahman Aitiangkt;buvfana IX

C, Malacca

Faramesvara (Mcgat Iskantlar Shah)

Srt Maharaja, son of above

Raja Ibrahim, son of above . - -

Raja Kaaim (Muaaffar Shah), half-brother of above
Mansur Shah, son of above
Ala'ud'din Riayat Shah, son of above ,

Mahmtid, younger brother of altove

175s

1792 '

1810

1814

1S22

1855

1877

1921

»W 9

, 1403

. 1424

t444

. 1459

' H 77

1488-13]I

D. ACHEI! (AciHff)

All Miighayat Shah

Salah ud-^Jiu tbn AVi - - *

Ala'ud-dtn al-Qahhar ibn Ali .

Husain

Sultan Muda {a few days)

Sultan Sri Alam
Zainal Abidin .

Ab'ud-din of Perah (Mansur Shah)

Sultan Boyong , • - •

Ala*ud-din Riayat Shah .

Ali Riayat Shah *

■ *496

1528

. IJ 37
. [<68
> 1575

. 1575

, 1576

- *S 77

is 89 (?)
. 1596

1604

74* A?PEf4D\K

Iskandar Muda (Meukuta Alatn)

iltf

ficc^ifwrj

1607

Iskandar Than! ^

1636

Safiyat ud-din Taj ai-Alam hint hkandar Muda (widow of Tskan-
dar Thani) ^ * . . , * *

1641

Naqiyat ud-dln Nur al-AJam

>*75

Zaqxyat ud-din Lnayat Shah « «

1678

Kamalat Shah 2 inat ud-djfi

1688

Badr al-Alam Sharif Hashim Jamat ud-din

1699

Perkara Aiam Shanf Lamtui

1702

Jamat al-A 1 am Badr al-Afunir , ,

1703

Jauhar al-Alam Amin ud-^in (a few days)

1726

Shams al-Alam (a few days)

1716

Ala^ud^in Ahmad Shah

1727

Ata^ud-din Shah Jahan » ^ *

* 7 J 5

Mahmud Shah (until 1781)

[760

Badr ud-din (until 1765)

*76+

Sulaiman Shah

» 77 S

Ala^ud-din Muhammad . . * _

1781

Ala'ud-din Jauhar al-Alam t (under regent until iSoa)

^795

Sharif Saif al-Atam ■ *

181s

Jauhar al-Alam II ^ ,

1818

Muhammad Shah ihn Jauhar al-Abm 1

1824

Mansur Shah

1838

(Dutch occtipatian {874)

E. Governahs-Genrral of the NETiiERijtNns East Ih^oirs

1609 Pieter Both
1614 Gerard Rejnat
t6i6 Laurens Keaal
i6tS Jan Pktcrxoon Coen
1623 Pieter dc Carpentier
16^7 Jan Piclensoon Coen
1629 Jacques Speez (acting)

1632 Hendrik Brouwer
1636 Anthony van Dienten
1645 Cornelia van de Lijn
1650 Card Reyntersz
1653 Joan Maetsuyeker
167S Rijklef van Gocna
ifiSi Cootetia Spedman
16B4 Johannes Camphuijs

749

WUti^m vm Otuhaam
Joh^n van Hnnm
Abraham van lUebctck
Christoffcl van Swell
Henricus Zwaardcctwn
Mathena de Haan
Dirk Durvcn
Dlfk van Clnon
Abraham Fatias
Addaan Valckcnier
Johannca Thcdci^

Gustaaf W. van Imhufl
Jacob Mossel
P. A. van der Pwra
JcrtmU# van fiicmsdijk
Rcinicr de Klerk
WLLIUm A. Alting
Fietcr van Overetratcn
Johannes Siberg ^

Albert H. Wiese
Hennan W\ Daendala

(Lieul.-Gov. of the English East IndU

Company)

1816 John Fendall {lieut. Gov. of the English East Jodia Company)

,8,6 Commissaries-Gencni] of William I of the Netherlands
iRiS G. A. Baton van dcr Capclkn

,826 L. P. ]- Viseount du Bus dc Ghutigoies (Comrniflsaty-General)

1S30 J. Count van den Bosch

i8j 3 J. G. Baud

1836 D. J. dc Ecrens

1840 P. Merfcas

1844 J. C. Reynsst

184s J* h Rochussert

1851 A. J^ DnymaeT van Twist

1856 C. F. Pahnd

1S61 L. A. J. W. Baron Slocl van den Beck
,866 P. Mijet
1872 J. Loudon

1875 J> van Lanahcrge •

1881 F. ’a Jacob
1888 C, Pijnaclter Hotdijk
1S93 G. ii. J^ van dcr Wijk
1899 W. RoOMboom

1691

1704

1709

1713

171S

1725

1749

*732

>735

>737

>74>

>743

>7S«

1761

1775

>777

1780

1796

1801

1805

i8o8

i8ti

t8tt

75 ®

APPENQIX

igo 4 J. B. van Heut^

1909 A* F. vmn IdcnBurg

1916 J. P, Count ckf Limburg-Stinifti

igzi D+ Fock

1926 A. C. D. de CiacfT

1921 lunge

1936 A- L. Tjjxda van Btarkcnborgh-St^chouwer
1942 IL J. van Mook (to 1948) (Llcut-.Gov.-Gcn.)

TM DYNASTIES

A* Surhut'ai

date 0/
a£ffsiu)n

I* Sri Int‘arat"ilya izjS

2. Ban Muang^ fton uf i , , ^ . , (?)

3p Rama Khamhung, brother of z . . * * c, 1275

4, LG T^at, 5 on of 3 * , , ^ * , f, IJ17

5. T*ammaraja Lut'ai, son of 4 ^ ^ J347

6* T'ammaraja II, son of 5 . , , > 37 ° (^)

7, T’aitmiaraja IIL son of 6 * . , . * 1406

8. T'amniamja IV* brother of 7 h . , , 1419

(T^ammaraja IV and subsequent ruicis were merely hereditary govemorB
under Ayut'ia,)

B* Avin'iA

datr of
acffifioit

1. Rama T"ib<)di ► * , ... 1350

a. Ramc^en, son of 1 , , . , , 1369

3. Boromoraja I, uncle of 2 * , , . , 1370

4_ T'ong Lan^ son of 3 ..... 13SS

3, Ramesuen (second reign) ..... i3Sfi

5. Ram Raja, son of ^ . » . , , , 13^3

5 . Int'artja* nephew of 3 - . . . . 1408

7. Boromoraja If, son of 6 . * , . ^ 1424

8. Boromo Trallokanat, son of 7 , , ^ t

9. Buromoraja III^ son of 8 ..... 1488

10. Rama T'ibodi If, brother of 9 . , ^ ^ 1491

ji, Boromoraja IV, son of 10 . . . ^ , 1339

12* Ratsada^^son of 11 ..... . 1534

13+ F^rajai* half-brother of 11 . * , . . 1334

14. Kco Fa^ son of 13 , , * , . , 1^46

15* Khun Worawongsai usurper * . . ^ 1548

i6. Maha Chakrap'at* brother of 13 . . , . 1549

AliPENDUt

17, son of 16 * -

T^ammiraia. Chief of Sokhot ai

tg. Narcuueng mn of 18 » * ^

ao. Ekat^otflaratt brother of 19 -

21* Ini’araja 11 (^ngt’am)« ^

^2. Jettison of 21 . - “ *

2 j* At'ityawongp brother of 3 i *

2 ^. Prasat T‘ong, usurper

25. Chao Fa Jsl, boh of 24 . ■ *

26. Sri Sut'amroaraja. brother of 24 .

27- Narait brother of 25

2S. P’ra P'etraja^ usurper

zg. P^rachao Sua^ son of aS -

30. T'ai Sra, son of 29

j t. Maha T'ammaraja U (Boromotot), brother of 30

32. Ut’ump’on, son of 31

33. Boromoraja V (Ekai’al), brother of 32

75 ^

* nf>9

. 1569

* J590

160s

[610

* 1628
1630

, 1630

1656
1636

1657
. (68S

1703

* 1709

* ‘733
> 7 S®

1758-67

C. Banckok

j P’ya 'I'aksin, Chinese general in Siamese service
2’ Ran>a 1 (P’« Futt'a Yoi Fa Chnyok), Sumew general

‘Rama 11, son of 2 . ■ '

Rama Ill (P'ra N»ng Klao), son of 3
Rama IV (Maba Mongkiit). brother of 4
Rama V (Cbulalojighorn), ison of 5 .

Raitu VI (Maha Vajiravudh). wn of 6
Prajadhipok, brother of 7 ,

Ananda Mabidol, ncpliew of 8
Bumipol Adulct, brother of 9

3 ’

4 -

5 -
6 .

7 -

9 '

iO.

1767

1782

1800

1824

1851

iBbS

1910

‘925

> 93 S

1946

D. Muonc Swa

List of thirti-fivc rolere, undated, up to the year 13.6, the J«te of the
birth of Fa-Ngouo, founder of the kingdom of Lang Chang, taken from
local chronicles {Lc Boulanger. //«rwVr du Laos Franfois, pp. 39 ’ 4 «')‘

2 .

3 -

4 -
S*
6 .

Phaya-Nan-Tha (of Ceylon?) , j „

Phaya-Imhapalha (of Cambodia), who married his predecessor s widow

'niao-Phou-'nia-Saijie, son of 2
Phaya-Ngou-Lueutn, son of J.

Thao-Phe-Si, son of 4
Ay-Saleukhcuk, son of S

AFFHNDIX

7S2

7. Ay-Tict-Hai, son of 6

8. Thno-Tiamlia-Pliaiiii, a be-tol-nut iiSrerchant who came from ViEmiiane

9. Khoiin-Swa, a Kha chief

10. Khotin-Nglba, son of 9

11. Kiiooa-ViiigiiA, sod of jo

12. Khoun-Kan-Hang, son of 11

13. Khoiui-Lo^ eldest son of a lai prince

14. KJioun-Swa'Lao, son of 13
15* Khoun-Soung

16. Khoim-Khet

17, Khoun-Khotim
x8. Khaun-KhJp
19* Khoun-Khap

20. Khoun^Khoa

21. Khoim-Khane
23 . Khoun-i^Fh^g
23. Khoun-Pheng
34- Khoun-Pheung
25^ Khoun-Fhi

26. Khoun-Kham

27. Khoun-Houng

28^ Thao-Thene, son of 27
39, Thao-Nhoung
30* Thao-Nheuk

31. Thio^PhLo '

32. Thao-FHat

33. Thao-Vang

34- Phaya-Lang-Thirat

35. Phaya-Souvanoa-Kham-Pliong, son of 34, ficlicr of Thao-Phi-Fa and
grandfatlicr of Fa-Ngoun

E. LaSG CiiANO

(List compiled ffofri Lc Boulanger, op ciiJ)

[« Fa Ngonti ^

Jaleef

auwioH

. 1353

2. Sam Sfene T*ai, son of 1

- U 73

3« Lan Xham DcDg» son of 2 «

. I4j6

4. P'ommat'at, son of 3

. I4ZB

5. Fak Houei Luong, son of 2

. 1419

ij. T^ao Sai, brother of 5

• ! 43 “

7. Faya XHai, son of 3

■ *430

8, Chieng SaL son of 3

. 1433

9. Sod of 3, name urtknow D

- M 34

APPENDIX

TO. Kam Khcut« of a palace slave .
tf. Saj TLaltap^at, $Dn of 3
iz. T'iiic Kham, son of i t

13. La Sene T'ai^ brotberof la

14. Som Fou^ 300 of 13 , . .

15. VisouJi, soil of T1 .

16. P^ot'isarat, son 0/15 , ^

17. Kctt*at'lrat, son of 16 ^ .

i8> S^c Soulint^a (regent)

19. ^tialia Oupaliat^ TcUdonship uncertain
iS. S^ne Soulim'a (Iting)

Nukhonc Nol, son of iS .

(Interregnum ISS3--91)
2SI, Nokeo Koumanc, sonW 17

22. 'Fummikaniti cousiu by marriage of 21

23. Oupaguouvarat, «on of 22 ^

24. P^oi'isarac 11 , of i 3 -

25. Mone Kio, brother, of 24 .

26. Oupagnaovarat, son of 25 V

27. Tone Kham, son of 26 j dates unknown

2S. Visai, brother of 27 J

29. SouUgna Vongsa, aon of 27 .

30. Tian T^ala^ son-in-Jaw of 29

31. Nan T^arat, usurper

32. Sal Ong Hu6, grandson of 29

753

dait 0/

H 3 S

» 43 S

*479

i486

1496

1501

15ZQ

•548

1571

>575

1580

158*

1591

1596

1622

1623

1^27

• 1637
169+

. 1700

* 1700

In 1707 the kingdom was split up into two independent states with
capitals at Vicn Chang (Viemianc) and Luang Prabang,

ViEK Ceeanc {Yiekttane)

i- Sai Ong liui, of Lang Chang
a* Ong Long, son of i
3* Ong Botitip son of 2

(Interregnum 1778-S2)

4. Chao Nan, son of 3

3. Chao In, brother of 4

ft. Chao . 4 iiou, brother of 5 ^

G, LlfASG Peabawc

1. King Kitsarat, son of 29 of Lang Chang

2, Khamonc Noi^ cousin and son in law of t .

■ (1700)
* ms

. 1760

1782

1792

1SD5-28

* i7'^7

. 1726

7S4

APPENt>rs;

3. lm*a SoiUp biothcf of i *

4, Sotil^ Koumane, soti of 3 .

5^ Tiao-Vong, brother of 4 ,

(Interregnum 17S7-91)

6. Anourout, son of 3
7- Mani'a T^ourat^ son of 6 .

S* Sooka Scum, son of 7
9- Tiantha. brother of S
10* Oon Kham^ brother of 9 *

(Inicrregnum 1887^4)^*

11. Zaiarintp son of id .

12+ SUavang Vong, son of 11

dau &f

- 1727

• * 77 *

. 1781

• I??*

. 1817

. 1836

1S5 *

. *871

- 189+

1904

VIETNAM

A. The Leciwdary Dynasty of the Honc-Bang, *879-258 ®.c.
Kingdom called Van^Tang
Capital at Phang-chau

: B. The Thuc Dynasty
Kingdom called AU'lac
Capital at Loa-thanh

Jaie 0/

itcfefjum

Thuc An-Duong Vuong , , . . 257^208 a.c.

C. The Tjoeu Dynautv

Kmgdom called Nam-vi^
Ca(>ital at Phien-ogu (Fan-yo)

Trieu Vo-Vuong (j?r Vo-Dc) , - * - 207 b.c.

Tricu Van-Viiong * ^ - ■ « ^ 3 ^

Trieu Minh-Vuong ^ - * * *

Trieu Ai-Vuong * * . - -

Tricu Vuong Kien-Due . . . * iti

(Kingdom incorporated in China)

D+ The EAfttien Li Dvnasty

Capital at Song-bifn

Li Nara-Vj£t Dc Bon (Li Bi) + + + . a.p. 544

Trieu Vi£t-Vuong Quang-PhuCp usurper * + 549 ^ 7 *

Kppmmx

75 S

dfiUi tfj

Li Dji*>*Laiig Vuong ThiSn-Bao ■ • * S 49"55

Li Hau-Dc Phai-Tu , . . - - syi-toz

(602 Vietnam again under Chinese domination)

E. The Nco Dynastv
Kingdom called Dai-co-viet

Ngo Vuong Quyen

Dunng-Binh Vuong raih-ltha, usurper , .

Ngo Nam-Tan Vuong Xuong-Van

Sgo ThiCn-Sach Vuong Xuong-Ngap .

(^5—8 period of anarchy)

939
945
. 9 S '-^5
. 95‘-4

F, The Dinh Dynasty

Dinh TtCT-Hoang De
Dinh Dc-Tnan .

96S

979

G, 'I’HE Eahlieh Le Du-nasty

Lc Dai-Hanh Hoang-Dr ,

Le Trung-Ton Hoang-Dc • • ■

H. The Lateh Li Dynasty

Li Thai-To (Cong-Uan)

Li Thai-Ton (Phat Ma)

Li Thanh-Ton ... * *

Li Nhon-Ton . - » * •

[j Than-Ton

Li Afth-Toti . > > * '

Li Cao-Ton , - ■ ' ’

Li Hu£-Ton . . . * •

Li Chieu-Hoang . . * *

I. The Than Dynasty

Tran Thai-'roti ...»

Tran Thanh-Ton ... *

Tran Nhon-Ton . - ■ ■

Tran Anh-Ton . . • • ■

980

1005

1009

load

1054

1072

1127

113S

”75

I2t0

1224

1225

135$

1278

1293

75®

APF£N1>IX

aiftmQn

Tran Minh-Ton

*314

Tran Hicn-Ton

1329

Trail Du-Ton ,

* 34 *

Duong Nhut-Lc

1369

Tran Nghe-Tan

1370

Tran Due*Tqn

137*

Tran De-Htln (or Fhe-Dc)

•377

Tran Thuan-Ton

1388

Tran Thieu-I>« * *

•398

J. The Ho Dynasty

Ho QuULi

I- *

1400

Ho Had-Thuong

1400-7

K. The Re^qred

Tran

Dynasty

Tran Dc-Qui or Tran Cian-Dinb De

1407

Tmn De Qui-Khoang .

■

•1 ■■

1409-13

L. The Later Le DYNAsm'

Lc Loi or Binh-Dmh Vuong

[41^

Lc Nga, usurper

1420

Tran Can, usurper

[4^6

Lc Thai-To or Can Hoang-Dc *

[42S

Lc 'Thai-Ton or Van Hoang-Dc

*431

Le Nhon-Ton or Tuycn l [oarig-De

1443

Lc Nghi-Dan, usurper «

*459

Le Thanh-Ton or TTujmn Hoang-De

1460

Lc Hi^n-Ton or Due Hoang-De

U 97

Lc Tue-Ton or ECham Hoang-Dc

1504

Lc Uj-Muc Dc

1504

Le Tuong-Duc De

1509

Tran Cao

1516

Tran Thsng 1

1516

LcBarg J

t5iS

Lc Du

1518

Lc Chieu-Ton or Than lloang-Dc

E516-26

Le Hoang-De-Xuan (or 'Hiung) or Cung 1 inang-De

1522-7

(Interregnum of the Alac:

Mac Dang-Dung ,

-■

■r ■

1527

Mac Dang-Ddanh .

* m

1530)

■

JIPPENDJX

757

date of
acfraion

Lc Trang-Ton or Du Hdang-Dc

* *533

Le Tning-Ton ot Vo Hdang-De

1548

Lc Anh-Ton ttr Tuan Hoang-De

1556

Lc The-Ten or Nght S^lomig-Dc

1573

Kgtiycn Dtiong-IVf inh^ usurper .

■ 1397

Nguyen Minh-^Tri^ usurper

^597

Lc Kinh-Ton or Hui Ilcjang-De

. 1599

Lc Thanh-Ton or Uyen Hoang-De

. 1619

Lc Chan-Ton or Thuan Hoang-Be

1643

Le Than-Ton or Ugen-Hoang-Dc

, 1649

Lc Huyen-Ton or Muc Hoang-Be

. ]6Ga

Lc Gia-Ton or Mi Hoang-Be ^

1671

Lc Hi-Tofi or Chuong Hoang-De

. 1671

Lc Du-Ton or Hoa Hoang-Dc ,

^ 1705

Lc De Duy-Phiiong

, 1729

Lc Thuan-Tofi or Gian Hoang-Dc

Y 1733

Le LTon or Huy Hoang-Dc

^ J 73 S

Lc Hicn-Ton or Vint l^ioang-De

* i 74 <^

Ltr Man Hnang-De

1786-1S0+

M, The Mac Dynasty

Mac Dang-Dung

. 1537

Alac Dang-Doan h

1530

Mac Phuc-Hai ,

. [540

Mac Phuc-Nguyen

1546-

Mac Mau-Hop ,

i 563

Mac Toan

1593

iiac Kinh-Chi ,

159^

Mac Kinh-Cung

■ ‘593

Mac Kinh-Khoan

1613

Mac Kinh'Koiui

N. The Tiunh Family

OP TONGKiNG

1638-77

Tdnh Klcm

■ ‘539

Trinh Cni

Tnnh Tong

1570

Trinh Trang

1623

Trinh Tac

1657

Trinh Con ^ , ,

. 1682

Trinh Cuong

, 1709

Trinh Giang

* >7*9

75*

APPENDS

Trinli Diah

eaCTAfl^fl

■ 174*

TrLoh S»in

* 1767

Trinh Can

1782

THnh Kkai

* 1782

Trinh Fhung

* 1786-7

O. The Tay-Son Rvi ees

Ngvy«^ Vaa Ktmc, eldest of the three brothers

m<^

* 77 »- 9 J

Nguyen Van-Hud, younger brother

17S8-92

Nguyen QiLang-Tuaup son of V'an-Hue

»•

1792-1802

P, The Nguyem of Hut

Nguyen Duc-Trung

. (?)

Nguyen Van-Lang

^ *

died 1513

Xy^yeo Hoang-Du

died 151S

Nguyen Kim - *

died 1545

Nguyen Hoang

1558-1613

Nguyen Phuc-Nguyen

. succeeded 1613

Nguyen Phuc-Lan

■ *^35

Nguyen Phuc-Tan

. 1648

Nguyen Phuc-Tran

. 1687

Nguyen Phue-Chu

1691

Nguyen Phuc-Chu

. 1725

Nguyen Phuc-Khoat

- * 73 *

Nguyen Phuc-Thuan

■ *765

Nguyen (Phuc)-Anh (becomes Emperor

Gifl-long of Annam)

. 1778

Gia-Long

. 1802

^Unh-Mang

iSzo

Thicu-Tri

. 1841

Tu-Duc

. 1848

Nguyen Due Due

. 1883

Nguyen Hwp-Hoa

. 1883

Kien-Phuc

. 18S4

Ham^Ngbi

. 1S85

Dong-Khan^

V 18S6

Thanh-Thai

. 18S9

Duv^Tan

• 1907

Khaj-Dinh

1916

Uao Dai

• 191S

A?PENDr!C

759

Q, CovEfiKORs AND Governors-Geseral of French Inikj-China

C^Y GcfVtrnors

M- Lc Myrc dc VUcrs^ July 1879-Novcmlwr 1882
M* Tliomaon, Jajiuun' 1883-July 1885
Genera] Begin, July 1885-Jwc 1886
M. Filippini^ June i886^etober 1887

Noel PariJori, 23 Odobor-i November 1S87, Lieut .-Gov, Inierimflire
Piquet, 3 November^ 15 November i8S7t Lieut.-G ot. interiinaire

Got'tmors-Generut

ConetaAB, No%^ember iSSj-April xS88
Richaud, April t8S8—May 18^

Piquet, May 1889-April 1S91
Bidcsu (intctimaire)

Dc LwicfiBan, April iBqi-Octobtr 1S94
Rodxcr (intcrinuirc) ^

RuuBAcau, December 1894-March 1895

Foures (mtcriinaire) *

Paul Doumer^ February 1897-March 1903
Paul Beau, October t902-Fcbmar>^ 1907
Bonbourcr (intcrimaire)

Klobukow^jV September 1908-Januajy 1910

Picquie {int^imairej

Luce, February — November 1911

Albert Sarraui {lit term), November iqii-Jaimarj’ 1914
Van Vollentioveo (intcrimairc)

Rdumc, March i9t5-May igtb
Charles (intennrtaire)

Albeit Sarraut (ind terna), January t9i7-May 1919
Montguilint (interimalrc)

Maunce Long, February^ igao-April tqaa
Haudoin (imerimaire)

Merlin^ Augiiut 1912-April 1925
Mnntguillct (interimairet aeitJnd term)

Ale.vandrc Varedne, November I9a5-January 1928
MontguUlot (idterimaitc, third term)

Pierre Pasquier, August 1928
Rctic Robin, February 1934
Jult3 Brevt^, Scpicm^r 1936

General Georges Albert Julien Catroux, Augittii 1959
Admiral Jean Dedout, July 1940

760

APPENDIX

tiigk Commissti^nm

Admiral Georges Thierry d'ArgezilieUt 6 September 1945
Emile Bollacrt, 2 y !V[arch 1947
L^n Pignqn, zo October 194S

General Jean de Lattrc de Tassigny^ 6 Decenibcr 1950

Jean Letoumeau, i April 1952 (aj»o Minister for the Associated Stated)

Cofmatstiojim Gentrol

Jean Letoumeau^ 22 April 1953 (also Minister for the Associated States)
Maurice Dejean^ 38 July 195^

General Paul Ely, 10 June 1954 *

f f

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SELECT B!BLIOGR.\PHY

L Bibljog«phJw
n. hocsH Chrdiiick :9

Illi Contemporary Accounts (Collections of Docuracnts, Memoirs}

IV, Early and Mediaeval Periods
V* Burma

VI. Indo-Chiiia (Annam, Carnbodia, Cochin ChinSf Laos, Tangking)
VIL Malaya and Indoncsui
VIII. Thailand
IX. Biography
X* General Works

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Hobbs* Cedi C., and asaencs.: Indochina: a bibliography of Iftod and people.
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7*3

BtflLlOdaAPHV

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Sotner^ J. M.: Dtr Korte Vcrklprlng,^ Breda, ^934-

Song Ong Slang: One Hundred Years History of the Chinese in Singa-
pore« London^ 1923.

Stapcl^ F, W* (ed^): Gcschiedenis van Nederlandsch-Indic. 5 vols.
Amsterdam, 1939^

(author): Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch-Indie^^Amstcrdam^ t930j 1943^
St. John, R,: The Indian Archipelago. Its hisiDiy and present state,
2 vole. London, ^1^53.

Swcticnham^ Sir F,; British Malaya* London, 1948.

TcrHaar, B,: Adat Law in Indonesia. New York^ 1948.

Terpstra, II.: * De Factory der Oostjndische Compagnie te Patani\
Vcrhandelingcn van het Kon^ Inst., i* ^s-Gravenliage, 193S.

* De Nederlandsche Voorcompagniecn*^ in Stapel, F. VV.^ Geschiedenls
van Ncderlandsch Indie, Deel D, D. Amsterdam, 1938^

"Franseben en Engclschen^ ibid., Deel If, t. .Amsterdam^ 1938.
Thompson, V*: Fostn^ortem on Malaya. Ncav York, 1943*

Valentjjn, F.: Oud en Nicuw' Ooat Indlen* Dordrecht-Amsterdam, 1724-6,
Vandenbosch, A.: 'ITie Dutch Past Indies* Califomia, 1944^

Verbocket, K.: *Geschiedenis van dc Chineeaen in Nederland-Indie*,
Kolonial Studien, nos. 5 and 6 (1936),

Vermeulen, J. Th.: De Chineezen te Batavia cn den Trocbelen van 1740.
Leiden, 1938.

Mekke* B. H. M^: Nusantan: A History of the Eaat Indian Archipelago,
Cambridge, Mm.* 1943.

Wilde* dc NcytoeJL and Moll, J* Th.: The Nclhcrianda Indies during the
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Wilkinson, R. j*i History' of the Peninsubr Malays* 3rd ed. Singapore^
19 ^ 3 *

*The Malacca Sultanate V jRASMB, xill, pt* 2 (i935)»

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VIIL Thailand

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IX. Biooraphv

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Thompson, and Adloff^ Rp: The Left Wing in South East iisfa. New
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Cultural Institution^ and Educationai Policy In Southeast Asia: A
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Vogel, J. Ph.: The Contributioji of the Univeraity of Leiden to QnentaJ
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since 1945 r London, 195^-

YuJeaud BumcLl: Hobson-Jobaon, London^ 1:903.

SOUTH-EAST ASIA

^'S[0 ti t h

San Fei

■PHtUPPlMES

wryi

k *k

pi xK 4 ^ft

Afa/M^

nB^ttinj

Mentawat^^.

hia/rds'

f' A f AH

I' ri.frt#i ^m%

^ ji^ fVmr

INDEX

Abdul Jaial o( JoIkwc, 587
AbduU^ of Ffrikt 475~8
Ab h i do mfmap i taka, S37
Abrcu. AfUonio

AbuUbtiih of wntfliil (SultlUl

Agimub 364^-5
Ai:li£, CdDife d'* 4^3
Acheh, AthinKf, 54^ ^*3^ 19ig9>

aj9p i6tp 277, 45*.

441. 474i 4^-^. Jt».
ada|r«eA^p 408
Adit>Tivonnfln, 77, 8^3
Admiiii»ttativ« Act of 1806, 405
AdviKt (Unftsdcrattd StHtp, Makya),

488-i>

AiitVmn WJiFp AfKbani3tMfl^_Si4“5p M9.5S5
A,F\P.F,L., 693, 706-13
Agutya, 41, 58

Agent, Britiah^ dt tht Couft of Av*, S4t-J«
^ 555. 5*5
A«o*i 544

Ahom dynaaty p kingdom of Ataun ,145,5 * 3
Ai-Lao, tt9

Airland, V, 54, 61-4, 66
Akbar^ the cmpcfof, Zli
Aksobh)^, 66* T*"?

Akui route, j jB
Akyab, 115, 605
AJa'uddirt (Jahore), i8j
AU'uil-dm Rjiyit of Aihish, 199, ^^4-5
AliungpayB, 141, 345-S*- 37^®*^ 3®^
, 9t 4=4!

AJaungfttliiU. 129

Albuquerc|ue^ Don Aflbnae do, 188, 198>
206,615

Alexander of Rhodes, 357
Ali Mnghayjit Shib of Aiiicht 28+
Almeida, FrulClsCO dc, 197-8
Alves* Captain Walter, 751
Amangliu Buwono 1,

Amangku d of Jogjikdritt, 4^0

AxdJini^u Btkwono III^ 415, 466
Amangku Buwono SV* 4^

Amangku Buwono 466
AmangkuTal I (Sunan TegalwangiV, 160,
265-4

Amaitgkurat II (Adipali Aiioni)* 264-9
Amatigkurat I [I (Sunam hfaa)* 269
Amanjjdcumt IV, l6<j
Aminpuni, U3 p 5M. 5**' 5^8, 510, Si a,
St7p laa-Ji Sa^JOp 53*

Amnrfi^^tl (Quang-njilii), 154

Ainarai'att,BuiSdMatmiag0,14, i^, 19, ^7
Amboba, i 98-"105, 231, aS7, 340^ MS.
149-50,256-7^ 260, ahip 176, aSi^ 4to,

431.4*3.467

America, Untied Slalea Of* 400-1. 406^
46it 49S-6p 545p 557. 67 U *8a-€j7,

717+ 721-5

Ameitcan Independence^ ^Var of, 414^
448, 505

Amherst, Lotdji 515

.Amoghapasa* BodhUattva, 65^ 67, 68, 7S
Atnutcrdiimj 116, 135
An Fdad, 696
Aiuinda ^i^ldol, 735-^

Ananda temple, Pagan* n, 127-9
AnaukpetIunK King, 230, *99* 3iS-*8
Anawnd^tta, loi, 122* 123-7. 14a* 339^
635

Andaman iaUnds* 429-'s-a* 515
Andemtn, John, 435 ^

Andereon, Sir John, 486’

Ang Chan, 37J'-4> 397. 4<»

H>kng-Duiing^ 400‘ 1
Ang Eng. 367^ 373* 397
f^ngkor, 4, gj-lfS, 144. 151-4. 16^1
5* zofp 207, 373, 564. |6*. ™p *1^*
oao Siemiwip

Angkor 'Ihom, 9*. 107^. M7-18

Adj^or Wat, 103-5

Ang Afcy, i|OD

Ang Non, 361-3. 367, 393

Ang Nou tRoma T'ibodj), 39®

Ang Snguon^ 374
Ang Sor^ 563

Afig Tong, 39®-!. 395 , .

Anindltupum (Saladiiyapura), 871 9®.

AimafnH4.*P !3 p **i-7 ** ^SSp

30!p 355'75p 376. 379p 383-51 3®“.

55*^. 57^"7p 59^. 643-8, 71 j, 7tS
Anlhirunii, Lucas* 239, 317
Antwerp, Truce of, 246, 249
Arab*. 38. SC SSp * 4.^*7*. i^Op

197,258*276. 457.^655

Arakan, vU, 15^ 13. 3*. 1^9“43 p 1^5. 19^1^
1,205,111,218-13. i54-*i 313" 3^0^

42. S03. 509-17. 5!S- 5*8*

533-4. S3*r 5^8, 649 .,^5-7
Argenlicu, AdmimJ G. T^hlOiry d * 713-^7
ArgyrOi 16, izo, 328 ■

791

IffDEX I

792

Ailliciiiaii5, 32^-3. 3?6t 53*

Anj Falakka of £k»ni. 36;z, 29^, 494

Arya Vinir^A (B^cfjak VVid-e}, 6q, 71 , '74-5

Asoka, Mbuq'ii cmpcnUT, I5« 17
Aasarn, 3, 6, ij, 14$^^ 353, 30S, 508.

, Si3-«?. 5>f>> S^5. S95
Aita, S3

Atilcc, Cl«utfit^ 705
Auckland, LiDTidp ^34
Aiinf; Swip 696, 706-10
AuninRi^b {Mu^lK 34ip 338h 3+^
AusinlU, ^5, 7 ZZ
Audtnc liLn;@^g]e4> 9-10
Av^ 134-43. t^T-Xp 110-23, 3M. 31^^37,
342“54. 38flp 433* 5*ip 54ii 54^-5
553, 6ot, ^3, 610

Avalokitavim ([^^csiani), 63, ia^«. izi.
Set^ ids^ Lok»viiTm

Ayufiflp tt6-tSp i 4 t, 144-5S4 20$, 207-8,
214^23, i3C»p 446. iSSh i^7-3i4p 31 ^
t 7 p 35^1- 357* 3*^^ 3761 38 *p

33M1 p 3W* 5^P

fiiiABULLdUif Sulim of Tcmafc^ 203
Bade, 574

BaEi-Eiifihp s73“4
Bociono-Hoabinbim cuiti^rc, 6
BAC-thanh» 371
Ba«yjd»w, 5*4^3

Bakrr, CaptMiUr G«irE:Cj 347
Bakr id (Muilim festival ^ z 16
Bttladityft, S7, qq

BalamtMngan, ttland m Sub Sea, 423-8^

43t

(Javji)^ 1S4, 204, 234
BalapuTra, 43^ 47, 31 p 59
BoLitp 561

Babi, Gupafo, 219

Bali, Bklmon:, 60-1, ftq, 72. 77-Sr *t*},
184. 203, 354, 267, 377. 416* 494, 6j 8
Biliiuitg, 41. 4s. 46. sft
Hal], Gtor^p 341-2
Byllcltlcr^ 4OI-2
Bn Ma.w, 6914 706'-7

BandB iilandi^ 77^ ig3p 233-5O1 163, 473i
281

B^ndula^ Maha, 514-^16, 3^8
BsuiKkok, 307, 311-ia, 373-^4^ 389-404,
562-4. 578 F 613, (172-81, 6^
Banj^rmifiin 277^ 280p 410,

4i3p +16* 494

Eonka, 38, 416, 461, 501, 66a
Ban Naphio, 566, ^ga
Bannermin, Coyind, 43^

^lain, i 84 f 20+f 227-'33- 337" 4*^ 464-7,
176-7* 179, 303 f 357t 410+ 4*3-i5t 4^4
Bantny Sth, 98 -9
^ 713, 715, 7t7-ta

Ba Pc, U, 617

Ba Fhni^ntp ^64
Bnphuqn, eoi

EaUlk, 85, 90f 379, 381

B;a4iietii^ 142, 210, 230, 344, 349f is I*

432 ^ 302 p 5 i 8

Eata^'ia (Biindii Kaliipa, Jac^trUp Jakarta),
201, 446 - 5 <»r 55 ^-* 5 . 314 , 337 i

340. J77. 4*8, 41a, 414-5. 46J, 4^H,
+96-501, 653, 687, 71S-19. 721
Batavian R-cpublic, 281 p 405* 431
Batix laido, 471, 491
Batik woricp 8, 636

Baiiatnbmif. 373. 397^ 361, 564, 5S4,
608-lip 684

BayinnaunR, ua, 205, xez-eS, 220, iw,

3'S, 350 f JSf. JV*. J79. 3«9
Bayofi teinpw, gfi, 106, ioS-10
BoaUp Paul, 642-3, 645-6
BebainCp Figncoii dr„ Bi&bop oE Adran,

363, 366-75. 556
Bm, Mandarin, 373

BorbCDolen* 265, 277, 4*+. 43i* 441-I5
46ip 4^

fionKaJ, 127^ T 37 i^ i 87 p 3 & 5 . 316, 31^-Ph
413. 416, 5*8“9, 512, 515^ S 34 . S 37 ^>

695

BrniiTil, B*y ot 205, 239p 303, 3i'9> 32ip
3i3p43i^3p 429, S05
Beruon, Colon^rl RkKard* 524
Beirudm, 283, 447

Bvmiifd, Sir CharJiia^ 530, 555, 621
Ek«t, Captoiti lliOEiw, 239
Bbadravaomin p 3]

Bhagodatta oF Limka^ukip 33
Bhairfiva-Byddbap 67^8^ 72, 79

145, i86^ 303, 3^*'^^ 337-9+
54^-3. 55*. 565* 6tt, 696

Editirnff¥yuadfmt
Bbavavarmaii, 31, 85--7
Bhit^iiLvaiTnan LI* 88

Hicn-boa, 361-3, 560-1
Billitnn, 416, 494f 501,

Ibnh-'Fbuan, 573-^, 576
Biimya Llbila* loJit kkn)$ of FtiHU, J 27 p 343 ""
Sh 354

Binnya U+ iJSt ^4*

Bbtani; iktirid^ igg* 283, 417
Birvb, J. W, \V., 477

Bittek 560-7*. ^71. 57 5i 597-8
Black river of Toonkmgp 57+-5r 594-3^
SO7-9

BodJVAftayip 342, 354, 39 S+ 444 ~ 5 .
Bombay Burmoh Tnidiiig CoiporaEionp
„ 5f»* 554r sSi.

BoriAparlo, Loiiia, 4*5-^

Bonn+rd, Admiral, j6o-2
Borneo, 70* 77| 84, 184^ 188, igj* 199 p
aoip 239 -^ 4 *+ 177 ’ 9 + ^* 4 . 4*1 - 4 ^ 6 * 431 .

465, 479, 494t 4W-S*4s 663,
(i6H, (170, 711

Boiobodur, 41-5*. sSp 420

mpEX

793

BDrDnic 4 ti>t tMnhRT^wniTiMrflijj 11), 388-90

Boramonja (jf Ayafta,

BoronKkrmjiL i>f CambiiJili, ilS
Soromnrajs L 152:

Barom^nija 153“+

B^Jroinot^ [11+ IjS

Bo«ch. JohanriM van ikHp 4b%-^0, 4 ?i

Both, Pii:lcr+ 334

Bmicl, Central, 57 ^ "3

Baug;aini'illc^ Louia Antouic de,

B^aurcaa-Dctaiiidc*! 305

Bcpivviinj^fc tjir JohD, 402, 57®“®!

B<a»yC 4 irp 71 ioma 5 , 313, 359
Braam^ J. F, 393 h 4^9
Brahnuii, 19 p ^57
BrBntal ri^€r, 60^ 63, 7 ^

Bripps plan, 706

Britain, British, a8o-i, jSa, 399. 4o^-<»,
410 ao, 4^1 -331 4 H-^« 4 ^*-
473-®9i 49Si Sl^SS. 557 * 559 * 503,
565, S7it S 7 S- 93 P 6*l-ia,*l;&p & 30 - 3 i*
661-71+ 674, ^76, 633-7, ^ 9 *+
608-713, TlS-llp 7 ^-S
Bnriflli Commciii^Hikhp 7<Op 7 i6

Brito, Philip dc, 105-6, 113+ 209*315-16,

Brdulh ,16 *

Bromc kettledrum^, 7

Brookcp Henry. 346-7 _ .

Brciake, Sir Jumea, 40 tj 4 S 3 i 456"™*

493*579, ,

Bityuu'cr, Hen-ilnk, 154

Brosh-nc, Colonel Planice, 543 h S 4®-9

Bmais, 283

Brunei, 77, i® 4 i 199 * ^ 93 ' 4 ^ 7 + 4 S 4 ^f

493 t 662

Bruno, Situr de^ 344“*

* Bubal bluodhath \ 79^-80

Buddhism p Mahayarui, 33, 39- 5®. 63**^*

i 01,107, iitf I24 t t3<i *46* i6o, 170,638

Buddhiam, Thcrai^ilu or Kuiayiiiift, n,
I9 p 56* 93. to?. t*4 16. iHn iMJh
131, T4ap 2Q7’8p 32®“9i. 377* *15*
Buddhum, TantmyatlB^ li, 39« 63, 6 Sp
66,79- 114 , ^

Buddhist, 37t 214. ^itp 316+ po. 377 h
3®5. 3W. 5*4 H 529* 536+ S4J. 62=

Budi CiDittO. 636* 639

Bufter fitiiTe Comifussioili 609

Buffis, BuRiticie, 361, 264, 189 “93 P 43 Ji

+ 53 - 4 SS *,+;>4 ^

BuitEnxotK (Ifegforj, 34+ ^75* 4*2

Bukit Meriam, 33

Bunpa Maa* 435^* ++ 5 . 44®-^

Burma, Btirmw, n* 35 . 119-431

144, S 55 h *85. tyt. 205, M7-13. * 39 .
154-6, 397, 3*^. 315-27. 328-30- 342-
$4^364, j66, 379 ,3841 3 ^®“^^ 39 S. 435 r
4J7^ 444, 4s6, 504-5 Sp 363. 582^ 585-6.
595, 60l-a

Burmu Road, 537, 684, 686, 694, 6ij6

‘Bumitse B™' begSnnirLH A.n. 638, 1 Z 0 >
215

Bumaty. Richnrdp 304. 309
Burney^ Henf>\ 381^1, 399, 4+6-50.
522-4

Charles Cutelnsu de, 505
Butorip 257

Butterwonh, Gnvemor+ 557
Bu>’vkei+ A. A.p 461-4

Cabot, John, 114
Cocliar, 514-tl

Caesar Fredcinckc, ai + i 2161 320
Cidoutta, 3+9^ 351, 365P +11, 449* 433 ^
444, 446-7t 449p 464, 505-17, 519-41 +
524-7* 534- 537 i 546-^* 549-50. 553
Cambay, 64, 177

Cambodiia(ii), ro, ii, 14,10, 24, 30-tp +1,
sSp^ 63^ 80p 85-(i8, ii4p I30p 1+1* mTp
154. 139p 162-5, t® 5 p ao7, *1:8-20,
355+ 499 P 356-7. 361-3+ 366-8. 372 - 4 *
377. 379i 387. 390-4? 395, 397 p 400,
556--&7. 575-7 p 59t-2 . 6d 3, 611> 643-
Ip 684,713, 718
CamiriDn, S9fl-9. 605
Com Oiin p 597-^. oiid Deo-van-Tn
CampbcHp Sir Archibald^ 516-17
C^pMl, J. G. D., 585 > 588 -I?
Camphuys, Johannes. 266
Comntnh Bay* 27
C-am-Sinhp 595, 597

Candra dyitist>- (Araksn), 13.36, I 4 I, 3*9

I Cenhi son o( Nguyen Anh, 368-^1
Canningp John, 511-13. 517
CflJlton, 37 p Sip 51. 176, iSS, 364, 426,
559-^, 68j
CaE^bini;, 175

CapcUcrip G. A, G. P,p Baron ^nn dcr,

461-6

Cariman islands, 432, 441

Catttarvqn, Lord, 476-8

CBsTjercaiijh+ Lordp 419-20

Castlcinrip ^Bmusl, 243

Catholicp Caihohcurn, 306, 312^ 357, 615

Cavanij^T +5^-*

Cavendbh, Thomas, aoj, 245
Cdcilc^ Admiral, 557

Celebesp IS. 184, 3U3M. 439r *57- 462,
4651 +67, 494, 5*9*7**

Ceram, 4+o-2p 248^ 256* 260
Ccylonp 56, 130, 139> 14*1 147.

150, 207, 260-3 p 369, 173> 276-71 379-
St, 388, 406, 442, 461^ 669
Chaise-p Ptrc de la^ 3o6p 310
Chaiya, 32. 40, 56
Chakravarttn, 93+ 9+ ^

Chakri dynasty, 296, 673
Chakri, Genera! (Rama I>p 373, 395
Cham, 10—II. 7J, 76, S7p 94, lOl, lo6-7h
liip 117* 114, 150. I59'68p 185^ 356,
360-11 618+ 645

UiDEX *

Champi, 4. 14. iJ. a 6 -^. 39, 31^3,

5Sp 4Jp 58> ?o. 73. Sq, 83, S5, S6^ 87,
91, 99* loip 193 , vo 6-7^ ii 3 p 159-68,

187-9*398
Chiuidaii, 2S-9
Chiiidi ij^BgDp 65 p 66, 79
Chandj Jwvi, 77, 79, So

Ch^di KflJaaan^ 41.43
Clumdi M^nduc^ 43^ 4^-50
Chindi p 65
Cluiiidi Pawan, 49-59
Clifliidi Plji9i4nR 44
Quuidi Bevu^ 44
Ch&ndi Slngourt^ 8b
Chindfabluijnii, 149
dundrnkiinta Siit||h, 314
Chiuitabuji^ 117-8. 368p 392, 608,

619-TT

CtuLO-Afiou, 38 i-3p 385
Cluia Mun Vai Vorontil, 595-7
Chao-Njui, 381, 385
Chscp Noi, 593
Chao Pho^ 593
diio 'POp Gi^cial^ 169-70
dupaiAp 107, 130
dupiruin, Charles, 365-6
Charles li, 350h 265p 306
Charner^ Admlnl, 560^ 563, 566
' Chaner for the Anatlc > ikutementa'j
1304 , 406

Chaudoc, 4O0p 565
Chau Ju^kuB'^H Cha^fan-cld^ 55^
Chaumoni^ Chevalier, 306-7, 3Q9
Che Bang Nge, ihj-Sp
Chaog-ho, AdniiraJp 83 p xoo-l
ChenK 27p3ip 83^ 89-9^, loj. 1 j 6, 361-4
Cheribon, 264-5^ 269^ 371, 406, 472
Cherok Tclniri, 55

ChettUp Chett^arp fi50H 652^ 634;, 656
Cbpvalier, 365

Chkf Secreucy (Malaya), 486
Chiang KaJ-B^^, 667, 6^

ChieiiB Khotiang, 37S, 383 p 593 4
Chum^], 100, III, 141, iSt-8:, 207-9,
211-15, 232 , ^^> 9 p 30a. 117 * lao, 337 p
3S4. 3 S«- 9 > 394 p 504 p SJ 7 -®p 59 *
Chicngrai, 153, 504
Chiengaenp toop 213* 381, 394, 504
Chicut Gilbert, 646
Chm (tnbei]|^ 336, 709, 711
China, confenvicnt of titlta on Houih^
^it A^iOii rulrfa, 30+ r|6-^, i39p i8a
Chinap miaaiotii to South-uiil Aaia^ 24-6,
69-7^*! 83. ti 2, ti4-iSp ii6p 131, 137,
166, 17a, 180. Sft Chmg-hQ, K^ang
^ Kublai i 4 tiafi

Cbma, miiakrtta from South-Eoit Mh to,
= 5-1 ip 13 -S. 39 - 40 h S(>- 7 , «4p
90-it ii^. iJ3-i6, ri9p laip 147, 132,
13&P 147* I 49 p i5i-a, 139-62,

104-5, i 71 p iSo-j;, 37t

China, roodemp 444, 456, 45S, 337, 542-

661, 6S3'4. 6*6-7, f> 94 , 6^, 7»3^*4.
7IS, 726

China trade, 176, tsS, 204-5- ai 7 - 8 p 304 .

31 Ip 364-s, 424-31* 439, 5 J 7 - 8 t
54a, 546. 565, 569P 667 p 670
Chifuip VielnAiTteie Bliuggles for indc^
dezH:p of> 169-71* 173-4
Chin* war of i»6i, 557, 360^ 566, 374
Chinese invaakkos of &Duth-£ii$t Aaiap
70-it i3a-4p 138-40, 146, 166* t6Bp
172-4, iSo, 3oS^ J03, 320p 35i-3i 384.

Kublai KhaA^ Vimg Li
Chinese pimey, 459^ 474
Cbincac rocogfticiun qlf Soudl^Hai! ;\jEurL
ru\m, 83-4* t32, 136* 141* tS7t 161-2,
17J* 174-Sr 180^1, 360* 370-1
Chinese auzeraintyviilh 131. 136-H9P 144,
174* i8i-2, 370-1 p 7S3, 435-6* 566*
57 It 573 +

Chinese m JndonesUp 272-5, 409, 464,

^6* 4^* 639, 661-3

ChincBe in ^'t■l2ya and Borneo, 436—7*
+ 55 r 47 J'Bo. ^* 3 * 4S7, 66 j- 7 . 67 &,

^ Ml, 688-9, 6^9-700, 704
Chmeae in Sambas (Bomeo)^ 277-8
Chin Byan f Kingberillg*), 512-J4
Chindw.in river, 131, rsj, 136, 3*4, 5*1,
, S.36p 538, 686. 6fli, 6 ^

Chun dynasty, 32

Cb'in dyrunly’p 169-70

Chi Taruiii ri%cr, 34

Chit HlkLtig, U* 627

Chitroaejia (Mahendraii'iirmiin), 31, 85-7

ChlttaBonR, 303, 318-44, 305^

Choiacnlp Due dr, ^63
Choi*, si-S5h 65, 126-7
Cho-pb* 34 , 35, 45

^nuTa-kuan, iDOp toi, 1 j*, 114-15,149
Chnstiui, Chrutiatirtyp 502-3+ aja, Jll,
316. 315. 3 S 7 > 37S. 499 » 556-9. 570.

6|6,68i

Chfiatbou, Generah 719

Chrya^p i6p tao

Cbulat^p General* 380-1
ChliLblongkcin, 31 Sp 581-6, 595,597* 6oSp
672-3

Chula 2 >ak*ftit. St€ ' Bunnefe Era'
Chungkingp 690, 694-6
Chuun, 557

Ciluiunon, ajy 273, 275, 436, 469
Clarke, Sir Aiidrctt% 473-7
Clifford* Sir Hugh, 4B2, 566
CJovci. 64, 168 - 9 , iij, SJt, iJT. MO,
26a, 278. 436, 491

Coclun Chinit, t4, V69, 154, 3 J7, 364-
15 . 55(^77. S8i> Jfll- 2 , 601-3, 643-8.
6 S 4 -S. 690, 7 » 3 . 71S

INHEIt

795

Cdtfiir Jin PctcfiXOtinp £40-50, £52-4 p
171-^.318.334

CofFeo, proiluclicm inti trade, 17z~3, 406,

417. 4^3-+. 4<^7". 401, S»

Cokayfije, Gcorgie, 341-1

Col dtt Nui^, 17 p tS 9 r ifr?! t 7 t p 174

Colornbo, 116-17

ColontJll QfHcc, tmnsftrcncc of Straits
S^kincnti tci» 451, ^75
Cummuiiistn, ComftiUlit&ts^ 619, 637-S^
647-8, 664, 677-S*. t%P 694, 700,
705-6, 7^3^, 7 H 3 “J 5 . 7i7^i8> 7io> 712*
726

Confuciantsm, tSf, 556, 55S
ConjcvcmiHt 13, 130 , I 3 S%

Conti, Nreota dc, 190-1 '

Cook, Cmfitflun Jumti, 426
Co-operative movement^ 652^ 656, 659,
66t, 663

CornwiiliSp Lord, 411, 514
Corofiundcl Coasts 1}, 21^ 51+ 239^ 345,
26ip 188,303, 307 p 333t 42J-4

CoHOUt cuJtiviitTOn and trade, 27424,

4 & 9 . S 37 -S

Coiindf of India^ or ibe IndiA^ 254, 26 x,
3 I 7 J 4 34 &r 407, 4^2
Courbet, Admiral, 571+1
Courthopc, Nitbinid, 143-7

Cox, Captain tlilalil, 507-9, $ 11 * 514^ 537

' Coxinj^^ CKuo llnne lehL 258
Cmnj^or«> 16
Cranuerlp VV. 413
CrawfunJ^ John, i^rj, 41^, 4,20, +40-1^
445-6, 44jS^ 520-1,537
CrinieEin Wfur^ ^32
Cmihiviite^ Sir Clwriei, 64 j
Culture eytt-cm tn Javi, 464, 4^8-711

633^^1

Curzon, Lordp 608^ 61 1

Dacca, 332-8, 340

Dacndclip MArah+l llermau WUJem,
406-10. 4IJ, 4ts, 41^^. 4^

Ddnfl Kcfnhoja, 191
DiiriK Pirani, 190-1
DiitiR McreWih^ 291
Dikaa, 58

Dak, SirXhoniai, 344^

Dilhouvie, MAE^uk of, 516-32^ 538^ 546
Dilrytnple, Alexindcr^ 4i5~7
Dammictcdip 141,114
I^Eunrong^ Piincc^ 584, 586, 588
Danubyu, 344, 516
Dan Jingn, 7 ^

Dan Prtak,^ 73-4

Da'^'ies, M ajor H, R-, 611

Dckket, Edward Douwrip^ Muliatull \ 49J

Deb, 184, 495, fOQ

]>cniak, 184, X04

Desa (Java), 416-17, 462-3,

Desransci, Siarahal, 307-12

Deahiinn, 258

* Dcuiero-Atilaya V 7

Dera-iaja cult, 93-4, 97+ toi, ]o£, 116,

De^-au-ongse, Prtiice, 584^ 6oj^

Devdlr, 6ff7-8
Deventer* C. Th- van^ 633
Dhammapala, 115

DbainntathHt (Burtneae rtndEring of
Dliftirmuhaaira), 215*16
Dharajtifidfavarmafi J, tpl-J
DharmaJcizti, 53
Dhamasbi^traSp 13
Dharmasrfl^ti, 66-7
DhdmiaN'Biiiaa, 51, 60-1
Dhonbitri, 396
Dunga, 205, 331-41
Didcjcns, John, 437

Dicnicfi^ Anronk %Tin, 156-^, 337, 377

Dindin^p 291

DitlJi-binh-phu, 594

Dinh dynaat^'^ 161,171

Dianyiiu^ PrriClt<r«S, 16

Dipo Negora, 466-74 6t8
Djikarta, vii, 34
Dobama Asiayeme, 706
DominEeans^ 356-7
DanjE-duon^, 17, 160
DooK-ion culture, 7-8, 169
Do'rh5nfi*Nhon, 36?

Douirur, Paul, 6^

Drake^ Sir Prancii^ 103, 225-7
Dubruanr, 308,, 31
Du Bus dc Gisignica, 465-8
Duffciin, Lorib 553
Duplex. juMph, 344-*. J*4-3. 4ii
Dupr6, Adnuml, 569-70
Dupuis, Jean, 5^-70
DurVen, Diedcrik, 270
Dutch, 184, 105-6, 214^82, 285-1^^
*99-314. 3*9-11 P 33a-4^* 357-9- 3^.
377 p 495-Mp 43*t +24. 430-3. 43^-+3.
446, 4S3“6p 45S, 461-7*. 474. 490-501,
616, 610, 614, 630, 633-4* f 658-62j
668^, 686-8, 69S, 718-24
Dutch Fundamental Law (1814)^ 461
Dutch Libexala, 492
Dvanvati, m, 36, 86^ 87, lOO, 121, 147
Dyaki, [84

Dyarchy, 626-8, 631, 643

East l?40t4 CctuPAKy, 327+ 246, 250, 294,
3t*-t4, 317,345,351, 359,364-6,398,
4tip 413, 419, +24, 434, 441, 444, 455*
^ 5 ^Sp 5*7r 531

nkBpotsarat, the * VVhiti^Kini|E\ 197
Elout, Corndk Theodorus, 461-4
EngLand, PlnidUh, 224-5*65. 270, 2^g,
*85, 299-314, 317-261 364-*h +?6
hnEenic Cordtale of 1904? 6 j i
KrBcrfelLp Pieter, I50p 272

INDEX

7 f»h

Fa-HiE.SV ^o, 34

Fai Fa, 356, 3Jt*

rmi CJijUi (rujraiin}^ zj

Fan Fo (^Lui->‘i)| z8, 31

Fang. 39a, 391

Fa N|5 oiiii, J51, 31&7

Fan fiaiung a6

Fan HfiUJI (Flfimin)^ ^5

Fan Man or Fan SFih-man, 120

Fan Yi (LLi-^yi), 37

Farquhar, It J,, 43439-40

Fn^icral Council [Malava), 4S5-6

FniEnitjon of 18^ (Mklaya) 483 4, 4M

F«;t«ratinn of ]4>48 (Malaya), 704

FendAll, John, 430, 462

of ATakati^ 33i>-4o
Frnmndcz, Duanc, 158

C'*?’ 57 *'

ritch, Ralph, ai-i^ lao-ij 2x4
Fkcmood, Edivsrd, 323
Flons^ Picier WiltrnMioon. 339, 333
Fonnsmcblcau doofcrcnccp 7j 4
' Footwear qucstian548^

Forced deliveries and contiii|;}cnci»j 408^
41 fc

Foimosi. zjS, 574-5, 683
rorrcai, Hmfy. 317-18
FoCTy^, Sir I>ouidaa. 546
Fort St- DcOr®e tMadraa). 303, 30^, 318^
321-;*. 348, 435 p 42S
Foumicr^ ComroandniJit, 574

‘ Fourth EiiK:Ibih3Var** 379—So. Zoi.+zS-Q

Frm Alauro^s map* 187

Fiance, Ktcncht 356. aSo-l;, 296,

J01-14. 3az, 344-^, 35+. 3^-75,
3®5- +IO, 413, 419, 421-4, 42B-

31^ 4 ^i 595^* St I. 532, 5+4. 550^-77.
5S2, 591^12, 6r*, 6^, 6^'-S. 654-8.
, *74^ 683-4^ 686, 71 J-i. 725
rnuicklin. WiUianv, 509-10* 537
Fiedc^k Henry* PriiiL-e, 300
‘ Fnce 'lliaii * moveinrcnt. 7^4

PrwU 3*4

FulEcfton, Rohctl^ 4J5 t 446-50
Fi^h, i+, 23-31. 33-7. 49*%-7, W.

Fyichc, Albert, 541-2. 365, 623

Ga^a Mada, 7S“fli
Gajayana, 4a, 58

Galluia pErai Catholk buhop of Burma, 3 a6
Galvflo* Antonio. 202
Gama. V* 3 co da, 197
Gojnrfun (orchoatraj, 8
Gandhara iculptiirc, 19
GaiullUp Tbiohancijtti Kammdiandp 617^
^ 636. 639

Ginflea, nvi^r, delu. 3294 33+-4n
Gamier, Franciip 54a, s^- 7 <». 572 k S93i

^ 593-*

Uy^, 539

Oavatli. 7J. 7 ft
Genouilly. Rigault de, 560
Goiiiij. A^lajor, 582

Germany, 552, ft 73 -+* ^97

G^rib Ncuii*^ 314
Ota-dinhp 362, 370, 556, 560
Gta-LrOngp 171-5. 361* ssfti olw

Kguyen Anb

GilleapiCp ^ir R. El,, 411. 415-ift. 419
Cfyfte* the 239

Go*. 19^, 103,116-17. * 3 t- 3 . 234t
361, 3D2 3(J. 317. 331-2, 337
Godwin. General Sir Henry Tbnmaa,
..jiM

Goeru. Ryldo^-van, 261. 164
Gocaaensp Joan. *578
Gokonda, Kingdcim of, 309
Good CHfica ComniittK. 752
GtA’cmment of Bomm Act, 1935, 629
Go^'emment of India Act 193s. ftiS-9

* Great East", 711

* Greyer Endta", vi. 4. 20
GraiJcp 176. 201,204, 2J3. 253
Groagujin. 605, 607

Guam* 685, 6^

Gujeratu, Ctderat, 177, rfij
Gimavaiman, 39
Cynavarman of fCsshrnir. 34
Gtapta style in an. 14, 31, 34. 43, 121
Gyffard, Will iam ^ 358^

Haa$. Fredcrk^ 552

Hague, The, X38, 471, 49S* 639* 719, Jl2
Haiphong, sftg, 714
] lai^^ Fulton of Temalc^ zny
llaji, Sultan of OiLntJiim. 265

Hflitn. 120-1
Kilmahera., 19R
Hamia. Sultan of Teniatc, 256
I fan dynasty, 4, 16
Ifankoiv* 543, 567

Kanni, lai* iM. r6S, 172-5. 370. J 73 - 4 k
561^^2, 598. 645 ^N ftS4, 7>3-I4
Haribara* 30-1, 88-9, 97
Hariharaiiiiya, 93-4
Elaripiinjaya (l^iSinp^Un). T03. its
HarivntKfs, 64

HariiirmiLn [V (Champa), 162-3
Hamumd, Dr., 572-5
Harahavaiman 11 (Angkor)* 99
Harahavarman 111* 101-2
Hartainek* Pieter^ 4^

Hauan Ud^, 1S4
Hasspi Udin of AlacasAit^ z6l-2
Haatingv* Warren^ 3ft'5^» 42 tp 428-9
Hfl'tien, 355, 362, 3^7* J^7 p
5^5

H atta, Mabommedi 690-1 * 71S. 721

HawK I.ofd, 4=6^

Hay am Wuruk ( 1 ^ijuan 2 garti)p 76-Sa,

15ft

# ■

-■

INDEX

H«eren XVIT^ 333^ ^44^ ^47
Hfrrfmtifmifn, 405 p 40^, 470
tlciizKLi, 3+4, 34<)

H^H^crt, CAptnin JcAirtp 417
li«uviz, Johjinncf BowtSictu* vnn^ 457-f^
Hcytip PkuIlu Cntm^r. 334
Hino^Wu, fmpciiarp 3^

Hieii;Ho», 573. 575
Hi^ruon, Ndihanicl, 313, 359
liinduLbidon, IJ, iB
HippoloSp Grctfk pilot, tS
HlutddWp is5p 541, 5^, 553
llmanmin Yaiaujn," Gluj Piolactf Chitm-
\ IJO. 131

Hmawn (Old Prome)^ ^

Ho* SW'5. S97 ^ „

Ho Chi Muih, ^47+ 7*3*

Hoc\*ell, VV. H-, Biifon van^ 471

Ho^tJiddrp, Dirk ii'an, 403, 41^

' Ho-linif", za, 4$
lj<»m izurrm^Vui^ 3
Hume 5

Ilairni 3

z6o, :i 7 St 4^5

Hong Kod^p 456, 557, 581^ 648,667, 63 ^^
635

Honfie!d» Thoma*, 420 ,

Houfttunp ComdU dtp 126-3 *85

Haraivip 353

Hsinbyu&hid, 3St-4p i^o, 391

H^ipaw, ail, 353

Hli 6 {Thu‘a-ihicfi)* 13» i6p 31, i 73 j 3SS^

35 ®* 361-4.. 37®. 1®J« 3 ® 7 i 397.

557 , 559 - 4 Sip ^6s, § 7 ^- 5 , S 93 .

596.71^5

bir t^dwardp 43i>

335t 439

Huka^Ttg \TiUcy, 69s
Hunt, Riduird, 14^

Htirgrotijtf, Sfiqyclr, 497-S
HoBuio^ Sulran of Johorirp 43 3> 440-1

Iftx BaTCTA, 79p I77p 1S7

[bti Iskander, 166

] Hanoi of Sulu (Morm, BjlJftntiii)p 279^
W.+SJ -4

liTthoff, Guffinaf itlcnit Baron ^Tin, i74"
6 , 291
imphi 3 p 695

Indljip 441, 444. 44^52. 477.

5ii'ip 525, 531, 537-9 p 543-4. 5+®“
Sir 5S4- S57n 5®a-3, 5»&, 6so* 633*
625-9, 6611 666. 695, J 2 Z
Indim inwnjgratiirtl CO Aawp 4B7+

616,651,663-7,704
Zndufk inJIucnECp 4-5, 60. Stf tJ«0
liindui^don

Indi&ti Nationil Oingrcia, 617, 637
indo-Chtna (French), 554,

612, 640, 654-3, 667-Sh 6S3-7P

6t>3, 71 3 -iKk 734.-5

797

IndoqeEiji(ii>p 6, 13^ 64, 77, 193, 174“5«
405-ao, 475. 49 <^^ 5 o^ 6i6-t7^ 633-41*
658-62, 686-93, 718-44

[ndia (Sailendcii king), 47
[odragiri, aSg, 194

[ndrapiini (Bontoiy Pna Noknr), 93^ 161-
2, 171

Indra^'i.TTTuii II (Champil>p 07, 160-I
IndmvajTiun III (Angkar), 114-15
1 Hi't raja, 153

Ini^a-Sonit 378^-8®^ 383. 385
limwaddy delta^ ia6p 132^ 141
Imiwaddy rvct, lo-iip 15*33. * 33 ^

J« 7 r 310 , 303, J52, 5t6, 555-6p 33 ®^*
54T-ip 565p 649, 686, 696, 7 ^* 7 ^
lianai^Lroun Ip 86—90

I Sender Muda of Achehp a6x, 286^ 495

Islam, 19 p 57, 79 . 83. iji. 19 ®^

aOz/i77p 467, 4®, 498-9* 6 iSp 6jvk
616* 667, 6SBp 703, 721
[-Utng, 20, 44 , 37^^. 170-*

Jaafaa, Daio Ono Bin^ 703
Jacatra, 119* 140-^

Jainttii, 5x5

Jombip 235, 146, 389-9*

Jamra Ip a38p 247,1S6, J58

jHmci II fDuke of York), 510-1 321

Jonggatfl, 64, St

Jansaetis, General Jan \SlIlcitt, 41 i-t 3,416
Japan p Japan«e, 449 - 5 *. 138^ 197-9.
356* 385* 6 i 7 t fi 35 > ^>46. M. ^ 7 ^, 673,
681-99, 7 *^. 7 i 3 > 71®. 7 ^

Japrn, ift 4 r 199 ^ 4 * 4 . 240. 145

yaitikitt^ 14, 18, 30* 65. tl9-l*

Ja™, Javanese, 12, jo* 34"5. 37-8+. 91,

i6o-ip i66^ t76p i8ip 183. 18*^1. t98*

202, 325, 119, 140, 244, 14®, 160-81 p
405-20, 461^-71^ 490 ^ 3 * ■. 5®3^

620p 633-41, 653-6tp 667, 686, 691,
695, 711 * 7^3
Java Etknkp 467
Jayabhavn, 64

Jayi Indrav-mmiait IV (Champa)* 106
Jnyakitwarigp 7 [-2
Jayanflgaxap 73"6, 79
Jayantisa 3®

Jaya Stmtharamwi HI (Champa)^ 73p

JayaTarman^ 29-30
Jaj'avarTiian ^ 88p 90
Ja>‘avArTniui [ bu.^ 91
Jaj'miftmian II, 58, 9l~4.

Jii^ivaiman 111, 94-5
Jd^-avaiman IV, 99
Jaya^'imian V, 99 ^

Jayavaimon Vl, loa

jK^^iurmaji Vllp 96, 105-13, 13** t4^.
164-5

lft>iai'ftrTii«n VIIIp 112-15
Jayift^maan P^rameiVflrap 115-16

INPES

798

Jchflngir^ Mu^al cinprrar^ 139

jcrvcb. Sir Willijun, 4-57

jesu!». 30*, 397 ::f 4 ., 3 i 5 . 3 S®. 377 “*. 55 ®
Jett’K (Runa T’ibodi tlK 157-4
Jogjokana, 41, 4J, *76, a^iQ-So, 406,
415-14, 4*4, 464-7* 7^3
Johore, iSi, *33-4, *93-6. *94-5. 364.
43*-J, 443. 474* 498-9. 670.

T03

JorcUnuB^ji Fra, 1^-90

John, i+n-6,

Judictfl r^omu, 4P9, 4Tlp 463
JimkCi^Iotk (Pukl^t)p 3 BS^ jja^ J9«, 43®^

+ 45 i |i=i+

ECmi^w vaU«y, 311, jsr-i, 54 j»

Rfchin ([KD|tk), 709i 7 ^^

Kiini^u^i 318

Kjd^iaiiit 143 .

17. 40

E^wnbu-Merft dj-mitic kf^end,
Kun 4 »VAtAp &4
Kflnipatp 383
Kjunpot, 363, |63, 564
Kmmunj?, x\vc prince, 539-3Q
Kimburt river, to™, 33 ^ joz, 330^ 6#9
K&ndy tooth of Buddhn^ 56^ zi^t

323

Kanganv vy^lem^ 666
t’ai, 34-6

K«ni&ka (Ki^haju cfnpEror)p 17
^Rafi-t^o-li*p

KorrOp 135, 546, 688-9, 712

ICojtasuriL, 364, 367, 369, *73^4
Kanini, Raden Ad^eny, 635
Kiuruiinyd^ 14, 20* 34p 35* 39, S^p 86*

S 7 p 90

Kaundifiya ] L, 39, 33

KflUnglimijdiiw pojjodfl, 325

ICamiRtan, 332-3, 3S0

Kevenpamiuti, t 6 p 30
Kedah, ij, a*. 40, 177, tS*. aSj. *«6.
aa«, *91, 394, 398, 4^1, 4*7-8. 430,
434-6, 445-6, 44«, 4SQ, 454, 4«8-9,
504, Ora

Kcdiri, 64-5,6Sp yi-a, 74^ 75,105,363-4,
167.467

Keel 10^4 VVtlltatrk, 337-B
Krionuiip 44^jf» 4825 48fi-9» 504^ 6ri
Kdufi^p 574
Kempriui^ 689

Ken Aoi^ (Ksj*#*), 64-3P 71, 71
Ken DedcAp 65
Keng Chengp 603
Kcnghiinj^, 537
Kcniftim^, 351, 536, 6oi, 603
Fop 387

Kemni^ra, v* 65-78, fio, 1S7
Kcmrajata Jaya^^rddiuTka tViJay*), 71-
7 S. 70

KertAvijoyn, 84

^ Lette^1i.^ aSi^ 3 q+* 430^^ 438
KJuntLOnF-Noit 379^ 3lS3“4
Khmof* to, 85-1184 144'Mi

161-5, 207. 611, 618, 64s
Kh«ie^ 605

Khiuog Ap1ujwoa^4 724^5
Kuni^ 601, 603, 609

Ki Kadjiir Deviwtoro, 630
Kimberley* Loedp 474-6
Kitidst, 538

King^fGtsarat, 378^^80, 383

Kiowun Minfyi^ 544, 547^

Kjehi Tdpa* 376^

Kljing (SckiiDvri* 38 j* 391* 473
Kock, Monnia dCp 466^

K^ndia, ]6 ,k 2 C

Ko-lo-Ion^p 3ip 131

KaTnpanfr-thaiii:5 565

Koabaonji M3-54 p 5^5^ Si^- 5 $

Koflinklijk FdkeivAart MAducKnppij, 501

KWtp lip it8p 383, 386p 390p 39s,

Kom Fflo. 307

Krm, leJhmtti ofp i3» aS, 51

Kratt6p 87, 90p 91* 564

Ktiik Limipiif, 473, 478, 480, 4^3-4.

4B*. 7 ^J. 703
KmU Seliiuin^, 33
Ku&n|f^An, 561

KublEii Khan. 57 p 6S-73, 113, 115.

151, j66fc 173, 186^8
Kudiipjf.

K'un-^lufi, 8p lOp 131

Kuts-mtn^tiiiEi, 617* 647.664,680.70^

Kulirajs., 495,497

Kutoi, 15, 34r m

Kuthodftw pagodip 536

Kutip 74 ^Sp 76

Kv’mOgtk, 169

Kwanj^angp 17* 169

KvAniitthap i03p iiip ti&^

Kyaukii, 113, tjo, 13*. 134, tjft, t^o,
318. 3Si

LAfiotmaoN's At,<t,Bcrtrati4l>Pran5(4* M«M
■do, 413

I.abiiin klond, 437. 456, +58, 493
LognmdilrF. Rcar-Adinirn.l dc, 561-5
Lrfleifc, Dnurdnrt do, 542.563-4, 566p 568,
S93

LdUy, Comte de, 433
I^Eimbert. CoimnodoeF* 516-75 539
Lamponi^p 177

LoncalEcr, Sir Jvirtei, 336-8,-319
Lbq Ckon^, 1:16^ 151, i$% 307-33. Sf€
o/id Liiiin,^ Prabong
Lonkuiikip

Laii-Kh[in^D6n|I^ 308

TiLni^-flODp 171, S74-S

[JintJnp 4S4-5 t 457-7

INUES

799

Ldi», IJQ, I-H* J53, isfip ifi6, 20 J,
3 :^ 9 . 351 . 37 fe-S 5 . 4 ». SQS-^. ^iTp
643-3, 684, 7^-4
l^f^kcc, Admintl. 556
Lirt L>jongs^ne« 5®

Larut (Fenk)^ 475^ 476, 480
6[[| 69^

Ltdo, 696

Lc dytiitty, 174-Sp 57 *

Iyi!ffe\-rt^ Mgr^> 557“3

Le Hwi, f6i+ 171
Lfionoweni^ Airna, 579, 583, 387
Lfriii, Fnibcr 377-a

L^tcxi Enaippi Thomu, 34^~9
Iv? TTmnii-Tcrei, 174. a6&,«]6Di
Le Va-n-Duy^t, 556
L«yd«i, Dr. 41T-14
Li Anh-Ton^ 163
Li Borij 170
JJ dyiwry* 163+ i 7 i
Lightp FrancU, zZck, 293-4t 447 - 3 &* 434“
7 f + 4 S* 4 S 3

Ligor, 18, 40p lOOp 1413, 183, 494 . 44L

^ -W- + 5 L ^54
L 4 Hung CKnng, 57+-S

2 ^P 4+1:. 44 Jp 45 *. 454
Lingifsiijfiti ARTtemfUTp 7 Jf -3
Unggip 49 ^. 477

Linachotenp Jsn Huygtn van, 127^ 239
Lin-j-angp 35

lin-yip 13^ a6-S, 31-3, H5. o/J*
Chompap Chutlj
LUbnn, 446, 438-9# ^ 3 ^

Li ITvflnh'Twi, 163, 173
Lakci^ihrii, 109# 111
l^^ofobokk 377. 499
Lnntliarp 243^ 247-8

[^hurt (Ijl¥oK |oa-ip 103# 145, i47>
I SI- 1 , 313, 3S6, sSSp ?i6
1 ^ 'Palp J JO

Iffiub^rc. SinitCin ile k, 397

Louif XIV^ 256^ i65-6p 301-14. 431* 615

Ijovck, 111, 3 Wp 3^1

Lowp Sir Hugh, 45Mr 478 0

Low* JflmM, 446p 44 ^ 5 ^

Luang PnihimR^ 6p toi, 1451 149 . 15Ip
1S&. isS. 307, mi 3 . a*Bp iiSp 299. Ji?.
378-85, 387, 394 p 397.

61 r

Lu Ttti, 150-1
AIacao* 251. 356. 587

MbjchIUt (Cddaea), 77. 3O3* 134* 240 r- 3 ,
356^, 260-3. ^ 5 * 27?. 364. 419. 413.
453t 463.467. 301

^lai: CilUp 3&2

Mac dynaBty p 174-5* 355
Mace. 193. 198, 237. i6o
Mickeoxkp Cnlin. 42D
Macphertop.^ Sir Johiip 429-30. 434
Mar Thirn Tu. 362. 366-7. 394

Madnui, itSp J 2 l^, J45p 34S,

359, 413-a, 534

Madun. J^fadumc, 69. 78. 184, 204^
253 p 263p 269p 274, 413. 416. 721-2
MactBii>'ckcr^ |o&ii, 261^5
XfagcUofip 2^1

Mmithhmaia, 6op 6ip 641 89
Mahiibodi irmpEe, Buddhagaya^ 127, 129^
13?, 142

^f«ha ChalcFup'at* King# 210. 213-T5
Mahoiiiirfimayasa Dipati. 314, 344
Mabomuni imagep Jl^-^p 543
Maba Salfanir.. beginning A.D. 78. 215
Malu Tewip PiinE^aa, 309^ 214, 112

^Idia 'nubalhurap 394. 502
Mabm Vajir^vUiJK. 672-3
^lahazcdi pKgodn, II7
Mahfnnd ^ ^[alaeca, iGa-^Jt i^99i ^83-4
Mahipatlv^rnian. or. 91
pMahfiiud n of loltoKp 433
Makommedan, Atualim, Moor, ^4. i^Xp
I97t m. a&4. 206, 254. 278, 31B, 330,
340, 4S3, 485, 701, 703
Ma Huan. $3^4

MwftpBbit,4i.56,7J-84.177. 179. 183-4.
i04p 453. 363. 267, 270, 618

Makaitiinip [6

Matabarp 10*. *07+ 261
Malacca <dty)^ 18, 83. 84. 156. ijS.
176-85* i83, T92-3, io8-2o6p 231-4*
25*1 asSp 157^ 280-1, 183-96^ 301,
3J7. 4* ** 437”9p^44i p 448. 46a-

3# 476> 480. 613, 663, 6711 703
Malacca (straita)* it* 38, 55^ 198. 226*
280,293.364. 366* 414. 442* 4S4-5i 458
Malang,^ 5OO

Mnlay, Makyi, in, 86, 91, 171, 183. 193,
178# 283-^* 386* 389# 398-9# 41
421-33 P 435-6# 442, 444. 447> 450-60,
473"89« 616, 658+ 661^1 1 688 -^^ 691-
2, 690-706* 726

Mikyu fjambi), 37^^ 53, 56, 57. ^^6-70,

72. 78-9.83. 170

MnJdivc ialatia*p S3
Mnlino canfeicnce, 72 1
Mana?’* Dkanmaabaatra. 13
Mancku dynuty, 175* zs8« 301* 3i9~'io
Mandalay, 121, 123, 135, 503, 536-55,
696

MviRran 1 iz. 146.151
Manila* 20r. 203* 233. 240. 252, 3^7.
+26, 437

Manipur. IJJ* 321. 324-6, 347* 3S&-L
3S3+ SM-19. 521-a. 538. 69L 695-^
Manjllid. Bodkium'a. 79
Manku Butnl. Multan .At^ngku Buwonn,

^lanrique* Fra SeboadlU}, IJS-^ ’

Mansur Shall (Raja Abdulbii}, iSx
Mant't-T*our*t. 385
Manu. Laws of, ij, 00. 141, 152, 215

8 cx)

NtanthaA, 331, 511

MkFRajy, Aufluatus, 5+3, 571
MviKnalli, Jgtiri, 1

Mimbin, 140^ 141, 143, 149 k 3io-i]f

115. 119. a22-3>29^. 3*>a.lifr-i7*33;*.

335* 316, 51K
MBSjium FartJ'p 7^1

Moiuiipiitnm, 134, 139, 246^ 3OJ-4. 309^
3nf3J3,

^Ib Tyui'-Un, 31, 89

MBHiam, +1-31 Si, lEH, 353-4.. *S7“®i
^6 q, 3^-70,190
MAUitivatma^va, 79
Mittng Cylt Sir J. A., fiij
Nliuiig^ Ok, 536
i^lounf^n, 15
Mnuii-c^ of 107

MDurtiiui, 117. 1S9. 4^^, S*S. 5^9+

511

MnW Shins, ]j+, 136, 137, 13S
Max SfiTTv/o^^ 491
McLwl^ CiptsdnK 537
Mecca, 15+, 363. 49®^
Metifer^Cnmclis, 407, 413
Me^ac iBknndiLr Shiii, iSck-i. See
F^mmesvini
MciktiJM,

Mekong rivei-p 10, 33, 15, 37, ji, 8f,

87-118 paitim^ T44, 151, 163-4,

169, 307-8, ass, 360.^376, 378, 398,
536. 54^. 554. 5^. 565-7. 5Sa, 595^,
6a I005, 607-10, 681, 685
Mckut'i, King, 213^14
Menim river, iia-ii, 14, 33, 35, 56, 86.
103, 113 , JZI. 144-582o8, 219.
390* 554x 606-7* W-IO
Mep’iDjj river, 1+4

Mcr^i, 141, 138, 205. 302-14. 389,

396, 42s* 433, 429, 504, 516
Menni, Father, 378
Middlclon, David, 237^

Mi^lcion, Sir Henry* 337, 240
Mijcr, Govemor-Gerietal P., 634
Mdord^ Pierre, 413
Mimjani, 283

Mman^hau, 190,161. 390-5, 431, 473,
^ 477.

Mijibin, 33CH-1

Mbdon Min, 5*9-47f 583

Mindnnoa, 454

Mines; Bouitte* 662: Cod, 657; Iron,
670; Lead, 653; SUver, 653; Tin. 654,
662* 668-9 J Tunjjstcn* 654: Zmc, 657
MiriK dyiuBtj-, 39, 80. 83. 116, 136^ 151,
157, l6Sp 173-5. J9*. 158* 286^ 303,
319.361

Muir JuL 35a-|* 38->

MbRun pagoda K 504
MiMRyi SwMsVLke, 136-7
Mmhk4un|;;;, 137
MtnhkamaunR^ 332

i .

Minh-MonR. 375, 3S3, 385, 400, 55^7*
_559^59j*-3 ^

Minhti of Arokan, 329
Minkyinij-o, 140
Min RexaRyk 3 > 5 . 331-3
^til^rek>^iu‘din, King, 321 ^ 334
Minrhib’J, 5*3-5

Nlinio {Gilbert £liian]i. Lord, 410, +13,
+ 18-19. 4 JJ^ 439 . 5 »>-i 4
MmtfwMorle^' refomra, 625
Mir Jumlfl, 338-9
MiiOn, 17, 31^ 159-60
MiLChe^r Sir Cherlea. 482-;!

Mi~thOp 361, 370, 560
MoRVungp 145, 150, 353
Mogok* 544 ^

Mobilyin, i;36-^40, 150, 253

Moira, Loid (Murqui* of HjutuiRa), 4iqp
413p +39

Mok$obomyo (Shwebo), 337, 343
MCktuCcH, 60, 64, T7. 84, iSo, 184, I^J,
h> 8 -m 3 , ssj, a3i-5», *54. 260-2,
,*81.,43 1 . 44a. 4 S 3 . ->65, 4 W
Momein (I'tnRyueh^, ^43
Mon* 10-11, 15, 30, 35, 57, B6, 100, 103,
107, 114, 117-43, ii9a t4^i i49t
191,210^23 316,318^7, 319-31. 343 ’
54. 379. 3M. 392-4. 3 y 9 - 4 M.

503* 504, S16, 650. See diu TaluJng
Mon 5 * 3 iz
Ttlongkolbeiuey, 397
MooRkur, King Malm, 314, 398-9, 533,
54 *. i+ 7 . S 6 J- 4 . S7S-aa. 5 ^ 4 , S** 4 . **6
M6nR J#em, 609

M01111PII4 68-7^, 113, 124, ih-4p <36+
i+bp 151, j 66* 172-3* t86, t88, 19&
Mong Singp 609-10
Monsooru^ iB, 311, 390. 432
Montigu-CbclfnsTord rcfopmi, 625^6
Monte Cor^'ino, John of, 1 88
iMiKik, Dr HO- 687* 69J, 719. 741,
723

Murantp Sir Hoberi, 583, 589

Lambert dc Is, 302-3, 3S7
^EdUhiil, lEcnri, 37S, 566, 593^ 5^
MuuLmeLn^ 22, m, no, 219, 222, 299,
521* 534, 537^. 543 p ***

Mountbatten, J^onl, 6^,
M.P,AJ^„699
Mraiuna, 123

MfDhiung, 364 55, 138, 205, 311, 3564
328-41, 509, ^12. 516
Muong Keso, King^ 308-9
Mubt river, 199^ aSj, 443
Myda Hashim* 456-7
Mrighil* 305-6, 21 a, 330-41
Mdm^rman, 15, 34
Muji rivet, 27, 87, 90, 1:17
Muniia, 9-10
Mundy, Captain, 4ir7‘'Q
MuntinRhe. H- W,, 413, 4t5, 46?, 465

rNPra 8 oi

Muoo^ Sw«« ^07
Miirundu^ 35 p iS
MufCQvy Cutnpsnj^t iA+

Mtuta&Tp Suitttn « Ferak, 187^
Mjuuiinf (LunhAv). 344
Myat Tud^ 530

Myaz«di imcription, 113, isg
My£di, SI9

Mycdup 133* ill

Myin^un PrincCp ihc, 550
Myifuuin$r. il3-4
Myi[k>4lla,_ 3S2, 6m, 695-6
Myothu^'if frai^a
Mysore, 41

Naat riv*r, 341, 5T5

Nona propIcSp 6

^■E^dFaJ&jfriTqfairta* fis-SOi* Ijy-S

NttiEflIa, 443. =47^8
Nokhon Sril'ammaratp 386, 3^

Nakorti Fat^otn, [£4
^aiondA (Ben^), 37, 39, 51, 54
Nwbi, 74-5

Nanchao, BSp ggt, 114,131-3* i^Sp 144,171
Nofida Bayin, 417-43, 316, 33t* 37^^
Xanfl [<lBa* 578^

Nuung, 295

Niii-yu£ (Na3n-Tkt)p 17a
Nopolrni'i Elfyptiin «xprtiiiiiaiip 44^
Napolccn [ir+ ^6ip 563, 565, $^Z
Nftnii, King of Sianip^ 136, 301-14, 341,
581,726

NiTomcjldili, I 37 p 3 ^ 9-30

Nanpnthi, 138-9

Nanpatig) I, 337^

Ntrapaii«ifctau, 107^ 149^31
Narcsuciip King, 118-43, ^97^ 37^i- 6i8
NatSonaluni in S.-IL Bimnn, 617,

626, 706; Indn^Chinap 617» 644-^g
indotiea^ 617, 633-41; ^laJa^^, 616
Not wnrJlupj, 145^

NaungiLawgyip King, 216, 351,3®9
N«kp Jacob van* 247, 231-1
Ncdcrbujgh» S. 481 1 4&S

Ncdjcrliindacihc Handclmutschapplj, 465,

471

N«gapatam, 5s, S$t ^8*

Nograia, 216, 310, 3^4, 34S^S&. 433-3
Ncgricr, GenetaJ dOp 57+‘"3
Negri Scmbilan, 195^ 473, 489
NetberlaniLi Steam Ndvigaiioci Cchp 403
CaiLTEc ', Dutch, 616, 624, 633-41
New Guinn, 459, 279, 638, 667, 689,

6gi[p 6941 6y6

N<ry ^iu Coimxiuaion, 543^ 601
Ngaaaunggyan, 132* iflb
Nghc-«n, 163, 17+

Ngd Qiiyen, 171

Nguyrn of liue, 168, 355, 36*“7Si

387* 556, 571

Nguy«n-Ai-Qync, 647- 1 . Srt flina ilo Chi

Mitdi

Nguyen Anh (Nguyoi Phne-Anh),
Emperor G»-Long, 363-75
Nguyen Hoang, 175
Nguyen Van-Hud of Tay-ano, 370
Nguyen Van Xuan, 717
Nha-tning, 159-60
Nknbar Ulan^, 189, 429
Ntddtsa^ 14, 13, 48
Ningyan, 533
Ninh Binhp 569

NokedP Koumane^ 217-18, 242, 376
Narndmii (aec, 1860}, 561-4^ S 7 S* 39*
Noro 4 oFn (Ang Vntcy}, 401
North-Ewt Co«it Province (Javo), 274-6,
406, 40S

NripatindiaiFarmBnp 90-1
Nu, U, 7iOp 713
Ntuintt^rra^ 7 *“ 3 f 76 - 7 r 27S
Nutmeg, 64, 193. 198, 237, 260, 27S,
436, 49*

Nyaung-iip 130_

Nyaimgym PHner, the, 547, 556

Oc Eo in Funan, 14. ^3, 49, 90
Odoric of PordeDonep 179* 187-9
Ong-Boun* 380-1
Ong-Long^ 3 j 9 ^

Opium, 474. 4 ^f + 9^. 576, 580, 583
Ord, Sir Ufirryp 473-5, 583
Dfttcnd Company, 326^

Oudongp 562-3, 566

Oun 594-511 59 ?“^

PAcinc OtsAS, 683-5, 691, 693-5
Fwbing, 500

Padri wftra, 493, 499

Fagan (Burma)* 4, lu 107* i^i*^35* 146»
t86* 113, 3Mp 116, 329,-6x8
Min, si5"9

Pahang, 70, 156, 179, 1S1-3, 283* $36-8,
+43. 45*-*. 4Si^i 485
PainafL ConiraCt* 2S9
Puknam, 4OE, 606-9, 685
Pakuhnwono I (Pangdian Pugef)^ 269
PakubutlOftD II, Susohunan, $73-5
Fokuhuwoao 111^ 275-^

Pakuhuarcino Vll, 467
PaJembang, ly, 3^-84* 179^ 18261,
4*®* 413- 416, 465, 494 t 662.

o/jro Sfiy^iya

FaUava, 20, 43, 49, 35. *^6

Fallu^ Blahop of HeUapDlij* 303, 357
Falmertton, l^ard, 4S^'9
fWialayu, 66-72, 79
Faficapanu dI Panangkalan, 4^-3. 47
Panduranga (FhMl-rung), lOE, 159.
Fangdran Guiti^ 276-7
PaTL^ran Pugw (PakuhuwonD t)* $69
Pkftginr Engagement, 476-7

mDE^

So3

P^jftinu Potenip

Punjatup 64

P'aii-p'aji ^pcra 3 n>p 34; (ttAte). 56

FAimmcsnn, fmmder of Mnlio^ 1 7^^ i ,
aka ^t«p^I tlkafldar Bhkh
Far^^arafan, 64-6* 73-4
Paii^, iSo^

PdstiniJLn, 367

Pfltoi, 156, 15S, I79t 2*S. =3J. ^J5. iJ9p
545-&P =55. =86, :i07 "3oi. 55^. 4=1*
^ 445f 5&4
Pacapnn, 47
Pttlcii6trc, M., 575
PaEcudn^ ^l4

PaviCp Aui^uato, s^i* 56^-9. 6pj-io
Foyao, T4+, 153
P^oyo Soi Tiakap'aE,

P'nya Sijie T‘»i {Oun Huoun),

207-$

PcKU. =0. 1^2, t3S* 137, 141-3, 145, I9t,
203, 2i*-i3, 239i 315-19. 3=4-7i 3=9.
343'50t 399. 5=8-31, 534, 536, 53$^

544. 63Q, 649, 597

Pci nver, 557

Pc|dn$r. 3»4. 5<^p 571* 573-5. 60j
_ Ptfllewv Sir Edward, l.ord Exmootli,
406

Pombcrtan, Lieutenant R. H., 33$

Penanp, 33, 326^ iSa, 39^-9. 411,

4=9-31P 434-9 p 444^5&. 454» 4&6r +73.
489. S04, 663, 703
People'1 Forty (^iiniui)^ 617
Pepper, 103, ==7> =40p =4^t =^^1 =84,1S9,
436*469, 491, 500

Pertk. 383-8, 291, 193, 44S-’S'^. 473-80,
483, 489

Pmpiui af thi^ Kryihrati 15-1 ft* 10
Pcrlic^ 57
Peri^A, ^8-9, 613

Pemol, Calonal, 59S

Per^eribitnii Kommuniat IndiE (P.K.l.J,

^37:8

Pnzcrikflton ^^at[onal Indoncftta iP.N.l.S
63S

PcseedorcA, 574-5

Peotpoli, 333

Petroltum, 501, 653, 661-3, 668
PKan Thatih^iiin, 360, 565
Phaulkon, Coiutant, 156, 3^-14, 726
Phayn:, Sir AftS^ur Piirvea, 318-38^ 541*
565, 630

PhilflStTe, M., 5^^i
Philip tt of Spoun, 303, 215^ laS* 337
Phil]ppin«, 3DI* 105, ii6* 234, 430-
455p SS9. 671, 685-6, 696
PtimearLaka*, TOO

Fllniom Kiden, g*

Phtiom Penh,lift, isi, j6a, J74. ,1^,
' 397 . +™. 5 ^^, iSfi
Fhunttphon Adiindet, 725
Htu-ycrtn 31, 57*

P^ibian SonR'j^nmn* 679-80, 681, 6S4“Si
*90. 7=4^

Fikntan, 47

Findalc, Kin^, 310-20

Pinto, pemio MendcaL, 306, log^-i ]

Finya. 134-S

PinQV 278-9, 33», 4+4, 451-60, 471,
„470i 495, 499

Pjm, Tom^^ 283

Pith^ani^trOpui erecifui, 5
P’i^urok, 154, 157,11s, 35KP. joa
PEaine dca Jo^, 565
PooDck, AdiriLml Sir Geonze, 421
Poivre, Pierre^ 364

Polo, Tilarco, 57^ 166, 176, t70i 186-^5
Pofldkhciry, it, ao, 311-12, 345-8, 364,
368-9,350
FeriigrfmitrdtM, 153
F'ong Tuk* t4, zip 35
Pontianok (Romeo), 431, 474
P<^*p Mount, 116
Porak^d, 16

Porte d'Aimjuii, 17, 171
Pony;g:ije^^ Pnrtii^l* 183, Ig4-=96,124-
54 p =35 p = 44 . = 49 * =5=2 =58, 261, 270,
17=. =83-6, 302, 315-16,319* 326^ 330-

5. 355-8. 398^453. 381, 615

P 9t uarak, 208-7

Pntad^ (l^nfcrenre, 697, 713, 718
* Pr2balinjz3^ paptr^, 40^

Fn&ban^ ifnag^k 'Iinienild Bu1ldhl^ 380
Prajadhipok, 673^*0

P'mjjii^ Ki«^, aetj
Pnmhinan, 45* 58

Pm Nflitrr (Kin^ Narsuen)^ 218^3
Prapann;^, 65-81
P'ra Pathoin, 14,13, 35
Pm P'ctnijiip 3t2, 386
PrasatT*ong, KinR, 355^ 500-t
Preanger, 267, ^67, 417, 463-4, 637
PrenderKiat, General, 554
Priannun,

Prtdi Banomyong, 677-So, 724-6
PrinpT, Martin, 145
Pramc, 15, lao, no, 213^ 316^ 331^
_ 344 . S t 7 . 5=8, 686, 697
ProtO-iVljilay'is \ 7

l^oleinyj, Claud hia, 16, 13^ 120, i^>o,
32B

Public hcnltli meoAUr^, 623, 666, 676,

672, 700

Puket (Innk Ceylon), aSS^ in, 398
Pu Kombo^ 364

Pulo Cnndore^ 187, 364, 367, 415, 560,
646

Pulo Potijan^^ 363, 368
Pumtm, So
PurnavaRnAn, 30
Puahknmkiha, gi

Pmte, IhbC Franjen van dr* jlqi, jqj:

P'ya Batiol, 678 80 '

INDEX

803

FjTi Bodin, jBa-s, +00-1, soa
I^^ya jMfuiup&chain, Ii77

Pv-%nclii, 135-6

Burriauk, 5^7-S

PVi Txdcsin (Pay^ 'fiik), 3S-“4t 3^“7i
j7a-j, 360-1, 3S4, 38^?-^, 61a
Pyt, King. 30a, 3M

Py u people, liiii^age, 10-11, aa, 35^ t vy-
a, 119, 144

Qvai d'Ohsat, 573. 596, 393, fioi, 604-5

OuAri|f-bifih> zba^ 370

Quang-Tiam, 46, 3 ^ <^h 3 S 5 ^ 3*3

Qiung-lTi, 370

C^i-nhon, 370, 570

Quoc-ngyp 357p 645

Raht, Prince, 586
ftttilwiiys, Chiiui-Biimia, s+i-'li
MandaUy-roungoo. 55a; Htain,
Toiifi^cine-Yunnanfiip 6n; Htpiol-
KunmEiig, 683^ 7i4t Assamp 693 i
^ DirAtb railway ^ 6894. 698
FUlfBc?, Sir Thi^maa Swnford, 394, 496,

41 i-xop 43*-3t ^3Si 443> 45*4*1-3.
466, 468, 5a*, 5J4
Kaheng 34
Raja Hajr, 293-3

Raja Kaiim (MtidhafiiT Or MuxalTat Bhih
of ^taliac!ca)p 156^* iSt

Raja Kochilp 390-1

Hajaraja {CKola Idng), 53

Rt^jmvanldlianj. 84

Raja Singa of Co>‘]H>rip 260-1

Rajeodra {Chola kitlg)p 53

Rajcndnivarmaii (Lower ChmlaL 91 ■ 93

Rtueiidrai*3rman H. 99

RjJchjiing (^pyi). 328

Rama I (ChaLi), 370, 381.39^^

Rama lip 374^ 57^

R 4 ima 111. 399-4«a, 578> ^^4

l^nta IV Mongkiit

Pbum Vp 583, See idi^ CbuJalonRlccim

Rama KJiamhcng, 57^ ill. 115. 140.

R^ma 'Fibnadt U Rumadhipatip 116, 151-3

Rama Tibodt II, 158

Ramayartfif 14. sSp 89

Ramcauen, Kingp 152-3

Ramrea inland, 341

RAHTtlp 33 [

Rangga-Lowe. 73-4

Rantoon, 141, 34+. 347 . 349 t 354 s 4 i 9 .
590 . 511, 515-1*. 51*. 534 "Si S 34 'Si
53 ®. 541-2. 54 *. S 5 o> SS^p 55 St ^ 5*1
6Ei6p697. 7^1
Ratburip 390, 394
Ratu Fatima of BaltEnlfF, 376-7
Raymond, Cieori^, 226
HBaadarir, 136-^, 14^“^

Rraelp Lauren^p 343. 353

*Red Flags',. 57id* 573, 5^4
R«1 Ktver of Torigking (Siongkoi), 567*^®+
570-3, S9S ,

Regemry {distnct)p 463
Rfgentlgi^irg^ement of iSiSp 462-3
of 1854, 49Q
Ri^baiip 193, 394-j
RemHIh {ahifi* agrteOiClit), 723
Rcaident, British, in Biiima+ 313-6p 307,
S17, 519-14. 543. 547-9 _ , ^

RcaidenE, trench {lndi>-CmQa)p 570*

575^

Re$identp Residenq? (Jbsti)i 408* +16* 463.
469

Rcsidcnt-Cctheral (tVt3tay3>p 483^
Residential symtem in ^lalnyUp 456p 476-
So, 481-2

Reyntt, Cemrd, 241

RiaUp 289^^3, 4 i8-9p 431-3. 44L 441.
454x 496

Rice, 360, 409^ 4^6. +38t 47*^^487. 534.
539. S4*. 649-51. 654-6. 66^1^ 693, 699,
.712

Riehardaon, Dr, Daridp 537

Riebeek, Jan van, 260

Rivit»p Captain Henri, 573

Roberta, Sir Ftederkk (l^rd>, 623

Rolin^Jaequeoiina, M.p 582, 586

Roaebc^p Earl of, 603-8

Rosengijn, 343

RoUordam l-byd, 49J

Round Tabic Conference (Buiina)p 628

Rubber, 486-8,656-81660-2,669-70,701

RudrasHrmaii CChnmpa). 53

Rudravmmian {Fotian), 30-1, 86

Rudmvarmaii 111 (Champa), 162

Run, Pulo, 24^-5, ^48

Riusbip 496. 673, 683, 685, 697* 71 ^ 725

^Sadmko^ rDali), 77-8 ^

Ba|(tting. 134-6^ 344

Saigon, 36T, 363, 365"7&p s69^^. 5**+
S68. S79, S7b, 678, 713

Sailendm dynut>% 37-59p 54. 5®. 92. 179.
«95

SaUOng'Hy6. g^S-Sa
Sai Vjong's refomw, 360
Salcdi Na, 155
Sahdo^ 28S

Saliabury, I>ordp 543. S52f 601-3* 61®
Balwccn river, 22, iigi 143. t40p 144,
35t-^P 515. 536. 538. 69 Ip 686
SamaralungBf 47
Bamboa, 494

Bambhupura^Sambor, 9o,5p i, 1 o x 6 564

Sambhuyatinan (Champit),

Samudra* S7, 79, 1^4

Bamudragupta, ag
Samuel, ^'homaa* 239* 317* 538
Bandathudamma, 338^41
Bandoway^ 344

IxSDES

8d4

SpEKJwip bJAnd {Siiniliva>p

San^rafruip loi
S^jay^K + 7 . 5 l

Simakfitp bnKU 4 K«. UteraiUJ*^ inMidp-

tians. 13-15, 19, as, 44, SB, *9, 131
SantA H^rcmamodc\ 144-3,19a

$ 4 ir 4 W 4 k^ 4i:ix» 456-60, 495, ^6B
S«tkjit IsL™, 619, 636-I, 640^ 661
Sarrmut, Aibert, 642-6
Satt*4 of Camb^Up ai^p 111
Saw, Up 710

SawttnJduIokp 14^50. iJSr *57.

SchooibiiTKk, Sir RolMit, 451

Schoytcn, iooatp 300

Scon, Sir JimiraG-eor^p. 595, 6c^tp 609-10

SH-l>yal^p

Sccdiid Kinp; {Siiifii)p 15^

Security ComicU (U,N.>p 721^3
Sdgnelkyp 307

Mtfayu (Malay ArmalB), 156^
iSl, 19$

Selanf^rp ifljp 289. 291, 295, 42S, 44 S“ 7 i

449. 473^4. 4^0

Scmarang, 373, W^t 4« 4^1

Semtwi, 636-7

SouJintV 217

Setii Piamo], 724-S

Sdubos and Sckirran tribe« (Sn-Dyaks),

Sen at tral* 109 ^ 113-17
Shah Jahan, 33a, 335-8
Shakpun ialand. 513
Shah Shujap 338-40

Shan, 124, i 3 i” 4 ii * 5 ®x 315. 3*71

319. 343 - 35 ^. 535. 538 p 54 ^. SS^p 596.

601, 709

Shan^Brathersv, the Thfcep 133-4, *4^
Shayista KKanp 205^ 34a-1
Shin Amhan, 124^ i29>p 130
Sbinaawbtip Qiicctip 141
' Shoe OtJeatian^ 546^

ShoiVp Sn John, 59^, 507-8
ShwcbOp 1 ^ 0 , 12 J, 343-4. 347. 35*1
Shwe Ofij^on Pagoda, 119^ 141-I5 22
344^ 543
Shwemyo, 537

Sak, afii, 189-95? 43^

Siam, Siamesep 6, 8op uip 114, 150-
8, 179, 181-3, *^S. i7i> =07-13.
239* 154-6, i88p 295, 197-3 * 4 . 3i7-i»*
3i7r 350, 354* 38t-3i 3^. 37&*

371“4 i 371t^5. 4^9* 434t

444-52. 48ip 503-4. 511. 546, 561-4,

57B-6ia, 6rs-i6, b6i, 668, 670, 673-

83,684.697,754^5

Siamese Dnbasaica Id Vcrsalllcap 306-7

Sidntanp 294

Siemrup. 9J, 97. 375* 397, s* 4 , 59 !,
608-12, 684

Simon Commiuion, 628

SlnJcsk^ 59f 60

SinuapofTp 3 q6p 399, 401 p 413, 417,
431-Jh 438-™, 474, 481-2, ^7-9,
496. soo SiOp 5 S 7 r sSit 662-5.
„.™^“7J« 6®3? 609, 691-2, 700^ 703-4
SmEhep Cdoipany (tinj, 501
SinSfota. 22, 30ip 307

hme&iaxi, 43. 56. 58. *5-71. 7** 1S7
bingu, 394

Sinhalese Buddhism, ii4p i 25pi 130^ t47p
150. 3S8

bjp^offis Oiu-Thai. 594-5. 598

ftip-SofLg-PnnjH, 379
SiBOThon, 397
Si 1 «Pr 35

Siitujjj nvrr, 135, 6S6,

Siva, bsivite, Saiviioi,. 9. 19^ 31-=, -fo.
4^. 44, SS, lio, 63,6;, 79,85,88, <>31 ^17.

'M. *31, isy

an'^-Buddha, cult of, 12^ 65. 71
Si Vaithflp 576
Si Vodia, 561

Sladefip Sir Ed^andl, 541-a, 63! j
SlaviHp slave-trade,, ahlvcryj 352-40, 408p

SmarmLikamit 64

Smim Htnwp ail

Smim Htuw Biiddhakrtip 325-7P jSB
Smim Sawhrut, 312
Smith. Sir Cedt Uicmcnti,

Snc^4iet, Hendrik„ 6j6

Soci6t< dta Missions EtranRfcrea. 506.

^ 357-9 p 365

Sfiaatiin Marabah 111. i65* 17a, 187
Sniok,, 294

^ma, Nagi princessp 24, S6, S7+ 90
hofia, 15, tt9

Songt^im (Int^araja). 197-500
San-tay, 573-4

^rap74

Sodka-Koumane, 5E4
^laka-Scinn^ 5^5^ 592
SchiliEini-VaniKiap 37^8
Spain, Spamahp aoj, ao6, 325, 234-^8,
i4ap 244. 247-g, 252, 25S-9, 261. 302,
+3*? 455

spaniah Armada 1588^ 116
spcaim, Thomaip 55fiMt, 557. 539
gpecr, Jacquesp 354
SpMctyp Captain T. C. S., 480
Spc^tiutrLp CnnicEia Jansiiion, 262-7,
189-^, 341

Speiilt, Herman van^ 249
Spr^. Cdpiain, 537-S, 542
an LhulainBiiivamuidevii Vih«ra,^ 52
Sri Deva (SaJIcndr* kitli^h 54
^rlkiheltm (Hmawaa), 35^ 120-r
Sri Mara, 25

gn%i>ayM, la* 37-57i4 67, 68^ 79,

171? 18*. 151.=95

Imitate 4^9^ 4S4-6

John, 317-lS

Stilwefl^ GeneinI Jofteph, 6S6, 641-5
Striia SritEtaiiJsiiti, 435-6$^ 473, 473
Stjraiigh> WilliM, 305
^trOVEr, Caplabip 542 4

Smng Ttolr, ij, 83-7, 394^ 603, 643

Suc^dana (Borneo), 240
Indira UiHuhi, 636
SuEi Caiuil^ 474 P 4^3 p 54^

Suffrtn, ihE BaiLU dc, aSo, 41^, 505
Sugar production, tridr, 372, 464^ 469-
70p 49 J-i»

8ujra.r L-arW (iB7U)p De Waal'a, 44 [-H
Suhita, S4

Sukarno, Pre^identr 638-9^ 690-1, 71H-23
SuIdKii'alp 56. Ei3^ 113; E3Xp 14D, [46-38^
167^314^394

Suitan Sopnh (jQgJttkflrta)* 415

Sulu Af^ipc-lago, S03, 377p 4^S~7 p

Simutni^ iSp 16^ Mp 37^84^ i^Op 177, 184,
187-91. i 99 p 233, i 39 p 34+. asOp
277, 279-81. 283-96, 44^i* 465. 47 Sp
494^S»499-S*t. 638, 66o-i, 693. 721^2.

Simv) of Klauram (Susuhuiilin)^

245r ^53-5i 257-S, 26* 263
Sundft (kingdom), 69, 77^

SLinda (ACraitk), 55. 57. 246. *5*p 2 S 9 p

279 k 364 p 4 ^ 7 , 424 p 42 ^

.Sung dynuty, 29, 39* Si p t6ip 163
Hiingci Jugrup 283
Sungd Ujongt 29Sp 4S2> 473 p 477
Stipayab^ 548

Sunil^ya, 37p 62,66,201,204,253, 406-8,
4 i 7 t 463. Sewp 637, 720
Siimk&rta, 275,279-80,406,4 iq, 4iS'i6p

SumpAiip 207-9, 272
Sutit, 234,1J9, 2444 246^ 305
Suryavatltlajl [, 100-1, I47i 162
SiLryaAiiiitiaii Up 103-5, 163-41 i 74
Sutan Sjahrirp 690^ 719-21
Sutomo, 639

Suvamabhumi, I5i aO^ 25^ 119
Swettenham, Sir Frank, 477, 4B3-5. 7^3
SymEs, ^licliBclp 50J, 507-®. 51®-1 r p S2 *p
. 5?7

byruun, 14a, nMf 3 »S- 47 i 333 i 345 “*.
423. 5 » 6 . *53

b«cch«‘M, 41 , [I 9
SruiiuGp 538

TAJUNSHTa-tim, i4Qt 143 p 158 , aos, aio-
12, 318, 330

Tichard, Pftrc* 306" 14 .

Tack* Miyorp 267
Tagaung, 1J3, 135, iJOp <86
T^JUp Thai* it* 5*. 9*p lOj* t 1 1, 11 Zp I t4p
u6- tS, J30, l44“5Bp i6Sp 167, i69p
207-23p 6iS, 726

T*^iii adminiitratiort, 134-3
Tftikthugyi, 621-2
Tujigda Ming3~ip, 548
T*id Sm^ 387
Ta Kco, iflo

Takola (? T'iu-ku-li)* 25* 28
Taku forti, 337
Taiaingp 20, 122
Talifup

Tambnlintra^ 28, 33^ 36, 100, m, 149
Sft aho LigDr
Tamilp tSi-2
TamSuk (TaEiiralipti), M
T'aminaniji of Ayufiop 213-21

dyiiMtyv 33 p 97, 161, 171

i an Alalaka, 6371 7iP
Taoum^ 1G5

T^ao Sri Suda Chan^ ao^r-io
Tara, 41

Tarok Kan ^[lUgyi^ 134
TarokpycEnin (Narathihfloatah rJ0^2
Tanima, 29, 39

TiiUTtan, Abd Janaaodo^ 238-9
Tautigup faiis, 696

Tamy* 131^ 219^ asZp 299, 3SOp 390, 396^
504. 516

Taylor, Thoniia, 343-6

Ttyyon brd[bEt«p 363 p 363-^1, 397

TrlingaiiB, 20, 124

TrausBcrifD^ i\j, 151, 158, 191-3+ ioSp
222p 254p 299. 317 i JSffp 3 ^. 39 ®. JW.
44f P I&44 ^174 535. SiSp 533-4,

335-8, 6zo, 634, 6S6, 709
T*6nc Kham, 208
Tofigku HEusadn^ 394-^

"Pcngyiieh (Maitkcin). 342
TcrrLalE^64p 198-203, 225. 134 p ^37, 456+
260-2, 278, zSi, 410 .

H^okin Party, 68S-9, 706
THalun, King, 318-19

11 i 4 itndda^ Ian king of AraKan^ 342p 303
^I'hanh-hcHp 146^ 163, 169, 173, 874, 353
Thiin Tun, 706

Thnrrawaddy Min, 523-Sp 5^9. 536, 538
THatlusmbiingp 623

'I'haton (Sudliiimiiiai'uu). 15^ 35, 96, 10 (,
t24p [26p 140

Thatpinnyu temple^ 129
Thayctn’iyo, 549
Thibaw, King, 547“S®i SS^S
Thim-Tfi* SS7~S

Thiiialhup Hdnbyuahin^ 138
Thihathura^ 1J9
Tbinhkaba* 135
Thirithudainma^ 334-7
Thongaobivip 138-9
ThorTtUt Captain ManiJtcr 605
Thm Pagndas Pasg, 219^ jogp 320, 3^*4.
iR^P 504

Tiantha Koomano, 366, 392-4
Tihio S^haitiim OirtiziJEaj. zoSp 33 (-2

806

INDEJC

Tibet, ii. 53, (A, iij, 565

Tulcin:, J9*-ie»3, 237, £41, 347,

£78

Tiku, 2 .U

Timor, 413 ■

Timur * 15

Tiu. ZJO, z^, zlis, 287-^, ayz, 4tO,

1 Ul 1 UE. 711

Tipu SidCflu,^ 5C}9
Tjfltei Aminuto* ^3(1-7
Tobdcco, 44^5. 500, 658^ Me
Tongkmg, 4, 0* 7* a6, 3a, 41 . VI, lofp
iiy, 1461 iM^ 253 k J5S-73h

550. 5M* 55^77r 5 SH-Sp ‘S,

654^ 713-10
'rofik Sbii* as, K7

'foungicKip I35p i4o-ip 143, jojp Z12-3.
3 JS"e 6 p 34ip 3SI

Tmimue. 173, 3^Jp S^Sp 55?-^?.

57®

Towimon* Gabtidp 250

Trmfihiim P'a 130

TniJJuk IBoromo TmlvkiUllitJp i54'-7

Tni-kifiu, 37, 159

Tpan Anh-ton, 173

Tnm i6Sp 174-3

Ttanif, 446

Tmn Kuibp 376, 378,38^,383,

Treaties, ttcw* AmicflBp* 406 ^ AnRla^
Burriie$e lx862)^ 53^+ S+i* AnRlfi-
Burmese (1^67), 1541, 546; Angio^
Dut{:h (1619), 247-50^ 31S- hA/irIq-
441'-3 k 4S3 i 455. 495:
An^tv-l^rerKh (189^}. 61a: Anglo*
.Siamese (i85j>^ 370-^ i; Aftglo-Suin*
«K C]9<39)* 48^8: Anglu-^jtaiiiesc (1946^,
7? Si Anti^'orniiitem Puctp 683* Bon-
Ifiya, afii, 291; Breda, 250^ Boniia-
ilaly, 544; Krmneo-Siamese (l®93).
M9' fH.liCo*SiaincH (1946), 725;

Kanruitid. 575; LmsKidjHti, 721-3;
l/ondon Convendau (l8[4)i 419. 441.
4^11 Low's Pervk Twty (i^abjp 449-
50: Nu^AnJec (1 947 )p 710; Parii (1763)1
426; Sink f 495^ Sumatra CiS7i>k
474-5; Thai-JupKiM* (i 94 ®)p ^ 4 i
Ticnt*mp 5^P S7L S75; VerafliUw
^17^3). 529^ ^*7; Vichy-Tokyo, 684;
Wnngltsii Ci844>p 55 ?

IrtnegDfiUp ts^, 177* 1H2,194, 428. 44S-
Sa, 484, 488-9^ 61a, ^70
Tribbuvttimp 76
Tfincofiutlee (CeylonJ, 429
Trinb Can, 355-6
Trlnh Cuongp reromu of, 359
' Tnnh familyk a^Sp 335

Trinh Giiing, reform* of, 359 60
Tryjiojoyo (TnjnBjdja7ai)p 163-4, 267
^rnpitnksi. Fail cajiDiip 144, 536
TuW, 61, Mp 7ip iD4^ a53

558-61, 57 ®'^i 575 k 593

1 uku L nu, 497-4t
Tulodang, 59

Tum»ik {SitigBporcL 54 * 77 . *79

Tyii-hiUiip zy
Tun Pemk, 181-2
Tuiievp Turka, 271, 496
Tw wi^ varip 493

1 +

UboKp 38 E-3

Udayadityaviiirmark 11, 101
Liefongp 387. 397, 400
U->lN.a.p7o3-+
ll-^niort of Buim*, 710
k?nion IndnchjkLOisep 576
Union of MriJuya, 703
United Netherlands, 461
United States of Indonesia, 731. 733
U.p 710-Tp 714-5
U T'ani:, 151
UiLom, I5 p tt9

Vach^, Fine, 303-6
Vdbalip 319
Volkenicrp 273-+

Varthem*^ Ludo^O di, 143* 191-4
Vedd«9, 6

Verecnigdo Ooatiivdifrdie Compioniie
(V .0,C.),a3 3-3 p =33 ^ fia. 187 -8,403 - io»

VerEennes, Chides Grdvjcr, 365
V'erhOefFp Pljeltf M'lJlemaa. 237-8
VeiMiil™, 303, 30 Sp 311,369
Vmpastonp iS

Viftorid, Queen, 403, 544, 580
Viwi Chung (Vimiiuiie), io7p 149, aerfi,
217-J8, 155, I5J, 376-85. 3S7, 39ip
, 394 . 597 . 4 ». 5 ^p 592 p S94. 59ft
\ icnnap Congre*ji of, I'reaty ofp 419, 461
Vietminh, 648, 689^ 713^

Vietnoin^ Vietnamese, 1^75,

pi. 397. 4»-C 55^-77. S®®t59l-6ta*

ir ' 3- * 7^6

Vijiyz ^Binh Dinh), t6E-8^ 17a, 174
Vilfremii dynasty, 120
ViJkjrznuivii^ilhani,^ 82-3
VilUige Art, Biimul, 6zz

Village Relation Upper BurmAp622 634

V^aya, 536
Vinhdongp 400, 565
Vimbimi!, Sa-3

Vuhnu, VaiJtlirvjle, 30-1, 63, 88. 97, On.

155.(37,1*1.131,159
Vidatiii(Saitondri king), 46-50
Vi^m-ardlpjUp 63^6, 67 .

Vlict, Jrtemiaa \m, 5flO-i

VXKC.p 233-3, *5*-^*. 387 3,405-40,453

VolkafiLad, 639^40

VE?Orbur«^ Otiril Vk\, 339

Vrtis, Maarten Gerritu dcp ssfl

%^yadhaputa.p 13, Mp 90

WAiiDiNcJirtizVp M., 601-3
Dkttmmathnif 141
Wsi, Pulo, 33 f, *4*-^. *47
ftfiifiOB Awimy, 557, 647
Wbjik Chi, I38-^J
Winjf Mttngp Emperor, 13
W«¥m, Moj^vdtip 131, 140-1* 143* j4f>
Wsirwijiic, WybFand x-Bii, 334
Wd«hiiigton 6^4, 6^, 718, 725

Wat Vtfiounp aoS ■

IhVawi, 59

(shadow iLntmaK 8, 64
Wcidp Sir Frvd«rickp 481-4, 701

M. 39S. 437 , 445 .

WelJcaliJi’j Aithuj'^ Duk« Wcllinj£tai»,
4J7

\Srllulcy* Rkhardp Lonl Momiiigiuii,
Mirquia, 431^ 5o8->ia
Writdcn, Ariihon^'* 310-11
WrItcvTcdto, 407
Wen (Chinese cnfiptirorV* io
^Ven (Lm^yi), z 7 - 3 »

Wettcrw^oll:, Adnlti, e

Wetwin, 137

Whjte» Sir Fi^ciick, 616
WTuie, Gcoriio, 304, 310
Whiiep Samuelp 305^ 309 «

^Vhite cicphaiit 93, 191
JfWe marl, thtp ^34-3
WnJunu V of OraiiMO,

WllJlBin VI qf Orange (Kiiiji William l)p
461, 465, 468

Willianu, Dr. CJement, 53S-9
^VllAon, CmimodQre, 425
NVingatCp Ord, 693-5

iNDliX 807

Wiscp Uciir>', 459-60 *

Wonoprlp 6a

WVrawoiiff* P*ya Sri <?rauc T'ona)^ joo
WUp Empernr, 15
Wimgyia, 544, 547
Wn-ti, Empemrp rTti

WiiyifhofFp vnDp 355 , 377 , S65
Xavleo,. St, Francis^ 302

Yaui, ELihu* 309, 311

Yannida* 397-300

Yandahop Treaty of* 517* 519-10, siip 554
Ya^ Mu

Ya^hampun (AriRVor), 96^ 99^ 106
Va^-artnan I, 96-7, 160
VaAovariTUR Jt, 1015-^

Ve« 3 i 7 » 5 i 6

• YeUow flaga'* 570* 594-5
Yenaiip 694
Yertbay Mutiny, 647

Yc-jj'o-r'i, 34, JJ

Ye-tEBO, 15
Yi-kVmu-aiii* 71
Vulc* Sir Hcnry^ 510, 538
Yuiig-ch'anjt, 31, 119-10^ ig6
Yung U (Minir>» 30a, 319-20. 353
Yung-Jo, 83 p 173

Yimnan, 131, 134, 143^ ^*5^

a 13.347*351-3. S36-S> 5+J-
570 -t. 57 +, 595 f 611
\ unnaaTup 537* 568

*Kabag‘ 4ii^K544 S$y 9 ^

.y<r alfo Snv't^ya
ZwaardekrocKn* HcnrkiUp 270-1

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CENTJS-\L ARCH^OLOGtCU LIBRARY,
^ NW DELHI -

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Catalogue Not 5D/Hal-35 S9

Author— Hull, J. G. Ji ♦

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^ Titl e h istory of Jcuth—SuEt -lsi»

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Borrowci No*

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